Book Reviews

Krushil Watene: University of St Andrews, UK

Felix Rauschmayer: the UFZ-Centre for Environmental Research, Leipzig, Germany

Kristin Williams: the Global Resource Center, George Washington University, Leipzig, USA

Brian Jenkin: studies Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Division of Religious and Theological Studies, Boston University, USA

Alejandra Boni: Universidad Politécnica of Valencia, Spain

Final version of a paper which was published in 2011 in theJournal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12 (3), 457-467.

Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities

Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns (Eds), 2010Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, ix + 257 pp.,ISBN 978-0-521-71147-0 (paperback)

A theory of justice must provide us with answers to

a number of questions. Important among them is thequestion of how (by what metric) we assessindividual advantage, and determine when statesof affairs are (more or less) just. How shouldwe answer this question? One answer (associatedwith John Rawls) is the primary goods metric.According to this approach, we should focus onindividual holdings of important goods. Weshould measure individual advantage and states ofaffairs based on the possession of somestandardized package of goods (basic liberties,powers and prerogatives, income and wealth, and thesocial basis of self-respect). Another answer(associated with Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum)is the capability metric. According to thisapproach, we ought to focus on what individualsare able to do and be. It is, on this view, notenough to focus on the possession of somestandardized package of goods, but more appropriateto look at how (and whether) these goodscontribute to the kinds of lives individuals areable to live. This leads proponents of thecapability metric to accept (and proponents of theprimary goods metric to deny) that a theory ofjustice must be sensitive to an individual’sability to convert goods into functionings.

The primary aim of this volume of essays is tocompare these two widely held answers to thequestion of what the metric of justice ought tobe. The aim is to further consider the differencesbetween them, and to ask whether there are any(theoretical and/or practical) reasons forfavouring one over the other.

The first section considers some of thetheoretical reasons for favouring primary goods orcapabilities. The section begins with a paper byThomas Pogge, in which two main claims are made.The first is that the differences between primarygoods and capabilities have been overstated. Hecontends that the primary goods metric is able totake on board many of the insights that thecapability metric has contributed to thediscussion. Thus, the metric of primary goods(despite claims made by proponents of thecapability metric that it cannot) is, on closerexamination, able to deal quite well withdifferences between individuals. Pogge then pointsout that the metric of primary goods has done muchmore than the capability metric has managed to, sofar, achieve. Pogge points out that it remains tobe seen whether the capability approach is able todeliver a public criterion of justice that wouldcompete with John Rawls’ two principles. Erin Kellysupports the contention that the differencebetween primary goods and capabilities isoverblown. However, Kelly furthers Pogge’s secondclaim by arguing that the difference betweenprimary goods and capabilities turns on whether aproponent of the capability metric will commit toprotecting capabilities over time. Such acommitment (amounting to a perfectionist theory ofjustice) not only departs from the primary goodsmetric, but it gives us (or so Kelly contends) goodreason to reject the capability metric.

Taking issue with the claim that there is verylittle separating the approaches, ElisabethAnderson highlights that (among other things)

informal social inequalities (such as unjuststigmas and stereotypes) are both invisible tothe primary goods metric and beyond the reach ofresource re-distribution. These inequalitiesaffect what individuals are able to do and be—not necessarily what goods they have or couldget. We need to focus on capabilities andfunctionings to pick them up and address them.Anderson then points out that preferring thecapability metric does not commit one to anyparticular principle(s) of justice—let aloneperfectionist ones. After all, a proponent of theapproach could hold something like her‘capabilities-based principle of democraticequality’ (p. 95)—a ‘sufficientarian standard’ thatdoes not offer a comprehensive theory (p. 83). Itseems, then, quite possible to develop principlesof justice that support the capability metric.Richard Arneson supports both of Anderson’sclaims. However, Arneson (departing from theother contributors) rounds this section up byclaiming that we ought to ensure that individualsare actually able to live good lives. What matters forsocial justice (or so Arneson contends) arecapabilities that are ordered by an objectivelist. What social justice requires, in otherwords, is a perfectionist theory of well-being.

