british seapower and the mysore wars

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Volume 97, number 4November2011

British Seapower and the Mysore Wars of the Eighteenth Century

PhilipMacdougall

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The Mariner’s Mirror 97:4 (November 2011), 299–314

British Seapower and the Mysore Wars of the Eighteenth Century

Philip Macdougall

The naval aspirations of Hyder Ali (1760–82) and Tipu Sultan (1782–99), rulers of the southern Indian state of Mysore, is a much neglected subject. In creating a naval force, that clearly emulated those of the European nations, it was seen as a means of first neutralizing the power of the British before being ultimately used to remove all European colonizers from the subcontinent. Factors both aiding and working against the creation of this fleet are discussed together with the interest shown by the French in developing a working arrangement with the nascent Mysore naval power. That the efforts of the two Mysore rulers came to very little was a result of a series of swift and decisive actions taken by the British at the outset of any period of hostility combined with the difficulties faced by a land power developing an effective maritime force.

During the second half of the eighteenth century there was no greater threat to the British presence in India than that of the independent state of Mysore.

Under the leadership of Haidar Ali (1760–82) and Tipu Sultan (1782–99), the state of Mysore clashed with the British on no fewer than four occasions.1 Undoubtedly, the root cause was a desire on the part of both Mysore and the British to expand the extent of the territory over which they had either direct power or a high degree of influence. For their part, both Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan were aware that only through neutralization and eventual expulsion of all overseas colonial powers from the entire Indian subcontinent could their particular aims be fulfilled.

Although the ambitions of both Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan were ultimately crushed by the British, they were seen as a very real threat and one furthered by the decision of those two rulers to create a state navy.2 Indeed, Tipu Sultan actually developed plans that would have created a maritime force that would have exceeded in number anything available in the waters around India to the combined fleets of both the Royal Navy and East India Company. Only the swift actions of the British, combined with the difficulties faced by a land power developing an effective maritime force prevented this threat becoming a reality. For European naval historians, the actions of these two rulers in developing a state navy have largely been viewed as of little significance and approached only as a means of rounding off a generalized account of overall European naval strategy. Conversely, Asian historians, in researching the achievements of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan have

1 The spellings of the names of the two rulers of Mysore frequently vary between sources. Adopted here is the form most frequently used by contemporary Indian historians. However, when part of a quote, the spelling adopted is that of the given source. I am grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions of anonymous referees.2 Mark Wilks, Private Secretary to the Governor of Madras during the period of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, was one contemporary that saw the state of Mysore as a real threat: see M. Wilks, History of Mysore II (1810, reprint New Delhi, 1989), passim.

300 The Mariner’s Mirror

usually failed to apply a naval perspective to their writing and, when doing so, have been unsystematic in approach.3

Of those four conflicts, it is invariably the fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1798–9) that acquires most attention. In part, this was due to Arthur Wellesley, the future 1st Duke of Wellington, gaining his first battle honour at the siege and fall of Srirangapatnam, Tipu Sultan’s capital. It was during the siege that Tipu Sultan himself was killed, so bringing an end to the father and son dynasty, and also ensuring that Mysore was firmly brought within the sphere of British influence. While not wishing to diminish the importance of these events, the frequent attention placed on Wellington, has resulted in the downplaying of sea power in these various conflicts together with its underpinning of the growth of the short-lived independent Mysore state.

Haidar Ali, as founder of the dynasty, was a great modernizer. In analysing his European adversaries, he realized not only the importance of their efficient and well-equipped armies but that of their navies, which ultimately sealed their presence in

3 Material published in the West on the subject of the Mysorean navy usually goes little further than making a connection with European naval operations and offers no analysis of the nature of the fleet created. Among the most useful titles are C. R. Low, History of the Indian Navy (London, 1877) I; J. Michaud, Histoire des progrès et de la chuts de l’empire de Mysore sous les règnes d’Hyder-Aly et Tippoo-Saib (Paris, 1809); C. Northcote-Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas 1793–1815 (London, 1954); Sir H. W. Richmond, The Navy in India 1763–1783 (London, 1931). An exception however is Pamela Nightingale who provides a glimpse of how the navy under Tipu Sultan was effectively used; see P. Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, 1784–1806 (Cambridge, 1970). More recent interest has been given to the Mysore state during this period by a number of Indian historians of which a few make considered reference to the development of a maritime force: see, I. Habib, State and Diplomacy under Tipu (New Delhi, 2001); I. Habib (ed.), Confronting Colonialism (New Delhi, 2002); M. Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan (Delhi, 1951); S. P. Sen, The French in India, 1763–1816 (New Delhi, 1971).

Figure 1 India at the time of the Anglo-Mysore Wars

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India. While merchant ships helped create wealth by shipping sizeable amounts of commodities back to Europe, it was the navy that provided ultimate protection. In turn, of course, with the wealth secured, the construction of a larger and more powerful navy on European lines was possible. If, therefore, Haidar Ali was to better his enemy, he must take similar steps to develop his own trading fleet and the ships needed to protect it. Eventually, a further stage would be reached, that of having a sufficiency of naval power to take on and defeat the colonisers at sea. That this was his intention is evidenced by instructions left to his son, Tipu Sultan, in which he stated that for the purpose of expelling the British, ‘from the lands they have invaded’, it would be necessary to use against them their own weapons both on land and at sea.4

