augustine on christian and pagan virtues

Augustine on Christian and Pagan Virtues Chris A Kramer

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Introduction: In this paper I outline what I take to be Augustine’s view of virtue concentrating primarily on his Against Julian and books V and XIX of City of God. The first part is an overview of Augustinian virtue in contrast to pagan virtues of the Roman city. In the second part I consider whether the pagan virtues are actual virtues for Augustine, perhaps best categorized as lesser virtues than the Christian virtues, but virtues all the same. In parts three and four I argue that, for Augustine, pagan virtues are in fact nothing more than “splendid vices”, which results in a very austere and provincial account of virtue and ethics in general. Part V provides the groundwork for a future paper that investigates the prospect that Augustine’s account of virtue prohibits even the devout Christian from being truly virtuous.

I. Augustinian Virtue

The City of God1 is not written to a wide audience who already hold the beliefs for which

Augustine argues in that massive tome. It is to a very sophisticated reader2 that he submits his

case, for our purposes here, regarding the proper manner to worship the one true God (not gods),

how to live properly in this “mixed”3 life in which each individual straddles the secular and

divine cities,4 and most importantly for this paper, the proper conception of the virtues. It is

significant that Augustine is cognizant of the need to use philosophical argument in order to

confront the non-Christian (many anti-Christian) philosophers who do not begin with

Augustine’s presuppositions:5

1 All references from City of God are from Saint Augustine, The City Of God Translated by Henry Bettenson. (London: Penguin Books, 1984). 2 See Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 302-3. 3 William Haggerty, "Augustine, the "Mixed life," and Classical Political Philosophy: Reflections on Composilio in Book 19 of the City of God." Augustinian Studies 23 (1992), 149-50 and especially James Wetzel, “Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank's Augustine.” Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 2 (2004), p. 275. 4 Paul Weithman, “Augustine's Political Philosophy.” In The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, edited by Eleonor Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 236, and especially Karin Heller "Justice, Order and Peace: A Reading of Augustine’s City of God, Book XIX, in the Light of His Conversion Experience." Presented at the 2007 Conference on the Cardinal Virtues, Viterbo University. La Crosse, Wisconsin, April 13, 2007, p. 4. 5 But there is some common ground: “…Augustine is not entitled simply to stipulate necessary conditions for a virtue; he needs to show that his favored necessary conditions are independently plausible. In appealing to some teleological criterion, he relies on an independently plausible condition for a virtue (at


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It is clear to me that my next task is to discuss the appointed ends of these two cities, the earthly and the heavenly. Hence I must first explain, as far as is allowed by the limits I have designed for this work, the arguments advanced by mortal men in their endeavor to create happiness for themselves amidst the unhappiness of this life. My purpose is to make clear the great difference between their hollow realities and our hope, the hope given us by God, together with the realization—that is, the true bliss—which he will give us; and to do this not merely by appealing to divine authority but also by employing such powers of reason as we can apply for the benefit of unbelievers6

So in one sense he is sensitive to the non-believers with their philosophical arguments who might

read City of God, but in another he is anything but concerned for their sensibilities: “I am

astounded at the effrontery of the Stoics in their contention that those ills [human suffering, e.g.]

are not ills at all…Yet so great is the stupefying arrogance of those people who imagine that they

find the Ultimate Good in this life and that they can attain happiness by their own efforts, that

their ‘wise man’ (that is, the wise man as described by them in their amazing idiocy), even if he

goes blind, deaf, and dumb…that such a man would not blush to call that life of his, in the setting

of all those evils, a life of happiness!”7 There is more than mere ridicule in this passage from

Augustine; in fact, lying beneath the negative rhetoric against the pagan ethical theories about

civic virtues such as nationalistic courage, e.g.,8 there is the kernel of his definition of true virtue.

For Augustine, it is of paramount importance that one properly structures one’s life

around the natural hierarchies one finds in the world. In other words, he accepts the pagan

least, within the assumptions shared by most ancient moralists); it is not so clear that an extremely strict criterion would be equally plausible” (Irwin 113). I will discuss the important distinction Irwin makes between “moderately strict” and “extremely strict” teleological criteria for genuine virtues below. The point being made here is that Augustine cannot appeal solely to Scripture, for instance, as he is writing in large part to non-believers. But I will argue in the end that he relies too heavily upon Scripture, a particularly exclusive interpretation of Scripture at that, despite Robert Dodaro’s (Robert Dodaro. “Augustine’s Secular City.” In Augustine and His Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless. (London: Routledge, 2001, p. 231-59) claims to the contrary, to reach his conclusions about virtue. 6 City of God XIX.1, my emphasis. 7 City of God XIX. 4, my emphasis Augustine’s ad hominems. 8 City of God V. 12.


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ethical consideration of justice as “to assign to each his due”,9 but views that as insufficient

unless it is grounded in a particular sort of supernatural telos,10 as well as buttressed by his

theological/philosophical understanding of love: “We must, in fact, observe the right order even

in our love for the very love with which we love what is deserving of love, so that there may be

in us the virtue which is the condition of the good life. Hence, as it seems to me, a brief and true

definition of virtue is ‘rightly ordered love.’”11 We might also add: “And so a rightly directed

will is love in a good sense and a perverted will is love in a bad sense.”12 So the lack of true

virtue would be due to the disorderly or disturbed love; such disorder is a result of the act of

original sin and the consequent condition of original sin inherited by all human beings.13 If real

virtue is not impossible, then how are the fallen to possess it? According to Etienne Gilson, “[i]n

Augustinism, therefore, we should speak of an illumination of the virtues which matches the

illumination of the sciences: just as our truth is only a participation in Truth and our beatitude a

sharing in Beatitude [Happiness], so every human man becomes virtuous only by making his

soul conform to the immutable rules and lights of the Virtues dwelling eternally within the Truth

and Wisdom common to all men. The four cardinal virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and

justice, have no other source but this….”14 Gilson will focus on love, charity in particular, as the

inner force that drives one’s will toward one’s goal. But he cautions that the mere capacity to

love is ineffective without the proper object of that love: “When a person loves another to ensure

his own happiness, it is absurd for him to abandon the idea of reciprocity and do away with

9 City of God XIX.4. 10 See below on the discussion of moderate and strict teleological criteria. 11 City of God XV.22. 12 City of God XIV.7. 13 It might be more accurate to claim that real virtue is more difficult to achieve due to the Fall, but surely not unattainable; that would mean that Fall which is responsible for the very need for the virtues to begin with, is also that which makes them unattainable. This is not a position Augustine would want to defend. 14 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. (New York: Random House, 1960).


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himself for the sake of his beloved. And the reason is quite clear: no finite good is worth what

we should destroy within ourselves if we did away with ourselves to have it take our place. But

it is altogether different when we are dealing with the absolute Good [God]. To possess it is to

possess everything hence, it is useless for one who possesses it to have anything else besides.”15

Continuing with the theme of love and virtue, Augustine claims, “[t]herefore, a love which

strains after the possession of the loved object is desire; and the love which possesses and enjoys

that object is joy.”16 Paul Weithman adds that “[t]wo ways of loving are especially important for

Augustine: what he calls “use” and “enjoyment.” To enjoy something is to love it for its own

sake; he contrasts this with regarding things as useful for securing something else. Something

that is worthy of being loved entirely for its own sake is the sort of thing that is capable of

conferring true happiness.”17 Since it is only the eternal God that is worthy of being loved

(enjoyed, not used) in this way, since He is the only thing not prone to corruption, decay, or

dissolution, anything short of that kind of love could not bring true happiness, and thus is not a

true virtue.

