building research capacity in social sciences for development in bolivia: a case of institutional...
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Building Research Capacity in Social Sciences forDevelopment in Bolivia: A Case of Institutional Innovation
Prof. Léa Velho
Maria Carlota de Souza Paula
Roberto Vilar
April 2004
Discussion Paper Series
United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies, Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands
Tel: (31) (43) 350 6300, Fax: (31) (43) 350 6399, e-mail: [email protected], URL: http://www.intech.unu.edu
BUILDING RESEARCH CAPACITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCES FORDEVELOPMENT IN BOLIVIA: A CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATION
Lea Velho, senior researcher, UNU-INTECHMaria Carlota De Souza Paula, consultant, Brazil
Roberto Vilar, consultant, Bolivia
Abstract
This paper analyses a form of North-South cooperation for building research capacity fordevelopment that is quite innovative. It concerns support granted by the Ministry ofDevelopment Cooperation of the Netherlands to Bolivia to foster research in social sciences fordevelopment. The most notable innovation is that the donor approached the recipient countrywith an open agenda, allowing Bolivians total autonomy to plan, implement and manage theirown programme, thus ensuring local ownership of the process in the South. The resultingprogramme - Strategic Research Programme of Bolivia (PIEB) – was devised so as to promoteresearch around an agenda built with wide participation of stakeholders. Research grants areallocated on a competitive basis, widely publicised, with clear guidelines and selection criteria.Research proposals are carried out by teams, have a strong component of training andinvolvement of research users. The achievements of the programme discussed here show theimportance of the South retaining autonomy and ownership, provided the local leadershipcreates mechanisms for building trust and social accountability. They also demonstrate theimportance of building local alliances, fostering social capital while, at the same time, nurturingresearch excellence by creating quality control mechanisms. All elements taken together, PIEBmay be seen as an example of institutional innovation in the Bolivian context.
The case also demonstrates that PIEB was possible because the Dutch Ministry of DevelopmentCooperation was prepared to take risks and to innovate – an attitude often lacking in the donorcommunity who is usually reluctant and cautious to engage with the unknown.
Key words: capacity building, north south partnerships, social sciences, institutionalinnovation, Bolivia
UNU-INTECH Discussion Papers
ISSN 1564-8370
Copyright © 2004 The United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies,UNU-INTECH
UNU-INTECH discussion papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of the researchcarried out at the institute to attract comments
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 7
2. THE LIMITS OF NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR CAPACITY BUILDING IN THESOUTH 9
3. THE MULTI-ANNUAL, MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH PROGRAMMES 11
4. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BOLIVIA 17
5. THE STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROGRAMME OF BOLIVIA – PIEB 21
6. PIEB IN PRACTICE 25
6.1. RESEARCH 256.2. CAPACITY BUILDING 296.3. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING 316.4. DISSEMINATION AND USE OF RESEARCH RESULTS 32
7. A NEW MODE FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 39
8. CONCLUSION 43
BIBLIOGRAPHY 45
THE UNU/INTECH DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 49
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores a form of North-South partnership that is quite innovative. It concerns
foreign aid provided by the government of the Netherlands and aimed at building research
capacity in social sciences for development in Bolivia. The innovative character of this aid
intervention has many facets, as will be discussed here. The most novel aspect, however, is that
the northern donor did not approach the recipient country with an institutional blueprint, but left
adequate room for autonomy for the Bolivians to design, implement and manage their own
research programme.
In so proceeding, the donors were bound to a new policy for development research that was
approved by the Dutch parliament in the 1990s. The policy intended to avoid the charges made
by countless studies and evaluations on the limits of development research. From the pioneering
work of Streeten (1974) to conferences convened by donors to discuss the matter (KFPE, 2001),
and the work of various development experts, the broad consensus was that despite some
success in research capacity building, North-South research partnerships have had a very limited
impact on development.1
Reasons for this are varied and complex, but an important explanation lies in the dominant role
played by the North.2 This manifests itself in the way that the research agenda is set, the making
of decisions concerning analytical and methodological frameworks, the management of research
funds and the key role played by Northern researchers in the publication and dissemination of
results. In short, an outcome conventionally referred to in development jargon as ownership of
the cooperation remaining with the northern partner. Equally important is the fact that donors
frequently disregard the social and economic context within which research takes place in the
South, so that the cooperation itself and its results score poorly in terms of local relevance. 3
Taking such problems into consideration, the Directorate General for Development Co-
operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (henceforth DGIS), established a
1 See Velho (2002) for a review of evaluation studies and conferences on the impact of North-Southresearch partnerships.2 The limits of North-South research cooperation were put forward by Paul Straiten in a pioneerpresentation at a conference in Beluga, Italy, in 1974 (Straiten, 1974). There he develops the argument ofthe difficulties of research cooperation to meet its objectives given the dominance of the North in thewhole process. In the 30 years since, innumerable studies have confirmed his charges, such as Velho(1996) and Gaillard (1998) among many others.3 Lack of ownership from the Southern partners and how this reflects on social relevance of the researchcapacity being built was extensively discussed in a meeting organised by the Swiss Commission forResearch Partnerships with the participation of the most varied types of donors. The articles presentedand the discussions held are published in KFPE (2001).
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new modality of research cooperation for development called Multi-annual, Multidisciplinary
Research Programmes (henceforth MMRPs). The central tenet of MMRPs is that cooperation
programmes ought to be designed with a view to the needs identified by the recipient countries
and not by the donor. One such programme was established in Bolivia under the name
Programa de Investigacion Estrategica de Bolivia (Strategic Research Programme of Bolivia –
PIEB) and is the main focus of this paper. PIEB has shown that it is possible to implement
successful research cooperation projects in a quite different way, most notably, by assuring
ownership of recipient countries. For this to take place, however, it was necessary for both
parties to overcome conventional practices of negotiating, planning and implementing a
research partnership, a process that involved different kinds of learning of all sorts and led to
significant innovation at the institutional level.
The remainder of this paper is organised into seven parts. The second section presents a short
survey of relevant literature on the problems of building research capacity in poor countries,
heavily dependent on foreign aid and lacking a critical mass of professionals with whom
Northern researchers can collaborate on an equal footing. The new Dutch policy for
development cooperation was conceived in the beginning of the 1990’s aimed at counteract
these sorts of problems. Section three provides background information about the
aforementioned Dutch development cooperation policy, which is relevant for understanding the
general principles underlying the MMRPs. The argument here is that such underlying principles
fit into modern conceptions about knowledge production and utilisation. The fourth section
gives a snapshot of the economic, social and political context of Bolivia, as well as of the
research environment in place when PIEB was negotiated.
Section five gives an account of the history of PIEB, focusing on how the Bolivian partners
understood, negotiated and implemented the MMRP concept. Section six presents and analyses
the implementation of PIEB, focusing on the strategic work lines devised, particularly on the
efforts towards structuring an institutional model for social science research in Bolivia. Section
seven discusses the achievements and impact of PIEB in light of the principles of the MMRPs,
justifying why PIEB is considered to have been successful in creating an institutional model that
articulates criteria for research quality and social relevance in the social sciences. This model, it
is argued, fits in with the new theories about knowledge production and utilisation. The last
section presents the main conclusions.
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2. THE LIMITS OF NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR CAPACITYBUILDING IN THE SOUTH
International research cooperation since the end of World War II has reflected the changes in
the direction and substance of North-South relations. Against this backdrop, donor-initiated
research capacity building in the South has shifted significantly away from granting
scholarships and extending technical assistance as was the case in the period between 1950 and
1970 to fostering collaborative research projects where Northern and Southern partners are
meant to participate on equal terms from the 1980s. This shift coincides with the realisation
among some donors that the assumption that technology transfer would take place from North
to South was too simplistic. It is now widely accepted that the South must take charge of its own
development and find its own way. In the words of Stiglitz, “That standard view of delivering
knowledge for development leads to an impairment of the self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-
efficacy of the clients. [It is as if the South] need to be ‘helped’– to be shown the way. New
forms of colonialism are masked as ‘quality control’. But these ways […] only reinforce the
clients’ passivity and perceived lack of self-efficacy” (Stiglitz, 2000:11).
Notwithstanding such a significant change in donor perspective, modes of carrying out donor-
initiated research policies and their implementation remain problematic despite well-intentioned
capacity strengthening programmes aimed at building collegial partnerships between Northern
and Southern researchers (UNCTAD, 1999). At first glance, they have tended to reproduce the
unequal positions of the partners in the economic and political world order. With their resources
and scientific knowledge, Northern partners have been prone to believe themselves more
capable of identifying the needs of those in the South and to ‘teach’ them how to do research
(Kuramoto and Sagasti, 2002). The absence of favourable conditions for the sustained growth of
research in the South, on the other hand, has led researchers to uncritically accept whatever
offer of cooperation was presented to them. It is widely known, for example, that the severe
economic crisis that descended upon the developing world during the 1990’s hit particularly
hard the incipient science system that was funded almost exclusively by the public sector. For
the few existing qualified research staff, engaging in research partnerships with Northern
colleagues or doing consultancy work for donors was the only way out both to maintain a
decent standard of living as well as to keep doing research (Waast and Krishna, 2003).
In such a context, Northern researchers have continued to dominate research networks despite
the rhetoric of partnership with the South. The practice and analysis of research cooperation
provide ample evidence that research themes are decided by Northern partners to whom most of
10
the benefits of the partnership accrue. Such benefits include things like managing and deciding
on project resources, publishing the results and getting most of the recognition for the work
done in partnership.4 Depending on the modality of the collaborative research and the attitudes
of the researchers involved, there have been cases of projects where Southern partners served as
‘glamorised’ research assistants who provided ‘raw data’ for analysis by academic researchers
in the North (Velho, 1996; Toni and Velho, 1996). In addition, research cooperation
programmes devised in the North have frequently been accused of contributing to the
consolidation of research traditions, capabilities and reward systems that are divorced from the
needs of the South (Vessuri, 1996; Kuramoto and Sagasti, 2002). In effect, research cooperation
has helped build a ‘peripheral’ scientific community with no ties to its socio-economic reality
and which, at the same time, is not capable of fully participating in the mainstream scientific
enterprise. Furthermore this scientific community is now in danger of disappearing and become
instead a pool of consultants depending on orders for research work and on temporary contracts
(Waast and Krishna, 2003).
