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M. A. Conflict Studies

British War-Gaming, 1870-1914

Christopher Yi-Han Choy

King’s ID 1261533

Supervisor: Dr. Ahron Bergman

Submission: 30 August 2013

Word Count: 13,085

Declaration

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This work is the sole work of the author, and has not been accepted in any previous application

for a degree; all quotations and sources of information have been acknowledged.

Signed: Christopher Yi-Han Choy

Date: 30 August 2013

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Abstract

The 18th century saw the confluence of sciences, mathematical theory and military

strategy in a singular product unprecedented in intellectual history, the creation of military

simulation, which strived to emulate the conditions of the battlefield on maps with

representational models underpinned by a mathematical framework. While the concept of

abstracting strategy using representational models is a concept as old as human civilisation, it was

George Leopold von Reiswitz who conceived applying the abstractions of chess-style war-games

to a concrete military framework which would reflect the realities of contemporary warfare and

be supported by corresponding mathematical data. A century of development and widespread

adoption of these simulations, known as war-games, and the resulting extrapolation of this idea

led to the fields of Operational Research adopted by Britain in the Second World War, and the

widespread use of simulation in the modern world in fields far beyond the military scope

Reiswitz imagined; what Philipp von Hilgers described as the ‘most effective and fateful concept

the twentieth century produced in order to master its crises.’ While histories of the Prussian and

German war-gaming tradition and development are detailed and widespread, the history of war-

gaming in Britain is less well documented. This paper will chart the adoption and use of war-

gaming in the British military in the late Victorian and Edwardian period.

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Contents

1. The Dawn of Simulation

Reiswitz, Elder and Younger 6

Probability Applied to War 8

The Watershed War 10

2. War-Gaming in the British Army

The British Kriegsspiel, 1872 13

Spenser Wilkinson, War-Game Pioneer 17

The Victorian Army’s 1896 War Game 19

Polemos, A New Game of War 20

Chamberlain’s New Game of Invasion 22

J.M. Grierson and the British Army 1905 War Game 23

Bellum, A 1909 Kriegsspiel 27

3. War-Gaming in the Royal Navy

Early Naval Wargaming and Colomb’s The Duel 31

Chamberlain and The Naval Blockade 32

Fred T. Jane and the Naval Wargame 34

4. Conclusion: The Outside Context Problem

5. Bibliography

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1. The Dawn of Simulation

The 18th century saw the confluence of sciences, mathematical theory and military

strategy in a singular product unprecedented in intellectual history, the creation of military

simulation, which strived to emulate the conditions of the battlefield on maps with

representational models underpinned by a mathematical framework. While the concept of

abstracting strategy using representational models is as old as human civilisation, it was George

Leopold von Reiswitz who conceived applying the abstractions of chess-style war-games to a

concrete military framework which would reflect the realities of contemporary warfare and be

supported by corresponding mathematical data. A century of development and widespread

adoption of these simulations, known as war-games, and the resulting extrapolation of this idea

led to the fields of Operational Research adopted by Britain in the Second World War, and the

widespread use of simulation in the modern world in fields far beyond the military scope

Reiswitz imagined; what Philipp von Hilgers described as the ‘most effective and fateful concept

the twentieth century produced in order to master its crises.’1 While histories of the Prussian and

German war-gaming tradition and development are detailed and widespread, the history of war-

gaming in Britain is less well documented. This paper will chart the adoption and use of war-

gaming in the British military in the late Victorian and Edwardian period.

The year 1870 was not only a watershed for Prussia and for the subsequent balance of

power in Europe, but also marked the beginning of the rise of war-gaming from an obscure

Prussian hobby to a standard practice in all militaries of the world. Prussia, long regarded as a

second-rate military power had in the space of a few years crushed the Austrians at Sadowa,1866,

1 Philipp von Hilgers, Benjamin Ross trans. War Games, a History of War on Paper (London: MIT Press, 2012), ix.

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and the French at Sedan and Metz, 1870, the two pre-eminent Continental powers of the day, to

establish the German Empire and render the sobriquet ‘Prussian’ synonymous with military

effectiveness2. Vera Riley and John Young ascribe a significant factor of Prussian success to their

war-gaming3, as does von Trier who ascribes an ‘unequalled mastery’ which ‘arose there with

respect to both war machines and mathematics.’4 Therefore it is necessary to delve momentarily

into the genesis of war-gaming in the Prussian crucible to understand their historical context in

relation to the period and their purpose; as no British war-gaming tradition existed independent

prior to the introduction of Reiswitz’s Kriegsspiel, it must thus be upon it the foundations of the

Prussian tradition we build our study of British war-gaming upon.

Reiswitz the Elder and Younger

Leopold von Reiswitz’s contribution to the development of an entirely novel semiotic

method of operation has been largely glossed over by history. While the concept of representing

military units on an abstract field was not a new concept- chess-like war-games were widespread

in early 18th century Prussia, notably Johann Venturini ‘s 1797 Krieges-Spiel and Johann Hellwig’s

1803 Kriegsspiel, Reiswitz’ contribution was to innovate the playing board on which the war-game

took place on, abandoning the grid system of chess-style war-games for a three-dimensional,

scale map of terrain, which could be re-arranged to reflect different scenarios. A brief diversion

into the history of cartography is necessary, as Reiswitz’s innovation was only made possible by

advances in map-making in the late 17th century. The development of scientific war-gaming is

closely tied to the improvements in survey techniques and representation of features on

topographical maps in the preceding years. The most common form of map in the 18th century

remained the cadastral map, which mainly focused on the political landscape and salient

geographical features of cities, roads and rivers, without properly scaled topography.5 Accurate

topographical surveys were an achievement of the 18th century which had significant

consequences for military planning, and created the possibility of far more accurate simulation of

reality in war-gaming. The first accurate topographical survey of France was begun in 1670 by

Cassini and completed in 1789 by his grand-son, which triggered a vogue for map-making in

Europe- the British Ordnance Survey was commissioned in 1790 to produce a similar accurate

national map to scale.6 With the introduction of scaled maps in war-gaming, one is able to

2 And consequently the attendant stereotypes of efficiency, discipline and severity. The negative connotations of dullness and lack of imagination came later. 3 Vera Riley and John P. Young. Bibliography on War Gaming (Maryland: John Hopkins, 1957). xiii 4 Hilgers (2012), ix. 5 Jon Peterson. Playing at the World (San Diego: Unreason Press, 2012) p. 218. 6 Ralph E. Ehrenberg. Mapping the World (Washington DC: National Geographic Press, 2005) p. 149

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represent the actual distances a body of troops are able to travel in reality, and the ranges at

which their weapons function. Scale is a tool which binds the rule-set to reality, and enables the

mathematical calculation of previous abstractions.7 The introduction of scale empowers the

transition of a game of war into something entirely unprecedented: a simulation.

Much like the Cassinis’ undertaking, the von Reiswitz Kriegsspiel was a generational

endeavour started by the elder von Reiswitz, Leopold von Reiswitz, in 1809. Prussia, at the time

under the heel of Napoleonic dominion, was experiencing a strong undercurrent of patriotic

militarism, and war-games were a popular endeavour especially in the Prussian metropolis of

Wroclaw (Breslau), where the elder von Reiswitz resided as a Kriegs-und-domanenrath, a manner of

civilian war counsellor to the Prussian court. Leopold himself was an avid war-gamer from youth

and familiar with contemporary Prussian war-games, notably Hellwigg’s Kriegsspiel, which he had

access to from relations with local nobility.8 Building upon criticisms of unrealistic representation

of terrain in existing war-games, Leopold invented a war-gaming board with a sand table in lieu

of grid squares, in the scale 1:2,373, with wooden blocks to represent troops.9 A presentation to

the Prussian princes in 1811 impressed them sufficiently to grant him an audience with the King,

Friedrich Wilhelm III, but he insisted on refining the board and presented a polished version of

the war-game with tiled terrain and playing pieces in a neat cupboard.10 The game was well

received at court but developments on the continent proved a distraction from war gaming with

the defeat of Napoleon. It fell to his son, Johann von Reiswitz, a lieutenant in the Prussian

Guard Artillery and recipient of the Iron Cross in the recent Napoleonic conflict, to further

develop and refine the system. Johann’s stated aim was to produce a ‘realistic pictures of events’

on the battlefield, and hoped to reflect the uncertainties of real combat. 11 The sand-table tiled

terrain was replaced by topographical maps in a 1:8000 scale, details corresponding to realistic

military operations were added, an umpire was introduced, and most vitally, the system of

combat was revamped to be based on probability rather than a discussion. As Johann addressed:

Anyone who has observed the effect of fire power at the artillery ranges will know

that the results achieved can differ considerably, even when circumstances are the same...

If, therefore, we were to give fixed results for fire effect we would arrive at a very

unnatural situation... Only when the player has the same sort of uncertainty over results as

7 Peterson (2012), p. 220. 8 Georg Leopold von Reiswitz in Bill Leeson (trans.) Von Reiswitz Kriegsspiel, (Hemel Hampstead: Self Published, 1989), vi. 9 Peterson (2012), p. 224. 10 Militar-Wochenblatt, 1874 no. 73 in Bill Leeson, The Reiswitz Story: Five articles from the Militair Wochenblatt, The War Game Library (1988), p. 2. 11Reiswitz in Leeson (1989), vi.

