PRAISEFOR

AHistoryofIran

“Moregrippingthananovel...EmpireoftheMind’saccountofIrantodayandthechallengesitfacesisworthathousanddocumentariesandnewspaperbriefingarticles.”

—RobertIrwin,Prospect

“Inviting us to look beyond the menacing bluster of the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,AxworthycelebratesIran’srichhistoryoftoleranceandcreativeexpression.”

—ChronicleofHigherEducation

“An engrossing, powerfully argued, and elegantlywritten history of a countrywhich finds itself onceagainatthecenterofinternationalaffairs.”

—JustinMarozzi,authorofTamerlane:SwordofIslam,ConqueroroftheWorld

“Readers are likely to share this reviewer’s sense that a fragmentary knowledge of Persian historysuddenly,withtheauthor’sengaginghelp,approachesaroundedpicture—onewellworthenlarging.ItishardtoimagineabettertreatmentofPersiawithinasinglevolumethanthis.”

—ForewordMagazine

“Axworthyhasattemptednothingless thantoportraythreemillenniaofIranianculturalhistoryin threehundredpages.Indoingso,hedoesnotonlysucceedineliminatingenormousgapsinourknowledge,healsosetshiscuriousreadersonnewpathsthatarewellworthfollowing.”

—Tageszeitung(Germany)

“Atthistimeaboveall,weneedadeeplyinformed,engaginglywrittenhistoryofthenationfromCyrustoKhomeiniandbeyond.Axworthydoesthejobwithbalanceandaplomb.”

—Independent(UK)

“Fascinating introduction to the history of a uniquely developed civilization. Axworthy treats historyevenhandedly:hedoesn’thidethesinsofthewesterncountries,especiallyBritainandtheUnitedStates;nordoeshepresentIranasthewretchedvictimofgreatpowerpolitics.”

—Nipvet(Finland)

“MichaelAxworthyisaloverofthingsPersian:theirhistoryasoneoftheoldestcontinuingcivilizationsin theworld, their poetry, theirmodern cinema, and so on.Axworthy, in his book,AHistory of Iranunderstands Iranasbothanempireof themind (adeeper,humane, reflective Iran)anda revolutionaryIslamicempirewithaheightenedsenseofitsownuniqueness.”

—JewishHeraldVoice

“AfinediscussionofIranianprogressandatoppickforanylibrarystronginMiddleEasternstudies.”—MidwestBookReview

“[Axworthy’s]workprovidesconsiderableinsightintohowthecountrygotwhereitistodayandusefulcontext forunderstanding the sometimesalarmingcommentsof its current leaders.On thatbasis alone,EmpireoftheMindiswellworthreadingforanyonewho’sinterestedinMiddleEasternaffairsandtheirimpactontherestoftheworld.”

—CharlestonPost&Courier

“Axworthypresentsahistorybyturnsthrilling,cautionary,inspiring,andsurprising.”—ScotlandonSunday(UK)

“[Axworthy]haswrittenacompactbut still inclusivenarrativeaccount thatconveysboth thediversityandrichnessofthevariousempiresandculturalforcesthathaveshapedtheIranianpeople....Thisisanexcellentexaminationoftheforgingofapeoplewhoarepoisedto,onceagain,playaprominentroleinworldaffairs.”

—Booklist

“[An]excellentshorthistory.”—DailyTelegraph(UK)

“Thebookdescribes2,500yearsofIranianhistoryandhistoryofthoughtinalightandreadablestylethatisbothappropriatetothesubjectandtypicalofmanyEnglishauthors.Iran,concludestheauthor,hasfarmoretoofferthanrepression,suffering,andunreliability.Itoffersawholeintellectualcosmos.”

—FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung(Germany)

“Sweeping, sensitive, and evenhanded overview of the ancient nation, from the days of the prophetZoroaster to thoseof the IslamicRepublic.FormerBritish foreign-serviceofficerandIranianhistorianAxworthycoversanenormousamountofmaterial inelegant,upbeat fashion. . . .Axworthy’s reasonedsurveywillbeespeciallyhelpfultolayreadersandstudents.”

—KirkusReviews

“The book is comprehensively useful, interesting, and still light to read. It has been written with apersonaltouchwithoutreducingobjectivity.”

—Agricola(Finland)

Copyright©2008byMichaelAxworthyEpiloguecopyright©2016byMichaelAxworthyHardcovereditionfirstpublishedin2008byBasicBooks,AMemberofthePerseusBooksGroupPaperbackeditionfirstpublishedin2010byBasicBooks

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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataAxworthy,Michael.AhistoryofIran:empireofthemind/MichaelAxworthy.p.cm.

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.1.Iran—History.I.Title.

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Contents

PrefaceAcknowledgments

1 Origins:Zoroaster,theAchaemenids,andtheGreeks

2 TheIranianRevival:ParthiansandSassanids

3 IslamandInvasions:TheArabs,Turks,andMongols—TheIranianReconquestofIslam,theSufis,andthePoets

4 Shi‘ismandtheSafavids

5 TheFalloftheSafavids,NaderShah,theEighteenth-CenturyInterregnum,andtheEarlyYearsoftheQajarDynasty

6 TheCrisisoftheQajarMonarchy,theRevolutionof1905–1911,andtheAccessionofthePahlaviDynasty

7 ThePahlavisandtheRevolutionof1979

8 IranSincetheRevolution:IslamicRevival,War,andConfrontation

9 FromKhatamitoAhmadinejad,andtheIranianPredicament

Epilogue

NotesSelectBibliographyIndex

...However,whenIbegantoconsiderthereasonsfortheseopinions,allthesereasonsgivenforthemagnificenceofhumannaturefailedtoconvinceme:thatmanistheintermediarybetweencreatures,closetothegods,masterofallthelowercreatures,withthesharpnessofhissenses,theacuityofhisreason, and the brilliance of his intelligence, the interpreter of nature, the nodal point betweeneternityand time,and,as thePersianssay, the intimatebondormarriagesongof theworld, justalittle lower thanangels,asDavid tellsus. I concede thesearemagnificent reasons,but theydonotseemtogototheheartofthematter..... . .EuanthesthePersian. . .writesthatmanhasnoinborn,properform,butthatmanythingsthathumansresembleareoutsideandforeigntothem:“Manismultitudinous,varied,andeverchanging.”WhydoIemphasizethis?Consideringthatwearebornwiththiscondition,thatis,thatwecanbecomewhateverwechoosetobecome,weneedtounderstandthatwemust takeearnestcareaboutthis,sothatitwillneverbesaidtoourdisadvantagethatwewereborntoaprivilegedpositionbutfailedtorealizeitandbecameanimalsandsenselessbeasts....Aboveall,weshouldnotmakethatfreedomofchoiceGodgaveus into somethingharmful, for itwas intended tobe toouradvantage.Letaholyambitionenterintooursouls;letusnotbecontentwithmediocrity,butratherstriveafterthehighestandexpendallourstrengthinachievingit.

—PicodellaMirandola,OrationontheDignityofMan(translatedbyRichardHooker)

PrefaceTheRemarkableResilienceoftheIdeaofIran

HarkaskebedanadvabedanadkebedanadAsb-ekheradazgombad-egardunbejahanadHarkaskenadanadvabedanadkenadanadLangankharak-ekhishbemanzelberesanadHarkaskenadanadvanadanadkenadanadDarjahl-emorakkab’abadod-dahrbemanad

Anyonewhoknows,andknowsthatheknows,Makesthesteedofintelligenceleapoverthevaultofheaven.Anyonewhodoesnotknow,butknowsthathedoesnotknow,Canbringhislamelittledonkeytothedestinationnonetheless.Anyonewhodoesnotknow,anddoesnotknowthathedoesnotknowIsstuckforeverindoubleignorance

(Anonymous,attributedtoNaserod-DinTusi(1201–1274);anticipatingDonaldRumsfeldbyperhapssevencenturies)

Iranianhistory is fullofviolenceanddrama—invasions, conquerors,battles, and revolutions.BecauseIranhasa longerhistory thanmostcountries,and isbigger thanmany, there ismoreof thisdrama.Butthere ismore to Iranian history than that. There are religions, influences, intellectualmovements, andideas that have changed things within Iran, but also outside Iran and around the world. Today Irandemandsattentionagain,andthenewsituationposesquestions:IsIrananaggressivepower,oravictim?IsIrantraditionallyexpansionist,ortraditionallypassiveanddefensive?IstheShi‘ismofIranquietist,orviolentandrevolutionary?Onlyhistorycansuggestanswerstothosequestions.Iranisoneoftheworld’soldestcivilizations,andhasbeenamongtheworld’smostthoughtfulandcomplexcivilizationsfromtheverybeginning.ThereareaspectsofIraniancivilizationthat,inonewayoranother,havetouchedalmosteveryhumanbeingon theplanet.But thestoryofhowthathappened,and the full significanceof thoseinfluences,isoftenunknownandforgotten.

Iran is replete with paradoxes, contradictions, and exceptions. Most non-Iranians think of it as acountryofhotdeserts,but it isringedwithhigh,coldmountains.Ithasrichagriculturalprovinces,andothers full of lush subtropical forests. Reflecting its wide climatic variations, Iran has a diverse andcolorful rangeof floraand fauna.Between IraqandAfghanistan,Russiaand thePersianGulf, Iraniansspeak an Indo-European language in themidst of theArabic-speakingMiddle East. Iran is commonly

thoughtofasahomogeneousnation,withastrongnationalculture,butminoritiesliketheAzeris,Kurds,Gilakis,Baluchis, andTurkmenmakeupnearlyhalf thepopulation.Since the1979 revolution, Iranianwomenhavebeensubject tooneof themost restrictivedresscodes in the Islamicworld,yetpartly inconsequence,Iranianfamilieshavereleasedtheirdaughterstostudyandworkinunprecedentednumbers.Morethansixtypercentofstudentsenteringuniversitynowarefemale,andmanywomen—evenmarriedwomen—haveprofessionaljobs.

IranhaspreservedsomeofthemoststunningIslamicarchitectureintheworld,aswellastraditionsofartisanmetalworking,rugmaking,andbazaartrading:acomplexandsophisticatedurbanculture.Andyetits capital, Tehran, has slowly smothered itself in concrete, traffic congestion, and pollution. Iraniansgloryintheirliteraryheritageandaboveallintheirpoetry,toadegreeonefindsinfewothercountries,with the possible exception of Russia. Many Iranians can recite lengthy passages from their favoritepoems, and phrases from the country’s great poets are common in everyday speech. It is poetry thatinsistentlydwellsonthejoysoflife—themesofwine,beauty,flowers,andsexuallove.AndyetIranalsohas an intense popular tradition of Shi‘ism, which in the mourning month of Moharram (when Shi‘aMuslimsmournthedeathoftheEmamHosein)emergesinreligiousprocessionsdominatedbyamoodofgloom, and a powerful sense of betrayal and injustice. Iran’s religious culture also encompasses theworld’smost forbidding, censorious, anddogmaticShi‘aMuslimclerics. It is an Islamic republic,butoneinwhichonly1.4percentofthepopulationattendsFridayprayers.

One thing is best explained at the start—another apparent paradox. Iran and Persia are the samecountry.TheimageconjuredupbythenamePersiaisoneofromance—rosesandnightingalesinelegantgardens,fasthorses,flirtatiouswomen,sharpsabers,jewel-coloredcarpets,melodiousmusic.ButintheclichéofWesternmediapresentation,thenameIranconjuresaratherdifferentimage—frowningmullahs,blackoil,women’sblanchedfacespeeringfromunderdarkchadors,grimcrowdsburningflags,chanting“deathto....”

In the south of Iran there is a province calledFars. Its capital isShiraz and the province containsIran’smostancientandimpressivearchaeologicalsites,PersepolisandPasargadae(alongwithSusa,inneighboringKhuzestan).InancienttimestheprovincewascalledPars,afterthepeoplewhohadsettledthere—thePersians.Whenthosepeoplecreatedanempirethatdominatedthewholeregion, theGreekscalled it the Persian Empire. Later, the term Persia was applied by the Greeks, Romans, and otherEuropeanstoallthedynasticstatesthatfollowedinthatregion—theterritorythatisIrantoday:SassanidPersia in the centuries before the Islamic conquest, Safavid Persia in the sixteenth and seventeenthcenturies,Qajar Persia in the nineteenth century.But all through that time the people of those empirescalled themselves Iranians, and their land Iran. The word derives from the very earliest times,apparently meaning “noble.” It is cognate both with a similar word in Sanskrit, and with the term“Aryan”—thewordused and abused in the racial ideologiesof the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies.1

In1935RezaShah,wantingtodistancehisstatefromthedecadent,ineffectualQajargovernmenthehaddisplaced, instructedhis embassies overseas to require foreigngovernments henceforth to call thecountry Iran in official communications. But many people, including some Iranians outside Iran, stillprefer the termPersiabecause it retains theancient,oftenhappier, connotations.Mypractice is tousebothterms,butwithapreferenceforIranwhendealingwiththeperiodafter1935,andforPersiafortheprecedingcenturies,whenitwasthewordusedforthecountrybyEnglish-speakers.Iraniansthemselvescall their language Farsi because it originated in the Iranian dialect spoken in Fars province. Thelanguage is now spoken not just in Iran but also extensively inTajikistan; inAfghanistan (as theDaridialect);andithashadastronginfluenceontheUrdulanguagespokeninPakistanandnorthernIndia.In

the earlier chapters of this book, the term Iranian is used also to cover the non-Persian peoples andlanguagesofthewiderregion,liketheParthians,Sogdians,andMedes.

There are many books available on contemporary Iran, and on earlier periods of Iranian history.Severalcover thewholehistoryof Iranfromtheearliest times—notably themonumentalseven-volumeCambridge History of Iran, and the huge project of the Encyclopedia Iranica (the latter is as yetincompletebutnonethelessincomparablefortherangeanddepthofknowledgeofIranianhistoryitpullstogether—andmuchmorethanhistory).Thisbookdoesnotattempttocompetewiththose,buttriesratherto present an introduction to the history of Iran for a general readership, assuming little or no priorknowledge.Inadditionitaimstoexplainsomeoftheparadoxesandcontradictionsthroughthehistory—probablytheonlywaythattheycanbeproperlyunderstood.Andbeyondthat—especiallyinChapter3,whichexploressomeofthetreasuryofclassicalPersianpoetry—itattemptstogivethebeginningsofaninsightintothewaytheintellectualandliterarycultureofIrandeveloped,andhashadawiderinfluence,notjustintheMiddleEast,CentralAsia,andIndia,butthroughouttheworld.

Acknowledgments

Thetitleofthisbook,ifnottheideaofitaltogether,isunusualinthatitoriginatedatapublicevent—apaneldiscussioninfrontofaninvitedaudience,arrangedtoinauguratetheForgottenEmpireexhibitionattheBritishMuseumintheautumnof2005.ThepanelwaschairedbythejournalistJonSnowandincludedtheIranianambassador,SeyyedMohammadHosseinAdeli(recalledtoTehranshortlyafterward),HalehAfsharofYorkUniversity,AliAnsarifromtheUniversityofSt.Andrews,andChristopherdeBellaigue,authorofIntheRoseGardenoftheMartyrs.NeilMacGregor,thedirectoroftheBritishMuseum,madeanintroductorypresentation.

ThediscussionrangedwidelybutcenteredonthequestionofcontinuityinIranianhistory,andontheenduringpoweroftheideaofIran,theinfluenceofitsliteraryandcourtcultureontheotherpowersandlinguisticculturesoftheregion,anditsresilienceovermillenniadespitewar,invasion,religiouschange,andrevolution.ThenJonSnowaskedtheaudiencetoputquestionstothepanel.Iaskedaquestiontowardthe end—to the effect that if, asmembers of thepanel had suggested, the center of Iranian culture hadmoved at different times fromFars in southern Iran toMesopotamia, toKhorasan in the northeast andCentralAsia,and towhat isnowcalledAzerbaijan in thenorthwest;andgiven itsstrong influencefarbeyondthelandofIranitself, intoAbbasidBaghdadandOttomanTurkey,forexample,ontheonesideand into Central Asia and Moghul India on the other; then perhaps we should set aside our usualcategoriesofnationhoodand imperialcultureand think insteadof IranasanEmpireof theMind?Thepanelseemedtolikethissuggestion,andsomeoneintheaudiencecalledoutthatitwouldmakeagoodbook.So,hereitis.

Ihavebenefitedgreatlyfromthegeneroushelpandadviceofanumberofpeople,especiallyBaqerMoin, Ali Ansari,Willem Floor, Sajjad Rizvi, Lenny Lewisohn, HashemAhmadzadeh, Chris Rundle,Touraj Daryaee, Michael Grenfell, Peter Melville, Duncan Head, Haideh Sahim, and Mahdi Dasht-Bozorgi,GarySick,LucianoZaccara,RudiMatthee,AnnaPaaso,andoneanonymousreviewer,whoreadallorpartofitinadvanceofpublication;butalsomyfatherIforAxworthyandmysisterJanetAxworthy,PeterAvery,FrancesCloud,GordonNechvatal,ShaghayeghAzimi,PaulLuft,andPaulAuchterlonie,aswellastheotherstaffattheUniversityLibraryinExeter,andattheLondonLibrary.IshouldalsothankmyotherfriendsandcolleaguesintheInstituteofArabandIslamicStudiesinExeterfortheirhelpandsupport,especiallyTimNiblock,RasheedEl-Enany,GarethStansfield,JamesOnley,andRobGleave,aswell as Michael Dwyer (simply the best editor it has been my good fortune to encounter), MariaPetalidou,andtheircolleaguesatHurst;LaraHeimertatBasicBooks;JimMorgan;myagentGeorginaCapel; and (not just last but not least this time) my wife Sally for her unfailing cheerfulness andencouragement.

The author andpublisherwish to thank the following forkindly agreeing to reproduce copyrighted

material included in this book. Penguin Books Ltd., for permission to reproduce the quotations fromArthurKoestler’sDarknessatNoon,©PenguinBooks,1969,andfromTheConferenceoftheBirds,byFaridal-DinAttar,translatedbyA.DarbandiandD.Davis,©PenguinClassics,1984;IbexPublishers,forpermissiontoreproducethepoemonp.116fromAThousandYearsofPersianRubaiyat, translatedby Reza Saberi, © Ibex Publishers, 2000; The University of Washington Press for permission toreproduce the excerpt fromThe Tragedy of Sohrab and Rostam, translated by J.W. Clinton, © TheUniversityofWashingtonPress,1996.

TRANSLITERATIONThetransliterationofnamesandothertermsfromPersianintoEnglishisanawkwardproblem,anditisnot possible to be fully consistent without producing text that will sometimes look odd. As with myprevious book, onNader Shah, I have used a transliteration scheme that leans towardmodern Iranianpronunciation,becauseIdidnotwanttowriteabookonIranianhistoryinwhichthenamesandplaceswouldreadoddlytoIranians.Butthereareinconsistencies,notablyoverthetransliterationofnamesthathavehadalifeoftheirowninWesternwriting—Isfahan,Fatima,Sultan,mullah,forexample.Other,lessjustifiableinconsistencies,ofwhichtherewilldoubtlessbesome,areinallcasesmyfaultratherthanthatofthosewhotriedtoadvisemeonthemanuscriptinitsdifferentstagesofcompletion.

1

ORIGINSZoroaster,theAchaemenids,andtheGreeks

OCyrus...Yoursubjects,thePersians,areapoorpeoplewithaproudspirit

—KingCroesusofLydia,accordingtoHerodotus

ThehistoryofIranstartswithaquestion:WhoaretheIranians?ThequestionconcernsnotjusttheoriginsofIran,butechoes,inoneformoranother,inthehistoryofthecountryanditspeopledowntothepresentday.

The Iranianswereonebranchof the Indo-European familyofpeopleswhomovedoutofwhat aretoday the Russian steppes to settle in Europe, Iran, Central Asia, and northern India, in a series ofmigrations and invasions in the latter part of the second millennium BC. This explains the closerelationshipbetweenthePersianlanguageandotherIndo-Europeanlanguages—particularlySanskritandLatin,butalsomodernlanguageslikeHindi,German,andEnglish.AnyspeakerofaEuropeanlanguagewhoislearningPersiansoonencountersaseriesoffamiliarwords:pedar(father,Latinpater);dokhtar(daughter,girl,German tochter);mordan (todie,Latinmortuus,Frenchmourir, lemort);nam (name);dar(door);andperhapsthemostfamiliarofall,thefirst-personpresentandsingularoftheverbtobe,thesuffix—am (I am—as in the sentence “I am an Iranian”—Irani-am). An English-speaker who hasattemptedtolearnGermanwillfindPersiangrammarbothfamiliarandblessedlysimplebycomparison.Therearenogendersorgrammatical cases fornouns.Persian, likeEnglish,has evolved sinceancienttimesintoasimplifiedform,droppingtheheavilyinflectedgrammarofoldPersian.IthasnostructuralrelationshipwithArabicortheotherSemiticlanguagesoftheancientMiddleEast(thoughittookinmanyArabwordsaftertheArabconquest).

LongbeforethemigrantswhospokeIranianlanguagesarrivedfromthenorth,therewereotherpeoplelivinginwhatlaterbecamethelandofIran.PeoplelivedontheIranianplateauasearlyas100,000BC,inwhat is knownas theOldStoneAge, andby5000BC agricultural settlementswere flourishing in andaround the Zagrosmountains—the area to the east of the great Sumerian civilization ofMesopotamia.Excavation of one of these settlements, at Hajji Firoz Tepe, has produced the remains of theworld’soldest-knownwinejar,completewithgraperesidueandtracesofresinthatwereusedasaflavoringanda preservative, indicating that the wine would have tasted something like Greek retsina.1 Before andduringtheperiodoftheIranianmigrations,anempire—theempireofElam—flourishedintheareathatlaterbecametheprovincesofKhuzestanandFars,basedinthecitiesofSusaandAnshan.TheElamites

spokealanguagethatwasneitherMesopotamiannorIranian,buttheywereinfluencedbytheSumerians,Assyrians, andBabylonians, and transmitted elements of their culture on to the later Iranian dynasties.Elamite influence spreadbeyond the area usually associatedwith its empire.An example of this is inTepeSialk,justsouthofmodernKashan,whereaziggurat—anancientMesopotamiantemple—showsalltheformsofanElamitesettlement.ThiszigguratatTepeSialkhasbeendatedtoaround2900BC.

RecentDNA-based research inothercountrieshas tended toemphasize the relative stabilityof thegeneticpoolovertime,despiteconquests,migrations,andwhatlookfromhistoricalaccountstobemasssettlementsorevengenocides. It is likely that theIraniansettlersorconquerorswererelativelyfewinnumber, compared to the pre-existing peopleswho later adopted their language and intermarriedwiththem.Andprobablyeversince that time,downto thepresentday, therulersof Iranhaveruledoveratleastsomenon-Iranianpeoples.Fromtheverybeginningthen,theIdeaofIranwasasmuchaboutcultureandlanguage—inalltheircomplexpatterns—asaboutraceorterritory.

Fromthebeginningtherewasalwaysadivision(albeitafuzzyone)betweenIran’snomadicorsemi-nomadicpeoplesanditssettled,crop-growingagriculturists.Iranisalandofgreatcontrastsinclimateandgeography, and in addition to areas of productive agricultural land (expandedby ingenious use ofirrigation from groundwater), there are more extensive areas of rugged mountain and semi-desert,worthlessforcropsbutsuitableforgrazing,evenifonlyforalimitedperiodeachyear.Overtheselandsthenomadsmovedtheirherds.TheearlyIraniansseemtohaveherdedcattleinparticular.