It may not be entirely fair though, to argue that Northern partners wilfully dominate North-
South research cooperation. While many of them have determined the directions of research
projects in the South, some may have been forced to do so by the lack of research capacity of
their Southern partners. The severe constraints posed by unequal research capabilities on
collegial collaboration has made it imperative to redress the imbalance by developing a critical
mass of competent Southern researchers (Bunders and Mukherjee, 1998). The challenge facing
developing countries is how to create a research capacity, both in terms of human capital and a
conductive research environment, which, at the same time, abides to criteria of scientific quality
and to social accountability. And, significantly, how to accomplish this when the support from
local government to S&T activities is stagnating or even decreasing.
It was the above sort of issues that were addressed by the Dutch development cooperation
policy document of 1992, as we will see in what follows.
4 See, for instance, case studies of international scientific cooperation compiled in Gaillard (1996) for theproblems linked to dominance of the arrangements by the northern partners.
11
3. THE MULTI-ANNUAL, MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCHPROGRAMMES
The MMRPs were designed and presented for the first time in a 1992 DGIS policy document
entitled ‘Research and Development Cooperation’ and endorsed by the parliament of the
Netherlands in the same year (DGIS, 1992). The new policy, materialised in the MMRPs
framework, was shaped in two international conferences on research and development held in
the city of Groningen in 1989 and 1992 under the leadership of Jan Pronk, nominated Minister
of Development Cooperation in 1989.5
The participants of both conferences, coming from a variety of countries and professional
backgrounds, presented and debated their concerns and experiences on research cooperation as
well as the challenges faced in making the process more relevant to development in the South.
The discussion centred on the future of development-related research cooperation to address the
needs of the South remaining instead mostly driven by the scientific interests of the North. The
main recommendation, totally adopted by the policy document, was that priority should be
given to strengthening domestic research capacity within developing countries, shifting funds
and responsibilities for research to the South.
The MMRPs were thus conceived under the above policy framework, as autonomous research
programmes, designed to meet the demands and/or needs of the countries that receive this
foreign aid. It was also recognised that autonomy and ownership of the South, while essential, is
not enough. In order to ensure the contribution of research to sustainable development, the
MMRPs set out to frame their activities around five general requirements: a focus on
sustainable development; demand orientation/involvement of users/policy relevance; location
specificity; multidisciplinarity; strengthening research capacity (individual and institutional).
The implementation of this policy concept as well as of its requirements (also called unifying
links) was left to the specific countries. In view of this, it was expected that the programme, its
governance as well as its operational schemes would take different formats, shaped by the local
historical context as well as by the actors involved.
The development of the MMRPs involved the following steps: a) DGIS identified intended
partners in specific countries6; b) after an initial dialogue, the Southern partners alone were
responsible for setting the goals, designing, implementing and managing the programme; c) the
5 The presentations and discussions of both conferences were published in Schweigman and Bosma(1992) and Schweigman and van der Werf (1994).6 Countries were selected in the basis of existing development relations with the Netherlands.
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research agenda was chosen on the basis of internal dialogue among stakeholders (researchers
and non-researchers); d) a specific research programme was then formulated under the
supervision of a governing body constituted by domestic members only; and e) a variety of
activities to be funded were devised in order to achieve programme goals (Waardenburg, 1997).
A notable feature of this set-up was that the MMRPs, in practice, would function as a research
funding agency, managing research funds in a competitive way, according to a research agenda,
activities and procedures negotiated and agreed upon by stakeholders in the South.
The autonomy of the South in this process, given its innovative character, posed a number of
challenges both to the Southern partners themselves and to the donor. The former, used to
receive clear guidelines from the North, had to get used to the idea that nothing would happen
unless they took the initiative themselves. A ‘power vacuum’ was thus created, which was up to
the local partners to fill. The nature of the response from each country varied considerably. For
some, such as the state of Kerala in India, it was quite a natural transition because the partners
had significant research tradition and were used to taking the lead. In others, like Zambia, the
immobility of local stakeholders prevented an MMRP from getting off the ground (Lange,
1999).
Other difficulties faced by recipients, but also by the donor, emanated from one of the required
features of the MMRPs, namely a demand orientation in setting the research agenda. As
different stakeholders – researchers, government bodies, NGOs and grassroots organisations -
have different interests and, consequently, different perceptions of what is important, the
question remained of whose demands were to be met.7 Ironically, there were occasions, such as
the case of the MMRP in Nicaragua, in which difficulties to reconcile divergences among local
stakeholders led them to call on donors to solve the dispute - a role the donor refused to play
(Toni and Velho, 2000).
On the side of the donor agency, the MMRPs required, among other things, the restructuring of
the role of government officials. The latter were now to be ‘facilitators’ and not protagonists of
the process in each country, something in which they had no prior experience. Implementing
such a change was not easy, not only because it defied standard bureaucratic procedures within
DGIS, but also because the new policy faced some resistance from an important part of the
Dutch academic community. The latter saw themselves excluded from the MMRPs, which
meant less research funds for cooperating with colleagues in the developing countries. A
concern was also often expressed by Dutch researchers about the lack of ‘quality control’ of
7 This is referred to by the development cooperation community as the Ganuza dilemma, a problemnamed after E.Ganuza, who brought it up at the first development conference in Groningen (Ganuza,1992).
13
research that was demand-oriented, called for, selected and carried out exclusively by
researchers in poor countries.8
The challenges above were addressed with the adoption of a process approach, meaning that
only the objectives and overall strategy of the MMRPs were laid down from the start. The
precise details of that strategy were worked out step by step on the basis of practical experience,
self-reflection, new insights and sharing knowledge within the MMRPs, among them, and
between the MMRPs and DGIS. It is clear, therefore, that the MMRPs required extensive
learning both on the part of the donor agency and the Southern partners. With this in mind,
opportunities for sharing knowledge were devised so as to make explicit whatever tacit
knowledge had been accumulated by each MMRP as well as by DGIS. Examples are the
periodic meetings of MMRPs coordinators, the MMRPs newsletter, the evaluation of the
programmes and regular meetings within DGIS concerning the MMRPs. In addition, because of
the innovative nature of the MMRPs, DGIS commissioned a comparative study on the impact in
the South of a number of donor-supported research programmes (Bautista et al, 2001).9
Given the practical and process approach of the MMRPs, it is not surprising that the underlying
concepts lacked an explicit definition and there was no coherent theoretical framework
articulating them. However, in the course of the comparative study it became apparent that the
MMRPs, albeit implicitly, were in keeping with the recent theoretical developments concerning
knowledge production and utilisation (Bautista ET al, 2001). First of all, the MMRPs had
broken up with the linear model in which research is seen as the starting point of innovation and
which entails a clear separation between knowledge producers (researchers) and knowledge
users (firms, government, and society at large). This model also assumes that research results
produced in line with theoretical frameworks and prescribed methodologies of relevant
disciplines, ought to be utilised by end-users because of their scientific validity. The latter is
ascertained by the scientific peers and reflected in publication of articles, preferably in
mainstream journals.10
Differently from above, the MMRPs subscribe to a systemic, interactive model in which
knowledge is produced in the course of cognitive and social practices carried out in the context
8 In order to quiet the complains of the Dutch research community about the MMRPs, DGIS made asubstantial contribution to the Research Council (NWO) to support researchers-inititatied internationalresearch cooperation projects (personal information)9 The main objective of the comparative study was to reply to the question: is the Netherlands policy forcooperation, as operationalized in the MMRPs, any different from ‘conventional’ forms of North–Southcooperation, or from the policies adopted recently by other similar agencies? What are the differences andsimilarities between these policies? The findings suggested that indeed the MMRPs were quite innovativeas a modality of North-South cooperation and the impacts were very positive.10 The linear model of innovation was articulated in the famous document of Vannevar Bush, Science theEndless Frontier, to the US president, H.Truman, in 1945. For a description and discussion of the model,see Rip (1994).
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of application to a concrete problem. It recognises the existence of multiple knowledge sites,
and of various skills and experiences that need to be brought together to solve particular
problems. Quality is assessed not only in terms of scientific merit but also of usefulness or
relevance of the knowledge produced, being more socially accountable and reflexive. This new
vision of knowledge production and use has been articulated in the last decade, with slight
variations, by a number of researchers and from various disciplinary perspectives. The system
of innovation approach of Freeman (1988, 1995), Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993) and others is
the most influential innovation model that articulates these ideas today among economists of
technology. Others propose models from a sociology of innovation perspective such as the
social construction of technology of Pinch and Biker (1994) and the ‘actor network’ model of
Callow (1994). The model proposed by Gibbons et al (2000 [1994]), of Mode 1 (linear,
disciplinary) and Mode 2 (interactive, multidisciplinary) of knowledge production is another
proposition to understand the changing relation between ‘science, technology and society’.
What all the models have in common is the idea that there is no linearity in the relation between
research and development; that the process of knowledge generation and utilisation is much
more complex and involves various social actors who need to be in close interaction.
Interactions are mediated by institutions that are shaped by the local historical, political, social
and economic context. And these are exactly the ideas, if just implicitly, underlying the
MMRPs.