Section Two considers primary goods andcapabilities in light of some important practicalchallenges. Interestingly, like Section One, theessays diverge on the issue of whether there isanything that separates the approaches. A numberof contributors seem to suggest, at least in lightof the practical issues they examine, that

framing the question as a choice between primarygoods and capabilities might not be the best wayto move forward. For instance, Norman Danielspoints out that there is very little separatingthe metrics once we accommodate the importanceof health within Rawls’ approach. Likewise, ColinMcLeod tells us that neither primary goods norcapabilities give us all of what we require todeal with children. But the problem, according toMcLeod, lies in the way that both metrics rely onan account of agency – leading both metrics tooverlook those goods that stand apart from thedevelopment of agency. Similarly, on the questionof what account of educational opportunities bestguide practise, Harry Brighouse and ElaineUnterhalter conclude that neither primary goodsnor capabilities (alone) provide us with anadequate way forward.

So how then, should we work towards solvingthese problems? Norman Daniels tells us that thesignificant question for both approaches—at leastwhen we are dealing with health—is what we oughtto do with the limited resources that we have.Colin McLeod suggests that we rethink bothapproaches, and do so with the ‘intrinsic goods ofchildhood’ (p. 187) in mind from the start. HarryBrighouse and Elaine Unterhalter suggest that acombined approach is likely to provide us with themost useful guidance for education, and soencourage researchers to work on developing a hybridtheory.

This is, however, not the conclusion drawn onall of the issues considered. Lori Terzi (writing

on disability) and Ingrid Robeyns (writing ongender) maintain that capabilities seem to be morepromising than primary goods. In line withElisabeth Anderson’s contention, they both claimthat the metric of primary goods leaves us short-changed, and that we need to move beyond it toengage with the way disability and gender issuesfeature on the ground. They are, however, inagreement with the contention that there is (forproponents of the capability metric) still morework to be done. Terzi points out that the listquestion and indexing question require moreconsideration, and that there is a need toarticulate principles that ensure ‘the demands ofall disabled people are demands of justice’ (p.169). Similarly, Ingrid Robeyns points out that thecapability metric requires principles that movebeyond the political and structural limits foundin Rawls. That is, if we want to find a way todeal with gender injustices.

While the aim of this volume is to compareprimary goods and capabilities, it is no greatsurprise that the book examines, considers, and socontributes far more than this. An importantconclusion is that we must go beyond a discussionof the metric of justice to get to the bottom ofthe differences between primary goods andcapabilities. Indeed it is very difficult (asAmartya Sen points out in his concluding remarks)to read some of the papers without reading intothe background assumptions about justice, and theframework within which the metric of primarygoods (in particular) sits. Framing the questionaround the metric of justice does, then, make some

of the papers difficult to follow. Overall,however, the volume illuminates all of the issuesit examines, and all the questions it raises.

This volume is, no doubt, a significantcontribution to the literature on theories ofjustice, an important accompaniment to the recentworks by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, and animportant resource for anyone interested inpolitical philosophy. Most significantly, thevolume helps to raise the question of how theoriesof justice ought to develop, and the question ofwhere the capability approach to justice (inparticular) might go to from here. If we acceptthat a theory of justice ought to speak to all ofthe practical challenges covered, then we are leftwith serious questions about the kind of theoryable to do so. We are, as it happens, also leftwith questions about whether there are otherchallenges that deserve our attention (such as theenvironment and future people), and what insightsthese challenges might provide us with indeveloping such a theory. Perhaps more engagementwith how current theories might be modified inlight of the challenges considered, as well as somethoughts on what we include within the scope ofjustice, would have been helpful. That aside, thevolume certainly leaves us with a good manyimportant questions and challenges to consider. Iam sure it will generate more thought anddiscussion around all of them.

