chapter five: recommendations to advance the struggle
TRANSCRIPT
Until the lions have their own historians, the stories of hunting will always glorify the hunters (NewAfrica, December, 2004).
i
Table of contents
Table of contents................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. v
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. vii
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................... ix
Chapter One: The Background ........................................................................................... 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .......................................................................................................... 1
1.2. Introduction to Tanzania ......................................................................................... 3
1.2.1. The Economy .......................................................................................................................... 3 1.2.2 Social ...................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2.3 Land and Land use ................................................................................................................. 5 1.2.4 The Wildlife Sector ................................................................................................................. 7
1.3. THE TANZANIA’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE............................................................................ 8 1.4 THE RESEARCH QUESTION ........................................................................................................... 9
1.4.1 Objectives of the Research.................................................................................................... 10 1.4.2 Relevance of the Study.......................................................................................................... 11
1.5 UTILITY...................................................................................................................................... 11 Chapter Two: Literature Review ...................................................................................... 12
2.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 12 2.1 WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: ORIGINS AND CONCEPTUAL GENESIS ............................................. 12 2.2 APPROACHES TO WILDLIFE CONSERVATION .............................................................................. 13
2.2.1 Fortress Conservation .......................................................................................................... 14 2.2.2 Community Based Conservation (CBC) ............................................................................... 14
2.3 CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................................... 17 2.4 KEY CONCEPTS AND DEVELOPMENT DEBATE............................................................................ 18
2.4.1 Development ......................................................................................................................... 19 2.4.2 Participation and Partnership.............................................................................................. 22 2.4.3 Development Populism ......................................................................................................... 27 2.4.4 Knowledge: Local, Western or Both?................................................................................... 29
2.5 INSTITUTIONS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE ................................................................................... 33 2.6 DEVELOPMENT ACTORS............................................................................................................. 35
2.6.1 Civil Society/NGOs/Voluntary Sector/Mass Movements ...................................................... 36 2.6.2 Business/Commercial sector................................................................................................. 36 2.6.3 The State ............................................................................................................................... 38
2.7 LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS...................................................................................... 40 2.8 LAND POLICY, DONORS’ PERSPECTIVES: THE CASE OF THE WORLD BANK ............................... 42 2.9 TANZANIA’S RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY ............................................................................. 44 2.10 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................... 46
Chapter Three: Research Methodology ............................................................................ 48
3.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 48 3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 48
ii
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLING ........................................................................................... 49 3.3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS..................................................................................................................... 54 3.4 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY .................................................................................................. 55
3.4.1 Documents ............................................................................................................................ 55 3.4.2 Interviews ............................................................................................................................. 56 3.4.3 Peer Debriefing Group......................................................................................................... 57
3.5 ANALYSIS AND TOOLS OF ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 57 3.6 CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES............................................................................................... 59
Chapter Four: Findings and Analysis ............................................................................... 61
4.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 61 4.1 BACKGROUND TO THE SELECTED NATIONAL PARKS .................................................................. 61
4.1.1 Udzungwa Mountains National Park (UMNP)..................................................................... 61 4.1.2 Tarangire National Park (TNP) ........................................................................................... 65 4.1.3 Lake Manyara National Park (LMNP)................................................................................. 66
4.2 SELECTED LOCAL NGOS ACTIVE IN WILDLIFE AND LAND MATTERS ........................................ 68 4.2.1 Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT)...................................................................... 68 4.2.2 Land Rights Research and Resource Institute (LRRRI)........................................................ 72
4.3 TANZANIA’S LAND POLICY PROCESS ......................................................................................... 74 4.4 HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICTS................................................................................................... 79
4.4.1 Communities Lost their Rights to Land ................................................................................ 79 4.4.2 Wildlife Induced Damage ..................................................................................................... 81 4.4.3 Illegal Use of Natural Resources.......................................................................................... 82
4.5 WHY HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICTS ......................................................................................... 83 4.6 HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICTS RESOLUTIONS MECHANISMS..................................................... 85
4.6.1 TANAPA’s Community Conservation Service (CCS) ........................................................... 86 4.6.2 Wildlife Management Areas ................................................................................................. 88
4.7 GOOD PRACTICES IN WILDLIFE: AN ASSESSMENT ..................................................................... 97 Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................ 103
5.0 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 103 5.1 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................... 105 5.2 POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD....................................................................................................... 109
Annex 1: A Map of Tanzania showing Protected Areas................................................. 130
Annex 2: A Letter from the Wildlife Division............................................................... 131
Annex 3: Procedures of setting-up a Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) .................. 132
Annex 4: A typical experience of setting-up a WMA .................................................... 133
Annex 5: A Contract of Mutual Agreement ................................................................... 135
Annex 6: Semi-structured Questions for TANAPA ....................................................... 142
Annex 7: Semi-structured questionnaires to elite ........................................................... 144
Annex 8: Semi-structured interviews with Employees of Tour Companies................... 146
Annex 9: Questions and areas covered with villagers .................................................... 147
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Annex 10: An introduction letter to various sources of information .............................. 148
iv
Acknowledgements
In the efforts to accomplish this work, I am indebted to a number of people and
organizations. First, I am highly indebted to my former employer the Swiss Development
Cooperation, Dar es Salaam Coordination Office, and specifically its Management team
from 2000-2004, who approved my scholarship, and offered a lot of logistical support to
facilitate my joining UCD. I am grateful to them all. While in UCD, September 2004-
November 2005, I met classmates, the members of Academic Staff and the supporting
staff of the Department of Agribusiness, Extension and Rural Development of the Faculty
of Agriculture, who all became pivotal in varied ways in my efforts to achieve my
objectives, I thank them all.
I am also indebted to my family, my wife Selina, my sons Sabaya and Kalihose, whom
sacrificed in so many ways, particularly emotionally during the entire period I was away
from them pursuing this course. I hope my efforts and achievements will meet their
expectations, especially the two young boys who represent the young generation of
Africa and developing countries who will judge our performance and intentions. There
are many others; relatives, friends, and colleagues who contributed in special ways to my
accomplishment of this work I humbly express my thanks to all of them.
While in Tanzania, end of May to the end July 2005 for data collection, I interacted with
a number of people and organizations who contributed in many useful and sometimes
challenging ways to the accomplishment of this work. I would wish to mention the Land
Rights Research and Resources Institute (LRRRI), not only for allowing me to access
their documents/archives, but also for accommodating me as well as allowing me to use
their office infrastructure to organize my work as well as having it as my base. Special
thanks go to friends and colleagues in LRRRI for logistical support and whom we shared
ideas about my research and many other related issues, such interactions shaped this work
in many ways.
v
Without the cooperation of the World Wide Fund for Nature Dar es Salaam Office
(WWF), the Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA), the African Wildlife Foundation
(AWF) Arusha Office, and the Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), this work
would have been difficult and possibly impossible. I am so much grateful to their
openness and welcoming spirit. The villagers of Minjingu whom I had a long chart
beyond matters of this research deserve my thanks for their time, information and above
all, their understanding that my mission had nothing of immediate and direct benefit to
them. I was pleased by that understanding. I met many other people who despite tight
schedules, they offered their time, ideas, and above all encouragement. Their
contributions have been of great value, but some also have inspired me beyond this work.
I take that inspiration as both a challenge and an energizer.
Finally I express my appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Jim Kinsella for his support and
guidance. At times I slipped into unprofessional subjectivity possibly due to personal
links to the subject under discussion, but still managed to detach and look at things not
objectively but rationally because of the his coaching skills. I express my sincere
gratitude to him.
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Abstract This study examines human-wildlife conflicts in Tanzania. It is motivated by the fact that
for many years, there have been misunderstandings, tensions, conflicts, and sometimes
confrontations between local communities living within and around wildlife protected
areas on the one hand and the wildlife authorities on the other. The wildlife authorities
comprise the state supported by donor agencies (international financial institutions,
bilateral, multilateral donors, international agencies and NGOs).
Traditional communities living in rural Tanzania depend on land and natural resources
for their livelihoods. Their use of land is governed by seasonal variations of climate and
the physical characteristics of land. Such land uses are closely similar to the way wildlife
use land. These similarities often bring wildlife needs into convergence with the needs of
local communities, which historically were compatible and sustainable.
The study found that there are power imbalances between local communities and wildlife
authorities because the state owns all land de facto and all wildlife de jure. Donors on the
other hand are custodians of financial capital invested in wildlife conservation as well as
architects of wildlife conservation approaches and methodologies as well as values
associated with wildlife conservation such as tourism and nature aesthetics. In this regard
local communities’ resource and economic base is alienated for wildlife and other
externally directed uses while local communities’ cultural values are altered and their
ways life are sometimes criminalized and outlawed.
Apart from the loss of land and natural resources, wildlife which move freely outside
protected areas cause damage to property, spread diseases as well as threaten peoples’ life
outside protected areas. They also cause many inconveniences to the normal life of local
communities. Such events cause conflicts between local communities and wildlife
authorities. After a protracted process, wildlife authorities supplemented fortress
conservation approaches with community-based-conservation approaches.
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The study examined community-based-conservation approaches in view of whether they
address both human-wildlife conflicts and bring about or support autonomous local
communities’ development. The findings show that community-based-conservation is not
different from fortress conservation as it is also ‘wildlife conservation’ biased. It
manipulates local communities to serve wildlife interests and transform them into
dependants of wildlife authorities. Furthermore, wildlife conservation seems to benefit
local political elites and both local and international big investors. The study therefore
concludes that wildlife conservation, as practised in Tanzania, impacts on local
communities negatively by impoverishing them, violating their rights, imposing western
values at the expense of own culture, and sustaining structures of inequalities and
poverty. However, wildlife authorities view the current development interventions as
desirable and an unavoidable undertaking to bring about development. Some activist
organisations see it as an instrument of control while local communities view it as an
instrument of oppression and impoverishment.
In view of the findings, the study recommends a break away from cultural domination
inherent in the post-World War II ‘development project’ where external interests (culture
and finance) determine and dictate the course of events among local communities. It
recommends that local people need space to decide on their own livelihood strategies,
trajectory and other aspects of their development. It further recommends unity in
diversity in terms of human culture, whereby different peoples’ culture and lifestyles
should be respected and upheld.
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List of Acronyms AWF African Wildlife Foundation
CBC Community Based Conservation
CBNRM Community Based Natural Resource Management
CCS Community Conservation Service
CMZ Community Management Zone
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CwD Conservation-with-Development
DFID Department for International Development
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FINNIDA Finish Development Agency
GAWPT George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITR Individualization, Titling and Registration
IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature (sometimes
referred to as World Conservation Union)
KATAA Kamati ya Taifa ya Ardhi
KFW
LEAT Lawyers Environment Action Team
LGRP Local Government Reform Programme
LMNP Lake Manyara National Park
LRRRI Land Rights Research and Resource Institute
MLHSD Ministry of Lands Human Settlement Development
MNRT Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NALAF National Land Forum
NCA Ngorongoro Conservation Area
NCAA Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
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NRMC Natural Resource Management Committee
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PA Protected Area
PORALG President’s Office Regional Administration and Local
Governments
PORI Partnership Options for Resource Use Innovations
PRA Participatory Rapid/Rural Appraisal
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RDP Rural Development Policy
RIDEP Regional Integrated Development Programmes
TANAPA Tanzania National Parks
TAWIRI Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute
TCBA TANAPA Community Benefits Account
TF/GAAWPT Tony Fitzjohn/George Adamson African Wildlife Preservation
Trust
TNP Tarangire National Park
TOR Terms of Reference
Tsh. Tanzanian Shillings (Tanzania currency).
UMNP Udzungwa Mountains National Park
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
URT United Republic of Tanzania
USAID United State Agency for International Development
VCCC Village Community Conservation Committee
WB World Bank
WD Wildlife Division
WMA Wildlife Management Area
WWF The World Wide Fund for Nature Conservation
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Chapter One: The Background
Preamble
A study of “rules” is a very limiting approach to understanding property. One can learn
more about property by following people to see what they are doing, and asking them
about it, than by asking them about rules. If we begin by understanding property as
everyday practices, then the idea of common property as clearly specified and bounded
set off from the state and from private property becomes limiting (Vandergeest 1997:6 in
Cousins 2000:166).
1.0 Introduction
This study is a modest attempt to assess some aspects of land use, land use conflicts, land
reforms and associated policy and legal responses designed to minimize, mitigate and
resolve land use conflicts. The study focuses on wildlife conservation in relation to other
uses such as small-scale traditional livestock keepers, peasants, and hunters-and-
gatherers. A right of access to land and natural resources is the underlying theme of the
study. Ownership, access and use of land and natural resources are broadly interpreted to
include material and non-material uses, whereas non-material uses encompass symbolic
and cultural specific uses such as spiritual, traditional ceremonies, and identities. Such
uses can best be realised when security of land tenure is guaranteed, which has an
implication on the type or quality of governance.
1.1. Structure of the Thesis
Overall, this is an evaluative study which examines public policies and laws vis-à-vis
land use practices and tries to explain the possible reasons for the emerging scenarios.
The study then tries to point to alternative perspectives of land and natural resource
tenure and management systems. The study also develops a case study where attempts are
1
continuously made to draw similarities and parallel with other cases within and outside
Tanzania.
This thesis is divided into five chapters; the first chapter gives a background to the
country i.e. Tanzania and a brief development history since independence. It further sets
the context for the following discussion that highlights the main issues that are covered in
the study.
Chapter Two is literature review, where an attempt is made to unearth the debate
surrounding development and its does and don’ts. At the end of this debate the
conceptual analysis informing this thesis is presented. Chapter Three presents the
methodology, which is purposely separated from Chapter One because it goes beyond a
simple description of the research procedure to an expanded justification of methods and
procedures adopted.
Chapter Four combines findings and analysis that gives it a close resemblance and strong
links with Chapter Two. Because the major source of data used here are secondary
(official documents) this chapter contains quotations and citations from such documents
and analysis based on studies that share the conceptual orientation with this one. Land
tenure in Tanzania is examined in this chapter because it has a bearing in wildlife
conservation, given the fact that wildlife conservation is a land-use type with unique
characteristics. Within the framework of land tenure regime the question of land
acquisition for exclusive use of wildlife is pertinent. Though this study is not a legal
analysis in any way, it was necessary to examine laws and legal instruments related to
both wildlife and land matters.
Chapter Five presents the conclusions and broad recommendations of the study. Attempts
are made to avoid giving any specific recommendations since this was not meant to be a
management evaluation or assessment of good practice in wildlife conservation in
Tanzania instead it is a bird-eye view of the policy and legal system. However, wherever
2
there was enough information to warrant making management related recommendations
they are made.
1.2. Introduction to Tanzania
Tanzania is a developing country and one of the poorest countries in the world (The
World Guide, 2003/4:533). It has an area of about 942, 600 sq. km. (MLHSD, 1997:3)
and a population of 34.6 million people as per 2002 Census with an annual population
average growth rate of 2.9 per cent (EIU, 2003:21). Both the highest and lowest points in
Africa are in Tanzania; Mt. Kilimanjaro 5,895m (19,335.6 ft) high and L. Tanganyika,
the second deepest lake in the world and Africa’s deepest lake with a depth of 1,471m.
1.2.1. The Economy
Agriculture accounts for 50 per cent of Tanzania’s GDP (EIU, 2003:32; Kweka et al,
2003:337) employing about 73 per cent of the population (EIU, 2003:21). The 1992
Ministry of Agriculture statistics show that 93 per cent of land under cultivation is
managed by small scale producers owning their lands under customary land rights
(MLHSD, 1997:4; EIU, 2003:33). The remaining 7 per cent of land under cultivation is
under large scale farming with granted rights of occupancy (MLHSD, 1997:4).
The 2000 National Livestock Census shows that the country has 15.6 million cattle, of
which 13 million are indigenous stock, 10.7 million goats, and 3.5 million sheep (EIU,
2003:35). The indigenous livestock keeping is under small scale traditional producers.
Although Tanzania is among the leading countries in Africa in the number of livestock,
there are no significant exports of livestock products because of low levels of government
investment in the sector (Tradepoint, undated: 1).
The economy of Tanzania is overwhelmingly agricultural; plantations grow cash crops,
including coffee, tea, pyrethrum, sisal, rice, peanuts, tobacco, sugarcane, cotton, copra,
cashews, and cloves. Most of the population, however, is engaged in subsistence farming,
growing corn, wheat, millet, sorghum, vegetables, bananas, and cassava. Timber is
important and includes mahogany, teak, ebony, camphor wood, and mangrove. The
3
following minerals are also mined: diamonds, tanzanite, gold, salt, gypsum, phosphates,
and kaolin. Artisan and large scale commercial fishing is done in rivers, lakes and the
Indian Ocean (ibid.).
Production by small scale producers is mainly for subsistence, with excess being
marketed to meet household financial needs. Cereals and livestock produced by families
(small scale producers) is divided between own consumption and sale to generate income
for other family uses like clothing, medication, education and the like (Mendola, 2005).
The Tanzanian economy suffered several shocks in 1970s and early 1980s that were
caused by external and internal factors (Baffes, 2005:21). With assistance of donors, the
government instituted economic reforms from mid 1980s nevertheless “large
macroeconomic imbalances and sectoral inefficiencies persisted until the mid-1990s”
(GoT, 2001 in Baffes, 2005:21). The 1986 Economic Recovery Plan under the World
Bank and IMF guidelines instituted austerity measures including cuts in social services
spending and liberalization of the economy (The World Guide, 2003/4:533). The
implementation of the plan followed agreement by bilateral donors that Tanzania should
undertake Structural Adjustment Programmes (WB, 2000:3). Since then the influence of
donors in the country development trajectory has continued to increase (Igoe, 2003:871).
In 2001, Tanzania’s debt burden was US$ 6.7 billion to multilateral lenders (EIU,
2003:44). Before the debt relief by Paris Club in 2000, the debt burden was US$ 8 billion
equivalent to 83 per cent of GNP and 556 per cent of exports (EIU, 2002:35). Tanzania
was admitted to HIPC1 in 2000 which gave the country a debt service relief which
resulted in an increased spending on education and health (EIU, 2003:44). It is a high
donor-dependent country, where in 1990-91 it was the second only to Mozambique in its
dependence on aid from OECD Development Assistance Committee countries (EIU,
2003:44). In 1999 development aid was US$ 30.1 per capita or 11.3 per cent of GNP
1 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative was designed to relieve the high external debt of some of the world’s poorest nations. The HIPC Debt Initiative addresses a key obstacle to economic growth and poverty reduction (WB, 2003:1)
4
(The World Guide, 2003/4:533). The National Development budget in 2003/4 was 41 per
cent donor dependent (Mkapa2, 2004; Mramba, 2004).
1.2.2 Social
The Tanzanian economy has lately enjoyed a healthy socio-economic development in
terms of macro indicators (NPA, undated: 1). However, micro level indicators at the
household level have been shown to remain stagnant or even to deteriorate (ibid.).
Poverty levels in Tanzania are high and thought to be increasing; in 2000 over 50 per cent
of the population was categorized as poor, and poverty was more pronounced in rural
areas, where about 57 per cent were poor (URT, 2000:6). The 1995 World Bank study
entitled ‘Voices of the Poor’ showed that security of land tenure was among the critical
priorities listed by poor people, while the environmentally sensitive exploitation of land
and natural resources was of less concern to poor people (URT, 2000:12-13). Small scale
producers use family labour and rudimentary technologies in production. Around 90 per
cent of energy needs are met by biomass, particularly wood-fuel; while electricity and
other modern energy sources constitute only 8 per cent (EIU, 2003:27).
Adult literacy level in Tanzania was about 75 per cent in 2000, (EIU, 2003:22; The
World Guide, 2003/4:533). Primary school enrolment rate as per 1997 figures was 48 per
cent but recently the negative trends in primary school enrolment are being reversed
partly as a result of debt relief fund (The World Bank in EIU, 2003:22). Tanzania is
among the 30 countries with the highest under-five mortality rate in the world (The
World Guide, 2005/6:537).
1.2.3 Land and Land use
Tanzania has an area of 942,600 sq. km. with about 75 per cent either uninhabitable or
difficult to manage because of difficult relief, tsetse flies, unreliable rainfall, or nature
2 Mkapa and Mramba are the President and Ministers for Finance of the United Republic of Tanzania respectively.
5
protected areas (MLHSD, 1997:3-4). Tanzania has a wide biological diversity comprising
of savannah and grassland tropical moist ecosystems (Mwamfupe, 1998:3). The coastal
belt is flat lowland while in the west and central part is a plateau and half of the country
is savannah and bush-land (The World Guide, 2005/6:538).
Tanzania is “one of the most important countries in the world for conservation. Its forests
are ‘of great biological importance’ its major parks have ‘outstanding universal value’
and its coral reefs are ‘among the richest in the world’” (WWF, 1990 in Neumann,
1992:2). At independence in 1961, Tanzania had three national parks, nine game
reserves, and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (URT, 1994a:263; MNRT, 1998:1).
Currently, it has 12 national parks, 31 game reserves and in total 28 per cent of the land is
devoted to protected areas 19 per cent of it is under protected categories that exclude
human settlement and cultivation (MNRT, 1998:3) (see Annex 1). Conservation of
forests on mountains started in 1891, by the German colonial powers when they declared
forest on mountain tops protected for environmental motives (URT, 1994a:262), wildlife
conservation followed in 1896 (Mwalyosi, 1992:24).
Wildlife conservation is the basis of the Tanzanian tourist industry (MNRT, 1998:4) and
since the 1990s tourism earns about 40 per cent of foreign income and is the second
largest foreign exchange earner after agriculture (Kweka et al, 2003:338) however it
employs only 30,000 people (MNRT, 1999:3). Tourism earnings as a share of GDP
increased significantly, from about 1% in the 1986-92 to over 6% in the 1993-98 periods
(Kweka et al, 2003:338).
Land is central and primary to the livelihood of a big majority of Tanzanians. Traditional
customary land rights guarantee every member of the community access to land for own
livelihood (Quan, 2000). Land can be loaned, rented or sold (Quan, 2000:32; Daley,
2005:543) for a number of reasons such as, at times of hardship or when one family
needs money beyond their normal savings (Daley, 2005:544-5). Loaning and renting is
mainly done during harsh climatic seasons by those having land in climatically fortunate
6
areas, thus in most cases loaning and renting is done on a seasonal basis rather than a
permanent specialized activity.
Traditionally, family land is inherited along clan lineages where most communities are
patrilineal thus heritage passes to male family members (Ishengoma, undated: 2).
Amongst few matrilineal societies the heritage of family resources, including land, passes
to the female members, but the overseer is the maternal uncle (ibid.). Land being a major
resource in Tanzania is also a site of the construction of culture, custom and conflicts
(Toulmin & Quan, 2000:2; Shivji, 2002:195). Even with few matrilineal communities, it
is still males who inherit land through mothers’ lineage i.e. brothers having access to land
of their sisters’ husband family.
Among many pastoralists, land is owned communally where there are common grazing
and watering grounds (Kideghesho, 2000:9). However, with the continuing shrinkage of
communal land, even pastoralists are gradually adopting individualized land ownership
where a kinship own land and accord usufruct rights to lineage members (Cousins,
2000:154). Some are adopting farming and small businesses (Hodgson, 2002). All these
systems are not homogeneous and unchanging, rather there are variations over space and
time and they are often problematic.
1.2.4 The Wildlife Sector The national wildlife sector in Tanzania is comprised of the Wildlife Division (WD),
Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA), and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
(NCAA). Legislation governing wildlife conservation in Tanzania includes; the Tanzania
National Parks Ordinance Cap 412 of 1959, Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
Ordinance Cap.413 of 1959 and Wildlife Conservation Act No.12 of 1974 and their
respective amendments. Tanzania’s Wildlife Policy (1998) provides for Wildlife
Management Area(s) (WMA) covering wildlife corridors, migratory routes, and buffer
zones. The WD is charged with wildlife outside national parks and Ngorongoro
Conservation Area, while TANAPA and NCAA are charged with wildlife in national
parks and Ngorongoro Conservation Area respectively (Wildlife Act, 1974; National
Parks Ordinance, 1959; Ngorongoro Conservation Ordinance, 1959).
7
In the forthcoming discussion, the term wildlife sector is used to imply all these agencies
and respective legislations as well as international NGOs working in the wildlife sector.
1.3. The Tanzania’s Development Experience
After independence in 1961, on the advice of the World Bank, Tanzania experimented
with two approaches to rural development3 namely the ‘improvement and transformation’
approaches (Mapolu, 1985:113). The improvement approach attempted to improve
production in existing villages, while the transformation approach involved grouping
identified ‘progressive’ farmers and supplied with modern farming implements and
inputs (ibid.). The two approaches failed and are criticized for being focused on intensive
imported technologies, export oriented production, and control-orient (Mapolu,
1985:113).
Post-independence development ideas were those of the World Bank as outlined in the
document titled, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Shivji, 1992:47). The main
thrust of the document was export promotion, industrialization through import
substitution and promotion of foreign direct investments (ibid.). OED4 rated
unsatisfactory the performance of the 1964-85 World Bank projects in Tanzania
attributing the reasons to the strategy lacking relevance and being unsustainable (WB,
2000:2). However, OED rated the Bank performance from 1986-95 as satisfactory, but
lagging in institutional development (WB, 2000:1-2).
Following the failure of improvement and transformation approaches, the country
adopted villagization effective from 1967, when it was voluntary and culminated in
forced re-settlement in 1972 (Mlimuka & Kabudi, 1985:69). The World Bank and
Scandinavian countries supported the socialism experiment in Tanzania (Shivji, 1998;
World Bank, 2000; EIU, 2003:19; Levine, 2002:1048). The villagization exercise was not
3 Rural development as encompassed by the two approaches was limited to farming systems and settlement patterns. 4 OED Operation Evaluation Department of the WB, which produces independent parallel evaluations
8
backed by law (URT, 1994a:43; Shivji, 1999b:4) and created conflicts that are persistent
to-date (Shivji, 1992:46), but the government clung to a colonial notion that “those
occupying land under communal (customary) tenure did so only by the permission of the
government and could be moved off their land with minimal notice at any time”
(McAuslan, 2000:81-2 see also Daley, 2005). Villagization disrupted the rural population
both economically and socially (Campbell, 1992:89; Daley, 2005:565).
After 1972 Tanzania experimented with Regional Integrated Development Programs
(RIDEPs), where each region of the country was assigned to a different donor to
implement development plans (Mlimuka & Kabudi, 1985:69). RIDEPs tied down
resources and made a mockery of the state’s planning process because of respective
donors’ autonomy (Campbell, 1992:89). Following a long spell up to 1980s, Tanzania
resumed liberal economic policies under the auspices of WB and IMF (Maliyamkono &
Bagachwa, 1990), which had not succeeded in altering the dirigisme built since
independence (Luoga, 2002:50). The World Bank argues that “because the reforms were
imposed, Tanzania failed to fulfil many of the conditions of the credit” (WB, 2000:2). In
view of this brief account, it may be argued that Tanzania’s development process since
independence has never been independent of donors’ interferences.
