1

“Bringing fighters together” A comparative study of peacebuilding and transitional justice in Angola

and Mozambique

Cláudia Almeida1, Edalina Sanches2 and Filipa Raimundo3

Introduction: Conciliating peacebuilding and transitional justice

Transitional justice (TJ) is an aggregate concept applied to numerous situations that essentially have in common the transitional character – either from dictatorship to democracy or from various conflict situations to peace. While lawyers, NGOs and other international actors see it as the bulk of measures to achieve justice and reparation following human rights abuses, political scientists see it (or should see it) as the intersection between actors, demands and interests which, more often than not, regard these processes as part of crafting of a new polity and making a stand towards the past.

In the particular aftermath of a civil war leading to democratization, TJ will never be seen as a story of “the good against the evil”. Practitioners and scholars soon understood the intricate connection between TJ and peacebuilding, namely DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration). As João Porto, Alden and Parsons accurately point out, “in war-to-peace transitions, there is often no clear victor on the battlefield and, as a consequence, DDR programs tend to be reached through negotiated compromise as part of peace agreements – involving incumbent governments and non-state armed groups, as well as third parties acting as mediators” (Porto et al., 2007). It should not be surprising, therefore, to see post-conflict societies opt for amnesties or even (inconsequent) truth commissions, instead of engaging in punitive forms of TJ.

In such situations, the priority becomes the stabilization of the country and the transformation of fighters into citizens. In his most recent How enemies become friends (2010), Charles Kupchan argues that “it is not simply the absence of conflict that makes a zone of stable peace a unique and intriguing phenomenon. Rather, it is the emergence of a deeper and more durable peace, one in which the absence of war stems not from deterrence, neutrality, or apathy, but from a level of interstate commitment that 1 Cláudia Almeida is a PhD candidate at Complutense University of Madrid and a research assistant at the Institute of Social Sciences - University of Lisbon. Her project focuses on post-war elections and war-to-democracy transitions. Her main interests are post-war elections, democratization, peacebuilding and Africa. Contact: claudia.almeida@ics.ul.pt 2 Edalina Rodrigues Sanches is currently a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Lisbon and has collaborated in research projects such as the Portuguese Voting Behaviour and the IntUne, both conducted at the Institute of Social Science (University of Lisbon). Her main research areas are political institutions and political parties in the third wave African democracies. Contact: ersanches@ics.ul.pt 3 Filipa Raimundo is a PhD candidate at the European University Institute (Florence, Italy), at the Department of Social and Political Sciences. She is developing a comparative project on transitional justice in third wave European democracies. Between February and April 2010 she will be a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. Her main interests are democratizations, transitional justice, legacies of the past. Contact: filipa.raimundo@eui.eu

2

effectively eliminates the prospect of armed conflict”. (Kupchan, 2010: 2). He further suggests that stable peace breaks out through a four-phase process, which includes: reconciliation through unilateral accommodation, concessions through reciprocal restraint, transactions through societal integration, and new domestic discourses through new narratives and identities (idem, 2008: 6-7).

If this sketching of how we can bring fighters together is correct, it provides a hypothesis to why, even when using roughly the same tools (DDR programmes, amnesties, etc.) some peace-building processes are more successful than others. We tend to believe that reintegration may be difficult without any sort of coping with the past. In the African context, which we explore in this paper, these processes could be further understood with an emphasis on the cultural dimension (Vaughan, 2005; Huyse and Salter, 2008). As the paper will show, traditional leaders have stepped in as substitutes for official strategies of confronting the past.

This paper focuses on how TJ tools and peacebuilding processes intersected in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, two former Portuguese colonies that submerged in brutal civil wars following the controversial decolonization processes. Our goal is to put forward some tentative explanations on the relevance of DDR programmes in combination with other tools for peace and democracy in these countries. Some theoretical correlations have been suggested to us by this relatively new literature, namely that: amnesty is more likely when the former regime maintains some level of power; the nature of the post-conflict transition (pact or rupture) is an important explanation for the presence or absence of punishment measures; the level of power sharing, the degree of human rights violation, the role of international organization and the “neighbourhood effect” may all influence the choice for the right justice mechanism to adopt (amnesty, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, International Courts) (Roper and Barria, 2009; Hayner, 2005).

The paper will begin with a brief introduction to the broader context of African conflicts in the twentieth-century, followed by a summary description of the origins, actors and consequences of the civil war in Angola and Mozambique. It will then focus on the various peace accords, their facilitating conditions, and the related processes of TJ and DDR. Particular attention is given to the nature of the actors.

Introducing the African Context

From 1946 to 2006, the Sub-Saharan region was affected by 88 major armed conflicts, including liberation wars, and other violent internal crises (Marshall, 2006). The magnitude of these conflicts increased rapidly during the first decolonization period (mid-1950s through the mid-1970s) and throughout the 1980s, but entered a downgrading trend (fifty percent occurrence) in the following decade (Marshall, 2006: 2, 41-43). In fact, since the 1990s, 41 major conflicts were still ongoing in this region, 18 United Nations peacekeeping missions – integrating DDR programmes4 – were conducted and 15 countries adopted Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as a justice mechanism in order to deal with the past (Roper and Barria, 2009: 386) while several others adopted International Trial Courts and amnesties.

According to Louise Mallinder (2008), Sub-Saharan Africa is the region that has introduced the greatest number of amnesty laws since the Second World War and where some of the most innovative approaches have been pursued. Most of the amnesty laws identified for this region were enacted after 1980 and were related to conflict resolution. 4 For more details see Overview: DDR processes in Africa; available at http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/overview.pdf

3

Still, Mallinder’s database reveals that the second region to pass more amnesty laws is Europe and Central Asia, where the language of Human Rights is much more culturally relevant (2008: 21). This suggests that commitment to liberal and democratic principles is not necessarily the key to understanding different approaches to the past. Comparative analysis in this context evidences mixed results in terms of DDR and different methods for dealing with the past. According to Graybill (2004), South Africa, Rwanda and Mozambique exemplify three types post-conflict resolution: in the first case pardon (TRC and the ubuntu – a Christian legitimating source for pardon over punishment), in the second punishment (International Criminal Court and the Gacaca traditional courts) and finally in the third amnesia (amnesty laws and traditional systems of justice)5. Outcomes of DDR and TJ in the African context suggest that these are context-specific processes and that in fact there is no exact formula for their ‘success’ or ‘failure’. In this sense, we consider that bargaining between different actors, the level of power-sharing and, to some extent, the way actors perceive their chances for increasing their basis of power gain, possess analytical relevance when we want to access these processes (Roper and Barria, 2009). Case selection

In this paper, we compare Angola and Mozambique. These countries have been selected based on empirical and theoretical evidences. Firstly, Angola and Mozambique share some historical features in the sense that they are two former Portuguese colonies that gained independence through armed struggle and in which the postcolonial state was governed by a party compromised with leftist ideologies. Secondly, they have experienced a civil war influenced by neighbouring states (Southern African Countries), as well as by the bipolar Cold War scenario. Thirdly, by the end of the 1980s, in both countries, the main antagonists negotiated peace accords that called for the intervention of the United Nations (UN).

However, if Mozambique was able to make a transition to a new peaceful and democratic regime following the first Peace Accords, in Angola it was only after the third attempt, in 2002, that the conflict was sealed and peacekeeping and democratic crafting started to be accomplished. This change was made possible due to the death of the leader of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), Jonas Savimbi that same year, but also thanks to the enlargement of the UN mandate. Finally, when we come to consider the TJ strategies, both Angola and Mozambique opted for amnesty instead of competing Truth and Reconciliation Commission and International Courts. In this context traditional leader’s systems of justice assumed a prominent role in performing cleansing and healing rituals that partially allowed victims and perpetrators to deal with the violent recent past.

For this purpose, the period under analysis is different for the two cases. As the civil war ceased in Angola only after two failed attempts, we will analyse the DDR and TJ procedures from 1991 to 2002, during the Bicesse Accords (1991), the Lusaka Protocol (1994) and finally ending in Luena Memoradum of Understanding (2002). In the case of Mozambique, the period under analysis ranges from the signature of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992 until the holding of the first multiparty elections in 1994.