KRUSHIL WATENE # 2011

Krushil Watene is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of St Andrews, UK

Breaking the Poverty Cycle: The Human Basis forSustainable Development

Susan Pick and Jenna T. Sirkin, 2010Oxford University Press, Oxford, 336 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-538316-4

Susan Pick and Jenna T. Sirkin combine quite a fewissues in their book Break- ing the Poverty Cycle: AmartyaSen’s capability approach (CA) with thepsychological theory on human change; programmeparticipants’ testimonies with theoreticalexplications; a long-standing political humanisticengagement with scientific rigour. This seems tobe a pretty vast endeavour—and quite risky, too.But the authors succeed to write up the challenge.

The book starts with Susan Pick’s personalstory—as a young Ph.D. student in psychology(attending a course on economic theory by AmartyaSen) she worked on family planning in Mexico,already combining psychological research (theory ofplanned behaviour) with the perspective ofcapabilities. For the past 25 years, she has beenprofessor and president of the NGO IMIFAP, theMexican Research Institute on Family andPopulation, implementing her basic idea: enablingMexican women to implement family planning—and

going far beyond this.

The book follows with three sections: the firstsets the scene, presenting Mexican socio-culturalnorms that impede individual and social change,illustrated by personal testimonies; the secondsection develops and explains a ‘Framework forEnabling Empowerment’; and the third section showshow this framework has been translated intoconcrete development programmes on family planning,sexual education, health programmes, teachingattitudes, and so forth. Here, the authors explainhow the programmes are designed and implemented ona local level, and are then scaled up to reachmore than 250 000 people with one singleprogramme.

I want to focus on the framework as this is theacademically intriguing part of the book andconstitutes an enriching combination ofpsychological theories of behaviour and change withthe CA. The framework does not deal with externalstate-financed empowerment as a passive means toexpand access to services and commodities orrefined doing functionings, but expands on theintrinsic empowerment of the people. The enrichmentof the CA by psychological theories makes adistinction between refined doing functioning (as thefirst aim of intervention) and refined beingfunctioning (as the, often intended, result of arepetition of such changed doings functionings)plausible and fruit- ful. The authors show thatteaching life-skills and other tools to addresssituational demands (such as communication oraccounting skills, knowledge on health issues or

reproduction, or the reduction of psychologicalbarriers by self-knowledge, reflection andmanagement of emotions) expand capability sets farbeyond the concrete situation. The teaching isdeveloped based on a needs assessment of theprogramme beneficiaries.

Pick and Sirkin explain (and statements fromprogramme participants spread throughout the bookillustrate nicely their scientific arguments) thatthe use of these tools leads to a changed behaviour;that is, refined doing functionings. By repeatingsuch behaviour, personal agency, norms, andattitudes change (i.e. the refined beingfunctionings) herewith constituting a secondincrease of the capability set. The third increaseof the capability set comes about through changesin the context, as empowered individuals veryoften succeed to change their social,institutional, or political environment towards anincrease in participatory decision-making in familylife, educational systems, political or financialinstitutions, to name just a few examples.

As you may have noticed, this book inspired me—and I am already using some thoughts in two of myresearch projects. There is one major flaw, though—a flaw that can also be found in the wider CA: theprevalent neglect of the natural environment. Pickand Sirkin talk of sustainable human development(this is even their subtitle), but in the book theyuse sustainable development in the generalmeaning; that is, a development that lasts. I seeno indication that they extend the temporal scopeof sustainability beyond a couple of years; that

is, they do not use the political notion of‘Sustainable Development’ that—for the past 20years—has combined intra-generational with inter-generational fairness and herewith necessarily hasto consider irreversible changes of our naturalenvironment. I understand that when working withpoor people in Mexico this is not the most pressingissue, but the dependency of poor people on localecosystem services endangers the sustainability oftheir development in our era of biodiversity loss,climate change, land grab, bio-fuels, and so forth.For me, working in rich Europe, the open (andinspiring) question is whether Pick and Sirkin’s‘Framework for Enabling Empowerment’ can be used toenable rich people to better assume theirresponsibility for a truly sustainable humandevelopment; that is, a development that does notendanger human development elsewhere now and in thefuture.

I recommend this book to those who want toimprove the efficacy of the CA via the practicalempowerment of the poor; to those who look for apsychological amplification of the CA; and to thosewho want to get motivated by the resumedtheoretical and practical experiences of 25 rathersuccessful years of empowering poor people inMexico by reading a well-written and inspiringbook.

