Aaron Winter, DPhil in Social & Political Thought, School of Social Sciences & Cultural Studies, University of Sussex, Awarded 2007. Supervisors: Prof. William Outhwaite (Sussex) and Prof. Clive Webb (Sussex). Examiners: Prof. Stephen Burman (Sussex) and Dr. Martin Durham (Wolverhampton)

Chapter 1

Becoming Extreme: Definitions, Histories and Trajectories

The extreme right in America has a long and diverse history and can be divided into five distinct eras,

each comprising multiple movements and organisations. In each era, old organisations disappeared and

new ones emerged, with the sole exception of the Ku Klux Klan which has been there since the

beginning. Just as extreme right movements and organisations rise and fall throughout history, so has the

extreme right itself. Each era was represented by a historically and politically specific form or

manifestation which emerged and declined within a particular historical time frame and political context,

yet it remained within historical memory and popular consciousness, like a spectre or ghost that

threatened to return. After seven years of relative quiet since the end of the third era, in the late-1970s,

two developments occurred from within the ranks of the Klan that signalled to many the revival of the

extreme right from the historical and political margins. The first was in 1975 when David Duke, Grand

Dragon of the Louisiana Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, began his mainstreaming strategy in order to

adapt to and win elections in the new post-civil rights era, and inaugurated the fourth era.1 The second, in

direct contrast to Duke’s mainstreaming response to the new political era, was a year later in 1976 when

Louis Beam, leader of the Texas Knights, issued his infamous call to arms “where the ballot fails, the

bullet will prevail”,2 which inaugurated the fifth era.

In spite of its explicit call to political violence, this statement could not initially compete with the

national press given to Duke or the implications of a notorious Klansman being elected and exerting

political power within a post-civil rights era liberal democracy. In spite of the early attention paid to

Duke, within five short years of Beam’s call to arms, America began to experience a rise in violent acts

and events linked to or committed by the newer and more radical extreme right movements of the fifth

era. This phenomenon quickly overshadowed and surpassed the political threat posed by Duke in the

eyes of the state, media, activists and academics, all of whom refocused their attention away from

mainstreaming to this more visceral and concrete threat of extremism. As such, they attempted to identify

and define these movements, trace their history and determine whether they represented a revival or

radicalisation of the historical extreme right, or an altogether new phenomenon. What occurred was far

from a revival or mere radicalisation, but rather a re-politicisation of the historical extreme right out of

which emerged an entirely new phenomenon, one that created a clear division between the past and 1 James Ridgeway, Blood In the Face: The Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Nazi Skinheads, and the Rise of a New White Culture (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1990), p. 146. 2 Ibid. p. 87.

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present, and between the mainstream and extreme right. In spite of this, the significance of such

developments was obscured by the influence of past manifestations on paradigms for the definition and

analysis of the contemporary extreme right, as well as the growing debate surrounding the use of the term

itself which had come into disrepute. It is a term which, I will argue, needs not only to be retained but

also redefined in order to address the developments of the fifth era and differentiate it from both its

predecessors and the mainstream right.

In this chapter, I examine these developments and put the fifth era and Christian Patriot movement,

which is my case study, in their analytic, historical and contemporary political contexts. In the first

section, I place the fifth era in its analytic context by surveying various definitions of the extreme right,

the issues and problems raised by them, and the challenges posed by its emergence. I proceed by

examining the history of the extreme right, from the first up until the fifth era, in order to analyse and

compare different historical manifestations which informed such definitions, analytic paradigms and the

debates surrounding them. Finally, I examine the development of, and the forms taken by, the fifth era

extreme right in relation to both their predecessors and existing analytic paradigms in order to illustrate

the historical transformation which occurred and the analytic paradigm shift it necessitates.

The Extreme Right: Definitions and Debates

When new political phenomena are encountered, the first task is to identify and then define them.

Although attempts to define the extreme right (or related phenomena) strive for clarity, coherence and

accuracy, and to fulfil a certain set of methodological requirements, there is little consensus as to its

definition. The labels and categories which have been developed and applied are diverse and conflicting.

They can be broken down into five specific, although overlapping, sub-categories. Each represents a

different level or register through which to identify, define and differentiate such phenomena, from the

most general to the most specific manifestation. These sub-categories are: positional or taxonomic

umbrella categories such as “extreme right” or “radical right”; historical-ideological categories such as

“fascism” or “populism”; thematic categories such as “racist right” or “religious right”; and, typological

categories such as “white supremacist” or “anti-communist”. In this chapter I will limit myself to the first

category, as I am dealing with the fifth era as a whole, and because the majority of literature on the

extreme right begins with and pivots on the concept of extremism.

Positional or taxonomic umbrella categories such as the extreme-, radical-, far-, hard- or ultra-right have

many meanings, functions and implications. Firstly, these categories refer to the particular position of

different phenomena on the political spectrum measured in terms of distance from the centre outwards to

the extreme end of the right (or left) pole, and differentiate between them in terms of such distance. It

must be noted that of the five categories listed only “far” represents distance while the others refer to a

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particular relationship to the centre, an issue that I shall return to. Secondly, these taxonomic or umbrella

categories are used to encompass, and signify a chain of equivalence between, a diverse set of

phenomena based on a family resemblance or co-presence within an established taxonomy which

constitutes a category. Thirdly, as with all labels and definitions these not only have a descriptive

function but a discursive, ideological and even prescriptive function. Both within the literature and

popular discourse, such terms are used to de-legitimise and demonise activists and movements. As such

terms designate a position outside and in opposition to the mainstream and legitimate political order, by

labelling an activist or movement this way, one discredits their politics and presents them as a threat to

the safety and security of that order.

According to Cas Mudde, there are at least fifty-eight possible characteristics which identify and define

the extreme right, including: racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-communism, nationalism,

patriotism, libertarianism or authoritarianism, paramilitarism, violence, terrorism and conspiracism.3

Such taxonomic definitions allow for the identification and inclusion of new phenomena, although they

are typically based on manifestations in different historical, political and geographical contexts. Where

new characteristics are encountered these can be included as part of the taxonomic register and the

category can be expanded. This effectively creates a de-contextualised reservoir in which historical and

contemporary phenomena and characteristics are placed and conflated irrespective of their meaning in

the context from which they are derived and to which they are applied. As such, taxonomic definitions

can be either analytically reductionist in their application, historically presentist in their use or apply to

characteristics that exist across the political spectrum, including the mainstream.

Taxonomic registers allow one to identify and define phenomena in the present based on characteristics

derived from past manifestations. Such characteristics are relieved of their context, as well as the form in

which they existed and were represented. Moreover, it is because of their manifestation within history

that these characteristics are significant to those observing subsequent political developments. Nowhere

is this more evident than when writers and commentators on the subject warn of the revival of the

extreme right. The spectres of the past loom large on the present in this field, particularly Nazism for

Europeans (and the Western world) and the Klan for Americans. In fact, because of its sequential

designation, it is widely assumed that the fifth era represents a revival of the American extreme right.

Much like Mudde’s taxonomic register, the history of the American extreme right from the first to the

third era provides its own rich reservoir of ideologies, strategies and other characteristics to mine for the

identification and definition of emergent phenomena. The main problem with this is that, because these

historical manifestations provide the terms and paradigms that allow for the identification and definition

of new phenomena, this enables the establishment of historical and analytic continuity where difference

and discontinuity may occur. 3 Cas Mudde cited in Paul Hainsworth, ‘Introduction: The Extreme Right’, in The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 2000), p. 9.

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We see this most acutely in Roger Griffin’s work on fascism. For Griffin fascism is a Weberian “Ideal-

Type” which provides both the ideological core for extreme right movements and the paradigm for their

definition and analysis. According to Griffin, fascism is a form of ideological “palingenesis”, the

mobilising vision and operating logic which is, taken from the Greek, that of rebirth from the ashes or

remnants of the past.4 While there is no doubt that Nazism (as opposed to Italian or Spanish fascism),

figures largely in the extreme right imagination, the problem is that Griffin turns a particular historical

phenomenon, the spectre of which looms large in the modern era, into a living thing and a functioning

analytic concept that can be altered and applied to accommodate difference and discontinuity. As such,

the analytic concept and paradigm of fascism enjoys the same properties of its object, and thus also

represents an example of “palingenesis”. What Griffin fails to recognise is that fascism is not a living

thing that is always in the process of becoming, but an analytic concept that is always in the process of

being altered and applied.

In terms of the concept of the extreme right and the problem of its application across historical and

political contexts, this is illustrated in Paul Hainsworth’s edited volume The Politics of the Extreme

Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream.5 In this volume, the authors examine cases from across the

world, including: Jean Marie LePen’s Front National in France, Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party of Austria

(FPO) and the American Klan, neo-Nazi and Patriot movements. With the sole exception of Michael Cox

and Martin Durham’s chapter on the latter, “The Politics of Anger: The Extreme Right in the United

States”,6 every other case study is on parliamentary movements. The reasons for this may lie in the title

and focus of the volume on the revival of the extreme right “from the margins to the mainstream”. For

Hainsworth, this revival and specific trajectory refers to the (re-) emergence of the characteristics in

Mudde’s list, in the form of the movements which espouse them in the post-cold war era, following their

de-legitimisation and marginalisation after the defeat of Nazism. The ability to measure this revival and

mainstream status is difficult and limits the scope of cases and analysis. The authors are left with the best

method available for gauging it, namely quantifiable data through electoral polls, results and support,

which can only be provided by parliamentary political parties, thus blurring the distinction between the

mainstream and extreme right.