5 This idea has been contested. Amnesty does not necessarily mean amnesia, as we will discuss below.

4

Historical overview

Angola

Angola fought for liberation from 1964 to 1974. After gaining independence from Portugal in 10 November 1975, it experienced a problematical postcolonial transition to peace and democracy, which only succeeded in 2002, following twenty seven years of civil war. The liberation war was fought by three nationalist movements - Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA)6, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)7 and UNITA8 - seeking each other dominance over the fresh-independent country. The Alvor Accord signed in 19759 committed all three liberation movements to form a transitional coalition government, based on power-sharing and equal representation, but this was not enough to satisfy the different parts of the conflict, that soon engaged in a brutal civil war (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). A new chapter of war between MPLA and UNITA, crossed by two failed efforts of negotiated peace, profoundly marked the recent history of Angola for a quarter of century until 2002, finally ending with the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. As in other conflicts in the African continent, Angola’s civil war was marked by the involvement of external actors, both regional and international. The two patrons of the Cold War fuelled the conflict between the nationalist movements. The Soviet Union, together with Cuba and the Eastern Bloc, supported with unprecedented military and human resources the Marxist-Leninist MPLA. Regionally, MPLA had the backing of the Congo (Brazzaville) and Zambia. Holden Roberto’s FNLA received recognition and support from USA and South Africa, but also from China, OUA10 and Zaire. Meanwhile, the supporters of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, specially USA and South Africa, had tried to defeat the governmental forces of MPLA trough military operations in the south and southeast of Angola. By the end of the Cold War and with the independence of Namibia in 1990 from South Africa11, a cease-fire was established in Angola on 15 May 1991 and sixteen days later the Bicesse Accords were signed.12 After a year of all but easy negotiations brokered by the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Portugal13, the Bicesse settlement was finally signed between MPLA and UNITA.

6 Founded in 1954. 7 Founded in 1956, with Agostinho Neto as leader and then José Eduardo dos Santos. 8 Founded in 1966 with Jonas Savimbi as a leader. 9 Signed between the main nationalist movements - MPLA, UNITA, FNLA - and Portugal on 15 January 1975 in Alvor (Portugal), granted Angola independence. Full text of this Accord available at http://angolalibre.e-monsite.com/rubrique,acordos-de-alvor,1143872.html. 10 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia). 11 The independence of Namibia and the territorially integrity of Angola were considered interlinked and an important piece to the peace and security in the south-western region of Africa. On 22 December 1988, in New York, two closely related agreements were signed. One bilateral between Cuba and Angola that provided the initiation of the independence process in Namibia and required the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. The other, a Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, stipulating that the ‘Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the States of southwestern Africa’. See the two agreements at USIP Peace Agreements Digital Collection, http://www.usip.org. 12 This first peace process is well-documented by Margaret Joan Anstee (Anstee 1996), at that time UN secretary-general’s special representative to Angola, and, from the view of implementing the peace agreement, interestingly analyzed by Bekoe (2008). 13 Members of the so-called troika of observers, they would also participate in verification commissions, namely, the Political-Military Joint Commission (CCPM) and Mixed Commission for Verification and Supervision (CMVF).

5

Except in the final stages, as a military observer, the United Nations was not involved in those negotiations (Anstee, 2001), nor were any other non-armed actors (Messiant, 2004). The agreement established a cease-fire as well the conditions for the consolidation of peace in Angola: disarmament and demobilisation, the creation of a new joint army – Forças Armadas de Angola (FFA) – and the presidential and legislative elections that would establish the new government (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). Despite the mutual distrust, incomplete troop assembly and demobilisation and the warnings about discouraging signs of Savimbi’s weakening commitment to the peace process14, elections were held as stipulated. The electoral results gave victory to MPLA, in both presidential and parliamentary scenarios.15 On October 1, 1992 the UN special representative in Angola declared that, even with logistical and organization related problems, much of the registered voters had voted in a pacific, orderly and free way. However, UNITA claimed that its electoral defeat was a result of fraud and, in the same month, Savimbi withdrew the party troops from the unified armed forces. Over the next three months, UN appealed to UNITA to accept the electoral results and tried to bring the parties to a cease-fire agreement without success (Anstee, 1996; Bekoe, 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). By January, civil war was once again devastating Angola. One year after the failure of the Bicesse Accords, renewed negotiations began now under UN-mediated talks and with the USA, the Russian Federation and Portugal as observers, leading to the signing of Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 199416. The United Nations managed the implementation of this second effort to bring peace to Angola through the establishment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III).17 As stated by Beckoe, “the Lusaka Protocol aimed to correct the perceived deficiencies of the failed Bicesse Accords’, namely: a weak mandate, poor funding and inadequate staffing of UNAVEM II; lack of international support for the United Nations” peacekeeping operation; failure to demobilize the antagonists armies completely; and finally, lack of power-sharing provisions (Beckoe, 2008: 75). In this sense, this Protocol had the following advantages: a higher numbered staff, higher funding, more emphasis on power-sharing as national reconciliation measures, ‘by allotting particular ministries to UNITA and provided for a “special status” for Savimbi, focused on the demobilisation of UNITA, and outlined a significant role for the United Nations’ (Beckoe, 2008: 75).18 This second attempt at peace (1994-1998) slowly progressed and with it many delays and frustrations. Between 1997 and 1998, the UN imposed several sanctions to UNITA. After UNITA partially fulfilled quartered its troop, UN removed from Angolan territory a substantial part of the peacekeeping force in 1997, leaving its successor MONUA to help in consolidating peace and national reconciliation.19 By the end of 1998, during its fourth congress, MPLA declared war to UNITA, demanding the end of Lusaka peace process and the MONUA withdrew 14 Jonas Savimbi declared ‘if UNITA does not win, then it means fraud’ (Anstee 1996: 151). 15 José Eduardo dos Santos, MPLA candidate, received 49.6 per cent of the votes and the UNITA one, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, 40.1 per cent. In the legislative election, MPLA won with 53.7 per cent, electing 129 deputies, and UNITA elected 70 deputies, with 34.1 per cent of the votes. As we can see, neither presidential candidates achieved a clear majority and according to the electoral law, a second round of balloting was needed (Hartzell and Hoddie: 2007, 118). For more detailed information of these elections results, see Kersten (2003) or EISA site, http://www.eisa.org.za/. 16 See http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/lusaka-protocol.php. 17 This peacekeeping mission was led by United Nations Special Representative Alioune Blondin Beye. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavem_p.htm. 18 See Lusaka Protocol, Annex 6: Agenda item II.4: National reconciliation. 19 The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was established on 30 June 1997 and ended in February 1999. This mission took over from the UNAVEM III. See http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monua.htm.

6

(Wheeler 2009). As stated by Birmingham (2002: 181) ‘the new civil war of 1998 was the most cruel yet seen in Angola’.20 As the civil war continued, MPLA revealed much more preparation for the military campaign. Indeed, there was an increased number of UNITA troops surrendering which weakened the rebel movement. In February 2002, the end of this long civil war was near, when in a search for UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi was found and killed by MPLA government forces in Moxico (south-eastern Angola).21 Six weeks after Savimbi’s death and following two weeks of negotiations, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding22 was signed on 4 April between the Delegation of the Angolan Armed Forces and the Delegation of the UNITA Military Forces, in presence of the United Nations and of the Ambassadors of the Troika of observer countries (USA; Russia and Portugal). This Memoradum of Understanding was intended to be the definitive resolution of the negative military factors that blocked the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion. In short, the definitive resolution of this bloody armed conflict.23

Mozambique Like Angola, Mozambique also gained independence in 1975 after a decade of

liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonialism (1964-1974). Following the signature of the Lusaka Accords in 1974 with the Portuguese transitional government, total sovereignty was recognized and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO24) assumed government. Until 1994, when the first multiparty elections occurred, FRELIMO implemented a Marxist-Leninist philosophy and organisation, in which differences of race and ethnicity, as well as other political forces were not recognised (Newitt, 2002: 196-198). Although FRELIMO’s road to modernisation had led to the exclusion of traditional chiefs (régulos), we shall see throughout this paper how religious organisations as well as the population of rural zones were key political actors in the post colonial history of this country (Granjo, 2007; Florêncio, 2007).

Short after independence, instability with neighbouring countries developed into a civil war between FRELIMO and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) a guerrilla movement created in 1975 by Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organisation that called for the support of traditional leaders and rural inhabitants (Carbone, 2003). In Mozambique the war zones were usually divided between government-controlled (southern provinces mainly Maputo and Gaza) and RENAMO controlled areas (mainly central provinces of Manica, Sofala, Zambezia, Tete and Nampula). The war lasted 15

20 According to this author, UNITA adopted a policy of starving the cities, refusing to allow humanitarian relief. On the other hand, diamond revenues continuing to enable UNITA to funding its military structure after cold war funding was cut of (Birmingham 2002). 21 Three days later, the UNITA Vice President, António Dembo, dies too. Griffiths (2004) suggests that ‘initial reports following Savimbi's death had suggested UNITA was determined to fight on, but the sense of impending defeat deepened with the news of Vice President António Dembo's death’. See Conciliation Resources’ chronology to Angola, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/chronology.php. 22 or Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol. 23 See the Memoradum’s original text at USIP Peace Agreements Digital Collection, http://www.usip.org. Unofficial translation to english available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/memorandum-of-understanding.php. 24 FRELIMO was founded in 1962 when three regionally based nationalist organizations – the Mozambican African National Union (MANU), National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) merged into one broad based guerrilla movement. The head of the party was recruited in the South (Gaza province), while the soldiers were recruited in the northern territories (especially Cabo Delgado) (Whitaker 1970; Henriksen 1976; Chabal 2002; Carbone 2003).