FELIX RAUSCHMAYER # 2011Felix Rauschmayer is with the UFZ-Centre for EnvironmentalResearch, Leipzig, Germany

Absolute Poverty and Global Justice

Elke Mack, Michael Schramm, Stephan Klasen and ThomasPogge (Eds), 2009 Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 279pp., ISBN 978-0-7546-7849-6

This book revolves around the Erfurt Manifestoprinciples; a set of practical recommendationsintended to give the reduction of national andglobal inequalities higher political priority. Therecommendations emerged from discussions onensuring progress in poverty reduction held amongeconomists, legal scholars, moral philosophers,development practitioners, political scientists, andtheologians at an interdisciplinary workshopsponsored by the German Research Foundation andheld in Erfurt, Germany in 2008. The recommendedpolicies strongly emphasize ranking povertyreduction equally alongside domestic priorities inwealthier countries. Commentary on the manifestoby the late Michael Ward admits that equalconsideration of global poverty is indeedcontroversial, but claims that distributivejustice improvements require more attention inorder for poverty-related death, disease, andcurtailed prospects to be effectively addressed.

Keeping both scholar and practitioner in mind,Elke Mack’s introduction outlines the book’sstructure and four phases for developing a system ofglobal justice in which poor individuals are thesubject. The book takes an interdisciplinary

approach, reflecting on what normative argumentsproduce relevant criteria for the protection ofhuman dignity. Assuming factual consensus on humanrights, this approach is used to cut across fourprinciple fields of research: economics, Christiantheology, the philosophy of justice, and methodsfor implementation. Mack’s introduction is easilyaccessible and provides background for how theseseemingly disparate fields overlap in theirconcern for distributive justice.

The book is divided into four parts. The firstpart presents and evaluates recent work in thefield of economics to measure poverty and trackprogress towards its reduction. Focusing on theeffort to halve poverty by 2015 through the UnitedNations’ Millennium Development Goals, the authorsexamine the adopted methods of measurement,collected data, and subsequent revisions topoverty counts produced by the World Bank. Withoutrecourse to technical vocabulary, the part oneelucidates substantial problems with trackingprogress in meeting the Millennium DevelopmentGoal. Michael Ward’s constructive pursuit of analternative approach is unfortunately merelysketched out due to the author’s untimely death.Yet, for those who are unfamiliar with the WorldBank’s methods of cross-country comparison ofpoverty, this part provides a concise overview.Some of the recent methodological changes and theirmotivations are explored, and an alternative routeis indicated.

The second part, ‘Christian Ethics on Justiceand the Poor’, is to serve as a case of a

comprehensive ethical doctrine that could informnormative claims of distributive justice.Discussions of justice are extracted fromtheological texts and their relevance for globaldistributive justice is examined. At the end ofPart Two, Johannes Muller and Michael Redercriticize secularizing public discourse, arguingthat religion can make a valuable contribution byeffectively mobilizing its members to rectifyglobal inequalities, and so should not be excluded.However, this part’s exclusive reliance onChristian theology to develop methods forextracting views of human dignity from acomprehensive doctrine weakens confidence in theapplicability of those same methods to othercomprehensive doctrines.

Part Three, ‘Global Theories of Justice andResponsibility’, is concerned with normative claimsof responsibility to eradicate poverty and thedemands poverty places on the global community. Theauthors in Part Three examine debates of globaljustice that hinder consensus on what organizationsshould be doing to effectively alleviate poverty.Principle issues of disagreement on the bestapproach and the trade-offs involved are canvassed.Yet, any reader who remains unconvinced thatconsensus on minimum criteria of human dignityhas in fact been reached may struggle with themanifold claims this appeal is supposed to supportin part three.

The fourth part, ‘Policies and Actions’, laysout a number of reforms designed to make piecemealheadway in addressing poverty-related concerns.