For his part, Haidar Ali fought two wars against the British, these rather un-imaginatively known as the First and Second Anglo-Mysore Wars (1766–9 and 1780–4). In both these conflicts, the British had made very efficient use of their maritime strength, utilising ships of the Royal Navy and the East India Company marine service, engaged in transporting troops to battle;5 support of troops on land;6 the carrying of communications and the establishment of a blockade along the entire Malabar coastline. Furthermore, during the Second Anglo-Mysore War (1780–4), the value of a navy to the French was also witnessed, with a squadron of French ships under the command of Pierre de Sufferen capturing Trincomalee and penetrating the coast of Sumatra.7 Less well documented are the activities of Haidar Ali’s own fleet. At the outset of the First Anglo-Mysore War, evidence from the Portuguese would indicate the existence of thirty warships and a number of transports in the hands of the Mysore ruler and all under the command of an Englishmen who was supported by several European officers.8 Little more is known of the activities of this fleet, other than that of the Royal Navy capturing several of these vessels during the early stages of the war. However, the navy of Mysore played a decidedly more significant role, as far as European sources are concerned, during the opening months of the Second Anglo-Mysore War. In February 1780, Sir Edward Hughes, Admiral commanding the Royal Navy’s East India squadron, lamented the ease with which Haidar Ali was able to communicate with a number of potentially friendly ports, including those situated in the Persian Gulf. One particular outcome was that of Haidar Ali being able to detain a Mr Hare, a British government messenger travelling from England by way of Suez.9 Much more significant however, was the role of his fleet in Haidar Ali’s invasion of the Carnatic. In May 1780, sailing from Mangalore, a number of his vessels brought troops and weapons to Porto Novo where it was planned that they should be used in conjunction with ships of the French navy.10

4 Michaud, Histoire des progrès, 48.5 The safety of Madras was secured in late 1780 by the transportation of 1160 European and native troops from Calcutta by East Indiamen.6 Ships under the command of Admiral Hughes provided considerable support during the siege of Cuddalore. Wilks, History of Mysore II, 189.7 Sen, French in India, 226–72.8 Habib, Confronting Colonialism, 172.9 NA ADM1/165, 6 Feb. 1780: Admiral Hughes to the Board of Admiralty.10 Tamil Nadu State Archives, Country Correspondence of the Madras Government. Muhammad Hyder to Governor Whitehill, vol. 29, fo. 145.


Later that same year, while Haidar Ali’s troops besieged Tellicherry (Thalassery), his warships ensured that the East India Company could bring little in the way of supplies to help the settlement.11 Hughes viewed the situation with alarm and prioritised the protection of a relief convoy that set out from Madras in early November. In admitting the urgency of the situation, he declared that the garrison, through the activities of Haidar Ali’s fleet, had been ‘reduced to great want of every article essential to its longer defence’.12 Having ensured the safe arrival of a number of supply ships, he ordered the 28-gun Coventry to remain in these waters ‘to protect and convoy the trade up the coast against Haidar Ali’s fleet’.13

At sea, Haidar Ali’s ships, especially when sailing in pairs, were relatively secure; his larger frigate-sized warships were equal to the majority of enemy ships that they might come across. The lone Coventry, for instance, was certainly vulnerable to Haidar Ali’s frigates, especially as the crew were, at the very least, equal to those of the Royal Navy. An incident involving Coventry certainly proves this to be correct. While off Mangalore on 29 November 1780, part of Haidar Ali’s fleet was sighted, ‘consisting of two ships, one snow, three ketches and nine galivants’.14 An attempt was made to engage the lead most ship, but she was able to out sail the British vessel, helped by Coventry losing the wind due to a missing stay while tacking. In the meantime, the rest of Haidar Ali’s fleet had closed in on itself, making it easier for the second frigate to protect them. In the subsequent engagement that lasted just over two hours, Coventry not only failed to make an impact but was herself brought under considerable fire. In his log, Andrew Mitchell, the ship’s commander noted,

The boatswain lost his leg in the action. The mainmast wounded [sic] in two places, one shot in the starboard and bow between wind and water [sic], pinnace yard shot through, great part of running rigging etc. shot away, some shot through sails, the eye of the stream anchor broke.15

Undoubtedly the Mysorean navy suffered one considerable weakness and that was the security of its naval bases and roadsteads. Geographically well-placed for the needs of the Mysore state, they were however, difficult to defend against the entry of a determined squadron of enemy warships. In particular, Mangalore, the major naval base, had its fort and batteries so poorly situated that they were unable to provide an adequate defence for vessels anchored in the outer harbour. As for the inner harbour, this was too shallow for larger ships, leaving them vulnerable to easy capture or destruction.16 It was not until the rule of Tipu Sultan that this problem began to be addressed, the son determining on a programme of fixed coastal defence batteries and forts.

The weakness of these ports was something of which the British were aware, using it as the means by which the Mysorean navy could be most effectively neutralised. One of the earliest of such ventures took place in 1766, at the outset of the First Anglo-Mysore War, when a British fleet attacked the anchorage at Onore, and

11 NA ADM1/164, 2 Jan. 1781: Admiral Hughes to Board of Admiralty.12 Ibid.13 Ibid. 14 NA ADM51/213. Captain’s log, HMS Coventry, 29 Nov. 1780.15 Ibid.16 NA ADM106/3123, 30 May 1818.