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he would have in the field can we be confident that the Kriegsspiel will give a helpful insight

into manoeuvring on the field.12

Johann’s system thus incorporated an entirely unprecedented method of calculating combat

results: probability and statistics, representing a break with the chess-style war-games of the past,

and Hellwig’s war-game, where ‘nothing depends on chance.’13

Probability Applied to War

Probability as a mathematical discipline was still a relatively new concept, dating back to

Cardano’s Liber de ludo aleae in 1663, and its practical application, statistics, an 18th century

formulation.14 Attempts to apply mathematics to warfare were prevalent in Prussian academic

circles; a royal ordinance of 1790 observed that mathematics ‘exerts a particular influence on

military things, on tactics and on all of the operations of war.’15 Venturini himself authored

several works on mathematical appliqué to warfare, but the outstanding example remains Gerard

von Scharnhorst’s work Uber die Wirkung des Feuergewehrs (1813) “On the Effect of Firearms”,

which attempted to infer from empirical data a mathematical model of probability for the effect

of various firearms at various distances.16 While the methods and mathematical extrapolations

may seem simplistic from a modern perspective- most of his empirical data resulted from

shooting cannon and muskets at a brick wall from various distances and then counting the

resultant hits- this was possibly the first study of its kind to attempt to quantify the various

effectiveness of modern firearms using statistical models. Johann von Reiswitz cites Scharnhorst’

work as his primary inspiration and model for his use of probability in determining combat

results, and forms the basis for ‘the cumulative effect of artillery bombardment, or small arms

fire, for given intervals of time, along with the effects of terrain, the minimum and maximum

effective range of guns and the decline in performance over increasing distances’ in his

Kriegsspiel.17 By introducing the element of unpredictability and statistical probability to

calculations of combat in his war-game, based on statistical probabilities derived from empirical

results, Reiswitz creates a far more realistic dimension of combat compared to the pre-

determined outcomes of chess-style war-games.

12 Ibid, p. 6. 13 Ibid, p. 9. 14 Deborah J. Bennett, Randomness (Cambridge: HUP, 1999). xii 15 Peterson (2012), p. 233. 16 Gerard von Scharnhorst, Uber die Wirkung des Feuergewehrs (Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1973) p. 1. 17 Peterson (2012), p. 234.

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The efforts of the von Reiswitz dynasty may have remained in obscurity if not for two

incidences of history, one which may have precipitated the other. Johann von Reiswitz continued

his work playing and refining his Kriegsspiel in the 1820s and in 1824 was invited by Prince

Wilhelm to demonstrate the revised war-game to the King and the Prussian General Staff,

childhood nostalgia for the elder von Reiswitz’ game probably a significant motivation.18 The

Chief of the General Staff, von Muffling, himself an enthusiastic cartographer and topographical

surveyor, was initially sceptical, but soon became absorbed in the game and declared at the end

enthusiastically ‘this is not a game! This is training for war! I must recommend it to the whole

army.’19 Holding true to his word, he published the following notice in the foremost Prussian

military journal Militar Wochenblatt in February 1842:

There have already been a number of previous attempts to represent warfare in

such a way as to provide both instruction and entertainment... they have always left a large

gap between the serious business of warfare and the more frivolous demands of a game...

after years of trial, an officer has pursued the topic begun by his father, and has so much

extended it that warfare can actually be represented in a simple and lively way... I will gladly

assist in seeing the number of available copies augmented... the further distribution and

knowledge of the game will earn him the thanks of the whole army.20

This endorsement from the highest echelons of the Prussian military establishment led to a

vogue for the von Reiswitz Kriegsspiel, attracting many adherents, not least the young Helmuth

von Moltke. Despite the death of its creator in 182721, Kriegsspiel became a staple of Prussian

military education for the next forty years. Many variations and improvements on the rules were

published, notably the Tschichwitz revision in 1867 which introduced rifled artillery, and three

revisions from von Trotha in 1869. Scenarios were constantly discussed in the Militar Wochenblatt,

and gaming clubs were formed throughout Prussia. Yet war-gaming might have remained an

obscure Prussian hobby if not for the seminal events of 1866 and 1870, where the Prussian army

defeated the foremost Continental powers of the day, Austria and France, in quick succession,

helmed by the avid war-gamer von Moltke. In hindsight, the antiquated, ill-disciplined armies of

18 The cupboard version of Kriegspiel had seen much use in the Royal Household. 19 General der Infanterie z.D. Dannhauer, ‘Das Reisswitzche Kriegsspiel von seinen Beginn bis zum Tode des Erfinders, 1827,’ “The Reisswitz Wargame from the Beginning to the Death of Its Inventor, 1827’ Militar Wochenblatt, 1874, no.56. in Leeson (trans.) (1989). 20 General von Muffling, ‘Anzeige’, Militair Wochenblatt, 1824, no. 42, in Leeson (1989). 21 Johann von Reiswitz apparently possessed a lively personality, and was given to making insalubrious comments on the military personages playing his wargame- and given that they mostly were of higher rank than him, he made sufficient enemies to be exiled to a distant outpost of the Prussian Empire in Torgau. Despondent, he shot himself in 1827.

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Austria and poorly-led French armies seem to us invariably fated to defeat by superior Prussian

discipline, military leadership, and rifled Krupp steel artillery, but in 1870 their defeats came as a

shock as Prussia had long been considered a second-rate military power; Friedrich Engels in

1866 derided it as ‘a peace army, with the pedantry and martinetism inherent to all peace armies.

No doubt a great deal has been done latterly, especially since 1859, to get rid of this, but the

habits of forty years are not so easily eradicated.’22 One such habit of forty years was Kriegsspiel,

and in lieu of other reasonable but far harder to discern explanations of Prussian military success,

such as accurate, long-distance artillery or brilliant staff work by the Prussian General Staff, the

military establishments of the world latched upon the Prussian predilection for war-games as the

crux of their success.

The Watershed War

How important, really, was Kriegsspiel to the military effectiveness of the Prussian army?

Spencer Wilkinson claimed in 1887 that nearly all the officers of distinction in the Prussian army

were connected in some form to a Kriegsspiel club, with Konigsberg, the headquarters of the 1st

Army Corps, being one of the foremost clubs.23 Von Moltke himself founded the Magdeburg

War-Gaming Club in 1828 and remained an enthusiast even after he ascended to the position of

Chief of the General Staff, although as Peterson ruminates, one can only speculate whether

Kriegsspiel ‘improved his military genius or merely delighted it’.24 That Kriegsspiel was very much

the vogue in Prussian military circles is not in question; did it contribute to their victory,

however? While the defeats of the Austrian and French armies no doubt were to a large extent

self-inflicted, through their inferior weaponry and poor discipline in the case of the Austrians25,

and inferior artillery and poor leadership in the case of the French26, there remains no doubt the

Prussians were far better led and prepared strategically- Kriegsspiel must have contributed in

preparing officers for command and it became apparent that war-gaming was an excellent tool

for training leadership as well as conceiving and testing strategy.

The Reiswitzian Kriegsspiel represented a departure from previous war-games which

proceeded from analogical frameworks, abstracting terrain and temporality and certainty in the

22 Friedrich Engels, Manchester Guardian, June 20, 1866. 23 Spencer Wilkinson, Essays on the Wargame (Manchester: Manchester Tactical Society, 1887) Introduction. 24 Peterson (2012), p. 243. 25 Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Cambridge: CUP, 1997) xii. 26 Christopher Clark. Iron Kingdom: The Rise And Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2006) p 237.

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outcomes of conflict. However aware of Clausewitzian dictums the creators may have been, the

Reiswitz Kriegsspiel introduced the fog of war, friction and uncertainty into war-gaming as well as

empirical measurement of distances and the effect of fire-power. The consequence is a game

where players are less restricted in the actions they can take and may thus freely influence events,

but yet are still limited by conditions within the game. This, and determinations by an impartial

umpire to adhere to reality, best approximates the experience of a field commander who

constantly struggles against uncertainty and has to make decisions based on available

information. Judging probabilities to achieve a set outcome, through the variation of a set of

inputs within the constraints of parameters, is the essence of simulation: to arrive at a probable

outcome helpful to the decision making process. The creation of military simulation by melding

accurate topography with statistical models of combat, supported by empirical probability has

had no antecedent in academic history, and the logical extrapolation of which represents the

dawning of the age of simulation in the following centuries. We now may progress to the

pertinent question: how did Britain adapt to this new discovery in the following decades?

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2. War-Gaming in the British Army

Colonel L.O. Solbert, the American military attaché in London, writing in 1920

equanimously prefaced his observations on the military system he had been privy to with the

caveat: ‘there is probably no more complex and complicated organization in the world than the

British Army.’27 With its byzantine rivalries, inscrutable traditions and complex regimental

system, the British Army to the uninitiated was less a monolithic institution like the Imperial

German Army than a rough collection of warring tribes united by loyalty to a shared sovereign-

and this after a half century of reforms and the experience of the First World War. From 1854 to

1904 the British Army was subject to a constant barrage of reformation: no fewer than 567 Royal

Commissions and committees were organised to attempt to improve the various perceived flaws

in its structure and performance, culminating in the establishment of a General Staff and the

Committee of Imperial Defence.28 While the vogue for Prussian military standards post 1870

meant the Cardwell reforms attempted to introduce a Germanic model to the British Army and

were largely successful: short service, the creation of the Army Reserve, and the linking of

battalions were implemented but a General Staff on the Prussian model was not implemented

until 1904. The lack of a central directive body meant official war-gaming pre-1904 remained

sporadic and localised, largely kept alive by interested volunteers and amateurs in separate clubs

across the country, the key ones in Manchester and naturally Aldershot, spiritual home of the

British army. The war-gaming tradition in Prussia which had now become institutionalised in

the Berlin War Academy with its combination of staff rides, sand-table and map exercises and

manoeuvres was never replicated at Staff College; on the whole war-gaming was never

thoroughly integrated into British Army culture and practice pre-1914. This may stem from the

British predilection for amateurism and the ambivalent Army attitude towards preparing for a

continental conflict; the average British officer of the period being more pre-occupied with polo

27 National Archives, 2017-223, ‘The British Army’, 1920, p. 1, Record Group 165 Box 636. 28 John Gooch, British General Staff in the era of Two World Wars, in David French and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff, Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939. (London: Frank Cass, 2002) p. 193.