Weithman continues along this theme: “We are also prone to seek happiness in the

possession of things that cannot confer it, including pleasures of the flesh, transient glory,

enduring reputation, and, especially, power over others.”18 Put in even starker terms by

15 Gilson 139. 16 City of God XIV.7. 17 Weithman 235. 18 Weithman 236. Due to original sin, all of humanity, in greater or lesser extents, finds “disorder in our loves.” This is so even for those Augustine would label “pilgrims” or “resident aliens” as (Brown 323) puts it, within the City of God. Abel might be considered such a pilgrim for Augustine, as he, unlike his brother Cain, whose name means ‘full ownership’ (or “earthly possession”—City of God XV.21), is not “at home in this world.” Abel is a foreigner, and thus requires some level of “hope” that there is more to this land than he can see, and more importantly, that he will be able to return to his homeland (Brown 319). An interesting question to put to Augustine might be what this world would have looked like if no Cains ever were born? Would no earthly city have ever begun? Would all of Adam’s descendants remained pure pilgrims here; and if so, what implications would that have had regarding the development of the virtues as understood by Augustine?


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Augustine: “For the good make use of this world in order to enjoy God, whereas the evil want to

make use of God in order to enjoy the world—those of them, that is, who still believe in the

existence of God or in his concern for human affairs.”19 In order to make his positive point

regarding the virtues, Augustine contrasts his notion of virtues with the presumptions of the

pagan philosophers who imprudently assert that a purely natural humanistic approach to virtue is

sufficient to attain actual fulfillment, eudaimonia, or happiness in this life. That is, they do not

posit the need for supernatural assistance to “rightly order their loves”, to put it in Augustinian

terms.20 This is the central feature of the pagan, that is, non-Christian or heretical Christian21

viewpoint that Augustine attacks, thereby revealing by way of contrast what he takes to be true

virtue.

One can glean Augustine’s position on virtue as if by a via negativa, in particular by

highlighting the reputed civic virtues of the Roman Empire as a case in point of what is not

virtuous. Augustine undermines the classical political traditions championed by Cicero, for

example, that rely in large part upon the ‘virtues’ “like justice, patriotism, and self-sacrifice

which both are good for them and to help sustain their society.”22 Augustine thought the

19 City of God XV.7. 20 This debate is outlined in the Pelagian heresy: “Pelagius taught that original sin did not taint human nature and that it was possible for human beings to live sinless lives without divine assistance. Although he did not think that Adam’s sin damaged human nature, Pelagius did regard it as a bad example which helped to explain the existence and pervasiveness of sin. Because Adam’s sin was just a bad example, however, Pelagius thought that humans were not fundamentally inclined to sin. Humans are free to choose good or evil. If their will is strong, they will choose the good; if weak, the evil. The choice is completely up to them. Thus, it is possible for anyone—Christian or pagan—to be virtuous without God’s help” (Brett Gaul, "Augustine on the Virtues of the Pagans." Augustinian Studies 40, no. 2 (2009), p.242. This view is obviously espoused by pagans, especially those who do not take seriously the ‘myths’ of religions other than their own. 21 I will use Irwin’s (T.H. Irwin "Splendid Vices? Augustine For and Against." Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999), p. 108 nt. 13, sense of “pagan” throughout: “I use ‘pagan’ rather loosely and inappropriately. Augustine’s objections are directed not only against atheists, or polytheists, or deists, but also against theists who do not believe Catholic (as opposed to Manichean or Pelagian) doctrines about (for instance) creation, sin, grace, good works, and the Incarnation.” 22 Weithman 241.


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Romans “refused to regard the ‘earthly’ values they had created as transient and relative.

Committed to the fragile world they had created, they were forced to idealize it; they had to deny

any evil in its past, and the certainty of death in its future.”23 In other words, they had to invent

myths and revisionist histories of their own past, and cherry-pick only those cases which seem to

reveal genuine virtuous behavior. But does this militate against the possibility of them possessing

any virtues? Surely they must have had some assets that enabled them to establish and maintain

such a strong empire for so long. Augustine argues that the source of their success was also the

root cause of their decline and not, contrary to the views of many Romans at the time, because of

the debilitating influence of the rise of Christianity and the “abandonment of the Roman deities

for the God of Christianity.”24 So what helped the Romans to succeed? In short, the

nationalistic pride that drove their willingness to die for Rome and/or for glory (which is

essentially the same end here), played an enormous role in sustaining the wealth and power of

the empire: “They were passionately devoted to glory; it was for this that they desired to live, for

this they did not hesitate to die. This unbounded passion for glory, above all else, checked their

other appetites. They felt it would be shameful for their country to be enslaved, but glorious for

her to have dominion and empire; and so they set their hearts first on making her free, then on

making her sovereign”25 But this is merely coincidental (or the ‘outward resemblances’)26

prudence, courage, justice, or temperance, to say nothing of proper (or any) faith, for which

many Christians would not hesitate to die.

According to Weithman, Augustine “claims that the self-restraint of the ancient Romans

was rooted not in such faith [the Supreme Good which is God], but in fear of destruction by the

23 Brown 307. 24 Weithman 241. 25 City of God V.12. 26 Weithman 242.


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enemy city of Carthage and in desires for Rome’s freedom, dominion, and the ersatz immortality

that comes from lasting glory. As Augustine says, ‘What else was there for them to love, then,

but glory, by which they sought to find even after death a kind of life in the mouths of those who

praised them?’ He concludes that neither these loves nor the self-restraint they motivated made

the Romans virtuous. They only made them ‘less vile.’”27 It is hard to uncover in any of these

descriptions an asset Augustine would find worthy of praise. But this raises the question, what

sort of society is possible for pagans in Augustine’s estimation? In answering this question,

which will also aid in answering the query of why Rome ultimately fell, it might be helpful to

note what Augustine says about society in general, as humans are social beings and living in a

commonwealth28 with many others requires virtue. Augustine considers the possibility that “’a

people is the association of a multitude of rational beings united by a common agreement on the

objects of their love’…[a]nd obviously, the better the objects of this agreement, the better the

people; the worse the objects of this love, the worse the people.”29 So the Romans might have

had a commonwealth, as they were united in their love for what they thought to be justice or at

least the drive for peace. But this is based upon an erroneous representation of a society. For

Augustine it is not simply as Cicero has Scipio Africanus puts it: “an assembly united in

fellowship by a common agreement as to what is right and a community of interest…a

27 Weithman 243. See also (Irwin 110 nt. 19), quoting Aquinas: “[t]he prudence of misers, by which they work out various sorts of gain, is no true virtue; nor the justice of misers, by which they scorn what belongs to other people, from fear of severe punishment; nor the temperance of misers, by which they restrain desire for excess pleasures, whenever they are expensive; nor the bravery of misers, by which, as Horace, says, ‘they travel overseas, over mountains, through fire, to escape poverty.’” If a prudent miser is not virtuous, is he still prudent? Is it a vicious prudence? Can a Nazi be truly courageous in an act that is evil and directed toward an evil end? Must we come up with a different term to distinguish the virtuously courageous and the viciously courageous? In other words, are there vicious virtues and/or virtuous vices? The latter might amount to what Augustine thinks of the decent moral acts of pagans, according to Gaul and possibly Weithman, for instance. But is this oxymoronic? Perhaps not--courage is a virtue; it is not virtue as such. Does this dissolve the logical worry? 28 City of God XII.22-3; XIX.5. 29 City of God XIX.24.


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partnership in justice.”30 Public service toward justice sounds like a laudable goal, but unless the

ultimate goal of God in the end is adopted at the same time, it is not real virtue for Augustine.

Augustine agrees with the pagans that justice, at least in part, is the condition in which each

person is given his proper due,31 but this implies for him the worship of the only true God. No

mere earthly city is capable of doing this collectively, because it has not occurred individually. It

has not occurred within any pagan individual because, by definition, pagans do not recognize the

Christian God—the one and only for Augustine. This means that to the extent that Rome was a

truly a city (Augustine does not even allow this much), it was definitely not a truly just one, and

in effect, it could be argued, as it will be below, that it was bereft of any and all virtues.