M. Minkenberg attempts to address this issue by arguing that the parliamentary parties and movements in

question “[….] are ‘extreme’ not in terms of being against or outside the existing constitutional order but

in terms of being extreme within it”.7 He continues by stating that these parties and movements abide by

“[….] a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates”. 8 The

4 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 34. 5 Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right. 6 Michael Cox and Martin Durham, ‘The Politics of Anger: The Extreme Right in the United States’, in The Politics of the Extreme Right, pp. 287-311. 7 M. Minkenberg cited in Hainsworth, ‘Introduction: The Extreme Right’, p. 7. 8 Ibid.

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problem of reconciling what is considered to be extremist, because it espouses anti-democratic values,

with its acceptance of the democratic or parliamentary order is dealt with by Michael Wieviorka who

points out that such discourses have the potential to incite violence in others; yet those others are not

included in the definition or analysis of the extreme right.9 The biggest problem with such definitions and

arguments is not simply that they negate the boundaries between the mainstream and extreme right, but

that they limit the political spectrum itself to parliamentary movements, and hence effectively empty the

space between the centre and extreme end of the spectrum where such distinctions are made. As a result,

where extra-parliamentary or paramilitary movements appear, if they even register on this spectrum, they

are conflated with parliamentary ones.

For Joe Roy Jr. of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Intelligence Project, the distinction between the

mainstream and extreme right is much clearer. According to Roy, movements defined as

extreme/extremist are “right of the radical right”, based on their abandonment of reason and logic (e.g.

conspiracy theory) and rejection of the political system and its processes. Roy emphasises the

abandonment of reason and logic as a constitutional characteristic of extremism. While it is not clear

what constitutes reason or logic (or its abandonment), it is clear that such irrational ideas, discourses and

rhetoric (i.e. conspiracy theory, racism and anti-Semitism) are defined by their association with or

espousal by groups who have extremist politics or credentials. Reason and logic are determined by

mainstream or legitimate political values, discourses and processes and thus their abandonment are

intimately connected to the rejection of the political system. According to Roy, such extremism can take

the form of speech or action (or both), yet speech acts are sufficient if they: represent an abandonment of

the political system; are anti-democratic in nature and content; emanate from established extremist

groups; motivate or encourage their followers/audience to reject the political system or act against it (or

others); and, infringe on the rights, freedoms or safety of others.10

While Roy clarifies the issues and makes the necessary distinctions between the extreme and mainstream

right, his definition also raises another problem, namely political and ideological de-legitimisation. In the

past decade, an increasing number of academics and activists have rejected the terms “extreme” and

“radical” right after subjecting them to much scrutiny and criticism. According to Sara Diamond in her

book, Roads to Dominion:

9 Michael Wieviorka cited in Hainsworth, Ibid. 10 According to Roy, this is the basis of the definition, inclusion and classification as extremist for monitoring or observation purposes. SPLC litigation must be based not on a movement’s (free) speech, politics or beliefs, but on direct involvement in activity that breaks the law or violates the civil rights of any individuals. Racism and anti-Semitism are not as central to this definition, while anti-government sentiment is, because the former are not constitutional to the extremism as a political modality (i.e. paramilitarisation) and because racism is constitutional (although not limited to) specific sections of the extreme right (such as white supremacy, neo-Nazism and Christian Identity) and not others (i.e. Militia groups are not, by definition, racist). This section is based on my interview with Joe Roy Jr. and other SPLC Intelligence Project staff (Montgomary, 18-22 March, 2002).

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‘[r]adical’ and ‘extremist’ are pejorative terms. They reveal their originator’s sympathy for the political status quo but elucidate little else. The ‘radical-extremist’ frame limits the honest study of those few who fit the description. It implies that movements so designated operate outside normal political processes and ought not to be taken seriously, which is generally not the case.11

This argument is pursued further by Chip Berlet, who is a noted critic of what Diamond terms the

“radical-extremist frame”,12 and the neo-conservative Radical Right theorists of the 1950s and 1960s

(including Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset, Earl Raab and Daniel Bell) who pioneered this

theoretical model.13 For Berlet, such labels (and the analysis which accompanies them) represent or are

based on what he terms “counter- subversion” and “pluralist-extremist” models.14 According to Berlet,

the former theoretical model originates in state intelligence circles, particularly the FBI, and applies the

label to oppositional (or counter-hegemonic) political activists in order to de-legitimise and represent

them as dangerous subversives, in order to justify state surveillance, censorship and suppression.15 In

terms of the latter theoretical model which originates with the radical right theorists, Berlet argues that it

is a normative theory applied to oppositional political dissidents and implies that their absence from the

mainstream political process is based on their status as social and political outsiders, as well as being

irrational or paranoid and thus potentially violent. According to Berlet, this theory therefore serves not

only to marginalise and pathologise such individuals but also asserts the primacy and hegemony of the

centre or status quo.16 Another reason for Berlet’s rejection of the terms is that ideologies that are

considered extreme may also be shared by those within the mainstream in either the same context or a

different one. Examples of this can include the racism and white supremacy of the Klan and George

Wallace or the anti-communism of the Klan, John Birch Society, Senator McCarthy and President

Reagan.

Berlet’s response to these problems is two-fold: firstly, he advocates the replacement of the counter-

subversion and pluralist-extremist models with that of social movement theory and, more specifically, the

political process model.17 Berlet argues that this theoretical model, instead of de-legitimating and

demonising such movements, looks at the political grievances, leadership, mobilisation, recruitment,

beliefs and activities of such groups in terms of their socio-economic conditions and opportunities and

political access. Moreover, he argues that Social Movement Theory seeks to:

11 Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), p. 512 Ibid.13 Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (New York: Anchor Books, 1964). 14 Chip Berlet, ‘Three Models for Analyzing Conspiracist Mass Movements of the Right’, in Conspiracies: Real Grievances, Paranoia, and Mass Movements, ed. Eric Ward (Seattle: Peanut Butter Publishing, 1996), pp. 48-49. 15 Ibid. p. 48. 16 Ibid. p. 49. 17 Ibid. p. 50.

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[c]onfront the demagogues [….] rebuke those grievances that are unjustified because they are selfish or bigoted, and encourage people to mobilize effectively in the public sphere around those grievances that are legitimate.18

While an admirable objective, Berlet’s approach deals with causes and solutions and not the problematic

labels or categories he criticises. At the same time, he continues to de-legitimise and demonise such

movements through the use of terms such as “demagogues” and the distinction between legitimate and

illegitimate grievances. Secondly, in terms of labels or categories, Berlet does address the problem by

replacing the extreme right with that of far right (or in some cases, ultra right). 19 Although much less

controversial, with the removal of the term extreme, the far right is not only still positioned in relation to

the centre but now occupies the furthest point from the centre, where the term extreme would otherwise

be. While not as historically, politically and ideologically loaded, the term “far” implies a distance from,

as opposed to a relationship to, the centre. This negates the actual existence and effect of hegemonic and

counter-hegemonic political and ideological relations that actually define political dissidence and

opposition, whether one approves or disapproves of the movement or cause. It seems that in all his

analysis of the dangers of normative state power and hegemony, Berlet fails to recognise their place in

organising and affecting political relations.

In his book The Christian Right, the Far Right and the Boundaries of American Conservatism,20 Martin

Durham attempts to establish clear taxonomic definitions and boundaries between the mainstream,

extreme, radical and far right. For Durham, those committed to white supremacy and anti-Semitism are

best defined as extreme right, while non-racist conspiracists are best defined as radical right.21 For this

category, Durham is specifically referring to the anti-communist John Birch Society and others, as

opposed to those such as the Klan or Christian Patriot movement that fit the requirements of the former

category; where there is ambiguity, indecision or overlap, Durham makes use of the term far right.22

Durham is one of the few authors to address the political and ideological implications of the term

extreme right while at the same time retaining it in order to differentiate between positions on the right.

Yet, he does so by comparing movements and ideologies, without addressing their contingency or

changing status and meaning in different contexts or their relationship to the hegemonic centre. These

two issues are in fact vital to the understanding and definition of the extreme right in the fifth era.

18 Ibid. p. 51.19 Interview with Chip Berlet (Brighton-Boston, 15 December, 2002); and Political Research Associates, ‘Mapping the Right: Right Wing Styles of Thought’, The Public Eye. <http://www.publiceye.org/research/concepts/Mapping-the –Right-01.htm>. accessed on 21/07/2002. 20 Martin Durham, The Christian Right, the Far Right and the Boundaries of American Conservatism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).21 Ibid. p. xii.22 Ibid.