Inthepre-modernworld,pastoralistnomadshadmanyadvantagesoversettledpeasantfarmers.Theirwealthwastheirlivestock,whichmeanttheirwealthwasmovableandtheycouldescapefromthreatsofviolencewith little loss.Other nomadsmight attack them,of course, but peasant farmerswere alwaysmuch more vulnerable. If threatened with violence at harvest time, the farmers stood to lose theaccumulatedvalueofa fullyear’sworkandbe leftdestitute. Inpeaceful timesnomadswerehappy totrademeatandwoolwiththepeasantsinexchangeforgrainsandothercrops,butthenomadsalwayshadthe option of adding direct coercion to purely economic bargaining.Nomads have had the upper handfrom the time the Indo-European pastoralist Iranians first entered the Iranian plateau, right up to thetwentiethcentury.

Fromsuchcircumstancesasystemoftribute—whatthetwentieth-centuryMafiawouldcallprotection—developed. The peasants paid a portion of their harvest in order to be left alone. From anotherperspective, augmentedwith a bit of presentational subtlety and tradition, this system could be calledgovernment taxation.Mostof thehistorical rulersof Iranoriginated fromthenomadic tribes (includingfromnon-Iraniannomadswhoarrived in laterwavesofmigration),andanimositybetween thenomadsand the settled population has persisted into modern times. The settled population (particularly later,when townsandcitiesdeveloped) regarded themselvesasmorecivilized, lessviolent,and lesscrude.Butthenomadssawthesettledpopulationassoftanddevious,whileconsideringthemselves,bycontrast,ashardy,tough,andself-reliant,exemplifyingakindofruggedhonesty.Therewouldhavebeenelementsoftruthinbothcaricatures,buttheattitudesoftheearlyIranianelitespartookespeciallyofthelatter.

MEDESANDPERSIANSTheIranian-speakerswhomigratedintothelandofIranandthesurroundingareaintheyearsbefore1000BCwerenotonesingle tribeorgroup. In timesomeof theirdescendantsbecameknownasMedesandPersians,buttherewereParthians,Sogdians,andothers,too,whoonlyacquiredthenamesknowntouslater in their history. And even the titlesMede and Persianwere themselves simplifications, lumping

togethershiftingalliancesandconfederaciesofdisparatetribes.Fromthebeginning,theMedesandPersiansarementionedtogetherinhistoricalsources,suggestinga

closerelationshipfromtheveryearliesttimes.ThefirstsuchmentionisinanAssyrianrecordof836BC—anaccountofanextendedmilitarycampaignbytheAssyriankingShalmaneserIIIandseveralofhissuccessorsthatwaswagedintheZagrosmountainsandasfareastasMountDemavand,thehigh,extinctvolcanointheAlborzrange.TheaccountstheyleftbehindlistedtheMedesandPersiansastributaries—thosepayingtributetothestrongerAssyrians.TheheartlandsoftheMedeswereinthenorthwest,inthemodernprovincesofAzerbaijan,Kurdistan,Hamadan,andTehran.IntheregionoftheZagrossouthoftheterritories occupied by the Medes, the Assyrians encountered the Persians in the region they calledParsuash,whichhasbeenknowneversinceasParsorFars.2

Within a century or so, however, the Medes and Persians were fighting back, attacking Assyrianterritories. Later traditions recorded by Herodotus in the fifth century BC mention early kings of theMedes,calledDeiocesandCyaxares,whoappearedintheAssyrianaccountsasDaiaukkuandUaksatar;andakingof thePersians calledAchaemenes,who theAssyrianscalledHakhamanish.By700BC theMedes—with the help of Scythian tribes—had established an independent state, which later grew tobecomethefirstIranianEmpire.In612BCtheMedesdestroyedtheAssyriancapital,Nineveh(adjacenttomodernMosul,ontheTigris).AtitsheighttheMedianEmpirestretchedfromAsiaMinortotheHinduKush,andsouthtothePersianGulf,rulingthePersiansasvassalsaswellasmanyothersubjectpeoples.

THEPROPHETWHOLAUGHEDBut before the first mentions of the Iranians and their kings appear in the records, another importanthistoricalfigurelived—ZoroasterorZarathustra(modernPersianZardosht).ItisgenerallyacceptedthatZoroaster lived and was not just a man of myth or legend. His dates are unknown and experts havedisagreedradicallyaboutwhenhelived.ComparedwithJesus,Mohammad,orevenMoses,Zoroasterisamuchmoreindistinctfigure.Littleisknownforsureabouthislife—thebestevidencesuggestshelivedin the northeast, inwhat later becameBactria and later still, inAfghanistan.But another tradition hassuggestedhecamefromwhatisnowAzerbaijan,aroundtheriverAraxes.Asareligiousthinkerandakeyfigureinthehistoryofworldreligions,Zoroastercertainlyranksinimportancewiththeotherprophets.Butforthesamereasonthatthedetailsofhislifeareobscure,itisalsodifficulttoestablishthepreciseimport of his teaching. The Zoroastrian religious texts that are the main source for both (notably theAvesta)werewrittendownintheformtheyareknowntousonlymuchlater,intheSassanidperiod.3Thestories about Zoroaster they contain are little more than fables. Some of the stories correspond withinformationfromclassicalGreekandLatincommentatorsandshowtheirgenuineantiquity.Forexample,there is the story that atbirth the infantZoroasterdidnot cry,but laughed.And the theologycombineswhatareundoubtedlyancientelementswithinnovationsthatwereincorporatedanddevelopedmuchlater.

So although Zoroastrian tradition places Zoroaster’s birth at around 600 BC, most scholars nowbelievehelivedearlier.Itisstillunclearjustwhen,butitisreasonabletothinkitwasaround1200or1000BC,atthetimeof,orshortlyafter,themigrationsofIraniancattleherderstotheIranianplateau.Thisviewisbasedonthefactthattheearliesttexts(theGathas,traditionallyconsideredtobehymnsfirstsungbyZoroasterhimself)showsignificantdifferenceswiththelater liturgical languageassociatedwiththeperiodaround600BC.Othercluescomefromthecharacteristicsofthepastoralwayoflifereflectedinthetexts,andtheabsenceinthemofreferencestotheMedesorPersiansorthenamesofkingsorotherpeopleknownfromthatlatertime.

It seems plausible that Zoroaster’s religious revelation arose in the context of the changes, newdemands, and new influences associatedwith themigration, including the self-questioning of a culturefacedwithnewneighborsandunfamiliarpressures.Thereligion,then,wastheresultofanencounterwithanewcomplexity.While itwastosomeextentacompromisewith thatnewcomplexity, itwasalsoanattempttogovernitaccordingtonewprinciples.

Other evidence supports theview thatZoroasterdidnot invent a religion fromnothing. Instead,hereformed and simplified pre-existing religious practices (against some resistance from traditionalpriests),infusingthemwithamuchmoresophisticatedphilosophicaltheologyandagreateremphasisonmoralityandjustice.Thisviewissupportedbytheexistenceofanearlytraditionthatheldwritingtobealienanddemonic—suggestingthattheIraniansassociateditwiththeSemiticandotherpeoplesamongwhomtheyfoundthemselvesinthecenturiesafterthemigration.4MoreevidencethatZoroasterreformedpre-existingreligions is that thePersianworddiv—cognatewithbothLatinandSanskritwordsfor thegods—intheZoroastriancontextwasusedforaclassofdemonsopposedtoZoroasterandhisfollowers,suggesting that the reforming prophet reclassified at least some previous deities as evil spirits.5 Thedemonswereassociatedwithchaosanddisorder—theantithesisoftheprinciplesofgoodnessandjusticerepresented by the new religion. At the more mundane level the demons also lay behind diseases ofpeopleandanimals,badweather,andothernaturaldisasters.

At thecenterofZoroaster’s theologywas theoppositionbetweenAhuraMazda, thecreator-godoftruth and light, and Ahriman, the embodiment of lies, darkness, and evil.6 This dualism became apersistent theme in Iranian thought for centuries. Modern Zoroastrianism is much more stronglymonotheistic,andtomakethisdistinctionmoreexplicitmanyscholarsrefertothereligioninthisearlystageasMazdaism.Otherpre-existingdeitieswereincorporatedintotheMazdaeanreligiousstructureasangels or archangels—notably Mithra, a sun god, and Anahita, a goddess of streams and rivers. SixImmortal archangels (theAmeshaSpenta) embodied animal life, plant life,metals andminerals, earth,fire,andwater.Thenamesofseveralofthesearchangels—forexampleBahman,Ordibehesht,Khordad—surviveasmonthsinthemodernIraniancalendar,evenundertheIslamicrepublic.AhuraMazdahimselfpersonifiedair,andinoriginparalleledtheGreekZeus,asasky-god.

ThemodernPersianmonthBahmanisnamedaftertheMazdaeanarchangelVohuManu—thesecondinrank after AhuraMazda, characterized as Good Purpose and identified with the cattle who were thesecond class of beings to be created byAhuraMazda, afterman himself. Part of the creationmyth inZoroastrianism holds that after all was created good by Ahura Mazda, the evil spirit Ahriman(accompaniedbysixevilspiritsmatchingthesixImmortals)assaultedcreation,murderingthefirstman,killingthesacredbullVohuManu,andpollutingthepureelementsofwaterandfire.TheimportanceofcattletothenomadicearlyIraniansisshownbythefrequentappearanceofbullsandcattleinsculptureand iconography from the Achaemenid period—but many of these images may have a more specificreligioussignificance,referringtoVohuManu.

ThenameAhuraMazdameansLordofWisdom,orWiseLord.Thedualismwentalongwaytowardresolvingtheproblemofevil thatpresentssuchdifficultiesfor themonotheisticreligions(theoriginofevilintheworldwasAhriman,againstwhomAhuraMazdastruggledforsupremacy)andatleastinitiallypermitted a strong attachment to the ideas of free will (arising out of the necessity of human beingschoosingbetweengoodandevil),goodnessemergingingoodactions,judgmentafterdeath,andheavenand hell. Some scholars have suggested that within a few centuries (but before 600 BC) Mazdaismdeveloped a theory of aMessiah—theSaoshyant,whowould be bornmiraculously at the endof timefromavirginmotherandtheseedofZoroasterhimself.7Butthedualismimpliedotherdifficulties,whichemergedlater.OnewashowAhuraMazdaandAhrimanthemselvescameintoexistence.Toexplainthis,

some later followersof the Iranian religionbelieved inacreator-god,Zurvan(identifiedwithTimeorFate),whoprayedforasonandwasrewardedwithtwins.ThetwinsbecameAhuraMazdaandAhriman.ThisbranchofMazdaismhasbeencalledZurvanism.

It was a characteristic of the new religion that philosophical concepts or categories becamepersonifiedasheavenlybeingsorentities—indeedtheseseemtohaveproliferated,alittlelikecharactersinJohnBunyan’sPilgrim’sProgress.Oneexampleistheideaofthedaena.Accordingtoonelatertext,abeautifulmaidenappearedtothesoulofajustmanafterhisdeath.Shewasthepersonificationofallthegoodworkshehaddoneinlife,andshesaidtohim,

Forwhen, in theworld, you saw someone sacrificing to the demon, you instead started adoringGod; andwhenyou sawsomeonecarryingoutviolenceandrobberyandafflictinganddespisinggoodmenandgatheringintheirsubstancewithevilactions,youinsteadavoidedtreatingcreatureswithviolenceandrobbery;youtookcareofthejustandwelcomedthemandgavethemlodgingsandgifts.Whetheryourwealthcamefromnearorfromafar,itwashonorablyacquired.Andwhenyousaw people give false judgments and allowed themselves to be corrupted with money and commit perjury, you insteadundertooktotellthetruthandspeakrighteously.Iamyourrighteousthoughts,yourrighteouswords,yourrighteousactions,thought,spoken,donebyyou.8

Elsewheretheworddaenawasusedtosignifyreligionitself.AnotherexampleofpersonificationinMazdaism is the identification of five separate entities belonging to each humanbeing—not just body,soul,andspirit,butalsoadhvenakandfravashi.Adhvenak,theheavenlyprototypeforeachhumanbeing,wasassociatedwithsemenandregeneration.Thefravashiweremoreactive,associatedwiththestrengthofheroes,theprotectionofthelivinginlife(likeguardianangels),andthecollectionofsoulsafterdeath(ratherliketheValkyriesinGermanicmythology).Theseandotherpersonificationsprefiguretheroleofangels in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but also have obvious connections to the idea of forms inPlatonism.ManyscholarsbelievePlatowasstronglyinfluencedbyMazdaism.

ParallelingAhuraMazdaandAhrimanwere twoprinciples, sometimes translatedasgoodandevilbutmorepreciselyasTruthandtheLie—ashaanddruj.ThesetermsrecurinsistentlyintheAvestantexts,alongwiththeconceptofjustice.Theyalsoshowupinsurvivinginscriptions(inoldPersian,thewordsbecameartaanddrauga)andinWesternclassicaltextsdescribingIranoreventsinIran.Inthecenturiesafter Zoroaster, there were different currents and separate sects within the Mazdaean tradition,representing both innovations and survivals from the pre-Zoroastrian religions, as well as variouscompromisesbetweenthem.Thepriestlyclass, theMagi(listedbyHerodotusasadistinct tribewithintheMedes) survived frombefore the timeofZoroaster.Asallpriestsdo, they interpretedandadapteddoctrine and ritual to suit their own purposes,while remaining remarkably faithful to the central oraltradition.

ThehistoryoftherelationshipbetweenIraniansandJewsisalmostasoldasthehistoryofIranitself.AftertheconquestofthenorthernKingdomofIsraelbytheAssyriansaround720BC, largenumbersofJewswereremovedtoMedia,amongotherplaces,settinguplong-livedJewishcommunities,notablyinEcbatana/Hamadan.Asecondwaveofdeportations, this time toBabylonian territory, tookplace in the590sand580sBCunderNebuchadnezzar,whodestroyed the templeofSolomon in586.Babyloncameunder Persian control in the 530s, and thereafter many of the Jews eventually returned home. Somescholars believe that Judaism changed significantly under Mazdaean influence in the period of theBabylonianexile(thelogicalcorollary, thepossibilityofJudaicinfluenceonMazdaism,seemstohavereceived less attention). The trauma of the Babylonian exile was never forgotten, and it marked awatershed inJewishhistory inseveralways.Oneof the leadersof thereturnfromBabylon, thescribeEzra,isbelievedtohavebeenthefirsttowritedownthebooksoftheTorah(thefirstfivebooksofthe

Bible,thebooksofMoses).HedidsoinanewscriptdifferentfromtheoneusedbytheJewsbeforetheexile.ThisistheHebrewscriptusedeversince.Post-exileJudaismlaidgreateremphasisonadherencetotheTorah,andonmonotheism.

For hundreds of years thereafter, first under the PersianEmpire and later underHellenistic rulers,diasporaJewishandMazdaeanreligiouscommunitieslivedadjacenttooneanotherincitiesallovertheMiddleEast.9Itseemsplainthatmanyreligiousideasbecamecommoncurrency,andtheQumranscrolls(the Dead Sea scrolls) indicate some crossover of religious concepts from Mazdaism.10 It is acontroversialsubject,andtherelativeobscurityofMazdaismandZoroastrianisminWesternscholarshipuntil recent timeshas helped to conceal the influenceofMazdaismon Judaism; but as furtherwork isdone,themoresignificantitislikelytobefound.PerhapsthestrongestindicatoristhepositiveattitudeoftheJewishtextstowardthePersians.

There are a number of contradictions between the later practice ofZoroastrianism, as it has comedown to us in thewritten scriptures, and the apparent norms of theMazdaean religion at this earlieststage.Manyoftheproblemsaredifficulttoresolve.Itisacomplexpicture.Buttheconceptsofheavenandhell,offreehumanchoicebetweengoodandevil,ofdivinejudgment,ofangels,ofasinglecreator-god—allappear tohavebeengenuineearly featuresof thereligion,andallwerehugely influential forreligions that originated later.Mazdaismwas the first religion—in this part of theworld, at least—tomove beyond cult and totemism to address moral and philosophical problems with its theology,emphasizing personal choice and responsibility. In that limited sense, Nietzschewas right—Zoroasterwasthefirstcreatorofthemoralworldwelivein.AlsosprachZarathustra.

CYRUSANDTHEACHAEMENIDSAround559BCaPersianprincenamedCyrus(modernPersianKurosh),claimingdescentfromtheroyalhouseofPersiaandfromitsprogenitorAchaemenes,becamekingofAnshanuponthedeathofhisfather.PersiaandAnshan,atthattime,werestillsubjecttotheMedianEmpire,butCyrusledarevoltagainsttheMediankingAstyages,andin549BCcapturedtheMediancapital,Ecbatana(modernHamadan).CyrusreversedtherelationshipbetweenMediaandPersia—hecrownedhimselfkingofPersia,makingPersiathecenteroftheempireandMediathejuniorpartner.Buthedidnotstopthere.Hewentontoconquer

Lydia,inAsiaMinor,takingpossessionofthetreasuryofKingCroesus,legendaryforhiswealth.Healsoconquered the remaining territories ofAsiaMinor, aswell as Phoenicia, Judaea, andBabylonia.ThiscreatedanenormousempirethatstretchedfromtheGreekcitiesontheeasterncoastoftheAegeanSeatothebanksoftheriverIndus—inextentperhapsthegreatestempiretheworldhadseenuptothattime.

Cyrus’sempiretookonmuchofthecultureofpreviousElamite,Assyrian,andBabylonianempires,notably in its written script and monumental iconography. But without romanticizing Cyrus unduly, itseemsthatheaspiredtoruleanempiredifferentfromothersthathadprecededitintheregion.Portentousinscriptionsrecordingthemilitarygloryofkingsandthesupposedfavoroftheirterriblewar-godswerecommonplaceintheMiddleEastinthecenturiesprecedingCyrus’saccession.Inthenineteenthcenturyaneight-sidedclayobject(knownsinceastheTaylorPrism,afterthemanwhofoundit),measuringabout15incheslongby5.5inchesindiameter,coveredincuneiformscript,wasdiscoverednearMosul.Whenthecharacters were eventually deciphered, it was found to record eight campaigns of the Assyrian kingSennacherib(705BC–681BC).Anexcerptreads:

Sennacherib,thegreatking.. .kingoftheworld,kingofAssyria,kingofthefourquarters. . .guardianofright,loverofjustice,who lends support,who comes to the aid of the needy,who performs pious acts, perfect hero,mightyman, firstamongallprinces,theflamewhoconsumesthosewhodonotsubmit,whostrikesthewickedwiththethunderbolt;thegodAssur,thegreatmountain,hasentrustedanunrivaledkinshiptome...hasmadepowerfulmyweapons...hehasbroughttheblack-headedpeopleinsubmissionatmyfeet;andmightykingsfearedmywarfare....

Inthecourseofmycampaign,Beth-Dagon,Joppa,Banaibarka,Asuru,citiesofSidka,whohadnotspeedilybowedinsubmissionatmyfeet,Ibesieged,Iconquered,Icarriedofftheirspoils....IapproachedEkronandslewthegovernorsandnobleswhohadrebelled,andhungtheirbodiesonstakesaroundthecity....

AsforHezekiahtheJew,whodidnotsubmittomyyoke:46ofhisstrong,walledcities...bymeansoframpsandbybringingupsiege-engines...Ibesiegedandtookthem.200,150people,greatandsmall,maleandfemale,horses,mules,asses,camels,cattleandsheepwithoutnumber,Ibroughtawayfromthemandcountedasspoil....11

ThewaythepharaohsofEgyptcelebratedtheirruleandtheirvictorieswasverysimilartothis,andalthoughHezekiah,thekingofJerusalem,appearsontheTaylorPrismasavictim,somepartsoftheBibledescribingtheIsraelitesandtheirGodsmitingtheirenemiesdonotreadverydifferently,either.

Bycontrast,anotherclayobject,about9inchesby4inches,alsodiscoveredinthenineteenthcenturyand covered in cuneiform script, tells a rather different story. The Cyrus cylinder, now in the BritishMuseum,was foundwhere it had been deliberately placed—under the foundations of the citywall ofBabylon. It has been described as a charter of human rights for the ancient world, which is anexaggerationandamisrepresentation.Butthemessageofthecylinder,particularlywhencombinedwithwhatisknownofCyrus’sreligiouspolicyfromthebooksofEzraandIsaiah,isnonethelessremarkable.Thekinglypreamblefromthecylinderisfairlyconventional:

IamCyrus,kingoftheworld,greatking,rightfulking,kingofBabylon,kingofSumerandAkkad,kingofthefourquarters(oftheearth),sonofCambyses,greatking,kingofAnshan,grandsonofCyrus,greatking,kingofAnshan,descendantofTeispes,greatking,kingofAnshan,ofafamilythatalwaysexercisedkingship....

Butitcontinues,describingthefavorshowntoCyrusbytheBabyloniangodMarduk:

When I enteredBabylon as a friend andwhen I established the seat of the government in the palace of the ruler underjubilationandrejoicing,Marduk,thegreatlord,inducedthemagnanimousinhabitantsofBabylontoloveme,andIwasdailyendeavouringtoworshiphim.MynumeroustroopswalkedaroundinBabyloninpeace,IdidnotallowanybodytoterrorizeanyplaceofthecountryofSumerandAkkad.IstroveforpeaceinBabylonandinallhisothersacredcities...

andconcludes:

Astotheregion...asfarasAssurandSusa,Agade,Eshnunna,thetownsofZamban,Me-Turnu,DeraswellastheregionoftheGutians,IreturnedtothesesanctuariesontheothersideoftheTigris,thesanctuariesofwhichhadbeenruinsforalong time, the imageswhichused to live therein and established for thempermanent sanctuaries. I alsogathered all theirformerinhabitantsandreturnedtothemtheirhabitations.Furthermore,IresettleduponthecommandofMarduk,thegreatlord, all the gods of Sumer andAkkadwhomNabonidus had brought intoBabylon to the anger of the lord of the gods,unharmed,intheirformerchapels,theplacesthatmakethemhappy.12

Like theprouddeclarationsofSennacherib, this ispropaganda—but it ispropagandaofadifferentkind. It showsCyrus in a different light, and according to a different scale of values. Cyrus chose topresenthimselfshowingrespecttotheBabyloniandeity,Marduk.PerhapsitwouldhavebeendifferentifCyrus had conquered Babylon by force, rather than marching into it unopposed (in 539 BC) after itsinhabitantsrevoltedagainstthelastBabylonianking,Nabonidus.Cyruswasaruthless,ambitiousman;noone ever conquered an empire without those characteristics in full measure. But we know that hepermittedfreedomofworshiptotheJews,too.Cyrusandhissuccessorspermittedthemtoreturnhomefrom exile and to rebuild the temple in Jerusalem. For those acts they were accorded in the Jewishscripturesauniquestatusamonggentilemonarchs.

Thelogicofstatecraftalonemighthavesuggestedthatitwouldbemoresustainableinthelongruntoletsubjectsconducttheirownaffairsandworshipastheypleased.ButthatpolicyhadtobeacceptabletotheIranianelite,includingthepriests—theMagi.LeavingasidethequestionofCyrus’spersonalbeliefs,which remainunclear, it is reasonable to see in thepolicy someof the spiritofmoralearnestnessandjusticethatpervadedthereligionofZoroaster.Thepresenceofthosevaluesinthebackgroundhelpstoexplain why the Cyrus cylinder is couched in such different terms from the militaristic thunder andarroganceofSennacherib.Theoldanswerwasterrorandabigstick,butthePersianEmpirewouldberuninamoredevolved,permissivespirit.Onceagain,anencounterwithcomplexity,acceptanceofthatcomplexity,andaresponse.Thiswassomethingnew.

Unfortunately, according toHerodotus,Cyrus did not end his life as gloriously as he had lived it.Havingconqueredin thewest,he turnedtocampaigneastof theCaspian.AccordingtooneaccounthewasdefeatedandkilledinbattlebyQueenTomyrisoftheMassagetae,anotherIraniantribewhofoughtmainlyonhorseback,liketheScythians.