The World Bank seems to regret its support to Tanzania’s development initiatives during
the socialist experimentation, as it asserts “the bank along with other donors initially
supported this strategy socialism uncritically and enthusiastically” (WB, 2000:1). The
failure of these policies is attributed to being colonial whereby policies were introduced
and implemented within the framework of colonialism (Mapolu, 1985:111) and because
the overall Tanzania development effort under the World Bank was one of modernization
(URT, 1994a:42).
1.4 The Research Question
Local communities within and around wildlife conservation areas are in conflict with
wildlife authorities over the use of land and natural resources within and around wildlife
conservation areas (Songorwa, 1999; Goldman, 2003; Brockington, 2002). The former
9
kill wild animals for meat, for security and safety reasons, to control bovine diseases as
well as competing with wildlife for resources like pastures, farming land and water
(Shemweta & Kidegesho, 2000:1). These practices pose threats to wildlife: while wildlife
threatens peoples’ lives and means of livelihoods (TANAPA, 2002a&b; Goldman, 2003).
Human-Wildlife conflicts and confrontations have thus become a common phenomenon
in Tanzania.
To resolve such conflicts and confrontations, attempts have been made to complement
fortress conservation with different typologies of community participatory approaches
(Murphree, 1997). Approaches like WMA; and Good Neighbourhood Programmes
(CCS) have been tried. Not much has been achieved by these initiatives (Songorwa,
1999; Goldman, 2003). However, there are some recommendations in both academic and
policy oriented studies on ways forward in amicably resolving land use conflicts within
and around wildlife conservation areas.
Since such conflicts are persisting, this study intends to both assess the extent to which
wildlife authorities have taken on board various research findings as conflict resolution
mechanisms and as aspects of good practice in land use as well as community
participation in wildlife management.
1.4.1 Objectives of the Research
In view of general principles and good practices in land use, (discussed in Chapter Two)
this study attempts to analyze the extent to which wildlife authorities apply these
principles and practices with a view of abating land use conflicts and related
confrontations. Specific objectives of the study are:
i) Mapping out and analyzing the salient land use conflicts between wildlife and
local communities;
ii) Analyzing land use conflicts resolution initiatives taken and or facilitated by
wildlife authorities;
10
iii) Analyzing the conflict resolutions initiatives (policies, laws, regulations and
other government instruments) in terms of their relevance in enhancing
equitable development;
iv) Assess the potential of wildlife authorities to effectively achieve their
mandated objectives with regard to land and related conflicts resolution.
1.4.2 Relevance of the Study
Many reforms taking place in Tanzania are setting in property regimes that are contested
and debated (see Mbilinyi, 2002). The relevance of this study is situated within the
framework of the efforts by some activist organizations and mass movements to
challenge the corporate-led globalization process and to defend the rights and
entitlements of the local poor people (Mbilinyi, 2002:2).
1.5 Utility
The primary motive of this study is a requirement for partial fulfilment of the Masters
Degree in Rural Development, however it is hoped it will have use beyond this. It is
intended to add and possibly bring-in alternative perspectives on the debates on human-
wildlife conflicts and the overall unresolved land question in Tanzania. It is also expected
to be of use if it manages to provoke debate on development cooperation particularly
challenging and questioning:
• issues of participation between unequals such as donors-recipients, government
agents-local communities;
• the motives in development cooperation;
• that the worsening poverty levels in Tanzania, and in developing countries in
general, can be remedied and reversed through the current practices in
development cooperation.
11
Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.0 Introduction
In this chapter a conceptual framework of the study is developed based on various
theoretical orientations and debates on development. Literature consulted and reviewed
are those with a leaning towards exploring human interaction with the environment from
a cultural perspective, as Goodwin (1998:486). Such orientation concerns itself with
cultural issues of knowledge, values and beliefs and how they influence socio-political
processes (ibid.).
This chapter has seven sub-sections, each presenting an independent component but
integral part of the whole. Sections 2.1 to 2.2 cover wildlife conservation; origins and
conceptual genesis as well as different approaches. Section 2.3 dwells on the links
between conservation and development and sections 2.4 to 2.5 cover a number of
contentious key concepts in development literature, endeavouring to sketch-out a
conceptual framework of this thesis. Section 2.6 present categories of different actors in
development, while section 2.7 covers property rights, including land tenure systems.
Section 2.8 dwells on donors, perspectives of land policy using the World Bank as a case
and section 2.9 deals with the Government of Tanzania conception of rural development.
The conceptual framework this thesis is charted out in the last section i.e. section 2.10.
2.1 Wildlife Conservation: Origins and Conceptual Genesis
The first national park in the world is the Yellowstone in the USA which was established
in 1872 but the idea of preserving untouched nature with wilderness goes back to a
proposal of George Caltin, an American painter, in 1830s (Nash, 1970:726). From then,
the idea spread to Europe, Japan and elsewhere including Tanganyika, which was under
German rule. However, in the Far East, India, China, and Japan, nature was also
appreciated even before the idea of national parks emerged in the USA, but it was for
worship and nobility hunting, but never equalled in essence the American parks (Nash,
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1970:731). However, “the concept of a national park free of human interests began at the
London International Convention of 1933”, and ratified by Tanganyika in 1951(URT,
1994a:263). Overall, the idea of nature conservation was for glorifying God’s creation,
aesthetic and ethical reasons (Nash, 1970; Ghimire, 1994:198).
Four factors that made it possible for the USA to establish and maintain a national park
are: American experience with nature i.e. having emigrated from Europe where nature
and wilderness was raped and plundered; having a democratic ideology, existence of a
sizeable ‘undeveloped’ land, and affluence to afford to preserve nature for non-utilitarian
values (Nash, 1970:726).
The national park idea was first introduced in Tanganyika in 1896 by the German
colonialist, when they established Selous Game Reserve, currently the largest wildlife in
Africa (MNRT, 1999:1) that is 50,000 km square. Since then, more national parks and
nature reserves were established. Protected areas continued to be created even after
independence based on western philosophy i.e. “national parks as the last bastions of
wildlife, islands of untouched nature within a sea of landscape altered by man (Mwalyosi,
1992:26). The post-colonial state has gazetted more land into different forms of nature
reserves than the colonial state though some exist only in name because of weak law
enforcement (Brockington, 2002:10).
2.2 Approaches to Wildlife Conservation
There are two broad categories of approaches to modern wildlife conservation namely
fortress conservation or ‘fence-and-fine’ and community based conservation (CBC).
Traditionally, communities conserved or co-existed with wildlife and harvested them
sustainably not because of low human population but because of the then inefficient
hunting techniques (Parkipuny, 1975:10; Murphree, 2001:6) and in some places because
of traditional rules (Parkipuny, 1975:10). All this changed with the coming of steel wire,
muzzle loaders and modern firearms (Western 1989:163; Murphree, 2001:6) and trade in
wildlife products.
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2.2.1 Fortress Conservation
Fortress conservation is a conventional approach to wildlife conservation sometimes
referred to as ‘fence and fine’. It requires a protected area to be kept in its raw nature,
untouched and unsettled (Nash, 1970:730). This approach has not only been unsuccessful
in conserving wildlife but also is a cause of many human-wildlife conflicts within and
around national parks. Fortress conservation is well documented all over the developing
world for impoverishing local communities such as in Tanzania (see Neumann, 1992;
Songorwa, 1999; Brockington, 2002), Cameroon and Zambia (Adams & McShane,
1996), Madagascar and Thailand (Ghimire, 1994) Botswana (Twyman, 2000), South
Africa (Magome et al, 2000), Zimbabwe (Vivian, 1994) and India (Gadgil & Guha,
1994). The experiences documented in these studies are all similar it is only names of
places that differ.
2.2.2 Community Based Conservation (CBC)
CBC as a variant of Conservation with Development (CwD) introduced not to substitute
fortress conservation but to complement it (Murphree, 2001:6), it came as a
reconciliatory gesture. Many e.g. Ghimire (1994), Goodwin (1998), Brockington (2002)
and Goldman (2003) argue convincingly that CBC does not shift the focus of
conservation from nature, but relieve it of exclusive state management to include
communities. It draws communities into conservation with the underlying assumptions
that they are interested, willing and able to conserve wildlife if they get direct and
immediate benefit from it. However, conservation approaches are externally defined and
benefits are restricted and limited to a few material ones. Such assumptions have been
challenged both by practice and theory for its exclusive focus on few materialistic aspects
of conservation and nature ignoring cultural aspects (Stocking, 1992; Emerton, 1999;
Magome, et al 2000; Goldman, 2003). CBC further changes the cultural meanings of
conservation from local to western/‘universal’ values (Neumann, 2005). Despite various
‘participatory’ mechanisms attempted through CBC to entice communities to buy-in
wildlife conservation with a western/state perspective, less have been achieved, and there
is ample evidence suggesting that not all communities are interested and willing to
14
conserve wildlife within those parameters. Furthermore, the state control of communities’
use of hitherto their natural resources created resentment on the part of communities.
Murphree (2001:6) and Martino (2001:7) identify three different but not exhaustive
positions on community conservation; the first is an emotive polemic against sustainable
use reflecting cultural sensitivities in industrialized and urbanized societies which as
Neumann (1992:3) view it is criminalizing traditional/rural communities’ lifestyles and
ways of seeing. A second is conservation biologists position which consistently “reject
current trends toward a more systemic and contingent science of conservation…and
argues for a return to more directive state policies informed by a disciplinary and
reductionist science separated from people and politics” (Murphree, 2001:6).
A third position accepts systematic approaches to conservation and the linkage between
conservation and development, nevertheless considers conservation as flawed in concept
and implementation, (Murphree, 2001:6 see also Magome et al, 2000; Levine, 2002;
Goldman, 2003).
The broad picture of CBC in Africa remains one where successes stand as islands in a sea
of initiatives where performance rarely matches promises and is sometimes abysmal
(Murphree, 2001:6). Experiences from Northern Kenya (Haro, et al 2005) show limited
evidence of workable community participation in conservation except when properly
integrated through a bricolage5 process. Wunsch (2000:504), points out that unless
honest and effective use of traditionally existing structures is made, the concocted
transplants of community participation remain a dream. Overall, the current forms of
community participation in practice are managerial rather than democratic; they are
devised to co-opt communities rather than empowering them (Murphree, 1997:5;
Cleaver, 2002).
5 Many social groups adopt a particular style as a component of their culture which distinguishes them from other groups. The style may consist of a medley of items, a bricolage, taken from different sources and with different original meanings which when put together, do convey a unitary meaning (Abercrombie, et al, 1994:37).
15
Briefly CBC is criticized because it makes unwarranted assumptions about the existence
and profile of communities; encourages stratification and inequality within communities;
it is externally initiated and imposed; co-optive and re-establish control by state elites;
shows little evidence that they encourage sustainable land and natural resource use, or
are sustainable themselves, and lack the technical and financial capacities for natural
resource management (Murphree, 2001:6).
2.2.2.1 Community Wildlife Management Areas (WMA)
The concept and application of WMA emerged since 1930s in the USA, known by the as
buffer areas and later buffer zones (Martino, 2001). It became prominent in 1970s when
UNESCO introduced ‘Man and the Biosphere Programs’ (Ghimire, 1994:199; Martino,
2001:1). Biosphere Reserves are internationally designated sites managed for research,
education and training (Mwalyosi, 1992:24). The Man and the Biosphere Program of
UNESCO created buffer zones in areas where national parks already existed to form
concentric rings around the protected area solely for protection (Daniele et al, 1998 in
Martino, 2001).
According to Mwalyosi (1991:176 in Martino, 2001:4), to minimize conflicts across
boundaries between the Park and adjacent villages, buffer zones with partially restricted
land use are essential. These would give an added layer of protection to the National Park
and benefit villagers (MNRT, 1998:10). Wildlife Management Area(s) (WMAs) are
always made by encroaching on the communities’ land. The use of land and natural
resources within WMA revert to the control of the Director of Wildlife (Severe, 2000).
The Wildlife Policy (1998) succinctly points that, WMA is a strategy of protecting
wildlife, rather than facilitating communities to benefit from wildlife (MNRT, 1998:8).
Jambiya & Sosovela (2001) and Goldman (2003) elaborate a top-down centralised and
unfair process of setting-up WMAs and its obvious bias against communities in favour of
national parks (see Annexes 3&4).
16
WMA is the operationalisation of CBC in Tanzania, where CBC implies “what
communities do on their own land through the proposed WMA under the new Wildlife
Policy (MNRT, 1998:8&10) and Land Policy (1997), while to TANAPA, it means
“TANAPA’s park and people outreach approach” (Nshala, 1998:10).
Both the Land Policy (MLHSD, 1997:13&36) and Wildlife Policy (MNRT, 1998: 8&10)
provides for the establishment of WMA in critical habitats found adjacent to the village
settlements and protected areas (PA). Areas targeted for WMA include wildlife migration
corridors, buffer zones, and dispersal areas (Severe, 2000). These areas form part of
village common land as envisaged by the Land Policy (1997) (Nshala, 1998). Both the
Land Policy (1997) and the Wildlife Policy (1998) allow communities to make use of
resources within a WMA as follows: to collect firewood, honey, wild fruits, traditional
medicine, cut grass for their livestock, fetch water for domestic use or for their cattle and
other uses but all have to be defined in respective village by-laws (see Annex 3).
2.3 Conservation and Development
Stocking (1992:338) traces the official inception of Conservation with Development
(CwD) in Africa development planning to the 1969 Agreement between IUCN and 33
African Governments. The agreement acknowledged that “conservation must include
attention to the resources upon which local communities depend; that is conservation is
dependent on the development of rural communities” (ibid.). As an operational
conservation concept, CwD is a derivative of conservationism and environmentalism
thinking (ibid.) driven by notions of poor communities degrade the environment (Vivian,
1994; Brockington, 2002:3). CwD is therefore biased towards managerial issues rather
than effective community participation (Goodwin, 1998; Goldman, 2003).
Linking conservation and development is corrupting conservation and natural resource
management (Oates 2000 in Murphree, 2001:6). To Oates (2000) the role of
conservationists is to safeguard protected areas only (Murphree, 2001:6). Advocates of
decoupling conservation from development see human needs as ever expanding while
wildlife population is not, thus they suggest “development projects should decouple
17
human needs from the harvest of large mammals” (Barrett & Arcase, 1995 in Murphree,
2001:6).
Ecologists prefer to do community empowerment in conservation with caution, otherwise
communities may become really autonomous and may see more valuable alternatives
uses of land other than wildlife and get rid of wildlife (Brockington, 2002:10). Politicians
prefer the same stance because it sustains their patronage to communities and flow of
donor resources for conservation which are both important political assets (ibid.).
Those valuing the link of conservation to development but critical of its conceptual
strength and implementation expose the thrust of WMA as an instrument to use
communities for wildlife conservation, which reduces conservation costs, expand areas
under conservation as well putting communities under the scrutiny of wildlife authorities
(Goodwin, 1998, Levine, 2002). As Escobar (1995:156) succinctly puts it “The aim is not
simply to discipline individuals but to transform the conditions under which they live into
a productive, normalized social environment: in short to create modernity”. Martino
(2001) contrasting reviews of the WMA concept sees CBC as using communities to do
conservation, hence proposes that performance assessments of WMA have to be limited
to the extent to which conservation objectives have been achieved rather than community
development. Brockington (2002:9) presents an ambiguity in community participation,
posing a question, “is it concerned with development or conservation?”
2.4 Key Concepts and Development Debate
This section deals with contentious issues and concepts in development with a view of
charting out the conceptual framework of this thesis. The list of concepts and issues
covered is not exhaustive nevertheless they shade light on the conception of development
in the framework of this thesis. Concepts and issues covered are: development,
participation and partnership, development populism, knowledge, and institutions. The
discussion of these concepts and issues is in the context of post-World War II
‘development project’ following the 1949 Truman’s vision of capital, science and
18
technology and subsequent variants in the name of alternative development (Escobar,
1995:4-5).
2.4.1 Development
Development is defined differently, Fowler (1997:9) define it as an empowerment
process of building capacities of individuals, groups and entities to be able “to exert
influence on existing power structures or to build new ones i.e. increase resources and
choices available to them.” Tucker (1999:1) sees development as a process whereby
people are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to an essentially Western
way of conceiving and perceiving the world. Tucker (1999:2) dismisses the notion that
development is trans-cultural and can claim universal validity instead he argues that it is a
Western myth.
Development is an empowerment process building capacities of individuals, groups and
entities to be able “to exert influence on existing power structures or to build new ones
i.e. increase resources and choices available to them” (Fowler, 1997:9). However the
‘development project’ is seen as a cause of worsening of developing countries human
welfare status (Escobar, 1995:4-5; Tucker, 1999:1) and expressed as an impasse which is
due to inability to critically examine powerful culturally constructed myths inherent in
development disappoint many (Escobar, 1995; Munck, 1999:196; Tucker, 1999:3).
Solutions to the impasse are alternative development implying viewing development
from different perspectives such as peasant, women and environment (Escobar, 1995,
Chapter 5) which are also criticized as bureaucratizing development (Escobar,
1995:47&181). Others like Chambers (1997, 1998) advocates changes among
development workers on how they deliver development. They largely propose
‘participatory methodologies’ (PRA) (Chambers, 1997). PRA entails development
workers swapping roles with the poor and changing their behaviour and relationships
with poor people they work for so that they (development workers) become learners,
listeners, and facilitators (Chambers, 1998: xiv). In the mainstream literature,
‘development project’ is “conceptualized as the solution to backwardness, poverty, and
19
environmental degradation in the Third World (Escobar, 1995:8; the WB in Deininger &
Binswanger 1999; WB in Quan, 2000; Neumann, 2005:92). The ‘development project’
mainstream advocate for industrialization, commercialization and ‘tamed’ globalization
as means of developing the backward people of developing countries (O’Hearn,
1999:117, Stiglitz, 2002; Griffin, 2003:805).
Rocheleau & Slocum (1998:20) summing up the views of critics of development, argue
that development is paternalistic, top-down and has failed to challenge power structures.
Its practice is accompanied by a lot of cultural arrogance and everyday abuse of power
(ibid.). They thus proposes that “in order to demythologize development facilitators need
first to identify the multiple actors within communities, as well as those who work within
and between communities and others whose decision affect local development from
afar” (ibid.). Tucker (1999:4) proposes demythologizing “development process by
placing it in its historic context.”
Alternative development advocates, for instance Chambers, (1997, 1998), Stiglitz (2002)
and O’Hearn (1999) seems to omit the incentives or push factors for development
managers and deliverers to change hearts. Their proposed alternative of changing hearts
by development workers, donors, local elites and powerful local structures is lacking in
terms of the push-factors for such changes as well as portraying the poor and weak as
inactive in the domination process, with exception of rioting at times. They do not depict
resistances and contestations against ‘development project’ in all forms. However
O’Hearn (1999), Stiglitz (2002:13) and Griffin (2003) see a role of a developing country
state as a neutral arbitrator and an agent of local development, a role disputed by
advocates of a weak and illegitimate post-colonial state (Shivji, 1985, Clapham, 1985,
1998; Randal & Theobald, 1998; Mbilinyi, 2002 see discussion under 2.6).
Post-development advocates view ‘development project’ as a cause of backwardness,
exploitation and domination of the South by the North and therefore should be abandoned
(Escobar, 1995:4; Chachage, 2000:9; Neumann, 2005:93). The ‘development project’
does not only discipline individuals of the South but also transform the conditions in
20
which they live through the normalization by endless variety of interventions into their
daily lives i.e. the modernization project (Escobar, 1995:156; Neumann, 2005:94). The
‘development project’ is “a particular discourse which does not reflect but actually
constructs reality” (Kiely, 1999:31). Some argue that it is possible construct a defined
future, but this does not reflect the way society change thus one cannot have a
development road-map (Fowler, 1997:17; Wunsch, 2000:502).
Alternative development through alternative perspectives as feminism, sustainable
development, environment and peasants (Escobar, 1995:155) is dismissed because they
do not question “the very procedures and structures of development as an institution of
ruling” in short they bureaucratize development instead of transforming reality (Escobar,
1995:181). Sustainable development is “based on a paradigm that favours growth without
attention to equity and social responsibility, it does not challenge injustices in political,
social and economic relations between North and South” (Slocum et al, 1998:3-4).
Notions of social justice and fairness are omitted from the concept of sustainable
development (ibid.).
Alternative to development argues that a way forward is through the expression and
nurturing of cultural difference in specific location that is a culture of resisting the agent
of development- the state and its international allies (Chachage, 2000:204, Neumann,
2005:94). Ferguson & Derman (2000:121 in Neumann, 2005:98) point that “we need not
accept the existence of a master development narrative that has erased alternative paths.”
Critics of alternative to development paradigm argue that “critique of development must
focus on the unevenness of its implementation, rather than its alleged success as a means
of exploiting periphery” (Kiely, 1999:36). Others critics argue that alternative to
development is superficial in economic alternatives, but also it is not enough to promote
cultural resistance instead they propose efforts “to gain access to and control over the
development process” (Bebbington, 2000 in Neumann, 2005:97) and “also restructuring
of local power relations and access to resources in a way beneficial for subaltern groups”
(Neumann, 2005:97).
21
Other critics such as McCarthy, (2002 in Neumann, 2005:115) and Randall & Theobald,
(1998:15-6) tend to conceptualize development in the current notions of globalization,
where winners and losers are found in both sides of the divide, hence do not see
development re-conceptualization as North-South debate, but a global phenomena.
Post-development thinking is flawed “on contingency and questioning of neutrality of
technology” (Kiely, 1999:31). He proposes that “ideas about development …need to be
assessed not in terms of their alleged autonomy from post-development discourse, but in
terms of improvements in both the quantity and quality of life” (Kiely, 1999:48) and the
paradoxical unity of modernity; (Berman, 1982 in Kiely, 1999:31) implying “a set of
ideas about the way the world works and should be ordered, understood and governed,
development should also be glimpsed if not as the creation of the Third World, then
certainly as reflecting the responses, reactions and resistance of the people who are its
objects” (Crush, 1995 in Kiely, 1999:48).
2.4.2 Participation and Partnership
Participation is “deprofessionalization in all domains of life…so as to make ‘ordinary
people’ responsible for their own well-being” (Illich 1983 in Goulet, 1995:91; see also
Escobar, 1995:17). Wolfe (1983 in Goulet, 1995) view participation as the organized
efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social
situations, on the part of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control.
Freire (1970 in Goulet, 1995:92) sees participation as “When once oppressed people
participate thereby becoming active subjects of knowledge and action they begin to
construct their properly human history and to engage in processes of authentic
development.”
Participation is a process through which stakeholders’ influence and share control over
decisions and resources that affect their lives (Fowler, 1997:16). The last part i.e. ‘that
influence their life’ may question the involvement of international civil society
22
organizations (CSOs) and donors in developing countries affairs, however the strategies
he advocates of fostering links: vertical, horizontal, micro, meso, macro (Fowler,
1997:13) give a justification for outsiders involvement in the South, but still the South
does not “influence and share control” of the North.
O’Riordan et al (2002:74) argues for a common way participation is operationalised in
conventional development arguing that participation has centred on encouraging local
people to contribute their labour in return of food, cash or materials, yet these incentives
distort perceptions, create dependencies and give a misleading impression that local
people are supportive of externally driven initiatives. The ‘stage-managed participation’
(O’Riordan, 2002:75) leads to distrust and greater alienation (cf. screened invitees in
Chapter Four). This is carefully done to avoid empowerment and transformation as
correctly observed that “real social change inevitably leads to the possibility of conflict
and confrontation” (Thomas-Slayter, 1998:12). Fowler (1997:17) is critical of
participation through a project approach because project approach has pre-defined
objectives, time bound, pre-defined assumptions and should lead to measurable results.
Human behaviour change requires an experimental approach because there is limited pre-
known (Fowler, 1997:13).
Briggs & Sharp (2004) see that the increased invoking of indigenous knowledge into
development as not because of its added value per se but the failure of top-down
approaches and hallowing of the state. However Goodwin (1998:486) referring the same
as experts’ knowledge argues that: participatory processes are seen as “instrumentalist
program that aims to facilitate a more productive relationship between conservation
organizations and key management groups”.
Experts are wary of letting a community agenda reign, wholesomely because they see it
as parochial and fragmented. An expert remarked;
“If we’re not careful, we will allow community participation, to allow it to
go for lots of little patches without any sense of the context and their
linkages, and so, the danger I see of being simply responsive and seeing
23
ourselves as servants of communities objectives one by one as they choose
to present them, is that you miss the business of hooking it together”
(Goodwin, 1998:487).
It is the admission of experts that community participation is a give and take business;
communities’ agenda need to give some space to experts’ expertise. Defending the
representativeness of the Land Commission findings, the chairman of the Commission
said: “What we did was to systematize, articulate and present in a coherent manner what
we had gathered from the people in the language of their daily experience and practical
wisdom” (URT, 1994a: xii). Such remarks further imply the linguistic gap between
experts and the subaltern, which leave an open question: after such diction does the
document still carry the same meanings and narratives as subalterns would like? A
member of community quoted by Goodwin (1998:489) said, “There are issues, areas, we
are listened to but they implement what I wouldn’t do. They listen to us on silly things.
The mundane rubbish.” This expression captures a none-honest and manipulative
participation. In other words experts’ language put narratives of the truth in a
homogeneous and unified form rather that fragmented opinions of the communities
(Goodwin, 1998:487). The outcome of this is “local community decision-making is seen
as lying principally in the area of implementation of national objectives and not what
community decides” (ibid.).
Participation in other perspectives is “a neo-conservative agenda encapsulated in notions
of empowerment as a means of shifting conservation burden from national authorities to
communities (Goodwin, 1998:489). The Director of Wildlife statement regarding village
scout (Severe, 2000) fits the notion of community participation being ‘hired hands rather
than local voices’ (Goodwin, 1998). Literature show that the implementation of WMA in
Tanzania as a mechanism of getting unpaid labour and additional land, than having local
voices in conservation. The villagers pointed that the wildlife authorities know what they
want to do and do it no matter what are the local voices. Structures formed of community
members have to undergo training in experts’ ways of seeing and doing and elimination
of their local knowledge into experts ways of knowing (Goodwin, 1998:488).