Once the general framework of the MMRPs was developed, DGIS selected a number of
countries where the process would be initiated. Beginning in 1994, nine MMRPs were
established in the following countries: India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Uganda, Tanzania, Mali,
Egypt, Nicaragua and Bolivia. It is to the programme in Bolivia that we now turn our attention.
We start by, first of all, providing general information about the Bolivian context where the
programme was set up.
Information for this study was collected from documents of many kinds provided both by DGIS
and by PIEB, including official agreements, reports, exchange of correspondence, evaluation
missions and so on. PIEB also granted the authors unrestricted access to its project files,
minutes of meetings of its various decision making groups. The authors also participated as
observers in workshops for setting the research agenda in some of the regions (Oruro, Beni and
Chuquisaca) and carried out a number of site visits to projects in different regions. The most
important source of information, however, were interviews carried out with different
stakeholders such as, members of the Directors Committee, of the Executive Secretariat, of the
qualifying jury, advisors, readers, senior and junior researchers, as well as with applicants
whose projects had been rejected. Policy-makers, members of various NGOs and grassroots
organisations were also interviewed, as were local media journalists and local representatives of
15
other donors, such as the Swedish, the Canadian and the British Development Cooperation
Agencies (SAREC, IDRC and DFID, respectively). In total, over 100 interviews were
conducted in two different periods: from August to December 1999, when two of the authors
(LV and MCSP) were involved in a comparative study of donors-initiated capacity building
programmes in the South (Souza Paula and Velho, 2000) and in August 2003, when two of the
authors (LV and RV) were involved in a mid-term evaluation of PIEB (Velho & Vilar, 2003).
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4. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BOLIVIA11
Bolivia is a postcolonial society with a turbulent political economic history. Having obtained its
independence from Spain in 1825 after almost three centuries of colonial rule, the new republic
experienced political instability and territorial wars with neighbouring countries in the 110-year
period after its independence. The wars reduced the size of Bolivia, which today covers an area
of 1,098,581 km2, and discredited the traditional oligarchy, thereby paving the way for a series
of coups and the establishment in the 1930s of Bolivia’s Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario — MNR).12
Popularly supported by indigenous miners and peasants, the MNR spearheaded one of Latin
America’s three most significant agrarian revolutions in the 20th century.13 Following the
economic decline and social unrest of the post-World War II years, the Mexican-inspired 1952
Bolivian Revolution instituted sweeping land reform and nationalised the tin industry, which
had dominated the Bolivian economy from the early 20th century.14 But by the mid-1960s, the
left-wing MNR control over a civilian government gave way to a series of military coups that
saw ten dictators seize power and was only returned to civilian rule in 1982.
Throughout the post-Revolution military coups and guerrilla warfare, the Bolivian economy
managed to maintain a modest growth, with a brief period of accelerated growth in the 1970s.
But by the 1980s it had floundered and the bankrupt democratic transition government could not
save it. Amidst widespread discontent and nation-wide strikes, the country reeled from Latin
America’s first recorded hyperinflation (reaching as high as 24,000% in 1985). Bolivia’s per
capita income in 1985 had fallen below its 1965 level. 15
The change of governments in mid-1985 broke the momentum of economic downturn.
Subscribing to a neoliberal economic model, the government implemented an austere
11 This section is mostly drawn from Bautista et al (2001).12 Two wars of profound consequences were a) the War of the Pacific [1879 to 1883] in which Bolivialost its seacoast and rich nitrate fields to Chile [within the 1925-1935 period, Bolivia lost nearly half of itsterritory because of wars and bilateral agreements]; and b) the Chaco War with Paraguay which led to thecoups, the politicisation of the Indians and the formation of political groups of which the MNR was themost significant (Hudson, 1991; The Netherlands Development Assistance, 1998).13 The Revolution led to the institution of a civilian government, universal suffrage and primary educationin the rural areas, enhancing in the process the indigenous population’s identification with the Boliviannation.14 Mining has been an important sector in Bolivian history. Until the 1880s, the silver industry was animportant feature of Bolivian colonial life, with Indians toiling in the silver mines for the Spanish coffers.However, the silver industry suffered a sharp decline in the late 1880s and was replaced by the tinindustry. By the end of World War I, Bolivia was the world’s second leading producer of tin, with a fifthof the world’s output mined in Bolivia.
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stabilisation programme that deregulated the economy, legalised the US dollar, eliminated
subsidies, imposed a wage freeze and radically restructured the public sector. Interestingly, this
was the first outright adoption of a stabilisation programme in the country. Successive Bolivian
governments had negotiated six tentative stabilisation programmes with the IMF between 1979
and 1985 but they were not implemented because of strong opposition and a lack of political
continuity.
The successful reduction of the hyperinflation rate within a few months to 10%-20% in 1985
and to 6% in late 1989 reinforced the subsequent administrations’ espousal of a neoliberal
economic policy framework (Hudson, 1991). Despite achievements associated with the
stabilisation programme, the export-dependent Bolivian economy remained vulnerable to crisis.
The crash of the tin market in the last quarter of 1985 broke this dominant industry’s back. This,
together with the government’s austerity programme, contributed to the loss of jobs during the
late 1980s of between 11.5% affecting 25% of the labour force. The economic distress
associated with unemployment and the restiveness of those directly affected by the crisis and
government’s stabilisation programmes brought to the fore an important feature of the
contemporary Bolivian political economy: the role of the informal sector in propping up the
economy (Hudson, 1991 and Griffin, 1996).
During this entire period, Bolivian civil society has shown notable strength. Its long history of
leftist-inspired struggles since the 1930s and the growth of NGOs in the 1970s in response to
church initiatives in defence of peasants, have contributed to the organisation and mobilisation
of various groups in the country. Thus, Bolivia has evolved a thickening web of grassroots
organisations that form ephemeral political alliances through networks of kindred organisations
(Annis, 1988). Their discursive underpinnings include Marxism, the cooperative movement,
feminism and liberation theology. These features, we argue have contributed both to shape
PIEB as an institution as well as to its implementation modes.
Bolivia thus arrives at the 90’s with an estimated population of about 8 million, 60% of which
are indigenous peoples of more than 30 different ethnic groups (although there is dominance of
the Aymaras, the Quechuas and, to a much lesser extent, the Guaranis). Constitutional reform
approved in 1994 recognises Bolivia’s multiethnic composition and cultural diversity as well as
respect for and protection of indigenous peoples’ rights – in particular rights to land originally
held collectively. Within the framework of constitutional changes legislation has been adopted
on popular participation in the decision-making processes, decentralisation of government,
education for all, privatisation of state enterprises and reform of the public sector.
15 Hudson (1991); The Netherlands Development Assistance (1998: 20).
19
Evaluated against the background of most social and economic indicators Bolivia is one of the
poorest countries in Latin America and the poorest in South America. Official statistics indicate
that more than two thirds (70%) of the population live in poverty, and in rural areas the figure
can rise to over 90%. Gross national product (GNP) per capita is estimated at U$S 1,078.
Agriculture contributes about 20% of GNP while ore and metal mining accounts for about 12%
of GNP and over 40% of exports (Bolivian National Statistics Institute, 2000).
Foreign development assistance to Bolivia focuses in a very special way the support to the
above mentioned structural reforms. In 1994 foreign development assistance constituted about
U$S 724 million, equivalent to almost 20% of its gross domestic product (GDP)16. On a per
capita basis Bolivia is the second-largest development assistance recipient in Latin America,
surpassed only by Nicaragua.
Concerning higher education, up to the 70’s Bolivia had eight public universities and one
private university, the Catholic University of Bolivia. From their creation, Bolivian universities,
as is the case in most Latin America, had a strong commitment to social development and were
very politicised. As a result, during the period of military dictatorship, the universities were
identified as subversive enemies and faculty was massively fired. Many of the latter fled the
country, and the few who stayed, particularly in the social sciences, could only continue their
professional activities in private research centres (Arocena and Sutz, 2001; Barreiro and Velho,
1998).
Bolivian university system experienced a large expansion in students and institutions: from
1972 to 1995 the number of students enrolled in the public sector increased by 525%, and 25%
of 18-24 years old were attending university, one of the highest rates in Latin America. During
the 80’s, the number of universities, especially the private ones, increased substantially; at
present, there are 12 public and 34 private universities, although the former account for about
83% of the enrolments. This formidable growth was accompanied, however, by decreasing
quality and efficiency levels: drop out rates are very high and only 17% of students get their
degrees, although a larger share complete course work but never finish their Bachelor degree’s
theses (known as egresados) (IUOG, 1998: 43-56; Telleria-Geiger, 1999).
Graduate degrees (Masters and PhDs) started only recently in Bolivia - the first Masters course
opened in 1984. A major increase occurred between 1995-96, albeit through a very chaotic
process, without any form of quality control - reaching 54 Masters and three PhD programmes
16 The greater part of development assistance is contributed by OECD countries and multilateral agencies– which account for about 55% of foreign development assistance to Bolivia. The three largestinstitutions are the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), the CAF (Andean Development Fund) andthe World Bank. These three institutions combined contribute about 47% of overall foreign assistance toBolivia. The main bilateral donors are Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and theUnited States of America (Bolivian National Statistical Institute, April 2000)
20
in 1998 (IUOG, 1998: 54-55). As expected, national expenditure on S&T, as percentage of the
GDP, was very low: 0.1% in 1982, and 0.3% in 1992, representing about US$20 million and
being almost totally spent on salaries and infrastructure (IUOG, 1998: 217). This rate remained
practically at the same level in 1996: 0.33%, and is much below the Latin American average of
0.6%. It is also noteworthy that over 30% of such expenditures come from foreign sources,
basically in the form of aid from multilateral and bilateral agencies (Ricyt, 2002).