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The spectres of past eras blur the boundaries between what is politically and ideologically mainstream

and what is extreme, particularly as what is mainstream or extreme in one historical context, may not be

in another. To put it simply, what was considered mainstream in the past may be considered extreme in

the present and vice-versa. As such, what emerges in the present may actually serve to shed new light on

the status and meaning of its predecessors as opposed to the other way around. In the case of the fifth

era, just such a phenomenon occurred. Berlet rejected the term extreme based not only on its normative

and hegemonic meaning and implications, but also on the fact that the third era Klan and John Birch

Society both represented mainstream and hegemonic ideologies (if not also strategies). Yet, by the fifth

era, such movements, their ideologies and strategies had not only been de-legitimised and demonised, but

many third era activists and their successors also rejected these. They did so not because these ideologies

and strategies were extreme, but because they retained the trace of hegemony that did not or could not be

applied to the new post-civil rights and post-cold war contexts. Instead, they developed counter-

hegemonic ideologies, identities and strategies through which they responded to and represented this

very loss of hegemony, and attempted to actively resist the new one. These movements made a break

from the mainstream, thus establishing a clear distinction between mainstream and extreme political

ideologies and strategies and effectively negating any overlap.

As such, for all its methodological and ideological problems, and historical baggage, the term extreme

right must not only be retained to recognise and define the developments of the fifth era, but also its

break with both their predecessors and the political mainstream. More specifically, the term extremism

must be seen as a historically, politically and ideologically contingent category which describes political

phenomena that are themselves contingent upon its antagonistic relation with and opposition to the (also)

hegemonic centre. It is not that we can reject the term because of overlap between such movements and

the mainstream at some points in history but should instead redefine and apply it when there is such a

break and antagonism between them, as was the case in the fifth era. As such, I define the extreme right

as a historically, politically and ideologically contingent category which applies to right-wing movements

that reject and oppose mainstream and legitimate hegemonic politics, ideology and strategies, thus

placing themselves in mutually antagonistic relation to the centre, by both intention and effect. Through

this definition, we not only avoid the problem of overlap between the extreme and mainstream right but

also do not burden the definition with specific taxonomic characteristics, whose form and status is

contingent and subject to change, as we shall see in the following sections. It should be noted that, at this

point, this definition is general. Yet, just as the fifth era redefined the terms of the extreme right in

comparison to its predecessors, it is only through an examination and analysis of its re-politicisation and

emergence that the meaning of the definition itself can fully emerge.

From the First to the Fourth Era: The History of the Extreme Right

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In the previous section, I outlined the various approaches and critiques of numerous definitions of the

extreme right and related phenomena, both in the past and present, if not also in the future. The paradigm

for contemporary and future definitions of extremism and trajectories of continuity and revival are

largely informed by previous manifestations and determinations about their status and meaning. This is

because they provide the terms that allow for the recognition, identification and definition of new

phenomena as part of a larger historical phenomenon and continuum. For the fifth era, this is encouraged

and perhaps made inevitable by its sequential designation (which itself may partly be the construct of

commentators as opposed to the actors themselves) in the history of the American extreme right. This

point is best illustrated in David Bennett’s book The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New

Right in American History.23 Bennett not only established a historical continuum from the first to fifth

eras but also included right-wing movements and organisations from across the political spectrum. In this

section, I trace the history of the extreme right, examining its development up until the fifth era. Through

this history, I will examine the problems presented by using such historical examples as a de-

contextualised repository of paradigms and frameworks for definition and analysis, and illustrate how the

fifth era re-defined the terms of extremism.

The history of the American extreme right is structured into five relatively distinct eras, each

representing a particular set of movements, ideologies and strategies within a particular historical period

and political context and relating to a particular set of historical, social, political, economic, legal and

ideological antagonisms and interests that provide the conditions for a movement’s politicisation and

emergence. The first era Klan, as it is termed because it was constituted by the first emergence of the Ku

Klux Klan and was dominated by them, occurred between 1866 and 1871 during the historical period

known as the First Reconstruction.24 The Klan was formed in Pulaski, Tennessee in 1865 as social club

for veterans of the Confederate army but soon became political.25 The club provided an outlet for

disenchantment and resentment for having lost the war and opposition to federalisation and the abolition

of slavery.26 The Klan of this period were politically and ideologically white supremacist. According to

the first era Klan Creed of this period, published in 1867, their stated objective was “the maintenance of

the supremacy of the White Race in this Republic”.27 The Klan of this period was organised in local or

state dens or “klantons” which Gordon and Nathan Bedford Forrest unified and established as a South-

wide movement, which at its peak had 550,000 members in the south and 40,000 in Tennessee alone.28

23 David Bennett, The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History (New York: Vintage Books, 1990).24 Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort (London: The Guilford Press, 2000), pp. 58-62. 25 David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku Klux Klan 1865-1965 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 8. 26 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America, pp. 58-62.27 Cited in Cox and Durham, ‘The Politics of Anger’, p. 289. 28 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 34.

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The Klan became a political organisation in 1868, when the unified klantons tried to disrupt voting

efforts of blacks and northern carpetbaggers in the south.29

The strategies of the first era Klan included voter harassment and intimidation, ritualistic cross burnings,

night riding, lynching, parades and protest marches, creating the iconic image of the white robed and

hooded Klansmen on horses and with burning crosses.30 Although cultic in their style, ritual and

organisation, and violent in their strategies, the Klan of this period represented mainstream hegemonic

politics and ideologies, at least in the South, where white supremacy, southern rights, pride and culture

and opposition to the abolition of slavery, freedom and rights for black people, federalisation, northern

political power and carpetbaggers reigned, and resistance to the outcome of the Civil War and its

implications for southern institutions, culture and power were acutely felt and shared by whites across the

socio-economic class divide. Yet, by the 1869, the Klan was losing favour and becoming a problem for

the state because of its violence. The same year, Nathan Bedford Forrest disbanded his Klanton, yet

chapters remained throughout the country.31 In 1871, Congress passed the first anti-Klan Act which

suspended habeas corpus in order to by-pass the Posse Comitatus Act and allow President Ulysses S.

Grant the power to send federal troops to suppress armed combinations, night riding, harassment and

other Klan violence. It was at this point that the first era Klan was dissolved.32 In 1905, Thomas Dixon

Jr. memorialised the organisation in his novel The Clansman,33 which was made into the film Birth of a

Nation, directed by D.W. Griffith in 1915.34 The film celebrated the Klan as heroes in the birth of the

nation and white masculinity, the defenders of southern culture and protectors of white femininity in the

face of freed former slaves. It brought widespread and positive attention to the Klan at a time when

America was on the cusp of experiencing a rise in xenophobic nationalism, which provided the context

for the re-politicisation of the Klan and emergence of the second era.

The second era occurred between 1915 and 1941.35 It can be divided into two different (although

historically and ideologically overlapping) parts, related to their particular ideologies and historical-

political contexts; the first, from 1915 to 1933, and the second from 1933 to 1941. The first part of the

second era occurred between 1915 and 1933, in what was known as the nativist period. The extreme right

of this period emerged in the context of, and in response to, the economic insecurity, unemployment and

poverty brought about by the depression, coupled with an influx of Jewish and Catholic immigration

from Europe (in addition to those already present), and the first red scare. As such, the extreme right of

this era was defined by nativist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic and anti-

29 Ibid. p. 33. 30 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, p 10. 31 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in the United States, p. 61.32 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 34.33 Thomas Dixon Jr., The Clansman (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970). 34 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in the United States, p. 95. 35 Cox and Durham, ‘The Politics of Anger’, pp. 290-291.

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communist populism, nationalism and a rise in political Protestantism.36 It was opposed to all those

constituencies, cultures and ideologies that it believed to be not only foreign but also antithetical and

threatening to American national racial, ethnic, religious and cultural make-up. Moreover, these

constituencies, cultures and ideologies were also scapegoated as the cause of the depression and spread

of communism, and hence, a threat to the dominant ideology, national identity and security.