24
Partnership is an expression of complementarity between involved parties in relation to
decision-making and importance given to each contribution for the purpose of promoting
or achieving common objectives or interests (Mohiddin, 1998:5). However Nyong’o is
sceptical of that arguing that shared goals and purposes are unimaginable in a world of
unequals (Nyong’o, 1998:12). Whose agenda reign or as Chambers (1997) put: whose
reality count, at the end of the day shows that community participation is a camouflage
for experts pre-defined agenda. What of local communities gets into participatory
processes is what experts consider worth for good or bad that is the ‘mundane rubbish’
(Goodwin, 1998:489). For the partnership to be sustainable it has be based on trust,
respect, ownership, equality and function on principles of well-defined roles,
responsibilities, rights and obligations (Mohiddin, 1998:6).
The partnership poses a danger of local authorities, political leaders, and businesses,
posing as collaborators, while they represent narrow experience and interests (Rocheleau
& Slocum, 1998:20). Instrumentalist view of participation sees it as an open-ended
transformative process that generates its own dynamics influences conservation agenda
(Goodwin, 1998). In Tanzania, wildlife authorities hold a belief that CBC is transforming
wildlife conservation agenda among local communities’ interests (WWF, 1994;
TANAPA, 2002a, b). However CBC in wildlife transforms communities into dependents
of conservation authorities (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:41; Twyman, 2000).
Community participation in conservation has a notion of nursing local ownership and
sustainability (TANAPA, 2002a), but even at its best ebb, it suffers a deficit of un-
representativeness (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998 Chapter 6). Within communities there are
key powerful figures who set local agenda and exclude others based on local criteria,
either wealth, eloquence, traditional beliefs etc (Cleaver, 2002:17; Goodwin, 1998:490).
In this regard what may be referred to as local views, remains doubtful till the process
through which they are generated, processed and presented is evidently authentic
participatory.
25
Participation is not affected only by power relations between outsiders and insiders, but
also “by the social relations between participants in the project themselves” (Goodwin,
1998:490-1; Neumann, 2005:92). In the CCS evaluation (Nangoro & Kipuri, 1996) the
fact that topmost priorities emerging out of village participatory processes are associated
with what mostly concerns Maasai men, give an impression that social relations of
project participants might have been overlooked. Such flawed participatory practices that
do not identify, acknowledge, and correct pre-existing imbalances are bent to reinforce
existing social inequalities (Slocum et al, 1998; Neumann, 2005:92). What are referred to
as local knowledge are experiences of local people extracted as data to be analyzed and
interpreted by ‘experts’ (Briggs and Sharp, 2004). Participation carried as a technical
process turns social and political problems into objects like counting successes of
conservation on numbers of hectares, increase in fauna and flora species etc omitting
people and their lives (Goodwin, 1998; Martino, 2001).
At times local people unresponsiveness to messages from experts and authorities is
interpreted differently, either as apathy or ignorance, but Goodwin (1998:491) argues that
sometime “people receptiveness and response to information is shaped by their sense of
agency,” that is the degree to which they feel they can influence events, and or lack of
trust.
Participation provides a means of changing conception of conservation from one position
of experts to the position where experts represents only one among many contested
meanings because there maybe a mismatch in expectations which undermine the
effectiveness and credibility of existing participatory initiatives (Goodwin, 1998:495).
The deployment of an instrumentalist approach to conservation which accord
communities a limited role in decision-making renders participation self-defeating and
weakens end results legitimacy (ibid.).
An effective participation process needs to hook itself through a bricolage process to
existing community institutions and take into account existing material and non-material
resources required to act upon the knowledge generated and received (Goodwin,
26
1998:495; Cleaver, 2002; Wunsch, 2002). Objectives of participatory processes should
not be pre-determined beyond learning but emerges out of the process (Fowler, 1997).
Effective participation is an arena of experts and communities to re-contest, rethink,
renegotiation, and ultimately reach a consensus based on give and take. It is not an
efficient process in technical economic terms, but the most optimum in social terms. It is
a continued engagement between community and experts with varying degrees of risks
and uncertainties. Participation should be a process of collective learning that change the
way people think and act, it entails social learning (O’Riordan et al, 2002:75).
2.4.3 Development Populism
Populism is a situation where in a dependent society, modernization development
paradigms fail to enrich mass politics, thus leads to weakening of democratic institutions
(Crabtree, 2000: 164; Smith, 2003:122) consequently existing extreme inequalities
threaten social stability (Crabtree, 2000:164). Outsiders and or semi-outsiders emerged to
challenge the status quo, by appealing directly to the people, by-passing established
political structures (Paniza, 2000:146) and attempt “to channel and direct mass political
participation in such a way as to absorb pressures from below (Crabtree, 2000:164). It is
a method by which elites (often with narrow agenda) seek to legitimize themselves
through a direct appeal to the people resulting into social control rather than mobilisation,
typically involving a complex web of clientelist relationships at all levels of society
(ibid.). In this context, the scope for representation is limited, since populist leaders seek
to eschew institutional mediation in favour of a direct relationship between the elites and
the people (Crabtree, 2000:164). “Control tends to outweigh any element of
empowerment that may arise from political mobilization” (ibid.). Development populism
emphasizes the local, rural, and the small-scale in directing efforts to improve conditions
in developing countries (Neumann, 2005:85). This process does not acknowledge and
deal with existing and conflicting social groups, but appeal to partnership for an imposed
common good (Fowler, 2000:4-5).
Promotion of bottom-up, participation and local knowledge ignoring existence of
“unequal distribution of power and authority within communities and between
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communities and outside actors are unlikely to achieve any lasting or widespread
improvement in local livelihood” (Neumann, 2005:92). Some participatory processes
show communities as “unproblematic homogeneous political entities when they are in
fact heterogeneous” – economically, ethnically and along other social lines (Brockington,
2002:9; Cleaver, 2002).
Participation in terms of ‘headcounts’ does not lead to or form a democratic process, but
may entrench existing inequalities, as Nangoro & Kipuri (1996) have shown on priority-
setting among Maasai communities. Neumann (2005) is critical of development
interventions inability to recognize and effectively deal with inequalities within and
among communities. Bernstein (1988) in Kiely (1999:44) argues that “many peasant
communities are actually composed of petty commodity producers and/or semi-
proletarians, integrated into modern sector”. It is thus populist propaganda to assume and
behave as if communities are homogenous and unproblematic on their own. Each human
community has its own social, economic and political differentiation and therefore its
own dynamics as shown by Cleaver (2002) in an irrigation project in Usangu basin,
Tanzania.
Development interventions that avoid or inadequately deal with pre-existing social
inequalities promote populism in development. Development interventions under the
‘development project’ do not deal with pre-existing social inequalities for many different
reasons such as misrepresentation and misunderstanding of social inequalities as
explained by Chabal & Daloz (1999) or simply remain silent about (Mitchell, 1991 in
Escobar, 1995:47-8). Chabal and Daloz (1999:22) show that civil society organizations
(CSOs) in Africa are “nothing other than new ‘structures’ with which Africans can seek
to establish an instrumentally profitable position within the existing system of neo-
patrimonialism.” They imply that CSOs are simply elites’ strategies to re-position
themselves to access donor funds that are diverted from state channels.
Donors promoting working with CSOs in Africa fail to understand “the ‘shadow boxing’
that takes place between state and society” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:21). Hagberg
28
(2004:214) puts it cogently that “most voluntary associations adjust identity politics to fit
either the culture frame or the development frame.” Tdvet (1998:45) shows how
international NGOs pose as altruistic development agents while they are
internationalizing their respective home agenda. In such scenarios, dealing with issues of
social inequalities which pose a danger of conflicts is avoided. Brockington (2002:10)
cogently observes that resources sought by NGOs for conservation may support
community conservation, but may be a reason for state authorities not to seek
legitimation of national parks from local communities. In such arrangements,
development aid entrenches and strengthens existing inequalities, injustices, and sustains
illegitimate and unaccountable structures in developing countries.
2.4.4 Knowledge: Local, Western or Both?
The failure of development to achieve its promises for more than four decades has
brought many challenges to the body of knowledge informing it (cf. Escobar, 1995;
Munck & O;Hearn, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002; Briggs & Sharp 2004, Neumann, 2005). Post-
and anti-development theorists argue that development thinking has carried with it
uncritically the colonial attitudes which preserve western-centred attitudes as well as
unquestioned validity of science and western knowledge (Escobar, 1995:169-181).
Briggs & Sharp (2004:662) argue that “‘development experts’ from the west are brought
in to analyze a development problem and to offer a solution based on scientific methods”.
A good number of development interventions have been carried out by western experts in
total exclusion of local knowledge and local experts that ultimately fail, e.g. 1960s
resettlement under transformation and improvement approaches by the World Bank (see
section 1.3 Chapter One) and Community participation in wildlife conservation in
Zimbabwe (Vivian 1994). These experiences show the extent to which the arrogance of
western knowledge wielded by development actors using either local experts, foreign
experts or both have failed and where victims (the poor people) have no rights of
recourse to such experts (Escobar, 1995:161; Mbilinyi, 2002:1; Stiglitz, 2002:225).
Agents giving loans bother little about failure or success of projects because to them
giving loans is business and they are sure of being repaid (Escobar, 1995:161; Stiglitz,
2002:208). Stiglitz (2002) goes further to argue that the success of the Asian Tigers as
29
shown by the Miracle Tigers Report has discredited the claims of IMF and others that
emergence of Asian Tigers is due to implementing IMF prescriptions. He argues that
such “countries had been successful not only in spite of the fact that they had not
followed most of the dictates of Washington Consensus, but because they had not”
(Stiglitz, 2002:91 cf. O’Hearn, 1999:119).
Acknowledgement of the relevance of indigenous knowledge has offered development
practitioners alternatives, nevertheless very little of that trickled into practice (Briggs &
Sharp, 2004). Claims of universality of knowledge began to be abandoned and social
scientists were prompted to confront the relativity of all forms of knowledge (both
popular and scientific), some disciplines turned towards the everyday knowledge of both
ordinary and elevated folks in explaining socio-economic patterns and processes
(Goodwin, 1998). Briggs & Sharp (2004) sight the influential writings of Chambers in
the 1980s on participatory approaches as evidences of experts resorting, or need to resort,
to ordinary people views to informing development however they are wary of the limited
translation of such theories into development practice. Martino (2001) debating
definitions and concepts of buffer zones in protected areas, shows that such notions of
indigenous views informing development is co-optation of locals into serving the experts
defined agenda.
The debate on traditional/local knowledge versus modern/scientific knowledge gives
evidence of gaps and blind spots of both. However, gaps and blinds spots of traditional
knowledge are not commented on i.e. no consistent development endeavour driven by
traditional/local knowledge that is documented to show its prowess or weaknesses, this
can be attributed to the suppression and belittling of traditional knowledge by modern
science. The success of modern knowledge in becoming universal is not the same as
being a better alternative for development, despite its claims to be so (Jiggins et al, 1996;
Briggs & Sharp, 2004). Space for either traditional or modern science has to be achieved
through a concerted struggle, which from a number of cited examples shows that
western/modern knowledge is gaining grounds over traditional knowledge.
30
The need of two brands of knowledge to complement one another has been repeatedly
argued (Jiggins et al, 1996) but little efforts are being made to integrate the two into
practice (Briggs & Sharp, 2004:663). Briggs & Sharp (2004) further point to a lack of
communication between postcolonial theory and development studies.
There are conflicts in different knowledge outlooks, such as professionals/experts such as
materialists are criticized for a tendency to dismiss what exist but incomprehensible to
them calling it illogical to justify ignoring it (Pulido, 1998:720). Postcolonial theory
views development studies as mired in modernization theory and colonial mindset, on the
other hand development studies attack postcolonial theory for being complex and
ignorant of the real problems of subalterns (Briggs & Sharp 2004:663). On the other
hand, postcolonial theory attempts to formulate theoretical and practical strategies of
resisting western domination of knowledge (Briggs & Sharp, 2004:663).
Development studies theory regards culture as epiphenomenon and secondary giving
economic and political domain excessive importance (Tucker, 1999:2). Chachage,
(2000:201) shares the views that development practice is unidisciplinary informed and
economics or ‘science’ is dominant. This is not to dismiss economic science, but
questioning its unidominance (see also Escobar, 1995:165; Mbilinyi, 2002, Stiglitz,
2002:196).
Analysis of the complicity between power and knowledge is central to postcolonial
theory, an approach examining how western knowledge systems have bound-up with the
construction of both colonial and postcolonial ways of knowing and acting around the
world (Said, 1978 in Briggs & Sharp, 2004). Expert knowledge is being challenged and
abandoned and other forms of knowledge (scientific and popular) are increasingly being
adopted, despite resistances (Goodwin, 1998:482). Popular participation and inclusive
practices in decision-making is expounded as an alternative to unidisciplinary current
practices (Chachage, 2000:204, Mbilinyi, 2002:7&12).
31
Spivak (1988) in Briggs & Sharp (2004:664) argues that subaltern cannot be taken
serious if they speak their own language, they have to speak through experts: those with
language of science, philosophy, and western concepts. Shivji & Kapinga (1998:69)
support Spivak’s argument pointing that people should be facilitated to struggle on their
own speaking for them is abstract, patronizing and unsuitable. McAuslan, (2000:93) is
critical of technical and foreign languages used in official policies and laws because they
limit their use by ordinary people, but also challenge tradition of local elites to maintain
colonial ways of knowing.
The power of western knowledge (science and technology) in getting Africa agricultural
and food security problems sorted are articulated in both the concept and implementation
of the Sasakawa Global 2000 Program (Borlaug & Dowswell, 1995). Reacting to
conceptual flaws of Sasakawa Global 2000, Jiggins et al (1996:98) argued that the
debates and actions have moved beyond the simplistic opposition of ‘traditional’ and
‘modern’, science-based agriculture to a recognition that the capacities of both formal
science and technology transfer and farmer-based experimentation and innovation are
needed.”
Experiences and arguments made above show Escobar (1995) in Briggs & Sharp
(2004:662), that “....the domination of Western knowledge is explained not through a
privileged proximity to the truth, but as a set of historico-geographical conditions tied up
with the geopolitics of power.” A number of other authors e.g. Tucker (1999), Goodwin
(1998), Briggs & Sharp (2004) challenging superiority and universality of expert/western
knowledge, argue that such knowledge can neither claim universality nor superiority but
is one among many competing and contested knowledge systems.
The critics of development cooperation is not an attempt to dismiss its theoretical
foundation as useless, but as succinctly pointed it is their unidisciplinary, perspectives
and arrogance which some experts call to question (Escobar, 1995:13; Chachage,
1996:201; Stiglitz, 2002:37 & 207; Mbilinyi, 2002:1). Despite their unidisciplinary staff
composition, World Bank, 70% are economists (Escobar, 1995:165); IMF, majority are
32
macro economists (Stiglitz, 2002:36), and critic that their development theory conception
is either misguided, flawed or narrow focused, international financial institutions and
western donors continue to guide official development policies ignoring alternative
unchallenged views (Shivji, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002 Chp.2).
Foucault (1980 in Kiely, 1999:41) argues that “power is inseparable from knowledge and
truth claims”, and proposes to be resisted. Kiely (1999:42) sees this as a failure on the
part of Foucault to distinguish truth and ideology, where ideology is supported by
falsehood. Quan (2000:31) explicitly shows the arrogance of WB on ignoring in practice
what it acknowledges in theory and conception as valid.
2.5 Institutions, Conflicts and Change
Institutions are broadly defined by Fowler (1997:20) as “principles or norms that are long
established, stable, accepted and collectively valued on the basis on which society work.
Cleaver (2002:17) argues that “institutions are formed through processes of bricolage in
which similar arrangements are adapted for multiple purposes, are embedded in networks
of social relations, norms and practices and in which maintaining social consensus and
solidarity may be equally as important as optimum resource management outcome”.
Bricolage process is not smooth, it encompasses conflicts and struggles between different
political, social, and economic interests and entities hence its final outcome is not
necessarily a more socially just institution, but more a strong responsive, resilience and
respected institution (Cleaver, 2002).
Conflict is an integral part of human life, though there is a common psychological dislike
and avoidance of conflicts (Cleaver, 2002:26). Where relations of reciprocity and
institutions help to channel access to resources, then conflict must be avoided to ensure
secure access to material livelihood assets (ibid.). Bricolage is a valuable concept, though
has limited visibility in mainstream institutional development literature, instead
institutional development is informed by the art of design and crafting (Ostrom, 1992 in
Cleaver, 2002:14). The composition of land matters adjudication machinery proposed by
the Presidential Land Commission incorporated the principles of bricolage process (cf.
33
modernise tradition as opposed to impose modernisation in URT, 1994a:131). The
rejection of the Commission’s proposal without publicly being debated and with not
explicit reason is an expression of the prowess of the power of finance and politics (see
Chachage, 1996; Shivji, 2002).
In conservation, militaristic and punitive measures are common as instruments of
institution building (Escobar, 1995:167; CFU, 1998; Shauri, 1999:11). Policies, laws and
regulations arising from ecoliberal conservationists intervention outlaw and exclude the
substance of all the pre-existing regulatory regimes which ultimately lead to further
marginalization of local communities and the disadvantaged (Neumann, 1992) hence
bringing to life what CFU (1998) assert that, policies, along with laws and regulations
enacted to guide conservation can mitigate conflicts, create new conflicts or exacerbate
existing ones. Emphasis on confrontation and punishment rather than compromise and
reconciliation erode rather than reinforce the social trust on which institutions depend
(Cleaver, 2002:27).
Neumann (2005:82) poses a question, “could a more ecologically sustainable and socially
just, development be derived from bottom-up approaches, building on local institutions,
knowledge and practice?” Cleaver (2002:13), cautious of oversimplification of
institutional analysis into weak or robust and proposes institutional transformation
through a process of bricolage where embeddedness in everyday relations, networks of
reciprocity and negotiation of cultural norms are central. Bureaucratic organizations are
commonly preferred by the elites because they are top-down and control oriented
(Martinussen, 1997:334). Through a process of bricolage traditional institutions may be
transformed to combine with or replace bureaucratic/formal institution (Cleaver
2002:15). He argues that institutions formed through a process of bricolage are multi-
purpose touching all aspects of the community in question as opposed to bureaucratic
institutions that are centred on one aspect say natural resource management.
Community institutions crafted through bureaucratic processes are mostly perceived by
communities as costly, illegitimate, and cumbersome (Cleaver, 2002:28) and therefore
34
face acceptability and trust hurdles. Such bureaucratic institutions based on individual
rights and principles of modernity undermine social trust, relationships based on ethics of
care and mutual interdependence (Upperman, 2000 in Cleaver, 2002:28) because they are
not necessarily inclusive, fair and emancipatory, socially embedded and reproduce social
inequalities and proposes bricolage process as an optimum way in institutional building,
through an analysis of content and form rather than on form alone (ibid.)..
2.6 Development Actors
The development environment has different actors that may be broadly classified as:
government/state, business/private, and voluntary/NGOs/CSO/Mass movements/the third
sector (Fowler, 1997:23; Tdvet, 1998:12). There are varied explanations on the roles and
relationships of the three actors. Some like Fowler (1997:8) sees the NGOs and private
sectors as complementary to the state but also NGOs as organs of representation. Tvedt
(1998:45) shows Norwegian NGOs as a convenience convergence of the state and once
missionary organizations to internationalize the Norwegian agenda. Levine (2002) has
similar views in regard to conservation international conservation NGOs in Tanzania.
Shivji & Kapinga (1998:59) dispute that “an NGO can be a suitable vehicle or
mechanism to effect the right of participation”. Chabal & Daloz (1999) and Hagberg
(2004) show NGOs in Africa as patrimonial institutions of patronage and proper
positioning by local elites to access donor funds.
Brockington (2002:2) shows a relation between Western NGOs working in conservation
in developing countries as having strong ties with big businesses in the west. Levine
(2002) shows that the convergence of the private sector and western governments on the
onset of African independence as a convergence of convenience to safeguard and
advance the colonial mission in conservation. Local power structures, both the state and
local NGOs use the NGOs-State-Businesses relationships to strengthen and legitimatize
their hold of power (Brockington, 2002:10). These ties are used to promote conservation
but serving business interests (Brockington, 2002:2) and not honest service to the poor
(Escobar, 1995:46).
35
2.6.1 Civil Society/NGOs/Voluntary Sector/Mass Movements
Civil society is outside the state and seen as a bulwark against anarchy, market, the state
and totalitarianism (Fowler, 1997:8; Tdvet, 1998:42). Others see NGOs and or CSOs as
voluntary civil society membership organizations that usually act as pressure groups
(Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:58-59). Local civil society organizations are sometimes seen as
groups of elites re-positioning themselves strategically to access donor funding (Chabal
& Daloz, 1999:22; Hagberg, 2004:206; Tvedt, 1998:50). Tvedt (1998:51) further argues
that NGOs in developing countries are a response to political and financial initiatives of
donors searching for suitable local partners. Hagberg (2004:202), warns that voluntary
associations in Africa should be approached as one among many responses of society to
the post-colonial state.
Neumann (2005:91) points to the real dangers of misrepresentation and marginalization
that may result from “uncritical promotion of NGOs, civil society and community in
development.” He further argues that international conservation NGOs’ roles in post-
colonial Africa has been that of formulating conservation policies, concepts, plans,
organizing and fund-raising (Neumann, 2005:124). The African Wildlife Leadership
Foundation (now AWF) set the College of African Wildlife Management in Mweka “to
train wildlife managers of all former British colonies” (Levine, 2002:1046; Goldman,
2003: 843). Since then, conservation education has remained amongst strong conduits
through which international NGOs/businesses shape conservation agenda in Tanzania
and Africa. Wildlife lobbies took assurance measures that wildlife conservation continues
after independence, in September 1961, two months before Tanganyika independence,
the Arusha Manifesto declaring a commitment of the post-colonial government to
wildlife conservation was signed (URT, 1994a:263).
2.6.2 Business/Commercial sector
After the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio a growing awareness of the links between
biodiversity conservation and business increased and officiated by over 160 countries
ratifying the Convention on Biological Diversity (Bowles et al, 1998:209). Article 11 of
the Convention requires countries to create economically and socially sound incentives
36
for conservation (ibid.). The Convention provides for private business to address the link
between economic and environmental issues, because of societal and consumers’
demands which are backed by legislatives regulations (ibid.). Before the Rio Summit,
partnership between business and conservation was forced by laws, which remains, but
supplemented by economic incentives to accomplish biodiversity conservation (Bowles
et al, 1998:210). Economic incentives are provided because they are affordable, despite a
loss of revenue by government in the short run, but economically, socially and
environmentally sound in the long term (ibid.).
There are varied methods and instruments to use to achieve environmentally responsible
private sector investment (Bowles et al 1998:211). AWF has tried some of such methods
in Tanzania through the introduction of Land Trust Fund (AWF, 2000 in Levine,
2002:1052). Concessions and community-private sector agreements are operational in
Tanzania (see Annex 5). These attempts have had problems such as private sector using
loopholes in the law to violate biodiversity regulations. Tanzania Association of
Professional Hunters (TAHOA) for example violates hunting regulations using existing
loopholes in the law (LEAT-b).
Neumann (2005:123) traces the origins of both AWF to wealthy big game hunters in the
USA, and WWF “to media blitzes and secret fundraising campaigns among the world’s
business and political elites” in Britain. These developments took place at the onset of
independence of African states, which is in line with Tvedt’s (1998:45) disclosure that
Norwegian CSOs had to transform themselves from religious to secular organizations to
fit a contemporary role of “internalization of Norwegian Society” on the demand of the
state.
Brockington (2002:2) shows how businesses team-up with developing countries states to
safeguard and advance business interests in the name of conservation. George Adamson
Wildlife Preservation Trust (GAWPT) based in UK and Tony Fitzjohn/George Adamson
African Wildlife Preservation Trust based in the USA, supported the maintenance of
Mkomazi game Reserve and outreach programs through the Wildlife Division
37
(Brockington, 2002:2). The two Trusts are run by influential politicians and big
businesses with connections in the media and film industry (ibid.). Multinationals which
are only accountable to their boards of directors have almost a monopoly on the tourist
industry globally but behave as representative of societal broad concerns (Lea, 1988;
Ascher, 1995; Sinclair, 1998:20).
O’Hearn, (1999:114) observes that the rise of supranational global institutions and
market-oriented global networks has increased the power of capitals to subjugate
peripheral regions in the age of ‘postmodernism’ and post-developmentalism’. If it is
hoped to achieve the socialization of economy that is, the de-marginalization an
understanding of processes of wealth accumulation and deprivation of others is
imperative. Uneven development as a consequent of capitalism accumulation has forced
majority who are deprived to participate in a system that prioritizes commercialistic
exchange-value considerations over popular well-being” (ibid.).
2.6.3 The State
The state is a central actor in conservation in Tanzania as the owner of land and wildlife
(MNRT, 1998:6). In general developing countries’ states are characterized as weak,
fragile, primordial and have no or weak organic links with their society (Randall &
Theobald, 1998; Leftwitch, 1998). African states are “unable to mobilize their human and
material resources because their systems are inflexible, inefficient, bureaucratic,
dictatorial, corrupt, and lacking in democracy, good governance, transparency and
accountability” (Mohiddin, 1998:9).
The Tanzanian state is said to be nepotistic, corrupt, biased (Shivji, 2002:205),
unaccountable and coercive (Fjeldstad, 2002:22), with inefficient, illegitimate, and unjust
justice machinery (Shivji, 2002:205) and its budget is donor dependent. It is also “a client
state” (Mbilinyi, 2002:1).
A state that is “weakly institutionalized and ineffectual in terms of making and
implementing policy” is a weak state (Randall & Theobald, 1998:166). Hyden, (2000:24)
38
observes that “African governments are not policy but patronage institutions”, their
decision-making machineries elevate unofficial goals over those stated in official public
documents. Clapham (1998:495) discussing West African states, observed that “The first
concern of West African governance is not the management of societal demands, but the
welfare of the rulers” and is an instrument for the struggle for the spoil. Hyden’s and
Clapham’s claims are not far from Buchanan’s (1980 in Kiely, 1999:37) arguing that the
public sector is comprised “of self-interested individuals…therefore the public good is a
myth”. From an economic perspective, Moore (1998:85) characterizes a strong and
legitimate state as one that can earn a significant amount of its income using its own
revenue-raising bureaucratic and organizational machinery and one with a high degree of
effective reciprocity between citizens and the state. Though sometimes well intentioned
donors conditionality of matching funding to encourage efforts for own revenue raising
have had a counter effect of inducing “increased tax effort at the expense of
accountability and democratic development” (Fjeldstad, 2002:22).