TheMassagetaeareinterestingbecausetheyappeartohavemaintainedsomeancientIraniancustomsthatmayshedlightonthestatusofwomeninPersiansocietyundertheAchaemenids.TherearesignsinHerodotus(Book1:216)thattheMassagetaeshowedsomefeaturesofamatrilineal,polyandroussociety,inwhichwomenmighthaveanumberofspousesorsexualpartners,butmenonlyone.PatriciaCronehassuggested that this featuremay resurface inmen’s apparent holdingofwomen in commonaspracticedlater by the Mazdakites in the fifth century AD, and by the Khorramites after the Islamic conquest.13Mazdaism certainly permitted a practicewhereby an impotentman could give hiswife temporarily toanother in order to obtain a child; it also sanctioned the marriage of close relatives. But in general,Persiansocietyseemstohaveleanedtowardlimitingthestatusofwomen,followingpracticeselsewhereintheMiddleEast.Royalandnoblewomenmayhavebeenabletoownpropertyintheirownright—andeven,onoccasion,toexertsomepoliticalinfluence.Butthisseemstohavebeenanexceptionassociatedwithhighstatusratherthanindicativeofpracticesprevalentinsocietymorewidely.14

Cyrus’s bodywas brought back to Persia, to Pasargadae, his capital, to rest in a tomb there.Thattomb, which can still be seen (though its contents have long since disappeared), is massively simpleratherthangrandiose—asepulchrethesizeofasmallhouseonaraised,steppedplinth.Thistombburial

has raised some questions about the religion of Cyrus and the other Achaemenid kings. Many of hissuccessorswereplaced in tombsofadifferent type—rock tombshalfwayupacliff face.Tombburialwas anathema to laterZoroastrians,whoheld it to be sacrilege to pollute the earthwith deadbodies.Instead they exposed the dead on so-calledTowers of Silence, to be consumed by birds and animals.CouldtheAchaemenidkingsreallyhavebeenZoroastriansiftheypermittedtombburial?

SomehaveexplainedtheinconsistencybysuggestingthatdifferentclassesofIraniansocietyfolloweddifferent beliefs—different religions, effectively. As we have seen, there probably was someconsiderablepluralityofbeliefwithinthebroadflowofMazdaismatthistime.Butitseemsmorelikelythat thepluralitywas sociallyvertical rather thanhorizontal—aquestionofgeographyand tribe ratherthanofsocialclass.Perhapsanearlier,pre-Zoroastriantraditionofburialstilllingeredandtheelevatedpositionofalltheroyaltombswasakindofcompromise.Halfwaybetweenheavenandearth—itselfastrongmetaphor.AroundthetombofCyruslayaparadise,agardenwateredbyirrigationchannels(ourwordparadisecomes,viaGreek, fromtheOldPersianparadaida,meaningawalledgarden).MagianpriestswatchedoverthetombandsacrificedahorsetoCyrus’smemoryeachmonth.15

Cyrus had been a conqueror, but a conqueror with imagination and vision. He was at least asremarkable aman as that other conqueror,Alexander,whose careermarks the end of theAchaemenidperiod just as that of Cyrus marks the beginning. Maybe as a youth Cyrus had a Mazdaean tutor asremarkableasAristotle,whotaughtAlexander.

RELIGIOUSREVOLTCyruswassucceededbyhissonCambyses(Kambojiya),whoextendedtheempirebyconqueringEgypt,but in a short time gained a reputation for harshness. He died unexpectedly in 522 BC—by suicide,accordingtoonesource—afterhehadbeengivennewsofarevoltintheempire’sPersianheartlands.

An account of what happened next appears on an extraordinary rock relief carving at Bisitun, inwesternIran,abouttwentymilesfromKermanshah,abovethemainroadtoHamadan.Accordingtothetext of the carving (executed inOldPersian,Elamite, andBabylonian), the revoltwas ledby aMagi,Gaumata,who claimed falsely to beCambyses’s younger brother, Bardiya.Herodotus gives a similarversion,saying thatCambyseshadmurdered the trueBardiyayearsearlier.The revolt ledbyGaumataseems to have drawn force from social and fiscal grievances, because one of his measures to gainpopularity was to order a three-year remission of taxes. Another was to end military conscription.16PressurehadbuiltupoverdecadesofcostlyforeignwarsunderCyrusandCambyses.ButGaumataalsoshowedstrongreligiousintolerance,destroyingthetemplesofsectshedidnotapproveof.

An Iranian revolution, led by a charismatic cleric, seizing power from an oppressive monarch,assertingreligiousorthodoxy,attackingfalsebelievers,anddrawingsupportfromeconomicgrievances—howmodernthatsounds.Butwithinafewmonths,Gaumatawasdead,killedbyDarius(Daryavaush)andasmallgroupofPersianconfederates—akillingthatsoundsmorelikeanassassinationthananythingelse.

The carving at Bisitun was made at Darius’s orders and it presents his version of events, as puttogetherafterhehadmadehimselfkingandtherevolthadfinallybeencrushed.Thecarvingitselfsaysthatcopiesof thesametextweremadeanddistributedthroughout theempire.Andwhatarevolt ithadbeen—Babylonrevoltedtwice,andDariusdeclaredthathefoughtnineteenbattlesinasingleyear.Itwasreally a series of revolts, affecting all but a few of the eastern provinces of the empire. The Bisituncarving illustrates thisby showinga rowofdefeated captives, each representing adifferentpeopleorterritory.Whateverthetruenatureoftherebellionanditsorigins,itwasnosimplepalacecoup,affecting

only a few members of the elite. It was just the first of several religious revolutions, or attemptedrevolutions,inIran’shistory.Anditwasnopushover.

Bisitunwas chosen forDarius’s grand rock-carving because it was a high place, perhaps alreadyassociatedwiththesacred,closebywhereheandhiscompanionshadkilledGaumata/Bardiya.ThesiteatBisitunisamuseumofIranianhistoryinitself.AsidefromtheDariusrockrelief,therearecavesthathadbeenusedbyNeanderthalsfortythousandyearsearlier,andbymanygenerationsafterthem.Amongotherrelicsandmonuments,thereisarock-carvingofarecliningHerculesfromtheSeleucidperiod,aParthiancarvingdepictingfireworship,aSassanianbridge,someremainsofabuildingfromtheMongolperiod,aseventeenth-centurycaravanserai,and,notfaraway,somefortificationsapparentlydatingfromthetimeofNaderShahintheeighteenthcentury.

Manyhistorianshavebeensuspiciousabout thestoryof thefalseBardiya.TheBisituncarvingisacontemporarysource,butitisplainlyaself-servingaccounttojustifyDarius’saccession.ItisconfirmedbyHerodotus andotherGreekwriters, but they allwrote later andwould naturally have accepted theofficial version of events if other dissenting accounts had been stamped out.Dariuswas not a naturalsuccessortothethrone.HewasdescendedfromajuniorbranchoftheAchaemenidroyalfamily,andeveninthatlinehewasnotpreeminent—hisfatherwasstillliving.CouldaMagianpriesthavesuccessfullyimpersonatedaroyalprincesomethreeorfouryearsaftertherealman’sdeath?IsitnotrathersuspectthatDariusalsodiscreditedotheropponentsbyallegingthattheywereimposters?

If the story was a fabrication, Darius was certainly brazen in the presentation of his case. In theBisituninscriptions,therebelleadersarecalledliarkings,andDarius,appealingtoreligiousfeelingandMazdaeanbeliefsaboutartaanddruj,declares,

[. . .] you,whosoever shall be king hereafter, be on your guard verymuch against Falsehood. Themanwho shall be afollowerofFalsehood—punishhimseverely...

and,

[...]AhuraMazdabroughtmeaidandtheothergodswhoare,becauseIwasnotdisloyal,IwasnofollowerofFalsehood,Iwasnoevil-doer,neitherInormyfamily,Iactedaccordingtorighteousness,neithertothepowerlessnortothepowerful,didIdowrong...

andagain,

ThisiswhatIhavedone,bythegraceofAhuraMazdahaveIalwaysacted.Whosoevershallreadthisinscriptionhereafter,letthatwhichIhavedonebebelieved.Youmustnotholdittobelies.

PerhapsDariusprotestedalittletoomuch.AnotherinscriptioninDarius’swords,fromanothersite,reads,

BythefavorofAhuraMazdaIamofsuchasortthatIamafriendtoright,Iamnotafriendtowrong.Itisnotmydesirethattheweakmanshouldhavewrongdonetohimbythemighty;norisitmydesirethatthemightymanshouldhavewrongdone tohimby theweak.What is right, that ismydesire. Iamnota friend to themanwho isa lie-follower [. . .]AsahorsemanIamagoodhorseman.AsabowmanIamagoodbowmanbothafootandonhorseback...17

Thelatterpartofthistext,thoughtelescopedherefromtheoriginal,echoesthefamousformulafrom

HerodotusandotherGreekwriters,thatPersianyouthswerebroughtuptorideahorse,shootabow,andtell the truth.Dariuswas pressing every button to stimulate the approval of his subjects. Even if onedoubts thestoryofDarius’saccession, theevidencefromBisitunandhisother inscriptionsofhisself-justification, and the use of religion by both sides in the intensive fighting that followed the death ofCambyses, nonetheless stands. It is a powerful testimony to the force of theMazdaean religion at thistime. Even the suppressors of the religious revolution had to justify their actions in religious terms.AlthoughDarius by the end reigned supreme, the inscriptions give a strong sense that he himselfwasnonethelesssubjecttoapowerfulstructureofideasaboutjustice,truthandlies,andrightandwrong.thatwasdistinctivelyIranian—andMazdaean.

THEEMPIREREFOUNDEDDarius’s efforts to justify and dignify his rule did not end there. He built an enormous palace in hisPersianhomeland,atwhattheGreekslatercalledPersepolis(CityofthePersians)—thusstartingafresh,away from the previous capital of Cyrus at Pasargadae. Persepolis is so big that a modern visitor,wandering bemused between the sections of fallen columns and the massive double-headed columncapitalsthatcrashedtothegroundwhenthepalaceburned,findsitdifficulttobecomeoriented,muchlessmakesenseofit.ThemagnificenceofthepalaceservedasafurtherproptothemajestyofDariusandthelegitimacyofhisrule.Butithelpedinturntocreatealastingtradition,amystiqueofmagnificentkingshipthatmightnothavecomeaboutbutfortheinitialdoubtsoverhisaccession.AdedicatoryinscriptionatPersepolisplayedagainontheoldtheme:

MayAhuraMazdaprotectthislandfromhostilearmies,fromfamine,andfromtheLie.

The motif of tribute and submission is also repeated from Bisitun. Row upon row of figuresrepresentingsubjectsfromallovertheempireareshownqueuinguptopresentthemselves,frozenforeverinstonerelief.ThepurposeofthehugepalacecomplexatPersepolisisnotentirelyclear.Itmaybethatitwas intendedasaplace forcelebrationsandceremoniesat the timeof the springequinox, thePersianNewYear (Noruz—celebrated on and afterMarch 21 each year, today as then). The rows of tribute-bearers depicted in the sculpture suggest that itmay have been the place for annual demonstrations ofhomageandloyaltyfromtheprovinces.WhateverthereasonforthegrandeurofPersepolis,itwasneverthemain,permanentcapitaloftheempire.ThatwasatSusa,theoldcapitalofElam.

This,again,showsthesyncretismofthePersianregime.CyrushadbeencloselyconnectedwiththeroyalfamilyoftheMedes,andtheMedeshadaprivilegedpositionwiththePersiansaspartnersattheheadof theempire.ButElam, too,wasimportantandcentral,andnot leastfor its language,asusedinadministrationandmonumentalinscriptions.Thiswasanempirethatalwayspreferredtoflowaroundandabsorb powerful rivals, rather than to confront, batter into defeat, and force submission. The guidingprinciplesofCyruspersistedunderDariusandatleastsomelaterAchaemenidrulers.

Darius’sreignsawtheAchaemenidEmpireineffectre-founded.Itcouldhavegoneunderaltogetherin the rebellions that followed the death of Cambyses. But Darius maintained Cyrus’s tradition oftolerance, permitting a plurality of gods to be worshipped as before. He also maintained the relatedprincipleofdevolvedgovernment.Theprovinceswereruledbysatraps,governorswhoreturnedatributeto the center but ruled as viceroys (two other officials looked after military matters and fiscaladministrationineachprovince,toavoidtoomuchpowerbeingconcentratedinanyonepairofhands).

The satraps, who often inherited their offices from predecessors within the same family, ruled theirprovincesaccordingtopre-existinglaws,customs,andtraditions.Theywere,ineffect,provincialkings,whileDariuswaskingofkings(ShahanshahinmodernPersian).Theempiredidnotattempt,asamatterofpolicy,toPersianizeastheRomanEmpire,forexample,latersoughttoRomanize.

Thecertaintiesofreligion,theprincipleofsublimejusticethattheyunderpinned,andthemagnificentprestige of kingship—these were the bonds that held together this otherwise diffuse constellation ofpeoples, languages, and cultures. A complex empire was accepted as such, and was subjected to acontrollingprinciple.ThesystemestablishedbyDariusworked,provedresilient,andendured.

Tablets discovered in excavations at Persepolis show the complexity and administrativesophisticationofthesystemDariusestablished.AlthoughDariusestablishedastandardgoldcoinage,andsome payments were made in silver, much of the system operated by payments in kind. These wereassessed, allocated, and receipted from the center. State officials and servants were paid in fixedquantitiesofwine,grain,oranimals;butevenmembersoftheroyalfamilyreceivedpaymentsinthesameway.OfficialsinPersepolisgaveordersforthelevyingoftaxesinkindinotherlocations,andthengaveorders forpayments inkind tobemade from theproceeds in the same locations.Couriersweregiventablets to produce at post stations along the royal highways, so they could get food and lodging forthemselvesand their animals.These tablets recordingpayments inkindcoveronlya relatively limitedperiod,from509to494BC.Thereareseveralthousandofthem,andithasbeenestimatedthattheycoversuppliestomorethanfifteenthousanddifferentpeopleinmorethanonehundreddifferentplaces.18

It issignificant that the tabletswerewrittenmainly inElamite,not inPersian.Weknowfromothersources that the main language of administration in the empire was neither Persian nor Elamite, butAramaic,theSemiticlinguafrancaofMesopotamia,Syria,andPalestine.TheBisituninscriptionstatesdirectlythattheformofwrittenPersianusedtherewasnew,developedatDarius’sownordersforthatspecificpurpose.ItispossiblethatheandtheotherAchaemenidkingsdiscouragedanyrecordofeventsother than theirownmonumental inscriptions,but theseareall strongechoesof the Iraniandistaste forwritingthatweencounteredearlierinMazdaism,anditmaygosomewaytoexplainanapparentanomaly—the lack of Persian historical writing for the Achaemenid period. It is possible that histories wererecorded,thatpoemswerewrittendown,andthatallsortsofotherliteratureonceexistedandhavesincebeensimplylost.ButlaterPersianliteraryculturewasstronglyassociatedwithaclassofscribes,andthefactthatthescribesintheAchaemenidsystemwrotetheiraccountsandofficialrecordsinotherlanguagessuggeststhattheliteraturewasnotthere,either.TherewasnoPersianhistoryoftheAchaemenidEmpirebecausethePersianrulingclasseseither(theMagi)regardedwritingaswickedor(thekingsandnobles)associatedwritingwithinferiorpeoples—orboth.Toride,toshootthebow,totellthetruth—butnottowriteit.

Thatsaid,nohistoriesassuchhavesurvivedfromtheEgyptian,Hittite,orAssyrianempires,either.Itismore correct, in the context of the fifth century BC, to call the innovation of historywriting by theGreeksananomaly.

Toourselves,atourgreatremoveoftime,awashwithwrittenmaterialsanddominatedbythegettingandspendingofmoney,ahumansystemthatwaslargelynonliterateandoperatingforthemostpartonthebasisofpaymentsinkind,notcash,seemsprimitive.Butthehistoryofhumandevelopmentisnotlinear.We should not regard the oral tradition of sophisticated cultures like that ofMazdaism as unreliable,flawed,orbackward,somethingwehavegonebeyond.ThePersianswerenotstupidly trying,with thewrongtools,todosomethingwecannow,withtherighttools,doincomparablybetter.Theyweredoingsomethingdifferent,andtheyhadevolvedcomplexandsubtlewaysofdoingitverywellindeed,whichourculturehasforgotten.Totrytograsptherealityofthat,wehavetostepasidealittlefromourusual

categoriesofthought—despitetheapparentfamiliarityofconceptslikeangels,aDayofJudgment,heavenandhell,andmoralchoice.TheAchaemenidEmpirewasanempireofthemind,butadifferentkindofmind.

THEEMPIREANDTHEGREEKSIngeneral,Darius’s reignwasoneof restorationandconsolidation. Itwasnota reignofconquest likethose thathadbeenpursuedbyCyrusandCambyses.ButDariusdidcampaign intoEurope in512BC,conqueringThraceandMacedonia,andtowardtheendofhislife,afterarevoltbytheIonianGreeksoftheAegeancoastofAsiaMinor,hissubordinatesfoughtawarwiththeAthenianGreeksthatendedwithaPersiandefeatat theBattleofMarathonin490BC.Thisushered inwhat theGreekscalled thePersianwars,theshadowofwhichhasaffectedourviewoftheAchaemenidEmpire,andperhapsourviewsofPersia,Iran,andtheOrientingeneral.FromaPersianperspective,themoreseriouseventwasarevoltinEgyptin486BC.Beforehecoulddealwiththis,Dariusdied.

ThestandardGreekviewofthePersiansandtheirempirewascomplex,andnotalittlecontradictory.TheGreeksregardedthePersians,astheyregardedmostnon-Greeks,asbarbarians(thetermbarbarianisthoughttocomefromadisparagingimitationofPersianspeech—“ba-ba”),andthereforeignorantandbackward.TheGreekswereawarethatthePersianshadagreat,powerful,wealthyempire—butone,totheirminds,runontyrannicalprinciplesandredolentofvulgarostentationanddecadence.ThePersianswerethereforebothbackwardanddecadent.Here,wemaybeirresistiblyremindedofthecontemporaryFrenchviewoftheUnitedStates.PerhapstheviewoftheGreeksalsowasbetterexplainedintermsofasimpleresentmentorjealousythatthePersians,ratherthantheGreeks,wererunningsuchalargepartoftheknownworld.

ThisisacaricatureoftheGreekopinionofthePersians,andcannothavebeen,forexample,Plato’sattitude or the attitude (openly, at any rate) of themanyGreekswhoworked for orwere allies of thePersians at various times.19 TheGreekswere also an imperialistic or at least a colonizing culture ofpioneeringIndo-Europeanorigin.PerhapsthehostilitybetweenthePersiansandtheGreekshadasmuchtodowith similarity aswithdifference.But in contrast to thePersians, theGreekswerenot a single,unified power. They were composed of a multiplicity of rival city-states, and their influence wasmaritime rather than land-based. Greeks had established colonies along almost all parts of theMediterranean coast not previously colonized by the Phoenicians, including places that later becameTarragonainSpain,MarseillesinFrance,CyrenaicainLibya,andlargepartsofSicilyandsouthernItaly.Theyhaddone thesameon thecoastof theBlackSea.Unlike thePersians, theirspreadwasbasedonphysicalsettlement,ratherthanonthecontrolofindigenouspeoplesfromafar.

Just as Persians appear inGreek plays and onGreek vases, there are also examples showing thepresenceoftheGreeksinthemindsofthePersians.AswellasvasesthatshowaGreekspearingafallingorrecumbentPersian,thereareengravedcylindersealsshowingaPersianstabbingaGreekorfillinghimwitharrows.20ButitisfairtosaythePersiansweremorepresenttotheGreeks—atleastinitially—thantheGreekstothePersians.PersianpowercontrolledimportantGreekcitieslikeMiletusandPhocaeainAsia Minor—only a few hours’ rowing away from Athens and Corinth—as well as Chalcidice andMacedonia on the European side of the Bosphorus. In Persepolis, Susa, and Hamadan, by contrast,Greece would have seemed half a world away, and events in other parts of the empire—Egypt,Babylonia,andBactria—wereequallyorrathermorepressing.

Darius was succeeded by his son, Xerxes (Khashayarsha). The set-piece of Xerxes’s reign in the

historicalrecordwasthegreatexpeditiontopunishAthensanditsalliesfortheirsupportof theIonianrevolt. But at least as important for Xerxes himself would have been his successful reassertion ofauthority inEgyptandBabylon,wherehecrusheda rebellionanddestroyed the templeofMarduk thatCyrus had restored.Xerxes is believed (on the authority ofHerodotus) to have taken asmany as twomillionmenwithhim to attackAthens in480BC.His troopswipedout the rearguard ofSpartans andothers at Thermopylae, killing the Spartan kingLeonidas in a protracted struggle that leftmany of thePersiantroopsdead.Xerxes’smenthentookAthens,hishardysoldiersscalingtheAcropolisandburningit.Buthis fleetwasdefeatedatSalamis, leavinghis armiesoverextendedandvulnerable.Xerxes thenwithdrewtoSardis,hisbaseinAsiaMinor,andhisforcessufferedfurtherdefeatsthefollowingyearatPlataea andMycale (479BC).Among other effects of the Persian defeatwas the loss of influence onMacedonandThraceontheEuropeansideoftheBosphorus,permittingthesubsequentriseofMacedon.

Xerxes’ssonArtaxerxes(Artakhshathra)succeededhimin465BCandreignedforsomefortyyears.ThebuildingworkatPersepoliscontinuedthroughthereignsofboth,anditwasunder thesetwokingsthatmanyof theJewsofBabylonia returned toJerusalem,under the leadershipofEzraandNehemiah.NehemiahwasArtaxerxes’scourtcupbearerinSusa,andbothEzraandNehemiaheventuallyreturnedtothePersiancourtaftertheireffortstorebuildJerusalem.ThebooksofEzraandNehemiahgiveadifferentpictureofthePersianmonarchytocontrastwiththelessflatteringimageintheGreekaccounts.

ThewarsthatcontinuedbetweenthePersiansandtheGreeksendedatleastforatimewiththepeaceofCalliasin449BC,butthereafterthePersianssupportedSpartaagainstAthensintheterriblydestructivePeloponnesianwars.TheseconflictsexhaustedtheolderGreekcity-statesandpreparedthewayforthehegemonyofMacedon.At thedeathofArtaxerxes, palace intrigues resulted in themurders of severalkingsorpretendersinsuccession.InthereignofArtaxerxesII(404–359BC)therewerefurtherwarswiththe Greeks, and a sustained Egyptian revolt that kept that satrapy independent until Persian rule wasrestored under Artaxerxes III in 343 BC. But then a particularly lethal round of political intrigueorchestratedbythevizierorchiefministerBagoascausedthedeathsofbothArtaxerxesIIIandhissonArses,bringingDariusIIItothethronein336BC.

The Iraniansmust have changed theirwayof life considerably over the two centuries between thereignsofCyrusandDariusIII.Oneindicatorofsocialchangewastheconstitutionoftheirarmies.PriortoandduringXerxes’sinvasionofGreece,largenumbersofMedesandPersiansfoughtonfoot,butbythetimeofDariusIIIthearmiesweredominatedbylargenumbersofhorsemen.TheimpressionisthatthewealthoftheempirehadenabledtheIranianmilitaryclassestodistributethemselvesacrosstheempireandsupplythemselveswithhorses,changingthenatureofPersianwarfare.Thereseemsalsotohavebeena deliberate policy ofmilitary garrisoning andmilitary colonies, notably inAsiaMinor.According toHerodotus,Cyrus hadwarned that if the Persians descended to live in the rich lands of the plain (heprobablyhadBabyloniaparticularlyinmind),theywouldbecomesoftandincapableofdefendingtheirempire.Itistooneattosuggestthatthisispreciselywhathappened.Itmaybesomewhatthecontrary—that by the time ofDarius III, taxes had risen too high and the Iranians, having had their expectationsraised,hadbecomeimpoverishedanddemoralized.Butwhatevertheirexactnature,fundamentalchangeshadtakenplace,andIranhadalreadymovedclosertothesocialandmilitarypatternsofthelaterParthianandSassanidempires.