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and social engagements than actual military education29, and the Germans having far more

serious continental military dilemmas to face, with far more at stake. Nevertheless, war-gaming in

Britain suffered no lack of adherents and enthusiasts with no small number of war-games being

published, propagating an amateur tradition that endures to the modern day.

The British Kriegsspiel, 1872

Within two years of the Franco-Prussian war the War Office issued its first copies of the

Reiswitz Kriegsspiel, on 18th February 1872, with the memorandum attached:

The Secretary of State for War, having approved of the issue of a certain number of

sets of the ‘War-Game’ for the use of the Officers of the Army, His Royal Highness the

Commander in Chief, in recommending that Officers should avail themselves to the

utmost of this useful means of instruction, directs that the game is to be played according

to the accompanying Rules. 30

The rules attached were a translation by Captain E. Baring, Royal Artillery, of the 1862 version

of Anleitung zum Kriegsspiel by Capt. W. von Tschichwitz, already considered almost obsolete in

Germany. John Curry considers this edition key in the spread of British military wargaming, as it

was one of the first translations of contemporary Kriegsspiel to see circulation.31 It was by no

means the first translation of Kriegsspiel into English- the Manchester Tactical Society had an

operable translation in 1839- but it was the first time its value had been acknowledged by the

military. Within Captain Baring acknowledges the effect the victories of 1870 have had on

military opinion – ‘the game is no novelty, it is only recently that its importance has been fully

recognised out of Germany... due to the feeling that the great tactical skills displayed by Prussian

officers in the late war had been, at least partially, acquired by means of the instruction which the

game affords.’ The aim of the war-game was ‘apart from the tactical instruction, which it is the

primary object of the game to impart, it teaches officers to realise the space occupied by troops,

either when deployed or on the march, and the time required to transport bodies of men from

one point to another... it also excites a spirit of emulation, and leads to the frequent discussion of

military questions of importance.’32 Baring was to update the combat resolution tables to be

more in-line with British military equipment and practice and the game was to be played on the

29 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) p. 97. 30 R. Airey, Horse Guards Department, War Office Memorandum, February 12th, 1872. In John Curry (ed.) The British Kriegspiel 1872 (London: Lulu, 2013) p. 17. 31 John Curry (ed.) The British Kriegspiel 1872 (London: Lulu, 2013) p. 17. 32 Captain E. Baring, Rules for the Conduct of the War-Game (London:HMSO 1872) in Curry (2013) p. 19.

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scale of six inches to the mile, rather than the Prussian standard of eight. Baring was also to

assuage interested parties that it was ‘by no means necessary that every officer who plays at this

game should thoroughly understand all these conventional rules... all that is require of them is

that they should learn what the various blocks of metal severally represent... be able to read an

ordinary map, and... A tolerable knowledge of the leading principles which govern the march of

troops and their disposition in action, and that they should yield implicit obedience to the

decision of the Umpire.’33 The core component and fatal flaw of the Reiswitz Kriegsspiel was its

over-reliance on the role of the third player, the umpire, to adjudicate and enable the game to be

played. As Baring notes, ‘the Umpire himself must be thoroughly acquainted with that part of

the modern art of war which has reference to the movement of troops both during an

engagement and previous to it... the value of the game depends, indeed, almost entirely upon the

Umpire... who must make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the manner in which the game

is conducted.’34 This made the game relatively simple to learn and play, the chief obstacle being

the availability of competent umpires given the time-consuming difficulty of learning to play the

role of the umpire.

The game itself was an updated version of the younger Reiswitz’s Kriegsspiel: coloured metal

blocks representing infantry, artillery and cavalry placed on a topographically accurate map,

subject to limited movement in turns representing two minutes of real-time. Enemy units would

only become visible to the player when they appeared in visual range, as determined by the

umpire, and combat was resolved by the umpire consulting various combat tables for results and

rolling dice, to add the dimension of probability. All orders were to be written as they would in

reality and queries were to be addressed only through the umpire, whose decisions were final. To

determine the scenario played the umpire was required to conceive a ‘General Idea’, which was

the conditions of the military circumstances of the encounter, while each player receives a

‘Special Idea’, which would delineate their objective for the game, their available forces, and any

information about the disposition of enemy forces available. Observations by Lt-Col. Middleton,

Superintending Officer of Garrison Instruction at Aldershot of the experiences umpiring

numerous sessions with the Aldershot War Game society describe how the Prussian scale of 8

inches to the mile is preferable as it enables larger playing pieces, and thus easier play, and that

the game was played best with three separate maps, one for each player and one for the umpire,

33 Ibid,p. 20. 34 Ibid.

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to best simulate the uncertainty of not knowing the opponent’s force dispositions.35 Arguing

with the umpire was prohibited and subject to penalties- which seems to be a perennial problem

with sessions of von Reiswitz’s Kriegsspiel . At the end of a game, both players would be informed

by the umpire of their performance and where improvements could have been made, essentially

the most important part of the training process. Contemporary figures in Prussia were already

aware of the limitations of Kriegsspiel, mostly critiquing the difficulty of the umpire’s task.

Wilhelm Jacob Meckel in 1873 published the Studien uber das Kriegsspiel , the ‘Study of Wargames,’

in which he recognises the necessity of war-gaming in military education but sees four core

failings with the current rule-set: the judgement of the umpire being too constrained by the rules,

the limitations of the rules themselves to apply to realistic battlefield conditions, the calculation

of damage takes too long and is of little use to the simulation, and the difficulty of finding

umpires or learning umpiring given the complexity of the rule-set.36 Already, the pioneer war-

gamers were discovering the fundamental dilemma of war-game design: increasing realism

necessitates increased complexity, but complexity reduces playability and ease of learning, and a

successful war-game needs to balance the two poles. Enter the next iteration of Kriegsspiel,

unsurprisingly the idea of a German general, Julius von Verdy du Vernois.

Verdy du Vernois had served had served as the head of intelligence on the Prussian

general staff during the Franco-Prussian war, and was a member of Moltke’s inner circle, and

was already a celebrated author of a manual on troop training, Studen uber truppenfuhrung, ‘Studies

in Troop Leading.’37 In 1876 he released his interpretation of the Reiswitz Kriegsspiel, which was

duly translated into English in 1884 by Major J.R. MacDonnell. The eight year gap in obtaining

the most contemporary and lauded version of Kriegsspiel thus far may be useful insight into the

state of British war-gaming, as by the translator’s admission he was unable to find an ‘accessible

treatise in English in which the principles of the Game are laid down.’38 The authorised

regulations were out of print and MacDonnell was unable to find a copy at either Horse Guards

or the United Services Institution. Was the enthusiasm for the War Game flagging in the British

Army? The difficulty the Maj. MacDonnell had finding an English translation of Kriegsspiel, much

less opponents and a referee, seem to suggest so. Certainly even in the German army there was a

certain fatigue for undertaking the Reiswitz Kriegsspiel, as Verdy du Vernois observed in his

35Lt. Col. A. Middleton, Explanation and Application of the English Rules for Playing the War Game (London: Mitchell, 1873) p. xii. 36 Jacob Meckel in H.O.S. Heistand (trans.) Revue Militaire de l’Etranger, August-October 1897. p. 225-235. 37 Peterson (2013), p. 246. 38 J.R. MacDonnell, The Tactical War Game: A Translation of General Verdy Du Vernois’ Beitrag Zum Kriegsspiel (London: Clowes and Sons, 1884), p. 1. In John Curry (ed.) Verdy’s Free Kriegsspiel, (London: Lulu, 2008).

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introduction: ‘cases are often met with in which attempts to practice (Kriegsspiel) have been swiftly

abandoned,’ despite the ‘universal acknowledgement of the utility of the War Game,’ mostly the

reason being ‘we have no one here who knows how to conduct the Game properly.’39 The root

of this neglect, Verdy du Vernois found, was ‘chiefly in the purely technical part of the conduct

of the Game, the novice failing to understand the Rules, or the use of the Dice and the Table of

Losses.’40 He concedes the difficulty of mastering the rules unaided resulting in ‘many officers,

who should be especially fitted from their position, to take the matter in hand who utterly shrink

from doing so.’41 His solution was to, taking a cue from the staff rides or ‘instructional

excursions’ where decisions are made but no dice are consulted, remove entirely the calculation,

dice-rolling and tables of loss for the umpire to consult, and for the Umpire to decide conflicts

primarily by his own discretion. This ensures senior officers are able to umpire a session of

Kriegsspiel without having to memorise the necessary combat tables- their experience in battle a

being a sufficient substitute, as Verdy du Vernois reasons, if war-games are meant to train

officers in war, experienced officers should be able to conduct war games. While addressing

impartiality as a concern, ‘dice... provide an apparent security against partiality in decisions,’42 the

deliberations of the umpire were secret in a game of Kriegsspiel and bias would in any case be hard

to detect, considering the restrictions on questioning the umpire.