Transforming economic, corporate, and politicalinstitutions so as to make poverty alleviation theforemost priority is advocated; and the normativeclaims in Part Three are used to guiderecommendations. This part of the book bridges theproposed initiatives with current work in thefields of public health, business, and climatechange by providing analysis of current projectsand related resources. Proposals will be ofparticular interest to the development practitioneror those seeking to design projects with a viewtowards concerns of distributive justice. Inconclusion, Else Øyen reflects on the impact ofproblems within three major conceptual frameworksaddressing poverty in the research community andcalls for more opportunity in cross-disciplineresearch.

While appeal to sufficient consensus leaves roomfor disagreement among authors, the trade-offshighlighted in Part Three undermine the claimthat consensus has been found in the ErfurtManifesto’s principles. The reader will find someagreement from one essay to the next but, whenconsidered as a whole, individual arguments pullin different directions. In particular, it is leftunclear what distributive justice requires in viewof conflicting demands of human rights, or howprotection of human dignity is to help solve thematter. Yet the conflict lends strength to Øyen’scall for cross-discipline research that prioritizesfinding consensus on poverty- related issueswithin the research community.

The collection provides a cross-disciplinary

view of concerns for a global theory ofdistributive justice relevant to policy-makers anddevelopment practitioners who are looking to spana variety a disciplines in formulating policy ordesigning a project with a view to the least welloff globally. The collection would be useful forlibraries of international non-governmentalorganizations and humanitarian agencies as areference for methods of incorporating disparateviews in policy or project design.

KRISTIN WILLIAMS # 2011

Kristin Williams is with the Global Resource Center, GeorgeWashington University, USA

Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems

Alexander Kaufman (Ed.), 2006Routledge, New York, 239 pp., ISBN 0-415-36055-2

This edited volume capably lays out the main pointsof contention surrounding what has come to be knownas the ‘capabilities approach’ to human developmentand social justice. That is, is a focus onachieving equality of capabilities—roughly, whatAmartya Sen (the pioneer of the approach) claimsrepresent a person’s freedoms to be (e.g. healthyor ill) and do (e.g. work or not work)—better thana focus on equality of welfare or equality of resourcesfor achieving equality of justice? While thecontributing authors actively disagree over the

answer to this question, they nonetheless share asingular goal: that of providing conceptualclarity to an intrinsically complex—and frequentlymisunderstood—argument. Considering the amount ofwork published on the capabilities approach sincethis volume’s arrival (much of it dealing with thevery same points of contention) one might be ledto believe that the authors fail to providecompelling resolutions, or at least navigableroadmaps to future

resolutions, to those yet concerned that: thecapabilities approach is needlessly sufficientarian(i.e. it aims only to achieve minimum levels ofbasic capabilities); it is not clearlydifferentiated from other equality-focusedapproaches (e.g. those that focus on welfare orresources); and its (theoretical) commitments arenot readily appropriable by (practical) policyframeworks.

Such a judgment, however, would be too hasty.Universal ‘resolutions’ to problems of justice areforever wanting; practitioners and policy-makersare time and again left with choosing amongstbetter or worse temporary ‘fixes’ that(imperfectly) meet the particular social, cultural,and political dynamics of the context underconsideration, whether local, national, or global.

The book is divided accordingly; each of itsthree sections addresses one of the above-statedconcerns in detail. The ‘Introduction’ first spellsout the manner in which the capabilities approachpositively expands the conceptual resources of

egalitarian discourse, especially as itsspecialized vocabulary more satisfactorily givesexpression to: intuitions regarding the properdistri- bution of social goods (e.g. egalitarianjustice’s distribution should balance out ‘morallyarbitrary’ factors); and intuitions regardingegalitarian justice’s proper scope (e.g. it shouldconcern itself primarily with rectifying thekinds of inequalities for which one is notresponsible).