MACEDONIA—STRANGEFRUITWhowere theMacedonians?Somehavespeculated that theywerenot reallyGreeks,butmoreclosely

related to theThracians.Orperhaps theydescended fromsomeotherBalkanpeople influencedby thearrivalofIndo-EuropeanGreeks.TheyhadcomeunderheavyGreekinfluencebythetimeofPhilipandAlexander—butevenatthatlatestagetheMacedoniansmadeastrongdistinctionbetweenthemselvesandthe Greek hangers-on who accompanied Alexander’s eastern adventure. In the fifth century BC,Macedonianswerenormally,likeothernon-Greeks,excludedfromtheOlympicgames.ButthePersiansseemtohavereferredtothemas“Greekswithhats”(theywereknownfortheirwide-brimmedhats),andHerodotustooseemstohaveacceptedthemasofGreekorigin.LiketheMedesandPersiansinthetimeofCyrus,aswellasmanyothermilitantpeoplesfrommountainousormarginalareas,theMacedonianshada strong sense of their collective superiority—but they also sustained many private feuds amongthemselves.Theywerenotoriouslydifficulttomanage.

Few stories from the classicalworld arebetter known than that ofPhilipofMacedon andhis sonAlexander.Oftentheimportanceofthefathertothesuccessofthesonisneglectedinfavorofthelatter’smore dramatic victories. Philip was born around 380 BC, became king of Macedon in 359 BC, andimmediatelysetabouttheexpansionofhiskingdom.OneessentialcontributiontothesuccessofMacedonwashiscreationofanew,tightlydrilledinfantrycorps,equippedwithalongerspearorpikethanwasnormal in Greece at the time. In favorable conditions this army usually swept aside or rolled overconventionally armed infantry.Having established himself as the prime power in northernGreece andThrace,PhilipdefeatedtheallianceofAthensandThebesattheBattleofChaeroneain338BC,andthenset up the League of Corinth, which established Macedonian hegemony and effectively ended theindependenceoftheGreekcity-states,withtheexceptionofSparta.WhenPhilipdemandedsubmissionoftheSpartans,sayingthathewouldcometoSpartaandwrecktheirfarms,killthepeople,anddestroytheircity,theSpartansreplied:“If.”PhilipandhissonlefttheSpartansalone—perhapsnotleastforthesakeofthelegendofThermopylae.

Philiphadotherplansinanycase—planstoinvadethePersianEmpire.Hispreparationswerequiteopen, and were justified in pan-Hellenic terms by reference to the Persian desecration of Atheniantemplesintheinvasionof480BC.Butin336BC,beforePhilipcouldputhisinvasionplansintoeffect,hewasmurdered.Thecircumstancesof themurder aremurkyandweredisputedat the time—somehavesuggested thatAlexander and hismotherOlympiaswere involved, but it is possible that the Persiansinstigatedthekilling.

Alexandercontinuedwherehis fatherhad leftoff.Heconsolidatedhisauthority inGreece,quicklycrushingarebellioninThebes,andthen,in334BC,crossedintoAsiaMinor.HedefeatedaPersianarmyat theGranicus River (near theDardanelles), conquered the towns of the Ionian coast—including thePersian regional base atSardis—and thenmarched east.The followingyear hedefeatedDarius at theBattleofIssus(ontheMediterraneancoastnearthemodernborderbetweenSyriaandTurkey),leadingthedecisiveattackpersonallyat theheadofhiscompanioncavalry(hetairoi).Alexander thenmarchedsouth,takingthecoastalcities,conqueringEgyptandfoundingAlexandria.Movingeastagain,in331BCAlexander defeatedDarius in a third battle, atGaugamela, nearMosul and Irbil inwhat is now IraqiKurdistan.DariusleftthebattlefieldandwaskilledsometimeafterbyBessus,thesatrapofBactria.

ThisisnottheplacetoconsiderAlexander’sconductofwarinanydetail,buthismilitarybrillianceillustratessomethingthatmayappearatfirstcounter-intuitive—thefemininenatureofmilitarygeniusatthehighestlevel.Successfulhighcommandhaslittleornothingtodowithmasculineattributeslikebruteforce,bravado,machismo,arrogance,orevencourage,exceptinsofarasitmaybenecessarytoadvertisethese from time to time to inspire the troops.Rather, it has todowithwhatonemight regard asmorefemininecharacteristics—sensitivity,subtlety,intuition,timing,anindirectapproach,anabilityquietlytoassessstrengthandweakness(basedperhapsonanintuitivegraspfortheopponent’slikelybehavioras

muchasfactualinformation)toavoidandbafflestrength,toflowaroundit,toabsorbitsforceandstrikeunexpectedlyattheweakspotatpreciselytherightmoment.Militaryhistoryshowsagainandagainthatpredictablemalebehavior,manifestinfrontalattacksandrelianceonstrengthalone,isatbestaliabilityandatworstcatastrophicallywastefulatthecommandlevel.Themaximumeffectivenessofmilitaryforceisachievedonlyby themoresubtlemethodsassociatedwithwhatonemightcalla feminineapproach.WithoutmakinganycrassconnectiontoAlexander’sbisexuality,hisconductofwarfareexemplifiesthiswell.

AlexandercontinuedontoBabylon,Susa,andfinallyPersepolis,whichheburnedtodestructionin330BCaftersomeweeksandmonthsofcelebrations.Onestorysaysthatacourtesanaccompanyingthearmy,Thaïs,persuadedAlexandertodestroythepalaceswhilehewasdrunk,inrevengefortheburningof the Athenian Acropolis by Xerxes, and threw in the first torch herself. But it is likely that thedestruction was a deliberate political act, to show that the Achaemenid dynasty was over for good.Notwithstanding the destruction of Persepolis, Alexander had been presenting himself, at least sinceGaugamela,notsomuchastherevengerofGreecebutasthesuccessortotheAchaemenians.21Fromnowonheappears tohavefollowedadeliberatePersianizingpolicy,encouraginghis troops tomarry localwomenandsettling themincolonies.HehimselfmarriedseveralPersianprincesses, includingStatira,the daughter of Darius III, and later Roxana (whose name is cognate with the modern Persian wordroshan,meaning“light”),daughterofOxyartesofBactria.Alexandercontinuedwithhiscampaigns,intothefarthestreachesoftheformerempire,wipingoutallresistance,andthenbeyond,intoIndiaandwhatisnowthePunjab.Buthistroopsgrewincreasinglywearyofthenever-endingwars,anddisaffectedwithhisperceivedpro-Persianpolicy.

AlexanderdiedinBabylonin323BC,probablyofnaturalcauses,afterasessionofheavydrinking.Thesuccession tohisempirewas leftunclear,and theresultwasa lengthyseriesofwarsbetweenhisgeneralstodivideuphisconquests.Inthese,themurderousunrulinessoftheMacedoniansemergedwithfull force. Alexander’s secretary Eumenes of Cardia had some temporary success in reunifying thecentrifugalelements insupportofAlexander’syoungson,born toRoxanaafterhisdeath.But theothergenerals and soldiersdislikedEumenesbecausehewasaGreekanda scholar, and in316BC hewasbetrayedandkilled.WithinafewyearsRoxanaandAlexander’ssonwerealsomurdered.

Despitehisearlydeath,Alexander’saim—tobringGreekinfluenceintoPersia,PersianinfluenceintoGreece,andtocreateablendofEasternandWesterncivilizations—wasrealizedtoastartlingextent.Butultimatelyitfailed.FormorethanacenturyafterAlexander’sdeath,PersiawasruledbythedescendantsofSeleucus,oneofAlexander’sgenerals,andGreek influencepersistedafter that.But thekingsof theSeleucidperiodruledmoreinagrandPersianratherthanaGreekstyle.ThiswasarguablyalsothecaseforthePtolemieswhoruledinEgypt.WhenRomerosetodominatetheentireMediterraneanbasin,theRomanEmpirewasdividedbetweentheGreekeastandtheLatinwest—butstillthestyleoftheGreekeast showed the influence of the vanished Achaemenid Empire, and in turn influenced Romans withimperialambitionsfromPompeytoElagabalus.

AlthoughtheIranianssubmittedtoforeignrule—notforthelasttimeintheirhistory—Greekinfluencewas ultimately passing and superficial despite the presence of colonies of Greek ex-soldiers. TheMazdaeanreligionpersistedandconsolidated,servingasafocusforhostility to theGreeks,andto thememoryofAlexander.

It isgenerallyrecognizedthat thehistoricalaccountswehaveofAlexanderandhis lifearepartial,written mainly by authors writing at second hand and in awe of their subject. They are all Westernaccounts, and although there is an Eastern tradition of Alexander (Iskander) as a warrior-hero, theZoroastriantraditionabouthimisverynegative,suggestingadifferentsidetothestory.Thereislittlein

the Western sources about measures Alexander took to establish or consolidate his rule, but theZoroastrianrecordsayshekilledmanyMagiandteachers,andthatthesacredflamesinmanyfiretempleswere extinguished. This may simply reflect the incidental killing and destruction of the plunderingMacedonianarmies.ButitislikelythattheMagianpriests,proprietorsastheywereofthereligionthatunderpinned theAchaemenianstateand therefore themost likelycenter foranycontinued resistanceorrevolt,wouldhavebeenatargetforrepressioninanycase.

Whateverexactlyhappened,itisunlikelythattheIranianscooperatedassubmissivelyinAlexander’spacificationpoliciesastheWesternhistorianslatersuggested.InlaterZoroastrianwritingsAlexanderistheonlyhumantosharewithAhrimanthetitleguzastag—meaning“accursed.”22

2

THEIRANIANREVIVALParthiansandSassanids

WehavemadeenquiriesabouttherulesoftheinhabitantsoftheRomanempireandtheIndianstates....Wehaveneverrejectedanybodybecauseoftheirdifferentreligionororigin.Wehavenotjealouslykeptawayfromthemwhatweaffirm.Andatthesametimewehavenotdisdainedtolearnwhattheystandfor.Foritisafactthattohaveknowledgeofthetruthandofsciencesandtostudythemisthehighestthingwithwhichakingcanadornhimself.Andthemostdisgracefulthingforkingsistodisdainlearningandbeashamedofexploringthesciences.Hewhodoesnotlearnisnotwise.

—KhosrawIAnushirvan(accordingtotheByzantinehistorianAgathias)

TheempireestablishedbySeleucusNicatorin312BC lookedtobethemostpowerfulofthesuccessorstates that emerged out of the collection of territories conquered by Alexander. It controlled Syria,Mesopotamia,andthelandsoftheIranianplateau—aswellas(atleastintheory)otherterritoriesfurthereast. Initially thecapitalwasestablishedatBabylon,and lateratanewsiteatSeleuceiaon theTigrisRiver.FinallyitmovedtoAntiochontheMediterraneanSea.

TheSeleucidkingspursuedtheeasternizingpolicyofAlexander.TheyestablishedGreekmilitaryandtradingcoloniesintheeastandusedIranianmanpowerintheirarmies,buttheirpoliticalattentionwasonthewest—particularlyontheirrivalrywiththeothermajoreasternMacedonian/Greekdynasty,thatofthePtolemies in Egypt. In the east, outlying satrapies like Sogdiana and Bactria gradually becameindependent princedoms, the latter creating an enduring culture in what is now northern Afghanistan,fusingeasternandGreekculturesunderGreeksuccessordynasties.

WARRIORHORSEMENThehorse-based cultures of the northeast hadgivenAlexander problems, and theAchaemenids beforehim.TribesliketheDahaeandtheSakae,whospokelanguagesintheIranianfamilygroup,wouldalwaysbeverydifficultforanyempiretodominate.Withtheirmilitarystrengthentirelyonhorseback,theywerehighlymobileandable,whenthreatened,todisappearintothegreatexpansesofdesertandsemi-desertsouthoftheAralSea.WithintwogenerationsofSeleucusNicator’sdeathin281BC,onetribeorgroupoftribesamong theDahae—theParni—established their supremacy inParthiaandother landseastof the

Caspian.TheysupplantedthelocalSeleucidsatrap,Andragoras—whoaround250BChadrebelledandtriedtomakehimselfanindependentrulerinParthia—andbegantothreatentheremainingterritoriesoftheSeleucidsintheeast.TheParnirulingfamilynamedthemselvesArsacidsafterArshak(Arsaces),themanwhohadledthemtotakecontrolofParthia.ButastheArsacidsexpandedtheirdominion,theywerecarefultopreservethewealthandcultureoftheGreekcoloniesinthetowns.Parthiankingslaterusedthetitlephilhellenos(friendoftheGreeks)ontheircoinage.

Several Seleucid kings carried out expeditions to the east to restore their authority in Parthia andBactria,andtheParthianArsacidsoccasionallychosetoallywiththemoreventosubmit,ratherthantoconfront them.But theSeleucidswerealwaysdrawnback to thewest, and in the reignof theArsacidMithradatesI(171–138BC)theParthiansrenewedtheirexpansion,takingSistan,Elam,andMedia.ThentheycapturedBabylonin142BCand,oneyearlater,Seleuceiaitself.

Inthedecadesthatfollowed,theParthianswereattackedbytheSakaeintheeastandbytheSeleucidsinthewest.Fortunesswungeitherway.Atonepointin128BC theParthiansdefeatedaSeleucidarmy,capturedit,andattemptedtousetheprisonersagainsttheSakae—onlytofindthattheSeleucidtroopshadmadecommoncausewith theSakae.Together, theydefeatedandkilled theParthianking,Phraates.ButMithradatesII(MithradatestheGreat)wasabletoconsolidateandstabilizeParthianruleinalongreignfromabout123to87BC,subduingenemiesinbotheastandwest.HealsotookthetitleKingofKings,adeliberatereferencebacktotheAchaemenidmonarchy.This,alongwithotherindicators,suggestsanewIranianself-confidence.

ConcealedbehindthelongstrugglebetweentheSeleucidsandtheParthianslietheoriginsofthesilktrade, which was to be of central importance for many Iranian towns and cities for more than amillennium.The initial involvementofGreeks andGreek cities in the silkbusinessmaygo somewaytoward explaining both the survival of Greek culture in the Parthian period, and the Parthian kings’respectforit.TheywerefriendstotheGreeksnotoutofaestheticsensibilityordeferencetoasuperiorculture,butbecausetheywantedtoprotectthegoosethatlaidthegoldenegg.1

MithradateshaddiplomaticcontactswithboththeChineseHanemperorWuTiandwiththeRomanrepublicunderthedictatorSulla.InordertoestablishalastingpresenceinMesopotamia,eitherheorhissuccessorGotarzes foundedanewcityatCtesiphon,nearSeleuceia.Ctesiphonwas tocontinueas thecapital formore thansevenhundredyears, thoughSeleuceia,on theother sideof theTigris,wasoftenusedasthecenterofadministration,andEcbatana/Hamadanasthesummercapital.

TheParthiansestablishedapowerfulempireandruledsuccessfullyforseveralcenturies,buttheydidsowitharelativelylighttouch,assimilatingthepracticesofpreviousrulersandbeingcontenttotoleratethevarietyofreligious,linguistic,andculturalpatternsoftheirsubjectprovinces.Asystemofdevolvedpower(parakandehshahi,alsocalledmulukal-tawa‘ifinlaterArabsources)throughsatrapscontinued,often keeping in power families that had ruled under theSeleucids.2 Parthian scribes continued to useAramaic, as in the time of theAchaemenids, and there appears to have been a continued diversity ofreligion.NameslikeMithradatesandPhraates(thelatteranamethoughttoberelatedtothefravashioftheAvesta)showtheMazdaeanallegiancesoftheArsacidsthemselves,butBabylonians,Greeks,Jews,andotherswereallowed to followtheirownreligious traditions.Asbefore,Mazdaismitselfseems tohaveencompassedavarietyofpracticesandbeliefs.InJewishtradition,theParthiansarerecordedandremembered(withtheimportantexceptionofthereignofonelaterking)astolerantandfriendlytowardtheJews.3ThismayreflectthefactthattheriseoftheParthiansintheeastwashelpedbytheprolongedstrugglebetweentheMaccabeanJewsandtheSeleucidsinPalestine.

TheParthianswerenotjustcrudenomadsassumingthecultureoftheirsubjectsforlackofanyoftheirown—or,atleast,theydidnotremainso.Parthiansculpture,withitsownparticularstylethatincludeda

strong emphasis on frontality, was different in kind from any predecessor. Parthian architecture—asexcavatedatNisa,forexample(inwhatisnowTurkmenistan)—showsforthefirsttimetheemergenceoftheaudiencehallorivan,afeaturetobeofgreatimportancelater,inSassanidandIslamicarchitecture.TheParthiansexemplified thebestof Iraniangenius—the recognition,acceptance, and toleranceof thecomplexityoftheculturesandinfluencesoverwhichtheyruled,whileretainingastrongcentralprincipleofidentityandintegrity.

ROME’SGREATRIVALINTHEEASTTheParthianswerealsomastersoftheartofwar,astheywouldshowinthenextperiodofconflict,withRome.Drivenontoever-widerconquestsbytheambitionsofmightypatricianslikePompeii,Lucullus,andCrassus,leaderswhosawconquestandmilitarygloryasnecessaryadjunctstoasuccessfulpoliticalcareer, the Roman republic by the first half of the first century BC had taken over the easternMediterraneanfromitspreviousHellenisticoverlordsandhadbeguntopressevenfarthereastward.TheRomans’mainareaofconflictwiththeParthianswasinArmenia,Syria,andnorthernMesopotamia.

In53BCMarcusLiciniusCrassus,a fabulouslyrichRomanpoliticianwhohaddestroyed theslaverevoltofSpartacusinsouthernItalyinearlieryears,becamethenewgovernorofRomanSyria.HopingtomakeconquestsintheeasttorivalthoserecentlyachievedbyCaesarinGaul,CrassusmarchedanarmyofsomefortythousandmeneasttoCarrhae(modernHarran)—arrogantlyrejectingtheadviceofthekingofArmenia to take advantage of his friendship and follow a less exposed northerly route.AtCarrhaeCrassus’s army was met in the open plain by a smaller but fast-moving force of about ten thousandParthian horsemen, including large numbers of horse archers, supported by a much smaller force ofheavilyarmoredcavalrymenonarmoredhorses,eachmanwieldingalong,heavylance.TheRomanforcewas composed primarily of armored infantry equippedwith swords and heavy throwing spears, alongwithsomeGaulishcavalrymenwhowereeitherlightlyarmoredornotarmoredatall.

The Parthians confronted Crassus with a kind of fighting that the Romans had not previouslyencountered,andagainstwhichtheyhadnoanswer.TheRomaninfantryadvanced,buttheParthianhorsearcherswithdrewbeforethem,circlingaroundtoshootarrowsintotheflanksoftheircolumn.Hourafter

hour thearrowsraineddownon theRomans,anddespite theirheavyarmor thepowerfulParthianwarbowsfrequentlyzingedanarrowpasttheedgeofashield,foundagapattheneckbetweenbodyarmorandhelmet,punchedthroughaweaklinkinchainmail,orwoundedasoldier’sunprotectedhandsorfeet.TheRomansgrewtiredandthirstyintheheat,andtheirfrustrationatnotbeingabletogettogripswiththe Parthians turned to defeatism, especially when they saw the Parthians resupply themselves witharrowsfrommassesofheavilyladenpackcamels.

AtonepointCrassus’ssonledadetachment,includingtheGaulishcavalry,againsttheParthians.TheParthianspulledbackasifindisorder,buttheirrealintentionwastodrawthedetachmentawaybeyondany possible assistance from themain body.When theGauls rode ahead to chase off the archers, theParthianheavycavalrychargeddownonthem,spearingthelightlyarmoredGaulsandtheirhorseswiththeirlonglances.Indesperation,theGaulstriedtoattacktheParthianhorsesbydismountingandrollingunder them, trying to stabup at their unprotectedbellies, but even thisdesperate tactic couldnot savethem.ThenthefullstrengthoftheParthianhorsearchersturnedontheRomandetachment.Moreandmoreofthemwerehitbyarrows,whileallweredisorientedandconfusedbythecloudsofdustthrownupbytheParthians’horses.Crassus’ssonpulledhismenbacktoasmallhill—wheretheyweresurroundedandeventuallykilled,withtheexceptionofaboutfivehundred,whoweretakenprisoner.

ThedefeatofthedetachmentandthejubilationoftheParthiansfurtherdemoralizedthemainRomanforce. Finally, Crassus attempted to negotiate with the Parthian general, Suren, only to be killed in ascuffle andbeheaded.The survivorsof theRomanarmywithdrew indisorderback intoRomanSyria.Meanwhile,asmanyas ten thousandRomanprisonersweremarchedoffbytheParthians to theremotenortheastoftheempire.

AccordingtotheGreekhistorianPlutarchtheheadofCrassuswassenttotheParthianking,Orodes,anditarrivedwhilethekingwaslisteningtoanactordeliveringsomelinesfromEuripedes’splayTheBacchae.Totheapplauseofthecourt, theactortooktheheadandspokethewordsofQueenAgaveofThebes,whointheplayunwittinglykilledherownson,KingPentheus,whileinaBacchictrance:

We’vehunteddownalion’swhelptoday,Andfromthemountainsbringanobleprey4

Some have suggested that the Parthian general, recorded in theWestern sources as Suren,was thewarrior-hero later remembered as Rostam and immortalized in the revered tenth-century Persian poetFerdowsi’sShahnameh(BookofKings).LikeRostam,SurenhailedfromSistan(originallySakastan—thelandoftheSakae),andlikeRostam,healsohadatroubledrelationshipwithhisking.OrodeswassoresentfulofSuren’svictorythathehadhimmurdered.

ThedefeatatCarrhaewasagreatblowtoRomanprestigeintheeast,andafterittheParthianswereable to extend their control to includeArmenia. But in the fiercely competitive environment of Rometowardtheendoftherepublic,thedefeat,humiliation,anddeathofCrassuswereachallengeasmuchasa warning. To succeed where Crassus had failed—to win a Parthian triumph—became an invitingpoliticalprize.Anotherincentivewasthewealthofthesilktrade.WhilethehostileParthianscontrolledthecentralpartoftheroutetoChina,wealthyRomansweredismayedtoseemuchofthegoldtheypaidtohavetheirwivesanddaughtersclothedinexpensivesilksgoingtotheirmostredoubtableenemies.

ThenextRomantotesttheParthiansinamajorwaywasMarkAntony.ButbetweentheexpeditionsofCrassusandAntony,theParthiansandtheRomansfoughtseveralothercampaigns,withmixedoutcomes.In51BC someRoman survivors fromCarrhae ambushed an invading Parthian force nearAntioch anddestroyedit.Butin40BCanotherParthianforce,commandedbyOrodes’ssonPacorus(withthehelpofa

renegadeRoman,QuintusLabienus), broke out of Syria and conquered bothPalestine andmost of theprovincesofAsiaMinor.ExploitingthechaosofthecivilwarsthatfollowedthemurderofJuliusCaesarin44BC,theParthianinvadersreceivedthesubmissionofmanytownswithoutasiege.ButayearorsolaterPubliusVentidius,oneofMarkAntony’ssubordinates,rescuedtheeasternprovinceswithsomeoftheveteranlegionsofCaesar’sarmy.HedefeatedtheParthiansinaseriesofbattlesinwhichallthemainParthiancommanderswerekilled, includingPacorus andLabienus.Back inRome,Ventidius’s triumphovertheParthianswasconsideredararehonor.Seeinghislieutenantsopraised,MarkAntonywantedthegloryofavictoryagainsttheParthiansforhimself.