successfully took two of Haidar Ali’s warships. From there the British sailed on to Mangalore, capturing a further nine vessels, described as being of considerable size. Similarly, it was two highly successful attacks mounted by Hughes in 1780, at the outset of the Second Anglo-Mysore War, which eventually relieved pressure then being mounted upon the East India Squadron by ‘Haidar Ali’s fleet, which infested the coast’.17 The first of these attacks was on 25 November when Exeter, Burford, Eagle and Sartine attacked a number of Haidar Ali’s vessels in Calicut roadstead, cutting out and bringing away a grab that was at anchor and forcing another on shore. In turn, however, Sartine was lost, this a result of having been warped into shoal water to cannonade the enemy’s ships and striking rocks at low water.18 In December, a combined force of Bombay Marine and Royal Navy warships sailed once again into Haidar Ali’s main fleet base at Mangalore. On this occasion, an even larger number of ships were destroyed, including three frigates from 36 to 26 guns, two snows from 20 to 16 guns, four ketches from 20 to 10 guns and six gallivants and galleys from 8 to 4 guns. As for losses received in return, a number of British seamen were killed as they boarded a 12-gun ketch deliberately blown up at the instant of their boarding.19

The loss of a substantial portion of his fleet as a result of the attacks upon both Mangalore and Calicut placed Haidar Ali at a considerable disadvantage. Gaining a land victory at the Battle of Pollilur (20 September 1780), his further progress along the Carnatic littoral was halted by the British held fortress at Chennapatan. With his maritime striking force intact, Haidar Ali could have prevented Chennapatan being supplied by sea. According to the subsequent reflections of Tipu Sultan:

Our government had abundant forces for conducting wars on land, but to prevent reinforcements reaching Chennapatan, ships were needed.20

Following the conclusion of the First Anglo-Mysore War, Haidar Ali set about acquiring the necessary materials for the building of a much more sizeable fleet than the one he had formerly possessed, a point that was subsequently noted in a series of files assembled for a history of India that was to be sponsored by the East India Company:

Hyder Ali endeavoured by every means in his power to collect as large a supply as possible of naval and military stores from the European and country shipping for the receipt of which the port of Mangalore was very conveniently situated, from whence . . . stores [for naval purposes] were sent with great facility by water to the different stations on the coast where vessels could be constructed as he was desirous of a great naval force.21

While copper bolts, sheathing and ironwork were the most likely stores imported, other materials, especially timber, were easily acquired locally. In particular, the trees of the Malabar coastal forests were highly suited to shipbuilding, a fact confirmed by

17 Ibid.18 NA ADM51/144. Captain’s log, HMS Burford, 24 Nov. 1780.19 Ibid.20 Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Ms 1677, fo. 22b. Re-quoted from Habib, State and Diplomacy under Tipu, 45.21 British Library, India Office Records, H456c, f.183.


the British in 1804, when it was reported that trees being felled in that region were ‘of very considerable size and applicable to all parts of a 74-gun ship with the exception of that required for futtocks and floor timbers’.22 Indeed, the value of the forests in Mysore’s maritime construction programme should not be under-estimated; the timber produced was universally recognised as of outstanding quality. According to Richard Smith, an employee of the Bombay Marine, it greatly enhanced the quality of vessels constructed:

It is invariably allowed by professional men, conversant in the nature of ships constructed in Europe and Asia, that those of the latter, from the species of wood, and manner of forming them, are more durable and less affected by the violent heat and damps of the climate.23

Sir Robert Seppings, formerly the Surveyor of the Navy, and therefore the senior technical member of the Navy Board, even went so far as to declare Malabar teak to be the most superior of all,

I beg to state that economy and efficiency, point out to the use of Malabar teak, in the construction of all vessels having to endure the heat of a tropical climate. So important (in my opinion) is the use of Malabar teak that I addressed the late Commander-in-Chief, Sir E. Owen, suggesting its more general introduction in the construction of ships for His Majesty’s Navy, particularly in such men-of-war destined for hot climes.24

Over the next few years, and through the amassing of essential materials and shipbuilding expertise, Haidar Ali was able to oversee construction of a number of frigates, these variously armed with 32, 28, 26 and 24 guns together with a number of 12-gun ketches. Of work being undertaken at Onore in 1775, we have the following description provided by an English visitor:

Here are two frigates building near the castle; one of thirty-two guns and the other of twenty-four guns. Being desirous to examine their construction, I went on board with two other English gentlemen near to them, without offering to go on board, lest it should give offence. The Governor, being there, overlooking the men at work, observed us walking away, very civilly invited us to go on board and examine them, adding that it would give him great pleasure if he would candidly give our opinions on them. We went on board both of them, and were surprised to find the work so well performed, particularly as they are the first ships of great burthen that have been built in Hyder Ally’s country. When finished they will be two complete frigates, being very strong and of a fine mould; they have a prow and are what they call ‘grabs’ and one of them is larger than the Bombay ‘grab’.25

Unfortunately, sparse though it is, this is one of the few descriptions given of either Haidar Ali’s vessels or shipyards. Of significance is that the visitor employs the word

22 NA ADM106/3123, 26 July 1804.23 John Rylands University Library, Manchester, Pitt MS 929, item 48, 18 April 1782.24 Sir Robert Seppings to the Marine Board of Bombay, June 1837. Re-quoted from J. Phipps (ed.), A Collection of Papers Relative to Shipbuilding in India (Calcutta, 1840), 21.25 Low, History of Indian Navy, vol. 1, 182.


frigate, suggesting the vessel to be of a size comparable to that of a British fifth or sixth rate. The subsequent use of the term grab is of additional value, demonstrating the vessel to be of a more traditional design and one associated with those nations bordering on the Indian Ocean. In fact, grab is an anglicised version of the Arab word ghurāb (plural, ghurban) and refers to a large highly manoeuvrable warship frequently used by corsairs.26 Reinforcing this vessel as a ghurāb is the writer’s emphasis of the vessel’s prow, such vessels having low and sharply projecting prows similar to those of a Mediterranean galley. Another feature of the ghurāb, and distinct from a frigate, was that of the use of triangular and lateen sails. 27 In recognition of their sailing qualities, the East India Company also employed ghurban, one of which was in service in 1754 and carried 18 guns.28