II. Pagan Virtues are Virtues…Just not as Virtuous as Christian Virtues? Augustine in book V of City of God appears to be open to genuine pagan virtues. Indeed, the

very titles of chapters 12 and 13, e.g., imply he thinks God must have played some sort of role in

the success (albeit limited) of the Roman Empire: “The moral character in the ancient Romans

which earned from the true God the increase of their empire although they did not worship him”,

and “The Love of praise: though a vice, it counts as a virtue because it checks greater vices.”32

The rest of the chapters attempt to answer why God would “deign to help the Romans”, as it

could not have been from their own anemic deities (‘false gods’ would be more accurate for

Augustine) nor some ‘destiny’ outside of the one true omnipotent God. If Roman civic virtues

performed the requisite role in Rome’s success, as Cicero or Varro might argue, then it will be

30 Weithman 241. 31 City of God XIX.4. 32 City of God V.12-3. Perhaps Augustine views the virtues of the pagans in a similar fashion to his view of the physical created world in general, as illustrated, again, in a descriptive chapter title: “The good things of which this life is full, even though it is subject to condemnation” (City of God XXII.24). Augustine even proffers praise (backhanded to be sure) for the misguided pagan thinkers’ amazing intellectual abilities: “Finally, the brilliant wit shown by the philosophers and heretics in defending their very errors and falsehoods is something which beggars imagination” (City of God XXII.24).


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helpful to give a deeper analysis of what exactly Augustine takes to be the conditions for genuine

virtue in order to establish whether Augustine considers the pagans capable of real virtue. T.H.

Irwin puts the matter succinctly: “Since Augustine is a eudaemonist, he must claim that the right

choice of virtue and virtuous action lies in their direction towards the right ultimate end.”33 To

put it simply, good action for the right reasons. This is the essential teleological criterion that was

briefly mentioned above. The pressing issue now is to what degree Augustine requires one to

hold to this condition. Irwin clarifies: “A teleological criterion for virtue, therefore, might be

made more precise in either of two ways: (1) A moderately strict criterion: S has a virtue if S acts

on the morally correct conception of the ultimate end. (2) An extremely strict criterion: S has a

virtue if S’s virtuous action is guided by a wholly correct conception of the ultimate end.”34 He

notes correctly, I think, that if Augustine adheres only to the second standard, then no pagan

could ever possibly be virtuous short of a genuine conversion to the one true faith.35 But Irwin

asserts that it is not clear how the latter criterion could be a reasonable stipulation for any kind of

virtue; with this I agree.

Others agree with Irwin’s general assessment on this: “This is not quite to say that no

pagan could ever be virtuous (for Augustine would not, in his most imperious of moods, have

claimed quite that) but that paganism lacks the conceptual resources—the right stories and

glosses on these stories—to imagine what a virtue really is. To describe a virtue but not refer it in

the requisite way to God is to imagine a vice. That is what Augustine seems to be saying in book

33 Irwin 109. 34 Irwin 112. 35 It is my contention that the extremely strict criterion is what Augustine espouses, and not only does such an espousal lead to the impossibility of genuinely virtuous pagans, but it might also eliminate the category of genuinely virtuous Christians as well; thus, on Augustine’s austere account, no one would ever be truly virtuous.


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XIX of City of God.”36 So, one needs to determine what would constitute the right way to seek

the ultimate good, and, fundamentally, what that wholly correct ultimate end is. If one is missing

either of these elements, we would then need to establish whether one is merely imagining a vice

or possessing an actual vice. Again, virtuous activity is striving for the right ultimate end in the

right way. Not surprisingly for Augustine, this entails having complete rest or peace in God as

the correct conception of the ultimate end. But Irwin is cautious here: “If the teleological

criterion simply requires us to aim at some genuine good, it is too generous to be plausible, and

certainly too generous to fit Augustine. For (to go back to his examples) misers may aim at

genuine goods, and to that extent aim at good ends, in so far as they aim at harmony with their

neighbors, or control of their own appetites; nonetheless they lack virtue because they

subordinate these good ends to their own miserliness.”37 Remember also how the Romans

manifested the morally respectable activity of self-restraint, but almost by accident, and certainly

not aimed at the correct conception of the ultimate end.38

How can Irwin and others find room for an Augustinian to compromise between a

position that is excessively liberal in its acceptance of all pagan virtue, and one that is rigidly

chauvinistic and exclusive such that only a very few saintly Catholics would qualify as virtuous

beings? One approach is to allow that there is only a single absolute ultimate end, but more than

one morally correct conception of that end. In other words, one might have a partially correct

conception of the ultimate end: “…we need to know whether Augustine agrees that the

philosophers are partly right in their views about non-instrumental goods, and in particular in

36 Wetzel 272 37 Irwin 112, my italics. 38 City of God XIX.4.


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their belief that virtue is a non-instrumental good that deserves to be chosen for its own sake.39 If

he agrees with them on these points, he must also agree that their conception of the ultimate end

is partly correct, since they take these goods to be parts of it. If, then, they act on this moral

outlook, they act for the sake of a morally correct, and hence partly correct, conception of the

ultimate end.”40 This looks right especially when one reads where Augustine41 recognizes the

“usefulness” of pagans who serve to glorify humanity over those who lack this ‘virtue’ but

would have been better off having it. At least this provides one with a partially correct

conception of the ultimate end. So, while a pagan might not ever have a wholly perfect

conception of the ultimate end, she is still capable of imperfect virtues. This is certainly more

than a “splendid vice” in much the same way that a child is not to be faulted for lack of

understanding why one should not harm animals, e.g., and yet refrains from doing so anyway,

perhaps incidentally for non-moral reasons.42 Here is Irwin: “Once we understand why

Augustine reasonably (given his theological outlook) takes pagan virtues to fall short of true

virtue, we should also see why he must regard them as something more than splendid vices. If

39 See above for the discussion on Augustine’s distinction between loves of “use” vs. “enjoyment” which closely resembles the intrinsic/instrumental value distinction. 40 Irwin 116. Irwin has to side with a version of the moderately strict condition in order to take into consideration Augustine’s claims early in City of God (V.13), “The love of praise: though a vice, it counts as a virtue because it checks greater vices.” In Irwin’s words, “If the pagan moralists are judged by the moderately strict criterion, they turn out to have both virtues and vices. If they are judged by the extremely strict criterion, they turn out to have vices and no virtues” (Irwin 117). The latter option seems to be precluded given much of what Augustine writes in book V, and Irwin’s assessment would thus be accurate, were that all Augustine wrote on the matter. According to Gaul, “What may account for the change [from granting pagans virtues to demoting them to vices] is that between his writing of Book 5 and Book 19 Augustine became embroiled in the Pelagian controversy. As mentioned earlier, among the things that Pelagius taught was that humans had the power to live sinless lives without divine aid. However, Augustine does not think that anyone, not even a believer, can be virtuous without God’s help. If not even believers can be good without God’s help, Augustine certainly will not allow that pagans can” (Gaul 248). 41 City of God V.19. 42 To clarify; not harming animals for the wrong (or no) reasons is still better than harming them in the first place. But if they are harmed for the right reasons (correct ultimate end), Augustine might very well count it as a virtue. The issue of torture for the right reasons, insofar as there are any, might be a case in point (City of God XIX.6).


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they are combined with arrogance, they are vicious; but they are not themselves part of the

arrogance or vice.”43 Irwin seems to end with a compromise of sorts in which Augustine allows

for pagans (some of them some of the time) to be virtuous, to an extent; at least when they are

not seeking domination over others or praise and glory from their own actions, then they can be

capable of virtuous acts. But will this be enough to make them virtuous people? “In his

[Augustine’s] view, we are closer to happiness if we have the right aims and find them frustrated

than if we have the wrong aims and fulfill them. Someone who aims at living according to the

virtues for their own sake has one important element in happiness, since having the right aims is

itself a part of happiness. A pagan who has the moral virtues aims to live in accord with them,

and has the morally correct conception of the ultimate end. To this extent, therefore, someone

with the pagan virtues has genuine virtues.”44 But he cannot claim this in the end, as to see

virtues as valuable in themselves precludes having the ultimate end in God, and thus, no real

virtue. For Augustine, there is more to virtue than the earthly struggle against temptation and

vice. If this were the extent of virtue, then there would be no reason for Augustine to be so

adamant in book XIX of City of God against the pagan civic “virtues” which are presumed to

achieve success in the city of man. If both the source of true virtue as well as the teleological

considerations built into true virtue are not properly conceived (“to have the unqualifiedly

correct conception of the ultimate end…one must perform a right action for only and all the

reasons he ought to do it,”45) then Augustine’s conditions for virtue are not met.