In36BC he tookanarmymore thandouble the sizeof thatofCrassus into the sameareaofupperMesopotamia.5Antonysoonencounteredmanyof the samedifficulties thathad frustratedCrassus.TheRomansfoundthattheirbestremedyagainsttheParthianarrowswastoformthecloseformationcalledthetestudo(tortoise),inwhichthesoldiersclosedupsothattheirshieldsmadeawallinfront,withtheranksbehindholdingtheirshieldsovertheirheads,overlapping,tomakearoof.Thismadeaneffectivedefense but slowed the army’s advance to a crawl. TheRoman infantry still could not hit back at theParthianhorsearchers,whosemobilityenabled themtorangeatwillaroundthemarchingRomansandattackthemattheirmostvulnerable.TheParthianswerealsoabletoattackAntony’ssupplycolumns,andthedifficultyoffindingfoodandwatermadethelargenumbersoftheinvadingforcealiabilityratherthananasset.Havingsufferedinthiswayinthesouth,AntonyattemptedamorenortherlyattackonParthianterritory, penetrating into what is now Azerbaijan. But he achieved little, and was forced to retreatthroughArmeniainthewintercold,losingasmanyastwenty-fourthousandmen.

Antony saved some face by a later campaign inArmenia, but the overallmessage of theseRomanencounterswith theParthianswas that thestylesofwarfareof theopponents,and thegeographyof theregion, dictated a stalemate thatwould be difficult for either side to break. The Parthian cavalrywasvulnerabletoambushbyRomaninfantryinthehilly,lessopenterrainoftheRoman-controlledterritories,andlackedthesiegeequipmentnecessarytotaketheRomantowns.Atthesametime,theRomanswerevulnerabletotheParthiansintheopenMesopotamianplainandwouldalwaysfinditdifficulttoprotecttheirsupplylinesagainstthemoremobileParthianforces.Thesefactorsweremoreorlesspermanent.

Perhapsrecognizingtheintractabilityofthissituation,afterAugustuseventuallyachievedsupremacyintheRomanEmpireandendedthecivilwarsbydefeatingMarkAntonyin31/30BC,AugustusfollowedapolicyofdiplomacywiththeParthians.InthiswayhewasabletoretrievetheeaglestandardsofthelegionsthathadbeenlostatCarrhae.TheParthiansseemtohaveusedtheperiodofpeaceinthewesttocreateanewIndo-ParthianempireinthePunjab,underalinedescendedfromtheSurenfamily.Butthewars in the west began again in the reign of Nero, after the Parthian king Vologases I (Valkash) hadappointedanewkinginArmenia,whichtheRomansregardedasadependentstateoftheRomanEmpire.ThegeneralGnaeusDomitiusCorbuloconqueredArmeniainAD58–60,buttheParthianscounterattackedwithsomesuccessthereafter,capturingaRomanforce.6IthasbeensuggestedthattheRomanarmormadeofoverlappingplates(loricasegmentata),familiarfromfilmsandchildren’sbooks,wasdevelopedasacountertoParthianarrowsaroundthetimeofthecampaignofCorbulo.TheoutcomeoftheArmenianwarwasthattheRomansandParthianssignedatreatyagreeingtotheestablishmentofanindependentArsaciddynastyinArmeniaasabufferstate,butwiththesuccessionsubjecttoRomanapproval.

VologasesImayalsobesignificantinthehistoryofMazdaismandthebeginningsofitstransitionintothemodernreligionofZoroastrianism.LaterZoroastriantextssaythatakingValkash(theydonotspecifywhichone—severalArsacidkingstookthatname)wasthefirsttotelltheMagianprieststobringtogetheralltheoralandwrittentraditionsoftheirreligionandrecordthemsystematically.Thisbegantheprocessthat,severalcenturieslater,ledtotheassemblyofthetextsoftheAvestaandtheotherholyscripturesof

Zoroastrianism.7IfindeeditwasVologasesIwhogaveoutthoseinstructions(aconjecturesupportedbythe fact that his brotherTiridateswas known also for hisMazdaean piety8), itwould perhaps fitwithother decisions and policies during his reign, which seem consistently to have stressed a desire toreasserttheIraniancharacterofthestate.VologasesIisbelievedtohavebuiltanewcapitalnamedafterhimselfnearSeleuceiaandCtesiphon,withtheaimofavoidingtheGreekcharacterofthoseplaces.SomeofhiscoinswerestruckwithletteringinAramaicscript(thescriptinwhichtheParthianlanguagewasusuallywritten)ratherthaninGreek,ashadbeenthecasebefore.AndtherearesuggestionsalsothathewashostiletotheJews,whichwasatypicalintheArsacidperiod.9Althoughhisimmediatesuccessorsdidnot follow throughwithallof thesenovelties, theydoprefigure thepoliciesof theSassanids.ThegradualerosionofGreekinfluenceandthestrengtheningofIranianidentityarefeaturesofthereignsafterVologasesI.

SOLINVICTUSSomethingelsetakenwestbytheRomansoldiersfromtheirencountersintheeastwasanewreligion—Mithraism.HavingbeenoneofthesubordinatedeitiesofMazdaismintheAchaemenidperiod,Mithrasbecamethecentralgodofareligioninitsownrightafterhistransitionwestward(inthewesthebecameknownasMithrasratherthanMithra).ItmaybethathissignificancehadgrowninaparticularcontextorlocationinPersiaorAsiaMinoratanearlierstage,andsomehavesuggestedthatthecultwasawhollynew one that took little from Persia beyond the name.10 As worshipped in the west, Mithras alwaysremainedprimarilyagodofsoldiers(whichmaypointupaconnectionwiththeParthianwars)andwasan important bonding element in the lives ofmilitarymenwhomight find themselves separated fromfriendsandfamiliarplacesagainandagaininthecourseoftheirlives,astheywerepostedfromplacetoplace.AlthoughMithraswasassociatedwiththesun(solinvictus—theInvincibleSun),Mithraismseemsto have taken on some of the ritualized cult character ofWestern paganism, losingmost of the ethicalcontentofIranianMazdaismandbecomingakindofsecretsocietyalittleliketheFreemasons.Itstenetsincluded secret ceremonies (mysteries), initiation rites, and a hierarchy of grades ofmembership.TheundergroundtemplesofMithrasarefoundallovertheempire,asfarawayfromIranasbytheWalbrookin London and at Carrawburgh (Roman Brocolitia) onHadrian’sWall. The period of the cult’s earlypopularityandspreadwasthefirstcenturyAD.

MithraismjoinsthelistofimportantreligiousandintellectualinfluencesfromtheIranianlandsontheWest. It is thought to have had an important influence on the early Christian church, as the Christianbishopsmade converts and tried tomake thenew religion as acceptable aspossible to formerpagans(though the rise of Mithraism only narrowly predates the rise of Christianity). Mithras’s followersbelievedhewasbornonDecember25,ofavirgin(thoughsomeaccountssayhewasbornfromarock),with shepherds as his firstworshippers.His rites included a kindof baptismand a sacramentalmeal.OtheraspectsofthecultreflecteditsMazdaeanorigins—Mithraswasbelievedtohavekilledabullasasacrifice,anditwasfromthebloodofthatbullthatallotherlivingthingsemerged.MithraswastheallyofAhuraMazdaagainsttheevilprincipleintheworld,Ahriman.

Inthefollowingcenturythegreatsoldier-emperorTrajanmanagedtobreakthestrategiclogjamintheEastwith a new invasionofMesopotamia, after theParthianVologases III hadgivenhimapretext bydeposingonerulerofArmeniaandappointinganother,whomtheRomansdidnotlike.InsteadoftryingtotoilsouthintheheattowardCtesiphononfoot,underahailofarrows,inAD115Trajanputhismenandequipment intoboatsandran themdownstreamthroughMesopotamiaalong theriverTigris.When they

reached Ctesiphon and Seleuceia, they drove off the Parthian defenders and applied themost refinedtechniques of Roman siege engineering. The twin capital fell, and Trajan annexed the provinces ofMesopotamiatotheRomanEmpire.HemarchedhismenasfarastheshoreofthePersianGulfandwouldhave liked to go farther, emulatingAlexander.But in 116 he fell illwhile besiegingHatra,which hisarmieshadbypassedearlier.Ayearlater,hedied.

Trajan’sconquests,althoughimpressiveenoughtowinhimthe titleParthicus,couldnotdestroythecenters of Parthian power further east. In the end, they proved to be little more permanent than theParthianconquestsofPacorusandLabienusinPalestineandAsiaMinorof40BC.BeforeTrajandied,theRomans had been assailed by revolts inMesopotamia and elsewhere in their eastern provinces. Hissuccessor,Hadrian,abandonedTrajan’sconquestsinArmeniaandMesopotamiaandmadepeacewiththeParthian kingOsroes (Khosraw) on the basis of the old frontier on the EuphratesRiver.Nonetheless,Trajan had overcome the ghost of Carrhae and had shown his successors how to crack the strategicproblemofMesopotamia.

It may be that the Trajanic invasion marks the beginning of a decline of the Arsacids, and it iscertainlyplainthatMesopotamiahadceasedtobethesecurepossessionithadbeenbefore.Overthenextcentury,Romanarmiespenetrated toSeleuceia/Ctesiphon twicemore—inAD165 (underVerus)and in199 (under Septimus Severus). But over the same period the Parthians fought back hard (assisted in165/166bytheoutbreakofadiseaseamongtheRomansthatmayhavebeensmallpox),andmadetheirownincursionintoSyria.

In 216, at the instigation ofEmperorCaracalla, theRomans again invaded, but got no farther thanArbela (Irbil/Hewler). Caracalla was one of the most brutal of the Roman emperors (in 215 he hadmassacredthousandsofpeopleinAlexandriabecausethecitizenswerereportedtohaveridiculedhim).While relievinghimselfon thesideofa roadnearCarrhae,hewasapparentlystabbed todeathbyhisown bodyguards. The Parthians under Artabanus (Ardavan) IV then struck back at the Romans underCaracalla’s successor, Macrinus, and inflicted a heavy defeat on them at Nisibis. After that, in 218,Macrinushad toyieldupaheavywarreparation thatcost twohundredmillionsesterces(according toDioCassius)tosecurepeace.

WhateverthepreciseeffectofthewarsontheArsacidmonarchy,theymusthavebeenexhaustinganddamaging—especiallyinMesopotamiaandthenorthwest,whichwouldalwayshavebeen,ingoodtimes,someofthewealthiestprovincesoftheempire.TherehadalwaysbeenviciousandprotractedsuccessiondisputesamongtheArsacids,thanksmostlytothenatureofcourtpoliticsand,perhaps,theeffectoftheinvolvementofagroupofnoble families (central toArsacid rule seems tohavebeenallianceswithasmall group ofwealthy families, including those of theSuren,Karen, andMehran).But these difficultsuccessionstrugglesseemalsotohavegrownmorefrequentandintractable,exacerbatingafalling-offoftheauthorityofthemonarchy.

THEPERSIANREVIVALEarlyinthethirdcenturyADanewpowerbegantoariseintheprovinceofPersis—Fars,theprovincefrom which the Achaemenids had emerged. A family owing allegiance to the Arsacids came toprominence as local rulers there, but inApril 224 the latest headof this family, havingbroadenedhissupporttoincludethecitiesofKermanandIsfahan,ledanarmyagainstArtabanusIVandkilledhiminbattleatHormuzdgannearShushtarinKhuzestan.Thisvictor’snamewasArdashir,areferencebacktothe nameArtakhshathra (Artaxerxes), the name of several of theAchaemenid kings.Ardashir claimed

Achaemeniddescent,probablytodisguisethemorerecent,relativelyhumbleoriginsofhisfamily(whocalledthemselvesSassanids,afterapredecessorcalledSasan).

ArdashiralsomadeastrongassociationbetweenhiscauseandthatoftheformofMazdaismfollowedinFars(hisfather,Papak,hadbeenapriestofAnahitaatthereligiouscenterofIstakhr).ThedownfallofArtabanuswaslatercelebratedinadramaticrock-carvingatFerozabad,whichshowedArdashirandhisfollowersongallopingchargers,strikingtheParthiankingandhismenfromtheirhorseswiththeirlances.

TheArsacidregimedidnotcollapseimmediately,andtheircoinswerestillmintedinMesopotamiauntil228.Butin226ArdashirhadhimselfcrownedKingofKingsafter takingCtesiphon,andwithinafew years he controlled all the territory of the former Parthian Empire. That fact alone suggests thatseveralofthegreatParthianfamilies(whoselocalrulershipsareknowntohavepersistedlongafter224)cooperatedinthechangeofdynasty.

Ardashirwasdeterminedfromthebeginningthathisnewdynastywouldassertandjustifyitselfinanewway.Hiscoins(andthoseofhissuccessors)boreinscriptionsinPersianscriptinsteadoftheGreekusedonArsacidcoins, andon the reverse showedaMazdaean fire temple.TheSassanidswere tobeIranian,Mazdaeankingsbeforeallelse.Inanothermassivelyimpressiverock-carvingatNaqsh-eRostamnearPersepolis,ArdashirisshownonhorsebackreceivingthesymbolofhiskingshipfromOrmuzd(thename of Ahura Mazda in Middle Persian). Artabanus IV is depicted crushed beneath the feet ofArdashir’shorse,andAhrimanunderthehoovesofthehorseonwhichOrmuzdisseated.Themessagecouldnotbemoreclear—ArdashirhadbeenchosenbyGod.HisvictoryoverthelastArsacidhadbeenassisted byGod, andhe hadovercomeArtabanus in a struggle that paralleled directly that ofOrmuzdagainstAhriman,theprincipleofchaosandevil.11CoinageinscriptionsalsodeclaredArdashirtobeofdivinedescent.Thiswasaninnovationwithimportantlaterresonances.

ParadoxicallyforthisveryIranianmonarch,theideamayhaveoriginatedintheprecedingperiodofGreekinfluence.Thepatternofanew,autocraticrulerfrommoreorlessobscureorigins,takingpowerbyforceafteraperiodofdisorder—andclaimingthedecisionofGodforhisvictoryandhisjustification—has been suggested as a recurring theme in Iranian history by Homa Katouzian, and perhaps has itsarchetypal image in this relief carving.12 The rebellion of Ardashir also, with its heavy religiousovertones,echoesearlierandlaterreligiousrevolutionsinIran.

Thisrock-reliefatNaqsh-eRostamalsoincludesthefirstknowninscriptionreferringtoIran,thoughtherearereferencesintheAvestathatprobablypre-datetheSassanidperiod,andthewordalsoappearsonArdashir’s coins. Fromother contemporary evidence, the term Iranmay refer to the territory overwhichthoseresponsiblefortheinscriptionsconsideredtheMazdaeanreligiontobeobserved.OritmaypossiblyrefertotheterritoriesinwhichtheIranianfamilyoflanguageswerespoken(thoughtheinclusionofBabyloniaandMesenewithinIranmakesthisdoubtful).Or,perhaps,itsignifiedsomethinglessclearlydefined,aboutpeopleratherthanterritory,whichpartookofboththings.

WhatismorecertainisthatalongsidetheconceptofIranwasthatofanon-Iran(Aniran)—territoriesruled by the Sassanid shah but not regarded as Iranian. These included Syria, Cilicia, andGeorgia.13Whatevertheprecisesignificanceoftheseterms,theiruseontherock-carvingstronglysuggestsasenseof Iranian identity,perhapscenteredonFarsbutwithsignificancemuchbeyond. ItalsoseemsunlikelythatArdashirconjuredtheseconceptsfromthinair.Theirutilityforhimwasasanunderpinningforhisroyalauthority.Tobeeffectiveforthatpurpose,theymusthavehadsomeresonancewithhissubjects—aresonancethattouchedonanoldersenseofland,people,andpoliticalculture.

In later years Ardashir attempted to round off his success in taking over the Parthian Empire bylaunchingattacksontheRomans,alongtheoldfrontinupperMesopotamiaandSyria.ThissuggeststhathefelttheneedtojustifyhisaccesstopowerbysuccessagainsttheRomansand,byextension,thatthe

Parthians’perceivedfailuresagainsttheRomanshadbeenpartofthereasonfortheirdownfall.Atfirstimpression,theinterminableseriesofwarsbetweentheRomanEmpireandPersia(bothintheParthianperiodandagain in theSassanidperiod) lookalmost inexplicable.Theywentonandon, centuryaftercentury.Therewasapotentialeconomicgainforbothsides—thedisputedprovinceswererichprovinces.Butitwasevident,certainlybythetimeofArdashir,thatthewarswereverycostly,thatitwouldbeverydifficult indeed for either party to deliver a knockout blow to the other, and that any gainswould bedifficultforeithersidetoholdpermanently.Thewarsandthedisputedprovinceshadtakenonatotemicvalue—theyhadbecomepartoftheapparatusbywhichPersianshahsandRomanemperorsalikejustifiedtheirrule.Thisexplainstheirpersonalparticipationinthecampaigns,thetriumphsinRomeandtherock-reliefs carved on the hillsides of Fars. Upper Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Syria had become anunfortunateplaygroundforprinces.

ArdashirwasnotinitiallysuccessfulinhiswarsagainsttheRomans,butaftersomeyearshewasabletoretakeNisibisandCarrhae.InhislastyearsheruledjointlywithhissonShapur,whosucceededhimafterhisdeathin241.AnditwasShapurwhoachievedsomeofthemostdramaticsuccessesofthelongwarswithRome.ThesebeganwithhisdefeatoftheRomansatMisikoein243,duringwhichtheRomanEmperorGordianwaskilled.In244,ShapuracceptedthesubmissionofEmperorPhiliptheArabandthecession of Armenia. In 259/260 the Emperor Valerian led an army against Shapur—but the PersiansdefeatedValerianwest of Edessa and took him prisoner. These events are commemorated by anothermuralsculptureatNaqsh-eRostam,whichshowsShapuronhorsebackreceivingthesubmissionofbothRomanemperors.The inscriptionclaims thatPhilippaid fivehundred thousanddenarii in ransom,andthatShapurcapturedValerianinbattle“OurselveswithOurownhands.”14TherearedifferentaccountsofwhathappenedtoValerianthereafter.Themoresensationalone(fromRomansources)isthataftersomeyearsofhumiliationtheformeremperorwaseventuallyflayedalive;hisskinwasthenstuffedwithstrawandexhibitedasareminderofthesuperiorityofPersianarms.AnthonyHechtwroteapoembasedonthisstory,fromwhichthefollowingisanexcerpt:

...Ahideouslife-sizeddoll,filledoutwithstraw,IntheskinoftheRomanEmperor,Valerian...Swunginthewindonaropefromthepalaceflag-poleAndyounggirlswerebroughttherebytheirmothersTobetoldaboutthemaleanatomy....15

ButtheinscriptionatNaqsh-eRostamsaystheRomancaptivesweresettledinvariousplacesaroundthe empire, and there is evidence of this at Bishapur and Shushtar, where the Romans showed theirengineering expertise by building a combined bridge and dam, the remains ofwhich can still be seen(alongwithotherRoman-builtbridgeselsewhere).ItmaybethatValerian,ratherthansurvivingonlyasastuffedskin tobegiggledat, livedouthisdaysaspontifexmaximusofaPersiancity.Given theotherevidenceofShapur’sgenerallyhumaneconduct(andthespiritoftheNaqsh-eRostamreliefitself,whichseemstoshowmagnanimityratherthanbrutalhumiliationoftheenemy),itmaybethattheformerstoryisjusta rathergruesomefable, reportedbyuncriticalRomanhistorianswhohadno ideawhat reallyhadbecomeofValerianafterhiscapture,butwerereadytobelievetheworstofthePersians.Largenumbersofordinarypeople,includingmanyChristiansfromAntiochandelsewhere,werebroughtbackandsettledinPersiabyShapurafterhiscampaigns. Inaddition to thewarswithRome,bothArdashirandShapurcampaignedintheeastagainsttheKushans,eventuallyestablishingSassanidruleoverlargepartsofwhatarenowCentralAsia,Afghanistan,andnorthernIndia.

ArdashirandShapurmadechanges ingovernment thatmayhaveparalleled thebeginningsof somedeeperchangesinsociety.Governmentbecamemorecentralized,thebureaucracyexpanded,andfromthedevolvedsystemoftheParthians(sometimes,probablymisleadingly,describedasakindoffeudalism)anewpatternevolved.16Newofficesandtitlesappearedininscriptions,includingdibir(scribe),ganzwar(treasurer),anddadwar (judge).TheoldParthian familiescontinued,butweregivencourtofficesandmaythereby,onemaysay,havebeendomesticated(achangereminiscentofthewayinwhichLouisXIVof France tamed the French nobility after the Fronde civilwars of themid-seventeenth century). Thischange in role for the great nobles may in time have helped initiate another phenomenon of social,cultural,andmilitarysignificance:theemergenceofaclassofgentry,thedehqans,whoinlatercenturiescontrolledthecountryside,itsvillages,anditspeasantryontheshah’sbehalf,andprovidedthearmoredcavalry thatwere thecentralbattle-winningweaponof theSassanidarmies. (Though in the interim thegreat noble families retainedmuch of their power in the provinces, and the cavalrywere provided inlargepartbytheirretainers—asinthetimeoftheParthians.)

Inseveralotherways the longreignofShapurcontinuedandfulfilled thepoliciesset inmotionbyArdashir. Following the precedent of his father at Ferozabad and elsewhere, Shapurwas also a greatfounder of cities—Bishapur and Nishapur, among others. The establishment of these cities17 and thegrowth of old ones, abetted by the expansion of tradewithin and beyond the large empire (especiallyalong the silk routesaswell as, increasingly,by sea to IndiaandChina),broughtaboutchanges in thePersianeconomy.Bazaarsofthekindfamiliarlater,intheIslamicperiod,grewupinthecities—ahometomerchantsandartisans,whoformed tradeguilds.Agricultureexpanded tomeet thedemandfor foodfromthe towns,andnomadicpastoralismreceded insignificance.Thespreadof landundercultivationwas facilitatedby theuseofqanat—underground irrigationcanals thatcarriedwateras faras severalkilometers,fromhighlandareastovillages.Thereitcouldbedistributedtofields.Agriculturewasalsoexpanded inMesopotamia, where, if properly irrigated, the rich soils of the great river valley werepotentiallyveryproductive,capableofyieldingseveralcropsayear.

Culturally, the resettlement of Greeks, Syrians, and others from the Roman Empire brought in arenewedburstofinterestinGreeklearning,andnewtranslationsintoPahlaviwerecarriedout(PahlaviwastheMiddlePersianlanguagespokenintheSassanidperiod,simplifiedfromthemoregrammaticallycomplexOldPersianspokeninAchaemenidtimes).Eventually,recognizedschoolsoflearning,includingthoseformedicineandothersciences,flourishedincitieslikeGondeshapurandNisibis.InscriptionsalsorecordShapur’spiousestablishmentoffirealtarsnamedforvariousmembersofhis family.Eachaltarwouldhaveinvolvedanendowmenttosupport thepriestsandtheirfamilies.Theseendowments,alongwith similar ones established by the great nobles, enhanced the economic and political power of thepriests(mobad).

DARKPROPHETAnotherphenomenonthatemergedinthereignofShapurwasanewreligion—Manichaeism,namedafteritsoriginator, theprophetMani.Aside fromamoreor lessvague ideaofadualisticdivisionbetweengood and evil, Mani and his doctrines are obscure to most people today. But on closer examinationMani’s ideas and his movement turn out to have been enormously influential, especially in medievalEurope.