Lack of organic (shared values) links between a state and its citizens is the single most
important reason for the fragile state (Clapham, 1985). Clapham (1985) differentiates the
fact that political fragility of the state is not the same as lack of capacity. States can be
endowed with resources, but still depend on external sources of legitimacy and political
support. A state is not weak simply because it lacks resources, but rather because it lacks
legitimacy (Randal & Theobald, 1998). This does not however imply that government
officials have no power on the contrary they may wield enormous and terrifying powers,
and extort bribes from the population (Randal & Theobald, 1998). Minimum democratic
features like regular elections are not enough to give a state legitimacy (Leftwich, 1998),
but legitimacy should encompass the “extent that there exist institutionalized mechanisms
through which the mass of the population can exercise control over political elites in an
organized fashion” (Moore, 1998: 86). As opposed to political legitimacy i.e. ascending
to political office through fair electoral process, constitutional legitimacy is “acceptance
of the rules for the organization and distribution of political power” (Leftwich, 1998:58-
9)
39
A differentiation between autonomous embedded and predatory states is imperative.
Under a predatory state, development policies are not derived from aggregation of
various social interests within society but imposed through and or by the elites claiming
legitimacy to rule (Randall & Theobald, 1998). Concisely a developmental democratic
state may be defined as one which has a mutually reciprocal relationship with the society
and able to define and execute a homebred coherent development agenda (Randall &
Theobald, 1998; Moore, 1998).
2.7 Land Tenure and Property Rights
The question of who control access to the land is a critical one in analyzing who
participates in, gains from, or is excluded from the process of development (Neumann,
2005:102). Land tenure rights vary i.e. land type, land use, resource type and location,
and socio-economic systems (ibid.). Land tenure encompasses both notions of ownership
and a corresponding bundle of rights (Bruce & Fortmann, 1988 in Neumann, 2005:103).
The current land tenure system in Tanzania has its origin in the 11th century English land
law, which defined what is owned as not land in itself but an estate or interest in the land
(McAuslan, 2000:78) therefore its like a bundle of rights that can be split into pieces.
There are four main forms of ownership; state, private, communal, and open – access as
well as four categories of land rights namely; use, transfer, exclusion, and enforcement
(Neumann, 2005:103). Private ownership is positioned as the highest form in the
evolutionary model based on Hardin’s (1968) seminal paper, suggesting that to improve
rational use of resources they should be privatized or else put under state ownership and
or regulation. Efficiency of resource thus increases from communal to private ownership.
Many dominant international development organizations active in Tanzania development
advocate policies and practices are guided by notions that privatization of land is a
precondition for security of tenure and increased investment and productivity (see
Mbilinyi, 2002). Deininger & Binswanger (1999) trace the historical evolution of World
Bank land policy since 1975 showing that despite unchallenged evidence that
individualization of land tenure in Africa does not improve security of tenure as well as
attracting investment on land the bank maintained its position on individualization of
40
land. The Presidential Commission on land showed significant misfit between ITR and
the realities in Tanzania, which may be summed as problematic because it renders many
people landless, does not improve efficiency as well as not improving security of tenure
to the majority (URT, 1994a:130).
Property rights are an expression of social relations therefore altering property rights
entails changing social relations (Neumann, 2005:104-5) which impact on the manner in
which society is organized politically and socially (Chachage, 1996:1). Roth (1993) and
Vivian (1994 in Neumann 2005:105) show that in certain circumstances land titling
threatens rather than enhances security of producers. Titling can transform multiple uses
of resources by excluding other users (Peluso 1996 in Neumann, 2005:105), while land
titling is a highly politicized process that produces winners and losers (ibid.). Common
property theory is criticized for romantizing the local communities by dodging questions
of class and gender that are source of contests, conflicts and struggles (Robbins 1998 in
Neumann 2005:106). Robbins (1998 in Neumann, 2005:106) argues that the different
forms of authority controlling or owning land is less important, more important is the
legitimacy of that authority.
When the rights and duties of groups of users in relation to common resources are
defined and enforced, the resource becomes common property, as distinct from open
access (Cousin, 2000:152). He continues to argue that the difference between open-
access, what Hardin (1968) confused with common resource, is that with the latter rights
and duties are not well-defined and tragedy of over-exploitation is possible. Land tenure
systems in Africa are communal in character. Communal means in the great majority of
cases, a degree of community control over who is allowed into the group, thereby
qualifying for an allocation of land as well as rights of access to and use of the shared,
common pool resources used by the group (i.e. the commons) (ibid.). Groups often
restrict alienation of land by outsiders by maintaining the identity coherence and
livelihood security of the group and its members (Hodgson, 2002; Hagberg, 2004).
41
In Tanzania, people have secondary rights to land, the state has primary rights (radical
title) and once the need arises, the state invokes its rights at the expense of individuals.
The Presidential Commission recommendations do not disrupt primary and secondary
rights arrangements instead they devolve and democratize the powers and processes of
state invoking its primary rights to land (URT, 1994a:131; Chachage, 1996). From
economic perspectives the Commission recommended “accumulation from below by
releasing organic social forces from within the smallholder economy” (URT, 1994a:131).
Since the accusations that executive arm of the Tanzanian state abuses land
administration powers are nowhere disputed (URT, 1994a; Chachage, 1996), it may be
argued that it is logical to institute mechanisms to limit, to vet, to check and to make the
application of such powers. Such mechanisms are possible within the framework the
Commission’s recommendations.
2.8 Land Policy, Donors’ Perspectives: The Case of the World
Bank
To the World Bank (WB) rural development is a strategy “concerned with modernization
and moniterization of rural society” thus it advocates polices that integrate the modern
sector and traditional sector (Escobar, 1995:162). The WB land policy since 1975 to date
has favoured abandoning different forms of customary land tenure in favour of freehold
despite acknowledgement that some customary land tenure arrangements can provide
increased secure tenure in Africa (Deininger & Binswanger, 1999:248; Quan, 2000:36).
The central concern of the WB and other donors is that customary land tenure in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) is an insecure form of tenure which does not attract investment on
land (Deininger & Binswanger, 1999:264) thus advocates for individualization, titling
and registration (ITR) to guarantee security of tenure and attract investments (Deininger
& Binswanger, 1999:260-5; Quan, 2000:34-5). The policy recommendations of the WB
are: privatize land ownership; register and title, and individualize to: increase security of
tenure, facilitate land markets, attract investments; conserve, increase efficiency and
promote economic growth (Deininger & Binswanger; 1999; Quan, 2000). Hardin’s
(1968) transitional model (see Figure 1) of privatization of land (Neumann, 2005:104)
reflects the WB and other donors’ policy to developing countries.
42
TIMEHigh High
Figure 1: The modernization model of tenure change, environmental conservation, and
agricultural growth (Source: Neumann, 2005:104).
Land disputes on the other hand have outgrown the land tenure system in Tanzania thus
cannot be resolved within the existing land tenure system and judicial system (URT,
1994b:9). Deininger & Binswanger, (1999:250) show that environmental degradation is
due to “a breakdown in the ability of communities to enforce rules governing the use of
communally held land” and advocate for helping communities this problem, not by ITR.
Experts wonder about the mismatch between operational divisions of the WB and the
Bank’s openness to new evolutions in land theories to the fact that individualization,
titling and registration (ITR) do not enhance poverty alleviation and development in SSA
(Quan, 2000:36 & 38). Experiences have shown that ITR is a major conduit through
which local elites grab community land as shown by cases listed (URT, 1994b; see also
Quan, 2000:39; McAuslan, 2000:92). Evidence from Kenya and other African countries
show that land titling has no positive impact on investment (Platteau, 2000:57). On the
contrary borrowing land within customary systems enhance security and reciprocity
relations “because borrowing and lending land are often part of a wider relationship
RES
OU
RC
E C
ON
SER
VA
TIO
N
Low Individual
LAND TENURE
AG
RIC
ULT
UR
AL
& P
AST
OR
AL
OU
TPU
T
Low
Traditional
Modern
Transitional
Communal
43
between two families or lineages and a desire to keep that relationship” have wider
ramifications on social relations e.g. social safety nets (Platteau; 2000:57; Daley, 2005).
The WB has experiences of scenarios where land titling is not the best instrument to
increase security of tenure but has not drawn such experiences into policy practice
(Deininger & Binswanger, 1999; Quan, 2000). “If the transaction costs associated with
lending to specific groups of producers exceed the benefits they can derive from the use
of credit, title would not be expected to increase credit access. In such cases, the title
might make it easier for large producers to access credit but would not make small
landowners creditworthy, a situation that would deepen pre-existing inequalities”
(Deininger & Binswanger, 1999:260). The assertion that titled land attracts bank loan is
wrong in the context of poor because the poor have a high risk of loan not repaying loans,
their assets are low value these add up to high transaction costs banks do not take
(Cousins, 2005:4).
2.9 Tanzania’s Rural Development Policy
The Rural Development Policy and strategies of the Tanzanian government are not
comprehensively defined since the abandoning of centralized planning. However the
scattered and inconsistent orientations are modernization as articulated in the Rural
Development Policy (RDP) document of 2003. The Rural Development Policy (RDP
2003) is an instrument to achieve five main goals of the National Vision 2025 namely:
high quality livelihood; peace, stability and unity; good governance; educated and
learning society; and competitive economy (PORALG, 2003: viii-ix).
The RDP 2003 broadened development indicators to include not only conventional
economic indicators but also aspects of vulnerability (URT, 2000). RDP set the
benchmark of a successful rural development strategy is “the eradication of poverty,
diseases, ignorance, social injustice and all forms of inequalities” (PORALG, 2003:2).
Despite these being goals of development since independence, the policy document
argues that pre-structural policy failures were due to isolated and uncoordinated
implementation (PORALG, 2003:3).
44
Learning from pre-structural policies failure, the RDP 2003 argues that it will facilitate
coordination of several other policies and strategies coalescing to achieve the goal of
National Vision 2025 (PORALG, 2003:4). Such other policies and strategies are:
National Poverty Eradication Strategy Paper (NESP), the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP), and the Local Government Reforms (LGRP) (ibid.).
In the context of RDP 2003, rural development implies a number of interrelated aspects
of development namely: increased popular participation, empowerment, raising peoples’
welfare, equitable resource allocation and taking into consideration vulnerable ones in
society (PORALG, 2003:5). In general, the RDP 2003 recognizes three main players in
development: the state as the overall development coordinator; private sector as
responsible for distribution and delivery; and communities as beneficiaries but also actors
in different economic activities. Civil society are predominantly assigned the role of
promoting voluntarism and policy influencing (PORALG, 2003:38-9), whereas donors
are expected to contribute finance and technical assistance (PORALG, 2003:40).
RDP 2003 recognizes the centrality of land for development, but all along claims that it is
“difficult to protect the land for future generations and make sufficient land available for
public purposes” (PORALG, 2003:15). This claim contradicts the land policy provision
that all land is public; users have only usufruct rights (MNRT, 1998:6) and at the disposal
of the President (Shivji 2002:195). The policy claim that it “will protect customary rights
of different groups …” (PORALG, 2003:15) sounds populist and lip-service on the
backdrop of government refusal to make land a constitutional matter (Shivji, 1998:46).
The problem of maintaining a multiple hierarchical and inconsistent land tenure system is
described as due to failure to translate various concepts and ideas of customary land
tenure into received law by former British colonies hence a tendency to ignore it
(McAuslan, 2000:93).
45
2.10 Conceptual Framework
The overarching conceptual framework for this study derived from literature is that of
political ecology; described by Neumann (2005:129) as concerned with the issues of
political conflict, social justice and ecological efficacy that surround state-directed
biodiversity conservation.” Leaning towards other social science conceptual frameworks
namely postcolonial theory and development studies approaches are also incorporated in
the thinking underpinning this study.
The political economy argues that “the relative success of biodiversity protection
strategies can only be fully explained through an analysis of the specific historical,
cultural, and political-economic contexts within which protected areas are embedded”
(Neumann, 2005:192). It addresses the question close to political economy but limited to
ecology i.e. what are the ecological costs of development; applying the political economy
framework of analysis of who produces what, who owns and control the produce and
who consumes what. Using these concepts the study analyzes wildlife conservation and
land use from a historical, cultural, political, and political economic perspectives.
Attempts are made to map and assess relationships between major players in the wildlife
sector with a focus on human-wildlife conflict management. It examines and considers
the national policies and laws as well as certain donors who are dominant in shaping
policies and practices of wildlife conservation in the country.
Within this conceptual framework attempts are made to propose broadly alternative
socially-just development conceptions. The argument behind the conceptual approach of
social justice is that it “would offer avenues of rehabilitating the victims of historical
injustices” (Chachage, 1996:197). The proposed composition of the land matters
adjudication machinery, the bottom-up process giving rise to the same, and the inclusion
of substance of “people’s sense of justice, rights fairness equity and reasonableness”
(Shivji, 2002:210) is the bottom line of what constitutes good practice in land matters, not
only in Tanzania, but presumably in any democratic society. Policy and law-making have
“to translate the interests, perspectives and notions of justice and fairness of the large
46
majority” (Shivji, 2002: 214), instead of ignoring them (McAuslan, 2000:83) and
criminalizes local cultures and practices (Neumann, 1992:3).
A human rights approach to development insists “that real development does not have
only one cultural expression but must be consistent with cultural pluralism, necessitating
in particular the enfranchisement of non-Western cultures” (Sutcliffe, 1999:139). Both
the WB (Deininger & Binswanger, 1999) and Tanzania’s PRSP (URT, 2000:11)
recognize the problems of insecure land tenure system in the country, but in proposing
measures to improve security of tenure they divert and advocate individualization, titling
and registration (ITR), despite evidence that ITR does not guarantee security of tenure
always in all contexts. However, Deininger & Binswanger (1999:258) make a clear
recommendation that “instead of reinforcing …artificial dichotomy between private and
communal rights or trying to privatize land rights, ….policy makers should focus on
ways to increase secure property rights within given constraints.”
47
Chapter Three: Research Methodology
3.0 Introduction
This chapter explains with justifications the way the research was conducted. It has six
main sections; dealing with the formulation, carrying out the research, analyzing the
findings and finally reporting. Section 3.1 presents the adopted methodology of the study,
including a general description of qualitative methods used. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 deal with
the design and structure of the operationalization of the study, while section 3.5 covers
tools of analysis and analysis. The last section of this chapter i.e. section 3.6 covers field
constraints and challenges.
3.1 Research Methodology
This study adopted qualitative research methods as its methodology. Qualitative
methodology is diverse, pluralistic and ridden with internal contradictions (Sarantakos,
2005:36) which makes it suitable for this study because the study does not intend to
produce reality as a monolithic whole, unproblematic and trans-culturally universal.
Instead it is interested in the subjective meaning, namely the way people make sense of
their world, and the ways in which they assign meanings to it (Sarantakos, 2005:40).
Interpretative methodology as a branch of qualitative methods is adopted for this study
because it facilitates deconstruction and reconstruction in the social world making
objectivism and rationalism relative concepts and involves reflective assessment of the
reconstructed impressions of the world, and integration of action processes in a general
context, which will constitute a new unit (Sarantakos, 2005:39). Overall interpretative
methods are adopted to facilitate searching for culturally derived and historically situated
interpretations of the social life-world as observed by Crotty (1998:67 in Sarantakos,
2005:40).
Political ecology, which is an overall conceptual framework of this study, can be situated
in moderate postmodernism which “sees reality not as objectively given but as being
48
created, interpreted, and maintained in interaction” (Sarantakos, 2005:315). It rejects the
unitary, uniform, homogeneous and self-evident world instead it sees the world as
pluralistic and split (Sarantakos, 2005:316). This is the essence of the study adopting a
deconstructive and reconstructive approach as its analytical tool, because the question of
access to land and natural resources transcends access to material resources, and extends
to ideas of symbolic meanings which are cultural and context specific and therefore are
subjective. The study thus intends to produce a cultural specific interpretation of reality.
The study used secondary data and complemented with semi-structured interviews (see
Annexes 6, 7, 8 & 9). Interviews with local communities and elites broaden the views
expressed in the wildlife authorities’ documents and independent academic publications
which are not always agreeing with wildlife authorities’ narratives.
3.2 Research Design and Sampling
The initial design of this study was such that villagers or local communities would not be
included in data collection because of the researcher’s belief that ordinary people
particularly in Developing Countries have been ‘overused’ as sources of research
material with little to show for it. A second justification of their exclusion was that
engagement with local communities for data collection raises unrealistic expectations
from them that would require extra-ordinary efforts to explain the reasons of that study to
the level of bringing down their expectations to the reality. This is based on the
understanding that data collected were primarily for meeting the researcher’s academic
qualification. This does not mean however the study is useless to the villagers instead it is
an appreciation that it does not belong to the realm of those with political and financial
clout who translate research findings into policy and practice as cited by Sarantakos
(1998) and Chachage (2000) and discussed in Chapter Four.
However, documentary evidence showed inconsistencies and gaps between practice and
theory/policy and it became imperative to include communities’ views in the study by
interviewing them. The following quotation may serve to drive home the concerns of the
policy/research-practice disconnect:
49
“The evolution of the World Bank’s policy is of interest because it reflects
wider historical changes in understanding amongst researchers and policy
makers, and because the World Bank and other Western donors have tended to
dominate debate on land tenure, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It should be
noted however that the new openness in World Bank policy on land is not
always or necessarily reflected in practice by its operational divisions” (Quan,
2000:36; see also WB Paper in URT, 1994a:116-7).
The question is; why is there a gap between theoretical/policy consensus among policy-
makers and academics on the one side and practitioners on the other? In efforts to answer
this question, adding communities’ voice into the unit of analysis becomes unavoidable.
Bowing to the temptation of including villagers in the interview is therefore based on the
fact that they “have no privileged access to the truth, but they do have privileged access
to their own opinions and meanings” (Baxter & Eyles, 1997:514). Their inclusion in the
unit of analysis was not meant to cover new or more grounds, instead it was a
triangulation method to ascertain what dictate/inform development practice, as there is a
mismatch between public policy and policy implementation on one side and research
findings and conceptual consensus on the other side (cf. URT, 1994a v/s Land Act 1999;
URT, 2000:11; Mbilinyi, 2002:3).
Official published documents are the most authoritative, but not necessarily the most
authentic (North et al, 1963:20). Based on the postmodernists suspicion that truth masks
and serves particular interests in local, cultural and political struggles (North et al,
1963:19; Richardson, 1994 in Sarantakos, 2005:316) and the flexibility of qualitative
methods of concurrently doing data collection and analysis (Sarantakos, 2005:344) it was
possible for the researcher to change his mind and include communities’ views in the unit
of analysis.
The study set to covers a period of ten years from 1994 to 2004 because of the following
reasons:
50
• The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land matters was appointed in 1991
and some of its reports became public in 1994 (Shivji, 1999b:1). From then,
debates on matters of land continued; highly informed and influenced by the Land
Commission’s findings and recommendations (see Chachage, 1996:4 footnotes).
• The piloting phase of Community Conservation Service and Wildlife
Management Areas started in the late 1980s (AWF, 1992) and early 1990s
respectively (MNRT, 1998).
• From the mid 1980s, Tanzania has been undertaking various reforms, central of
which was economic liberalization under the instructions of international financial
institutions which fuelled land conflicts due to formerly disposed land owners
coming back and reclaiming their lands (URT, 1997:20) as well as land
increasingly becoming a commodity while the government is denouncing it
(Manji, 2001:329; Daley, 2005:397 in Daley; 2005:526).
• From 1996, to date, the Tanzanian Government is undertaking Local Government
Reforms that have a bearing on the powers and responsibilities of lower tiers of
the government in matters also related to land and wildlife resources (see Shauri,
1999:4). Such reforms have had a significant influence on peoples’ lives where
the majority had been systematically excluded (Mbilinyi, 2002:1).
As pointed out in Chapter One, the Tanzanian economy is predominantly agrarian in
which more than 70 per cent of the population derive a living out of direct working the
land, and the economy as a whole depends on primary production (Campbell, 1992:91;
Kweka et al, 2003:337). It can therefore be argued that land is the centre of peoples’
livelihoods and the engine of the economy.
Broadly, the study focuses on the wildlife sector and land tenure system in Tanzania,
however specific reference is made to three national parks namely Udzungwa Mountains
National Parks (UMNP) in the southern tourist circuit, and Tarangire (TNP) and Lake
Manyara National Park (LMNP) both in the northern tourist circuit (see Annex 1). The
51
selection from both Southern and Northern tourist circuit is purposefully made to
facilitate comparison because local communities in the two circuits have different land
tenure systems and occupations (Goldman, 2003; WWF, 1994). The focus on national
parks includes the neighbouring villages and private sector operators in the area. Despite
this specific focus on the three national parks and neighbouring villages, the study also
draws experiences from other protected areas in and outside the country to give an overall
picture whenever possible.
Purposeful sampling is the technique used in this study because there was a “conceptual
reasons for directing attention to particular informants at the outset of the research
process” (Baxter & Eyles, 1997:513). Purposeful sampling technique is often used by
qualitative researchers stressing the search for informant-rich cases (ibid.).
Local NGOs selected for inputs to this study are Land Rights Research and Resource
Institute (LRRRI) and Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT). They were
selected based on known involvement in land and wildlife debates determined by
availability of their publications and easy access. These organizations have a countrywide
coverage which was important for having an overall picture, despite location specific
focus of the study.
The inclusion of African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF) was automatic following the selection of the three national parks where the two
NGOs are partnering with TANAPA and Wildlife Division. The local/international
balance, i.e. two international NGOs and two local, was purposeful for comparisons and
construction of commonalities across the groups (Baxter & Eyles, 1997:513).
Respondents for elite interviews were selected using a purposeful sampling method as a
start followed by a mix of purposeful and snowball method. However, some respondents
were included by the virtue of their positions in organizations selected. When snowball
52
sampling method did not work properly such as when would be respondents were also
authors, heads or part of commissions whose reports were included in the unit of analysis,
purposeful sampling was resorted-to to exclude such prolific would-be respondents. This
was done to avoid over-representation. Villagers and tour companies interviewed were
picked based on cost and time considerations and their willingness to participate.
Villagers were identified purposefully at the market place and discussions were held on
the next day both individually and as a group.
There is a risk of picking easy respondent because “easy contacts are not necessarily the
most informative contacts and such people may have only limited capacity to comment
on issues relevant to research question” (Baxter & Eyles 1997:513). The limited capacity
of tour company employees was noted and thus their contribution was taken with such
consideration, while other data checking methods were used to minimize other
weaknesses, as will be explained below.
Identification of government departments/agencies was determined by their respective
statutory responsibilities in regard to land and wildlife. The Ministry of Lands Human
Settlement Development (MLHSD) is charged among other things with land matters,
while the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) is charged with wildlife.
The Wildlife Division is a section of the MNRT charged with wildlife outside the
national park (Majamba, 2001:12-13) while the Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) an
autonomous government agency is responsible for wildlife within the national parks
respectively. Due to logistical limitations, the Ministry of Local Governments and
Regional Administration (PORALG) which is a crosscutting ministry was not directly
included in the study, however through its Rural Development Policy document 2003 it
was indirectly included.
53
3.3 Unit of Analysis
Existing secondary data in the form of reports and other documents form the main source
of data for this study; however it is complemented by elite and villager interviews.
“Document analysis in qualitative inquiry yields excerpts, quotations from organizations,
clinical or program records, memoranda and correspondences, official publications and
reports, personal diaries, and open-ended written responses to questionnaires and survey”
(Patton, 1990:10). In this regard the following were documents included in the study:
project reports (planning, evaluations, mid-term reviews, field reports, progress reports,
contracts/agreements, Memorandum of Understanding), senior government official
speeches, correspondences (internal file memos, emails, and letters) government policies,
laws and commission reports. A wide range of academic papers were also used.
Documentary methods are very useful tools of social science research and an
indispensable one, particularly when the research was focused on past events
(Sarantakos, 2005:299). In such cases documentary methods tends to be the most reliable
method of collecting data on past events (ibid.).
The documents accessed had gaps, as there were a number of documents that could not
be accessed for reasons such as missing in the archives/documentation rooms or in some
cases access was denied (see Annex 2). Even with organizations where access to archives
was fully granted, interviews were important because “we cannot treat records, however
official they are as firm evidence of what they report” thus they need to be complemented
(Atkison & Coffey, 1997:47 in Silverman, 2000:128). Interviews with senior employees
of organizations included in the study were used to bridge such gaps. Interviews were
also used to clarify some of the hazy ideas gathered from documents. Villagers were
included to augment the quality of the findings.
54
3.4 Data Collection Strategy
Data collection was done in eight weeks from May 25th to July 19th, 2005. In-between
data collection, peer debriefing6 discussions were held. Two main methods of data
capturing were used: notes-taking and tape-recording for interviews, while documents
were read, quotations extracted, summarized and some selected pages were photocopied.
Though tape recording was the preferred methods by the researcher during interviews,
some respondents refused to be tape-recorded. Tape-recording was very convenient for
the researcher because the whole conversation was captured, stored and can be retrieved
during report writing. Tape-recording also created a “natural conversation” environment,
as well as being more time-efficient.
3.4.1 Documents
Securing permits to access government ‘not-public’ documentation was cumbersome, and
even after securing it was still difficult to access such documents. Access was denied
with excuses like, “the responsible person has other duties”, or “list down what you want
and we will prepared them for you” and sometimes being advised to redirect the study to
other areas considered by such people as more relevant (see Annex 2). Scholars remain
dependent on what government chooses to reveal to them, which leaves many open
questions (North et al, 1963:19), but other avenues to access the same information
sometimes work. Some Government Ministries and agencies provided annexes of official
documents. Such documents were not very useful because they missed the main
documents, but also they were printed or copied from software archives that are
susceptible to unauthorized alterations. This constraint was dealt by accessing some of
those documents from international NGOs working with the government.
Process documents rather than final documents alone were considered important for this
study to describe and explain the policy making process because it is an important aspect
6 Peer debriefing involves exposing data and interpretations to a respected colleague in order to point up possible sources of misinterpretation and the ‘suppression’ of themes or voices that do not ‘fit’ the storyline (Baxter & Eyles, 1997:514).
55
of good practice (see Chachage, 1996; Shivji, 2002; Mbilinyi, 2002). Secondly, process
documents help in explaining the rationale of final documents, such as the Land Policy
(1997), which is claimed and criticized for being non-participatory (Chachage, 1996:4-5;
Shivji, 1999b:1) and exclusionary (Mbilinyi, 2002:1).
Vandalism of documents, books, and reports aside some documents such as commission
reports and consultancy reports could not be found in the University of Dar es Salaam
(UDMS) library. A librarian at UDSM said that to access certain reports one has to make
bilateral arrangements with respective consultants or commissioning authorities.
3.4.2 Interviews
In total nineteen (19) people were interviewed in this study; distributed as follows: six
(31.7%) researchers/lecturers at the University of Dar es Salaam, three (15.8%)
researchers-cum-activists with local NGOs, two (10.5%) senior program officers in an
international NGO, and two (10.5%) TANAPA Heads of departments, one (5.2%) head
of department at TAWIRI, three (15.8%) villagers and two (10.5%) private sector
employees. No personal data of the respondents was collected. Out of all the people
interviewed there were only two women (10.5%).
Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were held with key informants and villagers
(see Annexes 6, 7, 8, 9). With key informants, questions were varied depending on the
organizations they work for view of deepening the understanding and varied meanings
(see Annexes 6, 7, 8). Due to insistence from TANAPA respondents, questions were sent
prior to the interview day (see Annex 6). One of the respondent answered questions by
writing though a short interview was held, while the second was interviewed. It was
possible during the interview to open-up and cover areas not included in the questions
sent. Employees of studied organizations were asked questions of clarifications and or
probing deeper into some areas as well as filling in some gaps left by documented
evidences.
56
With the villagers the discussion revolved around the process of forming a WMA, the
functioning of WMAs, the process of land acquisition for WMA, formation of WMA
committees, and the overall management issues of WMA (see Annex 9). Discussions
were audio recorded. A one-to-one interview was held during the day and a group
discussion in the evening in an informal environment was held. A few controversial
issues raised in the one-to-one discussions were re-discussed in the group.
Informal discussions were held with employees of Byabato hunting and Kibo
photographic tour companies (see Annex 8). Two employees were selected for interview
by the virtue of their positions i.e. section heads. Information gathered while useful was
not particularly helpful in relation to wildlife, land and human-wildlife conflicts.
3.4.3 Peer Debriefing Group
The differences between official reports of the government and international NGOs on
one side and some activists, some academics and community views on the other side was
wide, conflicting, and sometimes contentious. It necessitated peer debriefing through a
group consisting of two experienced researchers and one trainee. Some of controversial
findings were discussed informally with the peer debriefing group. Peer debriefing and
triangulation are among the analytical techniques that may be used after data is collected
to verify its reliability (Baxter & Eyles 1997:514).
3.5 Analysis and Tools of Analysis
The challenge in qualitative methods is that there are few agreed-on canons for data
analysis, in the sense of shared ground rules for drawing conclusions and verifying their
sturdiness (Miles & Huberman, 1984:16 in Patton, 1990:372). However there are
guidelines and procedures, much of the rest depends on creativity and judgment, because
each qualitative study is unique (ibid.).
57
Content analysis was an overall tool of analysis in this study as it allowed delving into the
purpose of communication, and the underlying cultural patterns, attitudes, prejudices,
norms, and standards that are encoded in the message through deconstructing and
reconstructing of messages to identify their real meaning and the impact the context has
on the construction of meanings and their underlying justification (Sarantakos,
2005:300). Content analysis was adopted as an overall tool of analysis of this study
because it facilitate establishment of the intention of text and its contents since a text says
nothing beyond the intentions of the text producer (Lindkvist, 1981:24). Contents
analysis also provides a researcher with data of the policy realm, since it is often difficult
to have senior policy officials for in-depth interviews (North et al, 1963:17). Content
analysis also covers impressionistic, intuitive and interpretative essays and others that are
carried out at the nominal scale level (Rosengreen, 1981:11)
Content analysis as part of a broader branch of textual analysis has two main branches,
namely analysis and interpretation, where the former deals with manifest content and the
latter latent content (Lindkvist, 1981:26-7). Some researchers (see North et al, 1963;
Silverman, 2000) place content analysis into both quantitative and qualitative methods. In
quantitative methods for instance pre-determined categories are used to count the number
of certain texts feature in a document (Silverman, 2000:3 & 128). In this study no
counting of frequency of certain contents were made, instead the researcher was
“concerned with the process through the texts depict reality, than with whether such text
contain true of false statements” (Rosengreen, 1981:128). Hermeneutics7 technique was
used in the interpretation of the texts and contents of documents to understand the
contents and the intentions of producers, as well as the relations between producers and
receivers. Understanding of the content of the text facilitates the understanding of people
and social life in general.
The findings of the study were analysed by fitting them into a pre-designed conceptual
framework (see 2.10 in Chapter Two) with pre-determined categories which is a feature
7 Hermeneutic is a technique based on text interpretation i.e. an art of translating and constitutes an approach to texts and fixed expressions of human life with the purpose of understanding and interpreting them as well as their creators (Sarantakos, 1994:48)
58
of quantitative methods (Silverman, 2000:3) concurrently drawing lessons and making
judgments. This process was eclectic whereby findings-conceptual framework and vice
versa were contrasted and lessons drawn. The eclectic process is made possible and
justified by the nature of the study whereby official versions (from the Government and
international NGOs) proclaim a pre-defined future (TANAPA, 2002a&b & 2001; WWF,
1994) while some activists, some academics, and communities argue that each situation is
unique and there is a need for discussions on each case to chart ways forward (see URT,
1994a:140; Chachage, 2000:201-2, Mbilinyi, 2002, Shivji, 2002). Lessons were drawn by
contrasting concepts and notions of pre-determined universal/cross-cultural desired
futures from the official versions with that of communities’, some activists’ and some
academics’ context and community specific concepts of development.
Despite the study being qualitative, based on case study, it is possible to draw general
conclusions from specific findings and generalize within typical cases (Sarantakos
1998:26) as demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five of this study.
3.6 Constraints and Challenges
Due to budget constraints which were not expected during the initial stages of research
design, the sources of data was shifted towards easy accessible and willing to collaborate
sources. This however may have had no meaningful impact on the findings because
inaccessibility of some sources was due to other reasons like bureaucracy and lack of
transparency rather than financial constraints (see Annex 2). Limited access to
documentation in government offices such as the Wildlife Division may have biased the
findings despite efforts to balance using documentations jointly shared between the
government and international NGOs that could be accessed from the NGOs. Budget
constraints however lead to a more limited inclusion of the private sector in the study.
The composition of peer debriefing group was somewhat biased by having members of
the same organizations who had hierarchal relationships. This bias was noted and taken
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with that consideration in mind, because little could be done to overcome this
shortcoming because the group was formed relying on voluntarism.
The interview was gender biased, as shown there were only two women among
interviewees. Nevertheless, there is much confidence that gender issues are well
accommodated because the conceptual framework of this study attempts to advance
“beyond matters of sex bias and integration into development to questioning the very
procedures and structures of development as an institution of ruling (Escobar, 1995:181)
rather than head counts of those who constitute such structures/institutions.
Overall the methodology used and conceptual framework of the study offered adequate
space to delve deep into the findings and accommodated the diversities in real life. What
are offered at the end of it are certain views and perceptions that are value-loaded and
ideologically driven.
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Chapter Four: Findings and Analysis
4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents background information on the national parks, projects, and
organizations and processes in wildlife and land policy and law formulation and
implementation studied. It also presents analysis of different concepts and approaches to
community participation and human-wildlife conflicts in wildlife conservation, putting
forward varied and sometimes conflicting views and opinions on the same. Section 4.1
presents the background of the three national parks covered and the main actors in such
national parks. Since the two international NGOs, the African Wildlife Foundation
(AWF) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) active in wildlife conservation in
Tanzania are prominently active in the three national parks, they are also discussed in this
section. Section 4.2 discusses local NGOs involved in wildlife and land matters.
Section 4.3 describes briefly the land and wildlife policymaking processes in Tanzania;
while section 4.4 to 4.6 dwell on different aspects of human-wildlife conflicts. The last
section of this chapter (section 4.7) discusses the overall findings in a framework of good
practices in land policy and laws in the wildlife sector touching also development issues
related to conservation. Three boxes in this chapter are meant to illustrate development
operationalization in conservation work.
4.1 Background to the selected National Parks
The three national parks selected for study were Udzungwa Mountains National Parks
(UMNP), Tarangire National Park (TNP) and Lake Manyara National Park (LMNP). The
study includes communities around these national parks and Wildlife Management Areas
around them, as explained in Chapter Three (see section 3.3).
4.1.1 Udzungwa Mountains National Park (UMNP)
In 1988, WWF, IUCN and TANAPA proposed to upgrade Udzungwa Mountains forest
reserve into a national park (WWF, 1994). Both the district and regional authorities of
villages around Udzungwa Mountains opposed the idea fearing that the national park
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would deny local communities the rights to use natural resources within the would be
national park. Udzungwa Mountains National Park is in Morogoro and Iringa regions.
WWF and TANAPA went ahead to facilitate the establishment of a national park that
was gazetted in February 1992 (Brockington, 2002:11). WWF funded the construction of
park headquarters, park administration block and senior staff houses, procuring and
fixing of applied research equipments (WWF, 1994). It also paid salaries of TANAPA’s
Community Conservation staff and wardens up to 1994 and paid for surveying and
demarcation of 80 km park boundary (ibid).
An agro-forest project comprising of the development of village tree nurseries, woodlots,
growing fruit trees, efficient cooking stoves, beekeeping, were introduced in six villages
along Kiberege-Kidatu road in 1991, a year before the gazetting of the national park
(ibid.). The overall objective of the agro-forestry project among local communities was to
help people begin to develop alternative resource base (WWF/TANAPA, 1997:5). The
agro-forestry project was not very successful, because villagers were not interested in
fruit trees provided and the survival rate of planted seedlings was 13 per cent only. Part
of the reasons for low survival rate of seedlings was poor extension services (WWF,
1994). Under the agro-forestry projects several village committees were established such
as village community conservation committee (VCCC), and the natural resource
management committee (NRMC). The Community Conservation Service Staff of
TANAPA working under WWF by then helped communities in developing respective
instruments such as constitutions, work plans etc.
The Significance of the park
TANAPA (2001:8-9) describes the importance of the UMNP as follows:
• It represents the only eastern arc mountains forests block in east Africa with the
greatest altitudinal range and relatively undisturbed forest. It is a storehouse of
genetic diversity.
• It is the only known national park in Tanzania that has ten primate species, two of
which are endemic primates “the Iringa red colobus (procolobus badius
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gordonorum) and the Sanje crested mangabey (cercocebus galeritus sanjei)”
which are considered endangered (IUCN, 1996 in WWF, 1994:1).
• It is an important water catchment area that provides quality water throughout the
year for fishing and agriculture in the Kilombero Valley, and contributes to the
national economy through the production of hydroelectric power at Kidatu.
• It is rich in cultural values and contains unusual historical and religious sites, kept
intact prior to gazettement due to traditional taboos and beliefs. Such sites are
Mwanaluvele caves, Mwanihana peak, Nyumbanitu and Mdane, which attract
tourists and as well as local communities that regard the forests as home to
numerous deities.
• UMNP and its surrounding forests are the richest forest bird locality in Tanzania
and also support a large number of mammals.
• It has immense aesthetic appeal with waterfalls, tall tress, and an array of
wildflowers, mountain peak and superb views of the surrounding countryside.
• It protects the area against soil erosion on the mountain slopes.
WWF involvement in UMNP is to assist TANAPA to develop a park by providing
funding for: all essential park infrastructure; equipment and work with communities
outside the park; the Community Conservation Service which implements an agro-
forestry project with a view of (WWF, 1994):
i) Enhancing the capacity of the local communities to produce their own tree
resources outside the national park.
ii) Reducing the demand for fuel wood in the project area through the introduction of
fuel-efficient cooking stoves.
After the establishment of the national park, national park’s regulations were enforced
which restrict local communities’ use of resources within the park (TANAPA/WWF,
1997:9). However, arrangements were made to allow villagers: two days a week to
collect dead wood from the park, and with a permit from national park authorities to
collect thatch grass, medicinal plants and access worship and sacred sites within the park
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(WWF, 1994). An awareness project was launched to create awareness among villagers
of the importance of conservation.
WWF-UK, FINNIDA and DFID jointly funded UMNP while WWF Tanzania office was
managing the funds (WWF, 1994). Other organizations that were involved in the project
were Missouri Botanical Garden and an unnamed Italian NGO (Kashaija, undated).
After a period of almost five years TANAPA noted a worsening of the living standards of
the local people living adjacent to the national park and redirected its Community
Conservation Service (CCS) program to facilitate the production of food stuffs at the
household level and the establishment of in-come generating projects wherever possible
(TANAPA, 1999:4).
Protection of the park and promotion of tourism were the major concerns to TANAPA in
UMNP (TANAPA, 2001; WWF, 1994). Population growth among local communities (3
per cent per annum) was a concern to TANAPA because it considers human population
increase in the surroundings of the park as a threat to conservation (TANAPA, 2001).
The various experiences of UMNP under WWF have influenced certain national
programmes:
• Since 1999, the Ministry of Education announced its approval to include both in
primary and secondary schools’ curriculum, Environmental Education following
the success of pilot primary school Environmental Program in eastern side of the
UMNP (WWF, 2000).
• Mweka Wildlife College the main institution that produces Tanzania’s Park
Wardens and rangers, Game Reserve Wardens, uses UMNP as a field-training site
annually (WWF, 2000:9).
• Experiences and demands for community conservation projects influenced the
curriculum of Mweka Wildlife College to introduce a ‘Man and Wildlife’ course
(WWF, 2000:20). Furthermore WWF sponsors Sokoine University of Agriculture
in the training of Agricultural Extension Officers (ibid.).
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4.1.2 Tarangire National Park (TNP)
Tarangire National Park has an area of 2600 sq. km and was gazetted as a national park in
1970 (Brockington, 2002:11). During the rain season, animals migrate out of TNP to
Simanjiro plains, in Lorkisalie, Emboreet and Loibor soit villages for calving because the
nutrient content of forage in the park is poor for calving (TANAPA, 2002b; Goldman,
2003:846). Animals migrate back to the park during the dry season because of shortage
of water in the plains (Foley, 2004:12). Having animals outside the park attract private
camps to locate in village lands adjacent to the park (TANAPA, 2002b). Similarly
poachers had easy access to wildlife in Simanjiro plains (Foley, 2004:14). Small scale
and commercial farmers are also attracted by these plains and some of them acquired land
such as the Rift Valley Seed Company Ltd which acquired 381,000 acres of land for
farming (URT, 1994b:34). The plains are also community common grazing grounds.
These plains are therefore used by three different groups, namely: the customary owners
(the pastoralists); and two new others the wildlife sector and farmers.
Pastoralists having only customary land rights, felt teaming up with wildlife sector to
establish a WMA would help them keep away farmers from encroaching the plains
(TANAPA, 2002b). The wildlife sector also felt the same though wanted to control
pastoralists’ use of the plains as well (Franfurt Zoological Society et al, 1988). Wildlife
authorities considered that pastoralism rather than crop or ranch farming is compatible
with wildlife (Foley, 2004:13).
Back in 1988, the Franfurt Zoological Society study team advised TANAPA Board to
maintain and protect the Simanjiro dispersal and calving grounds by excluding all types
of intensive and extensive land uses such as “large and small scale agriculture, urban
development, mining, and ranching” (Franfurt Zoological Society et al, 1988). The study
team advised TANAPA to: establish a 30 km wide corridor in east and south-east of the
park; to establish a protected area between Tarangire and Manyara national parks where
only livestock grazing is allowed; to relocate human people living in the Tarangire-
Manyara corridor; and to embark on awareness raising and extension education to
surrounding communities (ibid.).
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Pastoralists, farmers, and others occupy the Kwakuchinja corridor that is located between
the TNP, Lake Manyara National Park (LMNP) and Ngorongoro Conservation Area
(Kideghesho, 2000; TANAPA, 2002b). Within this corridor, 70 per cent of the human
population is immigrants and half of them moved-in over the last ten years (TANAPA
2002b:19). Already there are conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over
grazing/farming land and water (ibid.). Simanjiro plains, TNP, Kwakuchinja corridor and
LMNP all constitute one ecosystem collectively referred to as Tarangire-Manyara
ecosystem or Maasai Steppe Heartland, defined by ecological and social systems integral
to the functioning of Tarangire and Manyara national parks (Goldman, 2003:846).
Evidence shows that the advice of establishing a WMA in eastern Tarangire became
feasible only after the 1998 Wildlife Policy providing for WMA. A WMA would
facilitate anti-poaching services from TANAPA as well as the Wildlife Division, village
scouts and tourist companies (Foley, 2004:14).
4.1.3 Lake Manyara National Park (LMNP)
LMNP is located in a tsetse fly infested area, which was seasonally used, by Maasai and
other pastoralists before the establishment of the park in 1960 (TANAPA, 2002a;
Brockington, 2002:11). LMNP is a small park with an area of 330 sq. km. (Brockington,
2002:11). Its headquarters are located on land that TANAPA has no legal ownership
(TANAPA, 2002a), a situation contributing to bad relations between the park and
neighbouring local communities, notably Moya-Mayoka villages (ibid.). The bad
relations have threatened park staff personal security, and are linked to other illegal acts
like poaching, trapping and arson by local communities (ibid.). Other reasons
contributing to and or worsening poor park-local communities relations are:
• Local politicians exploiting strained park-communities relations to earn votes by
teaming-up with communities against the park,
• Lack of prompt response from park authorities when villagers facing wildlife call
them related problems (TANAPA, 2002a).
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Wildlife authorities were brought to understand that a large and varied wildlife
population cannot survive in isolation, therefore they have to ensure that wildlife have
access to village lands outside the park (Foley, 2004:12), and that the number of
extinctions as well as the rate of extinction of large mammals in Tanzania’s parks is
inversely correlated with park area, indicating that smaller parks are less effective in
maintaining large mammal populations (TANAPA, 2002a). TANAPA emphasizes the
protection of critical wildlife corridors, as a best alternative to safeguard large mammals
in small parks like LMNP. TANAPA in 1972 and 1990 acquired Marang Forest and
Moyoka Farms, respectively and annexed them to LMNP, which almost doubled its size
(ibid.).
TANAPA has also intentions to annex mining areas in the southern part i.e. Marang
Forest neighbouring Moya-Mayoka village to avert potential land use conflicts. Once the
mine is annexed to the National Park, TANAPA would illigalize mining in the area
despite mining importance as a source of income to mainly villagers of Moya-Mayoka
and local government authorities. To mitigate the possible negative effects, park
authorities plan to compensate the losses through introducing alternative resources and
alternative sources of income such as employment opportunities, markets for local
products and improved communication (ibid.).
A sizeable number of wildlife killings happen outside the park (TANAPA, 2002a; Foley,
2004:12). To stop that, TANAPA has to maintain extensive wildlife dispersal areas, and
must influence the rate and nature of land use changes around the park (TANAPA,
2002a:35). In view of this, TANAPA introduced Community Management Zones (CMZ)
around LMNP. The CMZ are land areas around the LMNP set and defined on the basis of
their impact on the survival of the park (TANAPA, 2002a). Among the management
zones is the Community Influence Zone (CIZ), implying areas outside the park
boundaries that have a direct or indirect influence or impact on LMNP. Boundaries of
this zone are Karatu-Mbulu-Magara-Makuyuni road on the west, south and east, and
Selela-Upper Kitete wildlife corridors to the north (ibid.).
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In collaboration with AWF, district authorities, and private entrepreneurs, TANAPA
influences local communities’ land use and socio-economic activities in the CIZ in order
to address the existing park-people conflicts and achieve common conservation and local
community objectives. Interviewed TANAPA officials allege that there is a lack of
touristic culture amongst Tanzanians thus they do not use their leisure time in the
wilderness, consequently their low interest in supporting wildlife conservation. TANAPA
thus intends to properly document the diverse culture around the park to be used as
another tourist attraction as well as cultivating an interest among local communities to
visit national parks and tourist attractions (ibid.).
TANAPA and AWF support community initiated projects, raising conservation
awareness and facilitate sustainable land use programs in CIZ. They also develop
ecotourism activities through exploitation of a diversity of cultures in Mto-wa-Mbu
township (TANAPA, 2002a). Activities comprising ecotourism are: photographing
tourism, hunting tourism, walking safaris, horse riding, cycling, canoeing, camping,
controlled hunting, night game drives, cultural bomas, and sale of cultural artefacts. AWF
works with communities to form Natural Resources and Environmental Committees,
train them in sustainable land uses and ecotourism activities (ibid.). It supported Maasai
women in Esilalei village to establish a cultural boma producing handicrafts and giving
them management and organizational skills. The cultural boma business has largely been
unsuccessful (ibid.).
4.2 Selected Local NGOs active in Wildlife and Land Matters
Two local NGOs Land Rights Research and Resource Institute (LRRRI) and Lawyers
Environmental Action Team (LEAT) were selected (see section 3.3).
4.2.1 Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT)
The Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT) is a local NGO working on natural
resources management and environment protection with a focus of human rights and
democratic governance (LEAT-a). It is involved in issues related to the establishment of
an enabling policy environment for civil society, including civil liberties and human
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rights. It carries out policy research, advocacy, and selected public interest litigation. In
regard to wildlife conservation, LEAT produces Policy Briefs, analyzing wildlife policies
and making recommendations and poposing alternative options. Its analysis is anchored
on good governance, human rights, as well as administrative issues in wildlife and land
management.
LEAT starts with a view that “the state ownership of wildlife, which is a feature of
colonial governance, has partly succeeded to conserving Tanzanian’s biological resources
and contributing to sound land use and natural resource management” (Shauri, 1999:2). It
criticizes the reversal of roles between the government on one side and private sector and
civil society on the other where the government requires both the private sector and civil
society to support it (MNRT, 1998:29) rather than the other way round (Shauri, 1999).
The government views local Civil Society Organizations as its competitors for donor
resources thus endeavours to marginalize and suppress them, while giving undue space to
international NGOs, whose “role has been both direct, through manpower, technical and
financial support to conservation agencies, and ideological, through training within
conservation agencies in methods, ideals, and philosophies of Western nature
conservation” (Neumann, 1992 in Shauri, 1999:9).
LEAT shares the concerns that wildlife is in crises, and identifies such crises as: some
species like black rhinos and wild dogs are over exploited and their populations are
nearing extinction; and wildlife habitats are declining at alarming rates (Shauri &
Hitchcock, 1999:2). LEAT views these crises as also impacting negatively on customary
land rights in Tanzania and attributes its causes to:
• “Contradictory policies, weak law enforcement and poor performance of
institutions with wildlife management responsibilities” (Shauri & Hitchcock,
1999:2). Such practices include commercial poaching by locals and foreigners,
trophy hunting for short-term economic gains by the government, poorly regulated
game viewing which has resulted in the loss and degradation of wildlife habitats
(ibid.). Commercial poaching inadequately regulated by the Wildlife Division has
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adversely affected wildlife population inside and outside protected areas (Neumann,
1992 and Metcalfe et al 1998 in Shauri, 1999:2). It also alleges that game wardens
are involved in illegal poaching (ibid.). Concerns about state’s agents and
employees perpetrating wildlife mismanagement through illegal practices such as
poaching are also discussed by Singleton & Capper (2004).
• Government allocation of community’s land to local and foreign investors as well
as state agencies (Shauri & Hitchcock, 1999:3; Shauri, 1999:7). Some of such new
landlords are absentees (Shauri & Hitchcock, 1999:3). The government justifies
such allocations claiming it is allocating open-land, (i.e. land not subject to any
claim, including customary claim) (ibid.). Such allocations impact negatively on
both wildlife and local communities where communities like pastoralists, hunters-
and-gatherers; small-scale producers (farmers, miners) loose their customary rights
to land which is central to their livelihood (URT, 1994b:34; Shauri & Hitchcock,
1999:3). Despite the Superior Courts interpreting customary land rights as equal to
granted rights of occupancy, government executives continue to maintain in
practice that the latter is superior (Shauri, 1999:7 see also URT, 1994a:11).
LEAT appreciates some initiatives being taken by the government however makes
substantial proposals for improvements. The initiatives it appreciates are:
• The dispersal areas and migratory corridors being established to safeguard the
wildlife sector, however critical of the loss of land by local communities, and sees
this as among the main causes of human-wildlife conflicts in Tanzania (ibid.).
• Despite the institution of WMA as a conciliatory measure, LEAT argues that it
“has limited opportunities and benefits for local people and strained relations with
the Government” (Metcalfe et al 1998 in Shauri & Hitchcock, 1999:3). It also
sees WMA in their current form as placating communities and finally
transforming them into agents of the wildlife sector instead of resolving conflicts
(Shauri, 1999:4), however it appreciates some positive aspects in wildlife
management such as the devolution of wildlife user rights to communities and
benefits sharing provided by the Wildlife Policy of 1998 (Shauri, 1999:3).
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LEAT is opposed to the government position that the procedures of setting WMA are
clear, transparent and simple (MNRT, 1998:30), it criticizes them for being costly,
lengthy and facilitate traditional communities to loose their lands to large scale-farmers,
ranchers, and elites, and putting technical requirements beyond communities reach
(Shauri, 1999:5). The Wildlife Division (WD) is in-charge of wildlife outside the national
parks, but at times, TANAPA with its donor partners work outside the national park,
especially in dispersal areas and wildlife corridors, without the required ministerial
consent, a practice considered by LEAT as contravening principles of good governance
(Shauri, 1999:7). The inadequate performance of the WD is attributed to inadequate
resources, unwillingness to act and the employment of militaristic strategies that heighten
conflicts rather than foster peace (Shauri, 1999:7; Singleton & Capper, 2004:8).
LEAT views the state trusteeship of land and natural resources as a fundamental cause of
land and natural resource conflicts that have intensified in recent years within and around
protected areas in Tanzania (Shauri, 1999:3). To improve wildlife conservation
management and respecting and upholding traditional communities customary land
rights, LEAT proposes the following:
• The state should relinquish trusteeship of natural resources, arguing that
“Continued state ownership and control of wildlife resources perpetuates the
"wildlife-first" philosophy of biodiversity conservation…..and patron-client
relationships that have marked government-community relations in wildlife and
other natural resource management” (Shauri, 1999:3).
• Reviewing wildlife ownership in view of making rural communities co-owners
and co-managers of wildlife in village lands; and laws should be revised to
provide for such arrangements (Shauri, 1999:10).
• Streamline the current institutional fragmentation in wildlife to avert institutional
conflicts and rivalries (ibid.).
• The wildlife policy should equally protect the interests and needs of local
communities in areas inhabited by wildlife (ibid.).
• Streamline the procedures of setting WMA and other instruments guiding wildlife
management (ibid.).
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• The Wildlife Policy (1998) needs to recognize other players and stakeholders in
wildlife such as local NGOs (ibid.).
Recommendations of agencies like LEAT are countered by other communitarian
rights advocates pointing that park conservation is failing, community conservation
being introduced are “ways of introducing ‘modern’ land tenure instead of providing
secure land title to” local communities (Campbell, 2004:12).
4.2.2 Land Rights Research and Resource Institute (LRRRI8)
LRRRI organizes workshops targeted at grassroots level with a view of having a forum
for land debate, information sharing, exchange of experiences, and capacity building
(LRRRI file; 2003). Some of the direct results of the workshops are self-confidence
among the people on land matters and ability to initiate and eventually self-organize in
pursuit and advancement of their land rights (ibid).