III. Pagan Virtues are Nothing but ‘Splendid Vices’ (but some are worse than others)

43 Irwin 127. 44 Irwin 119. 45 Gaul 245.


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While it is unlikely that Augustine ever used the phrase himself, I think there is enough textual

support in his writings to conclude that he did view the “virtues” of the pagans as nothing more

than “splendid vices,” and in some cases, sans “splendid.”46 To the extent that they do have a

splendid character, it is in the sense that one is moved to good actions. But these are empty for

they lack the necessary willful component that is to direct them toward eternal peace with God

(the God of the Christian Bible—presumably not the Hindu gods or the god of Zoroaster,

certainly the pagan gods of the pagan pantheon47 will not suffice). Peter Brown quotes from a

later Augustinian letter the following:

‘Then, there are those who have left no literary remains; but we have learnt from the classics, that they had lived praiseworthy lives, by their own lights48 [this will not suffice of course]. Except for the fact that they did not serve God, but erred in worshipping the vanities that were the established religion of their time…they can justly be held up as models of all other virtues—of frugality, self-denial, chastity, sobriety, courageousness in the face of death for their country’s sake…All these things are…in a sense, worthless and unprofitable; but as signs of a certain character, they please us so much that we would want those in whom they exist to be freed from the pains of Hell: but of course, it may well be that the verdict of human feeling is one thing, and the justice of the Creator, quite another.’49

Is Augustine purposely being ambivalent here and masking his true feelings about the pagans

and their fate? Or is this a revelation that he wishes it were truly the case that pagan virtue really

is true virtue, and thus the upstanding Roman character, for instance, would be sufficient for one

to gain an entrance ticket to perpetual peace, or at least avoid eternal damnation in Hell,

assuming this is not a false choice? It is true that Augustine thinks that in the earthly city it is

difficult for mere mortals to know the minds and motives of others, not to mention of oneself,50

and that only God knows for sure who is saved and who is not, but I think Augustine feels he has 46 See my quotations of Augustine’s ad hominems above. 47 City of God II.6. 48 Augustine calls these pagan leaders of supposed great moral standing and character “good men in their own way” (City of God V.13). 49 Brown 306-7. 50 See Weithman 247 and City of God XIX.6.


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more than enough indicators to compel him to not only advocate for the Christian virtues as the

only virtues, but to the view that the presumed pagan virtues are in fact actually vices. The

pagans are held up as models of all other virtues, presumably non-theological ones, but only for

other pagans who happen to share the same “lights” and pride in country, for example.

Notwithstanding the good character that might be pleasing to Augustine and other Christians,

who are likely his audience in this instance, the hesitancy and oscillation has the ring of irony

more than sincere ambivalence. For instance, why does Augustine need to allude to Hell at all in

this context, if not to erect an unmistakable divide between true virtue and true vice? This is the

consequence of siding with the wrong ‘city’: “I classify the human race into two branches: the

one consists of those who live by human standards, the other of those who live according to

God’s will. I call these two classes two cities, speaking allegorically. By two cities I mean two

societies of human beings, one of which is predestined to be with God for all eternity, the other

doomed to undergo eternal punishment with the Devil.”51 Again, which is which, mere mortals

will never know for sure while on earth. This is a key point to which I will return in the last

section.

Furthermore, the likely sarcastic52 comment “except for the fact that they did not serve

God”, leads me to believe he does not really value the purported good works of these pagans

especially given the absolutely supreme importance he places on the right relationship with the

right God throughout City of God as well as all of his writings. For instance, consider the

following from City of God book XIX, starting with the title of the chapter:

True virtues impossible without true religion: The fact is that the soul may appear to rule the body and the reason to govern the vicious elements in the most praiseworthy fashion; and yet if the soul and reason do not serve God as God himself has commanded that he

51 City of God XV.1 52 As Brown notes, “Sarcasm had always been Augustine’s most formidable weapon” (308); but so too was a touch of ridicule; see italics above in the quotation from (COG XIX.4).


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should be served, then they do not in any way exercise the right kind of rule over the body and the vicious propensities….Thus the virtues which the mind imagines it possesses, by means of which it rules the body and the vicious elements, are themselves vices rather than virtues, if the mind does not bring them into relation with God in order to achieve anything whatsoever and to maintain that achievement.53

Notice, in addition to the unambiguous “vices rather than virtues” phrase, Augustine’s clear use

of “right kind of rule” when speaking of the Godly-driven acts. To further highlight the obvious,

this language points to a difference in kind rather than degree between the Christian and pagan

virtues; indeed, the latter are vices to the extent that they fail to meet the extremely strict

teleological criterion outlined by Irwin above. This reading does not place pagan virtues as

“second-best”54 virtues which might be seen as visually lower on the spectrum of the same sort

of virtue, with Christian virtues the highest in degree, for example.

As a possible rebuttal, one might appeal to Augustine’s apparent acceptance of some

pagan actions over others,55 such as seeking praise for glory rather than for the worse vice of

domination. Augustine allows for some level of degrees separating those who can at least be

used for the betterment in society,56 so, the ‘courageous’ barbarian fighting only for domination

might be worse than the ‘courageous’ pagan seeking only praise for glory, who is worse than the

‘courageous’ pagan who seeks praise for self-restraint, etc. But the ‘courageous’ Christian is not

found anywhere along this pagan continuum, just as the pagan is nowhere along the Christian

spectrum. For Augustine it is not merely a matter of more or less virtue where Christians are

closer to the Good, then pagans further down, and barbarians, e.g., the furthest away from the

Good/God. Rather, in this analogy, there are two different and separate (from a God’s eye view

53 City of God XIX.25, my emphasis He says as much earlier in the book: “That being so, when a man does not serve God, what amount of justice are we to suppose to exist in his being? For if a soul does not serve God it cannot with any kind of justice command the body, nor can a man’s reason [the only means available to the pagans] control the vicious elements in the soul” (City of God XIX.21). 54 See (Brown 325). 55 City of God V.12, 19. 56 City of God XIX.4.


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in particular) spectrums altogether, only one of which illustrates actual virtue—there might be

degrees of difference between the “virtuous” pagans and the vicious pagans along one spectrum,

but to compare and contrast those individuals with the truly virtuous Christians (or even those

Christians who do have God as their ultimate end but fail to properly keep that in mind, or does a

bad deed as a means toward that ultimate end) is like comparing the “weekend warrior” who

“trains” for the enjoyment (not use) of playing sports for the sake of the games themselves vs.

the Olympic athlete who has winning gold in the finals on her mind as the ultimate end. These

are not peers, and the scales of evaluation must be completely different.57

For Augustine, true happiness can only be found in the enjoyment of something for its

own sake, but it has to be the correct object of love, and be loved in the right way. “Its secure

possession brings about the quiescence of desire. Only God is worthy of being loved in this

way…no creature, whether animate or inanimate, ought to be loved entirely58 for its own sake;

no created good can completely quiet the appetites and confer the happiness and peace that the

enjoyment of God can bring.”59 So the ultimate end to be loved is God, and God is a being that

is to be “enjoyed” or loved entirely for its own sake. If one meets these two conditions, the

cognitional and volitional respectively, according to Gaul (245), then one possesses true virtue

and thus might find true happiness.60 If most Christians fail to live up to either or both of these

conditions61 then how likely is it that an unbeliever will? The answer is a resounding ‘not at all

57 A better example might be to imagine a virtual reality video game in which the players’ task is to build a virtual life and live a virtually virtuous existence for the sake of winning the game, and nothing else. 58 Does this reading allow Augustine to view other humans as partial ends in themselves, so we can avoid attributing to him the rather harsh prescription to only use other beings in this life? 59Weithman 235. 60 I am inclined to view both of these conditions as necessary but not jointly sufficient; at least not without the most important element for Augustine, the grace of God. Both conditions will be further defined below. 61 “However, not even the saints and the faithful worshippers of the one true and supreme God enjoy exemption from the deceptions of the demons and from their multifarious temptations. In fact, in this


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possible’, as by definition, the pagan, so long as she remains a pagan, will never willfully meet

the strict teleological requirement that places the Christian God as the ultimate end to be loved;

directing virtuous acts towards eternal peace with God is not the goal of pagans.