As a consequence of the above, research activities are quite alien to Bolivia. Universities,
including the most prominent ones, are basically teaching organisations. Given the lack of
research, teaching is outdated, conservative and based on concepts and research results
produced elsewhere. The proportion of full-time faculty is very small and no incentives exist for
research activities. In the Universidad Mayor San Simon, reported as one of the two universities
that do some research in Bolivia, researchers comprise about 12% of total faculty. A 1996 head
count revealed that in total, Bolivia had only 1.300 researchers and 560 full-time equivalent
researchers in, whose participation in the international scientific production is “scarce and
marginal” (IUOG, 1998:218; Ricyt, 2002; Telleria-Geiger, 1999:113). It is in this context that
PIEB was negotiated, planned and implemented, as we will see in what follows.
21
5. THE STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROGRAMME OF BOLIVIA – PIEB
In accordance with the procedures delineated for the MMRPs, DGIS carried out exploratory
missions in June 1992 and July 1993 to get acquainted with the Bolivian reality and identify
local partners (PIEB, 1995:2). What they found bas been sketched in the previous section. On
both occasions, a number of local social science researchers, policy-makers, development
specialists and representatives of NGOs and grassroots organisations were contacted and a
series of documents were commissioned about the feasibility of the programme and the focus
and format it should take.
During the process, it was agreed that the programme should have a focus on the social sciences
related to development. The reason was that Bolivia, as pointed out, was emerging from many
years of dictatorship, under which academic research at the universities was almost completely
destroyed. The social sciences in particular, as in many other Latin American countries that also
suffered under military regimes, were hit particularly hard. Practically all social scientists and
social science activities had to be located in NGOs (called ‘independent research centres’) and
were supported by foreign donors.17 The irony was that the return to democracy led to a decline
in foreign funding with no commensurate growth in local support. Although the Humanities and
Social Sciences account for the highest share of the undergraduate enrolment in Bolivia (41%
and 27% respectively, in 1994), the official research effort was mainly aimed at natural sciences
and engineering. In 1994, the last two fields concentrated around 90% of public research
investment, and about 83% of the 560 full-researchers in the public university system. (IUOG,
1998; Telleria-Geiger, 1999).18
Thus, even with the return to democracy in 1982, social researchers in Bolivia were mostly
doing consultancy work, lacking of a systematic approach and empirical basis, in an essay-
writing tradition. In the best scenario, they were working in NGOs engaged in action-research or
diagnosis-research frequently related to localised development projects. In all cases, there was
almost total reliance on foreign funding. (Souza Paula et al, 2000).
Having the above picture in mind, the Bolivians involved in discussing the programme had their
first tour de force with the Dutch. This involved the definition of the concept of demand-driven
and policy-oriented research embodied in the framework of the MMRPs. The Dutch tended to
17 This process was similar in many Latin American countries. For the case of Uruguay, see Barreiro andVelho (1998).18 This is not to say that research in the natural sciences and engineering is well provided for in Bolivia.The data presented in section 3 shows this not to be the case.
22
interpret the concept as research that would have a direct bearing on policies for poverty
alleviation, sustainable development and gender equality. The Bolivians, on the other hand, did
not want to link the research agenda to specific policy issues, but felt that the country needed to
first get to know itself through social science research and develop a national knowledge system
in the social sciences. As one of the protagonists expressed it: “I remember the considerable
amount of time we spent in discussions with the Dutch government regarding the need for
flexibility and the very wide range of issues that we wanted to research” (Montano, 2001: 9).
Moreover, the Bolivians emphasised that demand-driven research was already being done by
some action-research NGOs and it tended to be superficial and had not allowed the development
of academic skills lacking in the country. A compromise was reached eventually as the Dutch
reconsidered that autonomy to the South should prevail and the Bolivians conceded that the
research agenda would aim at ‘strategic research’, that is, knowledge to address processes of
change, empower social players and consolidate democracy and thus policy-relevant.
So it was that the research agenda to guide PIEB’s activities was shaped by the commissioned
studies and countless meetings and workshops held by the various Bolivian stakeholders
involved in the process of discussing the programme, before the latter’s formal approval. It was
decided that the programme would fund research activities related to four themes: (1) actors and
social relations in their daily life; (2) productive transformation, social integration and
sustainable development; (3) democratisation and State reforms in a plural society; and (4)
cultural transformations and communication. It is clear that the themes are broad enough to
allow for the flexibility in research agenda that the Bolivians had argued for. This agenda
already appears in a document entitled “Strategic Research Programme in Bolivia”, which is the
programme proposal, submitted to and approved by DGIS in 1995 (PIEB, 1995).
A second contentious issue in the negotiation concerned the institutional framework within
which the programme could take place. Although not explicitly part of the required features of
the MMRPs, the Dutch had in mind that the programme should be lodged at an existing
institution in the recipient country, thus increasing its sustainability in the future. The Bolivians,
however, believed that this was not appropriate because the local institutions, particularly the
universities, were only just recovering from the dictatorship and the programme needed an
independent institutional basis, not associated with any organisation. Once more the Dutch
conceded to the local viewpoint and PIEB was created as an NGO, later transformed into a
Foundation, governed by a Directors’ Committee, composed of seven specialists with renowned
academic trajectories in Bolivia, and known for their civil engagement. This committee is to
conduct the programme as described in the programme document “Strategic Research
Programme in Bolivia”(PIEB, 1995). These professionals are linked to government bodies,
social organisations, academia or NGOs, but are not institutional representatives. In order to
23
ensure that the members would not act on behalf of his/her constituency a fundamental rule was
put in place that people on the board could not apply for project funds.
The main functions attributed to the Directors’ Committee were: “to define the global and
strategic guidelines of the programme; to direct the academic aspects of the programme,
guaranteeing both academic quality and social relevance; to supervise the Office of the
Executive Secretary; to approve projects, budgets and audits; and to select personnel in charge
of decision making, such as the Executive Secretary and the members of the Qualifying Jurors”
(PIEB,1995: 24). In order to implement the decisions of the Directors’ Committee, an Executive
Secretariat Office was organised and, during 1995, a public call was made to fill the post of
Executive Secretary (PIEB, 1996).
During the discussion of the programme document submitted to DGIS, a third controversial
issue emerged. The point was that, for the Bolivian partners, the programme should give priority
to developing a critical mass of young researchers, including a strong “training” component in
the activities to be funded. DGIS opposed to this idea, as it is assumed that “there are plenty of
good scientists in the South who have to earn a living from doing other work”, and the MMRPs
“were specially envisaged as a way to engage existing and perhaps under-used research
capacity” (Waardenburg, 1994: 21-2). After much negotiation, the donor agreed to the plan to
build research capacity instead of only strengthening research capacity.
With the approval of the programme document by the Dutch ministry, PIEB was officially set
up in May 1995 (PIEB, 1995). It is clear that in the negotiation process both partners had to
learn a lot. The Dutch, as donors, had to face the fact that, despite their openness to decisions
being taken by the South, they had assumptions and expectations about requirements that were
not part of the MMRPs framework, but a legacy of the traditional bureaucratic logic and
previous practice. It took them determination and commitment to abide by the principle of
autonomy of the South and, at the same time, be clear about policy parameters so that the
features underlying the programme were respected. Above all, knowing how donors are, for
many reasons, cautious and reluctant to engage with the unknown, (Eyben, 2003), it is clear that
the DGIS was prepared to take risks when embracing the MMRPs. As for the Bolivian partners,
it took much group discussion, negotiating, making arguments explicit and convincing and
finally, for the first time, agreeing among themselves on a research agenda and on a programme
plan to implement it. As one of the Bolivian protagonists put it: “We have assumed the power to
make decisions [and therefore] we had to face the dilemma that donors normally face: how do
we build trust, how do we build legitimacy?” (Montaño, 2001:10). PIEB had to learn how to
cope with, and eventually overcome, these and many other challenges in the course of the
implementation of the programme. This is what we will discuss next.
25
6. PIEB IN PRACTICE
The final institutional set up of PIEB, therefore, was as an NGO with a governing body
constituted exclusively by Bolivians (the Directors’ Committee – DC) and an Executive
Secretariat. The programme was geared around three main objectives: to foster the development
of social sciences by the execution of research of social relevance and academic quality; to
provide an impulse for long range strategic research which would influence local development
and the formulation of public policies; and to “overcome the limited conditions in human
resources for social science research, which is a consequence of the institutional weakness of
the Bolivian educational system” (PIEB, 1999:1).
To these ends, PIEB signed a contract with and received a financial grant from DGIS of about
US$ 5 million for a period of four years (1995 to 1999). A grant of similar amount was provided
with a renewal of the agreement for a further four years period, due to expire in December 2004.
In order to achieve its objectives, PIEB articulated four strategic areas for its regular operations:
research; capacity building; institutional strengthening; and dissemination and use of research
results. While these areas are integrated in each research project approved, it is, for analytical
purposes, easier to treat them separately.
6.1. Research
In the same year of approval, PIEB planned and advertised its first call for research proposals.
The call specified a number of required features for the proposals. They should: a) fit into one of
the four themes of the agreed research agenda (as listed in the previous section); b) be submitted
by a team of at least three investigators; c) each research team should commit itself to train at
least two young researchers during the development of their study; d) have social relevance and
include a plan for disseminating research results to potential users and/or beneficiaries; e) have
academic excellence; f) be multidisciplinary (PIEB, n/d)19.