ManiwasborninApril216inParthianMesopotamia,ofIranianparentsdescendedfromabranchoftheArsacidroyalfamily,whohadmovedtherefromHamadan/Ecbatana.Thereisastorythathewasborn

lame,andsomehavesuggestedthathispessimismandhisdisgustatthehumanbodyhadsomethingtodowiththat.Aswithotherfoundersofworldreligions,Maniwasbornintoatroubledtimeandplace.HisparentsseemtohavebeenChristians,18andhewasstronglyinfluencedbygnosticideasinhisformativeyears.(ThegnosticswereanimportantsectofearlyChristianity,thoughsomebelievetheirideaspre-dateChristianity,incorporatingPlatonicideas.SimilarmovementsinJudaismandeven,later,Islamhavebeenidentified and labelled gnostic. Broadly, they believed in a secret knowledge—gnosis— that derivedfromapersonal,direct experiencewith thedivine.)At somepointbeforeabout240,Mani claimed tohave received a revelation that told him not to eatmeat or drinkwine or to sleepwith women. ThedoctrineofManiincorporatedChristianelements,butdependedheavilyonacreationmyth(ifitcanbecalled that) derived from Mazdaean concepts, particularly the pessimistically and deterministicallyinclined forms of the branch ofMazdaism called Zurvanism. This had been particularly important inMesopotamiaforseveralcenturies,drawingonindigenoustraditionslikethatofastrology.

Putsimply,Manichaeismwasbasedontheideaofaqueasy,dystopiccreationinwhichthegood—thelight—had been overwhelmed and dominated by evil—the demonic—whichwas itself identifiedwithmatter.Throughcopulationandreproduction(inherentlysinful),evilhad imprisonedlight inmatterandhad established the dominance of evil on earth. Jesus was able to liberate man from this miserablecondition,butonlybriefly,andtheonlyrealhopewastheeventualliberationofthespiritindeath.Thisdismalanduglyvisionofexistencewaspresentedasareligionofliberationfrommaterialexistenceandevil.Maniwrotedownaseriesofreligioustextsandliturgies,manyofwhichwerequitebeautiful.AfterameetingwithShapurin243atwhichManiimpressedtheshahfavorably,19ManiwasallowedtopreachthenewreligionallovertheSassanidEmpire.Presumablythekingfailedtoquestionhimtooclosely—Shapurwasdistinguishedbya tolerantattitudetoallreligions, includingJudaismandChristianity.It istemptingtowishthathehadmadeanexceptioninMani’scase.ManiaccompaniedShapurinsomeofthecampaigningthatyearagainsttheRomans,whichiscoincidentalbecausethegreatNeoplatonist,Plotinus,wasapparentlyaccompanyingtheRomanemperorthroughthesamecampaign,ontheotherside.

The teachings ofMani spread rapidly andwidely—beyond Persia into India, Europe, andCentralAsia.TheysurvivedlongestinCentralAsia,asanopenratherthanapersecuted,undergroundmovement,and there yieldedmost of the authoritative texts fromwhichManichaeism is understoodby academicstoday.Maniorganizedteamsofscribestotranslateandcopyhiswritingsintodifferentlanguages.20Hisfollowers formed a hierarchy of believers, with an exclusive elect of pharisaic priests at their head.Thesewerethepeoplewhofollowedthepurityrulesandtherulesofabstinenceandchastityandotherlife-hatingmumbojumbototheirfullestextent.Butthesectwasgenerallydespisedanddeclaredheretical—especiallybytheMazdaeanMagi,butalsobytheJews,theChristians,andevenbygnosticsliketheMandaeans. Eventually, Mani returned from his travels (after Shapur’s death) to a less tolerantatmosphere, and the Magi—who hated Mani more than anyone else because of his subversion anddistortionoftheirownbeliefs—wereabletohavehimimprisoned.InFebruary277Maniwaskilledbybeingcrushedoveraperiodoftwenty-sixdaysbysomeveryheavychains.

BythetimeofMani’sdeath,though,thedamagewasdone.ItwouldbefoolishtoattributealltheevilsofreligiontoMani,buthedoesseemtohavedonearemarkablygoodjobofinfectingarangeofbeliefsystemswiththemostdamaginganddepressingideasaboutimpurity,thecorruptionofmaterialexistence,andthesinfulnessofsexualpleasure.Ofcourse,someofhisnotionswereusefulalsotothosewishingtoelaboratemetaphysicallyuponmisogynisticimpulses,andtothosewithadeterministicbent.HisthinkingwasakindofPandora’sboxofmalignity,theparticlesfromwhichwentflutteringoffinalldirectionsontheirmisshapenwings.AsthescholarofPersianreligionAlessandroBausanisaid,Maniseemstohaveconstructedmythsoutofasenseofthe“monstrosityofexistence”:

...mythsthathavetheparticularlyunpleasantcharacteristicofnotbeingnaturalandrisingfrombelow...notbasedonawide-ranging religious sociality like the Zoroastrian ones, for they are almost the personal dreams of an exhausted andmaniacalintellectual.21

Buthisideaswerecomplex,varied,andinnovative,andnotallbad.TheymaylaterhavehadsomeinfluenceonIslam—Mani,likeMohammadintheseventhcentury,declaredhimselftobethe“sealoftheprophets,” and there are other parallels.22 But the central tenets of Islam were intrinsically anti-Manichaean in spirit, and theProphetMohammad, speakingofvarious sects and faiths,was clear that“Allwillbesavedexceptone:thatoftheManichaeans.”23DespitethecondemnationheapeduponMani’steachings,theyseemtohavepersistedamonganundergroundsect.ButthemoststartlingstoryisthatofMani’sinfluenceintheWest.

Ofall thefathersoftheChristianchurch,probablythemostinfluentialwasSt.AugustineofHippo.AugustinewrotewonderfulbooksthatexplainedtheChristianreligiontotheuneducated—explainedthedownfalloftheRomanEmpireinChristianterms,absolvingtheChristiansofblame(some,likeGibbon,have remainedunconvinced);Augustine also explained in touching andhumane termshis own life, hisownsenseofsin,andhisown(late)conversiontoChristianity(“OLord,Makemechaste—butnotyet”).Augustine’spresenceinthethoughtofthechurchinlatercenturieswasdominant.HealsoexplainedthereasonsManichaeismwashereticalinaChristiancontext.Buttheremarkablefactis,beforeheconvertedtoChristianity,AugustinehimselfhadbeenanavowedManichaean,hadconvertedotherstothesect,andmay have served as a Manichaean priest. It has been disputed, but the imprint of Manichaeism onAugustine’sthinkingisobviousandheavy.

ManyoftheideasthatAugustine’steachingsuccessfullyfixedinCatholicChristiandoctrine—notablythatoforiginalsin(stronglyassociatedbyhimwithsexuality),predestination,theideaofanelectofthesaved, and (notoriously) thedamnationof unbaptized infants—originated at least partly indebates thathadbeengoingonearlierwithin theChristianchurch, though thosediscussionshadbeen influencedbysimilargnosticideastothosewhichhadinspiredMani.Butmanyofthesekeyconcepts—especiallythecentralone,originalsin—alsoshowastrikingcongruencewithManichaeandoctrine.SurelyAugustinecould not successfully have foisted upon the Christian church Manichaean ideas that the church hadalreadydeclaredheretical?Yet thatseemstohavebeenwhathappened,andAugustinewasaccusedofdoingprecisely thisbycontemporaries—notablyby theapostleof freewill,Pelagius,whoin theearlyyearsofthefifthcenturyfoughtlongandhardwithAugustineoverpreciselythesetheologicalproblems.Pelagiuslost,andwashimselfdeclaredaheretic.ItwasperhapsthemostdamagingdecisionevermadebytheChristianchurch.24

As pursued later by the Western Christian church in medieval Europe, the full grim panoply ofManichaean/Augustinianformulaeemergedtoblightmillionsoflives,andtheyarestillexertingtheirsadeffecttoday—thedistasteforthehumanbody,thedisgustforandguiltaboutsexuality,themisogyny,thedeterminism(andthetendencytowardirresponsibilitythatemergesfromit),theobsessiveidealizationofthespirit,thedisdainforthematerial—alldistantindeedfromtheoriginalteachingsofJesus.Onecouldargue that the extreme Manichaean duality of evil materiality versus good spirituality emerged moststronglyinheresieslikethoseoftheCatharsandtheBogomilsthatthechurchpursuedmostenergetically(thesameBogomilsfromwhomtheEnglishlanguageacquiredtheterm“bugger”).ThegreatscholarandPersianist Bausani (fromwhom I have takenmuch ofmy account ofManichaean beliefs) doubted theconnectionwiththeseWesternheresies,25butmanyoftheirbeliefsandpracticesshowedacloseidentitywith those of Manichaeism, which is not easily discounted. The ferocity of the medieval church’spersecutionoftheCatharsandothersderivedreallyfromthedangeroussimilaritybetweentheheretics’

doctrinesandtheorthodoxones—theyhadmerelycarriedorthodoxdoctrinetoits logicalextreme.Thechurch was trying to destroy its own ugly shadow. The Eastern Orthodox Church, sensibly, neverembracedAugustiniantheologytothesameextent.

The real opponent to Augustinian orthodoxy was Pelagianism—a simple, natural golden thread,sometimes concealed, running throughmedieval thought, to emerge again in Renaissance humanism. IfeveraChristianthinkerdeservedtobemadeasaint,thensurelyPelagiusdid.IfeverapairofthinkersdeservedNietzsche’stitleWeltverleumder26(world-slanderers),thentheywereManiandAugustine.

ToreturntoPersiafromthisexcursion,weshouldrememberthatManichaeismwascondemnedbytheMazdaeanMagiasaheresyatanearlystage,andthatitismorecorrecttoseeitasadistortionofIranianthinking—or indeed as an outgrowth of Christian gnosticism dressed inMazdaean trappings—than asrepresentativeofanythingenduringinIranianthought.

RENEWEDWARShapur’sdefeatsof theRomanshadcontributed to thenear-collapseof theRomanEmpire in the thirdcentury.ForawhileafterthecaptureofValerianin260theRomanswereinnofitstatetostrikeback,anditseemedasifthewholeEastwasopentoPersianconquest.Butanewpoweraroseinthevacuum,basedon the Syrian city of Palmyra. It was led by Septimius Odenathus, a Romanized Arab, and his wifeZenobia(Zeinab).

OdenathussweptthroughtheRomanprovincesoftheEast,andsomeWesternsourceshavesuggestedthathecampaignedsuccessfullyinthewesternpartoftheSassanidEmpireaswell,thoughthishasbeendisputed.Odenathuswasassassinatedinabout267andwassucceededbyZenobia,whoconqueredEgyptin269butwasdefeatedbytheemperorAurelianin273.AurelianrestoredthefortunesofRomeintheregion.BythattimeShapurwasdead;heprobablydiedofillnessinBishapurinMay270,thoughsomehaveputhisdeath inAD272.27 Inanycase,his reignhadboosted theprestigeof theSassaniddynastyenormously,andhadestablishedthePersianEmpireastheequalofRomeintheEast.

After Shapur’s death several of his sons reigned for short periods in succession, and aMazdaeanpriest named Kerdir gradually strengthened his position at court. Kerdir used this position to beginassertingMazdaeanorthodoxymoreaggressively,achievingnotjustthedeathofManiandthepersecutionofhisfollowers,butalsothepersecutionofJews,Christians,Buddhists,andothers.Notforthelasttimethe over-involvement of religious leaders in Iranian politics led to the persecution ofminorities (andperhapstoo,atlength,tothediscreditingofthepersecutors).

In283theRomansinvadedPersianterritoryagain,andtheoutcomeofthewarwasanewsettlement,dividing Armenia between the two rival empires and losing some frontier provinces that Shapur hadconquered.ThePersiansmadefurtherconcessionsin298aftersomeless-than-successfulfightingunderNarseh,anotherofShapur’ssons(whohadascendedtothethroneinthewakeoftheKerdirepisode).Thepeacetreatysignedthenlastedformanyyears,andArmeniawasconfirmedasanArsacidkingdomunderRoman protection. A rock-relief at Naqsh-e Rostam shows Narseh being invested with royalty byAnahita,thetraditionalpatronessoftheSassanids.Ithasbeensuggestedthatthissignifiedapost-Kerdirreturntoatraditional,moretolerantreligiouspolicy.28

In 310 a young boy ascended the throne as Shapur II, after some dispute over the succession.Hereignedalongtime,until379.Onenotableaspectofthisreignisthatitappearstohaveconsolidatedtheprocessofrevision,collation,andcodificationthattheMazdaeanreligionhadbeenundergoingsincetheaccession of Ardashir, and perhaps before. According to a later Zoroastrian tradition, Ardashir had

instructedhishighpriest to reassembleandcomplete thedispersed fragmentsof textandoral traditionthathadbeenpreserved.ShapurIorderedthattheseshouldbeaugmentedbyalltheknowledgeofscience,philosophy,andotherfieldsthatcouldbegatheredfromsourcesoutsidePersia—notablyfromIndiaandGreece. Finally, Shapur II organized an extended discussion and debate between the various disputingsectsofMazdaisminordertoestablishasingle,authorizeddoctrine.ApriestcalledAdhurpatenduredanordeal by fire to prove the validity of his arguments.Because he emerged safely, hewaspermitted tomakefinalliturgicaladditionstotheAvesta.Thisseemstohavebeenthedecisivemomentatwhichtheprevious differences were resolved and Zoroastrian religion coalesced from its previous disparateelementsintoasingle,unitaryorthodoxy—fromwhich,inturn,modernZoroastrianismderives.Fromthispointon,andacknowledgingthearbitrarinessofchoosinganyparticulartimetomarkwhatwasagradualtransition,itmakessensetospeakofZoroastrianismratherthanMazdaism.29

ShortlybeforeShapurIIbecameshah,ArmeniaturnedChristian,atleastofficially.DuringShapur’sreign the Emperor Constantine designated Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire too,claimingtobetheprotectorofallChristianseverywhere.ThusChristianswithinPersiabecamesuspectaspotentialspiesandtraitors,andthistensesituationgraduallymadetheprevioustoleranceofmostofthe earlier Sassanid kings difficult to sustain. The new orthodoxy of Zoroastrianism,with its politicalconnectionsandinfluence,becameintolerantofrivalswithinPersia,andreligiousstriferesulted.Tensionalso increased becauseConstantinewas keeping at his court one of Shapur’s brothers,Hormuzd, as apotentialclaimanttothePersianthrone.AfterlearningthetradeofwarincampaignsagainsttheArabs(inwhichhewassuccessful,resettlingsomedefeatedtribestoKhuzestan),ShapurIIdemandedtherestitutionoftheprovinceswonbyShapurIinnorthernMesopotamiaandsubsequentlylostbyhissuccessors.WarwithRomebrokeoutagain,rollingbackandforthbetween337and359,andthePersianseventuallytookAmida(modernDiyarbakirinTurkey).

In363theEmperorJulian,oneofthemostinterestingofthelaterRomanemperors—ascholarandapaganwhodidhisbesttooverturnConstantine’sestablishmentofChristianityintheempire—launchedacampaigntorestoreRome’spositioninSyria,andtoputthePersiansintheirplace.AccompaniedbythepretenderHormuzd,Julian,whohadbeenasuccessfulmilitarycommanderintheWest,broughtanarmyofsomeeightythousandmendowntheEuphratesasfarasCtesiphon.Buthewasdissuadedfromasiegeand,perhapsbyaccident,burnedhisboats.Soontheproblemsofheat,thirst,supply,anddemoralizationbegan to bite in away that Crassuswould have found familiar, and theRomans retreated. EventuallyJulianwaskilled inbattleandhissuccessor, Jovian,madeapeace thatwas favorable to thePersians.ThistreatyrestoredthefrontiersastheyhadbeenattheendofthereignofShapurI,withafewadditions.Shapur IIwas alsogivena freehand inArmenia,whichheproceeded to annex, butdesultory fightingcontinueduntilhisdeathin379.TheachievementsofShapurII’sreignareallthemoreremarkableforthefactthat,atseveralpoints,hehadtoswitchfrontstotheEasttodealwithattacksfromtheChioniteHuns,whohadestablishedthemselvesinTransoxianaandBactria.30

STRIFE,REVOLUTION,ANDFREELOVEShapur II was a strong, successful king with enormous prestige. But his successors, who inclined totoleranceofreligiousminorities,apeace-orientedforeignpolicy,andinsomecasesmeasurestoupholdjusticeandprotectthepoor,hadtroublerestrainingapriesthoodandanobleclasswhowereinclined—ormaybeevenconditioned—tointoleranceandwar,andwhodislikedanyattempt tomitigate theirsocialsupremacy.ArdashirII,ShapurIII,andBahramIVwereallmurderedordiedinsuspiciouscircumstances

(Bahramwasshotfullofarrowsbymutinouscommanders).31Theirsuccessor,YazdegerdI, ruledfrom399andkeptapeacewiththeRomansthroughouthisreign—somuchsothattheRomanEmperoroftheEast,Arcadius,askedhimtobecometheguardianofhisson,Theodosius.Thisgestureneatlysymbolizedthe parity of the two empires, which now entered on a phase of partnership. Shahs and emperorscooperated (albeitwarilyandat adistance) against the internal andexternal instabilities thatmenacedthemboth.Theheroicperiodofambition-drivenwarfarewasover,andevenwhenwarbrokeoutagainbetween the twoempires in thesixthcentury, itwaswagednotbyglory-hungryemperors,butby theirgenerals.

YazdegerdIalsofollowedatolerantreligiouspolicy.HewasfriendlytotheJews(whohailedhimasthenewCyrus)andemployedJewishofficials.ItwasduringhisreignthatadistinctPersianChristianityemergedtobecomewhatisnormallycalledtheNestorianchurch,thefirstsynodofwhichwasheldinAD410.Thismeasurewouldhavehad theobviouseffectofdetachingPersianChristians from the taintofbeingafifthcolumnfortheRomans.Butnoteveryoneapproved.Thesereligiouspoliciesmadetheshahunpopularwiththeclergy,andYazdegerd,likehisimmediatepredecessors,wasmurdered.Thefactthathisnamewastakenupbyseverallatersuccessorssuggeststhathismemorywasnonethelessrespectedincourtcircles.

ThereignsfollowingthatofShapurIIaresignificantbecausetheyindicatetheemergenceofatheoryofkingshipthatwentbeyondasystemofallianceoridentificationwithaparticularreligionorclass,toassertthattheshahhadadutytoupholdjusticeforallhissubjects.Thatsuchatheoryexistedweknowfrompost-Islamicsources,whoadvisedrulersoflatertimesonthebasisofpatternsandideasthathadbeen thestandardunder theSassanids.Thekingruledon thebasisofdivinegrace(kvarrah inMiddlePersian/Pahlavi—aconceptthatgoesbacktotheAvestaandtheAchaemenidperiod,evidencedprimarilybysuccessinwar)andwasallowedtoraisetaxesandkeepsoldiers,butonlyonthebasisthatheruledjustly and not tyrannically. Injustice and tyranny would break the peace that permitted productiveagricultureandtrade.Thatinturnwouldreducethetaxyield,lessentheking’sabilitytorewardsoldiers,andthreatenthestabilityofhisrule.Justicewasthekeythatturnedaviciouscircleintoavirtuouscircle.Butinpractice,theattemptsofakinglikeYazdegerdtorulejustly,accordingtohisjudgment,mightnotaccordwith the ideasof theZoroastrianpriests.Theabstractprinciplecouldbeusedasaweaponbyeitherside.

Aftersomeconfusion,Yazdegerdwassucceededbyhisson,BahramV,alsoknownasBahramGur(wild ass) after his enthusiasm for hunting those animals. Bahram became a legendary figure, aroundwhommanypopularstoriesweretold.Theyelaboratedonhisloveofwomen,music,andpoetry,aswellasonhisgenerosityandbravery.HehadbeenbroughtupinHirabyanArabfosterfather,andthereisevidence that the over-mighty clergy may have disliked this. In war, Bahram Gur was successful atprotectingPersianfrontiers in theEast, re-establishingPersiancontrolofArmenia,andmakinga treatywith theRomans thatprovidedfor religious tolerance inbothempires.Buthis loveofhuntingwashisdownfall. He is believed to have disappeared into quicksand after a mishap while pursuing game inmarshlandinMediain438/439.

Yazdegerd II, who succeeded Bahram Gur, seems to have been a ruler more to the liking of theZoroastrian priesthood.He attempted to re-imposeZoroastrianism onArmenia, provoking a civilwarthere.He seems also to have permitted renewed persecution ofChristians and Jews in Persia proper.TourajDaryaee,anexpertonSassanidPersia,suggeststhatYazdegerdIIalsoinclinedtothemoreeastPersiankinglymythology,derivedfromtheAvestaanditsreferencestotheKayanidkings,ratherthantothewestPersiansub-Achaemenidversion.32

Throughout this period the threat from northern and eastern tribal nomads intensified (the Romans

cameunderthesamepressure,whichisonereasonthewarswithRomeabatedatthistime).YazdegerdIIwassuccessfulagainst themfor themostpart,but in454hewasforced toretreat.Hedied threeyearslater.Afteradynasticstruggle,hissonPeroz(Feruz)gainedthethronewiththehelpofthepeopleknownastheHephtaliteHuns.ButtheHephtalitescapturedhiminbattlein469,andPerozwasforcedtopayahugeransom,andtoyieldterritory,inreturnforhisrelease.Thiswasalsoatimeofhardship,drought,and famine. Peroz renewed the struggle with the Hephtalites in 484 but was killed in battle, and thePersianswere utterly defeated.His successor could only fend off his eastern enemies by paying themtribute,andhewaseventuallydeposed.

Kavad I came to the throne in 488 at a time of crisis. TheHephtalites had sliced off a swath ofPersia’seasternprovinces.Repeatedfamines,theexactionsofthearrogantnobility,andtaxesrequiredtomake tribute payments had reduced the peasantry to a miserable state. Provinces in the west andsouthwestwereinrevolt.

Then, on top of all this, a version of the Manichaean heresy reappeared in a new, revolutionarymovement. Itsmemberspreached that sincewealth anddesire forwomencausedall the trouble in theworld,wealthshouldbedistributedequally—andwomenshouldbeheldincommon.(Thelatterisoftenthoughttohavebeenexaggeratedbythesect’senemies,butthereisevidencethat“shrinesandinns”wereestablishedwherepeoplecouldmeetandmakelovefreely.)33ThemovementhasbeennamedMazdakismafteritsleader,Mazdak,thoughsomehavedoubtedhowcentraltothephenomenonMazdakactuallywas.Kavadhimselfwas apparently converted to the newbeliefs, having seen anopportunity to humble thenobles and the clergy.Granarieswere thrownopen to the people, and landwas redistributed.But thenobilityandclergymanagedtoovercomeKavad,imprisonhim,andreplacehimwithhismoremalleablebrother.Thecountry (especiallyMesopotamia,but alsootherparts)was in turmoil.Eventually,Kavadwasabletoescapefromprisonand,withthehelpoftheHephtalites,reimposehisauthority.

TheArabhistorianAl-TabariwrotethatKavadescapedthroughtheinterventionofhisdaughter,whowent to the prison commander and said she would allow him to sleep with her if she could see herfather.34 She stayed with Kavad for one day, then left in the company of a sturdy servant, who wascarryingarolled-upcarpet.Thecommanderaskedaboutthecarpet,butthegirltoldhimitwastheoneshehadslepton,andsinceshewashavingherperiod,shewasgoingtowashitandbringitback.Thecommanderletthegirlgoonherway,neglectingtoinvestigatethecarpetfurther“lesthebecomepollutedbyit.”Butoncethegirlandtheservantwereoutoftheprison,KavadrolledoutofthecarpetandtheyallescapedtotheHephtalites.Thesuperstitioustabooabout theimpurityofmenstrualbloodwastoprovedamagingtothenoblesandtheclergy.Thereisakindofcosmicjusticetoit.