7

years (1977-199925) and was influenced by internal and external factors and actors (Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, 2008; Hirch, 2009). On the one side, Mozambique was a major player in the liberation struggle of Front Line states26 and against apartheid in South Africa, which led white Rhodesians and South Africa special forces to support RENAMO against the ruling FRELIMO government (Hirsch, 2009: 203). On the other side, there is what we can call the “Cold War effect”; during the years of civil war FRELIMO relied on military and financial aid from the Soviet Union while RENAMO was supported by the Reagan Administration. The relationship with neighbouring states changed during the 1980s, and this impacted on the course of events. The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and signature of Nkomati Accords in 1984 – a joint declaration of armed activity and conflict between the government of Mozambique and South Africa – established new relationships with the Southern countries. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War RENAMO and FRELIMO lost support from the USA and the Soviet Union, respectively.

Apart from these facts, Hirsch (2008) argues that the fatigue of the armies and of the civilians, the drought and famine, the lack of natural resources that could eventually support the warfare and the perspective that none of the factions would have a military victory precipitated peace negotiations in 1989 (Nairobi talks). Sengulane and Gonçalves (1998) explain that the Mozambican churches took up Jesus’ call to promote peace in the country and pressured negotiation talks between the government and RENAMO. In fact since 1982, the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM)27 became one of the most influential civic institutions and repeatedly called for dialogue for the end of war, but Machels’ position was negative. It was only after his death in 1986 and with a new leader Joaquim Chissano that tentative contacts initiated with RENAMO. In result of the CCM diplomacy an encounter between Chissano and Dhlakama occurred in Nairobi28 (8-14 of August, 1989) from which three statements were made and the basis for the peace accord established (Sengulane and Gonçalves, 1998: 26-33). Hosted by the Sant’ Egidio community, the peace negotiations led to the signature of General Peace Agreement in Rome29 (4 October 1992). The Agreement called for United Nations (UN) participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring those elections. The UN mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ30) was headed by the UN Special representative Aldo Ajello, and contributed greatly for the process of democratic transition, the

25 According with Manning (2002), the first attacks inside Mozambique were reported in 1997, taking place in Manica, Sofala and Inhambane (p.38). 26 Front Line States (FLS) was an organization established to achieve black majority rule in South Africa. Former members included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 27 The CCM was founded in 1948 to promote unity and co-operation among Mozambican churches, representing Anglican, Baptist, Reformed, Methodist and Independent church traditions. In 1984 it established the Peace and Reconciliation Commission. Apart from CCM the Catholic Church of Mozambique and at the international level the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the World Council of Churches (WCC) were very relevant (Sengulane and Gonçalves, 1998). 28 The Nairobi Talks resulted in three major statements: Twelve Principles for Peace of Mozambique Government (17 July 1989); Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) (15 August 1989) and The US Seven Point Proposal (7 December 1989). 29 The GPA was signed in a meeting at Rome under the chairmanship of the Italian Government, in the presence of the Minister for Foreing Affairs of Italian Republic, Emílio Colombo and the presence of Presidents of the Republic of Zimbabwe; Botswana; Kenya; South Africa; Malawi and the Secretary General of the OAU. 30 ONUMOZ was established by Security Council resolution 797 of 16 December 1992 to help implement the GPA: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping.

8

establishment of and integrated army and the conversion of RENAMO from a guerrilla force into a political party (Hirsch, 2008: 203). Civil war legacies

The success of the peace accords put an end to fifteen and twenty seven years of civil war in Mozambique and Angola, respectively. Behind were unimaginable human atrocities (large numbers of deaths, refugees, orphan, displaced and war refuges and a massive destruction of basic infra-structures). Estimated numbers are presented in Table 1. This legacy matters not only in terms of defining DDR and TJ strategies at the elite level but also for restoring bonds, trust, identities and basic solidarities at the community level. While many of the first studies on TJ suggested that the extent of violence should explain the urgency and emotions of demand for justice (Elster, 2004), these numbers suggest that there is no direct relationship, and that other factors need to be present for this bottom up pressure to be felt.

Table 1 - Legacies of Armed Conflict

Angola Mozambique

Deaths (independence war/civil war)1 90,000/1.500.000 60,000/ 1.000,000

Refugees2 450.000 1.500,000

Displaced3 4.000,000 3.000,000

Children (orphans) 4 100,000 200,000

Child soldiers5 9,000 8,000-10,000

Infrastructures 6 (numbers missing) 2,773 primary and secondary

schools;

1,000 health clinics destroyed

Sources: 1Marshall (2006); 2for Mozambique - Human Right Watch (1992); for Angola (Porto et al, 2007); 3for Mozambique - Synge (1997); for Angola (Porto et al, 2007); 4for Mozambique - Human Right Watch (1992); for Angola McCants and Glen (2008); Honwana (2002); 5Honwana (2002) and 6 Human Right Watch (1992).

In Angola and Mozambique, if the numbers are so revealing, why did these governments opt for no confrontation with the past? As we shall demonstrate throughout the analysis of these cases, western models based on theories of accountability and state responsiveness do not explain the African cases. The answer to why the state does not act and why societies are not more demanding seem to lay instead in cultural dimensions and two main characteristics: weak states and ethnically divided societies.

The next section will deal with the issues of peacebuilding and TJ. It begins by highlighting the legal dispositions in order to understand how the institutional actors framed the problem. It will then rely on other sources to show how the absence of an institutional approach in some issues did not mean the lack of any approach to the past. Legal dispositions for peacebuilding and transitional justice strategies

Although we acknowledge that formal dispositions may have limited impact for the outcome of complex political processes such as these, they are nonetheless relevant.

9

In fact, more than reflecting decision making processes legal dispositions set a common framework within which the bargaining between different actors may occur.

The three peace agreements – Bicesse Accords, Lusaka Protocol and Luena Memoradum of Understanding – established the legal framework within which the DDR process would be developed in Angola.

In the Bicesse Accords, in exchange of UNITA’s disarmament and return of its controlled territories to the central administration, the government offered legal status and participation in the political process through elections and in return promised to disarm its troops (Beckoe, 2008). The Bicesse Accords further stipulated the cessation of all hostilities, supervised by a Political-Military Joint Commission (CCPM) and monitored by the United Nations (UN). Both armed forces should be assembled 60 days following the ceasefire, where the two sides would deliver their weapons31.

Following the general elections of 1992 and the civil war resumption, the UN undertook another negotiation process to put an end to the war, resulting in the Lusaka Protocol. The Lusaka Protocol opens with the need to conclude the Bicesse Accords, namely: the re-establishment of the ceasefire, the DDR of UNITA’s forces and civilians, the conclusion of the previously failed Angolan Armed Forces, the National Reconciliation, the completion of the Electoral Process (necessity of concluding the 1992 elections with a second round of presidential elections) and the fully cooperation with UN mandate, which will be responsible for management and implementation of this peace accord. A greater emphasis on power-sharing measures was put on the so-called National Reconciliation. The National Reconciliation (Appendix 6) gave Savimbi a special status and allocated particular ministries to UNITA. In this sense, the Annex I (Agenda of the Angola peace talks between the Government and UNITA) reinforced the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces, the disarming of all civilians and the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (F.A.A.), including demobilisation. Those provisions are then detailed in the Annex III and Annex IV on military issues.

In order to implement the Lusaka Protocol, the Luena Memoradum stipulated in Chapter II (Agenda of the Memorandum of Understanding) the quartering and demilitarization of UNITA (a total of 50,000 in Appendix I), integration of its officials into Angolan Armed Forces and in the National Police (a total of 5,007 members according to Appendix 2), demobilisation of the excess personnel from the UNITA military forces and vocational reintegration of demobilized personnel into national life (Appendix 4).

The Memorandum of Understanding defined DDR as a process to abolish the UNITA military forces by integrating them into the FAA or into national life. This process would be conducted by a Mixed Military Commission composed by the military representatives of the government and of UNITA and by permanents observers of the United Nations and of the Troika members32.