19 These features were clearly explained for interested candidates in the Guide for Submission of ResearchProposals in Social Sciences , as follows:a) Academic excellence: the projects should produce new knowledge with a solid empirical foundation;
they should strengthen and/or criticise the existing theoretical methods of analysis and explanation ofsocial phenomena; they should study the bibliography on the subject when dealing with it; theyshould identify gaps in theoretical knowledge, in order not to reiterate what is already known or toimprovise hypotheses or methodological strategies.
b) Social relevance: the projects should contribute to detect better strategies for development, i.e., berelevant and illuminating with respect to the decision making of the social actors, including theGovernment, and directed in such a way as to favour social integration and democratisation inBolivia. It is also understood that to cultivate social relevance implies carrying out research on
26
Beginning with the first call in 1995, a series of steps were devised for proposal selection, as
follows: a) presentation to and registration of projects by the Executive Secretariat; b)
administrative review of proposals; c) choice of experts for reviewing individual proposals
(project readers); d) evaluation of all proposals with readers’ opinion by the Qualifying Juror; e)
presentation to and approval of the Qualifying Juror’s verdict by the DC; f) implementation of
decisions (signing of contracts, etc) by the Executive Secretariat; g) academic and
administrative monitoring of all projects in progress.
As PIEB, from the beginning, was much concerned with its institutional credibility and
integrity, it took a number of measures towards building this. First of all, calls for proposals,
together with guidelines for submission, selection procedures and criteria were amply publicised
both by leaflets distributed to relevant organisations and by the general press. Second,
individual project reviewers as well as members of the Qualifying Jury were chosen among
senior researchers (academics, development specialists) who had a high reputation in the
country. In addition, readers and jurors were not allowed to present proposals of their own,
which of course restricted the local pool of potential reviewers and some times required the
proposals to be sent to a reader in another Latin American country. Actually, any work
relationship or kinship or reference of a candidate to any senior social science researcher in the
country was enough to disqualify the latter as a reader or juror in that specific call. Also, the DC
decided that the Qualifying Jury would be autonomous and autarchic and that their decisions
would be final, not subject to change by the DC. And, despite the anonymity guaranteed for
project readers, members of the Qualifying Jury would remain confidential only up to the
production of the Proceedings of the Resolution, which would then be published in major
newspapers with the signature of the jurors and referendum of the DC.
In the subsequent years of 1996 and 1997, PIEB organised another two calls for proposals
following, with slight variation, the procedures described above.20 In the process of reflecting
subjects of regional interest with scientific rigor, originality of outlook and the opening of new areasof study which foster the intellectual development of social science.
c) Multidisciplinarity: research must have an interdisciplinary character when approaching a specificsubject of study, either by the team of researchers choice or by the point of view adopted on the basisof a given discipline.
d) Training of young researchers: the transmission between generations of resources, opportunities andabilities for research is one of the essential purposes of PIEB, and is taken as a starting point.Research teams are encouraged to incorporate the training of human resources, who shall completetheir academic education with direct experience in social science research.
e) Plan for dissemination of research results: this could take up to 10% of the project budgetf) Coherence between the project and its budget: in the formulation of proposals, the cost of each
requested item must be justified in terms of the project’s characteristics.(PIEB, n/d)20 The variation was due to lessons learned from previous calls and includes new requirements such as:level of formal education of the senior researchers (Bachelor degree as a minimum), age limit and type oftraining of the junior participants (university education as a minimum), whether the members of the teamwere full time researchers, whether the candidates had permanent residency in Bolivia, whether a detailedplan for the training of junior researchers was included in the proposal.
27
on and monitoring the outcomes of each call as well as the progress of particular projects, the
members of the DC and of the Executive Secretariat became aware of two problems and
launched corresponding measures to address them.
The first one was that training young researchers in the framework of a senior researcher’s
project failed sometimes to produce the intended results. For one thing, only one or two junior
researchers participated in each project and the evidence indicated that they tended to be
confined to routine tasks, were not involved in project design and even less on report writing.
The result was that at the end of the project they had not been properly trained as researchers.
Only a few senior researchers seemed to be genuinely interested and willing to put the necessary
effort into training their junior partners.
With this in mind, PIEB decided to make a call for projects exclusively for junior researchers.
The call was articulated around the same four thematic lines used in the previous calls and
followed similar guidelines and selection criteria as the other calls. It was further specified that
the research team should be composed of no more than three members and that these should
have concluded their formal university course load.21 Once the projects were selected, PIEB
hired an “academic advisor” for each of them, to perform tasks such as: advising the team on
methodological procedures, on bibliographical background search and analysis, on devising
instruments for data collection, on the processing of the gathered information and on the
elaboration of progress and final reports. The advisor also had to submit his own report, on his
advisory activities, to PIEB. Despite being an important resource person, the advisor is not to
impose his/her own ideas on the team of young researchers who are, ultimately the only
responsible for decisions and outcomes (PIEB, 1998).
The second problem identified by PIEB in the course of the first three calls was that the great
majority of the proposals submitted were from researchers working in the capital La Paz and
Cochabamba. Only a few proposals originated in other states, some of which did not submit
any.22 While it was known that these two cities congregated the largest part of social scientists
in the country, the concentration of proposals went beyond expectation. Moreover, the few
21 In Bolivia, in order to receive a university degree, social sciences and humanities students must finishall course work and present a final graduation monograph. The idea behind this norm is to involve thestudents in some form of research and writing a long essay. However, given lack of skilled faculty staff tosupervise this work and lack of funds, a considerable proportion of students finish course work but neverget their degrees because they cannot finish a monograph. Thus, some of the junior researchers applyingto PIEB’s call for proposals had completed the course credits, but not yet received their Bachelor’sdegree.22 In the first call, out of 46 projects submitted, 30 were from La Paz and 10 from Cochabamba. Thesecond call elicited 83 proposals, of which 45 came from La Paz and 20 from Cochabamba. Theequivalent figures for the third call were 46 proposals in total, 20 from La Paz and 10 from Cochabamba.
28
projects coming from other regions could not compete in quality.23 It was clear to PIEB that
continuing only with national calls for proposal would widen the gap in research capabilities
among the regions. Thus it was decided to launch specific calls for proposal in each region.
To this end, a careful strategy was devised. The involvement of local organisations in the
process seemed paramount for a number of reasons: to mobilise local social actors to the
importance of research in solving social problems, to provide support to the researchers, to
ensure sustainability of research once the projects were finished. Thus, the first step in this
direction were visits of the Executive Secretary and members of the DC to local universities,
NGOs, state and municipal government bodies, professional associations, trade unions and co-
operatives and other relevant organisations to discuss the idea. At this stage, a diagnosis of
research capacity in the region would also take place. Eventually, local institutional partners
were chosen (the kind of organisation varied in each region), which were to implement the
actions together with PIEB. A first action was to build a local research agenda, as it was thought
that the way to mobilise local actors was to have a more specific research agenda, closer to local
problems and originated locally.
The process for building the research agenda involves multiple stakeholders. It starts with
consultations with professionals, identified by the local institutions, knowledgeable about the
region’s development problems and needs. These are individual interviews in which the
interviewee is asked to answer three questions: what are the main problems? what are the
research needs to solve them?, what are the research priorities? Systematisation of this
information and further discussion with relevant institutions leads to the identification of trends.
Two or three local professionals are then contracted to prepare documents where the
information generated in the consultations is analysed in light of the social, economic and
political context. The documents are next discussed in a workshop organised in discussion
groups specific for each problem/axis/theme. Persons invited for the workshops include those
interviewed in the first round and others new to the process. The research agenda for the
regional call emerges from final, plenary discussions at the workshop. From this point onwards,
procedures for project selection are similar to the ones described above. However, for the
implementation of projects in the regions, a local office is set up to give administrative and
logistical support to the research teams and an “expert advisor”, familiar with the projects’
topic, is hired to provide academic support to each project.
In the period from 1995 to 2003 PIEB organised 14 calls for proposals, of which 8 were
national (6 for teams of senior/junior researchers and 2 for teams of junior researchers only) and
23 During the military dictatorship social sciences research subsisted mainly in two independent researchcentres in La Paz (CEBEM) and Cochabamba (CERES) funded by bilateral cooperation, notably by theSwedish Agency for Research Cooperation (SAREC), as well as in a few NGOs.
29
6 were regional calls in the departments of Beni, Potosí, Oruro, Santa Cruz, Tarija and
Chuquisaca and one in Pando is underway, covering all departments of Bolivia, with the
exception of Cochabamba and La Paz. The calls resulted in the submission of 660 research
projects, involving 1.858 researchers, of which 92 projects were approved and carried out by
341 researchers. PIEB spent the largest share of its budget (over 50%) in funding such research
projects. The average cost of each project is US$50.000 for the national calls, with a duration of
18 to 24 months and involving teams of about 6 researchers. Projects approved in the regional
calls as well as those involving junior researchers only cost a maximum of US$20.000, lasting
between 12 to 18 months and are carried out by teams of 3 researchers on average.
There is wide agreement among all those interviewed that PIEB clearly fills a gap in terms of
research funding for social sciences in Bolivia and even more so in terms of research aimed to
produce strategic knowledge for development and to inform public policy.
There is also a general belief that the methodology for agenda construction developed by PIEB
is able to capture the main national and regional problems, as well as to identify the lack of
knowledge to address them. In addition, the process is reputed for its participatory nature, a
feature that is made easier by the long tradition of social organisation in the country (Blair,
2000). The methodology for agenda construction has, during this period, undergone changes as
result of accumulated experience, reasoning and learning. This notwithstanding, there is
awareness that responses to the calls for proposals leave many important and strategic themes in
the agenda vacant. One important reason is that such strategic themes are very complex and it is
unlikely that they can be tackled by teams of young and inexperienced researchers. In a way this
reflects the current research capacity in social sciences in Bolivia, which is exactly what PIEB
aims to strengthen.
6.2. Capacity building
The objective of this strategic line is to provide young professionals and researchers with
methodological and theoretical instruments to enable them to carry out quality social science
research. This is done through three types of action. The first is the requirement that all
approved research proposals should have the participation of young researchers who are trained
in research by experiencing it first hand. In the calls for senior/junior researchers, the
presentation of a plan for training young researchers is part of the research proposal and is an
important criterion in the evaluation procedures by the qualifying jurors.