IntheremainderofKavad’sreign,andinthatofhissonandsuccessorKhosraw(531–579),thetwokingspushed throughanumberof important reforms thatestablished theSassanidEmpire in somethinglike its final shape.Bothkingsexploited thechaoscausedby theMazdakite revolution todiminish thepower of the nobility and the clergy (this came across most clearly in Kavad’s later years, whenKhosraw’ssuccessionwasinquestion—theclergyandnobilitywereforcedtosupportKhosrawforfearthat another of Kavad’s sons, a pro-Mazdakite, would become shah). Perhaps most importantly, thetaxationsystemwasreformed,apolltaxwasestablished,andasurveyoftaxablelandwascarriedouttoensurethetaxationwasequitable.35Theempirewasdividedintofoursectors,eachunderthecommandofamilitarycommander(spahbod)andsupportedbyachancery(diwan) thatkepthis troopssupplied. Inaddition,anewclericalofficewasestablished—aProtectorofthePoor,whoreinforcedthemoraldutyof thepriesthood to lookafter the interestsof the lowest strataof society (aduty theyhadpresumablyneglectedbefore).Thereformscreated,orcertainlygreatlystrengthened,anewclassofdehqans—ruralgentry who collected tax in the villages and were themselves small landowners. The dehqans also

providedthebattle-winningPersiancavalrythatdominatedtheshah’sarmies.Fromnowon,though,theywerepaidandretainedbytheshahinsteadofthegreatnoblefamilies.Identifyingcloselywiththeshah’sinterest, and providing administrators and courtiers as well as soldiers, the dehqan class became theprime means by which the traditions and culture of Sassanid Persia were preserved and transmittedonwardaftertheIslamicconquest.

With these reforms well under way by the 520s, Kavad decided that Mazdak had outlived hisusefulness.36 It seemsadebatewasorganized inorder todiscredit his doctrines, atwhichnot just theZoroastrianclergybutalsotheChristiansandJewsspokeoutagainstMazdak.Accordingtothestorytoldmuch later by Ferdowsi,Kavad then turnedMazdak and his followers over toKhosraw,who had thecharismaticcommunist’speopleburiedalive—plantedheaddown inawalledorchard,withonly theirfeetshowingabovetheground.KhosrawtheninvitedMazdaktoviewhisgarden,tellinghim,

Youwillfindtreestherethatno-onehaseverseenandno-oneeverheardofevenfromthemouthoftheancientsages...

Mazdakwenttothegardenandopenedthegate,butwhenhesawthekindoftreesthatwereplantedinKhosraw’sgardenhegavealoudcry,andfainted.Khosrawhadhimstrungupbythefeetfromagallows,thenkilledhimwithvolleysofarrows.Ferdowsiconcluded,

Ifyouarewise,donotfollowthepathofMazdak.Andsothenoblesbecamesecureintheirpossessions,andwomen,andchildren,andtheirrichtreasures.37

Thisstorymayrecordsomeaspectofacontemporarymemory,andweknowthatFerdowsiworkedfrommuchearlieraccountsofevents.WecannotbesurehowMazdakdied,butthereligiousrevolutionassociatedwithhimwasan important episode. It didnotusher in aneworderof sharedproperty (letalone free love). It didweaken the power of the great nobles and bring at least somebenefits for thelowerclasses,thoughthemainbeneficiarieswerethedehqans.Butifwelookatitanotherway,ittellsussomeimportantthingsabouttheinterplayofsocialandpoliticalinterests,andtheinsurrectionitselfmayappearinadifferentlight.Mazdakandhisadherentsseem,atleastinitially,tohavedependedheavilyonthe authority of the king to get their revolution going. Even if hemisjudged the forces that would bereleased,Kavadhandledeventscleverly.Hewastooimportanttotheclergyandthenobles,bythetimeofhisimprisonment,forthemtosimplykillhim.Hewasthelast thingstandingbetweenthemandutterdestruction. The revolution was an overdue reminder to them of the basis of their privileges and theimportanceofthemonarchyinholdingsocietytogether.Justice,evenifnotperfect(letaloneegalitarian),had to be more than lip-service; and at least the principle of justice gave everyone a legitimateexpectationfromthesystem,ifnotnecessarilyarighttobeheard.Theeffectoftherevolution,likemostrevolutions,wasabroadeningof thesocialbasesofpoliticalpower, releasingnewreservesofhumanenergy.Theprestigeandpowerofthemonarchywerereaffirmedandenhanced,anditnowenteredwhatcametoberegardedasitsgoldenage.

KHOSRAWANUSHIRVANAfterhisaccessionin531,Khosrawcontinuedwithhisfather’sreforms,completingthedestructionoftheMazdakites.38 His court became a center for learning, attracting in particular some of the GreekNeoplatonistswhoseschoolofphilosophyhadbeencloseddowninAthensbytheemperorJustinian.But

asGibbonwrote,thesewerePlatonists“whomPlatohimselfwouldhaveblushedtoacknowledge”:

The disappointment of the philosophers provoked them to overlook the real virtues of the Persians; and they werescandalized,moredeeplyperhaps thanbecame theirprofession,with thepluralityofwivesandconcubines, the incestuousmarriages,andthecustomofexposingdeadbodiestothedogsandvultures,insteadofhidingthemintheearth,orconsumingthemwithfire.Theirrepentancewasexpressedbyaprecipitatereturn,andtheyloudlydeclaredthattheyhadratherdieonthe border of the empire, than enjoy thewealth and favour of theBarbarian. From this journey, however, they derived abenefitwhichreflectsthepurestlustreonthecharacterofChosroes[Khosraw].Herequired,thatthesevensageswhohadvisitedthecourtofPersia,shouldbeexemptedfromthepenallawswhichJustinianenactedagainsthispagansubjects;andthisprivilege,expresslystipulatedinatreatyofpeace,wasguardedbythevigilanceofapowerfulmediator.39

KhosrawencouragedthetranslationoftextsfromtheGreek,Indian,andSyriaclanguages,anditwasapparently in his reign that the game of chess was introduced from India (and probably somewhatamended).HeinstigatedthecompilationofahistoryofPersia,andanastronomicalalmanac.HeupheldthepositionofZoroastrianisminthecountry,butpersonallytookamorerationalistapproach,basedonhis readingofphilosophyandofwritings fromother religions.Throughhis reputation forwisdomandjustice,KhosrawlateracquiredthetitleAnushirvan(KhosrawoftheImmortalSoul).Inthewesthewasknown—partly throughhiscontactwith theNeoplatonists—asthephilosopher-king.TheArabs,as theyrecorded later, knew him as “The Just.” He established a magnificent court, and built the palace atCtesiphon (the great iwan arch of which can still be seen today) along with spreading gardens andprecincts that have since disappeared. The reign ofKhosraw, for its intellectual achievements, for itsexemplificationoftheSassanidideaofkingship,wasthepinnacleofSassanidrule.Inlatercenturiesitbecamealmost thePlatonicformofwhatmonarchyshouldbe,evenafter theSassanids themselveshadlongsincedisappeared.

Khosrawwasalsosuccessful inwar,defeatingnot just theHephtalitesbutalso theTurks,whohadbeeninstrumentalinweakeningtheHephtalitesatanearlierstageandwerenowpressingontheempire’snorthern and northeastern borders. Following up the successes of his father and his father’s spahbod(commander)Azarethes in defeating thegreat generalBelisarius atNisibis andCallinicum in530 and531,KhosrawalsofoughtaseriesofwarswiththeEastRomans(hereafterusuallycalledtheByzantines)inwhichhewasgenerallysuccessful.TheByzantinesrenewedtreatiesaccordingtowhichthePersians,in return for largecash sums,wouldpreventenemies from invadingAsiaMinor through theCaucasus.Finally,KhosrawretookthestrategictownofDarain572andwasableagaintosendhistroopsraidingintoSyriaasfarasAntioch.TheByzantinesmadefurthertruces,buyingthePersiansoffwithlargesumsofgold.40

OnKhosraw’sdeath in579,hissonHormuzdIV took the throne.Hormuzdseems tohavedonehisbest tomaintain thebalance establishedbyhis father—supporting thedehqans against thenobility anddefending the rights of the lower classes, as well as resisting attempts by the clergy to reassertthemselves.Butheresortedtoexecutionstodoso,andwasrememberedaccordinglybytheZoroastriansas a cruel and unjust king. In this situation, one of the generals, Bahram Chubin, who had achievedsuccesses inwar in the east,marchedonCtesiphon after being criticizedbyHormuzd for a less-than-brilliantperformanceinwarinthewest.BahramChubinwasadescendantof theoldParthianArsacidline,throughthegreatfamilyoftheMehran.Withthehelpofothernobles,hedeposed,blinded,andlaterkilledHormuzd,puttingHormuzd’sson,KhosrawII,inpower(inabout589/590).

But then Bahram declared himself king, restoring the Arsacid dynasty. This was toomuch for themajority of the political class, who held strongly to the dynastic principle and supported the right ofKhosraw II to rule.After a reverse that forced him to flee to thewest, Khosraw II returnedwith the

supportof theByzantine emperor,Maurice, andejectedBahram,who fled to the territoryof theTurks(Turan)andwasmurderedthere.

KHOSRAWPARVEZSurvivingvariousfurtherdisputesandrebellionsamongthenobilitywithArmenianandByzantinehelp,KhosrawIIwasabletoestablishhissupremacyagainby600,andtookthetitleKhosrawParvez—TheVictorious.Thetitlewastoproveapposite,butKhosrawIIdidnothavethevisionorthemoralgreatnessofhisnamesake,hisgrandfather.Hemayevenhavebeenimplicatedinthemurderofhisfather,andhislife was studded with incidents of cruelty and vindictiveness, intensifying as he grew older. He dideverythingtoexcess.Heburdenedhissubjectswithincreasinglyheavytaxation,accumulatingenormouswealth in the process. Although hewas remembered afterward for the great story of his love for theChristian girl Shirin, he had an enormous harem of wives, concubines, dancers, musicians, and otherentertainers.Whenhewenthuntinghedidsoinahugeparkstuffedwithgameofallkinds.Atcourthesatonasplendidthrone,underadomeacrosswhichcelestialspheresmovedbyahiddenmechanism,ratherasinaplanetarium.

Buthisgreatestexcesswasinwar.In602KhosrawII’sbenefactor,theByzantineemperorMaurice,wasmurderedandsupplantedbyausurper,Phocas—oneaccountsaysthatMauricewasforcedtowatchtheexecutionofhis five sonsbeforehehimselfwaskilled.TheByzantine territories subsequently fellinto disorder and civil war, made worse by divisions between Christian sects. Phocas sent an armyagainst dissenting Christians in Antioch, perpetrating a massacre there. At Edessa, a local ByzantinegeneralwasresistingPhocas’sforces.KhosrawusedthepretextofMaurice’smurdertomakewaragainstPhocas in revenge, and relievedEdessa.Hewas able from there to extend his control over the otherByzantinefrontierpostsandthen,aftersomepreparation,tounleashhisarmiesontheeasternByzantineEmpire.TheByzantineshadbeenconcentrating theireffortson theirDanubefrontieragainst theAvars,andwererelativelyweakintheeast.

Bythistime(610)PhocashadbeendeposedbyHeraclius,whowastoproveoneofthemostcapableof allByzantine emperors.OfArmeniandescent,Heraclius tried tomakepeacewith thePersians, butKhosrawignoredhim.TheablePersiangeneralsShahrvarazandShahinledtheSassanidarmiesthroughMesopotamia,Armenia,andSyriaintoPalestineandAsiaMinor.TheytookAntiochin611,Damascusin613,andthenJerusalemin614(sendingashockthroughthewholeoftheChristianworld).AtJerusalemtheChristiandefendersrefusedtogiveupthecity,anditwastakenbyassaultafterthreeweeks,andgivenovertosack.AccordingtoByzantineChristiansources, theJewsofthecityandthesurroundingregion(whohadbeenpersecutedandexcludedfromthecityforcenturies)joinedinamassacreinwhichsixtythousandChristians died.41 The Persians carried off the relic of the True Cross to Ctesiphon.Withinanother four years they had conquered Egypt and were in control of most of Asia Minor, as far asChalcedon,oppositeConstantinopleontheshoresoftheBosphorus.NoshahofPersiasinceCyrushadachievedsuchmilitarysuccesses.

But thenFortune switchedher allegiance.Heracliusmade careful preparations and crystallized thereligiousdimensionoftheconflictintoaholywar,devotinghimselfandhisarmytoGod.LaterChristianchroniclers includedhis expeditionwith thedescriptionsof theCrusades. In aboldmove, in622 (thesameyearastheProphetMohammad’sflightfromMeccatoMedina)hetookasmallbandofelitetroopsbywatertothesoutheasterncorneroftheBlackSea,bypassingalltheSassanidforcesinAsiaMinor,andfrom thereburst intoArmenia, deliberatelydevastating the countryside everywherehewent.Heraclius

managedtokeepShahrvarazinactivebysendinghimlettersthatsuggestedKhosrawintendedtokillhim.With the support of the Turkish Khazars from north of the Caucasus, the Byzantines marched on intoAzerbaijan anddestroyedoneof themost sacredPersian fire temples, atwhat is todaycalledTakht-eSoleiman(TheThroneofSolomon).

ThePersianswithdrewfromAsiaMinor,andin627sufferedacrushingdefeatatNineveh.Earlythefollowing year, with Heraclius threatening Ctesiphon, Khosraw II was deposed and his sonKavad IIbecameshah.Kavadsuedforpeace,offeringtherestitutionofallthepreviousPersianconquests,andthiswas agreed to in 629. Khosraw, put on trial, was convicted of a lengthy series of crimes includingpatricide(hiscomplicityinthemurderofHormuzdIV),crueltytowardhissubjects(especiallysoldiersandwomen),ingratitudetowardtheByzantines,ruinousavarice,andmistreatmentofhisownchildren.42ButKavadshowedhimselfscarcelymoreofa justruler,murderingallhisbrothers toeliminaterivals.Thesekillings (which repeated someof theworst crueltiesof theArsacidperiod)meanta shortageofcandidateswithobviouslegitimacyintheyearsthatfollowed.

Thedestructionofthewarshadruinedsomeoftherichestprovincesofbothempires,andthetaxationtopayfor themhadimpoverishedtherest.Turkswereontheloosethroughout theeasternprovincesofPersia, the Khazars were dominant in the northwest, and the Arabs, with a new determination andcohesionderivedfromthemessageofMohammad,wereraidingandbeginningtoestablishthemselvesinMesopotamia.Civilwarsbrokeoutbetweenrivalgreatnobles,andfloodsbroketheirrigationworksinMesopotamia, turning productive land into swamps. Plague appeared, killing many in the westernprovincesandcarryingoffKavadhimself.Theinternalchaosandinfightingbroughtasuccessionofshort-livedmonarchstothethrone(tenintwoyears),includingtheformergeneralShahrvarazandtwoqueens,PurandokhtandAzarmedokht(adaughterofKhosrowII,Purandokhtattemptedsomesensiblemeasurestorestoreorderintheempire,butwasremovedbyanothergeneralbeforeshecouldmakemuchheadway).Finally,in632,YazdegerdIII,agrandsonofKhosrawII,wascrowned.Hewaseightyearsold.

3

ISLAMANDINVASIONSTheArabs,Turks,andMongols—TheIranianReconquestofIslam,the

Sufis,andthePoets

Dushamgozaroftadbeviraneh-eTusDidamjoghdineshastejayetavusGoftamchekhabardariazinviranehGoftakhabarinastkeafsusafsus

LastnightIpassedbytheruinsofTusAndsawthatanowlhadtakentheplaceofthepeacock.Iasked,“Whatnewsfromtheseruins?”Itanswered,“Thenewsis—Alas,Alas.”

—AttributedtoShahidBalkhi(d.937).Theowlisasymbolofdeath.

OneoftherecurringquestionsinthehistoryofIranistheproblemofcontinuityfrompre-IslamicIrantothe Islamicperiodand tomodern times.Thegreat institutionsofPersiaas theperiodofSassanid rulereacheditsclimaxwerethemonarchyandtheZoroastrianreligion.BothoftheseweresweptawaybytheIslamicconquest,andwithinthreecenturiestherewaslittleapparentremnantofthem.

But there are some indisputable facts that point the otherway. The first andmost important is thelanguage.ThePersianlanguagesurvived,whilemanyotherlanguagesinthelandstheArabsconqueredwent under, to be replaced by Arabic. Persian changed from the Middle Persian, or Pahlavi, of theParthianandSassanidperiods,acquiredalargenumberofloanwordsfromArabic,andre-emergedaftertwo obscure centuries as the elegantly simple tongue spoken by Iranians today.1 Somewould say thatPersianbecameanewlanguage,muchasEnglishwastransformedintheMiddleAgesaftertheNormanconquest.Peoplecontinued tospeakPersian,andPersiancame tobewritten inArabicscript.ModernPersianisremarkablyunchangedsincetheeleventhcentury.ThepoetryinparticularthathascomedownfromthattimeisreadilyunderstandablebymodernIranians,isstudiedinschool,andisoftenquotedfrommemory.

Thereisanothermonumenttocontinuity,itselfanexusoflanguage,history,folk-memory,andpoetry—theShahnameh(BookofKings)ofFerdowsi.Thisisthegreatestsinglebodyofpoetryfromtheperiodoftransition,containingpassagesandstoriesfamiliartomostIranianseventoday.Ferdowsireworkeda

traditionalcanonofstoriesofthekingsandheroesofIranthatisknowninfragmentsfromothersources.Hewrote deliberately to preserve, as if in a time capsule, asmuch as he could of the culture of pre-IslamicIran.ThelanguageofthestoriesitselfavoidsallbutaveryfewoftheArabicloanwordsthatbyFerdowsi’stimehadbecomealmostindispensableineverydayusage,especiallyinwrittenusage.SuchisthequalityofthepoetrythatitinfluencedalmostallsubsequentIranianpoets.Andthecharactersofthestories—KayKavus,Rostam,Sohrab,Siavosh,Khosraw,Shirin—areasfamiliartoIranianstodayasinFerdowsi’stime.

ButindiscussingFerdowsiweanticipateevents,andtounderstandhimitisnecessarytoappreciatethesignificanceofIslamandthehistoryofthefirstthreecenturiesofMuslimrule.

MOHAMMADTheArabs ofMohammad’s timewere not just simple bedouin.Mohammad himself was the son of amerchant(borninMeccasometimearoundtheyear570),andlaterheservedarichwidowasaguardandleaderofhertradingcaravans.Eventually,hemarriedherandranthebusinesshimself.Thiswasaperiodofchange,bothsocialandeconomic.TownslikeMedinaandMeccahadbecomeanimportantpartoflifeintheArabianpeninsula,andtherewastensionbetweenausterenomadvaluesandthemoresophisticatedurban way of life. This was especially true between the traditional polytheism of tribes and themonotheismofurbanJews(thereweresignificantJewishcommunitiesintheArabianpeninsula—notablyatMedinabutalsoelsewhere).AsinPersia,religiousideastraveledthroughthepeninsulaandbeyondwith the merchants’ trade goods. Christian hermits rubbed shoulders with Jews as well as withpolytheistic Arabs in the Arabian towns. Arabs had served both the Sassanids and the Romans asmercenaries,andtheGhassanidandLakhmidArabkingdomshadservedasbufferstatesbetweenthetwoempiresinthesouthjustasArmeniahadinthenorth.ArabshadsettledinthewesternpartofwhatisnowIraq,andasfarnorthasSyria.

MuslimsbelievethatMohammadreceivedhisfirstrevelationsfromtheAngelGabriel,whichappearin theopeningfive linesofSura96of theQor’an, in thehillsaroundMeccaaroundtheyear610.TheearlyrevelationsgavethepronouncementsofajustGod,whoattheDayofJudgmentwoulddecideonthebasisofmen’sactionsinlifewhethertheyshouldgotoparadiseortohell.Theycondemnedfalsepride,neglectofthepoor,andcrueltytotheweak.Theyemphasizedthedutyofprayer.Around613Mohammadbegan preaching the revelation he had received in Mecca, and his reception there reflected socialdivisionsandtensions.Hisearlyconvertsweremainlyamongthepoor—amongmembersofweakclansandtheyoungersonsofricherfamilies.ButhispreachingthreatenedtheproprietorsoftheexistingorderinMeccabycreatinganalternativepoleofsocialauthority,andbycondemningthepolytheismthatamongotherthingsgavetherulingfamiliesanincomefromreligiousvisitors.

Eventually the hostility toMohammad from the ruling families of Mecca made his position thereuntenable.HefledMecca,andin622wasacceptedintoMedinabyagroupofprominentcitizens.LifeinMedina had been marred by feuding between rival clans, and it seems that Mohammad’s welcomereflectedtheirneedforanarbitratortopreventfurtherstrife.Asitturnedout,thearrivalofMohammadinMedinasignifiedtheacceptanceofanewprincipleofspiritualleadership—onesupersedingthepreviousstructurebasedonpatriarchalkinshiprelations.ThemovetoMedinaisrememberedbyMuslimsastheHijra,whichmeans“migration,”andhascentralimportanceintheearlyhistoryofIslam.ThemigrationfromMeccaand the establishmentof theMuslimcommunity inMedinaprovides thedate atwhich theMuslimcalendarbegins.

InitiallythegrouparoundMohammadwasopentoJewsandChristians,butitgraduallybecameclearthat the revelation was dictating a new religion in its own right, distinct from either Judaism orChristianity (though building on and surpassing the teaching of the prophets of both). Put simply,MohammadrejectedtheTrinityandthedivinityofJesus,andtheJewsrejectedMohammad’spresentationofhimselfasaprophetafterthepatternoftheJewishprophetsoftheOldTestament.

This was important in Medina because there were three important Jewish tribes there. Early on,MohammadhadgivenJerusalemasthedirectionofprayerandhadmadeotherprovisionsthatapparentlyconciliatedJudaism.Theearliest,mostessentialelementsofIslamarestrikinglycongruentwithJudaismincontentandsignificance.But theJewsrejectedMohammad’s revelation,and relationsbetween themandtheMuslimsdeteriorated.TheJewishtribeswereaccusedoftreacherouscontactswiththeMeccans,andinsuccessiontheywereejectedfromMedina.Theirpropertywasconfiscatedandthemalesof thelast tribeweremassacred after they attempted to betray theMedinans at theBattle of the Trench (AD627).2 As the remaining inhabitants were converted, Medina became the model of a unified Muslimcommunity—theumma.

Islamnowtooksomethinglikeitsfinalform,asexpressedthroughtheQor’an.Thefaithwasbasedonfivepillars:theshahada—theobligationtoacknowledgetheexistenceofoneGod,withMohammadashis Prophet; prayer (salat); almsgiving (zakat); pilgrimage (hajj); and the Ramadan fast. These fivepillars were supplemented by social rulings, regularizing and imposing a rational morality on thepreviouschaosofclancustoms.Theyestablishedanoverarchingethicofcommonalityandbrotherhoodwhile reinforcing some traditions of patriarchy and clan loyalty.The institution of the blood feudwasdiscouragedand regulated, aswasdivorce. Incestwasoutlawed, andhonesty and fairness inbusinessdealingswereencouraged.