In focusing on whether the capabilitiesapproach aims too narrowly at sufficientariansatisfaction of basic capabilities, Part I balancesboth persuasive critique and defense of this claimwith a judicious treatment of the approach’sinherent flexibility. The capabilities approach,like most approaches to egalitarian justice,lends itself to multiform theoretical formulationand practical implementation. For example,capabilities theorists disagree widely over theimportance of enumerating a specific list of basiccapabilities in achieving widespread consensus forthe approach. The chapters of Part II focus on thecompatibility or incompatibility of thecapabilities approach with alternatives that focusinstead on opportunities for personal well-being. Aninability to competently address the largersocial structures that perpetuate various typesof inequality then reveals itself as the realnarrowness of the capabilities approach—a result,perhaps, of its preferred focus on balancing theconditions resulting from those structures, such asgender inequality. Again, however, the pluralisticframework of the approach enables it to maneuver

effectively around such challenges. Finally, whetheror not that conceptual pluralism can translate intopracticable policy is taken up in Part III. Here,in pragmatist fashion, it is convincingly arguedthat the approach’s theoretical robustness is allfor naught without certain social and politicalcommitments to aid its practical success. Variousinstitutional forms are explored and evaluated tothis end, with an emergent and clear preference forthat of deliberative democracy.

A conspicuous omission from the volume’sanalysis—surprising, given the number ofphilosophers represented—is an assessment of theontological categories and epistemologicalassumptions operative in the capabilities approachitself. For instance, are capabilitiescorrespondent to individuals or do they arise moreclearly among relations between individuals? Arecapabilities even on the same logical level asresources and welfare when they more clearly applyto persons and not things? Likewise, is justice astate achieved or an ongoing process? And, finally,can any of these concerns be resolvedaprioristically? Adopting more explicit positionson such implicit concerns would greatly aid theauthors’ shared goal of bringing much need clarityto the somewhat vague philosophical foundation ofthe capabilities approach, whether motivated bycritical or defensive impulses. It would especiallyassist the most innovative arguments in the volume—those that attempt to expand the narrow,anthropocentric and able-bodied focus of thecapabilities approach to include important yetoften overlooked considerations of the environment

and the disabled.

BRIAN JENKIN # 2011

Brian Jenkin studies Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Division of Religious and Theological Studies, Boston University, USA

Desigualdades Sociales y Oportunidades Ciudadanas

Graciela Tonon (Ed.), 2008Espacio Editorial, Buenos Aires, 174 pp., ISBN 9078-950-802-294-3

El texto compilado por la Dra. Graciela Tono´n esuna contribucio´n muy valiosa a la literatura sobrecapacidades y desarrollo humano en lenguacastellana.

Son pocos los textos publicados en espan˜ol quenos presenten resultados de investigacionesinterdisciplinares en los que se haya empleado elenfoque de las capacidades para evaluar lapercepcio´n que de su calidad de vida tienen laspersonas. Tambie´n es destacable la discusio´n queaqu´ı se hace de la cuestio´n de la identidad apartir de los textos de Sen, un ´ambito muy pocoexplorado en la literatura sobre capacidades encastellano.

El libro tiene cuatro cap´ıtulos. En el primero,

la Dra. Tono´n nos presenta un resumen de loselementos b´asicos de la teor´ıa de las capacidadeshumanas y una discusio´n sobre la problem´aticade construir indicadores sociales y pol´ıticospara la medicio´n de la calidad de vida. Tras ello,se enumeran unas primeras evidencias extra´ıdas dela realizacio´n de un estudio, basado en elcuestionario del equipo de Anand, llevado a cabo endiversas ciudades argentinas con el objetivo deidentificar las desigualdades sociales y lasoportunidades reales de la poblacio´n. A la horade entender mejor el estudio y, como se ha dichoanteriormente, dado la escasez de publicaciones encastellano sobre esta tem´atica, se hubieraagradecido que la autora incluyera una copia delcuestionario utilizado. Adem´as, como matiza ellamisma, la tarea de convertir el cuestionariooriginal a un instrumento que sirviera para losintereses del proyecto supuso algo m´as querealizar una simple traduccio´n del instrumentooriginal. El cap´ıtulo continu´a con un primer an´alisis de unos resultados generales; la informacio´n es interesante en relacio´n con el contextoargentino aunque, dado el intere´s metodolo´gicosubrayado por la autora y dado el car´acterexploratorio de esta primera interpretacio´n de losresultados, hubiera sido pertinente una discusio´nsobre que´ aporta el cuestionario empleado aotros estudios cuantitativos sobre calidad de vidaen Argentina.