Through contacts with grassroots and through its research, LRRRI, point out that
“Hunters-and-gatherers’ land is more vulnerable and prone to grabbing by farmers and
pastoralists because the former lack of one voice and organization, absence of
coordinated land use plans, and negative attitudes of authorities towards hunters-and-
gatherers’ way of life (ibid. see also URT, 1994a:83).
The study of the Maasai rights in Ngorongoro 1997 resulted in the publication of a book
called Maasai Rights in Ngorongoro, Tanzania both in Kiswahili and English (LRRRI
file; HW10/10). The book recommends working out a plan for legislative reform of the
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) Ordinance 1959 and subsequent amendments to
integrate the basic rights of the residents and to enable them participate in the
management of NCA (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998). The book raises a number of insightful
issues, the mains ones are:
8 Prof. Shivji and others formed LRRRI in 1994; Prof. Shivji was the Chairman of the Land Presidential Commission and now the Director of LRRRI.
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• Some land conflicts in the NCA arise out of the multiple and sometimes
conflicting jurisdiction of Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA)
(Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:24).
• The NCA Ordinance 1959 did not extinguish pre-existing titles or rights to land
nor did it vest land in any form in the NCAA (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:28).
• The Article 24 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania must be
given generous and purposive construction, giving the term property a broad
meaning to also mean occupation and use of land (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:31).
This was made from a human rights perspective that sees the Tanzanian law
regarding bare and or undeveloped land to constitute no property and therefore
deserving no compensation when it is acquired for other uses (ibid.). See also
Daley, (2005:563-5).
• For consultation to be effective and not cosmetic, it has to take place prior to the
making of decisions (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:34).
• The NCA Ordinance 1959 and its amendments deny pastoralists living in the
NCA their rights to life and livelihood (Chapter 4),
• LRRRI is critical of the mainstream NGOs approach to human rights awareness
rising arguing that “the practice of many existing human rights NGOs is to
organize seminars, etc so as to ‘educate’ people in human rights” (Shivji &
Kapinga, 1998:69). It adds that this approach is “not only abstract and patronizing
but of little effect and certainly unsuitable for addressing the kind of human rights
issues…” (ibid.). The approach of LRRRI to human rights issues “takes off from
the existing struggles of the community rather than from some pedagogical
premises of human rights education” (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:68-9).
LRRRI uses research-generated material to publicize land conflicts and abuses of human
rights in Ngorongoro, but also use the same as training material in Training of Trainers
(LRRRI, file HN10/10). The training sessions target leaders of civil society
organizations, people’s representatives within the NCA, and some educated leaders
dedicated to serve as future trainers of the villagers (ibid.). The expected outputs of these
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processes are that the pastoralist society in NCA will be better able to understand their
rights; and through this take an active and informed part in:
i. The move to reform the existing relevant legislation (1959, NCAA Ordinance).
ii. Ensuring a sustainable and equitable utilization of the landscape and natural
resources of NCA.
4.3 Tanzania’s Land Policy Process
In 1991, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania appointed a Land Commission
to investigate land matters in the country (URT, 1994a:1). The upheaval and the potential
for social conflict created by previous policies and practices were “the reasons which led
the appointment of the Land Commission” (Shivji 1994 in Shivji, 2002:199). Shivji, a
law professor chaired the Commission, hence the Commission came to be popularly
known as Shivji Land Commission. All the Commissioners were local experts, and the
Commission was funded by the Tanzanian Government (URT, 1994a: xii) and
publication of its report was externally funded with a government permit (URT, 1994a:
xiii).
The salient recommendations of the Commission that are relevant for this discussion are:
• The main features of the land tenure should be included in the Constitution of
the Republic of Tanzania (Shivji, 1999a:2),
• The land radical title9 vested on the President should be diversified (Shivji,
2002:201). All lands in Tanzania should be divided into national and village
lands, the national lands to be vested in a Board of Land Commissioners under
the National Land Commission (NLC) to hold it under trust for all Tanzanians
and village lands should be vested in respective village assemblies (Shivji,
2002:202). In other words, land ownership and administration should be
detached from the Executive (Shivji, 2002:203).
9 Radical or original title is vested on corporate entity and land rights thereof depend on membership of that entity (URT, 1994a:140). It is based on English law, which separates what is owned from the physical subsistence of the land itself. Based on that law, what is owned is not land but estates or interests in the land, the ultimate owner of the land of the land is the Crown (President in Tanzania) subjects own estates in land held from the Crown who has a radical/original title. This was meant to restrict transfer of land in any way (McAuslan, 2000:78).
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• The NLC should be responsible and accountable to the National Assembly
(Shivji, 2002:202).
• All the processes dealing with land delivery (surveying, planning, allocation and
registration and dispositions of national lands should be done in public, through
elected representatives. No land would be considered ready and available for
allocation unless certified by the Circuit Land Courts” (ibid.).
• Five elders should be elected into baraza la wazee (elders council) and act “as
the basic village organ with original jurisdiction10 in all land matters, both civil
and criminal” (Shivji, 2002:205). These elders should be elected by village
assembly for a period of three years and recallable by the assembly before
expiry of their term (Shivji, 2002:206).
The Commission also stated that “land is the major resource and the site of the
construction of culture, custom and conflicts” (Shivji, 2002:195). Furthermore, the
Commission pointed correctly that the current “structure of the Land Act takes the top-
down statist approach (i.e. vesting of land in the President) as its primary building block”
(Shivji, 2002:203). The Commission found that people are dissatisfied “with the
decisions of judicial organs; they did not find them just or fair” (Shivji, 2002:205). Igoe
(2003) gives a detailed account of ineffectiveness of the judiciary in adjudicating
pastoralists and hunters-and-gatherers’ cases against land alienation sanctioned by
government executives. Overall, the Commission recommendations tried to bring a
hybrid proposal bringing “competing perspectives on justice between Western-trained
legal professionals, representing legal justice, and community elders expressing
alternative perspectives” (Shivji, 2002:206).
The government “ignored the major recommendations of the Land Commission, while
taking-in details in an ad hoc basis” (Shivji, 1999b:1). The World Bank however argues
that majority of recommendations of task forces it financed were included in the law
(WB, 2000:19). The reasons for Commission recommendations rejection were inexplicit
10 A judicial organ is said to have original jurisdiction in a particular matter when that matter can be initiated before it (Jowitt & Walsh, 1959:1030).
75
such as “the question of divesting land from the executive arm (the President) was
unjustified since it would mean the President has to be a ‘beggar’ whenever the need for
land for 'public interests' arose. The Commission’s proposal was viewed as detrimental from
the state's point of view if it has to alienate land for 'development projects' (including land
use planning) or investors” (MLHSUD undated in Chachage, 1996:5). Discussing the
Presidential Land Commission Report, Manji points out that the Land Commission was
prompted by donor’s pressure and anticipated to “rationalize and legitimate the
impending liberalization of land in line with policy diktat of the international financial
institutions” (1998:647-8). Manji (1998) implied that the government rejected the Shivji
Commission’s recommendations because it did not rationalize the demands of
international financial institutions.
In a process which seems to have taken place concurrently with the work of the Land
Commission, the Ministry of Lands published its National Land Policy which formed the
basis of the draft Land Act prepared by a foreign consultant. The draft policy of the
Ministry was discussed in closed doors among senior civil servants, top officials from
parastatals, judges, and some elected private law practitioners (Shivji, 1998). These
workshops were financed by the World Bank loan and facilitated by foreign consultants
(Chachage, 1996; Shivji, 1998). The Government had “to hire the Tropical Research &
Development, Inc of the USA in 1994 to quickly write a technical report, financed by the
World Bank in preparation for the January 1995 policy meeting” (MLHSUD undated in
Chachage, 1996:5). More or less the same time, the Land Use Planning Commission was
preparing a land use plan financed by FAO, worked by Prof. Okoth-Ogendo, another
foreign consultant (Okoth-Ogendo, 1995 in MLHSD, 1998:129; Shivji, 1998). The land
policy and land Act process was thus carried out by four different bodies working
independently and uncoordinated and funded through four different sources and reporting
to different organs some of them within the same ministry of lands (Shivji, 1998).
Some local NGOs coalesced around the land question, forming a National Land Forum
(NALAF) in 1997, with the objective of countering the Bretton Woods Institutions
pressuring the government to operationalise the new land laws made by the foreign
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consultant (Igoe, 2003:880; LRRRI internal files HN10/6). NALAF expressed the
following concerns (Change, 1997:72):
• The process of preparation of the draft bill did not involve people, the primary
stakeholders,
• The new land law bill and policy open doors for foreigners to acquire and own
land in Tanzania,
The NGOs Coalition (NALAF) warned that if the bill becomes law, it would threaten
peoples’ security of tenure on land i.e. “under the Bill, the large majority of land users
run the risk of losing their lands” (ibid.). NALAF formed a national committee called
Kamati ya Taifa ya Ardhi (KATAA) to coordinate its activities (LRRRI file, HN10/6).
NALAF issued Azimio la Uhai (Declaration of Life) (Igoe, 2003:880). Apart from
coordinating NALAF activities, KATAA was charged with a responsibility of
broadening, popularizing and publicizing the land debate (Change, 1997:72). The major
guiding principles of the Azimio la Uhai campaign were human rights concerns, current
and future national interests, and principles of democracy and equality (LRRRI, HN10/6).
NALAF made nine succinct salient features of the land bill, making its
interpretation/implications to the land access, use and control by people and made
recommendations on each (ibid.). Scrutiny of many recommendations of NALAF shows
that they are those of the Presidential Commission on Land as summarized above.
NALAF recommended that foreigners rights to land need to be restricted to use only
(ibid). It may be argued that this recommendation adds emphasis to the government
position is that “non-resident occupancy of land is restricted to investment purposes only”
(Mashindano, 2004:74 cf. Shivji, 1998:33). Some other recommendations proposed
restricted sale; transfer and renting of family land without consent of the whole family
(husband and wife) (LRRRI, HN10/6).
Despite the NALAF pressure, the Bill was passed into a law unchanged, a law that is
“fundamentally hostile to local control of land and natural resources” (Shivji, 1999 in
Igoe, 2003:880 see also Annex 5). The new Land Act No.4 of 1999 and village Land Act
No.5, collective referred to as new land laws, streamline the control of land and natural
77
resources by the Executive making it easier for the central government and outside
investors to override the needs and aspirations of rural Tanzanians (Lissu, 1999 in Igoe,
2003:880).
Evidence from what has been presented in this section suggest that there are two major
contending forces in land and wildlife conservation in Tanzania, namely: the orthodox
conservationists comprised of the government, donors, international NGOs and
government agencies on the one hand; and communitarian rights advocates comprised of
local communities, some local NGOs and some academics on the other. Common to the
two positions is the need to conserve wildlife, but the political economy of wildlife
conservation is what divides the two where orthodox conservationists justify wildlife
conservation for macro reasons i.e. to earn the country foreign revenues (WWF, 1994;
Kweka et al, 1995; Levine, 2002:1047 see also Ghimire, 1994:198) and safeguard
national or public interest (implied in Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:44-5). Local communities
having no influence and control over export earnings resent production for exports and
instead they prefer to produce for subsistence and domestic markets (Shivji, 1992:48;
Foley, 2004:15). On the basis of this scenario it may be argued that it demonstrates a gap
between the interests, aspirations and expectations of local communities (producers) and
those of the state (refer section 2.6.3 in Chapter Two).
From what has been presented in this section, it is evident that communitarian rights
advocates are much more anchored in the consequences and rights of local communities
in relation to wildlife conservation. They show how the on-going practices in wildlife
conservation and land policies violate and deny local communities their basic rights.
Their position may be summed-up by a remark of an activist-lawyer who said; “capital,
both local and international, is invested in such ways that it destroys the livelihoods of the
common man, and this is what we activists are against” (Interview).
In some activists’ views, “the need to open up land to the forces of market” is what drives
land and wildlife policies in place (Change, 1997:72). Findings show that the debates
around land and wildlife policies in Tanzania have similarities to those of forest laws in
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Cameroon which were championed by the World Bank and implemented by WWF in
collaboration with some local NGOs (see Geschiere, 2004). In the case of Cameroon, the
WB and WWF were concerned with the intensification of logging that seemed to threaten
the very survival of rainforest (Geschiere, 2004:238).
4.4 Human-Wildlife Conflicts
This section presents and analyzes the human-wildlife conflicts in the three national parks
and surrounding areas. The final part of this section discusses such conflicts, attempting
to categorize them into related categories.
The Wildlife Conservation Act, 1974 is governing wildlife conservation outside the
national parks and NCAA. The Act does not make reference to the active participation of
local communities in wildlife management (Walsh, 2001:2). Walsh further points that
“the general philosophy behind the two Acts (Act 1974 and its 1978 amendment) is one
of protection, regulation and punishment; and the principal powers of wildlife
conservation and management are vested in the President, the Minister responsible, the
Director of Game (Wildlife), and the Game Officers appointed to administer this
legislation” (ibid.).
Wildlife Conservation is a priority of conservation and development organizations and
also brings challenges to rural development (Holmern et al., 2004:5). In view of the
previously explained processes of establishing protected areas/reserves11, it become clear
that it entails land alienation and or restricting certain forms of human land uses as
detailed below (see also Annex 3).
4.4.1 Communities Lost their Rights to Land
In the three areas described, the establishment of protected areas entail what Twyman,
describes as privatizing and commoditizing once common resources as well as restricting
open access and excluding certain groups of resource users (Twyman, 2000:790). The
appropriation of pastoral land to create national parks has resulted in large-scale 11 Reserve(s) or protected area is an area set aside and managed under appropriate legislations for wildlife or other biological resources conservation (MNRT, 1998:34).
79
displacement and forced relocation of pastoralists and hunter-gatherers (Campbell,
2004:11). What constitutes national parks (UMNP, TNP, and LMNP) was once part of
communities’ land (LEAT 1998 in Goldman, 2003:849; Igoe, 2003:865). Establishing
national parks has excluded such communities from owning the land, and denied all other
rights associated with land ownership (see 2.7 on the concept of open access and common
resources). Pastoralism and hunting-and-gathering as resource-based livelihoods in the
Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem are governed by environmental and climatic variability as
wildlife (Goldman, 2003:849 also Twyman, 2000:793). Evidence from controlled and or
restricted use of land and natural resources within nature reserves shows that it has
negatively impacted on the livelihood systems of such communities. “Power and control
over land resources shifted and issues of inequality and dependency emerged as the
salient features of transformed livelihoods (Twyman, 2000:787). It has been shown in
this research that local communities have restricted use and access to natural resources
and culturally valuable sites like sacred and prayer places within UMNP.
Pastoralists and hunter-gatherers communities can no longer pursue their traditional
livelihoods, as both have lost large areas of pasture and wood land to development,
conservation and peasant agriculturalist (Igoe, 2003:864). Fortress conservation instituted
exclusionary policies that were resisted by local communities and “incidences of
trespassing, grazing and poaching in protected areas occurred frequently” signifying
resistances (Levine, 2002:1049). A consequence of losing their land led these
communities to organize through NGOs to reclaim and protect further alienation of their
lands (Igoe, 2003:864). Continued conflicts between local communities and protected
areas led to the UN General Assembly issuing a resolution stating “environmental issues
are closely intertwined with development policies and practices; consequently,
environmental goals and actions need to be defined in relation to development objectives
and policies” (UN, 1978 in Levine, 2002:1049).
Support and innovations systems such as efficient stoves, agro-forestry projects and
social services projects partly meet communities material livelihood needs but also
transform communities’ livelihood systems along externally and top-down defined
80
directions (Walsh, 2000; Goldman, 2003). Evidence from the findings of this research
suggest that controlled/restricted access to land and natural resources for non-material
needs like prayers and performing ritual ceremonies for the dead (as for the case in
UMNP) are not adequately addressed by projects and programmes instituted by
conservation agencies. Furthermore, the material needs have not been adequately
addressed as shown by pastoralists in the plains of Simanjiro who view WMA as a step
towards the further fragmentation of their landscape, and “see the political structure and
bureaucratic requirements of WMA, as a means of putting their community lands under
the control of district authorities” (Goldman, 2003:849).
From the earlier discussion, it can be argued that land alienation for exclusive use such as
national parks and modern plantations (Kilombero sugar plantations and Rift Valley Seed
Company Ltd), are among the major causes of pressure on land and natural resources,
subsequently leading to land-use conflicts and human-wildlife conflicts. Furthermore
evidence points that annexing lands such as Marang Forest and Moyoka farms to national
parks, diminishes further land available for local communities, and heightens tensions
and conflicts.
4.4.2 Wildlife Induced Damage
The costs associated with living next to wildlife for farming communities are crop
damage, predation on livestock and people by wildlife, reduction of the household
workforce due to guarding of farms, outsider control of community life, reduced access
to land and natural resources, and conflicts with wildlife authorities (Songorwa,
1999:2069). School children of families facing wildlife dangers on their farms have either
to walk long distances to school from guarding farms (Songorwa, 1999:2070) or some
not going to school at all as they guard farms with their parents (Study Interviews).
Wildlife destroys crops, kills and/or maims human beings and livestock, spread diseases
(Goldman, 2003:854) and causes damage to properties like houses and stores/barns
(Study Interviews).
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The Wildlife Policy of 1998 does not provide for compensation for any loss suffered
from wildlife destruction or killing of human beings. This omission is to avoid many
unsubstantiated claims (Songorwa, 1999:2070). He goes on to give an account of human
beings killed by wild animals that indicate the extent to which wildlife is a liability to
neighbouring communities. Loss of farm produce due to wildlife is also a major liability
that cannot easily be offset by community focused benefits of wildlife (Songorwa,
1999:2070-1).
4.4.3 Illegal Use of Natural Resources
The Wildlife Act 1974 provides a list of restrictions of use of resources in any protected
area. The Act restricts entry (Sect.7), carriage of weapons (sect.8), use of vegetation
(sect.9), restriction of hunting (sect.10), other restrictions (sect.11) and restriction of
grazing livestock (sect.12). All these constitute what Neumann (1992:3) refers to as
‘criminalization of local communities’ socio-economic and cultural practices’.
Households are heavily dependent on land and natural resources for income generation
from sales of charcoal, honey, wild fruits, and firewood (URT, 2000:21). Tanzania’s
Poverty Strategy Reduction Paper acknowledges that sales of these resources contribute
about 50 per cent of some household income (ibid.).
The wording of the Wildlife Act 1974 provides a possibility of bending of the law at will
by wildlife authorities and prosecute community members for possessing agricultural
implements, presumed to be weapons according to the definition provided by the Wildlife
Act of 1974 section 2 as done by a wildlife project in Iringa (Walsh, 2001:4).
Game meat constitutes an important part of nutrition of local communities around
wildlife rich areas (Songorwa, 1999). Following the establishment of nature reserves,
local communities have restricted use of natural resources, including wildlife in protected
areas (TANAPA. 2001). However, “following the model of other projects in the country
(such as Serengeti and Selous Game Reserve), villagers were assisted in hunting for meat
(Songorwa, 1999; Walsh, 2000). It was assumed that the local demand for cheap meat
was a major cause of poaching, and that the legal provision of bush meat by the project
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would not only satisfy this demand, but also improve nutrition and generate useful
income for villages” (Walsh, 2000:3-4). It was later realized that local communities
hunted as an income generation activity (Walsh, 2000:4). In Ngorongoro, the
Conservation Authority organized the provision of food relief to pastoralist communities
in NCA, to compensate for restriction on farming (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:41). “Food
relief becomes relevant only when there is a natural disaster” otherwise it demeans
human dignity (ibid.).
Singleton & Capper (2004:8) argue that the hunting permits were given to rich urban
residents and non-citizens who hunted for commercial purposes. They further argue that
the value of game exceeds the cost of license and fines charged hence did not in anyway
help in curbing illegal hunting (ibid.). The Wildlife Act 1974 prescription of types of
weapons required for one to be permitted to hunt discriminate many local communities,
because the prescribed weapons are beyond economic reach of many local residents
(ibid.).
4.5 Why Human-Wildlife Conflicts
Causes of human-wildlife conflicts are explained differently by orthodox and
communitarian rights conservationists. Orthodox conservationists rely heavily on neo-
Malthusian population-resource relationship theory where human population increase is
seen as a major cause of human-wildlife conflicts (see WWF, 1994; Mwamfupe, 1998;
Severe, 2000; Kideghesho, 2000; TANAPA, 2001, 2002a & 2002b:19; Newmark et al,
(1993) in Jambiya & Sosovela 2001). A consequence of such perspective has lead
wildlife authorities in the three studied reserves to institute human population control
measures through family planning education and/or forced eviction in order to limit
human population growth as shown by findings of this study.
The Land Policy (1998) acknowledges that pressure on land and subsequent land
conflicts are due to factors such as human population increase, nomadism (MLHSD,
1997:1), nature reserves (MLHSD, 1997:4), and land acquisition by big investors
(MLHSD, 1997:13&35). Despite such acknowledgement, the Land Policy and other
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official policies criminalize (Neumann, 1992:3) certain communities’ land use practices
such as pastoralism as the policy pronounces that “shifting agriculture and nomadism will
be prohibited” (MLHSD, 1997:36; MLHSD, 2005b:6). The Land Policy further argues;
to address land conflicts, ownership problems and land degradation due to unregulated
livestock movements “incentives to proper pastoral stewardship including the provision
of infrastructure like water supply and cattle dips should be provided and modern
transhumantic pastoralism will be encouraged” (MLHSD, 1997:36). These policy
measures are not new as they failed in 1960s when implemented under transformation
and improvement (see section 1.3). The Rural Development Policy 2003 acknowledges
that social services are still worse off in rural areas, for instance 88 per cent of rural
communities have no water supply (PORALG, 2003:2). The NGOs movement among
pastoralists and hunters-and-gatherers came into being among other things to “design and
implement programs that would address long-standing problems such as food insecurity,
lack of medical services, and gender oppression” (Igoe, 2003:865).
Communitarian rights conservation NGOs such as LRRRI and LEAT show convincingly
that land use conflicts in general and human-wildlife conflicts in particular are due to
state sponsored land alienation and unregulated wildlife resource management (Shivji &
Kapinga, 1998; Shauri, 1999; Shauri & Hitchcock, 1999). Evidence from the findings of
this study show that land alienation for establishment of the Rift Valley Seed Company
Ltd, annexation of Marang Forest and Moyoka farms to LMNP, restricting communities
access and use of resources within UMNP are causes of tensions and conflicts between
wildlife authorities and local communities.
Based on evidence from the Wildlife Authorities experiences in UMNP, TNP and LMNP,
it can be argued that inappropriate land use policies, land alienation and restricting
communities use and access to land are far greater causes of human-wildlife conflicts,
than population increase and cultural practices of local communities as alleged by
wildlife authorities.
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4.6 Human-Wildlife Conflicts Resolutions Mechanisms
In this section various human-wildlife conflict resolution mechanisms are discussed. The
two main conflict resolution mechanisms are CCS by TANAPA and WMA by the
Wildlife Division, but there are overlaps between TANAPA and WD in the
implementation of these conflict resolution activities. A WMA is “an area declared by the
Minister to be so and set aside by village government for the purpose of biological
natural resource conservation” (MNRT, 1998:35). CCS is a program initiated by
TANAPA in collaboration with its financiers in 1991 to improve relations with
neighbouring villages through the provision of social benefits such as the building of
schools and clinics (Goldman, 2003:836). The human-wildlife conflicts resolution
programmes are collectively referred to as Community Based Conservation (CBC) as a
complementary to fortress conservation (Murphree, 2001; Levine, 2002).
CBC arises from communities’ struggles to access resources within protected areas, and
the subsequent realization by conservation authorities that continued exclusion of local
communities from sharing benefits of conservation was detrimental to conservation
initiatives (Murphree, 2001; Levine, 2002; Goldman, 2003).
WMA and CCS as typologies of CBC are criticized as “designed not to offer sustainable
livelihood alternatives to the local communities but reduce their opposition to those
protected areas” (Songorwa, 1999:2061). In LEAT’s view, CCS is placating communities
instead of providing them with ownership or control of wildlife (Shauri, 1999:3). CBC is
a manipulative process that transforms local communities and makes them dependants of
external conservation agents (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:41 implied; Twyman, 2000).
CBC approaches are based and informed by beliefs that communities are interested, able
and willing to conserve wildlife if they get economic benefits out of it (Emerton, 1999:4).
“The benefits offered should at least match, if not exceed, the costs incurred by protected
areas” but in fact do not (Brockington, 2002:105). But Songorwa (1999:2066) found that
communities in the Selous National Park are more interested in collecting revenue and
having legal access to wildlife and other natural resources than conserving them.
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4.6.1 TANAPA’s Community Conservation Service (CCS)
The Community Conservation Service (CCS) is a program established by TANAPA and
AWF in 1987 to integrate local communities into park management systems (WWF,
1998 in Levine, 2002:1050). CCS seeks to protect the integrity of national parks by
reducing conflicts between wildlife and surrounding communities, by improving relations
with those communities and by helping to solve problems of mutual concern (TANAPA,
1998).
Through CCS, TANAPA supports the community initiated project (SCIP), putting
emphasis on awareness and extension services as a means of relieving tension over the
use of park resources between TANAPA and villagers (WWF, 1994). TANAPA waged a
conservation education campaign to community through the CCS department by
organising sensitization seminars, holding workshops, running mass media campaigns
and publicity, posters (WWF, 1994). It establishes community structures such as
committees, community fire brigades, and community natural resource scouts (WWF,
1994; Nangoro & Kipuri, 1996).
Activities implemented with and by village committees are strictly tied to conservation
and conservation education (Nangoro & Kipuri, 1996; TANAPA, 1998). Such activities
are combating forest fires, tree planting, family planning methods, zero grazing, use of
energy saving stoves and growing multiple use tree species, gardening, piggery, and
poultry as income generating projects (Ringo, 2003). Training sessions for such
committees were aimed to assist them to perform such activities better (Ringo, 2003).
AWF established many community-based conservation programs, including the
Partnership Options for Resource-use Innovation (PORI), which assists local people in
establishing wildlife-related businesses (Levine, 2002:1051). Through its Land Trust,
AWF assists the expansion of private sector conservation and purchase government-
owned wildlife land (Levine, 2002:1052).
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Areas supported are social services programmes such as education and health (TANAPA,
2001:7). TANAPA for instance contributed to the construction of Kiberege Clinic in
Kilombero district (WWF, 1994) and Sangaiwe in Babati district (Nangoro & Kipuri,
1996). Within the framework of CCS, TANAPA established the TANAPA Community
Benefits Account (TCBA) where it put money and donors put matching amount
(TANAPA, 1998). From 1992/3 to 1998/9 a cumulative amount of Tsh. 797,765,34212
was released into TCBA, but such figures do not indicate how much was actually spent
on community projects (ibid). On average Tsh. 113,966,447 (US$ 206,184) was spent per
annum, this being roughly Tsh. 9,497, 205 (US$ 17,182) per park per annum.