To help with these goals, several amnesties were granted. The first amnesties were not directly included in the peace agreements. There were three separate documents: Amnesty Law of 24 December 1988, Amnesty Law of 3 February 1990 and 31 The main provisions structuring the DDR process can be found in: Appendix I (Verification and Monitoring System), in Appendix 4 (Rules of Conduct for the Troops in the Areas of Assembly), Appendix 6 (Military Information to be Exchanged between the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola and UNITA) and in the Protocol of Estoril (disposition VI) 32 Also in Chapter II, 3. Cessation of hostilities and pending military issues under the Lusaka Protocol

10

Amnesty Law of 12 July 1991. All the military crimes were forgiven in order to materialize the National Reconciliation, but they were not blanket. The 1988 law, for instance, stated that amnesty was “conditional on the beneficiary not repeating his crime or committing any other serious crime”; on the other hand, the 1991 law excluded “crimes leading to death committed by members of the armed forces” (Mallinder, 2008: 133; 161).

Even so, the Bicesse Accords established ‘the release of all civilian and military prisoners who were detained as a consequence of the conflict between the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola and UNITA’.33 This provision was backed-up by the Amnesty Laws of 3 February 1990 and then by 12 July 1991.34 In those, all the military crimes were forgiven in order to achieve the National Reconciliation. Unlike Bicesse, the Lusaka Protocol included an amnesty provision: ‘The Government guarantees, in the interest of peace and national reconciliation, the approval and publication, by the competent organs and institutions of the State of the Republic of Angola, of an Amnesty Law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict between the UNITA military forces and the Government’ and ‘on the day on which the Lusaka Protocol is initialled, the Government and the leadership of UNITA shall each issue a statement on the importance and meaning of pardon and amnesty, as referred to in para. 5 of the general principles relating to National Reconciliation above’.

Two Amnesty Laws were additionally approved, one before and the other after the agreement signing (10 November 1994 and 9 May 1996). In the first one, all military crimes committed by national citizens against the internal security of the State during the post-electoral conflict (since October 1992 until 15 November 1994) were under amnesty. In the second one, the same was stipulated but the period of amnesty was longer (between the Bicesse Accords’ date and 8 May 1996). In the spirit of National Reconciliation, the Luena Memoradum of Understanding also presented the provision that ‘all Angolans should forgive and forget the offences resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the future with tolerance and confidence. Furthermore, the competent institutions will grant an amnesty, in accordance with Article 88(h) of the Constitutional Law, for illegal acts committed by anyone prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, in the context of the current conflict.’

This amnesty provision was preceded by the Amnesty Law of 15 December 2000. Amnesty was granted to all military crimes committed against the internal security of the State, but only if individuals turned themselves to Angolan authorities or voluntarily in the 60 days after the law came into effect. An interesting point is the crime against ‘honesty under amnesty’, punishable according to the Penal Law but can be forgiven if it is pardoned by the injured person. This provision has then expanded the amnesty conditions. This law was “offered” by President dos Santos in exchange of peace. In many public statements, dos Santos offered amnesty for those who laid down their weapons before formalising it in the legislation on the 25th anniversary of Angolan independence (Mallinder, 2008: 45). These public declarations of amnesty were backed by international actors, as the UN Special Representative who, in 1996, said to believe that the 1996 would: enhance mutual understanding and trust between the Angolan government and UNITA” (idem, 2008: 331).

At the same date of the signing of the Memoradum, the Amnesty Law of 4 April 2002 was approved. The same condition of granting amnesty to all crimes against the 33 See Ceasefire Agreement, II. Entry into Force of the Ceasefire. 34 Lei 2/90 and Lei 24/91.

11

internal security of the State of the previous law was now 45 days and not 60 days and the mentioned crimes against ‘honesty’ was not legislated in this law.

In Mozambique the politics of peace and justice started to be asserted in 1989 in the scope of the Nairobi Talks. From both leaders there was a commitment to end the conflict, and crimes of war though somewhat acknowledged by the government were downplayed and none of the leaders directly apologized for the atrocities committed.

In a speech given in 1989, Chissano acknowledged, "hundreds of thousand of people have already died. Many economic and social infrastructures in the country have been destroyed or paralysed, impeding the normal life of citizens and turning millions of people into displaced persons”. (17/July/1989, quoted in Vines and Hendrickson, 1998: 38)

Dlhakama’s reply was however more clear about the future politics of past in the sense that there is a refusal of recrimination and a quest for a national reconciliation35 and a brotherhood. “RENAMO stands for the population of Mozambique and is against any massacre or violation of the population. RENAMO is a people’s force (…). RENAMO wants a genuine negotiation conducive to national reconciliation without victors or vanquished and without recrimination followed by constitutional reform; to unite effects in order to form a new Mozambique where brotherhood will be affirmed by free debate of ideas and decision of consensus; a new Mozambique where armed struggle need never be the last and only resort for the solution of our problems (“RENAMO’s Reply to FRELIMO’s Proposals”, Nairobi, (15/August/1989) in Vines and Hendrickson, 1998: 39)”

The basis for institutional changes towards multiparty politics were also discussed between the parts. Government principles for peace included broad participation of citizens (n.o 4), a range of individual and social liberties (n.o 8) and consequent constitutional revision (n.o 9). For Dhlakama the recognition of RENAMO as an active political force was an imperative measure for a peace solution (Vines and Hendrickson 1998, 39).

Rules for the formation of political parties, as well as a range of civil and political rights were thus included in the GPA (Protocols II and III). Furthermore Protocol VI established that the parties should release the prisoners except for those being held for ordinary crimes. Ten days after the signature of the GPA the government granted full amnesty to all crimes36.

Finally, FRELIMO provided a legislative amnesty to all combatants even before the start of the Rome negotiation during which no discussion of any TJ institution and neither a TRC nor any tribunal were established A joint decision by FRELIMO and RENAMO to look to the future and o put the past aside prevailed (Mallinder, 2008; Hirch 2009, 204).

In Mozambique tasks for peacebuilding included: the established rules for the holding of the multiparty elections (Protocol V), the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) (Protocol VI), and the restructuring of the security forces and the economic and social integration of demobilised soldiers (Protocol VI). Consequently the UNOMOZ set a mandate in order: “1) to monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; 2) to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire

35 Reconciliation was also encouraged by the mediators. For instance, the US Seven Point Proposal read on the 5th point: “National reconciliation and unity shall be the guiding principles in the peace process.” 36 “Dentro do princípio de reconciliação nacional harmonização da vida do povo moçambicano (…). Artigo 1. São amnistiados os crimes cometidos contra a segurança do povo do Estado popular (…) os crimes contra a segurança do Estado (…) e os crimes militares (…).”

12

electoral process and 3) to coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population37”.

The troop strength of the FADM should be 30,000: army: 24,000; air force: 4,000 and navy: 2,000, with government and RENAMO contributing 50% each (GPA, Protocol IV). A $20 million package was announced for the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) that basically set very positive incentives for the soldiers demobilisation38. This was the legal framework (listed in appendix 1) within both DDR and TJ strategies were developed. Differently from Angola, in Mozambique, the process of peace, regime change and the mechanisms of justice were highly negotiated political processes with some level of power sharing included from the beginning. As we shall see in the following two sections that some of these prerogatives were hardly implemented and that the collaboration of political parties became easier when positive incentives (e.g. the grant of trust funds and of political offices) became more concrete through the ongoing negotiations. On the other hand the role of civil society actors’ (traditional leaders and religious organizations) on both processes was very relevant what is consistent with Migdal (1988) argument that African countries have strong societies but weak states. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DDR is one of the processes of particular utility in reducing the risk of violence and violent conflict, in order to promote a long-term security and stability (Sriram et al, 2009). But this is a delicate process which involves non-tangible aspects such as trust in political and institutions. More than a problem of trust, demobilisation hardly can occur if the insurgents believe that only the military advantage can be used to influence government (Kingma, 1997). But the same applies to the government’s side, as demobilisation can reduce its ability to keep insurgents at bay (Bekoe, 2008).

DDR programs and TJ tend to be implemented and even developed, in relative isolation from each other, which not only misses opportunities for coordination but also hampers their ability to implement DDR and successfully achieve long term reintegration and reconciliation. For example, efforts by institutions such as the International Criminal Court to prosecute rebel leaders for war crimes may sometimes impede the willingness of combatants to join a DDR process, requiring better coordination between external and local actors to ensure that the goals of peace and justice do not cut across each other. DDR programs also often seek to reintegrate former combatants into communities that were victimized by those combatants during the conflict. The acceptance of ex-combatants into these communities often requires a TJ process that enables both parties to move beyond this wrenching history39.