In February 1775 the British 24-gun frigate Seahorse, under the command of Captain George Farmer and in convoy with the East Indiaman Dodley, engaged two of Haidar Ali’s armed cruisers. According to Seahorse’s log, the incident came about through error, with Farmer apparently mistaking the vessels as belonging to the Maharattas with whom the British were then at war:

At 7 [a.m.] saw two sail standing toward us, which we imagined to be Bombay cruisers, at ½ past 7 they hauled their wind to the southward and stood after the Dodley, and hoisted Haidar Ali’s colours, we immediately tacked and stood after them, at 8 fired several shot to bring one of them too, thinking them to be a Maharatta. At 9 one of the ketches sent her boat on board us, and told us they belonged to Haider Haidar Ali, but as the ketch did not bring too or shorten sail, and several other vessels heaving in sight, which we imagined to be consorts, we kept firing round and grape shot at her until noon.29

That Farmer should clearly describe the two vessels considered as hostile to be cruisers, even mistaking them for those of the East India Company, is clearly indicative of these vessels being similar in design to those of European vessels, having gun decks and possibly fore and aft sails.30 Unfortunately, no further details are given nor is there a hint of their names, tonnage or complement. Of additional interest however, was that on board Seahorse, serving as a midshipman, was the future Admiral Lord Nelson.31

The French historian, Joseph Michaud (1767–1839), confirms that Haidar Ali was building his navy with a clear military intent. Referring to the dockyard at Mangalore, Michaud confirms it as Haidar Ali’s premier yard, and:

a navy had begun to be built there, intended to free the Indian ocean one day

26 D. A. Agius, In the Wake of the Dhow (Reading, 2002), 61–3.27 Ibid.28 H. Yule and A. Burnell, Hobson-Jobson: A glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words (1886 republished, Sittingbourne, 1994), 392.29 NA ADM51/883, 19–20 Feb. 1775.30 Farmer, however, makes several errors, first mistaking the vessels for East Indiamen and sub-sequently vessels of the Maratha navy. For this reason, little confidence can be given to his ability to distinguish vessels, with the likelihood of the vessel being lateen rather than fore and aft rigged.31 An account of this action appears in several biographies of Nelson, with particular detail in J. Sugden, Nelson: A dream of glory, 1758–97 (New York, 2004), 95–6.


from the European pirates.32

To this, and referring to the year 1780 when the British captured Mangalore, he adds:

Three ships of the line with fifty or sixty cannon had been completed; many others of varying sizes were in process of construction; and the English found considerable materials to equip a fleet with.33

On the part of the British, Richard Smith, an employee of the Bombay Marine, was particularly concerned with developments taking place in Mysore. He noted that, under Haidar Ali, warships had been developed that were clearly superior to those of the Bombay Marine, the Mysore state having ‘increased the size of their vessels, even to fourth rates’.34 Writing in 1782, Smith accepted that some of these Mysorean vessels had been destroyed and captured. However, he had little doubt that Mysore, under Tipu Sultan, would rebuild its fleet and:

will doubtless be encouraged by our neighbours, the French, who already have able artificers in shipbuilding, interspersed with the country powers.35

According to Smith, the Bombay Marine, the force that would be immediately exposed to the Mysore navy during the opening period of any hostilities, had an insufficient number of ships of the necessary strength to meet this future threat:

The Company Marine is at this time comprised of frigates, and smaller vessels, the latter originally designed for the purpose of defence and attack against those of the country powers, to which they are at times exposed, both being of easy draught of water, and light built, for the readier communication with the several small ports on the coast.36

Tipu Sultan, who succeeded his father in 1782, initially made no attempt to replace those ships lost during the 2nd Anglo-Mysore War, using only the existing ships for a range of different purposes during the period from 1784 until the opening of a third round of hostilities in 1789. In March 1786, four of these surviving ships were deployed on a mission to Basra with the object of seeking support from the Ottoman Empire in a future war with the British. However, due to British influence within the Turkish court, no interest was shown in undertaking such a venture, although the Porte did give full recognition to Tipu Sultan as the ruler of Mysore. The vessels used for this mission were all state-owned and of some considerable size. Between them they carried over 600 seamen, soldiers, diplomats and servants together with large amounts of merchandise and presents. Among the latter were four elephants, these distributed equally between two of the vessels. Although arriving at Basra without undue difficulty, the fleet subsequently suffered a number of disasters, with one destroyed by fire and two lost in rough seas during the return voyage of 1790.37

32 Michaud, Histoire des progrès, 58.33 Ibid, 58.34 John Rylands University Library, Manchester, Pitt Ms 929, item 48, 18 Apr. 1782.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 No information is available as to the possible tonnage of these vessels, with their carrying capacity used as an indication of size. The four vessels were Fakhrul Marakib (354 seamen and


Despite a probable shortage of vessels, both as a result of the diplomatic mission and their subsequent losses, the state of Mysore still had a sufficiency of naval warships to conduct a highly successful economic war against the British. This was in the period between the Second and Third Anglo-Mysore Wars and had, as its objective, the denial to British traders’ access to the highly lucrative pepper trade that was centred upon the Malabar coastline. In a letter of February 1788 to the faujdar of Calicut, Tipu Sultan briefly explained his policy:

How long will the above named [the English] remain? He will, in the end, despair of making either sales or purchases, and depart from thence.38

One private merchant, George Smith, following a failed speculative voyage from Calcutta to the Malabar Coast, in a letter to Henry Dundas at the Board of Control in London, likened the situation to a virtual war:

By the Embargo on the Productions of his Countrys, and the prohibition of Intercourse between it, & Tellicherry, the Co. cannot load their ships from hence for Europe, nor can any public or private supplies be thrown from his Countrys as before, into China, which proves in effect as injurious to the Commercial Interests of the Co. as actually at war with him.39

As part of this blockade, Tipu Sultan’s ships lay off the English factory at Tellicherry, depriving the inhabitants of rice and other foods.40 So successful was the blockade that the company authorities in Calcutta were seriously considering the abandonment of not only Tellicherry but also the Bombay presidency.41 However, for the East India Company, a satisfactory resolution to the matter was eventually brought about through war. In December 1789, Tipu Sultan’s forces entered Travancore (now Thiruvananthapuram), the Company bound to this territory by treaty and so choosing to use it as an excuse for a further war with the state of Mysore.42

Ships available to Tipu Sultan appear to be limited by the time of this, the Third Anglo-Mysore War (1789–90). At the outset, the British once again established a blockade of the Mangalore coastline, with a direct attack also undertaken upon the Onore building yard on 13 October 1791. On that occasion, the 38-gun Minerva, commanded by John Sutton and the 32-gun Thames, commanded by Thomas Troubridge, took possession of Fortified Island, which lay in the entrance to the harbour. This was a valuable move as the island contained storehouses for timber,

numeries), Nabi Bakhsh (145), Fat’h Shahi Mu’izzi (139) and Surati (a galiot). It is known that the Fakhrul Marakib returned, but the one destroyed by fire and the two wrecked is unclear. Marakib is the general term for a deepwater ship. See Habib, State and Diplomacy under Tipu, 19–65 for further details of the diplomatic mission. 38 Re-quoted from Habib, State and Diplomacy, 114.39 Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, 4040 Habib, State and Diplomacy, 115. As supporting evidence, Habib cites the following manu-scripts: Bombay to Tellicherry, 6 May 1789, Secret and Political Department Diary, Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay, mo. 39, pp. 216–17. Malet, Resident at Poona, 25 Jul. 1789, ibid. p. 368; and Malet, Resident at Poona, 17 Aug. 1789, p. 378. 41 Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, 38-4042 Ibid, 45–59.


cordage and other items necessary for shipbuilding.43 It also indicated that while Tipu Sultan had begun a programme of defending harbours, including his premier naval base at Mangalore, this work was either lacking or inadequate at Onore.

It was the past and present effectiveness of this British coastal blockade that seemingly reinvigorated Tipu Sultan in a decision to considerably expand the existing fleet, establishing new dockyards at Wajidabad (near Merjan) and Majidabad (now Sadashivgad) with a new harbour at Bhatkal. Furthermore, in choosing to do so, he was much more organised than the approach taken by his father, creating an infrastructure that was considerably more sophisticated than that previously witnessed in Mysore. Helping him in this objective were the many hidden bays along the Malabar Coast together with extensive inland forests that could provide timber. In Tipu Sultan’s own words:

By God’s grace this Government has large resources for building ships and there are many safe havens for ships under this Government.44

First mention of what was clearly a very ambitious shipbuilding programme came in the form of an ordnance, or hukmnamah, dated 25 March 1793 (14 Ahmadi in the Muslim year 1221), which indicated ambitious plans for the construction of 100 warships. Immediately however, ten ships were to be built, these to be of the Khizi and Ilaysi classes. Unfortunately, no distinction is made between these two differing classes of vessel. The hukmnamah further added:

Necessary material like wood, iron, ropes &tc, required for the construction of these vessels Khizi and Ilaysi is to be purchased and the ships made ready. If for purchase of war equipment, money is not found sufficient, a report should be made to the court and the required amount obtained. Labourers of all kinds should be paid their wages and the ships built.45

This ambitious construction programme was more formerly set out in a hukmnamah of 1796 when it was determined that work should begin on a further forty vessels. Of these, 20 were to be of 62-guns and upwards while the remainder were classified as frigates.46 To oversee the construction and subsequent service of these ships, Tipu Sultan established a Mysorean Board of Admiralty, its constitution laid down by a hukmnamah that gave the Board a membership of eleven lords of the Admiralty, titled mirs yam. While seven of the Board members were to be permanently located in the state capital of Srirangapatnam, the other four were appointed to the dockyards.47 Its resemblance to the British system for the governance

43 NA ADM1/167, 22 October 1791; NA ADM 51/983, 13 October, 1791.44 Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Ms 1677, f16b. Re-quoted from Habib, State and Diplomacy, 41.45 An original Persian language manuscript copy of this hukmnamah is to be found in the India Office Library under the title, The Hukmnamah-I-Tipu. I have used the translation by Iftik A. Khan. See I. A. Khan, ‘The Regulations of Tipu for his State Trade Enterprises’ in Habib, Confronting Colonialism, 148-60. 46 The vessels to be built were 20 ships of between 80 to 85 guns and 20 masted grabs of 25 to 30 guns. As for the construction of these vessels, this work was more or less to be equally divided between the yards of Jumalabad, Wajidabad and Majidabad. See W. Kirkpatrick Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan (London, 1811), Appendix K.47 William Kirkpatrick translated the hukmnamah in his Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, appendix


of naval yards was surely no coincidence and presumably reflects the influence of European advisors.