The result was a transformation of Kriegsspiel as dramatic as from Leopold von Reiswitz’s

version to Johann’s; freed from the plodding, deliberate pace of the previous version, with the

long tables of combat to be consulted and calculations made, Verdy du Vernois’s innovation

dispenses with written orders and instead has the umpire merely verbally questioning the players

on their intentions and orders, and then immediately appraising them of the changes in the

situation. This did not mean the umpire was free of responsibility- a detailed idea of the positions

of the troops on the map had still to be kept in mind, calculating when and how units would

clash in combat and the duration they would take down to the minute. The result was a more

dynamic and vastly more playable Kriegsspiel which could be learnt and played by all participants

in short order. Verdy du Vernois’ versions met with critical acclaim, partially possibly due to his

already stellar reputation, and his position on the famed Prussian General Staff- previously

authors of Kriegsspiel variations had mostly been junior-ranked soldiers, and his rank certainly lent

a cachet to his revision, which Jon Peterson considered ‘crowned the achievements of nearly one

39 Ibid, p. 14. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, p. 15. 42 Ibid, p. 17.

17

hundred years of German war-game design.’43 If the idea of arbitrary judgements seems a step

backwards from the younger Reiswitz’s innovations on probability, the game still retained general

guidelines and aids for the umpire to use when determining combat results- the focus merely

shifted more to the decision making process of the players, compromising on realism to a certain

extent. MacDonnell’s translation seemed to have revitalised the British war-gaming scene: at

Aldershot a committee of officers issued a new edition of the War Game, emphasising the

umpire’s judgements and down-playing the role of loss tables, following Verdy du Vernois’

advice44- new sets of the Game of War, or the War Game, as it had come to be known in Britain,

were commissioned and built for H.M. Government, one such specimen containing units

representing Maxim-gun teams, which were a recent invention in 1884.45 The most enthusiastic

proponents of the War Game were volunteers, as Col. Lonsdale Hale observed in an 1891

article, who overestimated its value, while regulars, who may have had more practical experience

in battle, dislike it and underrate its value.46 It was in this era a particularly enthusiastic volunteer

emerged to impact war-gaming significantly in Britain- Henry Spencer Wilkinson.

Spenser Wilkinson, War-Game Pioneer

Born in Manchester in 1853, Spenser Wilkinson was the son of pacifist banker who largely

forbade the discussion of military affairs at home. While touring Germany, Spenser happened

upon a pamphlet comparing the numerical strength of the armies of Europe. Shocked to find

Britain’s army so feeble, he dedicated himself to military interests- possibly rebelling against the

pacifism of his childhood, upon returning to Oxford he enlisted in the Volunteer Corps and

started organising the Oxford Kriegsspiel Club. Upon graduation he was called to the bar and

practised law in Manchester, and was commissioned into the 2nd Manchester Volunteers.47

Appalled at the poor standards of military training in the Volunteers, he joined the Manchester

Tactical Society, which formed the nexus for enthusiastic war-gamers in Britain throughout the

18th century, holding regular games and circulating a newsletter in which heated discussions took

place. In 1887 he published his Essays on the War Game, the foremost British publication of war-

gaming of the time, a collection of letters from his discussions with the society, which provides

valuable insight to the state of war-gaming in the period. In it, he declares : ‘Probably no form of

43 Peterson (2012), p. 247. 44 This edition was known as the Aldershot rules. C.G. Lewin, War Games and Their History, (London: Fonthill, 2012), p. 24. 45 C.J. Chivers, The Gun (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010), Introduction. 46 Col. Lonsdale Hale, ‘The War Game’, The Nineteenth Century(1891), p.298-317. 47 A. J. A. Morris, Wilkinson, Henry Spencer (1853-1937) in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

18

military study is more useful if properly conducted, as certainly none is so liable to be misused,’48

and promotes them as a substitute for troops manoeuvres which ‘like war itself, is too costly to

be attainable except on rare conditions.’49 Due to improvements in map-making accurate large-

scales were now being produced cheaply, aiding war-gaming immensely: ‘the officer to whom a

good map speaks clearly requires nothing but a strong imagination to see armies manoeuvring on

the country it represents,’ but unless an officer can read a map well, he will conduct his

operations ‘no better than a blind general,’50. The essays provide advice on how to best conduct

war-games, warning against complexity in calculations, and recommending finding a good

umpire as the best factor in a successful Kriegsspiel. Wilkinson was influenced by a Prussian

officer’s findings, a Captain Naumann, who in 1877 attempted an empirical study of the effect of

casualty rates in the 1870 conflict. Naumann found that a unit’s capacity to sustain casualties

depended if conditions were ‘favourable’ or ‘unfavourable,’- a unit in a favourable condition, i.e.

attacking with artillery and cavalry support, could sustain far more casualties than a unit in an

unfavourable position, i.e. pinned in a ravine, before breaking.51 Wilkinson recommended

Naumann’s tables for accurately reflecting casualties in the War Game.

Although Wilkinson never authored a war-game himself, he drew from his experience with

the Manchester Tactical Society to become an important civilian expert clamouring for military

reform, including the seminal work on the Prussian General Staff The Brain of an Army, which

significantly influenced the formation of the British General Staff. Moltke, upon reading it, was

said to have exclaimed ‘that it should have been left to an Englishman to produce such a work!’52

The Society published numerous translations of French and German military texts, including the

German Order of Field Service in 1893, which Wilkinson described as ‘perhaps the most valuable

book on the details of war that has ever been published,’53 and was the chief exponent for Verdy

du Vernois in Britain, who he described as the ablest writer who ever dealt with war games. For

Wilkinson, war-games were the best method of testing the strategic and tactical understanding of

its participants- ‘the only difference from actual war is the absence of danger, of fatigue, of

responsibility, and of the friction involved in maintaining discipline.’54 Spenser Wilkinson never

served in any capacity in the regular military and never saw active conflict; thus one may forgive

48 Wilkinson (1887), Introduction. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 R. Naumann, Das Regiments-Kriegsspiel.(Berlin:1887) in Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer, (London: Cresset Press: 1968) p. 10. 52 Quoted in Wilson, p. 7. 53 Spenser Wilkinson trans., The German Order of Field Service (Manchester: Manchester Tactical Society, 1893) Introduction. 54 Wilkinson (1887), introduction.

19

the enthusiasm of an interested amateur, although he remained influential as a war-

correspondent and eventually the first Chichele professor of military history at Oxford. His

instructions for war-games were sound, but his tactical advice on real military manoeuvres

possibly too intellectualised for the average infantry officer, recommending long reading lists of

military thinkers, and he retains the naiveté of an innocent to actual war in his writing.

Nevertheless, his influence on British war-gaming can be felt in the official 1896 edition of the

War Game, published as The War Office Rules for the Conduct of the War-Game on a Map, 1896.

The Victorian Army’s 1896 War Game

The 1896 edition followed the usual rules for Kriegsspiel, requiring maps, counters, two

players, an umpire and a General and Special ideas for the scenario to be played. Three maps

were used, as according to Wilkinson’s suggestions; combat results were to be resolved by the

Umpire’s judgement, but the difference with Verdy du Vernois’ version is that the War Office

included incredibly detailed tables for each aspect of contemporary warfare: rates of march,

length of columns on the march, daily advance distances, the speed of rail transport, and the

amount of time a unit would take to prepare itself for an attack. In addition guidelines were

provided for the different combat effects infantry, artillery and cavalry would have upon each

other depending on situation and distance; contrary to latter-day opinion of military tactics of the

day, the game prohibited prepared defensive positions being taken by infantry in a rush- the

game did not consider infantry charges to be viable unless the attacking force had an

overwhelming superiority of force.55 The game also noted that ‘framing of orders is perhaps the

most valuable training to be derived from war-games,’56 and special attention should be paid to

the players issuing their orders correctly.

The rules for the 1896 War Game were possibly the pinnacle of British war-gaming design

thus far- simple to learn and adjudicate, playable with a minimum of pieces, useful for training

and simulating reality to an acceptable degree. Most importantly, its scaled well for bodies of

troops of any size; the game itself limits the engagement to the division level, but applying the

principles of ‘free’ Kriegsspiel, as Verdy du Vernois’ version came to be known, would only

require a change of map scales and different sized-counters. It would form the basis for the

strategic war-games played officially, the first of which being the Defence of India in 1903 by

55 The War Office Rules for the Conduct of the War-Game on a Map, 1896 (London: HMSO, 1896), in Curry (ed.) (2008), p. 133. 56 Ibid, p. 117.

20

GHQ India at Simla, the summer capital of the British Raj.57 The Reiswitz Kriegsspiel was not the

only war-game in circulation in the period, however; war-gaming had begun to capture the

imagination of the general public and British war-games were being invented independent of the

Prussian tradition.

Polemos, A New Game of War

In December 1883 a war-game was published entitled Polemos, the New Game of War,

invented by a Dr. David Griffiths in Brighton, possibly assisted by a retired German army

engineer, Lt. Col. G.J.R. Glunicke, naturalised and now living in England.58 It went through

several revisions, a second edition being published in 1886 and a third in 1890, and had been

awarded a prize medal at the 1885 International Inventions Exhibition, and was also played at

the Royal United Services Institution.59 A picture appears in the Illustrated London News, 1888,

of the game being played on a square cloth grid with military miniatures representing blocks of

soldiers instead of the wooden or metal blocks associated with Kriegsspiel. The game itself was

described as follows:

It may be described as a kind of military chess, and can be played on a dining table on

which is spread a cloth which is marked off in two –inch squares and representing a

battlefield ten miles by five. (Each square represents 440 yards.) The pieces are made of

lead, and represent each arm of the service... a very instructive game may be played by two

or more players... the moves are sufficiently simple to enable young officers to play the

game with very little practice, and the combinations often become sufficiently intricate to

interest even field officers.60

Another article describes it:

There is no element of chance in it. A move has its consequences, as in chess and in actual

warfare. .. the objection made to the war game (Kriegsspiel) has been applied to Polemos... it

is more apt to teach strategy than tactics, and minor tactics scarcely enter into it. At the

same time it lends itself to dash, decision, ‘nerve’, as well as caution, foresight and the

57 Curry (2008), p. 7. 58 Bob Cordery in Curry (2013), p. 41. 59 Introduction to Polemos in Curry (2013), p. 28. 60 Article in the The Times, 1885, quoted in Curry (2013), p.28.