If there are degrees of real virtues, then again, they are only found along a spectrum of

Christian virtues: “For Augustine, then, the virtues of the pagans really are ‘splendid vices.’

Such virtues are splendid or impressive because they lead pagans to do right actions, but they are

in fact vices—not virtues—because they do not have the cognitional and volitional reference to

God. On Augustine’s account, a right action is either virtuous or vicious: there is no middle

ground….”62 This strict dichotomous approach is common for Augustine,63 even though his

intermingling of the two cities is ambiguous—it is not unclear for God. Gaul continues with his

strongest point: “Although pagans can perform right actions, because they are pagans, they can

never do them in the right way. The cognitional and volitional requirements are hurdles that

pagans simply cannot clear. Given this, they cannot be virtuous.”64 This needs some unpacking.

By ‘cognitional’, Gaul is referring to one of Irwin’s two possible teleological conditions, where

in this case, the ultimate end is seen as eternal peace with God.65 Gaul argues that this condition

situation of weakness and in these times of such evil such anxiety is even not without its use in leading them to seek, with more fervent longing, the state of serenity where peace is utterly complete and assured” (City of God XIX.10). 62 Gaul 245. 63 See City of God XV.1-2, distinguishing Cain and Abel, Ishmael and Isaac, as paradigmatic cases, e.g. 64 Gaul 245. 65 “Recall that Irwin explains the difference between a morally correct conception of the ultimate end and the unqualifiedly correct one by saying that if someone does a right action for some of the reasons he ought to do it, he has a morally correct conception of the ultimate end. In order to have the unqualifiedly correct conception of the ultimate end, though, one must perform a right action for only and all of the reasons he ought to do it. Again, the contrast here is between doing something for the sake of some combination of, for example, A, B, and C, and doing something for the sake of A, B, and C and only A,B, and C. But Augustine’s theory of virtue states that in order to possess a virtue, one must direct his virtuous actions towards eternal peace with God. Let us call this the ‘cognitional requirement’…. On Augustine’s account, though, even meeting the cognitional requirement is not enough to exhibit genuine


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is necessary but not sufficient to meet Augustine’s standards for virtue. One must also have the

‘volitional’ or right motive in loving God (again, the correct God; a point Gaul does not

highlight). If either of these criteria is missing, even if one engages in the right act, insofar as

that is meaningful and/or possible without the joint conditions, one cannot be truly virtuous. In

his Against Julian,66 Augustine seems to follow more closely the passages on virtue from book

XIX in City of God, in which the pagans are not represented as virtuous, rather than those in

book V of City of God, in which he seems to at least be ambivalent about pagan virtue. For

example, in reply to Julian,67 Augustine remarks, “[f]or you, who deny that the virtues by which

a man lives rightly are gifts of God, and attribute them to human nature and will, not to the grace

of God, are accustomed to argue that unbelievers sometimes have these virtues; in this way you

try to nullify our assertion that no one lives rightly except by faith through Jesus Christ our Lord,

the one Mediator of God and men, and thus you most plainly profess yourselves His

adversaries.”68 Augustine continues with even starker terms against the possibility of pagan

virtue: “But God forbid there be true virtues in anyone unless he is just, and God forbid he be

truly just unless he lives by faith, for ‘He who is just lives by faith.’”69

Must Augustine conclude the same thing for all pagans, even the Stoics or

Aristotelians,70 the latter a group often viewed as synonymous with virtue ethics? For instance,

consider the Aristotelian who strives for a non-instrumental approach to virtue that seeks out

virtue. To exhibit genuine [sic], one must also act from the right motive—love of God. Let us call this the ‘volitional requirement”’ (Gaul 245). 66 All references from Against Julian are from Saint Augustine, Against Julian. Translated by Matthew Schumacher. (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1957). 67 “Julian, the future [Pelagian] bishop of Eclanum, the most devastating critic of Augustine in his old age” (Brown 383). 68 Against Julian 177. 69 Against Julian 181. The number of passages in which Augustine repeats this claim against pagan virtue is too great to quote here in full. But see (Against Julian 177-8, 189-90, 197-8) for the most explicit. 70 Referred to as “the Peripatetics” by Augustine (City of God XIX.4).


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virtue as an end in themselves, rather than as a means to achieve something further, such as

pleasure or self-approval. If Augustine’s view cannot be widened sufficiently to include these

pagan virtues into the realm of real virtues, if only less virtuous perhaps, then it is likely that no

pagan virtues would be, which seems to be far too strong of a claim to make. So, Irwin will

compromise; the Aristotelian has a partially correct conception of the good. But then what could

it mean for someone to have a partially correct conception of the ultimate end71, and would this

suffice, assuming they have this, for a virtuous act that does not have any willful direction

toward the one true God72—the part that is missing in the pagan? Augustine thinks pagans lack

the comprehension of the right end and couple this ignorance with (“stupefying”) arrogance; but

even this fact is not sufficient to dissuade Irwin of his moderate position: “Although they are

virtues of arrogant people, they do not themselves aim at the distinctive ends of arrogant people;

they aim at praiseworthy ends that are equally appropriate ends for anyone who lacks

arrogance.”73 But this undermines the sense in which Augustine speaks of the vice of arrogance

(to say nothing of “effrontery” and “amazing idiocy”) especially among pagans.

Irwin appears to describe the virtuously proud ambiguously to allow for a pagan, even if

arrogant, to have virtuous ends; but then on Augustine’s account, he would not be arrogant. It is

the teleological consideration that is most important for Augustine, and thus it is the end toward

which one strives that determines the viciousness or virtuousness of one’s character. Irwin

attempts to salvage a reasonable position for Augustine on virtue: “From Augustine’s theological

point of view, pagans are indeed open to objection for being pagan, since they lack the relevant

beliefs about grace and sin. But they are not open to objection for their realization or partial

71 Irwin 127. 72 Irwin 116. 73 Irwin 125-6.


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realization of the pagan conceptions of the virtues.”74 This sounds like a reasonable approach to

virtue; unfortunately again, Augustine’s theological viewpoint does exclude pagans from real

virtue, as Augustine does not separate his theological perspective from his account of the virtues;

indeed, his account is entirely theological: “All these philosophers have wished, with amazing

folly, to be happy here on earth and to achieve bliss by their own efforts. The Truth ridiculed

such people through the words of the prophet, ‘The Lord knows the thoughts of men’—or, as the

apostle Paul quotes the passage, ‘The Lord knows that the thoughts of wise men are foolish.’”75

How exactly is happiness linked with virtue? William Haggerty provides a key passage and

comment regarding this connection, which can be used as a response to Irwin’s moderate view:

“In rejecting a ‘blessedness he cannot see,’ the pagan philosopher exalts himself and ignores the

true source of virtue and righteousness; he ‘fabricates an utterly delusive happiness by means of

a virtue whose falsity is in proportion to its arrogance.’…“The wisdom Augustine speaks of is

not the ‘knowledge without heart’ of the pagan sage, but that wisdom containing the precepts of

Christian love.”76 Even the pagan with the greatest character is subject to Augustine’s critique

that “[t]he philosophers have made a fundamental error by supposing that the Final Good and

Evil are to be found in this life. From this assumption all other problems will follow. Augustine’s

argument that follows is broad enough to cover any philosophical ethic that places happiness in

this world.”77

74 Irwin 126. 75 City of God XIX.4. 76 Haggerty 153, my emphasis. 77 Scott M. Sullivan, “Center for Thomistic Studies.” Happiness is Virtuous Activity with Crossed Fingers? The Augustinian Attack on Aristotle's "City of Man" Ethics. http://www.scottmsullivan.com/articles/happiness.pdf (accessed April 15, 2011), p. 6.