Like the previous era, the second era was dominated by the Klan which was reformed in 1915 in Georgia

by “Colonel” William Joseph Simmons. The Klan’s Creed of this era stated as its objective “uniting

native-born white Christians for concerted action in the preservation of American institutions and the

supremacy of the white race”.37 In addition to this it developed an increasing religious identity, ideology

and authority, evident in the statement from the same Creed: “We Honour the Christ as the Klansman’s

only Criterion of Character. And we seek at his hands that cleansing from sin and impurity which only

He can give”.38 The relationship between race and religion for the Klan of this era is best articulated in

the booklet Ideals of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, which included the statement “all of Christian

Civilisation depends upon the preservation and up-building of the White Race”.39 According to David

Chalmers, it was in 1917, when America entered the war, that the Klan really found their purpose,

defending the nation from within against aliens, strike leaders, slackers and immorality. 40 At the peak of

the era in 1925 the Klan had up to five million members.41 In addition to the Klan, there were numerous

religious-based nationalist organizations, such as Gerald B. Winrod’s Defenders of the Christian Faith,

established in 1925, and Gerald L.K. Smith’s Christian Nationalist Crusade.42

Although extreme in another context through their general nativist populism and nationalism, as well as

anti-Semitism, the Klan of this era identified with the dominant and hegemonic national identity and

ideology, which was shared by high profile members of society, the public and political leaders. The

most high profile exponent of this nativist anti-Semitism was Henry Ford. In 1920 Ford published “The

International Jew’, his re-write of the infamous Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion as a

contemporary conspiracy theory, in the Dearborn Independent.43 The prime examples of the mainstream

political status and influence of the Klan of this era included the election of Texas Klansman Earl

Mayfield to the U.S. Senate and Congress’s passing of a Klan- supported bill placing strict quotas on

immigration in 1924.44 Yet, by 1930 the first part of the second era was dying out as illustrated by the

36 Bennett, The Party of Fear, p. 182. 37 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 36. 38 Ibid. 39 Cox and Durham, ‘The Politics of Anger’, p. 290. 40 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, p. 31. 41 Ibid. 42 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, pp. 46-48. 43 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in the United States, pp. 104-105. . 44 Ibid. pp. 290-291,

34

Klan’s membership decline from a height of five million in 1925 to only 35,000 members.45 According to

Michael Cox and Martin Durham, this decline occurred for several reasons, including a reduction in

immigrants coming into the United States, the economic boom of the 1920s, divisions within the Klan

itself and the organisation’s increasingly negative image.46

The second part of the second era began soon after, as America experienced the depression. By this

point, the Klan had 100, 000 members at the most and, as a result, underwent a shift in its politics and

targets, re-focusing its attention on communists and labour radicals.47 At the same time, in 1933, Hitler

was appointed Chancellor of Germany and this introduced the American extreme right to fascism and

national socialism, which began to replace nativist ideologies. In fact, in 1940 the Klan established

relations with the German-American Bund.48 The most notable examples of the development of

American fascism were new activist organisations such as the Silver Shirts formed by William Pelley and

Gerald L.K. Smith in 1933 immediately following Hitler’s appointment;49 the Union Party formed by

Smith, Coughlin, Francis Townsend and Representative William Lemke in 1935; Defenders of the

Christian Faith; and, the Christian Nationalist Crusade, many of which comprised former Christian

Identity-affiliated Klan members and future Christian Patriots.50

Fascism and its Nazi variant, as totalitarian, state-centred and imperialist movements (and ideologies),

were at odds with American liberalism, anti-federalism, constitutionalism and republicanism, as well as

the isolationism of the time. Yet, they fit perfectly with the dominant American extreme right enmities of

the era, anti-communism, anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism, as well as representing an international

symbol of revolutionary white nationalist power and possibility. Moreover, in spite of their foreign

ideologies, such movements not only continued the legitimate political strategies of the Klan but also

attempted to enter mainstream politics. The prime example was the Union Party, which was established

as a third party in American politics, as well as Smith’s numerous campaigns for elected office. Smith’s

first campaign was in Louisiana in 1935, prior to the establishment of the Union Party. This was followed

by the Union Party’s failed campaign against Franklin Roosevelt in the 1936 Presidential election. The

same year, Smith ran for, but lost, the Republican nomination for the Senate in Michigan. As well as

Smith and the Union Party, Gerald Winrod of the Defenders of the Christian Faith ran a failed bid in

1938 for the Kansas Senate as a Republican.51 In addition to such mainstream political aspirations and

strategies, such movements had their own mainstream representative in aviator and national hero Charles

Lindburgh who was an early champion of Hitler and became the symbol of American Fascism.

45 Ibid. p. 291. 46 Ibid. 47 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, p. 5. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, pp. 44-50. 51 Ibid. pp. 48-50.

35

Although high profile, such movements encountered a radical turn in their fortunes in 1941. When

America was attacked at Pearl Harbour and entered the war against the axis powers, with the Soviets as

allies, the anti-communist red scare was replaced by the anti-fascist “brown scare”.52 Such groups were

identified as the enemy within and consequently became the targets of investigations, enquiries, anti-

fascist laws and federal criminal prosecutions for treason and seditious conspiracy.53 Examples of these

include federal sedition charges laid against Pelley in 1942 for which he was convicted and imprisoned.54

As with the first era, what we see here is the transformation of a hegemonic set of movements which

purported to represent and defend the nation against foreign enemies, become enemies themselves. This

occurred as the political situation changed, public and state support turned against these movements and

they were criminalised by new legislation. This shift in the second era occurred not only through a shift

in the state’s ideological position (from the red scare to the brown scare), but also within the extreme

right itself. In the next era, this would occur solely because of a shift in the political conditions, dominant

ideology, public opinion and state position on civil rights and communism, as a new hegemony emerged

to displace the previous one.

After a period of over ten years since the end of the previous era, the third era emerged in 1954 and

lasted until 1969, in the context of the civil rights movement and the second red scare. Where the first era

extreme right had been defined by white supremacy and the second by xenophobia, anti-Semitism and

anti-communism, it was the perceived threat posed by desegregation, voting rights, civil rights and a

second wave of communism, which informed the re-politicisation of the extreme right in the third era.

Like the twin planks of white supremacy and anti-communism which represented the dominant

constitutive antagonisms, the era was dominated by both the white supremacist Klan and the anti-

communist John Birch Society, representing the radical right. Yet, the era included a host of other newer

movements which represented either particular issues or new ideologies and strategies. These included

the neo-Nazi white supremacist and nationalist American Nazi Party, the Christian Identity-based Anglo-

Saxon Christian Congregation, the populist Liberty Lobby, the more local Southern white supremacist

and states’ rights organisations such as the National States’ Rights Party and White Citizen’s Councils,

and later the more militant Minutemen, Christian Nationalist Crusade and California Rangers.

It is this era that casts the longest shadow on the fifth era, with its history of racism, anti-Semitism, anti-

communism, white supremacy, Klan intimidation, marches, burning crosses, the lynching of African

Americans, the murders of civil rights activists and church bombings. Yet, what is striking is just how

52 Leo Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), p. xiii. 53 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in the United States, pp.151-156. 54 Bennett, The Party of Fear, p. 247.

36

much more violent and legitimate the Klan and others within this era were, while some, like the John

Birch Society were not even violent. To varying degrees and in different terms, these movements and

organisations, particularly the Klan and John Birch Society, purported to hold, and in some cases shared,

mainstream and legitimate racial, religious and national ideologies and interests.

For the Klan, their hegemonic racial, religious and national identifications and ideology can best be

summed up by their own statements, published in the American Klansman in 1952, which stated:

The Ku Klux Klan:

Is dedicated to the security of America, first, last and forever, and the rehabilitation of a Liberal Christian Faith as exemplified by our Saviour Jesus Christ. We will not compromise or temporize on the question of patriotism or one’s duty as a worthy citizen. This is a country of Laws, American Laws, observance of which, alone, will preserve our Democracy [….].55

The Ku Klux Kreed:

We, THE ORDER of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, reverentially acknowledge the majesty and supremacy of the Divine Being, and recognise the goodness and providence of the same. [….] WE RECOGNISE our relation to the Government of the United States of America, the Supremacy of its Constitution, the Union of States thereunder, and the Constitutional Laws thereof, and we shall be ever devoted to the sublime principles of a pure Americanism and valiant in the defense of its ideals and institutions. [….] WE AVOW THE distinction between the races of mankind as same has been decreed by the creator, and shall ever be true in the faithful maintenance of White Supremacy and will strenuously oppose any compromise thereof in any and all things [....].56

Yet, beyond their own claims, and what links these to the reality of the time, the Klan was committed to

the defeat of desegregation, civil rights and then voting rights, and to the maintenance of white

supremacy along with a wide section of the white Southern population. It was not only that white

supremacy, racial segregation and opposition to civil rights existed as ideologies within civil society and

extra-parliamentary movements, but they were also represented within the democratic system, by the

state, its elected officials and laws. This was most acute following the 1954 Supreme Court case Brown

vs. Board of Education, in which the Court ruled against the states to end school segregation. In response

to this, White Citizens’ Councils were formed by prominent community members, to prevent

desegregation.57 After the second Brown decision of 1955, in 1957 black students in Little Rock,

Arkansas were turned away from school by National Guardsmen under the direction of Governor Orval

Faubus.58 While President Eisenhower called in one thousand federal troops to integrate the school, and

55 Association of Georgia Klans, ‘The Ku Klux Klan’, in The American Klansman (Jan. 1952), p. 14. 56 Ku Klux Klan, ‘The Ku Klux Kreed’, in The American Klansman (Jan. 1952), p. 14. 57 Cox and Durham, ‘The Politics of Anger’, p. 292. 58 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, p. 82.