All donor funds to TCBA were channelled through European NGOs such as AWF,
WWF, Franfurt Zoological Society, and KFW. Donors contributing funds to the account
were the Netherlands Embassy, DFID, and the European Union, whose funds were tied to
specific national parks (TANAPA, 1998).
In 1996, the Netherlands Embassy in consultation with AWF prepared the TOR and
commissioned an evaluation of TANAPA CCS (AWF, 1996). The following are some of
the main findings (Nangoro & Kipuri, 1996):
• Projects such as education, health and domestic water supply supported by
TANAPA through CCS in some cases were not the priorities of local
communities. The evaluation found that local communities in Loliondo
considered addressing cattle rustling was of a higher priority than a water project
provided under CCS.
• Concerns of TANAPA sometimes were biased e.g. wildlife graze in village land
while livestock cannot graze in parkland and TANAPA does not address this.
• The level of community participation in project identification, planning and
implementation was minimal hence projects are perceived as TANAPA’s. In this
respect, Goldman (2003:834) comments that “local communities are in the
process, viewed as tools for, or commodities of, conservation rather than active
12 The average exchange rate between US$ and TZS in 1992/3-1998/9 was 552.74 (Bank of Tanzania figures) thus this amount was US$ 1,443,292.
87
knowing agents”. Community participation should entail “power-sharing in
decision-making which must include the real devolution of significant powers”
(ibid.).
• CCS did not address adequately the development of pastoralism as an economic
sector in terms of livestock water, veterinary services, dips, grazing pastures, and
licking salts.
• The establishment of various committees at village level was not very effective
because too many other existing village committees were dysfunctional (Nangoro
& Kipuri, 1996; see also URT, 1994a:95). It served no good purposes to add a
new structure to a dysfunctional system (ibid).
All the evaluation recommendations were directed to TANAPA (Nangoro & Kipuri,
1996), while findings showed that TANAPA did not have any say in the preparation of
evaluation TOR and commissioning of the evaluation.
4.6.2 Wildlife Management Areas
The Wildlife Policy (MNRT, 1998:8&27) provides for WMA, while the Land Policy
provides for the same in an implied rather than explicit fashion (MLHSD, 1997:13&36).
In his speech, the Director of Wildlife outlined how WMA addresses wildlife
conservation problems outside core-protected areas as follows: it checks human
population growth and nomadism; it cushions protected areas against poachers; it
provides mechanisms for filling-in anti-poaching staff vacancies by village scouts; it
protects wildlife corridors and dispersal areas; it improves climate; it contributes to
poverty reduction through employment creation in ecotourism enterprises; and it
enhances community participation in wildlife (Severe, 2000; see also TANAPA,
2002a:61).
WMA is a radical break from past wildlife policies in Tanzania but it falls short of
constituting active participation of communities (Sosovela et al 1999 in Goldman,
2003:839). Others share the view that WMA is a step in a right direction whereby the
communities’ management of wildlife resources is recognized for the first time in
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Tanzania and this amount to community empowerment (Walsh, 2000:9). However, such
praises are watered down by criticisms that the process of establishing WMA is top-
down, bureaucratic and statist, (Walsh, 2000:9; Goldman, 2003; Shauri, 1999). Others
criticize the whole process of decentralization and devolution in the wildlife sector for
being slow due to, among other things, key players lacking interest in it because of
personal losses entailed in full decentralized and devolved system (Walsh, 2000:9). CCM
Iringa region (the ruling party) and some government departments such as prisons Iringa
region were resisting devolution in the wildlife sector so that they maintain free hunting
quotas (ibid). Walsh (2000:9) calls for external assistance to get the devolution processes
going. LEAT on their side calls for streamlining of the process and inclusion of local civil
society organizations in policy process such as the establishment of WMAs (Shauri,
1999).
The central authority through a top-down process defines WMA for the sole purpose of
conserving biodiversity (Goldman; 2003:837). Goldman further argues that “even where
management rights are transferred, local communities are not recognized as capable
decision-makers (Goldman, 2003:839). The education provided to communities to
manage WMA is disempowering, and prepares communities to become subjects of the
state or tools of conservation (ibid.). Training undergone by communities was
standardized and prepared communities only to be recipients of technical assistance and
supervisions to properly manage natural resources (ibid.).
The Wildlife Director made directives that WMA should be established in areas where
the habitats are defined as important for wildlife dispersal and migratory corridors
(Severe, 2000:21). WMA are to “increase the total area under conservation (Severe,
2000:14). This indicates that WMAs are established to meet wildlife needs rather than
community development, as correctly observed by Goldman (2003:840) that the WMAs
are established only “where conservation agencies would like to protect important
wildlife corridors and grazing dispersal areas, such as the Tarangire-Manyara
Ecosystem”.
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Even after communities have undergone so many processes of training and education,
they are not still trusted to manage WMAs on their own instead they have to got into
partnership with the District and Wildlife Authorities such as TANAPA (Goldman,
2003:840). These partners are meant to provide communities with “skills, money and
investment opportunities to manage a WMA” (Severe, 2000:15). Though communities
are guaranteed ownership of the WMAs, the government maintains its intervention to
check that communities are not lured and cheated (Severe, 2000). This is a what
McAuslan (2000:83) refers to as “odd reasoning that justifies government of foreigners
imposing its own law on land occupied by communities so that the land becomes subject
to the superior power of that government, to prevent those communities from disposing
of their land to those same foreigners”.
The Director of Wildlife has powers to withdraw and or reverse a decision of having a
WMA when s/he is satisfied that villages are not meeting or abiding to proscribed rules
(Severe, 2000; Goldman, 2003:839). Findings of this study show that in addition: CBC in
general ignores individuals and households needs and deals only with public goods.
Based on African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) office files, the research established the
following two case studies demonstrating experiences of Tanzania Wildlife Authorities
and some donors operations in establishing WMA in Babati district Arusha region.
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Box 1: WMA Formation: The Case Study of the PORI Project
Several donors pooled resources together to finance a project called Partnership Options for Resource-
Use Innovations (PORI). The PORI project was designed “to assist local people in establishing wildlife
related businesses (Levine, 2002:1051). Parties to the PORI MOU were the Wildlife Division, AWF,
TANAPA, and some district councils. PORI was a four-year project (1998-2002) but implementation
extended up to 2005, funded by USAID (US$ 8,083,379), Ford Foundation and European Union (US$
684,728) and TANAPA (US$ 36,000). The district councils and local communities contribute in kind
while the Wildlife Division contributes technical expertise. AWF was the overall manager of donor
funds and responsible for the USAID contribution.
The project was managed through a Steering Committee comprised of all parties to the MOU. While
other parties had one representative in the Steering Committee, AWF had two plus one from USAID.
Additionally, AWF in consultation with other Steering Committee members invites four representatives
from the private sector.
The PORI project would facilitate the implementation of the Wildlife Policy 1998 by implementing the
following activities:
• Working with communities to identify options for CBNRM and identify appropriate areas for
establishment of Wildlife Management Areas,
• Identification and strengthening of appropriate local institutions and local NGOs,
• Providing a basic package of support services to CBNRM and appropriate capacity building
for the District,
• Disseminate relevant information on conservation,
• Monitoring & Evaluation systems for community conservation activities.
(Article 1 of the MOU of the PORI project).
The project team is headed by the District Natural Resource Officers as the Project Officer; other
members are District Officers for Land and Environment; Wildlife; Community Development; AWF
representative; and representatives of respective National Parks adjacent to the villages involved. This
team was in charge of spearheading the establishment of the WMA. The project officer and his/her team
visited earmarked villages for WMA establishment and organized meetings with villagers (see Annex
4).
(Source: Various AWF office files, 1998).
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Based on this description, it may be argued that the composition, the mandates and the
responsibilities of the PORI project are typical of donor –driven projects which generally
establish parallel structures and focus on few aspects of communities’ life (see Fowler,
1997:9 in Chapter Two).
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Box 2: PORI Project Implementation; the Experiences of Babati District One example of the process of establishing a WMA is in Babati district in the Tarangire-Manyara
Ecosystem. The project team organized meetings with villages to introduce the WMA concept. The
team’s message was that the government had introduced a new policy, which was also a worldwide
policy, which promotes the notion of community involvement in wildlife management on their own
land. The team meetings are sequenced; starting with leaders of villages and wards, followed by all
other villagers. In this graduated process leaders were sensitized, then the rest of the villagers were
brought in and sensitized by their leaders in the presence of PORI project team.
The process of the PORI project team contacting village authorities, holding meetings, visiting areas
earmarked for WMA, evicting villagers from WMA prospective areas, establishing required
committees, and preparing roles and duties of such committees took twenty one (21) calendar days in
both Minjingu and Vilima vitatu villages, ten (10) days in Mwada and Sangaiwe villages, and four (4)
days in Lositeti and Kitete Juu villages. Some of these meetings lasted only a few hours like the Mwada
meeting of 31st January 2000, which lasted for less than two, and half hours (2.15 hrs).
This exercise started in December 1999 and completed in June 2000 for these villages in question (see
Annex 4). Approving decisions, the formation of various committees and electing people to positions
were conducted through voting by a show of hands.
It was decided that all inhabitants of areas earmarked for the WMA should vacate such areas
immediately. Village and Ward Authorities ‘revealed’ that such people were from Arusha, Kondoa, and
ex-plantation workers who had moved in and acquired land without the knowledge and approval of the
village government. These ‘intruders’ were ordered to move immediately and go back to where they
came from. Villagers disputed the claim that such people were not ‘intruders’. Interviewed villagers
argued that such people cannot be considered intruders while they have official recognized structures
such as sub-village leaders, pay various village financial contributions, and participate in voluntary
development work. In this regard villagers did not want them evicted.
Attempts by some villagers to question the process as being too fast without enough time for those
people living in WMA earmarked areas to move was responded that “a decision to form a WMA in
such areas was arrived at as far back as 1997 and they were informed accordingly”.
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I
After the field process, an office-based process ensued: drafting by-laws, preparing land-use plans,
demarcating the earmarked areas, securing reliable vehicles for supervision and monitoring, and
organizing a study tour for the project team, village leaders and honorary game scouts. Included in the
study tour were village chairpersons, village and ward executive officers, ward councillor, selected
heads of village council committees, and honorary game scouts. All these groups were accompanied in
the tour by the PORI project team. The Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu group toured Ruvuma region, while
the Lositeti and Kitete Juu honorary game scouts planned to tour Pansiasi Mwanza. In the study tour,
the groups were to learn natural resource management, revenue collection, book keeping, report writing,
village scout and village natural resource committee formation.
The process was similar in Mwada and Sangaiwe from 31st January to 9th February 1999 however the
processes were completed in a shorter time than the first villages. Evicted villagers were those farming
close to Lake Burunge. Coercion was used to evict some of them who resisted orders to move out of
their lands. As in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu villages, villagers objected to eviction of their fellows
instead they wanted proper guidelines to be made to restrict agricultural activities to 50-100 metres
away from the lake shore. Their views were ignored and their fellow villagers were evicted leaving the
WMA establishment to continue. Village authorities allocated some of the evicted people new plots for
building houses without areas to farm. No compensation or any payment to meet demobilization and
other associated costs was paid to any of the displaced villagers
(Source: AWF, Meeting Reports, 1998 & Villagers’ Interviews, 2005).
n view of the above processes the following important issues are worth noting:
• PORI team started by introducing and convincing villages and wards leaders who
later introduced and convinced their electorate. Village and ward leaders became
spokespersons of PORI project, abdicating their original jurisdiction of being
peoples’ leaders,
• Many of those whose land was put for WMA were evicted out of the village.
• Decisions to evict some villagers were taken based on voting by showing of
hands,
• Evicted people were not compensated.
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Based on this process the following conclusions may be drawn:
• Irrespective of the technical correctness or otherwise, the immediate outcome of
this process was that sufferings, poverty and inhuman conditions were inflicted on
households and individuals.
• Establishment of the WMA had not been effectively debated and deliberated
among villagers, prior to its implementation. The minimum of 4 days and
maximum of 21 days for discussing a new idea, in a graduated and polarized
process, that seriously affects peoples’ life and livelihood is inadequate.
• Effective representation and consultation as principles of good governance were
violated. Ex-officio representing their people in natural resource management is
tantamount to concentration of powers to executives because, these leaders
(village council and ward officials) “although they were elected but with a
different mandate” (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:61). For consultation to be effective
it has to take place before decisions are taken (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:34).
• The claim by the PORI project team in collaboration with ward and village
leadership that a decision to establish the WMA was arrived at as far back as 1997
cannot be true because the policy providing for WMA was issued in March 1998
(MNRT, 1998).
• The exercise shows an attempt to “defend the rights of autochthons’ against
‘strangers’ and thus contest the very constitutional idea of equal rights of citizens
throughout the country” (Geschiere, 2004:237).
• The decision to establish a WMA on individuals or individual communities’ land
by ‘majority’ decision is not legitimate because “the concept of the majority
deciding for minority does not and cannot apply in respect of the individual’s
personal rights” (Ben Wacha in Halsteen, 2004:118).
• The process was flawed because the guidelines for establishing a WMA were not
followed (see Annex 3).
On the basis of the above observations, it may be argued that the establishment the WMA
fuelled conflicts and inflicted sufferings to some individuals and households. Finally,
based on the process explained above, the following questions may be asked: First, how
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do individuals and households whose land is put to WMA earn a living? Second, who
will take over the land under WMA in case it is disbanded while the original owners have
been evicted and some moved to other villages? Finally, it is very difficult to see any
positive elements of good practice/governance in the implementation of PORI project.
A ten years contract between villages operating a WMA and the tourist companies
provides that (see Annex 5):
• Villagers are not allowed to trespass into the WMA;
• The WMA land is for the sole use of the company awarded;
• A 10 km radius of land between WMA and village land be provided;
• No grazing of livestock within the WMA except during dry season and a permit
from a tour company must be sought and secured first;
• Mining, and harnessing other natural resources by other than the awarded
company within the WMA is prohibited;
• The village government has to report to the tour company the way the revenues
earned are spent;
• After the ten years of the current contract, discussions to renew and increase the
WMA area from 4,000 acres to 10,000 will be held;
• The village follow up to secure the title deed of the land and after securing it issue
the same to the tour company, but the company continues to pay all dues to the
village.
From these provisions of the contract, it may be argued that tour companies are cheating
villagers with a blessing from the wildlife sector, vindicating claims by local activists that
the new land laws and policies are geared to deprive small-scale producers of their land.
Furthermore, it is clear from the contract that the WMA is similar to a national park with
a slight exception that villages are paid some revenues directly. WMA also make up
pathway to Individualizing, Titling, and Registering (ITR) villages’ lands by big
companies (see section 2.8 and Annex 5).
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Based on the findings above, it may be argued that CBC (both WMA and CCS) are not
community based wildlife management initiatives but a sharing of some wildlife benefits
with local communities. This observation is based on the fact that under CCS, TANAPA
is actually managing wildlife and distributes some revenue thereof to neighbouring
communities, while in WMA, the Wildlife Division manages the wildlife and
communities reap some revenues through hunting, photographic and ecotourism
activities.
4.7 Good Practices in Wildlife: An Assessment
The concept of good practices is discussed under the following themes: participation,
social justice and accountability. As discussed in Chapter Two these themes are closely
related and at times overlap, hence in this section participation covers partnership,
empowerment, local knowledge, decentralization and devolution. Social justice and
accountability are discussed separately.
The position of NALAF was that the problems of land tenure systems in Tanzania are so
fundamental that a complete break away from the colonial past is a prerequisite for
improving small producers’ security of tenure, which in their view can be effected by
removing the radical land title from the hands of the state (i.e. the President). Evidence
unearthed by this study shows that overall land reforms and wildlife sector reforms and
management are driven by international financial interests working through development
cooperation organizations (bilateral, multilateral and NGOs). The findings further show
that local voices and interests are not accommodated adequately in land and wildlife
reforms, instead they are suppressed, ignored, marginalized and at best manipulated.
Consequently local communities and local interests are criminalized in the name of
bringing about development (Neumann, 1992; Chachage, 2000; Mbilinyi, 2002;
Neumann, 2005).
Consultation, participation and partnership between the government and development
partners on one side and the local population on the other side in the wildlife and land
policy formulation process as shown by the findings of this study, suggest that local
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people have insignificant influence on laws and policy decisions in Tanzania. The land
policy and laws showed that local leadership at all levels are made ‘gatekeepers’ between
development partners and communities (Igoe, 2003:881; Hagberg, 2004:200). In this
process, some local elites use their communities’ problems as baits to attract donors’
funds which they use to maintain their positions of power; on the other hand donors use
the same local communities’ problems to justify their domination and legitimating
criminalizing local practices and ways of life (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:24; Tucker, 1999:5;
Igoe, 2003:881; Hagberg, 2004:205).
Community structures introduced for the purpose of facilitating participation are
bureaucratic fitting conservation authorities’ convenience (Shauri, 1999; Cleaver,
2002:13) and manipulate communities to offer unpaid labour to conservation (Goodwin,
1998; Songorwa, 1999:2071; Severe, 2000). Socially embedded community structures are
transformed and result in the “demise in the power of traditional institutions” (Twyman,
2000:786). Formation of structures like natural resource committees, and village game
scouts constitute what Cleaver (2002:14) refers to as bricolage processes that result in
bureaucratization of traditional arrangements. Evidence from the findings of this study
show that such social structures are parallel and their functioning has to been learnt
through workshops, exchange visits and seminars that make communities further
dependent on conservationists.
Structures like CBC have no space for accommodating local knowledge despite the
acknowledgement of the relevance and importance of doing so (Goldman, 2003:853).
Goldman (2003:854) further shows that local participation in training of development
agents is neither because they learn useful things nor because they contribute their body
of knowledge into the process, but because they are paid allowances (see also Escobar,
1995:49). Similar views were expressed by interviewed elites saying “people attend
workshops, exchange visits, seminars, and symposia organized and funded by
development agencies because of allowances”. Responses from elite interviews further
showed that the identification of participants in Government and Development Partners’
policy discussions are screened to ascertain that only those who toe the line are invited.
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Shivji and Kapinga (1998:60) add that issues of participation need to be addressed in a
principled manner from the standpoint of the demands, interests and rights of the resident
community.
Customary land rights are weaker de facto (URT, 1994a:140; Shauri, 1999:7) and all
wildlife is owned by the state (MNRT, 1998:6). In view of such facts it may be argued
that community insecure land tenure and state ownership of wildlife are sources of power
imbalance. Evidence suggests that efforts to sort out tensions and conflicts resulting from
community-state power imbalances cannot be effective unless the primary question of
power imbalance is addressed, which entails reforming land tenure system, as proposed
by the Presidential Commission (URT, 1994a). Evidence further shows that if
communities’ land ownership is legally strong and enforceable, their participation
becomes highly enhanced, and other initiatives become secondary, as succinctly observed
“in the absence of secure tenure other forms of community ‘involvement’ or
‘participation’ should be accepted for what they are: co-optive, co-operative or
collaborative arrangements” (Murphree 1994 in Magome et al 2000:11).
Interviewed elites indicated that local research institutions such as TAWIRI, Universities
of Dar es Salaam and Sokoine and Mweka College of Wildlife were not allocated
research funds by the government. Such claims are vindicated by the budget speeches of
the Minister for Science, Technology and Higher Education (2005/6) which had no vote
for research and development (R&D) for the financial years 2004/5 and 2005/6 (URT,
2005/6). Furthermore, the core staffs of research institutions such as TAWIRI are 75%
foreigners working on specific mandates defined, given and funded by their home
institutions (research interview).
Drawing from remarks of the interviewees, Sarantakos (1998:27) remarks may describe
more correctly research practice in Tanzania when he said, “The questions of what is
researched, is not of most important but why the research is done the way is done, who
gains, how choice of research topic and research procedures are arranged, the extent to
which sponsors influence research, and how research funds are distributed among
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researchers” is a prerogative of the sponsors. Donors define a research question, make
terms of reference and determine the entire research process to the end (see an example
of the Netherlands in section 4.6.1 above).
Based on these findings, it may be argued that the current research practice in Tanzania
limits the realization of broader societal values because research is tightly controlled by
finance capital while the Tanzanian state is weak, illegitimate and client (see Chapter
Two and Escobar, 1995:41).
O
i
s
1
F
i
t
G
W
Box 3: A Case of Research Conducted by a US based University for TANAPA The Southern California University conducted a study titled An Economic Study of Tanzania National
parks: Towards a better understanding of park choice and nature tourism in Tanzania. Local research
institutions and local researchers were not included in the study team with the exception TANAPA
staff. The Conservation Strategy Fund (CSF), TANAPA and Oracle Corporation jointly funded the
study (CFS is a US-based non-profit organization that trains in skills of environmental professionals in
economic and policy analysis). Findings of the study were presented in October 2003 to the panel of
TANAPA, international environmental organizations, government ministries and tourism industry. This
study would form a basis on which TANAPA is going to make critical decisions on the national parks
management.
Source: (TATO; Twiga Times).
bservation: No single local research institution was involved in the study at any stage,
ncluding at the presentation of the findings. “How valid is research on the effects of
moking on cancer if it is conducted by researchers of tobacco companies?” (Sarantakos,
998:28).
rom the findings of the experiences of the PORI Project in the villages of Babati District
t may be argued that the process was not participatory, consultative or empowering, on
he basis that, the rights of self-determination and social justices cannot be guaranteed.
iven the clear documentary evidence showing the violation of procedures of setting a
MA and subsequent field reports indicating community disagreement to the way the
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WMAs were established in Babati (see CCS, 2000), it is difficult to exonerate the PORI
Project financiers from perpetrating social injustices.
Local research institutions and researchers expressed dissatisfaction by the manner in
which their findings and advice is not heeded in policy formulation (research interview).
An NGO worker remarked that, “in Tanzania, one does not win in policy advocacy by the
strength of the argument rather it is power that counts”. Other observers like Sarantakos
(1998) and Chachage (2000: xi) argue that the limitations for applying research findings
are not due to scientific or methodological consideration, but politics.
The findings have shown a prominent presence of donors in the wildlife sector in
Tanzania who are not only influential but prime movers of policies, laws and
implementation procedures, sometimes behind the scene. Evidence further shows that
government-donor partnerships are co-operation of unequals with inbuilt systems that
inhibit empowerment of the weaker partner, because the channelling of funds through
international NGOs, and marginalizing of local voices using political and financial clout
reduces local actors, government included to development cooperation spectators or as
Goldman (2003:834) put “tools for, or commodities of development rather than as active
knowing agents”. Government-donors partnership shows consistent lack of trust on the
part of donors who throughout entrust their finances to Western NGOs as shown by the
funding for PORI project, TCBA matching funds, the Netherlands funding of CCS, and a
consortium of donors funding UMNP establishment.
Development cooperation experiences as shown by the findings indicate that donors
conduct themselves as if they have a monopoly of truth. However the victims of failures
of policy choices made by donors are poor people (see Coulson, 1982; Mapolu 1985; and
Campbell 1992 in Chapter Two). Poor peoples’ views are suppressed, ignored,
criminalized and their aspirations considered irrelevant in development debates and
decisions, but they are the ones who bear the debt burden, sometimes paying debts that
never worked. Escobar (1995:9) cogently observed that “the development discourse is
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governed by colonial principles; it has created an extremely efficient apparatus for
producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over the Third World”.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations
Life is the most basic human right. If justice means anything at all, it must protect
life. That should be a constant underlying purpose of all social, economic, and
political activities of government at all levels… To have food, clothing, shelter, and
other basic necessities of life; to live without fear; to have an opportunity to work for
one’s living; freedom of association, of speech, and of worship. All these things
together are among the basic principles of living as a whole person in ‘Freedom and
Justice’. In other words all are almost universally accepted as basic ‘Human Rights’”
(Nyerere, in the Daily News 27th, Sept, 1993 in Shivji & Kapinga, 1998:38)
5.0 Introduction
This last chapter summarises lessons that may be drawn from the previous chapters and
provides conclusions, and general recommendations. The study outlined human-wildlife
conflicts and ameliorative measures instituted in Tanzania by the Wildlife Authorities in
collaboration with external partners. The study took a historical perspective approach
endeavouring to unearth the genesis and conceptual metamorphosis of the various
concepts of development in wildlife conservation and land in general. These concepts and
respective conceptual genesis were analysed within different cultural settings, showing
increasing trends in universalizing of western values in development, wildlife
conservation and land which unleashed misunderstandings, tensions, resentments,
resistances and conflicts. The consequences of such developments are an increase in the
cultural domination of South by the North through the ‘development project’ started after
the famous 1949 Truman speech, justified by cultural misunderstanding often referred to
as the ignorance of the developing countries’ people.
The discussion and analysis presented show that wildlife and land policies and laws in
Tanzania like many other developing countries are “a product of politics, not of objective
considerations of what is best for economic or social or sustainable development ”
(McAuslan, 2000:92), but a convenience of external partners and some local elites.
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It is possible to misconstrue the overall development trajectory advocated in this study
that it tries to maintain or cling to the past forms of livelihood and put cultural changes on
hold. That is not the purpose of this study instead the arguments presented here are based
on a frustrating development experience shared by many. Its major proposal is that every
people have a right to determine their own destiny, and they need and deserve an
acceptable level of autonomy and space to do so. The study challenges uninvited and un-
listening development interventions in its many forms, but specifically through the
Enlightenment Project, with its historical metamorphosis through missions of civilization,
colonization, cold war, and currently globalization expressed apolitically as
‘Development Cooperation’ (Said 1979 in Escobar, 1995:6; Tucker, 1999; Neumann,
2005). Since 1940s, development continued to encompass or view the world through an
increasing number of ‘spectacles’ but continuously excluded the fact that it is about
people (Escobar, 1995:44) and humanity as indivisible.
It is not the intention to replace Eurocentrism views with Third Worldism; foreign capital
with local capital as Kiely (1999:36&39) warned, but it is a modest attempt to expose the
vices of development cooperation in land and wildlife conservation, which is driven by
finance capital and informed by Eurocentricism, and which is against unity of humanity
in diversity of cultures.
This study also shows that the exclusion and marginalization of the majority of the local
population in processes of wildlife and land policy and laws making is not due to
limitations of resources, knowledge, technology, institutions and or competencies, but a
reflection of vested interests in maintaining firm bureaucratic control over the country’s
major resource i.e. land. The maintenance of an inconsistent, contradictory, incomplete
and vague wildlife and land policy and law is reminiscent of Chabal & Daloz, (1999:
xviii) notion of “political instrumentalization of disorder” whereby citizens are kept in a
limbo, and at any time convenient to the authorities they can be declared criminals. Such
disorder is a political instrument, rather than a gap or omission in design.