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Augustine sees this erroneous teleological assumption as fundamentally arrogant,

regardless of the ostensibly laudable character of those who seek certain virtues as ends in

themselves. But not only are these pagans arrogant in their ignorance, their ignorance leads

inevitably to failure with respect to their mistaken goal—happiness in this life by their own

efforts alone: “The pagan’s quest for happiness reveals the catch-22. Natural goods are needed

for temporal happiness, but natural goods are fleeting things subject to all kinds of radical

alteration. It does not even have to be the case that one has actually lost natural goods; just the

threat of loss is enough. Insecurity and fear of loss are incompatible with happiness and to not

fear what is needed for happiness is to lack wisdom. If the happy life is attainable, Augustine

tells us that external goods cannot serve as its foundation since these hang on fortune and are

exposed to mishaps.”78 But can there be hope of the appropriate virtuous sort for the pagan, at

least regarding good fortune for the maintenance of natural goods in the future? I will return to

this question in the final section.

IV. Virtuous Pagans One More Time--With Responses Perhaps Augustine is not as bound to an exclusive approach to religion, and thus virtue, as has

been argued above. Robert Dodaro argues that within the proper historical context, one can see

that virtually all Christians (heretical or not) had similar views with respect to the existence of

“an omnipotent God presiding over an intrinsic moral order”79, and that even pagans had some

notion of the sacred or “heavenly city”,80 so the differences Augustine appears to make in his

theological/philosophical writings against pagans generally is likely exaggerated.81 Interestingly,

78 Sullivan 7. 79 Dodaro 241. 80 Dodaro 244. 81 “Brown argues that, in effect, the practical religious intolerance experienced at large may have been less harsh and comprehensive than the written sources seem to suggest. By this reading, the outbreak at Calama, while not without parallel, may depict more the exception than the norm for the relations


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Dodaro will claim that the key differences between Augustine and Nectarius over the presumed

unfair and harsh treatment of pagan looters at Calama in contrast to the milder punishment in the

form of public confession for the Christian offenders accused of the same infraction, “lies not in

the lofty debate over ‘true religion’ (although traces of this argument are also found there), but in

the nature of the virtue mentioned in the statement which Nectarius opens the discussion and

which is quoted at the beginning of the essay: affection and care for one’s own home town

(caritas patriae).”82 Dodaro seems to be referring to the “splendid vices” of pagan civic virtue.

These are all of the virtues that Augustine claims did aid the Roman Empire in its drive for and

maintenance of power, but, at the same time and for the same reasons, these are not true virtues

because they lack the correct conception of the ultimate end in God—a central claim that would

be senseless outside of the debate over ‘true religion.’83 Moreover, if Brown is correct about

Augustine’s conception of the ‘pilgrim’ or ‘resident alien’84 as one who is akin to Abel rather

than Cain, and thus is not at home in this world, and more importantly, does not see any city

within this world as a proper home, but rather a temporary (un)resting place where one lives in

hope that she will return to the true home with God, then the ‘affection’ and ‘care’ for one’s

earthly home town can only be an instance of what Augustine would call a vice (arrogance), as it

is ineffectually (but with presumed certainty in the mind of the pagan) directing one’s actions

between Christians and pagans” (Dodaro 241). If true, then Augustine’s numerous passages from City of God XIX and Against Julian are exceptional; that would be a lot of exceptional texts! It appears the norm is in fact Augustine’s very strict and parochial view of the right faith. 82 Dodaro 243. 83 “It certainly doesn’t follow just from the ambiguity of life in the saeculum that historical and political narratives must be narrated in other than theological terms. In fact, the ambiguity that is of interest to Augustine is intelligible only in theological terms. Remove those terms and the conflicts that fuel human history and politics are bound to seem ultimately pointless (see postmodern historicism)” (James Wetzel, “Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank's Augustine.” Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 2, 2004, p. 274). See also (Wetzel 272) on Augustine’s attribution of the misconceptions of virtue as due to “deficient theology.” 84 Brown 323.


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toward an ephemeral end that will only lead to anxiety and suffering. This is an example of

“love in a bad sense.”85 Etienne Gilson reminds us that Scripture defines God as “Deus caritas

est”;86 God is charity/love, and so the beginning and end,87 so to speak, of human morality. God

is the source of all morality and the goal toward which all virtuous people must strive. This ideal

conception is expressly not present within mere pagan civic virtue as has been argued above.

Dodaro might be right about the historical reading88 of Augustine on heretical and non-

Christian beliefs and the issue of ‘true religion’89 if Irwin is correct about the moderate

teleological criterion. That is, he might be correct if Augustine grants that pagans possess

genuine virtue on either non-religious grounds, or at least quite liberal ones. But I have argued

that Irwin is wrong, and that Augustine does not allow for true pagan virtue, including the

conceptions of Ciceronian, Peripatetic, “members of the Old Academy—the sect supported by

Varro”90 to name a few, basically because of the debate over true religion. Dodaro, in fact, points

to this very issue: “In effect, Augustine substitutes Nectarius’ Stoic view that pardon should be

extended to everyone who sins because all sins are equal, with his own view that human beings

ought to pardon each other because all are equally sinners. True forgiveness thus arises out of an

identification with the other as sinner, an identification that would not be possible by the

searching self-examination and confession which rejects the possibility of ever completely

overcoming personal moral failure in this life.”91 As has been argued for above, Augustine

attacks this very certainty found in the prideful pagan philosophy that presumes moral perfection

in this life without assistance, much less an acceptance of Augustine’s conception of grace from

85 City of God XIV.7. 86 Gilson 141. 87 Pace (Wetzel 282)—see below. 88 Dodaro 241. 89 Dodaro 243. 90 City of God XIX.4. 91 Dodaro 246; see also 247-250 for similar points.


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God.92 Augustine’s view on virtue is centrally a theological one, such that he does not speak of

true virtue unless it is directed at the ultimate end which is eternal peace with the one true God.93

Only Augustine’s pilgrims within the city of God94 have the rightly ordered loves; all others are

conceitedly content to make a home in the earthly city, and in fact feel at home here, without the

need of God; but this is disordered love due to hubris: “Pride is not something wrong in the one

who loves power, or in the power itself; the fault is in the soul which perversely loves its power

and has no thought for the justice of the Omnipotent.”95

Finally, I would like to revisit Irwin’s claim that the arrogant might still be virtuous,

insofar as they possess a partial conception of the ultimate good (Irwin 125-6). Wetzel, in part,

seems to concur on this point with Irwin: “Suppose we just grant Augustine’s claim that

temperance is always a virtue of restraint and always of restraint against vice. It’s still not

obvious why we would further want to conclude that temperance is a lamentable virtue and that

its failings spoil the lot. The restraint of vice is, after all, restraint, and if vice is being

temperately restrained, why expect the other virtues to be especially hobbled?”96 But it seems to

me, on Augustine’s account, one’s conception and use/enjoyment of the virtues is considerably

‘hobbled’ when the appropriate ultimate end is not in view. Etienne Gilson argues that there is a 92 See Sullivan 7. 93Paul Weithman notes, “Thus Augustine’s remark about civic virtue should not blind us to the radical character of his political thought. His arguments that political authority is exercised because of human sinfulness, that it is fundamentally akin to slavery, that it exists to restrain and humble those subject to it, and that citizens do not develop the virtues by dedicating themselves to political life, together constitute a sustained assault on the tradition of political thinking which locates ‘the good for man’ in the common good of an earthly rather than a heavenly city” (Paul Weithman, “Augustine's Political Philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, edited by Eleonor Stump and Norman Kretzmann, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 243). 94 “Scripture tells us that Cain founded a city, whereas Abel, as a pilgrim, did not found one. For the City of the saints is up above, although it produces citizens here below, and in their persons the City is on pilgrimage until the time of the kingdom comes” (City of God XV.1). See also (Brown 319, 323). 95 City of God XII. 8. 96Wetzel 280. Indeed, this seems to support what Augustine claims: “All virtues do is wage perpetual war against the vices” (City of God XIX.4).