The hukmnamah that established the Board of Admiralty also laid down the procedures that would be followed in the construction and subsequent manning of the forty ships that were to be built. Timber, for instance, was to be provided from the extensive teak forests owned by the state. After being allowed to season for two years, it was to be brought down river to the dockyards where it was required. As for the design of these ships, they were to closely follow a model held in the boardroom.48 This would indicate that the planned fleet was to have a high degree of unity. Reinforcing the similarity of these vessels, all were to be adorned with a tiger figurehead and given names that ended Bakhsh, meaning ‘gift of’. In this respect, one vessel, to be named Bakhsh Sultan, would be recognised as the gift of Sultan (or Tipu Sultan).49 The use of a model indicates that building methods employed owed much to those of the traditional Indian shipbuilder. In the European naval yards, by this time, reliance was placed on drawn plans that were sent to each yard involved in the construction of any new vessel.50

Another area tackled by the hukmnamah was that of the fatal weakness of the existing harbour defences against enemy attack. In all three wars that had so far been fought with Britain, the ships belonging to the Mysorean navy had suffered heavily from a series of direct attacks upon vessels either anchored in road steads or within a supposedly safe harbour. While there is little evidence of Haidar Ali having given attention to the need for forts to provide protection of harbours, Tipu Sultan had given thought to the matter from the very beginning of his reign. Following the end of the 2nd Anglo-Mysore War, he immediately set about establishing a new coastal defence structure at Managalore that became known as the Sultan battery. As for the hukmnamah of 1796, this provides instructions for an existing fort to be renovated at Bhatkal, an additional harbour then being used by Tipu Sultan’s warships, with this work rapidly completed.

Napoleon Bonaparte’s capture of Egypt in 1799 was seen by the British as a clear threat to India, with Tipu Sultan seen as a likely supporter in any actions taken to invade the sub-continent. One who was particularly concerned, and possibly alerted to the potential danger that Tipu Sultan presented through his experiences on Seahorse as a midshipman, was Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson.51 While scouring the Mediterranean for the French fleet that subsequently landed Bonaparte at Alexandria, he frequently declared, both to the home government and to the English consul at Alexandria, his belief that:

If they pass Sicily, I shall believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria and getting to India – a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by no

L, pp. xxviii ff.48 Ibid. According to Kirkpatrick, this model was either of timber or ivory. 49 The tiger figurehead represented Tipu’s own motif50 B. Lavery, Building the Wooden Walls (London, 1991), 29. Lavery indicates that in England the practice of building naval warships ships from plan drawn on paper dates from at least the 18th century.51 The naval historian, Oliver Warner appears to have indicated that such might have been the case. See D. Forrest Tiger of Mysore: The Life and Death of Tipu (London, 1970), 263n.


means so difficult as might at first be imagined.52

The appointment in October 1797 of Richard Wellesley, the Earl of Mornington, as Governor-General in India, was to bring matters to a head. In particular, he had been instructed by Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Control for India, to keep a watchful eye over the increasing influence of the French upon a number of native states, including that of Mysore.53 Arriving in Calcutta in May 1798, Mornington was soon aware of a proclamation issued by Anne Joseph Maurés, Comte de Malartic, Governor of Mauritius that announced an alliance had been struck between the French and Tipu Sultan. According to Mornington, in a letter to Dundas:

The first appearance of this proclamation at Calcutta was in a newspaper of the 8th June, and the apparent imprudence and rashness of divulging to the world the matter which the proclamation contains induced me to doubt its authenticity, until within a few days of the date of my last dispatch to you, when I received authentic copies of the proclamation from Lord Macartney and from Sir Hugh Christian at the Cape.54

The Sir Hugh Christian referred to by Mornington, was Rear-Admiral Christian (1747–98), the flag officer in command of the Cape of Good Hope. In a separate letter to Macartney, Mornington also speculated on why the proclamation had been issued:

Tippoo, I think, could never have taken so open a measure without previous instructions from the French directory. I conclude that some force from the Mediterranean will co-operate with him, from which case I take it for granted that Ceylon will be the object and that they will rendezvous at Rio de la Plata.55

Some six weeks after he had learnt of the French proclamation, Mornington had received even more disturbing news, that of the French expedition having sailed from Toulon. To this extent, Sir Hugh Christian was being proved correct, other than that the ships of this expedition, carrying 30,000 troops under the command of General Bonaparte, was heading east. Dundas, for one, had no doubt as to its objective. To Mornington he wrote:

By the latest intelligence, transmitted to me by Lord Greville [Foreign Secretary], it would appear that Egypt and India are the ultimate objects of this great preparation.56

52 Nelson, Despatches and Letters, vol. 3, (London, 1845), 3153 Private Letters 1 and 2. The Earl of Mornington to the Rt Hon. Henry Dundas, 23 and 28 Feb. 1798. Reproduced in E. Ingram, Two Views of British India: The private correspondence of Mr Dundas and Lord Wellesley, 1798–1801 (London, 1969), 16–43. See also W. Dalrymple, White Mughals (London, 2002), 58. The Board of Control had been established in 1784 to supervise the political activities of the East India Company. However, time taken for orders issued in London to arrive in India, meant that the Governor-General in Bengal still retained a remarkable degree of independence. See H. Philips, The East India Company, 1784–1834 (London, 1968).54 Private Letters 6. The Earl of Mornington to the Rt Hon. Henry Dundas, 6 Jul. 1798. Reproduced in Ingram, Two Views of British India, 53.55 British Library, BL MS 37,278, 29 Mar. 179856 Private Letters 6. Rt Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington, 16 Jun. 1798. Reproduced Ingram, Two Views of British India, 47.