37

the Supreme Court ruled against the school board’s request for a postponement, Faubus responded by

closing high schools for a full year.59 Such mainstream support for, and representation of, Klan issues

increased in 1964 following the legislation of the Civil Rights Act, as the Klan and others were

overshadowed by the rise of electoral white supremacy and states’ rights politics. Examples of this

included segregationist Alabama Governor George Wallace’s failed 1964 campaign for the Democratic

nomination for president. Wallace would later resurface in 1967-1968 to campaign for the Republican

presidential nomination against Nixon, which he lost in spite of gaining ten million votes.60

Such mainstream overlap and representation applied even more so to anti-communism which was even

more pronounced as it was shared by the Klan, John Birch Society, the public and elected officials. The

red scare itself and communist witch hunts were orchestrated from the top down, within the halls of the

Senate. This point is best illustrated by the fact that the era was defined and symbolised in the name

“McCarthyism”, after anti-communism’s most public and powerful advocate, Senator Joseph McCarthy,

and embodied by the official HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee) hearings.

Because of such ideological overlap, for many commentators the distinction between mainstream and

extreme rests on strategy. This distinction is particularly apt for the third era where the split between the

mainstream and extreme or legitimate and illegitimate actually occurred. Yet, in as much as this

distinction applies to the third era, it is also where Berlet finds the best rationale for his rejection of the

concepts of extreme and radical right. This is because not only did the third era Klan and others represent

a popular and legitimate set of ideologies and interests as well as ties to the state but also, I would add,

violence was only one type of strategy. For the third era, violence supplemented the movement’s

engagement with the democratic political and legal system, institutions and processes. Strategies of the

era clearly differentiated between social and political approaches and targets. Violence was primarily

targeted at racial minorities and political activists within civil society, while political strategies targeted

elected officials and institutions, making use of democratic institutions and processes such as

(occasionally successful) electoral campaigning and lobbying. Examples of such political engagement

included that of Asa Carter, a member of the Alabama Citizens Council and the Klan who became an

aide to Wallace in 1957, following his klanton’s abduction and castration of a black man for which

Carter escaped prosecution.61 Other notable examples included: the National States’ Rights Party’s 1960

attempt to draft Governor Faubus for a presidential campaign; National States’ Right Party and Christian

Nationalist Crusade support for Wallace in his 1964 campaign; John Birch Society and Minuteman

support for Goldwater the same year; and, Klan support for Wallace in his 1967 presidential campaign.62

59 Ibid. p. 83.60 Ibid. p. 89. 61 Ibid. p. 79. 62 Ibid. p. 88.

38

There is no surprise that Klan violence could overshadow its political lobbying and campaigning, but

what was more significant was that with the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Klan became an

inconvenient and unacceptable presence, a reminder of state and public complicity in segregation and

white supremacy. Like the two previous eras, the Klan and other movements underwent a process of

social, political and legal marginalisation and demonisation when, in 1967, HUAC and the FBI

investigated the Klan for harassment, terrorism and financial mismanagement for diverting funds to the

Wallace campaigns, and, in the report entitled The Present Day Ku Klux Klan Movement, condemned the

organisation as un-American.63 It was at this point that the organisation went into decline, experiencing a

drop in membership from 40,000 to 50,000 at its peak between 1960-1967 to less than 10,000 between

1967 and 1974.64 By this time, the wider extreme right went into relative hibernation in the political

margins, a state that is necessary prior to a future revival.

It was these three eras, and particularly the last, in spite of their respective differences and discontinuities

both internally and comparatively, that establish the paradigms for identification and definition of those

that came after them. Yet, the fifth era was also that which finally placed the problematic overlap

between the extreme and mainstream into sharp relief. It did so by severing legitimate and mainstream

ideologies and methodologies from illegitimate and extreme ones, which distinguish between and define

the respective trajectories of the fourth and fifth eras.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the fourth era began in 1975, although it was only really

established in 1980 when David Duke left the Klan and began a long series of electoral campaigns, and

ended in 1991. The most notable Duke campaign was his unsuccessful campaign for president in 1988,

first as a Democrat in the primaries and then as a Populist Party candidate in the election.65 The next year,

Duke ran a campaign for the Louisiana State Legislature (New Orleans/Metairie), in which he won a seat

in the Louisiana House of Representatives.66 This success was followed by Duke’s failed campaign for a

seat in the Louisiana State Senate in 1990 and his failed bid for the Louisiana governorship in 1991.67 In

addition to his electoral campaigning, Duke also formed his own “civil rights” organisation in 1980 (the

year he was exiled from the Klan), the National Association for the Advancement of White People

(NAAWP).68 The name of the organisation was clearly appropriated from the civil rights organisation the

National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP). This appropriation was an

explicit expression of Duke’s belief, or political point, that the racial power structure had been inverted to

such an extent following the Civil Rights Act that such an organisation was needed to represent white

Americans in the capacity that black people had been.

63 Ibid. p. 293. 64 Ibid. pp. 292-293. 65 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, p. 264. 66 Ibid. p.265.67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. p. 264.

39

In spite of the self-conscious mainstreaming strategy employed by Duke, and the mainstreaming thesis

that followed this strategy, what becomes clear from looking back to previous eras is that he continued

the mainstream electoral activism of the Klan. What was different about Duke was that, on one hand, he

abandoned violence for mainstream democratic legitimacy and explicit white supremacy and racial

hatred for white rights and white identity-politics; on the other hand, he was out of context, no longer

representing the dominant or hegemonic racial-political position which had been discredited by the

violent activities of the third era Klan and the Civil Rights Act. This was why he devised his

mainstreaming strategy and why his popularity hit such a nerve: it was the Klan out of context, adapting

to the new situation, as opposed to developing a radically new strategy. In fact, the attention given to

Duke had more to do with his Klan history, popular support, electoral successes and potential democratic

legitimacy in the post-civil rights era than his ideology and politics.

The focus on Duke’s mainstreaming strategy is problematic to say the least. Not only was this strategy a

continuation of the Klan’s in the previous era but also, as the electoral records show, Duke’s successes

were limited. In addition to this, Duke was relatively alone in this enterprise which was by no means a

Klan-wide undertaking and, if there was an organisational link, it was to Carto’s Populist Party. In the

mid-1970s Duke was allied with (and the leader of) Klansmen Louis Beam and Tom Metzger who would

be central to the development of the fifth era, but by 1980 they had formed more radical paramilitary

organisations and Duke left the Klan.69 In fact, the leadership of Duke’s Louisiana klanton was taken

over by Bill Wilkinson who renamed it the Invisible Empire and established it as a prominent

paramilitary group.70 Duke’s abandonment of violence and search for legitimacy and mainstream status

were not only a self-conscious attempt to adapt and engage politically in the post-civil rights context, but

also part and parcel of a wider split within the third era Klan and the wider extreme right, a split which

gave birth to the fifth era.

The Fifth Era Extreme Right

Although the fifth era was inaugurated in 1976, seven years after the end of the third, it has its origins in

the period between 1960 and 1969. Moreover, unlike the previous eras, the fifth era does not include the

moniker of the Klan in its sequential designation and is merely termed the fifth era. There are two main

reasons for this: firstly, the origins of the era do not lie in the Klan itself but in the relationship between

the Klan, John Birch Society and Christian Identity movement, and the fragmentation of the first two

between 1960 (in the case of the John Birch Society) and 1976 (in the case of the Klan); secondly, the

fifth era was represented by radically new political movements, organisations and ideologies which bore

little resemblance to the Klan.

69 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in the United States, p. 277. 70 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 146.

40

The origins of the fifth era lie in the 1960s, when a radical division occurred within the third era over

strategy. In 1960, when the battle against civil rights was heating up, certain elements within both

organisations, seeing the failure of the movement to halt the legislation of desegregation in 1954, rejected

their legitimate political strategies and advocated a move towards violent political insurgency. The first

to do so was Robert DePugh, who was exiled from the more mainstream John Birch Society for his

advocacy of violent insurgency and formed the Minutemen in 1960, establishing the first extreme right

anti-government paramilitary organisation.71 The organisation was, in a historically and symbolically

regressive move (and a precursor to the Patriot movement), named after the iconic revolutionary-era

citizens’ militia of the same name which fought British colonial occupation in the War of Independence.