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mutual dependence and inseparability of the virtues for Augustine, all centering on love; this

takes us back to the opening remarks on virtue as “rightly ordered love.” Gilson notes that the

highest virtue would also be the highest love:97 “As for the virtues subordinated to this highest

virtue, these may be reduced to love quite easily. Temperance is love bestowed wholeheartedly

upon the thing loved; fortitude is love that easily endures anything for the thing it loves; justice is

love serving the object loved alone and consequently dominating everything else; prudence is

love wisely discriminating between what helps and what hinders it. Hence, if we said that two

men are equal in fortitude but one excels in prudence, this would mean that the fortitude of one is

deficient in prudence and by that very fact deficient in fortitude itself.”98 Consider Irwin’s

“arrogant pagan.” If I am a pagan, supercilious due to my presumption that I can successfully

achieve happiness in this life through my own merits, and deny or at least ignore the relevant

beliefs about sin and God’s grace, but all the same perform a virtuous act, like prudently avoid

wasting money from the city’s coffers, I could not truly be virtuous unless the virtues were not

97 It is interesting that Gilson places charity as the highest good or highest love, which “is the love whereby we love what we ought to love” (Gilson 136). Romans, e.g., can be charitable, but it would not be a virtuous charity; it would be a form of ‘perverted will’: “Thus, the malice of the act is never due to the goodness of its object but to the perversion of our love for this good. In such cases, our error is not in loving what is good, but in violating order by not preferring what is better” (Gilson 136). 98 Gilson 136. On the face of it, the following appears to support Gilson: “If I am tempted by a vice in the way that Augustine understands temptation, it is not simply the case that I am resisting some desire I deem to be bad (though that is true); it is equally the case that I want what the vice inclines me to want. I struggle not just against evil but against myself. In so far as I desire evil as if it were good, my prudence is impaired. In so far as I strive to establish and serve the order that my impaired prudence defines, my justice is impaired. In so far as my ability to endure the difficulties of an unjust and unwise world has to depend on my own sense of wisdom and justice, my fortitude is impaired. And finally—here is the kicker—if I am content to abide the peace that my compromised temperance affords me, then I acquiesce to the injustice in justice, the folly in wisdom, and the indolence in fortitude. I will have traded a pax Romana for the peace of God” (Wetzel 280). To be “impaired” seems as ambiguous as Gilson’s “deficient” in a virtue; do they mean “limited”, “less”, “lacking”, or “non-existent”? My contention is that if the person in question has the wholly correct conception of the ultimate end, then she still has virtues, ‘deficient’ or ‘impaired’, but virtues all the same. This is not the case for one lacking this ultimate conception—which not only adversely affects all of the other virtues, but prohibits them.


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interrelated. The point is the pagan will always have her loves disordered because she has no

interest in the ultimate good in Augustine’s God; an end which orders all of the other virtues.99

There are only degrees to virtue for those seeking the same correct path. The pagans are

not only on a different path, they are headed in a completely different direction, which is to say

nowhere, even if they are using similar means of transportation, i.e., the correct form of travel

(good deeds) to get one from A to B. But the pagans are only going from A to B (where B is a

merely temporal goal); the rightly ordered Christian is traveling from alpha to omega, if I may be

permitted some poetic license—the goal being an eventual return to the starting point in the

source. I believe this sufficiently addresses Wetzel’s position as well: “The other reading of

Augustine, the one I think is right, casts God as the origin and not the end of the virtues. It may

well be true that God is also, in a sense not opposed to natural happiness, the end of the virtues

for Augustine, but that isn’t the point he is making in City of God 19.25. In referring the virtues

to God he advocates there a return of the virtues to their source—a matter of attribution, but also

of surrender.”100 This seems partly correct, but unfortunately it is missing the most important

part—the teleological consideration. Pagans are arrogant in their “enjoyment” (not mere “use”)

of things and people and cities in this world. Augustine is quite clear on this point, especially in

Against Julian which I have claimed closely mirrors his views in City of God XIX: “You ask:

‘Will those, then, in whom there was true justice be in everlasting damnation?’ Words beyond

impudence! There was not true justice in them, as I declared, because functions should not be

99 “…[A]nd if the justice of the ungodly is not true justice, then whichever they have of the virtues allied with it are not true virtues (because failure to refer the gifts of God to their Author makes the evil men using them unjust) ; thus, neither the continence of the ungodly nor their modesty is true virtue” (Against Julian 182). 100 Wetzel 282.


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weighed by the mere acts, but by their ends.”101 This is essential with Augustine’s highlighting

the teleological considerations of action.

With respect to Wetzel, I think Gaul is correct when he notes that because Wetzel

concentrates primarily on City of God XIX and not Against Julian, e.g., “he does not thoroughly

explain what Augustine means by the phrase [that true virtues must have reference to God].”102

Consider Augustine’s own words on the matter:

All other works which seem praiseworthy among men may seem to you to be true virtues and they may seem to be good works and to be carried out without any sin, but as for me, I know this: They were not performed by a good will, for an unbelieving and ungodly will is not a good will. You call these wills good trees; it suffices for me that they are barren with God and therefore not good. They may be fruitful with those for whom they are also good,103 relying on your word, your praise, and, if you like, you as planter; yet, whether you will or no, I shall win my point that the love of the world by which a man is a friend of this world is not from God, and that the love of enjoying any creature whatsoever without love of the Creator is not from God; but the love of God which leads one to God is only from God the Father through Jesus Christ with the Holy Spirit.104

This is one of the more explicit passages in which he denies genuine virtues to the pagans;

indeed, because their actions are not performed with a good will, due to being ungodly, they are

sinful.

Gaul concludes his argument with two questions and Augustine’s reference to Romans

and Hebrews; I am interested in the implication he hints at with the scriptural references: “In

Against Julian Augustine mentions Romans 14:23 (“Everything which does not come from faith

is sin”) and Hebrews 11:6 (“Without faith it is not possible to please God”), but it is hard to see

how either passage could be taken to imply the cognitional and volitional requirements for

genuine virtue that Augustine appears to tease out of them. Held to these requirements, even the

101 Against Julian 190, my emphasis. 102Gaul 246. 103 Recall the earlier phrase Augustine uses, “by their own lights” from (Brown 306-7) quoted above. 104 Against Julian 197-8, my italics.


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saints would appear to fall short. Like the pagans, their virtues would also be vices.”105 The

conclusion that I have supported which denies pagans true virtue is troubling enough for an

Augustinian theory on virtue and ethics in general. But it would be far worse for Augustine if

his own arguments led him to the philosophical/theological conclusion that in essence no one is

capable of true virtue.106

V. What If Even Augustinian Virtues Are Not True Virtues?

“For it is never true in this life that vice does not exist” (City of God XIX.4).

If Augustine is committed to Irwin’s strict teleological criterion as I have argued, then

Augustine’s conception of virtue is unreasonable. To preclude Aristotle, the paragon of Virtue

Ethics, from the possibility of possessing true virtue due to lacking the proper theological system

of beliefs, is exclusivity bordering on chauvinism, and thus, puts Augustine’s approach to virtue

on shaky ground. But that is not all. He accuses the pagans of “stupefying arrogance” among

other things,107 in their presumptuous certainty that their self-made virtues will suffice to bring

peace and happiness in this life.108 On the other hand, true virtue is held only by those who hold

out hope for the next life, and genuinely view themselves as wicked and weak and in need of the

grace of God to make it through this pilgrimage on earth. The truly virtuous are presumed by

Augustine to be humble in that they admit their own limitations and need for God’s wholly

105 Gaul 249. 106 What follows is a tentative inference based upon references from Augustine in more of an indirect fashion than the arguments I have presented above—arguments I believe are supported with ample exegesis. Admittedly, much more research would be needed into Augustine’s theory of inner illumination and grace, e.g., to better defend my claims in this final section, which I take here to be groundwork for a more extensive future project. 107 City of God XIX.4. 108 “These philosophers assert that there can be no possibility of doubt about the nature of the Supreme Good and the Supreme Evil, its opposite” (City of God XIX.3).