37 UN Documents: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping. 38 The RSS a new package of $20 million was announced by Ajello in January 1994 the main contributors were Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland38. It included: 1) six months salary (half on demobilisation day); 2) transportation with the soldiers’ family to any part of Mozambique, where food for three months and a kit of tools and vegetable seeds would be provided an the other half of the six months’ salary would be paid; 3) an additional eighteen months’ salary, based on the ex-soldier’s former rank and payable in two-monthly instalments; 4) an information and referral system; 5) occupational training; 6) a provincial fund to support ex-soldiers’ activities in their communities. (Synge 1998, 65) 39 http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/ddr2.htm

13

In the case of Angola, all three agreements contained provisions on disarmament and demobilisation. However, the DDR process during the implementation of Bicesse and Lusaka was characterized by constant delays, distrust and lack of commitment. As reckoned by Porto and Parsons “the Bicesse Accords contained the origins of DDR structures still in place today” (2007: 41). In those, the full demobilisation of 200,000 soldiers serving in the two opposing armies and the creation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) of 50,000 men were two goals included in the principal provisions (Anstee, 2001). Each side’s military forces were to move to areas of assembly to be then selected for the new joint army.40 Supposedly, the assembling of troops would have been finished by the beginning of August 1991 as a requisite for the holding of multiparty elections. Instead, in the eve of presidential and legislative elections (29 and 30 September 1992), the two armies had not fully assembled their troops and their demobilisation was far from being complete (see Table 2). According to Ottaway (1998), “the demobilisation process started slowly and took much longer than expected”; starting only in April 1992 due to delays in the troop assembly (Sinjela 1994). By the time of elections, UNITA had a much more intact army than MPLA.

During this process, there were allegations of both MPLA and UNITA hiding a secret army. On the other hand, the appearance of the government’s antiriot force consequently increased the UNITA’s perceived vulnerability and distrust in the MPLA commitment of demobilisation and political reform. Savimbi considered these antiriot police as a “parallel army” and no more UNITA troops were demobilized.41 As Bekoe’s work (2008) and several reports of UNAVEM III show us the distrust was again a continued element in Lusaka Protocol. The main thorny issue that was delaying UNITA’s troop assembly was related to the information on the strength and location of the government Rapid Reaction Police. Moreover, one of the main reasons why the assembly of UNITA forces only began after November 1995 had to do precisely with a lack of information reciprocity. In other words, there was confusion if the assembling of the Rapid Reaction Police would begin at the same time as UNITA (Beckoe, 2008). Meanwhile, during this process, there were ceasefire violations. For instance, the attack of MPLA government on UNITA forces in the Soyo and Lunda North, oil and diamond-rich respectively regions (Beckoe, 2008: 81). Disarmament remained a critical issue in Lusaka Protocol as UNITA was maintaining significant arms supplies. On the other hand, the government was also required to disarm the civilian population. In August, the government suspended this process citing UNITA’s reluctance to disarm (Porto and Parsons, 2003a). By July 1996, the new joint army was officially sworn in, however as pointed by Porto and Parsons, “70,600 had been quartered, but it is believed that many were not in fact soldiers but had been conscripted to make up numbers, and a high proportions were underage or disable” (2003a: 25). One important aspect to understand the demobilisation process during this second peace process concerns the creation of Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN)42. As a power-sharing measure it was intended to make both

40 See Bicesse Accords, Appendix 4: Rules of Conduct for the Troops in the Areas of Assembly. Available at Conciliation Resources http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/bicesse-accords2.php. 41 According to Bekoe (2008, 72) “From August 6, the date the anti-riot police barged in on Savimbi’s residence, which in many ways confirmed UNITA’s fears of the purpose of the antiriot policy, no more troops were demobilized”. 42 Governo de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional.

14

forces relevant within the political space but did not had the expected effect. The GURN was established in on 11 April 1997 without the presence of Savimbi.

In October 1997, the UN peacekeeping mission was facing difficulties, namely, political, funding and logistical ones, to develop the demobilisation process.43 The following UN reports declared the increasing of tensions, continuing acts of banditry and troops movements. Indeed, The UN report of December 1997 stated that both sides were regrouping and rearming.44 The Luena Memorandum of Understanding regulated and updated the military components of the Lusaka Protocol concerning the DDR process of MPLA’s and UNITA’s troops as well as concluding the formation of the armed forces. According to Parsons (2004, 40), “in many ways, the DDR process under Luena thus reflected the nature of the ending of the war more than the original Lusaka Protocol – a victory by the Angolan government rather than a negotiated settlement”. In this context Luena represented only the conclusion of the process of integration of the two armed forces into new armed force ongoing since Bicesse. As a result, this process allowed the government to consolidate its advantage; by determining who constituted a potential “threat” to the peace process and then prioritize groups to demobilise. On the other hand, the provisions of the DDR process reflect the fact that it was a home-grown initiative and where there no provision for formal third-party monitoring (Porto and Parsons: 2003b). The government of Angola assumed the management of this process in the Joint Military Commission. The quartering, demilitarisation and demobilisation process of 50,000 UNITA’s soldiers was planned to be complete in 80 days. On July 2002, 85,585 of UNITA’s soldiers had been quartered and 81% of the estimated number demobilised (see Table 2). Table 2 - Troops Assembly and Demobilisation (1991-2002)

Total Number Assembled Proportion Demobilised Processes MPLA UNITA MPLA UNITA

June 17, 1992 173,712 104,982 - Bicesse September 2, 1992 - 61,994 (41%) 7,257 (24%)

December, 1997 - 78,887 - 41,796 (47,8%)1

Lusaka

March, 1998 - 87,514 - 49,851 (65,3%)2

Luena July 27, 2002 - 85,585 - 84,000 (81%)3

1 This percentage was calculated with respect to the total number of expected demobilised soldiers under UN’s responsibility (87,514). See UN DOC S/1998/333 (16 April 1998). 2 This percentage was calculated with respect to the total number of eligible soldiers for demobilisation (76,360). The rest would be incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces. See UN DOC S/1998/333 (16 April 1998). 3 By the end of the first trimester of 2007, the number of UNITA’s demobilisation increased to 97,390 soldiers (92,6%). See L'Escola de Cultura de Pau report, ANGOLA (Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, 2002-2007), available at escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/angola08i.pdf. Sources: Bekoe (2008: 69); Porto and Parsons (2003); UN DOC S/1998/17 (12 January 1998); UN DOC S/1998/333 (16 April 1998); UN DOC S/24556 (9 September 1992).

43 See UN DOC S/1997/807 (17 October 1997). 44 See UN DOC S/1997/950 (4 December 1997).

15

On 10 October 2002, the Government of Angola incorporated in the final General Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (PGRD) the World Bank and other donors (Porto and Parsons, 2003c) support to social and reintegration of ex-soldiers demobilised as a returning to civilian life.45

In Mozambique DDR occurred between January and September of 1994 ending only a month before the elections. For this task Ajello (UN’s special representative) authorized an innovative division of labour between civilian and military observers of ONUMOZ to handle the logistics of assembly and demobilisation. A civilian Technical Unit for Demobilisation was created to handle the provision of basic facilities and health care (Synge, 1997: 50).

The demobilisation of soldiers was hard to initiate and the preliminary step of assembling troops was delayed by accusations and disputes over the control of the territory (Synge, 1997: 91). RENAMO was considered to be very reluctant to begin assembly and demobilisation and to link conditions to the process. However, circumstances became more favourable from mid-1993 onwards as negotiations behind the scenes granted more money to Dlhakama.

Final figures reveal that, by 1994, around 87% registered soldiers (91, 826) had been demobilised but only 11% (12,177) had joined the FADM. At this point the new armed forces constituted a very incipient structure if we consider what the GPA had defined. As Synge (1997) points out RSS provided a tangible incentive for demobilisation that eventually overwhelmed the attempts of the parties to keep back the troops and once assembled the soldiers soon began to clamour for demobilisation rather than recruitment to the new army.

Table 3 - Final demobilisation totals

Government troops

RENAMO troops

Total Percentage of total

Registered 80,769 24,649 105,418 100 Demobilised 71,288 20,538 91,826 87,1 Join FADM 8,516 3,661 12,177 11,6 Absent 965 449 1,414 1,34 Source: Tom Pardoel “Demobilisation Programme in Mozambique, Summary Report, October 4, 1995” cited by Synge: 1994, pp. 108.

Soldiers were key actors for the success of the demobilisation process. In fact, after a number of protests, riots and disturbances46 in the assembly areas, government and RENAMO lost control over the soldiers and allowed them to choose freely between demobilisation and joining the new army (Synge, 1997).