The Minutemen included members such as Connie Lynch, Wesley Swift and William Gale, who were

derived from standard bearers of the extreme right of the day, the Klan, John Birch Society and American

Nazi Party. The Minutemen also established a national council and provided an umbrella for a host of

new paramilitary groups that were forming in its wake, including the Sons of Liberty, Soldiers of the

Cross, Christian Soldiers, the California Rangers and Christian Defense League, the latter two of which

were precursors to the Christian Patriot movement.72

Unlike the more legitimate strategies of their organisational predecessors, with minimal exception, the

Minutemen engaged solely in violent and political insurgent practices, including the stockpiling and sale

of illegal weapons, paramilitary training, robbery to fund a private army, harassment, attempted terrorism

and assassination.73 Their targets, unlike those of their predecessors were typically high profile political

officials and official institutions, as opposed to individual citizens and racial minorities. Examples

included threats made against members of Congress who voted to abolish HUAC; the attempted

assassination of Arkansas Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

William Fulbright; the attempted cyanide poisoning of the New York offices of the United Nations; and

the bombing of the Hollywood Bowl during a speech by Martin Luther King, Jr. 74 In 1969, DePugh and

other members were arrested and imprisoned and the Minutemen were effectively shut down. 75 The same

year a new organisation, Posse Comitatus, emerged out of Christian Identity-based Minutemen off-shoots

the California Rangers and the Christian National Defense League. The Posse was founded by Henry

Beach, William Gale and later included Richard Butler as the first Christian Patriot organisation, 76 which

followed on from the anti-government ideology of the Minutemen. Yet, unlike the Minutemen, the Posse

was initially an isolationist anti-government vigilante movement which retreated from the revolutionary

mandate and practices of its predecessors. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Posse would increase its

activism but up until this point it was, like the Minutemen, still subordinated to the more mainstream,

71 Bennett, The Party of Fear, p. 325.72 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, pp. 62-63.73 Bennett, The Party of Fear, p. 325.74 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 63. 75 Ibid. 76 Bennett, The Party of Fear, p. 352.

41

established and high profile Klan and John Birch Society, at least until the events that diminished the

impact of the latter two re-politicised the extreme right and led to the formation of the fifth era.

Looking back to the previous eras, which established the paradigms for not only defining extreme right

phenomena but also their trajectories, it is important to note that in each case, the era begins with the

emergence of hegemonic movement to defend against conditions and antagonisms that are constitutive of

its re-politicisation. Yet, such movements get defined as extremist (or become actively so) at the end of

an era. This occurs when the conditions of their re-politicisation change or disappear, when their

strategies or objectives fail, public support for their politics or ideology declines or turns against them,

state legislation or prosecution targets them and, ultimately, a new hegemony emerges in which the

movement and its ideology is de-legitimised, criminalised and marginalised. It is this finale which tends

to retrospectively (and retroactively) define the movements as extreme. This is particularly problematic

when the very conditions under which a new extreme right emerges are also the same conditions under

which their predecessors’ politics and ideologies, such as white supremacy and racism, are de-legitimised

and (retrospectively) defined as extreme.

This is problematic because, on the one hand, due to their history or predecessors, these new movements

become the standard bearers of such politics and ideologies. While these politics and ideologies may also

exist in the mainstream, although they are subject to scrutiny, they slip under the radar or assume some

legitimacy because they are overshadowed by violent paramilitary extremists of the fifth era on one side,

and mainstreaming Klan extremists such as Duke on the other. On the other hand, it is presumed that new

movements, in a new context, represent a continuity or revival of their predecessors’ politics and

ideologies, as opposed to being altogether new ones which may in fact be more extreme because of their

de-legitimisation and demonisation at the end of the previous era (and in the new context). This was very

much the case with the fifth era, for which there was no period of hegemonic, legitimate or mainstream

pretence when it became re-politicised and emerged in the wake of civil rights.

According to Ernesto Laclau, re-politicisation occurs in response to dislocating social, political and

economic antagonisms which expose the contingency of identity that has become sedimented and

forgotten over time.77 According to Anna Marie Smith, re-politicisation operates in the order of a

hegemonic re-articulation through which one attempts to overcome this contingency by suturing and

trying to reconstitute the discourse or identity as a new hegemonic totality which, paradoxically, is

constitutionally tied to and threatened by the conditions of its re-activation.78

77 Anna Marie Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 172. 78 Ibid.

42

In the previous eras examined, whether the dislocating antagonism that was perceived to threaten white

supremacy or the nation was the abolition of slavery, immigration, the communist threat, desegregation,

or civil rights, in each case the extreme right was able to suture the potential contingency within their

identity with recourse to a historical reservoir of hegemonic identifications and the claims to white

supremacy. Moreover, in each case, the perceived threat originated with social or political actors or

forces that were foreign, alien or without full political and legal power and rights or recourse. In addition

to this, when legislation was passed, race relations transformed in law but white supremacy was left

relatively unaffected and, as such, the perceived threat was overcome with time. All this changed

radically in the post-civil rights era. For the extreme right, the Civil Rights Act not only represented such

a dislocating antagonism but also the very last barrier to full equality and hence the spectre of their own

contingency, the loss of white supremacy. The perception was that by giving such rights and political

power to black people, the state was not only representing and advocating for them, but it was also

leaving white Americans without political and legal representation, thereby inverting the racial-political,

if not national, power structure reducing the white man to the racial other. The response from the extreme

right was far from the attempted suturing of this contingency and the establishment of a new hegemonic

totality, but the placement of this contingency front and centre of their identities and ideologies, rejecting

and attacking the hegemonic structures, identifications and ideologies to which they once subscribed but

which were now responsible for and representative of their perceived loss.

If the Klan creed of the third era, to which Beam subscribed, demonstrated their hegemonic

identifications and claims, his statement in 1987, at the peak of the fifth era, would later explain his

rationale for the re-politicisation and increasing radicalisation of the extreme right. According to Beam:

Political, economic, religious, and ethnic conditions in the United States have reached the point where patriots are faced with a choice of rebellion or departure. That this is indisputably the case, and further, that the sun has forever set on the American Republic of our Forefathers resulting in the necessity of such choice [sic] being made, is clear upon a collateral deduction that departure … is a sound method of re-establishing a new constitutional republic.79

This statement not only severs the Klan’s earlier equation between commitment to patriotism and the

Constitution and that to the state and nation, but also renders the latter two illegitimate and contingent. In

this respect, the fifth era not only represents the spectre of its predecessors, a revival of the extreme right,

but also the ultimate spectre that haunts America, its own contingent origins in colonial occupation and

revolution. In the fifth era, the government was placed in the position of illegitimate occupational

authority much like the British during colonial times and the movement in the position of revolution-era

freedom fighters and patriots fighting in the name of (white) rights, liberty, independence and a new

79 Louis Beam Jr., ‘Seditious Conspiracy’, in Calling Our Nation, n. 58 (1987), p. 21.

43

republic, against the state as opposed to in defence of it. This can be seen most acutely in the use of such

revolution-era discourses by the Minutemen and Posse Comitatus in the previous decade, as well as by

the Patriot and Militia movements later in the fifth era. Moreover, at this point in history, these American

anti-colonial discourses could not avoid being linked to the wider spectrum of international anti-colonial

or anti-imperialist discourses of national liberation movements that had proven successful in the 1960s

and 1970s.

The re-politicisation of the extreme right in the fifth era, in terms of its rejection of its predecessors and

the political mainstream, as well as its representation of itself as outsiders and revolutionaries, is

perfectly articulated by Beam’s infamous call to arms. Discussion on this statement has, for obvious

reasons, focused on the literal advocacy of the illegitimate violence of the bullet over the legitimate

democratic strategy of the ballot - hence the common description of the fifth era extreme right as

radicalised. Yet, while this was the case on one level, this apparently simple opposition is represented

much more symbolically in relation to his predecessors, peers and the political structure. The rejection of

the ballot represented a rejection of the legitimate political strategies of the third era which failed to

preserve white supremacy, the mainstreaming strategies of Duke, and of the legitimacy and authority of

the government and democratic political system which had abandoned white Americans, by handing

political power to African-Americans. The bullet which replaced and would prevail over the ballot was

represented not only by violent strategies but also by the development of counter-hegemonic and anti-

state political movements, organisations, ideologies and strategies which replaced the hegemonic ones of

their predecessors and mainstreaming peers.

From its inauguration in 1976 to its eventual decline in 1995, the fifth era was comprised of numerous

new, diverse and overlapping political movements, with accompanying ideologies, identities and

strategies, including paramilitaries, patriots, survivalists, constitutionalists, white separatists, neo-Nazis

and militia movements. Over its twenty-year lifespan, the fifth era can be divided into three particular

stages, each dominated by a particular movement and ideology: the first, from 1976 to 1981 was the

paramilitary stage dominated by Louis Beam’s Klan paramilitary units; the second, from 1982-1987,

dominated by the anti-government constitutional patriotism and revolutionary white separatism of the

Christian Patriot movement; and the third, after a quiet few years, from 1993-1995, dominated by a new

rise in anti-government paramilitary insurgency and the emergence of the militia movement.