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gratuitous dispensation.109 Here is I think the key passage in which Augustine claims that

genuine virtues:

…claim that though human life is compelled to be wretched by all the grievous evils of this world, it is happy in the expectation of the world to come, just as, in expectation, it is saved. For how can it be happy, if it is not yet saved? This point is also made by the apostle Paul. He is speaking not about men without prudence, without steadfastness, without self-control, without justice, but about those who lived by the standards of genuine godliness, whose virtues were therefore genuine virtues, and he says, ‘It is in hope that we are saved….As, therefore, we are saved in hope, it is in hope that we have been made happy; and as we do not yet possess a present salvation, but await salvation in the future, so we do not enjoy a present happiness, but look forward to happiness in the future, and we look forward with ‘steadfast endurance.’…Yet these philosophers refuse to believe in this blessedness because they do not see it; and so they attempt to fabricate for themselves an utterly delusive happiness by means of virtue whose falsity is in proportion to its arrogance.110

There is no fabrication on the part of the truly virtuous, so no arrogance; the Christian has the

certain knowledge of eternal peace in the end with God, but this is not an idealistic dream that

she “will not suffer any miseries” in this life.111 But this presupposes, it does not argue for, the

object of one’s hope. In fact, there seems to be little difference between the hope that Augustine

speaks of and Aristotle’s “crossed fingers” that one’s life will still be a happy one to the end to

the extent that one will not lose one’s good fortune in the last minute, so to speak: “We never

know if fate will bring to us the equivalent of ‘the rack’, and to call this man ‘happy’ because he

is good is to talk ‘nonsense’…Happiness is said of a good life. If we have to ‘keep our fingers

crossed’ about our eudaimonia, then this shows it is not yet complete and an ‘incomplete

eudaimonia’ that leaves more to be desired is a non-Aristotelian eudaimonia.”112 Granted, there

are some significant differences in these two ideas, but while Aristotle’s virtues are in a sense

incomplete or “imperfect”, or better, not virtues at all, in what way can Augustine’s presumed

109 Against Julian 149-50, 179. 110 City of God XIX.4. 111 City of God XIX.4. 112 Sullivan 5.


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genuine virtues be any more total? He admits they never can be in this life (“Is man’s life on

earth anything but temptation?”, and “in this life even good men are crushed or corrupted”,113

(that is, they can fall); so can it only be in heaven that the Christian’s virtues are complete? This

would be absurd, and Augustine’s own comments suggest why: “why should a man hope for

what he already sees?”114 Furthermore, “There [everlasting peace with God] the virtues will not

be engaged in conflict with any kind of vice or evil; they will be possessed of the reward of

victory, the everlasting peace which no adversary can disturb.”115 But then why call it a virtue,

especially as he has claimed that virtue is in “perpetual war against the vices”?116 I am not

courageous when there are no fears before me; I am not compassionate when no one suffers; nor,

most importantly, am I faithful when I am eternally with God in peace. To possess real virtue is

to accept that the state of affairs is not as it should be.117 So what can he possibly mean by the

virtues will be “possessed of the reward of victory”? It seems Augustine would be committed to

meaningfully real virtues as present in this life to buttress the human spirit against inevitable

horrors. But any success in this endeavor can only be a result of a gift from God that one may or

may not receive.

But if such grace is admittedly a necessary condition for true virtue, which is a necessary

condition for salvation, then the devout Christian is just as dependent upon hope that this will be

granted to her (indeed there is nothing she can do to change God’s mind, so to speak), as the

pagan is dependent upon luck or good fortune which is a necessary element for eudaimonia:

113 City of God XIX.8. 114 City of God XIX.4. 115 City of God XIX.10. 116 City of God XIX.4. 117 “Augustine will claim that all the virtues that aim at happiness in this life—not just temperance but also prudence, justice, and fortitude—bear witness to continuing human misery and wickedness. If there weren’t injustice, folly, and sundry other ills to bear in life, we wouldn’t need to work at justice, he suggests, or have our prudence and fortitude tested. The good of life would be ours just naturally” (Wetzel 279). Perhaps, referring back to Gilson, only genuine love remains in heaven as a virtue?


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“Thus, rational activity [according to Aristotle] is the attribute that belongs to the happy man and

this will help him be happy throughout his life….But this doesn’t solve the problem because

Aristotle is already committed to good fortune as foundational. If a man could now maintain

happiness without good fortune, then he would be recanting what he laid out previously. So even

in the midst of this attempt at a solution, Aristotle seems to reconsider and again say explicitly

that a happy man can fall from this state.”118 No matter how intelligent and wise the philosopher

might be, one is always at the mercy of chance and accident.119 Both body and mind are

inevitably affected by the fickleness of the ‘primary gifts of nature’ upon which the pagan theory

of virtue rests. Of course, all of the disasters that can be inflicted (and are) on the wise

philosophers seeking virtue in this life are equally prone to fall on the pious Christian. Recall the

quotation above (p. 21) from Sullivan on the pagan’s need for natural goods and the fear of

losing what one still has: “Insecurity and fear of loss are incompatible with happiness and to not

fear what is needed for happiness is to lack wisdom. If the happy life is attainable, Augustine

tells us that external goods cannot serve as its foundation since these hang on fortune and are

exposed to mishaps.”120 Likewise, Augustine’s hope for salvation, as opposed to eternal

damnation121 hangs on the gift of God.122 What greater fear could be imagined than the fear of

eternal Hell? This likely would bring greater mental anguish to a truly humble and devout

follower of God, one who is not so arrogant to claim certainty regarding her own salvation.

118 Sullivan 4, my italics. 119 “For is there any pain, the opposite of pleasure, any disturbance, the contrary of repose, that cannot befall a wise man’s body?…And what am I to say of those subjected to attacks of demons? Where is their intellect hidden under cover?...Yet is anyone quite confident that such a disaster cannot happen to a wise man in this life?” (City of God XIX.4). 120 Sullivan 7. 121 See City of God XII.22; XIX.11, 28, for the most explicit of his many references to Hell. 122 Against Julian 94-5. Augustine could claim that the grace of God is the essence of stability in contrast to the tenuousness of fortune or accident; but my point is the Christian pilgrim in this world has no greater certainty of that claim than does the pagan regarding his.


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Hence, there is the conundrum of the true believer hoping for salvation, but humble enough to

realize she can never be certain that it will be granted, which leaves the door cracked just enough

for the ultimate fear to continually penetrate. But this is not a fear of the non-believing pagan.

There is no epistemological difference between the hopeful pagan and the hopeful

Christian, unless Augustine has succeeded in converting the pagan to his correct understanding

of the Christian scriptures; a task that cannot be done solely through recitation of scriptural

passages (See opening quotation of this paper), as Augustine admits at one point, but appears to

ignore at others (“…always keeping in conformity with the authority of the Bible”123). But even

then, short of direct revelation, the epistemological issue remains. From the point of view of the

mortal, believer or not, there is little actual difference between the capricious gifts of nature and

the equally capricious gifts (grace) of God: “Those who belong to the City of God share with all

mankind the disappointment to never reach eternal and definite peace in this world.124 What

makes the members of the City of God different from those of the Earthly City is their certainty

to be in possession of the heavenly peace by faith and hope. The possession of this heavenly

peace through faith and hope is what ultimately drives their efforts for justice.”125 This

Augustinian notion of hope is not sufficiently different than the Aristotelian hope that fate or the

natural goods necessary for virtuous living, and thus happiness or eudaimonia continue into the

future--to the very end of one’s life. In other words, either there is just as much uncertainty in

the restless mind of the virtuous pagan as there is in the hopeful mind of the virtuous

123 City of God XV.1. 124 “Even peace is a doubtful good, since we do not know the hearts of those with whom we wish to maintain peace. And even if we know them today, we should not know what they might be like tomorrow” (City of God XIX.5). 125 Heller 5, my emphasis.


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Christian,126 or the virtuous Christian is in fact as arrogant in her certainty of salvation as the

pagan is certain of his happiness in this life.

126 “Who knows the mind of the Lord?” (Against Julian 192).


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Gaul, Brett. "Augustine on the Virtues of the Pagans." Augustinian Studies 40, no. 2 (2009): 233-249. Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. New York: Random House, 1960.

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