The state led Programme for Family Localisation and Reunification (PLRF) designed to address Childs’ basic needs, was one of the few programmes47 that followed

45 See Annex 4. Document pertaining to the vocational reinsertion of demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA Military Forces into national life. 46 The demobilisation period was characterized by several insurgences in assembled zones (e.g. in May 21, government troops rampaged through Mocuba (Zambezia) town, injuring civilians, looting houses and provoking a backlash from the citizens of the town; during several days in July 400 soldiers of RENAMO demanded demobilisation) (Synge 1997, 101). These incidents were generally caused by: 1) soldiers tired of waiting; 2) overwhelming desire of demobilisation, 3) need for food and clothing; 4) their uncertainty about the future (ibid, 100). 47 The International Community of the Read Cross and the Children Fund – USA also attempted to reunite as much youngsters with their families (Synge 1997).

16

up family reunification in the aftermath of the conflict, although with limited impact in terms of the demobilisation of child-soldiers (Cabral, 2005/2006).

Regarding disarmament, by December 1995 the UNOMOZ had collected: a large amount of unexploded ordnance (6.097,727 pieces of ammunition; 3,677 grenades; 351 kg of mortar bombs); 255,717 mines; 24,124 unspecified weapons and 1.263,424 pieces of ammunition (Batista Lundin et al, 2000).

Again it is important to underline the constructive role of CCM in uncovering arms caches and collecting weapons (Batista Lundin and Mario, 2008). The project Transforming Guns into Hoes (TAE)48 was introduced by the CCM in 1991 during the peace process. However, due to delays it was not officially launched until October 1995. In the first five months of the programme, an average of 115 weapons per month were handed in. By May 1998, 1,500 firearms and 34,000 explosives had been destroyed.

Another disarmament initiative was the Operation Rachel. This was a bilateral co-operation agreement on arms destruction between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), effective since 1996. Through these operations, significant sources of illegal weapons that have been destabilising the Southern Africa sub-region have been destroyed (Hennop, 2001). Additionally, in June 1994 the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) launched its new accelerating demining program (ADP). Since the commencement of demining operations in September 1994, 5,000 anti-personnel mines and some 400,000 square meters of land have been cleared49. Synge (1997) notes that the most heavily mined provinces were found to be Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia. At the eve of elections the most essential elements of the peace process - assembly and demobilisation of soldiers the formation of new army - were considered to be almost by Ajello (Synge, 1997). The comparative analysis of DDR programmes reveals that both in Angola and in Mozambique there was some reluctance and feelings of distrust from both parts. However governing parties – FRELIMO and MPLA – were able to gain leverage over the opposing parties – RENAMO and UNITA. Elites from the former regime were somewhat able to keep their power during the negotiations. However if in Mozambique political parties, UN, civil society and soldiers all were peace agents in the case of Angola the rival political parties still had military force, resources to maintain the warfare and thus continue the war until the military victory. Therefore reluctance to full demobilisation was constant since 1992 and positive results in terms of DDR only became clear in the long term when we consider the three programmes implemented. Other Transitional justice strategies

Angola and Mozambique are cases in which there has been no accountability or truth revelation proceeding. Prsicilla Hayner (2001) identifies four reasons for the lack of a truth process: dear of negative consequences (namely, an increase in violence), lack of political interest (from the part of political leaders and non-governmental actors), other urgent priorities (in face of destruction and the need to rebuild), alternative mechanisms or preferences.

Although it is considered that TJ involves the political choices made by states when confronting the patterns of human rights violation committed in the recent past (Sooka, 2008) we are adopting a wider concept of TJ in this paper. In fact we consider

48 Small Arms and Weapons: A Challenge to the Churches - http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/international/mozam.html. 49 http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4d-17.htm

17

that not only states but civil society groups use their resources in order to deal with the violent past. In this context the role of traditional systems of justice can be viewed as a response of civil society in face of the absence of state led formal policies for dealing with the past. A growing literature is focusing on the impact of indigenous legacies in shaping power distribution and politics in contemporary African countries (Vaughan, 2005: Huyse and Salter: 2008). This is a relevant issue for institutional building in post conflict societies. Traditional leaders/authorities have performed an important role not only during the civil wars but in their aftermath as they were seen, by the international community, as important actors for building a decentralized-model of state with a strong civil society (Lutz and Linde, 2004; in Mozambique’s case Florêncio, 2008; Buur and Keyd, 2005; in Angola’s case Pacheco, 2002). Through history, these traditional leaders saw their multiple resources – such as medical, religious and justice systems – being refashioned either by colonial rulers or by the post colonial incumbent governments. Kingma states that “demobilisation is a complex process, in which ex-combatants have to find a new civilian life and re-establish some roots in society” (2000: 18). According to Duthie (2005), the importance of traditionalism in the reintegration of ex-soldiers is a key element to reintegration processes endure and, ultimately, to peace and democracy. In terms of justice, this author advances with the idea that local and traditional ceremonies can sometimes be more efficient than formal measures (Duthie, 2005). Those are compared to “restorative justice”, mainly in the “attempt to address and balance the needs of the victim, the needs of the offender, and the need to restore the community” (Duthie, 2005: 15). As an example of that, we have the reintegration ceremonies practiced in Angola and Mozambique.

As we have shown previously, the government of Angola conceded amnesties and, in this sense, refused a more punitive approach. In parallel, the truth of past events during the civil war was sough through a number of ceremonies held by local community traditional leaders in order to deal with the violent past. As pointed out by Comerford, we are dealing with a “cultural belief that is possible to rehabilitate returned soldiers by enabling them to move beyond their experiences of war and distances themselves from the past” (Cromerford, 2005: 198).

Elsewhere in this article we have shown that the government of Angola conceded full amnesties therefore refusing a more punitive approach. This fact led to number of ceremonies held by local community traditional leaders in order to deal with the violent past. When we try to understand the reintegration ceremonies in Angola from a longitudinal perspective, we immediately have to deal with the challenge of gathering information on local traditional justice ceremonies between 1991 and 2002. Anthropological (Honwana, 2001; 2005; 2006; Willis, 1999) and psychotherapeutic approaches (The Lancet, 2002) have been the most frequent way of studying these issues. In Alcinda Honwana’s research, we find some important testimonies of healing rituals of ex-soldiers, adults and children, such as treatments, cleansing and purifications, executed by traditional leaders (Honwana, 2005: 2006). Comerford, who presents the traditional healing methods from 1991 to 2002, asserts that ‘traditional communities expected that all soldiers returning from war received treatment from the kimbanda, the principal practitioner of traditional healing methods’ (2005: 192). Moreover, in rural areas these were often the only mechanisms available to cope with war experience and peace in the post-war period, reintegrating individuals and groups in their communities (Honwana, 2005). In this line of thought, Honwana (2006) explains that not everyone goes through cleansing or purification rituals and that such practices are more common in rural than urban areas.

18

Not only individuals but also communities were involved in cleansing and purification rituals. This occurred fundamentally because it was believed that individuals, which had experienced war, who killed or who saw people being killed, were polluted by war and therefore should be cleaned. The communities received cleansing and burial rituals, often focused on quieting the spirits of the dead ones, for those who were not buried with proper rituals or for the ancestors who guarantee health and protection.

As an example of a traditional healing method, we have the description of Comerford (2005), where treatment is said to involve meetings first with the soba (chief or traditional leader) and then the withdrawing from the village for a period of time together with the Kimbanda to talk through one’s war experience in order to ‘tirar a guerra’ (remove the war), because there was a belief that if a person goes to war it becomes another person.

With respect to the actors that practiced those rituals, Angola, as Mozambique, presented a great diversity across regions. According to Honwana (2006), we can find four types of traditional actors, 1) the traditional chiefs (sobas), 2) the healer and diviners (kimbandas) and 3) the elders (seculo) and 4) leaders and prophets of independents churches which organize religious services and special rituals for returned soldiers. Similarly to Angola, there is a consensus that Mozambique’s political authorities did not develop any specific policy to deal with the abuses and crimes perpetrated during the civil war and that particularly affected the rural areas of the country (Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, 2008; Hayner, 2001; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994). The political elite decided to “forgive and forget” and Mozambique chose not to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This was a top down decision, but it was received at least with some level of agreement at the societal level. “No, we do not want to re-enter into this morass of conflict, hatred and pain. We want to focus on the future. For now, the past is too much part of the present for us to examine its details. For now, we prefer silence over confrontation over renewed pain. While we cannot forget, we would like to pretend that we can” (in Hayner, 2001: 185).