The first stage of the fifth era was the paramilitarisation of the Klan between 1976 and 1981. With the

failure of the Klan’s legitimate political strategies in the third era and their rejection by the more radical

elements of the movement who followed DePugh in 1962, Duke’s attempt to pursue these to their logical

conclusion in the post-civil rights era led to a second and more widespread split. This was articulated in

Beam’s call to arms and formalised when the majority of klantons, including Duke’s former Louisiana

44

one, established supplemental armed paramilitary units much like the Minutemen. These included: the

Invisible Empire, established by Bill Wilkinson of the Louisiana Klan; the White Patriot Party,

established by former Green Beret and American Nazi Party member Glenn Miller of the North Carolina

Klan; the Texas Emergency Reserve, established by Beam of the Texas Klan; and White Aryan

Resistance (WAR), established by John and Tom Metzger of the California Klan.80

While these initial paramilitary units rejected the legitimate political strategies, hegemonic ideologies and

ritualistic pomp and circumstance of the traditional Klan, they did share their penchant for protest

marches and lynching. What was most significant and distinguished them the most from the traditional

Klan was that they held a virulent anti-government ideology and were organised in small guerrilla-type

paramilitary units, taking up arms and engaging in arms and survival training as preparation for

insurrection against the state. In this sense, they established the modern paradigm for the militia

movement which came to prominence over ten years later in the mid-1990s. In spite of their anti-

government ideology, they were in fact a new militarised form of lynch mob targeting, not the

government but, like their predecessors, racial and ethnic minorities and civil rights activists. A prime

example of this was the 1979 Greensboro Massacre in North Carolina in which armed Klansmen,

including followers of Glenn Miller, opened fire on and killed five civil rights and Greensboro

Communist Worker Party protesters. According to James Ridgeway, this was the first event of the era. 81

Another example occurred in 1981, when Beam’s Texas Emergency Reserve attacked Vietnamese

shrimp fishermen on Galveston Bay, Texas, and this event led to the formation of the Southern Poverty

Law Center’s Klan Watch.82

By 1982, many of the paramilitary units either disappeared, were integrated into new national

organisations, or grew into national organisations with newer and more radical ideologies, which had

began to emerge between 1977 and 1981, taking up Beam’s call to arms and came to dominate the next

stage of the era. These new national organisations effectively replaced the previously hegemonic Klan

and John Birch Society and were, unlike their predecessors, not dominated by a single issue such as

white supremacy or anti-communism, but held new counter-hegemonic ideologies and identities,

integrating more diverse interests. These organisations were Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nations, National

Alliance and White Aryan Resistance.

These organisations not only represented the rejection and replacement of the older, more traditional and

hegemonic organisations, but also established new counter-hegemonies. These new counter-hegemonic

ideologies included, most notably, the rejection of white supremacy and possessive or defensive

nationalism in favour of white separatism, as well as anti-government, revolutionary and republican

80 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 14-15. 81 Ibid. p. 79. 82 Ibid. p. 102.

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patriotism. These were far more than simply a rejection of traditional extreme right ideologies but the

rejection of their (and their predecessors’) hegemonic identification with and support for the government,

the state and, ultimately, the nation itself, in terms of politics, law, ideology, race and religion.

Underlying these, as the case of Aryan Nations, White Aryan Resistance and World Church of the

Creator illustrate, was the replacement of older sub-ideologies that traditionally underlay possessive

claims to white supremacy and national identity, including history, biology and religion. These

movements rejected mainstream Christianity outright and replaced it with a myriad of new religions that

were foreign and antagonistic to mainstream American history, culture and religiosity, including

Christian Identity, Odinism, Racial Creativity and Paganism. Through these new religions, as well as

other secular revolutionary and populist ideologies, these movements and organisations effectively

represented their rejection of both their predecessors’ hegemonic identification with the nation, its history

and culture and constructed a basis for new political identities and programmes. These enabled them to

gain authority and legitimacy for their beliefs, actions and objectives outside and against the limits of the

nation, its history, culture and political apparatus, and construct new identities as the racial-political

other, a race without a nation, the precondition for their white revolution or separatism.

This antagonistic status as the racial and political other would be further supported by their strategies, of

which violence was only one. As discussed earlier, Beam’s advocacy of the bullet over the ballot

represented not merely a call to violence but the rejection of the government and political system. This is

where their split from the traditional extreme right, Duke, the contemporary far right and mainstream

right was most explicit and active. As discussed earlier, the fifth era abandoned any form of legitimate

democratic political activism such as lobbying, running for elected office or supporting those who did,

and replaced these forms of activism with those that represented an outright rejection of the state. Their

strategies included tax protest, isolationism, paramilitarism, terrorism, assassination, revolution and white

separatism. These strategies were not only the methods used by the fifth era extreme right to achieve

their political objectives but also were objectives in themselves, in so far as they represented a rejection

of the government, its laws and authority, and led to direct confrontation the state and activists.

While the Civil Rights Act was the first dislocation that informed their re-politicisation, what we see

following this throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, was a succession of political developments and

events which increased the hatred for the federal government by an already anti-government extreme

right. It was the chronological succession and accumulation of state-based antagonisms and conflicts that

informed the trajectory of the era and each stage within it. This is pointed out by Laurie Wood and

Michelle Bramblett of the SPLC Intelligence Project who identify three flashpoints in fifth era history

and development: the government siege at Aryan Nations associate Randy Weaver’s home in Ruby

Ridge, Idaho in 1992, the Rocky Mountain Rendezvous held by leaders of the Christian Patriot

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movement in response to Ruby Ridge in 1992, and the government siege at the Branch Davidian

Compound in Waco, Texas in 1993. According to Joe Roy Jr., the radicalisation, paramilitarisation and

proliferation of the extreme right in the era can be attributed to the escalation and alignment of several

contributing factors between 1970 and 2000, including: Civil Rights (post-1964); the farm crisis of the

1980s; the murders of Posse Comitatus member Gordon Kahl in 1983 and of The Order member Robert

Mathews in 1984 by law enforcement officials; President Bush’s “New World Order” Speech in 1990;

the government sieges at Ruby Ridge and Waco; and the build up to the millennium and Y2K.83

It is necessary to distinguish between three types of such state-based antagonisms and flashpoints, as well

as add several others which were more structural antagonisms. Firstly, external state-based

developments, which do not directly involve the extreme right but antagonise them in terms of their

identifications, ideological positions and interests. These included: Civil Rights; President Nixon’s SALT

Treaty, policy of Détente with the Soviet Union and visit to China in 1972; Watergate in 1972-1974; the

Arab-Israeli War and oil crisis in 1973-1975; the end of the Vietnam War in 1975; the farm crisis; the

end of the Cold War in 1989; Bush’s “New World Order” speech; the Brady Bill in 1993 and the Violent

Crime Control Act of 1994. Secondly, relational conflicts between the state and extreme right, which

included the deaths of Kahl and Mathews, as well as the siege at Ruby Ridge. Thirdly, actions taken by

the extreme right itself in response to one of the previous two categories, or conflicts within the

movement, which included: Duke’s mainstreaming strategy; Beam’s call to arms; the Rocky Mountain

Rendezvous; and, finally, the Oklahoma bombing in 1995.

Following the Civil Rights Act, the first major political development was Nixon’s SALT Treaty and

policy of Détente with the Soviet Union and subsequent visit to China in 1972. Although the extreme

right had lost the battle against Civil Rights and white supremacy, anti-communism remained as an

ideological link between them, the mainstream right and the state. Nixon’s diplomatic overtures towards

communist states effectively severed this link and led to the belief that the United States was either under

the influence of or already surrendering to communists. Soon after this was Watergate in 1974 which,

while not directly related to extreme right politics, served both to confirm their belief in the truth of

conspiracy theory and the criminality of the federal government. The next major developments occurred

during the Ford and Carter administrations, the Arab-Israeli War and the oil crisis. For an already anti-

Semitic extreme right, American support for Israel during the war confirmed the belief in a Zionist

conspiracy for the domination of America and the whole world. Moreover, the oil crisis hit closer to

home by affecting the economic situation of white Americans, particularly farmers and workers in the

auto industry who depended in some way or another on oil for work.

83 This section is based on my interviews with Joe Roy Jr., Laurie Wood, Michelle Bramblett and other SPLC Intelligence Project staff (Montgomery, 18-22, March, 2002).

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The theme of communism re-emerged following Nixon’s resignation when the American government

abandoned Vietnam to the communist North Vietnamese. Vietnam had been a divisive issue within

America throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, effectively splitting the country in two and creating

an ideological civil war between left and right. While in most circles Vietnam had been seen

retrospectively as an embarrassing misadventure, for the extreme right it was the ultimate battle against

the spread of communism. American defeat not only led to the belief that communists were winning, but

also led to great anger at the government for their surrender. In his book Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary

Culture in Post-Vietnam America, author James William Gibson places the paramilitarisation of the Klan

in the 1970s in this context.84 This was significant as the many involved were either veterans or military

enthusiasts, most notably Glenn Miller, the founder of the paramilitary White Patriot Party, who was a

former Green Beret.

Each of these developments represented a particular antagonism that influenced the re-politicisation of

the fifth era on some level, be it ideological or strategic, but it was with the election of Reagan in 1980

that the extreme right broke conclusively with the mainstream right. There are many reasons for this. On

one hand, at this time the Christian Right was on the rise, having established itself under Nixon: figures

such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Billy Graham were not only seen as state representatives but

also their support for Israel also led to a total break between the extreme right and mainstream

Christianity.85 This led to a rise in the popularity of the already emergent counter-hegemonic religions

such as Christian Identity. On the other hand, although Reagan’s populism and anti-communism would

have historically appealed to the extreme right, two developments occurred which firmly established the

latter’s anti-government ideology, Reagan’s support for Israel and the farm crisis. According to every

major commentator, the farm crisis was by far the most significant historical factor next to the Civil

Rights Act. Not only did it occur within the fifth era itself, but also it directly affected the lives of rural

Americans who comprised the ranks of the extreme right and were the constituency they purported to

represent politically.