21

calculation of consequences... it has, it is stated, been adopted at the Cadet College of

Prussia.61

The actual game took place on a cloth grid of inch squares, in which players were free to deploy

terrain, buildings and rivers to vary the scenario. Each player was then issued an equal number of

blocks of soldiers, called Regiments in the game, consisting of the three arms of Infantry, Cavalry

and Artillery, as well as the new addition, the Staff. The Regiments are meant to be

representational of a larger body of men; each Regiment has a symbolic base strength of ten

men, and when this is reduced by combat to nil the regiment is removed from the board. Each

player receives a reserve of twenty men to add to any Regiment in secret, thus introducing the

main element of strategy and uncertainty of the game, as players are never certain of the total

strength of a Regiment. During play casualties sustained are drawn from the reserve and placed

on the board, for an interesting morbid touch, but also serves to keep track of how much

damage a Regiment has sustained. Each arm has special rules governing their actions, and excel

at the arm they represent- cavalry cannot shoot but have a strong charge, artillery is slow and

cannot charge, but may shoot greater distance than infantry, etc. The staff serves no purpose

except should they be destroyed, the player loses- which may have lead to interesting strategies

for play- they have to be protected, the designers intending them to represent ‘in a measure the

necessary communications which must be kept open in the rear of an Army,’62. Each turn was

limited to ten minutes, kept track with two sand hourglasses, and no umpire was required.

Curiously enough the infantry have the ability to form square, which protects them against

cavalry charges- while ostensibly still used in colonial warfare in 1883, forming square would

have been suicidal in the European conflict the game is meant to simulate given the profusion of

needle-rifles and Maxim guns. The tactics the game represent seem antiquated, reflecting almost

a Napoleonic form of warfare- no provisions for machine guns in the later editions seem to have

been made- but Polemos does introduce several innovations in war-gaming, not least

representing a meeting of Prussian military technicality and British ingenuity vis the aesthetics

and design of the game. While the game does seem in some ways a regression to the rigid chess-

style war-games of the past, it retains the spirit of Kriegsspiel by allowing a multitude of scenarios,

free movement, an element of uncertainty, and combat vaguely based upon an empirical rate of

attrition. As a military training aid, it sacrifices realism for playability and while not as strategically

useful as Verny du Vernois’ Kriegsspiel, is a great deal easier to play.

61 Article in Otago Daily Times, 1889, quoted in Curry (2013), p. 29. 62 Dr. David Griffith, Rules of the Game, in Polemos, A New Game of War, in Curry (2013), p 33..

22

Chamberlain’s New Game of Invasion

Not all war-games of the period took the form of the Reiswitz Kriegsspiel; an entirely novel

strategy game was published in 1888 by Lt. Henry Chamberlain of the Royal Navy, titled the

New Game of Invasion, which was also possibly one of the first amphibious-warfare, inter-service

games of its kind. The game was meant to address the pressing issue at the time during the Naval

Manoeuvres in 1888, which was ‘if the British fleet were to suffer a crushing defeat in the

Channel, could we successfully repel an invading force, and secure London against capture?’63

The game was intended for civilians who would be able to play the game even if they were ‘not

in the slightest degree... acquainted with a single military term.’64 The game board consisted of a

19 inch by 19 inch map of South East England divided into grid squares, each square

representing 10-12 miles across. In the basic version of the game, British player receives fourteen

counters, representing divisions, but must place them in specified positions - the invader twelve,

and may place them in any position off the coast of England. Each piece may move one square

in any direction, unless assisted by railways, where they can move two. The British player wins by

successfully capturing all enemy pieces, but the invader wins if it can reach the central grid

squares of London. The game itself operates more or less like a version of chequers played on a

larger grip map. Curiously enough the game includes the yet un-built Channel Tunnel – whether

Chamberlain assumed one would be dug, or was planning of the contingency of one being dug is

unclear, but if included in the game, being optional, gives a significant advantage to the invader.

Designed to be a relatively simple strategic game, Chamberlain includes ‘for the benefit of those

who consider this game too simple,’ an expanded rule set for more serious play, which

necessitates a screen to render enemy movement unseen and an umpire to officiate. In the

advanced rules the number of counters is halved, each side may move all pieces simultaneously,

although the British require a ratio of 2:1 to be able to capture the invaders pieces, and rail travel

is increased to a distance of 10 grid squares for the defender and six for the attacker. The game is

simple enough to learn and play, with a significant advantage for the attacking player in both

versions- although clearly not complex enough to simulate any manner of military invasion, as a

tool to raise civilian awareness of the difficulties of defending the South-East it succeeds, in the

unlikely military scenario of this happening. John Curry sees the game as having an ‘underlying

political subtext which was to persuade the player certain measures needed to be taken by the

63 Lt. Henry Chamberlain, Introduction, New Game of Invasion (London: Ayres 1889) in Curry (2013), p. 48. 64 Ibidem.

23

British government as an invasion of Britain was feasible’65, although the sum political influence

of the game is probably difficult to gauge.

J.M. Grierson and the British Army 1905 War Game

Possibly the most important war-game of the pre-war period took place in 1905, when the

newly formed General Staff conducted an extensive war-game to simulate the outcome of the

outbreak of war between Germany and France. While Russia had traditionally been the perceived

military opponent in the years following Crimea, growing awareness of German hostility was

mounting in the British Army, as Anglo-German trade rivalry escalated with the new Kaiser’s

imperial ambition causing friction, and their ship-building programme a direct challenge to

Britain’s naval security. The key proponent of this shift to continentalism was Major General

J.M. Grierson, who was to succeed Nicholson, an old friend of Spenser Wilkinson’s, as Director

of Military Operations in the General Staff. Grierson had been a long standing admirer of the

German Army- at Sandhurst he had a statuette of Moltke on his shelf- and had published a book

on the British Army in German in 1897, which was only translated into English two years hence-

it was said in 1890 he was ‘almost as well known at Berlin as at Woolwich.’66 Grierson served as

the military attaché to Berlin from 1896-1900, no doubt participating in many games of Kriegsspiel

– where his experiences with the ‘Anglophobic tirades of its officers, and particularly the Kaiser,’

robbed him of any abiding affection for Germany and ‘convinced him that war between the two

countries was likely.’67 His experiences with the on Lord Roberts’ staff during the Boer War

convinced him of the need for a British General Staff, who would be then be able to conduct

war-games, or staff rides, to teach the control of armies in the field, without which ‘there is no

system about it, and without a system a large army cannot be properly handled.’68

Continentalism, the need for a continental military commitment with the outbreak of war, most

probably with Germany, began to spread in the War Office as Grierson exerted his influence. In

1902 the head of the Foreign Section of the Military Intelligence Department, Maj-General

William Robertson authored a paper stating ‘that in no other European country is hatred of

England so general or so deeply rooted as in Germany,’ and the balance of power in Europe was

shifting due to ‘a new preponderance now growing... of which the centre of gravity is Berlin.’69 In

1903 a memorandum was circulated in the Committee of Imperial Defence, essentially Britain’s

65 Curry (2013), p. 48. 66 D. S. Macdiarmid, The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir James Moncrieff Gierson (London: Constable, 1923), p.87. 67 Ibid, p. 115, 130-4. 68 Ibid, p. 271. 69 Report by Robertson, submitted by Sir William Nicholson to the C-in-C, 11 November 1902, p. 3, 9, Robertson papers, LHCMA 1/2/4

24

highest war council, by the Secretary of State for War, Arnold Foster, considering the growing

threat of the German military to Britain’s national security.70 It concluded that an invasion of the

British Isles was unlikely with the supremacy the Royal Navy enjoyed, but did not discount the

need for intervention in a continental conflict. When the British General Staff was finally

established and Grierson appointed the new Director of Military Operations, he pushed for a

war-game to study the consequences of outbreak of war between Germany and France.

Grierson, once a keen admirer of the Prussian military tradition, was no less convinced of the

efficacy of their methods despite now being opposed to their intentions- he was going to use

their Kriegsspiel against them: German methods to divine German intentions.

The format of the war game was to take on a much larger scale than had been attempted

before in British war-gaming history. Three commanders were appointed- Col. William

Robertson, under Grierson’s patronage now Assistant Director of Military Operations and

commanding the Germans, Col. C.E. Callwell, who was to be Deputy Director of Operations in

1914 commanding the British and the Belgian contingent commanded by a staff officer, Major.