The second is the provision of three week-long methodological workshops to all young
researchers, at key stages of the research process. One workshop is held before the start of the
project and covers research design and problem formulation; a second, mid-term one, relates to
30
instruments to collect and systematise information for analysis; and a final one at the end of the
project addresses techniques of analysis oriented to policy formulation and discussion.
A third action is the monitoring and support granted to the researchers by three research
facilitators: the supervisor who provides administrative and logistics support to all projects in
the regional calls; the academic advisor (asesor), who provides methodological and thematic
orientation and follows closely all phases of project development for young researchers and
those in the regions; and the evaluator, who reads and comments on the mid-term and final
reports submitted by the teams. The ultimate aim of this support, monitoring and evaluation
system is to guarantee the quality of training and of the final product of the investigation.
A summary of the training scheme developed is as follows:
• Presentation of a plan for training young researchers (TYR) as part of the research
proposal;
• Evaluation of the research proposal according to the consistency and relevance of the
TYR plan;
• Identification of approved proposals. Suggestions for improving the TYR plan;
• Implementation of research proposals. Roles and functions are attributed to young
researchers according to the TYR plan;
• Workshop on methodological strengthening for young researchers;
• Adjustments and corrections in team work;
• Final evaluation of the training process by the Executive Secretariat;
• Trained young researchers may present research proposals in the future.
On the basis of this strategy, PIEB has trained over 300 young researchers (140 in the regions),
of which 40% are women. It is also noteworthy that around 75% of these young researchers are
graduates from public universities, which have a more socially diverse distribution of students
than the private ones (Lizarraga, 2003).
The support from PIEB has allowed many young researchers to conclude their graduate or post-
graduate theses and thus obtain their Bachelor or MSc degree, by actually doing research and
not just writing a long essay. In addition, because the research training granted by PIEB has
achieved such a high reputation in the country, those who have been trained in the framework of
the programme find it easier to compete in the job market. Actually, the director of a well
known research NGO interviewed for this study said that in the last recruitment of research
assistants held by his institution, PIEB-trained young researchers were considerably valued and
given preference. They are known, according to him, as “PIEB researchers”.
There is no doubt, as expressed by most interviewees, that in the context of higher education in
Bolivia, and given the lack of national spending on social science research, the research training
31
offered by PIEB has a special significance. It provides a conceptual and methodological basis
for research together with research practice, which complements the professional education
provided by local universities. It is also notable that because PIEB allows research teams to
manage research funds and to be in close interaction with research users, the experience of
being a “PIEB researcher” also fosters the development of skills in research management,
negotiation (among researchers in the team and with research users), presentation and
discussion of proposal and findings.
6.3. Institutional Strengthening
PIEB’s strategy for institutional strengthening has been implemented around a number of
initiatives. From the beginning of the programme in 1995 to 1999, PIEB aimed to consolidate
the libraries and documentation centres in social sciences by inviting project proposals from the
relevant institutions. PIEB organised two such calls: one for information units restricted to the
city of La Paz, by means of which eight projects were financed; and a second one, with a
regional character, aimed at strengthening libraries and documentation centres in the regions,
following which 19 institutions in eight different Bolivian cities received support. This activity
helped to strengthen not only the social sciences collection of libraries and documentation
centres of the institutions, but also the technology for the control and use of materials. In
addition, it trained the librarians and archivists with courses given by national and foreign
specialists in order to acquaint the former with social science themes and information needs.
From 2000 onwards, PIEB decided to change its form of support as the institutions themselves
had taken the responsibility to maintain and update libraries’ equipment and collections. Thus,
the new focus was on granting financial support to information networks, which could,
henceforth, strengthen their own activities.
A second method through which PIEB strengthened the capacity of the research institutions is
by transferring to them the equipment, bibliographical material and other assets purchased and
used by the completed research projects. Around 75 such transfers have been made to public
universities (35 transfers), development organisations (NGOs) that perform social science
research (34 transfers) and other relevant social organisations (6 transfers). The transfer of
assets is usually done within the region where the research project took place.
A third way in which PIEB supports institutional strengthening is by serving as a facilitator in
processes initiated in the regions. This role, which was not anticipated during the formulation of
PIEB, is an impact of its previous actions in the regions. After the completion of the projects,
social actors in three of them – Oruro, Potosí, and Tarija – started to organise themselves to
identify ways in which to ensure the continuity of research activities in social sciences in the
region. Leadership of this movement arose in the regions themselves and did not only occur
32
among academics, but also had a strong presence of local government and development-
oriented NGOs. To achieve their objectives, the groups asked PIEB to play a facilitating role in
building and strengthening research platforms and researchers and institutional networks. As a
result PIEB is offering the support asked for, sharing the knowledge it has accumulated in
research management.
This strategy fosters a conductive research environment and social appreciation for research. If
the relevant social actors are convinced that research can contribute to the solution of problems
and that knowledge is essential for development, then the actors will commit themselves to
provide the necessary conditions for research and thus enhance its sustainability. This seems to
be the path being followed in some of the regions.
6.4. Dissemination and Use of Research Results
PIEB devised its strategy for dissemination and use of research results at two levels of
responsibility. The first one lies with PIEB and includes the use of publications, the Internet (a
site consisting of various web pages and also information sent by e-mail), book fairs, colloquia
for presentation of PIEB publications and of research results, workshops for debating specific
themes, organisation of science fairs, and systematic contacts with the general press.
Of all the dissemination channels used, publications are the most institutionalised. Up until
2003, PIEB had established and strengthened eight editorial series, one specialised journal in
social sciences (T’inkazos), one institutional newsletter and one bulletin for debate. These
publications have different modalities, each with a specific purpose, according to particular
editorial lines and following proper selection criteria. Such criteria have been set up by the
Commission on Dissemination and Use of Results, composed of four members of the DC. The
academic quality and the social relevance of the research results are the main criteria for
inclusion of an article in one or the other publication series, but for a final decision the
Commission takes into consideration the comments of the evaluators of the final reports.
However, T’inkazos, the Bolivian Journal of Social Sciences, which is the most academically
oriented of all publications and aims at scientific excellence, has a special Editorial Board with
external members and is open to contributions from researchers not funded by PIEB. This
quarterly publication, of which 15 editions have already appeared, has become the model
academic journal of social sciences in Bolivia. In its aim to become internationally visible, it has
produced a special edition in English, with a selection of the highest quality papers that
appeared in previous numbers.
The titles of the publications, their purpose and the number of issues produced so far are
presented in the table below.
Type of publication PURPOSE no. publishedSerie InvestigacionesRegionales
Disseminates knowledge about the regions to policy-makers, subject social groups and researchers in theregions
30
Nexos (InformativeBulletins)
Institutional newsletter published every 3 months about PIEB’s and partner institution’s activities and hasa massive distribution.
24
T’inkazos Quarterly publication of specialised research in social sciences (open to non-PIEB researchers). Hasbecome the model academic journal in Bolivia. Aims primarily at researchers, universities anddevelopment organisations in Bolivia and is now subject to an internationalisation strategy (1 ontologicalnumber was published in English)
15
Serie Cuadernos deResumem
Publishes summaries of all research projects funded by PIEB, including recommendations andsuggestions for public policy. It has very broad distributions and low cost.
19
Serie Investigaciones Publication of the whole research report which has attained high scientific quality, is socially relevant andinnovative. Aimed at academics and policy-makers.
16
Serie Documentos deInvestigacion
Publishes selected chapters of research reports which have above average quality and clear socialrelevance. Aimed at researchers and policy-makers.
5
Serie Ediciones deBolsillo
Dissemination of research carried out by teams of young researchers, not longer than 100 pages. Aimedat research subjects and policy makers. Is the most successful publication judged by demand.
11
Serie Formacion Systematises knowledge of PIEB’s teachers related to training of researchers, such as research projectformulation and organisation of documentation centres. Aimed at researchers, librarians and students.
2
Serie Documentos deTrabajo
Disseminates final reports of projects, edited and summarised by the researchers, which do not meetquality criteria for publication in book format. The work is copied and bound in hardcover and isdistributed to policy-makers, research subjects and civil society.
6
Serie Documentos deAnálisis
Publishes essays and empirical results produced by research funded by PIEB in the framework of aspecific theme. Aims at researchers, policy-makers, research-subjects and general society.
1
Boletin Temas deDebate
By-monthly publication which analyses themes needing urgent attention, using information produced byPIEB’s funded projects and the vision and opinion of policy-makers
1
35
The second level of responsibility for the dissemination of research results and creating
conditions for their use lies with the research teams themselves. For this purpose, the research
proposals have to present a specific plan to be executed and to this activity is channelled up to
10% of the project budget. The quality of such a plan is evaluated by the qualifying jurors and,
if necessary, revised until considered satisfactory. The plan may include a number of activities
(colloquia, meetings, workshops, and publications of various kinds). However, in general, three
workshops with potential “research users” or “beneficiaries of research results” are organised at
different stages of the research: once the project is approved but before its launching, at mid-
term, and when a first draft of the final report is ready. This practice goes far beyond
disseminating research results to “potential users”. More importantly, what it does, even if this
is not always clear at the conscious level of the research teams, is to incorporate users’ concerns
and knowledge to the research project’s questions, methodology and analysis of findings. This
point became clear during interviews with researchers. One research group, for example,
mentioned that after the first workshop to discuss the proposal with research users, it was
decided to carry out another case study in a different region in view of the latter’s
considerations. Another team pointed out that the very questions to be asked during fieldwork
were altered following discussions with some research beneficiaries. A number of references
were made to the fact that users are many times “quiet and shy” in the first workshop, but with
time they become more talkative and argumentative, what denotes a learning process and leads
to trust-building. The ultimate result of this practice of holding workshops between research
teams and users, therefore, is that the “users” of research results become part of the research
process and not only receivers of information. On the conceptual front, this is a considerable
advance.