The farm crisis, which lasted from 1981 to 1987, was caused by ten years of agricultural and farm

expansion, land and machinery investment and inflated crop prices encouraged by the government. When

America was hit with a recession and increased interest rates were imposed, this forced crop prices and

land value to plummet and left farmers unable to pay for the expansion and investment, resulting in mass

farm foreclosures.86 It is in this context that the Christian Patriot movement emerged, with its brand of

anti-government constitutional patriotism and populism, to defend farmers and their property against the

84 James William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in Post-Vietnam America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994). 85 Ridgeway, Blood in the Face, p. 100. 86 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, p. 259.

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government, the IRS and law enforcement officials, who they believed were part of a Federal

Government/Zionist conspiracy against white Americans.87

Up until this point, the paramilitaries had limited themselves to training and attacking racial and ethnic

minorities but had not taken the next step to engage the state. It is in this context that the development of

the fifth era ceased to be informed merely by external political events and entered its second stage

defined by active conflict and combat with the state, which would determine its subsequent development

and trajectory. It was during the farm crisis that the first major entanglements occurred between the

movement and the state when, in 1983, Posse Comitatus member Gordon Kahl was killed in a shootout

with law enforcement officers attempting to arrest him on arms violations.88 The following year, The

Order leader Bob Mathews was also killed in a similar shoot-out following his attempted arrest after a

two-year murder and robbery spree.89 Kahl and Mathews became the first two martyrs of the fifth era

and, for the various movements, evidence of both a government plot against such political activists and

white Americans, as well as the imminence of a civil war.

In spite of the antagonism with the state during the Reagan administration and with its policies,

particularly those concerning agriculture, the economy, taxation and Israel, unlike with Nixon’s détente

policy in the prior Republican administration, the extreme right was in agreement with Reagan’s virulent

anti-communism. When the cold war ended symbolically with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, one

would have expected the traditionally anti-communist extreme right to celebrate victory. Yet, the absence

of a monolithic global political-ideological enemy created a vacuum, one which was readily filled by the

intense hatred for and antagonism with the federal government. This was confirmed within the following

three years, when from 1990 to 1993 a succession of events took place. The first was President Bush’s

post-Gulf war “New World Order” speech on 11 September 1990.90 With the end of the Cold War and an

ideological vacuum to be filled, the speech was interpreted to mean that the federal government was

taking up the position of the evil empire as its declared objective and thus they became the new

monolithic enemy. The second event was the FBI and ATF siege at the Ruby Ridge home of Randy

Weaver, who was arrested earlier that year on gun violations, refused to become an informer on the

movement and failed to attend court. The eleven- day siege, which resulted in the death of Weaver’s wife

and son, became a rallying cry for the extreme right who not only made Weaver’s dead family members

martyrs and Weaver himself a hero,91 but also led to the belief that the “New World Order” was being

implemented first by law and then by force against those who resisted.

87 Ibid. p. 260. 88 Ibid. p. 267. 89 Ibid. 90 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, p. 286. 91 Southern Poverty Law Center: Intelligence Project, ‘Bombs, Bullets, Bodies: The Decade in Review’, in SPLC Intelligence Report, n. 97 (Winter 2000), p.14.

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The Ruby Ridge incident led to a meeting held by Christian Identity and Patriot leaders Pete Peters,

Richard Butler, Robert Miles and Louis Beam at Estes Park, Colorado in 1992, entitled the Rocky

Mountain Rendezvous. At this meeting, the men attempted to devise a strategy of response against the

government, which included Beam’s strategy of “Leaderless Resistance”.92 The fallout from this meeting

was the formation of the modern militia movement, which dominated the third and final stage of the era.

Hatred for the federal government amongst the extreme right increased in the following year when the

third event occurred. This was the 1993 FBI and ATF siege at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco,

Texas in an attempt to arrest its leader David Koresh on arms violations and alleged child abuse,

resulting in the deaths of over eighty members, including Koresh himself.93

This hatred of the government was compounded in the following years by two pieces of gun control

legislation: the Brady Bill signed into law by Bill Clinton in 1993, which required a five-day waiting

period on handgun purchases and criminal record checks on prospective buyers; and, the Violent Crime

Control Act of 1994, which banned the sale or use of nineteen types of semi-automatic assault weapons

and places a ten-bullet limit on gun clips.94 If there was one issue that the fifth era extreme right shared

with the mainstream right, aside from opposition to taxation, it was opposition to gun control. These

pieces of gun control legislation were seen as a direct attack on the constitutional rights and freedoms, as

well as potential resistance, of an already paramilitarised movement.

The next event was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols on 19 April 1995.95 In response to the bombing, in 1995 and

1997 the Government held five Senate Subcommittee hearings on the following issues: Combating

Domestic Terrorism;96 The Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID.;97 Activities of Federal Law Enforcement

Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians;98 The Militia Movement in the United States;99 and, the Nature

92 Ibid, p.15.93 Ibid. p.16.94 Ibid. p. 17. 95 Ibid. pp. 20-21. 96 United States Federal Government, Combating Domestic Terrorism, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104 th Congress, First Session, 3 May 1995.97 United States Federal Government, The Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 104th Congress, First Session, 15 June 1995.98 United States Federal Government, Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians, Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime, of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 104 th Congress, First Session, Part 1: 19-21and 24 July 1995, Part 2: 25-27 July 1995, Part 3: 28 and 31 July and 1 August 1995. 99 United States Federal Government, The Militia Movement in the United States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 104th Congress, First Session, 6-8,12, 14-15, 19-22, 26 Sept. and 13, 18-

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and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups In America.100 While this last development brought the

fifth era to the heights of its significance and the corridors of political power, it was also at this point that

it began its slide into decline.

Conclusion: Re-Defining the Extreme Right

Having examined the fifth era extreme right, its history, forms and trajectory, we can now return to the

issue of definitions. The application of the term extreme or extremist to any political movement is, as

Chip Berlet argues, problematic and not without serious implications. These may include, at best, a

failure to recognise the overlap between the movement and the mainstream or, at worst, be ideologically

complicit in the demonisation and repression of political movements within a democracy. In terms of the

first implication, as I have argued, having rejected the hegemonic identifications, ideologies and interests

of its predecessors because of their failure or in order to represent themselves as the marginalised or

persecuted other through new counter-hegemonic identifications, the fifth era created a clear divide

between the extreme right and the mainstream both historically and within its own context. As for the

second and more serious implication, this is very real, as the government sieges and resulting deaths at

Ruby Ridge and Waco demonstrated. Yet, from the moment Beam evoked the revolution and rejected the

ballot for the bullet, he did not merely challenge the legitimacy of the state but also put the movement on

a collision course with its political, legal and ideological apparatus. While this was precisely what Beam

and others were resisting or revolting against, if their starting point was the belief that white Americans

were marginalised, by rejecting the legitimacy and authority of the state and its laws, and taking up arms

against it, they became the targets of demonisation, politically as extremists and legally as criminals.

Although they believed this was because they challenged the state’s legitimacy and were racial others,

their demonisation and prosecution by the state, if not also members’ deaths in shootouts with law

enforcement, served to confirm this for them.

Although Berlet is correct in warning of the implications of labels such as extremist, the fact that such

implications were actively sought by the movements as negative affirmation of their beliefs and provided

the fuel for their political development, changes the terms of debate slightly. While this does not make

the use of such terms unproblematic, particularly if one takes the application of the term extreme or

extremist as factual as opposed to ideological or discursive, “extremist’ is applicable on two levels: on

one hand, the term extreme, in so far as it designates a position on the political spectrum, it is applicable

as a positional description. As these movements have rejected and turned against the hegemonic centre

19 Oct. 1995.100 United States Federal Government, Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups In America, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, First Session, 2 November 1995.

51

and thus the ideological and discursive bases for measurement, they therefore cannot be measured in

terms of degrees from the centre (such as far right), but in opposition to it. On the other hand, the term is

useful as a theoretical concept for the analysis of and engagement with the political, ideological and

discursive effects of such a mutually antagonistic relationship between hegemonic and counter-

hegemonic forces. This not only differentiates between such relationships and those encountered in the

third era (where Berlet’s critique has its foundations and real strength), but actively recognises the

contingency and constitutive character of asymmetrical power relations and antagonisms on the

construction of political identities, ideologies and trajectories – particularly that of the fifth era.

Through all these new manifestations of the extreme right in the fifth era, and the historical and political

developments through which they emerged, the one dominant presence and influence was the Christian

Patriot movement, which is the subject of my case study. The following chapter will focus on this

movement, define it, profile its various manifestations and trace its history before moving on in

subsequent chapters to its particular ideology, identity, discourses and strategies as influential on and

emblematic of the re-politicisation of the extreme right in the fifth era, its developments and innovations.

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