A. Lynden-Bell.71 All were assigned teams of staff officers from Military Operations and Foreign

Intelligence. The game was to be conducted with a modified strategic version of the 1896 War

Game rules, which required more detailed planning and taking place in real time, umpired by

Grierson and his staff. Excellent details were provided by German cycling maps, which detailed

many of the lesser known by-roads in the province of South Belgium. Curiously enough the

French were not represented in the game by a commander, as it would mostly take place in

Belgian territory. The ‘General Idea’ of the game was that

War had broken out between France and Germany on 1 January 1905. At this time

neither side had the help of allies. Germany had taken the initiative with an offensive

against the French defences between Sedan and Belfort; but after two months when these

attacks had failed, had decided to outflank the French by passing north through Belgium

with six Army Corps, three cavalry divisions, and two Reserve Army Corps... it was

assumed that Britain would be brought into the war by this violation of Belgian

neutrality.72

With incredible prescience, Grierson had anticipated the Schliffen plan and the British

commitment to Belgium in 1914. Given the strength of the French defences in the centre,

70 Wilson (1978) p. 21. 71 Records of a Strategic War Game, Directorate of Military Operations, W.O. 33/364 (A 1017), National Archives. 72 Ibid.

25

Grierson anticipated that the Germans would attempt an outflanking manoeuvre through

Belgium, although he believed it ultimately would not be successful due to the weaknesses of the

Belgian railway system necessitating a march on foot, which would mean the thrust arriving too

late and possibly critically weakening the main attack in the south. Preparatory studies had

discovered the central Belgian plain north of the Meuse was the most likely avenue of approach,

and serious weaknesses in the Belgian defences- the fourteen mile gap between the outer forts at

Antwerp, and the limitations of the Belgian army to simultaneously garrison their fortresses and

maintain a field presence. In the General Idea it was agreed upon that the German forces would

upon invading Belgium first seek to destroy the Belgian field army, or failing so isolating it and

preventing joining up with the British deployment- this resulted in the Germans choosing the

southern approach through the hilly plateau instead of crossing the Meuse below Liege, and

moving south across the Sambre.

The game lasted nearly five months from 1st January 1905 to the 24th of May. The

Germans began by feinting a cavalry division and infantry division north of Liege, while the main

body of troops proceeded south of the river Meuse, which prompted a hasty Belgian

redeployment from the South to the North, to garrison Antwerp and defend the British landing

areas. The Germans then crossed the river Ourthe, threatening both Huy in the north and

Dinant in the south. Convinced that the British were still disembarking and the Belgians unable

to act independent of British support, Robertson wasted no time and continued the advance on

Dinant. The British and Belgians counter-attacked on the 30th day of mobilisation and at this

point the game was ended in favour of a German victory, Grierson arguing that even if the

Anglo-Belgian counterattack had succeeded, it would have been unable to hold the salient as the

Germans had managed to secure their lines of communication and their advance ‘could not have

been materially interfered with, until the arrival of the greater portion of British troops.’73 The

game had highlighted a number of strategic dilemmas for the Belgian army, and more

importantly the serious deficiencies in mobilising the British Army and transporting it across the

channel. Callwell, commanding the British, argued that the Belgians should have deployed in the

North, protecting Antwerp and the landing ports and forcing the Germans to deploy more

troops to safeguard their flank, delaying their overall movement and allowing the French time to

concentrate around Dinant. Lynden-Bell demurred, arguing that the Belgians could not have

been seen to be giving up their southern territory too easily and opening herself to accusations of

collusion and of not sufficiently defending her neutrality, and that the German force was

73 Grierson, Ibid.

26

insufficient to conquer northern Belgium, and were able to redeploy north if it was threatened in

any case, which they did.

Grierson ruled in favour of the Belgian decision, citing the political situation. The

Admiralty originally envisaged the convoy of the British deployment, three Army Corps and

three cavalry Brigades, would require forty-two vessels and a shipping time of seven days. In the

game itself it was discovered that available troop transports were so limited that by the tenth day

of mobilisation only twenty-two were in operation, and it would take seventeen days before the

full number of vessels were available for use- the total convoy took thirty four days to complete,

and a further day for each unit to disembark and be equipped for the field. The result was by the

time a sufficient Anglo-Belgian response could be organised, the Germans had control of the

field. It was thus apparent that existing military preparations were insufficient, and the game

ruled that alone, France would be defeated before Britain and Belgium could militarily intervene.

This verdict was to have significant influence on British military strategy in the years to come-

possibly the first time a war-game had directly influenced the course of British history.

Was it wholly unexpected that Grierson, keenly committed to preparing Britain for a

continental conflict with Germany, would adjudicate a war-game which vindicated his stance and

could be used to influence policy in years to come? Grierson himself in the notes to the war-

game indicate he doubted the wisdom of committing an army to the conflict, as given the size

and potency of the Continental armies any British deployment was liable to being swatted aside74,

and the proper course of action should be a token commitment while maintaining maritime

pressure and the threat of an amphibious invasion. The question of Belgian neutrality was soon

discussed in the Foreign Office and three questions were posed to the General Staff, by the

Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour- What military advantages might Germany or France obtain by

violating Belgian territory? Would the Belgian army be expected to offer any effective

opposition? What is the duration before two British Army Corps can be deployed on the

Continent?75 The General Staff issued responses clearly influenced by its findings during the war-

game: Belgian neutrality could not be guaranteed by the military situation in the continent, as a

likely stalemate on the front would make a flanking attack through Belgium ‘imperative’,

especially for Germany. Belgium did not have the capacity to offer sustained resistance alone,

and the transportation of two British Army Corps would take a total of twenty three days,

assuming improvements to the convoy system.76 The weaknesses of the system were apparent to

74 Introduction, Ibid. 75 Wilson (1968), p. 25. 76 Ibid.

27

the government that within weeks joint Anglo-Belgian staff plans were organised and in 1906,

the Entente Cordiale was consummated with the beginning of joint planning with the French

General Staff, which would see come to fruition with the outbreak of war in 1914. Causality

here, of course is a dangerous thing; if the results of the war-game had been in favour of the

Anglo-Belgians, would events have turned out any differently? It seems unlikely, because the

Great Powers were locked on a trajectory of conflict that the results of a single planning exercise

would have done little to deflect. The 1905 war-game served as it vindicated their judgement and

lent credence to their policy- history is replete with the discarded results of war-games ignored to

the peril of their players.

Bellum, A 1909 Kriegsspiel

As late as 1909 Kriegsspiel was still being played and refined in the British Army- the

Illustrated London News reports on a variant invented by A.W. Mercer, commanding the Somana

Rifles on the North West Frontier.77 ‘Bellum’, as the variant was called, addressed many issues

with the current incarnation of Kriegsspiel with simple solutions which greatly eased play,

especially for units lacking the resources to conduct proper Kriegsspiel sessions.

The old conditions under which the exercise necessitated a copious supply of maps drawn

to a large scale... after two or three exercises all the players got to know the configuration

of the country by heart, and the maps became worthless for instructive purposes and new

ones had to be purchased at considerable outlay.78

Bellum eschewed expensive topographical maps for a white cloth gridded with two-inch squares,

over which coloured ribbons are stretched and pinned to represent rivers, railways and roads,

with to red string contours show at a glance the outline of the country and woods, lakes and

villages represented with signs.

Thus any map can be portrayed with about three quarters of an hour’s preparation- the

new game necessitates only one table and one umpire, the players divided by moveable

screens, all signs and blocks of troops are easily visible, and can be recognised at a once,

interest is stimulated throughout and kept awake as move follows move in quick

succession, the losses in killed and wounded being deducted by the umpire according to a

carefully schemed table of losses.79

77 Bellum, the New War-Game, Illustrated London News, March 6th, 1909, in Curry (2013), p. 20. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid.

28

It seems improvements to the playability of Kriegsspiel enabled the return to loss tables for the

Bellum variant, as play takes place on a single table the speed of play seems to have been very

much improved. The simplicity of these refinements to the game enabled play with a minimum

of equipment, and it was adopted first by the Indian Army as the preferred variant, and

eventually used as a training tool in the expanded British Army after 1914.80

By 1913 war-gaming was no longer restricted to the military sphere- Kriegsspiel had captured

the imagination of interested amateurs. Although miniature military figurines had existed as the

province of the wealthy for centuries, in 1893 an English toymaker, William Britain Jr., had

discovered a process to cheaply manufacture pewter toy soldier figurines, which soon flooded

the British market- the Germans having their own industry.81 It was not a stretch to use these

figurines to represent soldiers in an actual game, and in 1905 rules appeared for using the

figurines in game entitled The Great War Game For Young and Old. Linking war-gaming with

military figurines was most probably a British innovation- Robert Louis Stevenson was have

known to played war-games with his toy soldiers in an 1898 account82, as early as 1881; H. G.

Wells possibly being the most famous exponent of this manner of war-game with his 1913

edition of Little Wars in which he encouraged lavish battles liberated from the narrow universe of

the tabletop to the vast spaces of the floor, with corresponding miniature buildings, trees and

landscape. The common denominator in these war-games was the introduction of a kinetic form

of casualty simulation; miniature cannon would fire dried beans or, as the Great War Game

suggested, ‘the most effective, exciting and quickest method is to fire by throwing with the

hand,’83 and the soldiers getting knocked down being removed as casualties. Despite H.G. Wells’

recommendation for use in military war-games84, this method of combat resolution did not see

any adoption by the military of the period- being entirely too random and not scaling well to

larger engagements. It was not until the advent of computer technology that simulating the effect

of actual projectiles became a viable method of determining casualties from combat, and as

absurd Well’s suggestion may have been at the time, it is has become the method, albeit vastly

improved, used today in the most advanced and realistic war simulations.

Despite the profusion of war-gaming in both the civilian and military sphere, even in 1914

the tradition never became as established in British military culture as it had become in Germany.