As discussed bellow, there was no public debate in terms of TJ. After the signing of the GPA, the Mozambican Popular Assembly promulgated the law n.º 15/92 which provided amnesty for crimes committed between 1979-1992. Although it is argued that no public debate took place during this process some interest groups such as the Association for Demobilised Soldiers (AMODEG) and the Association for the Promotion of Peace (PROPAZ) argued for more effective measures. Some at AMODEG suggested the need for “Truth commission” or public inquiry to deal with government’s failure to deliver on promises made to former combatants while PROPAZ asked for more health measures (Batista Lundin and Mario, 2008: 43). The option for “amnesia” – considered a way to deal with the past by Graybill (2007) - led Mozambicans to use community resources for repairing their individual and collective lives (Batista Lundin, 2004). For Igreja these were “practices of rupture” with the mechanism of justice chosen by the political elite that basically refused any strategy of dealing with the grave abuses and war crimes (2009: 278). Consequently, in the aftermath of GPA, traditional chiefs and judges assumed increased relevance not only in performing reintegration tasks – such cleansing and healing rituals – but also in the whole process of population resettlement and relief operations that required a major coordination effort at the community level.

According to Batista Lundin (2004) diverse types of cleansing and healing rituals took place, involving those directly instrumentalised by the war (children, youth

19

and women) as well as those that have experienced or assisted brutal acts. Generally speaking, these rituals had three parts: the first part is designed to help the ex-soldier overcome his acquired the identity as killing machine and regain a civilian identity (a steam bath symbolises a physical and spiritual cleanse), the second part is the propitiation of spirits (to announce the dead relatives the lost sheep is back home) and the third part is the reconciliation with spirits of the dead persons killed (in this last part forgiveness is asked). Some examples are: • The magamba healers dealt with magamba spirits - male soldiers that died during

the war and returned to the world of living to fight for justice. This ritual common in central Mozambique province of Gorongosa was relevant for repairing family bonds, mutual trust and respect within the communities (Igreja and Dias-Lambranca 2008; Igreja, 2009).

• In southern Mozambique warriors or individuals who witnessed fights and deaths should perform Kugiya (simulation of fight) lead by the vaNyamusoro (divine-healers), in order to overcome the guilt feelings. The vaNyamusoro then provide, to veterans instruments of justification and forgiveness and help overcoming traumatic events and validate the possibility of reintegration (Granjo, 2007: 142).

• The Kuhlapsa ritual (very common in also southern Mozambique) allowed the reintegration and social reconciliation of children and youth militarized during the civil war (Cabral, 2005/2006).

• In rural zones the timhamba rituals (also known as Ku pahla or mahamba) were performed in order to appease the Mpfhukwa spirits - spirits of fighters that during the war did not received proper burial rites (Honwana, 1998: 77-79).

Although reports on TJ processes reveal that both in Angola and in Mozambique

children and women were not fully followed either by the state programmes either by traditional cleansing rituals performed by traditional leaders (Lundin and Mario, 2008; McCants and Mpani, 2008) it seems that this statement applies more to Angola than to Mozambique where traditional leaders’ rituals of cleansing seemed to be more active and widespread. At the same time it is difficult to fully acknowledge the impact of traditional systems in terms of reintegrating and reconciling civilians and soldiers back in to their communities since we do not have estimated number of how many people recurred to this rituals. Concluding notes

Angola and Mozambique are two cases of protracted civil war after independence. In both cases, transition from war to peace was negotiated and had external intervention. Unlike Mozambique, which did not return to war after the implementation of the general peace agreement, Angola achieved peace only after the third effort in 2002.

The DDR process and the TJ strategies in the two countries reveal certain similarities and differences. In the two countries, the DDR process was regarded as a security precondition to the war-to-democracy transition and the amnesty laws as a no-punishment measure of TJ that could facilitate the DDR engagement and materialize the national reconciliation. Angola even preceded Mozambique and has adopted multiple amnesties in the three stages of peace negotiations. Nonetheless, at least until 2002, they were not enough to prevent the re-emergence of conflict. In Mozambique, however, the amnesty seems to have contributed, to an extent, to the success of the peace accords. “FRELIMO first asked RENAMO to recognize their crimes as a condition to holding

20

peace talks. RENAMO responded by saying FRELIMO also had to acknowledge their own past crimes. It took five or six very difficult months before this issue could be worked out” (Hayner, 2001: 192).

This preliminary finding seems to confirm Hayner (2001) hypotheses that amnesty is more likely when the former regime maintains some level of power. In fact, since they gained independence in 1975 Angola and Mozambique were ruled by MPLA and FRELIMO, respectively. This made possible for them to negotiation the dispositions for the political at transition (firstly from war to independence and afterwards from war to peace and democracy), in a privileged position. In fact throughout the peace negotiations both parties gained leverage over their opponent. In this sense, the amnesty may have acted as a prerequisite or inducement to encourage the parties to enter negotiations, while parties’ decisions to enter these negotiations and adhere to the commitment were influenced by other factors. As we describe above, positive incentives such as political offices and monetary aid and the level of power sharing played an important role in compromising the parts to the agreements. As for the other factors suggested in the literature – the level of human rights atrocities committed (we found quite similar numbers although the civil war in Mozambique lasted fifteen years while in Angola twenty seven); and the nature of transition (negotiated [Mozambique] or rupture [military victory of UNITA]) – they are clearly insufficient to explain these two cases.

Regarding DDR, we observe inherent delays resulting from the lack of trust from both parts. Assembling and demobilizing troops became complicated tasks from the beginning for that reason. However while in Mozambique the ongoing negotiations brought the two parties to commit with the GPA protocols and a few days before the elections DDR was almost completed, in Angola the UNITA continuously broke the settlement and it was only with Luena that positive results became evident. If we consider the factors at stake, in Mozambique all relevant actors (political parties, religious organizations and soldiers) wanted to end the conflict. By the end of the 1980s with the withdrawal of foreign aid and with the level of destruction (see table 1) and fatigue of armies, FRELIMO decided to initiate the peace negotiation under the mediation of religious organizations. In Angola MPLA and UNITA still believed in a military victory and still had domestic resources to support the warfare therefore actors did not commit to full demobilisation of troops until 2002.

The return or the integration for the first time of ex-combatants into civilian life has raised not easy questions on how ex-soldiers can become civilians and the need to create important programs of social and economic reintegration. Although designed within the scope of the peace accords and implemented by the UN missions the reintegration measures only included reparations and pensions for the ex-soldiers. This left space for the development of informal strategies of TJ performed by traditional leaders in order to reintegrate civilians and ex-combatants back in to their communities. Although TJ and DDR were not defined at the same stage (in the sense that amnesties preceded DDR programs), as Sriram et al (2009) we believe that some sort of intersection and complementary was possible. In fact by promoting social reintegration through the cleansing rituals traditional leaders provided and informal resource very important in terms of restoring bonds and trust at the elite level. Bartoli and Jebashvili consider “the case of Mozambique is peculiar in its nature and outcome: its success is largely dependent on its idiosyncratic culture and traditions, which enabled for healing and reconciliation not based solely on Western traditions”. From an idiosyncratic point of view, Angola had the same traditional healing and reconciliation methods. But those were not sufficient to prevent war to resume, nor were

21

the amnesty laws. In order to compare and explain the different outcome in Angola and Mozambique, we have to consider political, planning and logistical questions. Politically, DDR processes are related with other provisions, namely the power-sharing measures and also with the will and commitment of key actors. For instance, the Lusaka Protocol in Angola had power-sharing provision but those had limited impact in preventing tensions and delays regarding DDR. More than that, the permanent delays and fragile commitments to the DDR process can be explained because each side of the conflict perceived vulnerability as military disadvantage and, therefore, a threat to his power, and a probable defeat.

We agree with Berdal and Ucko when they say that international actors’ reports and analyses of DDR tend to underplay the qualitative dimension of these processes: organizational and leadership structure, ideological and political coherence, internal dynamics and sociological make-up, self-sufficiency as a fighting force, quality of external support, measures of societal recognition and legitimacy (2009: 3).

More importantly, it is worth coming back to Migdal’s argument that African cases need to be regarded as weak states (from the infrastructural point of view) facing strong civil societies. In fact, in both these cases, in face of political decisions at the elite level, community level groups were able to organize and conciliate both TJ and DDR strategies.