Two days later, in a letter to Macarthy at the Cape, Mornington added a refinement to his earlier letter to Dundas,

A variety of occurrences, both here and in India, have lately afforded me strong grounds to suspect that Tippoo saib and some other native princes were meditating an attack upon the British possessions of India and they have received promises of support and cooperation from France in whatever measures they might undertake.57

The initial piece of intelligence that Mornington had received of a treaty having been struck between the French and Tipu Sultan was substantially correct. In sending envoys to Mauritius, Malartic had agreed to the provision of military and technical assistance, albeit very limited basis. Instead of a battalion of fighting troops, only 99 personnel were embarked on the French frigate Preneuse that arrived at Mangalore towards the end of April. Among them were a number of naval officers who were to serve as advisors together with shipwrights, a result of a particular request on the part of Tipu Sultan.58

The greater threat however was from Bonaparte following his landing in Egypt. Having secured control of the country, the French general made a point of visiting Suez, an obvious point of disembarkation for any attempt on India. However, as for Bonaparte’s actual intentions, these were never fully clarified. It is known that the Directory drafted instructions to Governor Malartic for all available shipping to rendezvous with Bonaparte at Suez, but these instructions were never received.59 At the same time, Bonaparte secured a number of native craft and gave instructions for the assembly of several new vessels from timbers that were seasoning at Suez.

Irrespective of the size and capability of Tipu Sultan’s navy, and the lack of absolute evidence that Bonaparte planned a landing in India, the British had little option but to take immediate and positive action. Vice-Admiral Rainier, flag officer in command of the East Indies (1793–1805), received news of a possible collusion between Tipu Sultan and the French in August 1798, it being communicated to him by way of a despatch from the Admiralty in London:

Influenced by the consideration of the several circumstances so ably detailed in your Lordship’s letter of the 31st ultimo respecting the apprehensions that may be reasonably entertained of the inimical designs of Tippoo Sultan, and the co-operation that may be afforded him on the part of the French, affecting the safety of British possessions in India.60

At that time Rainier was on board his flagship Suffolk then lying in the Madras

57 BL MS 37,278, 18 June 1798.58 The 99 despatched to Mangalore was made up as follows:

Chapuy, General of the land forces 1 Ship Builders and others 4Dubue, General of the Marine 1 Officers, Captains, Sergeants, Linguist 26Desmoulins, Commandant of the Europeans 1 European soldiers 36Officers of the Artillery 2 Soldiers of the second class (natives) 22Marine officers 6

BL IOR H/572, 18 Jun. 1798. See also Forrest, Tiger of Mysore, 254. f.59 Sen, French in India, 55860 NA ADM1/169, 31 August 1798. Re-quoted from Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, 147.


roadstead awaiting the homeward-bound Indiamen from China. Unable to leave these unprotected, but aware of the need to blockade the Malabar Coast, he had to split his resources, leaving only Victorious to protect the returning Indiamen. For the purpose of protecting the west coast of India, he could spare only Suffolk and Trident.

In London, the news of Bonaparte’s expedition having sailed from Toulon rapidly crystallized into a belief that his final objective was India. Among those who now held this belief was Henry Dundas. On 16 June 1798 he wrote to Mornington of his conviction:

The destination of this expedition has been matter of various conjecture. It was sometime supposed to be destined against Naples or Portugal, or, under cover of the latter, to lay the foundation for revolutionizing the Spanish monarchy. By the latest intelligence it would appear that Egypt and India are the ultimate object of this great preparation.61

Of more consequence was Dundas’s instruction of 13 June to the Admiralty to send a squadron direct from England to the Red Sea, this being considered Bonaparte’s most likely route to India. Given that the French fleet, at that stage, was still in the Mediterranean and two week’s sailing time from Egypt, then Dundas was certainly showing an incredible amount of foresight. As for Rainier, the man on the spot, and in possession of that same information (though admittedly not until September) he did not take a decision to investigate the area around Suez until much later. In fact, it was not until 5 November that Rainier issued instructions for two of his warships, Centurion and Albatross, to enter the Red Sea. To Captain John Sprat, he sent specific instructions,

You are to make the best of your way to the Red Sea and, on your arrival at Mocha, endeavour to find out and consult with Captain Willson aide de camp to the Governor of Bombay, as to the most expeditious and effectual manner of stopping the enemy’s progress at the head of the gulf, particularly in attempting to procure vessels for transports to convey any armament to attack the British settlements in India. And you are also to consult the Governor of Bombay on this subject previous to your sailing, particularly whether it may not be proper to call at Muscat for intelligence. You are also to require him to furnish you with pilots, and a linguist for the language spoken in the Red Sea, together with orders to the company’s broker to furnish you with such supplies of water, and fresh provisions as you may demand for the service of the crew, with cash to defray pilotages, and other contingent expenses.62

It was also in November that other ships became available to Rainier, allowing him to increase the size of the blockading squadron off the Malabar Coast. Among these ships was Victorious, now freed from protecting a returning convoy while the East India Company’s Belvedere was also available. To Lieutenant William Goate of Victorious, Rainier issued the following instructions:

61 Private Letters 6. The Rt Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington, 16 Jun. 1798. Reproduced in Ingram, Two Views of British India, 47.62 NA ADM1/169, 5 Nov. 1798.