In the course of carrying out the activities for dissemination and use of research results, the 92
projects funded by PIEB had organised over 150 events up to 2003. Of these, 50% of the
activities took place in the urban context and the other half in rural areas, mostly at the regional
level.
The dissemination strategy of PIEB as an institution has been adjusted over time. Despite the
dominance of publications as a dissemination mechanism, which tend to reach mostly a meta-
academic audience, PIEB has more recently invested considerable efforts in establishing
communication channels with the mass media (both newspapers and television). This seems to
be quite an effective means to reach society at large. In addition, the communication channels
used in the course of the research projects (workshops, colloquia, etc) as well as those at the
conclusion of projects are important references for research “users” that constitute a broad range
of social actors. Among the latter, policy analysts and policy-makers, both at the national and
regional level, can find relevant information to subsidise their work. Of course, dissemination
36
on one hand and the use of research results mean different things. It is much more difficult to
ascertain and to get evidence of the latter. Policy formulation is mediated by a number of factors
and it is often impossible to determine how much it has been influenced by specific research
results. What can be said in this respect is that it was possible to detect that some projects
funded by PIEB have had a notable impact on public debate about specific themes and, to this
extent, they may be said to have a bearing on public policy. One example of such projects is
presented in the box below.
The various communication mechanisms utilised (participation of users and dissemination of
research results) contribute to construct PIEB’s position and image as an institution that furthers
research with a commitment to social relevance. As a consequence, those who are funded by
PIEB also acquire such values and practice: researchers get used to involve users from the
beginning of their research projects and to consider social relevance as a component of research
quality. This no doubt consists in a new research ethics.
From the account above we see that PIEB expended considerable efforts into structuring an
institutional model for social science research that can be placed at the service of development.
It put in place a number activities to achieve its objectives, including the corresponding
procedural mechanisms, despite the absence of an established model to refer to. Although
guided by the ‘unifying principles’ provided in the framework of the MMRPs, PIEB went a
long way to conceptualise and implement each of the principles indigenously. In this process,
PIEB institutionalised a new mode of knowledge production in the social sciences in Bolivia,
the main features of which are discussed in the next section.
37
Figure 1. Project: Teachers and the Education Reform in Bolivia
By Maria Luisa Talavera, Erick Jurado, Ximena Sanchez, Gilberto Vera, Zonia Corderoand Maria Eugenia Luna
The project tackles the complex issue of the participation of schoolteachers in theprocess of educational reform. The objective is to analyse the impact of EducationReform on teaching practice in public schools. It does so by looking at how teachersresponded to the new teaching materials (modules) and educational support provided inthe workplace.The research took place at a number of public schools in La Paz and involvedethnographic observation of what takes place when the modules are used in theclassroom. It was found that teachers have made considerable effort to try out the contentsof the Reform despite the adverse situation in which they find themselves. Theirinteraction with the new materials has a motivating effect and raises theirprofessional self-esteem. However, after this first stage, teachers encounterdifficulties in creating new learning outlets with the material, basically becausethe educational advisory service at school does not promote opportunities forsharing learning and experience among teachers. Thus, the excitementexperienced during the initial processes needs to be maintained if the EducationReform is to succeed in transforming the structures in each school and not getstuck in the repetition of principles. Conditions for on-the-job training need tobe improved so that the advisory service can truly support teachers in theirlearning needs.Head teachers too need to be brought into the process and to coordinate theirwork with the educational advisers. The authorities in turn should put in placemechanisms that enable them to work more closely with schools. The studyprovides a number of suggestion of how to implement its recommendations.
The project had considerable impact and was the basis of many public debates,involving schoolteachers, school principals, parents and officers from theMinistry of Education.
39
7. A NEW MODE FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE SOCIALSCIENCES
The argument put forward here is that in the process of implementing the principles of the
MMRPs, PIEB shaped a new mode of knowledge production in the social sciences in Bolivia –
one that is in line with the new theories concerning the relations between research and
development.
In order to talk about a new mode, that is, a change, it is necessary to spell out what the ‘old
mode’ was. In the case of knowledge production in the social sciences in Bolivia, before PIEB,
as said before, there was very little – “the development of the social sciences is in its infancy”
(Sandoval, 1999: 2). Funding for research was normally attached to specific short-term projects
of interest to foreign donors. An elite group of foreign-trained social scientists carried out a few
discipline-based, individual projects, and built their reputations by publishing them and
participating in a few conferences. This form of knowledge production fits into what Gibbons et
al (1994) define as Mode 1.
PIEB inaugurated a new phase. The first innovation was the creation of a competitive fund for
social science research to which researchers could submit their proposals, thus introducing a
totally new practice. The novelty of the practice extends to its public, open and transparent
character: guidelines for submission and selection criteria are amply publicised; reviews of
project readers are sent to applicants; the verdicts of jurors are made public and measures are
taken to avoid conflict of interest. PIEB also keeps detailed statistics of its activities, and
disseminates this information broadly through its annual reports and more generally in its
newsletter (Nexos). By so proceeding, PIEB was able to build trust among those willing to
apply for research funds, those receiving funds and those to whom the research was intended, a
challenge that the Bolivian themselves had identified from the start.
A second significant innovation is the process whereby the research agenda is defined. The
methodology developed by PIEB ensures that research users are part of the research process.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the criteria for selecting projects include the suitability of a plan
for involvement of ‘users’. The latter are not called upon only in the final phase of
disseminating research findings, but are involved in workshops that discuss projects before they
begin, in mid-term development as well as at the end. Thus, the knowledge, experience and
expectations of users are fed into the concept and development of the project. By doing so,
PIEB meets the requirements of demand-orientation and location-specificity of the MMRP
framework and, at the same time, attends to criteria of social relevance and social accountability
40
of research24. The interactive model of agenda construction and user involvement developed by
PIEB fosters the creation of knowledge in the context of application, a core feature of Mode 2 of
knowledge production (Gibbons at al, 1994).25
It is in implementing the requirement of capacity building in the framework of the MMRPs,
however, that PIEB seems to have made its most striking headway. The decision not to rely on
the traditional Masters and doctorate degrees, but instead to include the training of young
researchers in the framework of the research proposals was quite innovative, as was the
mentoring provided to teams of young researchers. The point here is not that PIEB was able to
train large numbers of researchers only, although it did for its time of existence. What is
noteworthy is that PIEB trained researchers with a new professional attitude towards research,
or a new research ‘ethics’, which includes: a) building up social and methodological skills to
carry out demand-led research; b) work as a team, in a multidisciplinary fashion and
incorporating users in the process of knowledge production; c) appreciate research not as an end
in itself but as a tool for problem-solving and policy-making; d) care for scientific quality. This
kind of training is not offered anywhere else in Bolivia, and, as a matter of fact, in very few
places around the world, and is an achievement that must be followed up and constantly
evaluated so its impact can be properly identified before it becomes entrenched as a paradigm
for research training in the country and elsewhere. There is mounting evidence from both
advanced and developing countries that traditional PhD programmes need urgent reshaping to
meet the needs of the modern knowledge society (World Bank, 2002; CHEPS, 2002). The
model developed by PIEB may well be an important contribution in this direction.
Also standing out for its innovativeness is the way in which PIEB was able to articulate,
concomitantly, criteria for scientific excellence and social relevance when selecting research
proposals and monitoring their outcomes. It goes without saying that in the social sciences,
ideas and social practice are intimately related. It has always been accepted that social sciences
cannot divorce themselves from the historical and social context, but even so, contributions to
knowledge and reputations tend to be based on publications and peer review. In the PIEB
model, however, quality in the social sciences can no longer be determined largely by academic
or other expert communities but must be validated against more diverse, and diffuse, external
criteria, such as relevance and leading to social accountability.
Obviously one cannot judge the young researchers involved with PIEB only in terms of how
many papers they have published in scientific journals. Neither is it possible to apply in the
24 Both social participation and accountability are processes deeply embedded in the Bolivian culture ofcivil society organisation. A recent study comparing Bolivia with six other developing countries in termsof participation and accountability found that this country scored quite high (Blair, 2000).25 The model is also at a par with the modern theories of knowledge production that stress the importanceof linkages among stakeholders, such as the system of innovation framework (Clark et all, 2003).
41
selection of proposals the same quality standards used in the research councils countries with a
more advanced research tradition. But this comparison would miss the point entirely; losing
sight of the fact that achieving high standards for research quality has to be an evolutionary
process that builds up capabilities and critical mass. PIEB has demonstrated that scientific
quality can be achieved by subjecting proposals and reports to the scrutiny of peers, by
appointing mentors and advisors to young researchers and those in the regions, by creating
publication channels with differentiated quality standards. In short, the yardstick for judging
quality here has to be placed in the broader framework within which PIEB operates, as
described in section 3 above.
Another innovation has to do with learning in the governance structure of the programme. The
DC is by no means a nominal committee but remains very active. Members discuss not only
work documents and proposals coming from the Executive Director, but also have a pro-active
attitude. Programme documents and the interviews showed that members of the DC are
constantly monitoring developments of the programme in light of the Bolivian context,
incorporating lessons, discussing new activities. The DC and the Executive Secretariat
constantly and systematically monitor and evaluate concepts and operations and do not hesitate
to review processes, to incorporate lessons and to innovate. One of the mechanisms put in place
for this is to contract out independent experts to review a particular activity. Examples are: the
evaluations of the methodology for training young researchers (Salman, 1999; Talavera, 1999);
the impact assessment of PIEB’s support to social sciences research in the regions (Camacho &
Tapia, 2003); the auditing of PIEB’s image and public perception (Rodríguez & Baudoin,
2002).