22

Appendix 1. Summary of legal provisions Country Date Process Relevant Laws

May 31, 1991 November 15, 1994 April 4, 2002 May 1991 - February 1995 February 1995 - June 1997 June 1997 - February 1999

DDR Bicesse Accords Lusaka Protocol Luena Memoradum of Understanding UNAVEM II UNAVEM III MONUA

Angola December 24, 1988 February 3, 1990 May 31, 1991 July 12, 1991 November 10, 1994 November 15, 1994 May 9, 1996 December 15, 2000 April 4, 2002 April 4, 2002

TJ Lei nº 17/88 Lei nº 3/90 Bicesse Accords Lei nº 24/91 Lei nº 18/94 Lusaka Protocol Lei nº 11/96 Lei nº 7/00 Luena Memoradum of Understanding Lei nº 4/02

October 4, 1992 December 1992 - December 1994

DDR GPA (Protocol IV and VI ) UNOMOZ Mandate

17 July and 7 December 1989 December 19, 1987 January, 1, 1989 August, 13, 1989

Lei nº 14/87 Lei nº 9/88 extended Law nº 14/87 to last through 1989 Lei nº 3/89

October 4, 1992 GPA (Protocol VI)

Mozambique

October 13, 1992

TJ

Law No 15/92

Sources: Adapted from Mallinder: 2008 (Blanket amnesties are applied “across the board without requiring any application on the part of the beneficiary or even an initial inquiry into the facts to determine if they fit the law’s scope of application” Meintjes & Mendes (2000) quoted in Mallinder 2008)

23

Bibliography

Anstee, Dame Margaret J. (1996), Orphan of the Cold war. The Inside Story of the Collpase of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Anstee, Dame Margaret J. (2001), “The role of international mediators in conflicts: Lessons learned from Angola”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14 (2): 70-79. Baptista Lundin, Irae (2004). The peace process and the construction of reconciliation post conflict – the experience of Mozambique. Presented in Barcelona under the International Seminar “Experiences of Penal Alternatives in Peace Processes” – Barcelona 27-28 February 2004. Available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/colombia/seminario/seminario018.pdf Baptista Lundin, Irae, and Tomas Vieira Mario (2008), “Mozambique”, in Southern African Regional Mission Reports. Norwegian Centre for Human Rights: University of Oslo, pp 33-46. Available at: http://www.ictj.org/en/news/pubs/index.html Baptista, Irae et al (2000), “Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise: The impact of demobilisation in Mozambique”. In Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The development and security impacts, ed. Kingma. London: Macmillan Press LTD. Bartoli, Andrea and Jebashvili, Rati (2005), “Human rights in negotiating peace agreements: Mozambique”, ICHRP working paper, Belfast. Bekoe, Dorina (2008), Implementing Peace Agreements. Lessons from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Berdal, Mats and Ucko David H. (ed) (2009), Reintegrating armed groups after conflict: politics, violence and transition, London/ New York, Routledge. Birminghan, David (2002), “Angola”, In A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa, eds. in Patrick Chabal et al., London: Hurst & Company, pp. 137-184. Cabral, Llundi. 2005/2006. “Digerir o passado: rituais de purificação e reintegração social de crianças-soldado no sul de Mozambique”. Antropologia Portuguesa, 22/23: 133-156. Comerford, Michael G. (2005), The Peaceful Face of Angola. Biography of a Peace Process (1991 to 2002). Luanda: Michael Comerford. Duthie, Roger (2005), Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration, in Paper presented for the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR), Working Group 3: Reintegration and Peacebuilding meeting, April 4-5. Graybill, Lin S. (2007). “Pardon, punishment and amnesia: three African post-conflict methods”. Third World Quarterly, 25(6): pp. 1117-1130. Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew (2007), Crafting Peace. Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press. Hayner, Priscilla (2001), Unspeakable truths. Confronting state terror and atrocity. How truth commissions around the world are challenging the past and shaping the future, Routledge. Hennop, Ettienne (2001), “Operations Rachel 1995 – 2001”. Arms Management Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No 53. Available at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/53/Paper53.htm. Henriksen, Thomas H. (1976), “Peoples’ War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau”. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 14 (3): 377-399. Hirsch, John L.(2009), “Peace and Justice: Mozambique and Sierra Leone Compared”. In Peace Versus Justice? The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, ed. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, South Aftrica: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 202-219

24

Honwana, Alcinda (2001), “Children of War: Understanding war and war cleansing in Angola and Mozambique”, in Civilians in War, ed., Simon Chesterman, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 123-143. Honwana, Alcinda (2002), “Negotiating Post-War Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola”, In Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus, eds. George Clement Bond, and Nigel Gibson. New York, USA: Westview Press. Honwana, Alcinda (2005), “Healing and Social Reintegration in Mozambique and Angola”, In Roads to Reconcliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri Suhrke, Maryland: Lexington Books, pp. 83-100. Honwana, Alcinda (2006), Child Soldiers in Africa, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvannia Press. Honwana. Alcinda (1998), “Sealing the past, facing the future: trauma healing in rural Mozambique”, In The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective. London: Conciliation Ressources, pp. 75-81. Igreja, Victor (2009) “The Politics of Peace, Justice and–healing in Post-war Mozambique. “Practices of Rupture” by Magamba Spirits and Healers in Gorongosa”. In Peace Versus Justice? The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay. South Aftrica: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 277-300. Igreja, Victor, and Beatrice Dias-Lambranca. (2008) “Restorative justice and the role of magamba spirits in post-civil war Gorongosa, central Mozambique”. In Transitional Justice and Reconciliation after conflict – learning from African experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter. Stockholm: Sweden IDEA. Available at: http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/index.cfm Kersten, Ana Catarina Clemente (2003), “Angola”, In Elections in Africa - A Data Handbook, eds. Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut and Michael Krennerich, Oxford: OUP, pp. 65- 79. Kingma, Kees, ed. (2000), Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Mallinder, Louisse (2008), Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions. Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide, Hart Publishing. Marshall, Monty G. (2006), Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004: A Macro-Comparative Perspective. Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, DfID (UK). http://www.systemicpeace.org/peace.htm McCants, Ashley, Mpani, Glen (2008), “Angola” in Southern African Regional Mission Reports. Norwegian Centre for Human Rights: University of Oslo, pp. 11-31. Available at: http://www.ictj.org/en/news/pubs/index.html. Messiant, Christine (2004), ‘Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail? A critical analysis’, in Guus Meijer, ed., From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process, London: Conciliation Resources. Available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/index.php. Migdal, Joel S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States. State-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Newitt, Malyn (2002), “Mozambique”. In History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa, ed. Patrick Chabal. England: C. Hurts & Co. Ltd, 185-235. Norris, Pippa (2005), “Do power-sharing institutions work? Stable democracy and good governance in divided societies”. Harvard University. Available at: http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/6669.pdf

25

Ottaway, Marina (1998), “Angola’s Failed Elections”, In Postconflict elections, democratization, and international assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 133-151. Parsons, Imogen (2004), “Beyond the silencing of guns: demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration”, in From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process, ed Guus Meijer, London: Conciliation Resources. Available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/index.php Porto, João Gomes and Parsons, Imogen (2003a). Angola’s Institutional Capabilities for DD&R: Experiences and lessons learned from previous processes. Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration. Monograph No 83, pp. 19-30. available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No83/Contents.html Porto, João Gomes and Parsons, Imogen (2003b). DD&R in Angola: The current state of play. in Porto, João Gomes and Parsons, Imogen, Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration. Monograph No 83, pp. 31-40. available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No83/Contents.html Porto, João Gomes and Parsons, Imogen (2003c). Final DD&R Programmes and What’s to Come. in Porto, João Gomes and Parsons, Imogen, Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration. Monograph No 83, pp. 53-73. available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No83/Contents.html Porto, João Gomes; Alden, Chris and Parsons, Imogen (2007), From soldiers to citizens. Demilitarization of conflict and society, Aldershot, Ashgate Roper, Steven D., and Barria, Lilian A. (2009) “Why Do States Commission the Truth? Political Considerations in the Establishment of African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions”, Human Rights Review, 10 (3): 373-391. Sinjela, Mpazi. (1994), “United Nations Peacekeeping Role: The Angolan Experience”, African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 2. Kuwar Law International, pp. 47-70. Sooka, Yasmin Louise. (2009), “The Politics of Transitional Justice”. In Peace Versus Justice? The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, South Aftrica: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 21-43 Sriram, Chandra Lekha et. al (2009). “Beyond justice versus peace: transitional justice and as part of peacebuilding strategies”. Working paper 1, Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, University of East London. Synge, Richard. 1997. Mozambique: UN peacekeeping in action 1992-1994. USA: US Institute for Peace. The Lancet (2002), “Conselho: psychological healing in displaced communities in Angola”, Vol. 25, No. 9336, 14 September 2002. Vaughan, Olufemi (2005), Tradition and politics: indigenous political structures in Africa. Trenton, Asmara: Africa World Press Wheeler, Douglas (2009), “Uma breve história de Angola entre 1971 e 2008”, In História de Angola, eds. Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, Lisboa: Tinta da China, pp. 355-75. Whitaker, Paul M (1970), “The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa”. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8 (1): 15-35. Willis, R (1999), Some Spirits Heal, Others only Dance: A journey into Human Selfhood in an African Village, Oxford: Berg.