Andrew Wilson attributes this to the ‘tendency to obey tradition and instinct, and in the Army,

80 Peterson (2012), p. 271. 81 Ibid, p. 261. 82 Lloyd Osbourne, ‘Stevenson at Play,’ in Scribner's Magazine, Volume XXIV, No. 5, November, 1898. 83 Quoted in Peterson (2012), p. 263. 84 Peter de Perla, The Art of Wargaming (Annapolis: USNI, 1990) p. 46.

29

an antipathy for professionalism’ and that ‘once the Prussian vogue had been superseded by the

Anglo-French Entente, the tactical war game was regarded as altogether too Germanic for the

serious consideration of gentlemen,’85 the social makeup of which most of the officer caste in the

British Army consisted of. Unique cases like Grierson aside, the higher echelons of the General

Staff seem to have had little interest in their utility- Haig’s diary mentions war-games in passing,

but takes no special interest in them, while Lord Roberts, Sir John French and Sir William

Nicholson fail to mention them at all. This lack of commitment to war-gaming may be

symptomatic of a lack of general commitment to serious continental war- despite the reforms of

the half century, the British Army at the outbreak of the Great War still remained designed for

colonial intervention. With the outbreak of war itself the use of sand-table and map exercises,

mock battles and rehearsed manoeuvres would eventually become standard practice before an

attack, given that actual lives were at stake; although the process by which war-gaming took

shape in the Great War still remains an area which requires further research. It would take,

however, another half-century and another war before the full potential of applying war-gaming

to conflict would be fully realised by the British Army.

85 Wilson (1968), p. 11.

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3. War-Gaming in the Royal Navy

The British Navy of the late Victorian era was the most foremost naval military

organisation in the developed world. Unlike the hidebound, conservative British Army, the Navy

was acutely aware of its responsibility in safekeeping the most important British territory of all,

the sea, and would brook no laxity in maintaining the supremacy of its fleet; the complete

transformation of the pre-dreadnought British fleet to all-dreadnought modern navy in the

period 1900-190986 is testament to the technocratic nature, pliability to change, and commitment

to superiority in both the Admiralty and the Government. It is unsurprising then the first naval

war-games were created by British inventors- what is surprising, however, is they were not first

created by Naval personnel, but by civilians- and no formal war-gaming system was officially

adopted until 1901. The lack of a war-gaming tradition in the Royal Navy is puzzling, because

war-gaming naval combat is vastly simpler than designing an equivalent game based on land,

with no terrain to model and existing ship capabilities more or less known and quantifiable. One

explanation remains that the standard of naval education and promotion was sufficiently

advanced so that in most situations the Captain of a vessel would already know and be able to

predict the courses of action available and their outcomes; unlike combat on land, naval combat

is a simpler affair involving certainties of speed, armour and gun calibre. For a dreadnought in a

fleet under the command system of an admiral such as Jellicoe, little in the way of independent

thought is required, as one takes the lead from the flag-ship; tactical independence was less

important than running a tightly-drilled ship and achieving a good gunnery score. If war-games

86 Peter Padfield, Rule Britannia: The Victorian and Edwardian Navy (London: Pimlico, 2002) p. 209.

31

were to have relevance, they would be played at the higher levels in the Admiralty, although no

records of formal strategic war-gaming on the lines of Grierson’s 1905 war-game have been

found in my research. Furthermore, between 1870 and 1914 naval technology was advancing at

such a pace that no one was entirely sure of the capabilities of a new class of vessel as they were

gaps of entire generations of technology- from iron-clad to battleship and then dreadnought- all

untried in combat. Lastly, the fleet manoeuvres held every year could be construed as a large-

scale war-game, and as conducting them was a fraction of the difficulty and expense of

mobilising and conducting large-scale army manoeuvres, simulating them on paper was less

necessary. Thus, war-gaming in the navy was never institutionalised in Navy the as per the

Prussian tradition; independent leadership and initiative in the lower ranks was far less required

or desired.

Early naval wargaming and Colomb’s The Duel

Nevertheless, British war-gaming at sea has a long pedigree which dates back to John

Clerk, an amateur naval enthusiast, whose modelling of fleet tactics in 1779 using ‘small models

of ships.. disposed in a proper arrangement, gave most correct representations of hostile fleets...

being easily moved and put into any relative position required,’87 in a proto-war game discovered

the novel fleet tactic called cutting the line of battle, which may have influenced Rodney at the

Battle of the Saintes 1782 against De Grasse88, and later used by Nelson at Trafalgar in 1805. The

victory at Trafalgar ceded dominance of the sea to the British Navy, and some years elapsed

before credible challenges began to emerge to challenge this supremacy. In 1873 Lt. W.M.F.

Castle of the Royal Navy described a war-game invented by an old messmate, a certain Rev. Fred

Davies, which was played in the wardroom several times with wooden blocks representing ships

on a naval chart, where an umpire and two assistants directed two players moving fleets in turns

of two minutes real time. One game came to grief as once both players had

brought our squadrons within 800 yards of each other... then came the knotty point as

to who had the advantage. A discussion followed. Instead of the umpire giving a final

decision, every one present argued the point for themselves... the result was that the next

day none of us was satisfied.’89

The timing of the game, the format and the year it was played, not to mention the arguments

about combat resolution with the umpire, all suggest an attempt at a translation of the Reiswitz

87 John Clerk, An Essay on Naval Tactics, (Edinburgh: Longman, 1790) , Author’s Preface, xl. 88 Wilson (1968), p. 14. 89 W.M.F. Castle, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol 17, 1874.

32

Kriegsspiel to a naval format was attempted, though it seems unsuccessfully as interest in

developing the game further seemed to have waned. The next recorded attempt at a the naval

war-game was a more original concept, titled The Duel by a Cpt. P.H Colomb in 1879. It was an

attempt to simulate ‘on paper, as nearly as may be, what might happen between two ships

fighting in smooth water, in the open sea.’90 The game took a format similar to the Reiswitz

Kriegsspiel; two players, an umpire, and two ships starting on a naval chart 2,000 yards apart. The

umpire would ask each player his move, and he would reply with his orders, and moves were

measured in one-minute increments, with points scored for shots fired or ramming the enemy.

Special attention was made to ensure each ship would be reflecting the capabilities of an ironclad

in real life- empirical measurements were made of the HMS Thunderer’s speed and turning circle

in 1877 and reflected in the game, as were its gunnery records. If ramming seems to be a strange

way to achieve victory, Ironclads of 1870 had superior armour to gunnery power and after the

Battle of Lissa in 1866 where Austrian ships had sunk Italian ironclads by ramming whilst

gunfire proved ineffective, ramming enjoyed a brief revival in naval circles as a viable tactic.

Neither attempts at adapting a naval Kriegsspiel proved popular, possibly due to the awkwardness

of using the Kriegsspiel system with its umpire and complicated order system to reflect more

dynamic and kinetic naval combat. Colomb was later to bemoan the lack of enthusiasm for his

game:

The Government took no notice of it whatever, and naturally one got a little tired when

one found Russia, for instance, hard at it, spending considerable sums of money on it,

using it regularly officially, and making it part of their training course at Cronstadt – it did

not encourage one to enter into anything again of the same line.91

With the characteristic arrogance of a Royal Navy officer of the period, designing a system

enthusiastically adopted by a foreign military and used as a training tool in their naval education

was insufficient for Cpt. Colomb, as he clearly desired the adoption of the game and recognition

from his peers within the Royal Navy itself. Yet the question does again resurface unbidden:

what would it take to get the British interested in a war-game?

Chamberlain’s Naval Blockade

Lt. H Chamberlain RN, in a lecture to the Royal United Services Institution in April 1888,

attempted to directly address this mystery when introducing his invention, a war-game titled

90 P.H. Colomb, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol 32, 1888, p. 533. 91 Ibid, p. 535.

33

Naval Blockade. ‘We are unlike our German friends, who are pleased when asked to solve intricate

problems and abstruse questions, and derive positive amusement from a brain-racking Kriegsspiel.’

Consequently, ‘war games may be invented ad infinitum, the only difficult part consists in getting

people to play them- the number of men who can be persuaded to play a game varies inversely

to the square of its difficulty.’ 92 Simplicity in war-game thus seemed to be main thrust of the late

1880’s war-gaming revival in the military; Chamberlains’ game was designed to be simple, easily

played aboard ship, and useful in the training of both men and officer. The game was played a on

a board of 24 by 24 squares, each of one inch, with two ships as playing pieces as well as two

islands and rocks to provide some variation in terrain. The ‘General Idea’ of the game is one ship

has received orders to proceed to sea with important despatches, and the blockading ship has

instructions to intercept it before it leaves harbour and reaches open sea. Each ship may move

one grid square alternately, and alter their course 45 degrees. The blockading ship must attempt

to ram or disable the escaping ship before it reaches the other end of the board, and each ship

mounts a gun on each side and a the chasing ship and escaping ship have an extra gun mounted

with a 45 degree traverse on the bow and stern respectively, allowing some manner of exchange

of fire as one ship chases the other. Combat is decided by a six-sided die, with three faces

awarding four, two and one point of damage correspondingly, and the remaining three misses. In

addition there is a disabled result on a roll of four, which compels the disabled ship to

immediately stop. Ramming here again rears its improbable head, with a good portion of the

lecture addressing preparation and training in the art of ramming, as well as arguing his rules

were designed to reflect reality insofar as possible. Two demonstration games were held followed

by an evaluation of the game’s design- as C.G. Lewin notes it is exceedingly rare to find the

discussion of the merits of a war game fully reported.93 P.H. Colomb, the inventor of The Duel,

now an admiral, was present and expressed his enthusiasm for the game design, though

questioning its utility as an instructional tool.94 Admiral Sir George Elliot suggested that it would

be useful to allow the players to modify the rule-set to add variation to the game, for instance

giving one ship a strong bow and one a weak one, and adding an additional gun to the arc

missing one on the ships. Chamberlain concludes saying he feels his game reflects ‘the glorious

uncertainty of war,’ and when later taking his game into the smoking room for general

demonstration was immediately surrounded by ‘at least fifteen young men round me, Gunnery

Lieutenants, acting Sub-Lieutenants, and so on, and before we had been playing twenty minutes

we had disputed and argued more about ramming, more about other professional subjects, than

92 Lt. H. Chamberlain, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 32, 1888, p. 526. 93 Lewin (2012), p. 57. 94 Chamberlain (1888), p. 534.