Having said this, it is also clear that PIEB still faces has a number of challenges. The first is the
sustainability of the programme once funding from the Dutch government is not available any
more. Several strategies are being pursued by the DC, although it is too soon to describe them
here. What is important is that there are signs already that PIEB funding and training model is
being further developed, to be monitored and evaluated. The newly created Bolivian National
Research Council, for instance, has approached PIEB to learn from its experience. In addition,
some universities are interested in the training methodology developed by PIEB and thus it
seems a diffusion of the model is taking place.
A second issue is that despite their social relevance, projects tend to analyse situations at the
micro level, mostly on the basis of case studies. As such, they contribute to raising social
awareness of the problem but are not amenable to generalisation, being of restricted use for
policy purposes. One way to address this limitation might be to foster partnerships between
public (graduate programmes at universities) and independent research centres to pursue
strategic themes that require more complex academic capacity, experience and accumulated
42
knowledge and thus allow multidisciplinary approaches. The challenge here, though, is how to
do this while maintaining transparency and fairness in a process that, more likely, would not be
competitive, but by invitation, given the lack of experienced social science researchers in the
country.
A third and related challenge has to do with building an international profile. Cooperation with
social scientists and development research centres elsewhere is essential to keep pace with
knowledge advances, something that is absent today.
43
8. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the MMRP in the form of PIEB exhibits a number of very important
features. The first is the conduct of the negotiation process between DGIS and the Bolivian
partners. DGIS responded to the demands of the Bolivian group in a much wider sense than is
common in the development cooperation world. This behaviour, showing a strong commitment
to the idea of ‘autonomy of the South’ and ‘ownership to the South’, allied with a pro-active
attitude from the Bolivian side, allowed the programme to be a case of institutional innovation.
Institutional change is an evolutionary process of trial and error (learning by doing, reflecting on
mistakes and successes and trying again), that builds up momentum to gradually shift
conventional blueprints. DGIS was open to learning and granted PIEB the same opportunity.
Thus Bolivians could control the processes and this allowed PIEB to develop and to foster
different capacities – at the individual, institutional and societal levels – including the capacity
to design its own research and training systems for social sciences.
PIEB is the evidence of the promises of the MMRP concept as a modality of research co-
operation for development. It shows the importance of allowing the South the autonomy for
making decisions and thus having programme ownership, provided the local leadership creates
mechanisms for building trust and social accountability. It also shows the importance of
building local alliances, fostering social capital while, at the same time, nurturing research
excellence by creating quality control mechanisms.
Obviously we are not so naïve as to argue that autonomy and ownership of the South are
sufficient ingredients to guarantee that good results will come from a development cooperation
arrangement to foster research capacity. As mentioned above, one MMRP that was planned to
be created in Zambia did not get off the ground because the necessary initiative of local partners
was lacking. This implies that the case reported here cannot be generalised and that there were
special conditions in the Bolivian context that shaped the success story. Some of such
conditions are: the choice of the local initial group that became responsible for the programme –
this choice was not a random one, but involved prior knowledge of the Bolivian context and
time to discuss and negotiate; the tradition of participatory practices that is a mark of Bolivian
society; the existing capacity to design and implement a development programme. Such
conditions are not automatically found in all developing countries.
Notwithstanding the success and achievements presented above, building research capacity in
the social sciences for development is an intensive, long-term and continuous process.
Institutions take a long time to build and there is no substitute for the steady evolution of
44
practices and habits of interaction that create a favourable environment for research. Indeed,
PIEB faces a number of challenges now and in the future to consolidate the model it has begun
to establish. At the fore of these challenges, is its financial sustainability once the cooperation
agreement with DGIS expires in December 2004. This may perhaps becomes less of a challenge
if those involved in development assistance are aware of what can be achieved through
continued investment in research and research capacity in developing countries. The same can
be said about the Bolivian government. It is clear that there can be no future for science and
technology development without a firm commitment on the part of local government to create a
conducive research environment – investment in research infrastructure (human and financial
capital), in systems of higher education, in policies to link this effort to development objectives.
Foreign assistance of the type reported here will have a limited impact in the long run, as it
cannot be maintained for ever and, therefore, can only supplement investments made by the
countries on their own. PIEB provides the Bolivian government with an institutional framework
developed internally of how to proceed to obtain the desired results – but it has clear limits in
what it can achieve for the S&T enterprise of the country as a whole.
45
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# 2004-5 Technological Intensity and Export Incidence: A Study of Foreign and Local Auto-Parts,Electronics and Garment Firms in Indonesia By Rajah Rasiah
# 2004-4 Science and Technology in Latin America and the Carribean: An Overview by Léa Velho
# 2004-3 Coping with Globalisation. An Analysis of innovation capability in Braziliantelecommunications equipment industry by Sunil Mani
# 2004-2 Learning and Local Knowledge Institutions in African Industry by Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka,January 2004
# 2004-1 Productivity, Exports, Skills and Technological Capabilities: A Study of Foreign and LocalManufacturing Firms in Uganda by Rajah Rasiah and Henry Tamale, January 2004
# 2003-12 Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective by Ha-Joon Chang, December 2003
# 2003-11 Illusory Competitiveness: The Apparel Assembly Model of the Caribbean Basin by MichaelMortimore, November 2003
# 2003-10 The Role of Market, Trust and Government in the Development of the Information HardwareIndustry in Taiwan By Rajah Rasiah and Yeo Lin, October 2003
# 2003-9 Growth Theories Revisited: Enduring Questions with Changing Answers By C. V. Vaitsos,October 2003
# 2003-8 Designing National Regimes that Promote Public Health Objectives By Padmashree GehlSampath, September 2003
# 2003-7 FDI-facilitated Development: The Case of the Natural Gas Industry of Trinidad and Tobago.By Lou Anne A. Barclay, September 2003
# 2003-6 Sources of Training in African Clusters and Awareness of ICTs: A Study of Kenya and GhanaBy Catherine Nyaki Adeya, September 2003
# 2003-5 The Internet Diffusion in Sub-Saharan Africa: A cross-country Analysis By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Kaushalesh Lal, July 2003
# 2003-4 Defining an Intellectual Property Right on Traditional Medicinal Knowledge: A Process-Oriented Perspective By Padmashree Gehl Sampath, July 2003
# 2003-3 New Wave Technologies: Their Emergence, Diffusion and Impact. The Case of Hydrogen FuelCell Technology and the Developing World By Lynn K. Mytelka, July 2003
# 2003-2 Systems of Innovation and Human Capital in African Development By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lou Anne Barclay, May 2003
# 2003-1 Deregulation, Entry of MNCs, Public technology procurement and Innovation Capability inIndia's Telecommunications Equipment Industry By Sunil Mani, February 2003
# 2002-10 Moving Up Or Going Back The Value Chain an Examination of The Role of Government WithRespect to Promoting Technological Development in The Philippines By Sunil Mani,November 2002
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# 2002-9 Research Capacity Building in Nicaragua:From Partnership with Sweden to Ownership andSocial Accountability By Léa Velho, October 2002
# 2002-8 R&D in the Public and Private Sector in Brazil: Complements or Substitutes? By Lea Velhoand Tirso W. Saenz, July 2002
# 2002-7 Systemic Coordination and Human Capital Development: Knowledge Flows in Malaysia’sMNC-Driven Electronics Clusters By Rajah Rasiah, June 2002
# 2002-6 What is the ‘Knowledge Economy’? Knowledge Intensity and Distributed Knowledge BasesBy Keith Smith, June 2002
# 2002-5 Internet Access in Africa: an Empirical Exploration By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka andCatherine Nyaki Adeya, May 2002
# 2002-4 Institutional Support for Investment in New Technologies: The Role of Venture CapitalInstitutions in Developing Countries by Sunil Mani and Anthony Bartzokas, May 2002
# 2002-3 Manufacturing Response in a National system of Innovation: Evidence from the BrewingFirms in Nigeria By Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, April 2002
# 2002-2 Prospects for the Digital Economy in South Africa: Technology, Policy, People, and StrategiesBy Derrick L. Cogburn & Catherine Nyaki Adeya, April 2002
# 2002-1 TRIPs and Capability Building in Developing Economies by Rajah Rasiah, March 2002
# 2001-11Government, Innovation and Technology Policy, An Analysis of the Brazilian ExperienceDuring the 1990s By Sunil Mani, December 2001
# 2001-10Innovation Systems, Institutional Change and the New Knowledge Market: Implications forThird World Agricultural Development By Norman Clark, December 2001
# 2001-9 Working with the Market: The Israeli Experience of Promoting R&D in the Enterprise Sectorand the Lessons for Developing Countries By Sunil Mani, December 2001
# 2001-8 Conditions for Successful Technology Policy in Developing Countries– Learning Rents, StateStructures, and Institutions By Ha-Joon Chang Ali Cheema, December 2001
# 2001-7 Technological Change and Corporate Strategies in the Fertiliser Industry By AnthonyBartzokas, October 2001
# 2001-6 A Framework for Policy-Oriented Innovation Studies in Industrialising Countries By AnthonyBartzokas and Morris Teubal, September 2001
# 2001-5 Networks and Linkages in African Manufacturing Cluster: A Nigerian Case Study By BanjiOyelaran-Oyeyinka, September 2001
# 2001-4Financial Markets and Technological Change: Patterns of Technological and Financial Decisionsby Manufacturing Firms in Southern Europe By Anthony Bartzokas, August 2001
# 2001-3 Role of Government in Promoting Innovation in the Enterprise Sector An Analysis of theIndian Experience By Sunil Mani, April 2001
# 2001-2 Government and Innovation Policy an Analysis of the South African Experience since 1994By Sunil Mani, February 2001
# 2001-1 Firm Size, Technological Capabilities and Market-Oriented Policies in Mauritius By GaneshanWignaraja, February 2001