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In view of donors’ position on wildlife and land in Tanzania, one major flaw is a neglect
to acknowledge the nature and character of the Tanzanian state. In view of this, the
donors’ land policy (i.e. the World Bank Land Policy) is isolated and does not fit the
social, political and economic realities of Tanzania, thus its implementation is a
development disaster from social justice perspectives. Economic efficiency and
effectiveness which are the pivots of donors’ wildlife and land policy and laws can
potentially dispossess more than 5713 per cent of all rural dwellers of their lands. The WB
is conscious of the ideological and political implications of land in the struggles for
independence in many African countries (URT, 1994a:17; McAuslan, 2000; Deininger &
Binswanger, 1999) and yet its policy recommendations do not seem to accommodate
such historical realities. This is a daunting concern.
Participation and partnership in development have not in any meaningful ways
reinvigorated energies and enthusiasm of local people in development. Forms of
participation and partnership in development or conservation in particular have partly
contributed to people’s apathy and complacency by their failures in re-defining the
conservation agenda in people’s perspectives, instead they laboured to have people
internalize whole heartedly experts’ (western) views of conservation which perpetuate
poverty, cultural domination, subordination and structures of inequalities. Participation in
wildlife conservation has projected tendencies of unshared visions between local
communities/the poor and the powerful government and donors through its processes of
defining “appropriate use and users… and the justifiable exclusion of ‘unwanted’ others”
(Goodwin, 1998:494).
5.1 Conclusions
The modernization concept of development is an overall paradigm informing and guiding
land and natural resource management and conservation in Tanzania. It blatantly
condemns traditional systems of land use like pastoralism and hunting-and-gathering as
reflected in this statement, “pastoralists have to be given land and told to settle” (URT,
2005:14). It is patronising, criminalizing and poorly informed. It is not the conviction of
13 57% of rural Tanzanians are poor as per Household budget survey 1991/92 (URT, 2000:6)
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this study that traditional local systems are socially just; there are many unfair and
socially unjust cultural systems and practices, such as unequal control and ownership of
land among different members of local societies such as women and youths, nevertheless
sustainable and locally justifiable sources of changes and improvements should be owned
by those who are the immediate victims or beneficiaries.
The following specific conclusions may be made:
• Land property rights remain confused and difficult to enforce through existing
legal machinery. Shivji and Kapinga (1998:63-69) show the technical legal
pitfalls in enforcing communal property rights to land in Tanzania. Any rights
given to communities in the absence of a clearly defined and enforceable property
and common property rights are insecure and deemed to degenerate into tensions
and conflicts.
• As long as land and wildlife are owned by the State, community participation in
wildlife conservation cannot be effective and genuine, but remains a political
propaganda.
• Development processes in land and wildlife sectors are externally determined and
driven. Public policy-making processes are closed and inaccessible by the general
public and translate into top-down bureaucratic operational procedures such as the
Wildlife Policy of 1998 and Land Policy of 1997 that manipulate popular
participation to safeguard and promote financial interests and rent-seeking
behaviour of executives and politicians.
• The wildlife conservation approach pursued in Tanzania has attempted to look for
oversimplified and neat solutions to complex development problems however
there is no evidence that this approach works (Vivian, 1994:170). However there
is evidence pointing to the fact that this approach has not only failed but actually
disrupted locally and socially embedded structures, institutions and initiatives,
which impacted negatively at the welfare status of local communities. Protected
areas have undermined local livelihoods systems, because of their nature of
exclusive use, which is attained by displacing and or restricting access of local
communities to hitherto, their own land and resources. Consequently communities
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have no control of and access to manage the benefits accruing from protected
areas.
• Approaches to conservation in general and wildlife conservation in particular are
being universalised and standardized while the international actors across the
global remain the same. Included are the World Bank, USAID, IUCN, WWF and
AWF as financiers, developers of concepts, while local agents (state, civil society
organizations and businesses) are implementing agencies.
• The wildlife conservation in general has taken a policing approach accompanied
by education propaganda such as promotion and training. These approaches have
fuelled conflicts rather than minimizing and mitigating existing ones.
• Land degradation is not a result of ignorance or mismanagement on part of local
communities, but a result of social, political and economic constraints, which are
being heightened by wildlife and land policies such as ones discussed in this
study.
• Palliative measures that are well entrenched in the current development practices
do not only deepen and entrench poverty but sustain arrangements and or systems
that exploit local communities.
• Development efforts are populist by assuming or treating local communities, and
all other entities with a stake in land and wildlife (large-scale producers, finance
capital, and other power wielding groups) as having no conflicting interests thus
they can harmoniously collaborate to use scarce resources to attain socially just
goals.
• The provision that villages should enter into partnerships with investors in
tourism and other wildlife related businesses is nominal and a conduit through
which village land is encroached and ultimately alienated by individual big
businesses.
• Donors in general and the World Bank in particular have been in the forefront in
advocating and financing processes that leads to individualized land tenure
systems on the pretext of installing security of tenure to attract big, durable and
long-term investments. The consequence of such moves have been land alienation
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by those with financial resources and or able to infiltrate and manoeuvre those in
corridors of powers.
• Participatory development as practiced in conservation has bureaucratised
poverty, structures of representation and devolved procedures and structures of
power imbalance to lower levels not denting in any meaningful way
powerlessness and exclusion. Participatory mechanisms and processes can thus be
described as co-optation and sharing of the spoil arrangements.
• Criminalization of local culture and practices in wildlife conservation project a
strong standardization of the world which is informed by experts’ ways of
knowing that reject reality that is conceptualized outside the framework of their
knowledge and means of knowing.
• Large scale producers owning land under granted rights of occupancy, but using
only a small fraction of it, are not condemned for land under-utilization (see URT
1994b: 35) but smallholder producers under customary land right are constantly
under scrutiny and condemnation for underutilizing and or abusing land
(TANAPA, 2002a,b; URT, 2005).
There is a continuity of donors, and especially the World Bank’s imposition of
development policies, that have several times failed and such donors acknowledge their
faults, but maintain the same modus operandi. OED performance assessment of the
World Bank in Tanzania since 1964 to mid 1990s acknowledges criticisms levelled
against the Bank by local experts (cf. WB, 2000) however the Bank continue to largely
ignore views expressed by local experts who are outside its payroll, in what may be
referred to as arrogance on the part of the Bank (cf. Mapolu, 1985; Shivji, 1992;
Campbell, 1992; Chachage, 1996; Mbilinyi, 2002; Levine, 2002). To sum-up, apart from
development agencies being inefficient (Kiely 1999:37) they are also paternalistic and
arrogant while posing as having altruistic motives.
The trends shown in wildlife and land development initiatives in Tanzania are not limited
to these sectors, but reflect country-wide experiences where development initiatives are
top-down, made on templates, and sideline the majority poor. Overall, it may be argued
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that development processes lack the social contract between the government and the
people. The overall conclusion is that practice in the land and wildlife sectors in Tanzania
has fallen far behind good practice. This however is not unique to these sectors but can
arguably be said of the general development practice.
5.2 Possible ways forward
Since Tanzania is a country of small-scale producers, and land is a major source of
livelihood and site of culture formation, the land policy and law need to put small-scale
producers at its centre so that they become determinants and drivers of events. The
exclusionary policies and laws that are prevalent can only escalate levels of poverty and
ultimately lead to social and political instabilities that result in further suppression and
fuelling of more conflicts. The moral of this recommendation is neither to ignore nor to
eliminate large-scale producers (local and or foreign), but adherence to democratic
principles of social justice, whereby wishes, interests and aspirations of the majority
overrides all others, while safeguarding and protecting the rights of all individuals
including large scale producers.
Diversification and devolving the source of radical title is imperative since it amounts not
only to structural changes and de-bureaucratization of land management but changing
power relations between different tiers of the state. This further calls for introduction of
provisions of re-callable representatives before the expiry of term of office to limit risks
of changing of allegiance by peoples’ representatives. Provision of procedures of
compulsory acquisition of land by the state for national development projects and
programmes should be foreseen and provided for, taking into account the very principles
underpinning varied traditional land use practices.
The wildlife authorities in particular and development actors in general need to honestly
recognize, appreciate, acknowledge and resort to context specific solutions and
adaptations. Shifting of the control over resources and over decision-making to the local
people is imperative (see McNeely 1989; Escobar, 1995; Tucker, 1999; Shivji &
109
Kapinga, 1998; Chachage, 2000, Mbilinyi, 2002) as well as creating space for different
and alternative institutional arrangements, knowledge and property regimes (URT,
1994a; Cleaver 2002; Wunsch, 2000, Briggs & Sharp, 2004) and avoiding pitfalls of
‘one-size-fits all.’
Specific recommendations are as follows:
• Wildlife authorities need to delve deep into resolving the conflicts between
private needs and public needs among communities dispossessed through
establishment of protected areas. This is based on the fact that, much if not all of
what is purported to be provided as a substitute or alternative livelihood system
addresses collective and or public needs while losses suffered by individuals are
left unattended. Establishment of protected areas impact negatively on certain
basic private needs, thus there is a need to re-address the question of protected
areas establishment with a view to satisfactorily compensating the victims and
providing for socially just and culturally accepted alternative livelihood systems.
• Development needs to be re-conceptualized to take into account various forms of
democratic struggles; this entails restructuring social relations so that people
(men, youths, women, poor, rich, black, white etc) can regain control of their life,
resources and determine their destiny.
• De-criminalization of traditional property rights and lifestyles through a popular
process not guided by blueprints need to be undertaken. These proposals can be
appreciated at best and become effective in a framework of a changed paradigm
as Chambers (1997) put it ‘handing-over the stick’ or ‘putting the last first’, while
complementing it as a matter of necessity with the poor people struggles to
reclaim their rights and position in own development.
A trade-off between social justice on one hand and efficiency, effectiveness, feasibility,
and sustainability on the other hand need to be delicately made, because extremes can
yield short-term successes but long term doom. Shivji & Kapinga (1998:65) cautiously
noted that with struggles to facilitate communities to assert and claim their rights and
110
positions we need to safeguard and maintain communities “political clout and solidarity”
even by piecemeal but incremental achievements. Development need to be
conceptualized and rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural
traditions (Escobar, 1995:52).
111
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Annex 1: A Map of Tanzania showing Protected Areas
Source: Ndaskoi, (2002) Fourth World Journal Vol. 5 No. 1 in www.cwis.org/fwj/51/N%20 Ndaskoi
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Annex 2: A Letter from the Wildlife Division
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Annex 3: Procedures of setting-up a Wildlife Management Areas (WMA)
Officials of Wildlife Division elaborate the following as the procedure for setting-up a
WMA (Nshala, et al 1998):
1. A village assembly meeting must receive and support the idea of setting aside
village’s common land to be a WMA;
2. Once the village assembly accedes to or endorses the proposal its decision and
proposal is sent to the District council;
3. The district council, together with the village government, survey and
demarcate the land envisaged to be a WMA. The village must first acquire an
official title for all village land (Goldman, 2003:839);
4. An important aspect of the process is the creation of a village land use plan
showing how all the land in the village is to be used;
5. Zoning of other lands within the village must be made to show other land uses
such as grazing, cultivation, forests, social services, and reserved land (Njoroge,
2000 in Goldman, 2003:839). Findings from Ilkiushioibor village show that: in
the wildlife/forest/livestock area collection of water and firewood can be made
without village council permit. Grazing livestock and performing ritual
ceremonies require a permit, while business activities require both a permit and
payment. In agriculture/settlement zone farming and settlement is permitted,
but charcoal-making and cultivation is prohibited in corridors. The use of latrine
toilet is enforced as well as restricting grazing in farms.
6. The District Council must approve the LUP and forward it, with its
recommendation to the regional authorities: who on review and satisfaction,
send it to the responsible Minister (Wildlife and Natural Resources), through the
Director of Wildlife (Wildlife Division) (Goldman, 2003:839);
7. To be valid, the declaration must be published in the government gazette to
establish the village WMA (Shauri, 1999:5).
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Annex 4: A typical experience of setting-up a WMA The Experience of Babati District
Based on AWF office files, the following were steps in setting WMA in Minjingu and
Vilima Vitatu villages:
• 10-11th December 1999: a seminar on WMA was organized for leaders of the two
villages (village chairpersons, village executive officers, ward councillor, ward
executive officer and selected heads of village council committees).
• 14-15th December 1999: a meeting of all villagers of the two villages was
convened, 590 villagers attended. In this meeting all villagers unanimously
accepted the idea of establishing WMA in their area and deliberated that all
villagers residing in areas earmarked for WMA i.e. Kakoi and Mbulungu, should
vacate immediately. It was reported that the decision to the effect of keeping those
areas for wildlife was made earlier in 1997 in villages and ward meetings.
Secondly, people residing in these areas were not allocated those areas by
respective authorities.
• 14-15th, December 1999: Electing village honorary game scouts: a total of ten
honorary game scouts were elected.
• 17-21 December 1999: a seminar for village honorary game scout was conducted
on 21 December village leadership was joined for the seminar. Roles and duties of
honorary game scout committee were developed and agreed that the honorary
game scouts will be under village social services committee. Again, developing
roles and duties of honorary game scouts was delegated to the district natural
resource department. It was not clear why this activity was given to district
authorities it was reported completed in the meeting.
• 27-30 December 1999: visiting areas earmarked for WMA. Five representatives
from each village and experts from district council visited the areas. Village
representatives were village chairpersons, village executive officer, villages’
council chairpersons and ward executive officer and ward councillor. Based on
experts, the team modified some of the areas earmarked and affected villagers
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were advised to report to village offices for allocation of alternative places to live
and farm.
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Annex 5: A Contract of Mutual Agreement Between AA14 Company Ltd of Box abc Arusha
And the Village Community of BB Simanjiro District.
April 22nd, 2000
1) Details of exchange,
2) Condition on Each Side,
3) Length of Agreement (with Termination Conditions)
4) Description of Land Allocated for use by AA Company Ltd
5) Document of Signatures and Agreement of Conditions.
6) Map of Area Under Agreement.
1) Details of Exchange:
The AA’s Camp Limited be issues by BB Village a 4000 acre piece of land on which to
operate a Camp. That this piece of land be used solely by AA’s Camp Ltd and no other
photographic operator be allowed to use or access this land.
That AA’s camp will pay 100,000 T/Shilling per month to rent this land and also will pay
USD 10 per paying non-resident, per sleeping night at the Camp to BB village.
2) Conditions on Each Side:
a) The BB village allows no other photographic operator, to operate or access the
4000 acres to AA’s Camp Ltd.
b) That BB village use the money earned to finance Village development projects
and keep detailed records of all expenditures.
c) That the BB village council will report to AA Camp Ltd and District offices every
six months on how much income they have received and how it was spent. This is
good for us all.
14 For confidentiality the real names and other details that may disclose the identities are substituted with letters. The Contract is a draft, but nothing substantial is different from the final version (AWF, Officer).
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d) That the village council will make every effort to inform all community members
on how this income is spent. This is good for the council and AA Camp Ltd,
e) That BB village do not issue anymore land for cultivation within a 10 km radius
of the land issued to AA’s Camp Ltd. All present farms are allowed but no more.
f) That no grazing of livestock be conducted on these 4000 acres issued to AA’s
Camp except in very dry- years and with agreement with AA’s Camp. AA’s
Camp will never deny grazing or watering of livestock on the 4000 acres if it is
very dry, as it was in 1994 and Jan/Feb 1999.
g) That no cutting of trees or mining be allowed on the 4000 acres issued to AA’s
Camp ltd. except to clear an airstrip if agreed or build a second camp. If agreed.
h) That all building, equipment, tents, borehole, dam, or airstrip developments
within the 4000 acres of land issued to AA’s Camp Ltd. remains the sole property
of AA’s Camp Ltd. If the agreement to use this land is terminated all above items
remains the sole property of AA’s Camp Ltd which the can sell or remove.
i) That AA’s can enlarge their camp, develop water points, or clear an airstrip, build
a 2nd camp if agreed with the village. This will mean more money for the village.
And help in our joint conservation of this area.
j) That BB village will pursue their Title Deed with the land office and upon being
issued their Title Deed, will issue a title Deed to AA’s Camp Ltd for 4000 acres.
AA’s Camp ltd will continue to pay the agreed amount after title deeds are issued
to them.
k) That AA’s Camp Ltd keep detailed records of the number of paying visitors to
their camp/camps and charge their visitors 10 USD village Conservation Fees
which are payable to BB village Bank Account at NBC Account Nos. 123 and
456 Arusha and to nowhere else. For no reason whatsoever is AA’s Camp Ltd to
pay cash to any village Council member.
That record of how many visitors stay at the camp be reported to the village
council every month and that a member of the village working at camp agrees to
count the paying visitors to camp and agree the figure. Also AA’s camp will
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report to the village every month by radio and letter funds deposited into the
number of guests paying to stay.
l) The AA’s Camp ltd collect the village conservation fees from their visitors and
pay every month into the accounts. The monthly rent will also be paid every
month into the village accounts.
m) That AA’s Camp ltd will continue to offer employment to BB youth. AA’s Camp
will decide on how many and under which conditions.
n) That if AA’s Camp will continue to operate an airstrip on this land that the village
will write to confirm this to allow AA’s Camp to obtain a licence to operate. And
AA’s Camp ltd will pay BB village 5000 T/Shilling per aircraft landing on this
strip every month into the already mentioned bank accounts.
3) Length of agreement and termination conditions:
a) That this agreement be for 10 years from date of signing. But be terminated once
title deed is issues to the village, upon which the village will issue title deed to
AA’s Camp for the 4000 acres, and AA’s Camp will continue to pay the village
Conservation fees and monthly amount to the village.
b) That this contract/ agreement can only be terminated by either side if it’s
conditions are not met, and that one year notice of termination must be given by
either side.
4) Description of Land under this agreement:
The area of 4000 acres issued under this agreement for the sole use by AA’s Camp ltd
is situated between to already distinct boundaries.
i) To the West the Tarangire National Park boundary.
ii) To the North is the Monduli / Simanjiro village boundary (as yet not fully
demarcated by the Land Office).
To the East is Mbuga system.
So far it is verbally agreed that the CC village boundary lies West to East between
Kikoti top rocks and the high point as ‘View Point’.
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Once a title deed is issued then a Government Surveyor will measure and demarcate
the agreed 4000 acres, and makers will be issued.
NOTE: We at AA’s Camp ltd will not stop livestock from grazing or watering on this
land in dry years even if issued a Title Deed as long as no more farming be issued
within a 10 km radius of the 4000 acres issued to AA’s Camp.
5) AA’s Camp will always pay a village conservation fee for BB village even if
AA’s acquires a Title Deed to this land.
a) that BB village members and AA’s Camp employees will every endeavour to help
conservation of natural resources in the area by reporting any illegal hunting or
any poaching of wildlife, illegal charcoal burning, illegal farming, illegal mining,
and illegal operators to the government authorities i.e. TANAPA, Wildlife
Division etc.
b) AA’s Camp will if a ten year agreement is reached agree to discuss the prospect
with BB village to increase the area from 4000 acres to 10,000 acres with an
increase of rent per month.
c) The AA’s Camp and BB village work to control fires in this area and beyond to
keep the land from Tarangire National Park to Lokonwa Hill healthy for grazing
domestic animals and wildlife.
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6) Document of signatures and Agreement of conditions:
Conditions agreed upon in section 2
AGREED NOTES
2A YES/NO
B YES/NO
C YES/NO
D YES/NO
E YES/NO
F YES/NO
G YES/NO
H
I YES/NO
J YES/NO
K YES/NO
L YES/NO
M YES/NO
N YES/NO
Condition Agreed Upon in Section 3
AGREE NOTES
3 A YES/NO
B YES/NO
- -
Date of Signature …………………………………………………..
Date ……………………….…………………..
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BB Village Council Members and Witnesses
Name Position Signed Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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AA’s Camp Ltd
Name Position Signed
1
2
3
4
Advocate’s Witnessing of this Agreement
A Contour Map of the Areas
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Annex 6: Semi-structured Questions for TANAPA Land tenure regime in relation to TANAPA
- Application of Cap 412 of 1959 to acquire land for national parks v/s customary
land laws under areas acquired.
- How are we as conservationists justifying conservation work?
- Conservation policies:
1. how do they promote conservation,
2. policy coordination across sectors,
- Returns from conservation investment.
- Involvement of TANAPA with wildlife outside national parks boundaries.
- Damages caused by wildlife to local communities.
- Community Conservation Service (good neighbourliness) under the
situation where only one side (wildlife authorities) has rights.
- Coverage of CCS support i.e. does it include individuals, any project etc.
- Selectivity of support under CCS while the negative impact of wildlife
affects various aspects of human and communities lives.
- ‘Cost’ of conservation is unequally shared between local communities
around national parks and the rest of beneficiaries (national, international and
future generations).
- CCS focusing on collective or public social services while in most cases
damages are inflicted on individuals or households.
- Why is it almost a rule that the closer one lives to the national park the
more s/he hate it.
- Ecotourism activities (composition, constituents, benefits to local
communities, sale of cultural artefacts).
- Cultural tourism (respect of local culture, inspiration derived from it).
- TANAPA’s mission to encourage local tourism v/s levels of poverty in the
country.
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- Procedures to be followed to access and use wildlife and other natural
resources within national parks (applicability, accessibility of the majority to such
procedures).
- Comparison between Tanzanian national parks and national parks in
developed countries.
- The difference between traditional conservation methods and modern as
practiced by TANAPA and why modern methods.
- TANAPA self-sufficiency in running their operations i.e. the extent of
TANAPA dependency on its own resources.
- National parks ability to compete economically with other alternative land
uses.
- Donors’ involvement in TANAPA.
Structured Questions as requested a TANAPA officer
1. How far have you gone in addressing local communities-wildlife/park conflicts
using zoning and development of land use plans?
2. The question of land tenure system does not seem to pre-occupy TANAPA yet,
TANAPA does not own legally some of the lands that national parks are
established.
3. What concretely do you do to develop and exploit eco-tourism as an instrument to
ease park-local communities’ conflicts?
4. What inform your practice in view of a well articulated inadequacy of relevant
research findings and other constraint like finance and personnel?
5. The current planning practice of TANAPA does not have an inbuilt monitoring
and evaluation component, how do you assess programs progress?
6. TANAPA is emphasizing encouraging and cultivating touristic culture among
Tanzanians for two reasons: develop domestic tourists markets and facilitating
local population to appreciate wildlife. How does that work with increasing
poverty among the local population?
7. What is the opinion of TANAPA in respect of its organizational linkages with
local government authorities?
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Annex 7: Semi-structured questionnaires to elite General
- Relationships between local authorities and conservation authorities,
Land
- Land tenure system in Tanzania customary land law v/s granted right of
occupancy,
- A focus on land use planning v/s land tenure systems,
- Land individualization, titling and registration,
Wildlife Conservation Approaches
- Approaches followed and promoted and its rationale,
- Outcomes of complementing fortress conservation with community-based-
conservation,
- The fit of WMA fits into the two dominant wildlife conservation approaches,
- The overall assessment of community-based-conservation in regard to conflict
resolution and enhancement of locally desirable development,
Tourism
- Tourists composition and the industry ownership structure,
- The sharing of tourist benefits within the country and with foreign investors,
- Tour companies contribution to local development,
Research and Development
- The research design i.e. selection of research problem and research design,
- Research financing,
- Research and consultancy,
- Local researchers/consultants in partnership with external researchers/consultants
- Local research/consultants and development partners,
- The influence of locally generated researches on policy,
- The involvement of different actors and stakeholders in policy research, making
and influencing,
- Monitoring policy practice v/s researchers/academics and policy-makers
acknowledged research findings,
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- Relations between government and independent (not government commissioned)
local researchers,
- Institutional/organizational systems inbuilt to deal with policy research, advocacy
and policy influence,
- Systems of capturing and disseminating good practices in wildlife and land
matters,
- Purposeful information sharing among different actors in wildlife and land
matters,
- Dissemination of research findings and accessibility of research findings by the
general public,
- Monitoring and evaluation of policy-practice changes.
Networking, collaboration and information sharing
- Engagement with the government in policy and law formulation,
- Research mandates of local institutions and local researchers,
- Human-wildlife conflicts,
- Collaborating with organizations or those whom you don’t share the outlook on
conservation,
- Local elites and communities participation in policy-making,
- Collaboration/networking and engagement in consensus building debates among
different actors and sometimes with conflicting or different views on wildlife and
land matters.
145
Annex 8: Semi-structured interviews with Employees of Tour Companies
- Activities of the company,
- Acquisition of land for tour operation,
- Company ownership,
Relationship of the Tour Company and villages around the area
- Employment of local people,
- Financial benefits to the villages,
- Ecotourism activities,
- Off-land investment opportunities,
- Uses communities can make of land under WMA,
Relationship with wildlife authorities - Benefits to wildlife authorities,
- Working relationships,
Investment in wildlife - Any investment in wildlife,
- How is it organised (logistics),
- Promotion of wildlife conservation,
146
Annex 9: Questions and areas covered with villagers 1. Decisions to request for a WMA
2. Villagers meetings to discuss establishment of WMA with the PORI project team.
3. Benefits of WMA to villagers
4. Benefits sharing among villagers and government higher authorities
5. Formation of various village organs responsible for natural resources (scouts,
natural resource committees)
6. The functioning of the village natural resource committees i.e. what are their
duties.
7. Alternative means of earning a living for those whose land is put under WMA.
8. Identification of land for establishing of WMA.
9. The notion of village land i.e. land not belonging to an individual villager but the
village as a legal entity.
10. The functioning of village wildlife committees.
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Annex 10: An introduction letter to various sources of information
Richard Ndaskoi P.o.Box 13357 Dar es Salaam
The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, 26th, May, 2005
Re: Access to your official information and documentation I am requesting access to various official information and documentations in your organization. As per my introduction letter (attached herein), I am doing a research as a compulsory requirement for successful completion of a Masters Course at the University College Dublin, Ireland. I am in Tanzania for two months (May to mid July 2005) to collect data for my research proposal. The topic of my research is: An Analysis of Good Practice in Land Use in Tanzanian’s National Parks: A case study of TANAPA. The focus is to see the extent to which wildlife authorities takes on board various research findings and recommendations from its own researches and those of other actors regarding human-wildlife conflicts. I would appreciate to have your no objection to access various planning documents, budgets, progress, and activity reports of the last three years or more of the responsible departments/sections of your organization/ministry. I will also appreciate any other information which you consider may contribute to answering my research question. I have already written to TANAPA requesting the same, and planning to write to TAWIRI as well. Thank you for your cooperation Yours truly Richard Ndaskoi Tel. 0746-358144 Email: [email protected] Encl. Reference letter from University College Dublin.
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