Elaborado por L´ıa Rodr´ıguez de la Vega, elsegundo cap´ıtulo repasa las contribuciones deAmartya Sen a la cuestio´n de la identidad.Frente a las visiones de la econom´ıa que han

optado por ignorar las identidades culturales opresuponer la filiacio´n a una sola identidad, Sendiscute que las identidades son plurales y queexiste una capacidad de discutir, de manera impl´ıcita o expl´ıcita, la importancia relativa quecada persona habr´a de dar, en un con- textoparticular, a las distintas lealtades que compitenpor prioridad. Tras ello, se presentan losresultados de un estudio que ha averiguado laspercepciones de la poblacio´n sobre ladiscriminacio´n por orientacio´n sexual, raza, ge´nero, religio´n, edad, apariencia y lugar deresidencia. Lamentablemente, la autora no facilitadatos de la poblacio´n que ha respondido a laspreguntas del estudio ni tampoco el tipo decuestionario utilizado. Se puede suponer que lamuestra es la misma que la que se presenta en elcap´ıtulo 1, pero nada se dice al respecto, loque hace que esta segunda parte del cap´ıtuloquede un tanto confusa y dif´ıcil de entender.Tampoco queda muy claro co´mo de la discusio´nanterior que nos presenta el riqu´ısimo marcoconceptual de Sen, se pasa a las categor´ıas de lasencuestas. Es cierto que se manejan dis- tintascaracter´ısticas (orientacio´n sexual, ge´nero,edad, etc.) que est´an ligadas a la identidad, peroel texto se hubiera clarificado con la explicacio´ndel paso de las identidades a la discriminacio´n y,posteriormente, a la construccio´n de laspreguntas.

El tercer cap´ıtulo ha sido realizado por WalterCueto, Alberto Molina y Paula Petrelli y versasobre capacidades y calidad democr´atica. Seestudia cu´ales ser´ıan las condiciones,

capacidades y/o derechos b´asicos que permiten a unindividuo funcionar como agente, prestando especialintere´s a las libertades pol´ıticas y las garant´ıas de transparencia. Su eleccio´n responde a queson las m´as directamente vinculadas con el tema dela calidad de las pr´acticas democr´aticas ygeneran particular intere´s en Mendoza. Este cap´ıtulo presenta consideraciones interesantes sobrelas im´agenes y percepciones que tienen losciudadanos de Mendoza sobre la calidad democr´atica. Al igual que el cap´ı- tulo primero, quiz´asse podr´ıa haber subrayado en mayor medida losmatices que sobre calidad democr´atica permitenapreciar el enfoque de las capacidades comparado conotras maneras de medir las pr´acticas democr´aticas.

Por u´ltimo, el cap´ıtulo cuarto, escrito pordiferentes autores, presenta una visio´n del gradode satisfaccio´n de los habitantes de la Ciudaddel Mar de Plata en relacio´n con la salud,seguridad y vivienda. El texto puede ser de intere´s para geo´grafos que quieran entrar en el terrenode las capacidades, aunque la discusio´n que serealiza sobre las mismas es escueta, lo quedificulta la comprensio´n, ame´n de que ellenguaje utilizado es, en ocasiones, poco claro.

En resumen, el libro es un buen ejemplo de lasposibilidades que abre el enfoque de las capacidadesa la investigacio´n social; es tambie´n un valorque se publique en castellano porque, sin duda,puede contribuir a difundir en mayor medida esteenfoque. Siendo el resultado de un proyecto comu´n, se echa de menos mayor ligazo´n entre los

diferentes cap´ıtulos y mayor clarificacio´n de lametodolog´ıa empleada. Asimismo, la calidad de lasaportaciones no es muy homoge´nea, lo que puedeoscurecer, por momentos, los me´ritos del libro.

ALEJANDRA BONI # 2011

Alejandra Boni is Associate Professor at the Universidad Polite´cnica of Valencia, Spain.