You are hereby required and directed in His Majesty’s ship the Victorious under your command, to cruise off Mangalore, occasionally stretching to the northwards within the limits of Tippoo Sultan’s dominions which extend to Onoar, till further orders; to prevent any intercourse between the enemy and Sultan, and to oppose the landing of any French troops, as also the collecting of any number of vessels for the transporting of troops, and to take all French subjects out of any country vessels.63

Meanwhile, attention to Tipu Sultan was intensifying, with Rainier writing on 9 December 1798 that:

I have ordered the Senior Captain of His Majesty’s Ships on the Malabar Coast cruising off Mangalore, to treat Sultan Tippoo as His Majesty’s Enemy, whenever he shall be informed by proper authority, in my absence, that the Supreme Government of India has commenced hostilities against the Prince.64

Rainier, however, still lacked ships to effectively enforce the blockade and felt constrained to request the East India Company for more support:

At the same time as it happened that great part of the squadron under my command were absent on distant service, I suggested to His Excellency the Governor General the expediency of arming some of the East India Company’s large ships which were those adverted to in my letter of the 18th inst as named in the margin, and are now assisting in cruising with me on Tippoo Sultan’s coast. The Belvedere having sprung a leak I shall be obliged to dismiss her and the other two as the absent ships join, and their services can be dispensed with.65

In part, this had been made necessary through the age and unreliability of his own ships, many of them in desperate need of docking.

In tandem with the establishment of the naval blockade, the military under the orders of the Governor General had been deployed to the borders of Mysore. The object, assuming diplomatic efforts failed, was to invade Mysore on two separate but co-ordinated thrusts from both Madras and Malabar. Central to this plan had been the East India Company’s maritime arm, a number of transports utilized for the movement of troops from Calcutta.66 However, prior to any declaration of war, efforts at diplomacy were attempted, with Tipu Sultan encouraged to adopt a policy of friendship towards Britain. Rainier, of course, was fully aware of how matters were proceeding, informing the Board of Admiralty the strategy being pursued and of its likely outcome:

The conclusions of the negotiations with Tippoo Sultan which are to be determined on the great question of peace or war is daily and hourly expected. In the event of the latter taking place, the armies on both sides of the peninsula are

63 NA ADM1/169, 18 Nov. 1798. Admiral Peter Rainier to Lt William Goate, Acting Captain of Victorious. NA ADM1/169, 18 Nov. 1798.64 NA ADM1/169, 9 Dec.1798.65 NA ADM1/169, 29 Jan. 1799. Admiral Rainier to the Board of Admiralty.66 Among troops transported to Madras from Calcutta was the King’s 33rd under the command of Colonel Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington). The Indiaman in which he and about half his regiment sailed was the Fitzwilliam. See J. Weller, Wellington in India (London, 2000), 28–9.


ready to take the field in such force, from intelligence received, the Sultan is little able to cope with, without the Assistance of the French, its junction it will be my duty to [bring about]; and of which at present there is no great apprehension entertained.Tipu Sultan, however, failed to respond to Mornington’s overtures with the

Governor General making a declaration of war on 23 February. Shortly after, during the week of March, the strategy of invading Mysore on two separate fronts was initiated. Despite efforts on the part of Tipu Sultan to slow the advance, his capital of Srirangapatnam was under siege by April and was taken on 14 April, with Tipu Sultan himself among those killed in its defence.

An insight into the progress that Tipu Sultan had made into the rebuilding of the fleet since the issuing of the hukmnamah of 1796 is possible at this point, with his fleet having now fallen into the hands of the British. Irrespective of how many ships were in service prior to the issuing of the hukmnamah, it would appear that only limited progress had been made on the grandiose scheme. According to India Office records, the number of warships was no more than ten (of which only one was described as new), all of these roughly equivalent in size to a Royal Navy sloop or small frigate. Possibly these were of the Khizi or Illaysi class with there being no evidence of Tipu Sultan having embarked on the construction of the forty larger ships mentioned in the hukmnamah. In addition, the list of captured vessels also included two grabs and seven gallivants.67 The lack of any ships of size would also suggest that such vessels as constructed by Haidar Ali were no longer in service, having been either lost in battle or during the diplomatic mission to Basra.

The state of Mysore had now been successfully dismantled; this to ensure it would never again threaten the British presence in India. Those related to Tipu Sultan, and able to claim leadership through right of succession, were removed and placed under protective custody. Upon this being accomplished, a new ruler was introduced, a five-year-old boy who was descended from the rajas that Haidar Ali had once displaced.

Most important was that of the reduction in the size of territory that once formed Mysore, it now becoming entirely landlocked through the loss of its Malabar littoral. No longer would it be possible for the state of Mysore to continue developing an independent navy and possibly meet with the British on equal terms at some point in the future.68 This was of crucial importance in securing India for the British, ensuring that there was no continued internal threat that, through the use of warships, could prevent both the introduction of reinforcement from Europe and the successful deployment of troops from one coastal point to another. Finally, of course, through its acquisition of Malabar, the British government gained possession of the extensive forests with the highly valued shipbuilding timber that they contained.

67 India Office, Home Miscellaneous series, vol. 457, fos 240–3. Requoted from Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, 355–668 The French, still technically poised for invasion, were effectively neutralised through both the capture of Mysore and the presence of the Royal Navy in the Red Sea. Only in 1801 can it be said that this threat was entirely removed, a British landing in Egypt successful in bringing about the expulsion of the French from Egypt. However, one additional move was also made. As a result of correspondence between Bonaparte and Tipu, captured in Srirangapatnam, it was felt advisable to strengthen the Portuguese garrison of Goa through the addition of British troops, it being feared that this offered a further entry point for the French. See Weller, Wellington in India, 90.

british seapower and the mysore wars

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