34

these young men had talked of in the last three months. Why is this? It was because it was not a

difficult game; if it had been difficult they would not have played it.’95 Chamberlain had grasped

the pre-requisite for a war-game to be an effective training tool and apparently to appeal to the

Briton. Naval Blockade however was too simple to achieve widespread success, its author possibly

too junior; Naval war-gaming seems to have languished for the next decade until the arrival on

scene of Fred T. Jane in 1898.

Fred T. Jane and the Naval Wargame

Born to a curate in Richmond, Surrey, in 1865 and educated at Exeter, Frederick Thomas

Jane produced his first work of naval sketches at 17 while still in school titled Ironclads of the

World. An enthusiast of naval affairs since young, when he played games involving sinking model

ships in the village pond, Jane took his trade to London and after a spell of poverty succeeded in

gaining a following for his illustrations of naval events, disasters and battles, appearing in the

Times and other newspapers of the period.96 Jane compiled a naval album intended on selling

‘naval awareness’ to the masses and published All The Worlds Fighting Ships in 1898, which had a

unique approach of presenting ships in silhouette, for the perceived use of the look-out on the

bridge of a ship, or the public imagining themselves in such a position. The album was a great

success, and caught the wave of increasing literacy and interest in the naval affairs of the nation,

as well as being ordered by the Navy in bulk. Adjunct to the album he also published Rules for a

Naval War Game in 1898, subtitled A Sea Kriegsspiel Simulating All The Movements And Evolutions Of

Every Individual Type Of Modern Warship, And The Proportionate Effect of Every Sort of Gun and

Projectile97. Jane’s design retained many of the elements of Reiswitzian Kriegsspiel design, including

a map board, umpires, assistants, interrogative order-movement and the ‘General Idea’, but

involved an entirely novel if somewhat clumsy method of combat resolution, in which strikers

were used to punch holes in cardboard cut-outs of ships from across the board. The holes

punched would then correspond to where the ship was hit, and various damage tables consulted

to resolve the damage. Jane had pioneered his own system of rating ships, dividing guns and

armour into classes, ‘A’ class guns being able to penetrate ‘a-e’ class armour, and so on which

enabled a class of ship to be quickly quantified once spotted. The ratings in the book

corresponded to his ratings in the war-game, which generated interest in his book, and vice

versa. The game was played on a board of 1 inch grid squares, each representing 100 yards, with

95 Ibid, p. 537. 96 Richard Brooks, Fred T. Jane, A Short Biography: The Man and the Wargame in John Curry, The Fred Jane Naval War Game, 1906 (London: Lulu, 2008) p. 9. 97 Fred T. Jane, Rules for the Naval Wargame (London: Clowes and Sons, 1898).

35

ship silhouettes made from card or cork at the 1/2400 scale, or 1.5 inches long. This made actual

identification of ships difficult from the other side of the board, and was meant to reflect the

difficulties in identifying ships at the distances involved. Each move is calculated to simulate a

minutes’ time in game. A contemporary review described it as

a most instructive lesson in the capabilities of different types of ships to withstand or carry

on attacks; in the practicability of evolution and of their usefulness; in the value of gun fire,

and of the vulnerability of ships... it puts very fairly before the players the actual problems

which would face them were they commanding squadrons in times of war, and if played in

seriousness cannot fail to instruct them.98

If players had doubts about the feasibility of the striking system, the article concedes ‘this

manner of firing seems at first sight crude,’ but reassures readers that ‘all attempts to secure

accuracy which different players adopt end.. in failure, and no matter whether a short stroke or

long stroke is made, the effect is generally the same... strikers do very fairly imitate the conditions

of actual shooting... estimates of the amount done have been worked out from official

statistics.’99 In the first edition it seemed that the prescribed rate of fire was too high and actions

were resolving too quickly, and Jane advises to slow the rate of striking. The article concludes

that ‘it is certainly more realistic than our military Kriegsspiel,’ and that it ‘contains a mass of

information on ships... which cannot be found in so compact a form elsewhere.’100 Jane’s naval

war-game was clearly well received, and he received audiences with as diverse as the naval

attaches from Russia, Japan, Prince Louis of Battenberg, later First Sea Lord, and H.J. May, later

president at the Royal Naval College.101 By 1901 a revision of the rules was issued by the Navy

for use aboard Her Majesty’s ships, with a modified firing system based on rate of fire and

probability, as the physical striker system was impractical aboard ship.102

Jane introduced two innovations important to the development of war-gaming; a strategic

map, where manoeuvres would take place, and a tactical map, where combat would occur, and

the concept of points values in the strategic map. As Jane stated, ‘the close simulation to real

warfare is the sole object of the game.’103 In the strategic game each player would be allocated an

allowance of points, as ‘cost was the dominant feature of modern warfare.’104 Listed costs

98‘Introduction to the Fred Jane Naval Wargame,’ 9 December 1898, The Engineer, Vol. 86, p. 581. 99 Ibid, p. 583-5 100 Ibid, p. 585. 101 Jane (1898), p. 1. 102 Brooks (2008), p. 6. 103 Fred T. Jane, Hints on playing the Jane Naval War Game (London: Clewes and Sons, 1902), p. 3. 104 Lewin (2012), p. 60.

36

included 50 points for submarines, 200 points for forts, 250 points for troopships, and players

lost points for having coastal towns bombarded. Play would proceed from sketch maps on the

scale of 1 square to 100 miles to the tactical map when combat was joined. Regular sessions of

his war-game began to be hosted, and in his 1902 edition Jane was able to boast ‘officially, or

semi-officially, this Naval Kriegsspiel has now been adopted by almost every Navy in the world,’105

and included a fascinating account of an extended campaign involving seventy-five participants

played out over three months in Portsmouth, 1900, even involving a local newspaper providing

daily updates which could and was used to mount a disinformation campaign. Captain Robert

Lowry, who first played Jane’s War Game at RUSI in 1898, introduced it to the syllabus of the

War Course at Portsmouth War College when he became president in 1907, holding sessions

each Tuesday and Thursday afternoon106, and Admiral Jackie Fisher maintained a war-gaming

table in a large room in the Admiralty, where officers were encouraged to gather to discuss novel

tactics and to play war-games.107 In the 1912 edition, which included rules for aerial

bombardment from airships and dirigibles, Jane acknowledged the trend for rule improvements

to edge towards simplicity of play as the more complicated rules tables were substituted for by

umpire judgement, in parallel to the evolution of the Reiswitz Kriegsspiel; the object of the game

was also revised as it now had three aims: to provide a means of adding realism and practicality

to strategy, to simulate real war conditions for the testing of new tactics, and a means of

education of the strengths and weaknesses of warships currently afloat.108 Although the game

ostensibly still suffered from the problems inherent to Kriegsspiel, namely the quality of the game

depending largely on the umpire, Jane’s game adapted well to the rapid advancement of

technology from 1898- although Jane died in 1916, the Navy carried on with the war-game even

post-war; the rules for the 1921 edition of the official Royal Navy War Game are still identifiably

Fred T. Jane’s.

105 Jane (1902), p. 2. 106 Brooks in Curry (2008), p. 6. 107 Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (London: Vintage, 1993) p. 437. 108 Fred T. Jane, The Naval Wargame: Official Rules (London: HMSO 1912). P. 2.

37

Conclusion: The Outside Context Problem

Did Jellicoe war-game Jutland with Jane’s War Game rules? Unlikely, because Royal Navy’s

doctrine prohibited night-fighting, and consequently the fleet was not trained to engage in

combat at night. The rules provide allowances for night-fighting but not for night gunnery. Had

he done so, if such a scenario had come into play in a session, would the outcome of Jutland

have been any different? It is tempting to ascribe history-altering significance to the results of

war-games in hindsight, but it is important to remember that for the contemporaries playing the

game, the results of a war-game are just that of a game, one of many; often having no perceivable

bearing on actual decisions, despite results, their lessons discarded or ignored- see the Japanese at

Pearl Harbour, the Russians at Port Arthur and Tannenberg, the Germans at Barbarossa. War-

gaming at the outbreak of the Great War had changed significantly since its incarnation in the

crucible of Prussian military science, its potential as a training tool realised but its full value as an

oracle not yet been grasped. It would take another war and half-century before the application of

science to military endeavour begun by Reiswitz became fully realised, and the invention of the

computer to unlock its full potential. And yet with all these tools at our disposal, we still err- as

Jane wrote in 1912, ‘the true test of a war plan is its ability to succeed despite the occurrence of

things outside calculation.’109 Perhaps the lesson of war-gaming in 1914 for today is that no

matter how advanced our simulation or comprehensive our war plan there will always be the

occurrence of events which we did not factor in our calculations, and that even our best

simulations have their limitations.

109 Ibid, p. 6.

38

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.