TheimportanceofwomeninthestoryofMohammad’slife—firstKhadija,thenhislaterwives,Aishaandothers,andhisdaughterFatima3—isexpressedin theprovisionshemadefor them,whichineverycase limited the power of men over women while leavingmale supremacy intact. The Qor’an urgedrespectforwomenwithinmarriageandrespectfortheirmodestyandprivacy,thoughitmadenospecificrulesforwomen’sdressorveiling,andsomehavesuggestedthattheveiloriginatedasanelitepractice,copied from the Christian Byzantine court—comparable perhaps with the custom among aristocraticEnglishwomeninVictoriantimes.TheQor’angavewomentherighttoownpropertyintheirownname.Italsodiscouragedthepre-Islamicpracticeofkillingunwantedgirlinfants(inSura81,speakingoftheDayofJudgment:“...whentheinfantgirl,buriedalive,isaskedforwhatcrimeshewasslain;whentherecords of men’s deeds are laid open, and heaven is stripped bare; when Hell burns fiercely andParadise is brought near: then each soul shall knowwhat it has done”).Manyhave judged that theQoranic ideal andMohammad’s exampleweremore favorable towomen than laterArab andMuslimpractice.4

The decade after theHijrawasmarked by continuing hostility and eventuallywarwith the rulingfamilies of Mecca, and by missionary effort toward the tribes of Arabia as a whole. GraduallyMohammad and his followers made headway, and finally in 630 the Meccans accepted Islam andMohammad’ssupremacy.TheKa’baofMeccawasmadethecentral,holyshrineofIslam.Islam’svictoryovertheMeccans’resistancewonovermostof theremainingArabtribes.BythetimeoftheProphet’sdeathin632,mostofArabiawasunifiedunderthenewreligion.Vigorous,idealistic,anddeterminedtospreaditsdominancemorewidely,Islamhadcreatedapowerfulreligious,political,andmilitaryforcethatwastochangethefaceoftheregion—andtheworld.

THEARABCONQUESTWhenMohammaddied,theMuslimummathreatenedtofallapart.Differentfactionshaddifferentideasaboutthesuccession,andsometribessoughttoregaintheirindependence.Mohammad’sfriendAbuBakrwas elected as the Prophet’s successor, becoming the first caliph (Khalifa means successor) andpromisingtofollowMohammad’sexample(sunna).Itwasnaturalthatthisshouldincludefurthereffortsto spread the message of Islam as Mohammad had done—both by negotiation and by armed force,includingraidingintohostileterritory.InitiallythismeantconsolidationinthesouthernandeasternpartsoftheArabianpeninsula,andthenexpansionnorthwardintowhatisnowIraqandSyria.Thedynamicofexpansionhelpedtostabilizetheruleofthefirstfourcaliphs(knownbySunniMuslimsastheRashidun,therighteouscaliphs),buttheirrulewasnonethelessturbulentandthreeofthemdiedviolently.

The crucial point atwhich raiding turned intomore deliberatewars of conquestwas theBattle ofAjnadayn,nearGaza,in634,wheretheMuslimArabsdefeatedaByzantinearmysenttorestoreorderinPalestine.Theburstofconfidence inspiredby this successprompted furthervictories—Damascuswastakenin636andaByzantinereliefforcewasdecisivelybeatenattheBattleofYarmukinthesameyear,confirmingtheMuslimsinpossessionofSyria.TheirenemiesdiscoveredthatIslamhadgiventheArabsanalmost invincible cohesion andconfidence inbattle.This attributewas laterdescribedby thegreatArabhistorianIbnKhaldunasasabiyah,roughlytranslatingas“groupfeeling.”InthefollowingyeartheMuslimarmiesmovedeastagainsttheSassanidEmpire.

Persia, like the Byzantine Empire, wasweakened by thewars that had raged through the reign ofKhosrawII.TheSassanidshadrepulsedinitialmovesbyArabraidingpartiesintoMesopotamia,buttheroyalarmyunderKingYazdegerdIIIwasdefeatedatQadesiyya(nearHillainmodernIraq)in637,afterwhichtheArabstookCtesiphonandthewholeofMesopotamia.ArabgeneralspersuadedthecaliphtocontinuetheoffensiveagainstthePersiansratherthanallowYazdegerdtocounterattack,andtheydefeatedhim a second time at Nahavand, near Hamadan, in 641. After this, Sassanid resistance effectivelycollapsedandYazdegerdfledeast,begginglocalrulerstohelphimagainsttheArabs(hewaskilledatMervin651—notbytheinvadersbutbyoneofhisownsubjects,likeDariusIII).TheArabsincreasinglyestablishedtheirdominionovertheIranianplateau,thoughtownslikeQomandKashanfoughthardbeforesurrendering,andresistanceintheCaspianprovincesofTabarestancontinuedformanyyears.5Khorasanwasconqueredby654,anddespite resistance in theoutlying territoriesalong thesoutherncoastof theCaspianandinthenortheast,thesewerealltakenandBalkhcapturedby707.

Theconquestwasnot,forthemostpart,followedbymassmurder,forcedconversion,orwhattodaywewouldcallethniccleansing.InsteadthenewArabmasterswerecontent,asamatterofpolicy,simplytoreplacetherulingelitesoftheterritoriestheyhadconquered.TheArabtroopssetuparmedcampsinthe new lands, on the fringe of existing cities or in the form of new settlements, often on themarginbetween cultivated land and uncultivated territory that could be used to graze animals. The Arabsgenerally allowed existing proprietors, peasants, andmerchants to go about their business as normal,expropriatingonlystateland,theestatesoftheZoroastriantemples,andthoseofmembersoftheoldeliteswhohadfledorhaddiedinthefighting.

Religious policy was marked by the same tolerance and restraint once the conquest was over.MohammadhadspecifiedtoleranceforChristiansandJews(“peopleoftheBook”)onconditionthattheypaidtribute,whichbecameaspecialtaxfornon-Muslims(thejizya).ButthisleftIranianZoroastriansina gray area, and many fire temples were destroyed and priests killed before it became normal forZoroastrianstobetreatedwithsimilartolerance,subjecttothejizya.6Theexampleofthenewrulers,andthesettlementofArabsoldiersintothenewterritories,beganaslowprocessofIslamization,madeeasierbythesimilarityofmanyofthepreceptsofIslamtothefamiliarfeaturesofMazdaism—righteousthoughtand action, judgment, heaven and hell, and so on. There was a religious ferment through this period,withinwhichmanyconceptsandformulaemightbeheldincommonacrossdifferentsects.Considerthefollowing:

...atwhatevermomenthedieseightymaidenangelswillcometomeethimwithflowers...andagoldenbedstead,andtheywillspeaktohimthus:donotfearetc....Andhisfruitfulwork,intheformofawondrousdivineprincess,avirgin,willcomebeforehim,immortal...andsheherselfwillguidehimtoheaven.7

Thisremarkablepassagelinkstheideaofthehourisofparadise,familiarfromtheQoraniccontext,withtheMazdaeanideaofthedaenaleadingthesoultoheaven.ButthistextisaManichaeanone,intheIranianSogdianlanguage,fromCentralAsia.Bausanihasgivenaseriesofsignificantparallelsbetweenpassages in the Zoroastrian scriptures and passages in the Qor’an.8 Despite the firm, clear, guidingprincipleof theMohammadan revelation,otherearlier ideascontinued tobubble, sometimes toappearagainlaterinsomeofthemorediverseandeclecticIslamicsects.

ThepropertiedandeliteclassesofIranhadaninterestinconvertingtoIslam,inordertoavoidthejizya.TheyandmoremodestfolkconvertedandoftenattachedthemselvestoArabclansorfamiliesasmawali(clients),sometimestakingArabicnames.ButmostinhabitantsofIranremainednon-Muslimforseveral centuries. The restraint of the conquerors is probably another important explanation for thesuccessoftheconquest—manyofthesubjectsofthenewempiremayhavebeenlessheavilytaxedthanpreviously, and ordinary Iranians probably benefited from the replacement of a strongly hierarchicalaristocraticandpriestlysystembythemoreegalitarianIslamicarrangements,withtheiremphasisontheduty of ordinaryMuslims to the poor. But as in other epochs, the victors wrote the history; if morecontemporarymaterial from the peoples of the conquered lands had survived, the picture of tolerancemightbemore shaded.ThereweremassacresatRayand Istakhr,bothMazdaean religiouscenters thatresistedmorestubbornlythanelsewhere.9

UMAYYADSANDABBASIDSWithintwentyyearsofMohammad’sdeath,hisArabsuccessorshadconqueredmostoftheterritorywenowcalltheMiddleEast.Afteronehundredyears,theycontrolledanareathatextendedfromtheAtlanticto the IndianOcean. From this point on, Iranzamin (the land of Iran)was ruled for themost part byforeignmonarchsfornearlyamillennium.ButconquestandtheproblemsofwealthandpoweritbroughtalsocreatednewtensionsamongthevictoriousArabs.

The fourthcaliph,Ali,wasMohammad’scousin,andhadmarriedhisdaughterFatima.ButdespitetheseclosetiestotheProphetandhisownpiousreputation,Ali’scaliphatewasmarredbycivilwarwiththe followersof theprevious caliph,Uthman.WhenAliwas assassinated, a close relativeofUthman,Mu‘awiya, declared himself caliph. Thiswas in 661, a date thatmarks the beginning of theUmayyaddynasty,namedafter the family fromwhich thedynastywasdescended—oneof the leadingfamiliesofMeccathatMohammadhadfoughtbeforeMecca’ssubmissiontoIslam.

Soonthenewempireadoptedformsofgovernmentresemblingthoseofitspredecessors,theRomansand the Sassanid Persians. The capitalmoved toDamascus (at that time, of course, a city formed bycenturiesofChristian,Roman,andByzantinerule)andhenceforththecaliphatepassedmainlyfromfatherto son.TheUmayyadsdiscriminated strongly in favorofArabs in the runningof the empire, butwerecriticizedamongtheArabsforbecomingtooworldlyandmakingtoomanycompromises.Theydistancedthemselves from their origins, became lax personally in their religious observances, and depended onpaidsoldiersratherthankinsmenandclanfollowers.Astheempireandtheirresponsibilitiesexpanded,these changes were probably inevitable, as was the response—part of the eternal tension in Islambetweenpietyandpoliticalauthority.

Throughout this period there was dissent over the right of the Umayyads to rule. One group, theKharijites,said that thecaliphshouldbechosenbypopularassent fromamongrighteousMuslims,anddeposedifheactedwrongly.Anothergroupwastoprovemoreimportantinthelongrun,andtheirdissentfrom orthodox Sunni Islam (named after the sunna—the example of the Prophet) eventually created apermanentschism.TheseMuslims identifiedwithAli,and thefamilyof theProphetdescended throughhim. They believed that Ali should have been the first caliph, and that the caliphate should havedescendedinhisline,which(throughAli’swifeFatima)wasalsothelineoftheProphethimself.Ali’ssecondsonHoseinattemptedarevolt in680butwasoverwhelmedatKarbalabyUmayyadtroopsandkilled. This was a crucial event, the full significance of which will be explored in a later chapter.EventuallytheattachmenttothefamilyoftheProphet—toAliandhisdescendants—evolvedatheologyof

itsownandafirmbeliefthatthedescendantsofAliweretheonlylegitimateauthorityinIslam,becomingwhatwenowcallShi‘ism.

Tensionanddissentreachedacrescendointhemiddleyearsoftheeighthcentury.Inthe740stherewasarevoltagainsttheUmayyadsinKufa,andtheysufferedexternaldefeatsbytheTurksinTransoxianaandbytheByzantinesinAnatolia.Theninthelate740saPersianconvert,AbuMuslim,beganarevoltagainstUmayyadruleinKhorasan,wherethecreativedynamicbetweensurvivorsoftheoldPersianlandowninggentry(thedehqans)andthenewArabsettlershadbeenparticularlypowerful,andwheremuchintermarryingandconversionhadoccurred.Thereappears tohavebeena real fusionofcultures,withArabsettlersadoptingthePersianlanguage,Persiandress,andevensomepre-IslamicPersianfestivals.

AbuMuslim ledhis revolt in thenameof theProphet’s family, therebyconcealing themovement’sfinalpurposeandensuringawideappeal.DrawingsupportfromArabsettlersinKhorasan,whoresentedtheirtaxesandfeltbetrayedbytheUmayyads,AbuMuslimandhisfollowersdefeatedlocaloppositionand,startingfromMerv,ledtheirarmieswestwardunderablackbanner.TheydefeatedtheforcessentagainstthembytheUmayyadcaliphinaseriesofbattlesin749–750,andinthelatteryearproclaimedanewcaliphinKufa—Abu’lAbbas(forwhomtheAbbasiddynastywasnamed).AbbaswasadescendantnotofAlibutofanotherofMohammad’scousins.Before longthenewcaliph,uneasyat thecontinuingstrengthofAbuMuslim’ssupport inKhorasan,hadhimexecuted(in755),10 theeffectofwhichwastoendorseorthodoxSunnismand tomarginalizeonceagain the followersofAli, theKharijitesandotherdisparate groups that had supported the revolt originally. But the revolt of AbuMuslim was anotherimportantreligiousrevolutioninIran.HewasrememberedlongafterwardbyIranians,andstilllaterbyIranianShi‘ites,asarighteous,brave,andsuccessfulrevolutionarybetrayedbythoseheputinpower.

InsteadofDamascus,thenewcapitaloftheAbbasiddynastywasestablishedinBaghdad,hardbytheoldSassanidcapitalofCtesiphon(thoughtheseatofAbbasidgovernmentlatermovednorthtoSamarra).The center of gravity of the empire hadmoved east in a deeper sense, too.As timewent on, Persianinfluenceatthecourtofthenewdynastybecamemoreandmoremarked(especiallythroughthePersianBarmakidfamilyofofficials),andsomehistorianshaverepresentedtheAbbasidsupremacyasaculturalreconquest of the Arab conquerors by the Persians. The strengthening of Persian influence had begunalreadyundertheUmayyads.ButnowtextsrecordingSassanidcourtpracticeweretranslatedintoArabicandappliedbythenewbureaucrats.Thiscreatedamorehierarchicalpatternofgovernment.Thecaliphwas screenedbyofficials fromcontactwith petitioners, a departure fromearlierUmayyadpractice inwhichthecaliphhadstill takencounselfromtribal leaders inassemblyandmanipulatedtheir loyaltiesand allegiances in age-old patriarchal fashion. Now new offices appeared in the government of theAbbasids, includingthatofvizier,orchiefadviserorminister,andtheadministrationwasdividedintoseparatedepartmentsorministriescalleddiwans.These institutionswere takendirectly fromSassanidcourtpractice,andweretoendureinIslamicrulershipformorethanathousandyears.

TheinfluencewasalsoapparentinthebuildingsconstructedbytheAbbasids,andPersianarchitectsbuiltmanyof the buildings ofBaghdad.Even the circular groundplan of the new citymayhave beencopied from theSassanian royalcityofFerozabad inFars.Where theUmayyadshad tended to followByzantinearchitecturalmodels,AbbasidstyleswerebasedonSassanidones.Thisisapparentintheopenspacesenclosedbyarcadedwalls, in theuseofstuccodecoration, in thewaydomeswereconstructedabovestraight-walledbuildingsbelow,and,aboveall,intheclassicmotifofSassanianarchitecture,theiwans. These were large open arches, often in themiddle of one side of a court, often with arcadesstretching away on each side, often used as audience halls. As with other cultural inheritances fromSassanidIran,thesearchitecturalmotifssurvivedforcenturiesintheIslamicworld.11

ParticularlyundertheAbbasidcaliphAl-MansurmanyPersianadministratorsandscholarscameto

thecourt,mainlyfromKhorasanandTransoxiana(thoughtheystillworkedthereinArabic,andmanyhadArabicnames).ThesePersiansencounteredoppositionfromsomeArabs,whocalledthemAjam,whichmeans the mute ones, or the mumblers—a disparaging reference to their poor Arabic. The Persiansdefended themselvesand theircultural identity fromArabchauvinismthrough theso-calledshu‘ubiyyamovement, the title ofwhich refers to averse from the forty-ninthSuraof theQor’an, inwhichAllahdemandsmutualrespectbetweendifferentpeoples(shu‘ub).ItwasprimarilyamovementamongPersianscribes and officials; their opponents (including some Persians) tended to be the scholars andphilologians. But the shu‘ubiyya sometimes went beyond asserting equality or parity in favor of thesuperiorityofPersianculture,especiallyliterature.GiventhereligioushistoryofPersiaandthelingeringattachmentofmanyPersianstoMazdaeanorsub-Mazdaeanbeliefs,shu‘ubiyyaalsoimpliedachallengetoIslam,orat least totheformofIslampracticedbytheArabs.Asatiricalcontemporaryrecordedtheattitudeofatypicalyoungscribe,steepedinthetextsthatrecordedthehistoryandtheproceduresoftheSassanidmonarchy:

...HisfirsttaskistoattackthecompositionoftheQor’ananddenounceitsinconsistencies....Ifanyoneinhispresenceacknowledgesthepre-eminenceoftheCompanionsoftheProphethepullsagrimace,andturnshisbackwhentheirmeritsareextolled. . . .And thenhestraightaway interrupts theconversation tospeakof thepoliciesofArdashirPapagan, theadministrationofAnushirvan,andtheadmirablewaythecountrywasrunundertheSasanians...12

Intime,thesolutiontosuchconflictsprovedtobeassimilationandsynthesis,buttheshu‘ubiyyagavethePersiansinBaghdadacollectiveself-confidenceandhelpedtoensurethesurvivalofastrongelementofpre-IslamicPersiancultureaspartofthatsynthesis.13LikethereligiouscontroversiesaboutfreewillandthenatureoftheQor’anthatweregoingonatthesametime,theshu‘ubiyyawasasignofconflict,change,andcreativeenergy.

BoostedbythecreativityofthePersianstheAbbasidregimesetastandardandwaslookedbackonlaterasagoldenage.BaghdadgrewtobethelargestcityintheworldoutsideChina—bytheninthcenturyit had a population of around four hundred thousand. TheAbbasids endeavored to evade the tensionsbetween piety and government and to cement their support among all Muslims by abandoning theUmayyadprincipleofArabsupremacyandbyestablishingtheprincipleofequalitybetweenallMuslims.This same inclusive spirit extended even to taking Christians, Jews, and descendants of Ali into thegovernment—providedtheyprovedloyaltotheregime.

The integration of the huge area of theArab conquests under the peaceful and orderly rule of theAbbasid caliphate brought newanddynamic patterns of trade, aswell as a great release of economicenergy. The caliphs encouraged improvements in agriculture, particularly through irrigation, whichcreatednewprosperityespeciallyinMesopotamia,aswellasontheIranianplateau.Therethefollowingcenturies saw the widespread introduction of rice cultivation, groves of citrus fruits, and othernovelties.14 The region of Khorasan and Transoxiana profited hugely from revitalized trade along theancientSilkRoute toChina, from the agricultural improvements, and from themixingof old andnew,ArabandIranian.Becauseofthesechanges,theareaenteredaneconomicandintellectualgoldenageofitsown.

The Abbasid system relied first on the local networks of control set up by provincial governorsacrossthevast territoriesof theempire,andsecondonthebureaucracythat tiedthosegovernorstothecenter inBaghdad.Thegovernorscollected tax locally,deducted for theirexpenses (includingmilitaryoutlays),andremittedtheremaindertotheAbbasidcourt.Thehandofcentralgovernmentwasrelativelylight,butthesearrangementsputconsiderablepowerinthehandsofthegovernors,whichinthelongrun

wastoerodetheauthorityofthecaliphate.TheAbbasidcourtbecamerich,but italsobecameverylearned.Thecaliphs,especiallycaliphal-

Ma‘mun (813–833, himself the son of a Persian concubine), encouraged and supported scholars whotranslated ancient texts into Arabic. These were initially translated from Persian, but later also fromSyriac and Greek, drawing on writings discovered across the conquered territories. Al-Ma’mun’spredecessor al-Mansur (754–775) had founded a new library, theBeytal-Hikma (House ofWisdom),which attempted to assimilate all knowledge in one place and translate it intoArabic. An idea takendirectly from the model of the Sassanid royal libraries, the House of Wisdom drew extensively onwritings and scholars fromGondeshapur in Khuzestan, the most famous of the Sassanid academies.15Gondeshapurhadsurviveduptothatpoint,butitseemsthereaftertohavebeeneclipsedbyBaghdad.Atthesametime,thediffusionofscholarshipalsoprofitedfromtheintroductionofpapermanufacturingfromChina,whichreplacedthemoreexpensiveandawkwardpapyrusandparchment.

Al-Ma’mun seems to have encouraged a shift in emphasis toward astrology,mathematics, and thetranslationofGreektexts,undertheeyeofhischieftranslator,HunaynibnIshaq.Thesedevelopmentsledtowhathasbeencalledtheninth-centuryrenaissance,asPersianscholarswritinginArabicdiscoveredand applied the lessons especially of Greek philosophy, mathematics, science, medicine, history, andliterature.Thenewscholarshipwasnotmerelypassive,butcreative.Itproducednewscientificwritings,literature,histories, andpoetryofgreat and lastingquality, forming thebasisofmuch later intellectualendeavor—includinginEurope—inthecenturiesthatfollowed.

Throughthetranslations,AristotelianandPlatonicphilosophieswereespeciallyinfluential,thankstoprestigiousphilosophersal-Kindiandal-Farabi.Thegreathistorianal-Tabari(838–923)alsoworkedinBaghdad at this time.Medicine made significant advances through properly scientific researches intoanatomy,epidemiology,andotherdisciplines,buildingonandeventuallyfarsurpassingtheworkoftheclassicalGreekphysicianGalen.ManyoftheseachievementswerelatercollatedandmadeknownintheWestthroughthewritingsofanotherPersian,thegreatAvicenna(bornIbnSina,980–1037).Avicenna’swritingswereimportantinbothEastandWestforhispresentationofAristotelianphilosophicalmethodandespeciallylogic.DisputationsalongAristotelianlinesbecamecentraltoteachingatthehigherlevelineasternmadresehsfromthetimeofAvicennaonward.

It was a period of great intellectual energy, excitement, and discovery, and as the Abbasid courtbecameamodelforsucceedinggenerationsingovernmentandinotherways,sotooitbecameamodelinthe intellectual and cultural sphere. The translations into Arabic done by Persians in Baghdad in theeleventh centurywere later put into Latin forWestern readers by translators likeGerard ofCremona,workinginToledoinSpaininthetwelfthcentury.AccesstothesewritingsgaveanewvitalitytoWesternscholarship. Avicenna and Averroes—the latter an Arab and an Aristotelian like Avicenna—becamefamiliarnamesinthenewuniversitiesofEurope,andafterthetimeofThomasAquinasthephilosophyofAristotle,followingtheirmodel,dominatedEuropeanlearningfortwohundredyearsormore.

ButatthesametimetheredevelopedaseparatetraditionofIslamicscholarshipacrossthetownsandcitiesof theempire.This learning, independentof theauthorityof thecaliph,wasbased insteadon theauthorityoftheQor’anandthehadith(thehugebodyoftraditionsoftheProphet’slifeandsayings,andrelatedmaterial,collatedwithvaryingdegreesofreliabilityinthecenturiesafterhisdeath).Theulema—scholars practiced in the study and interpretation of those religious texts—tended to be hostile to thesophisticationandmagnificenceofthecourt.Thiswasparticularlythecaseinthetimeofal-Ma‘munandhis immediate successors, when the caliph and the court inclined toward the religious thinking of thegroupcalledtheMu‘tazilis,whofavoredideasoffreewill,adoctrineofthecreatednatureoftheQor’an,and (partly under the influence ofGreek philosophy) the legitimacy of interpretation of religious texts

basedonreason.Incontrast,manyoftheulemaoutsidecourtcirclestendedtofavormoredeterministicpositionsanda

strict traditionalism that insistedon thesufficiencyof the textson theirown.Theyalsodisapprovedofextra-Islamic influences. The parallel cultures of the Abbasid court and the ulema expressed thecontinuing tension between political authority and religion under Islam. In the end, the traditionalisttendencywas the one that prevailed—with variations and some compromises—in the four schools ormazhabsofSunnism:theHanbali,Shafi‘i,Maliki,andHanafi.

ButaspectsofMu‘tazilithinkingenduredmorestronglyintheseparateShi‘atradition.ThegreatArabhistorian and social theorist Ibn Khaldun recognized in the fourteenth century that most of the hadithscholarsandtheologianswerePersiansworkinginArabic(twoofthefourSunnimazhabswerefoundedby Persians). So too were the philologists who established the grammar of the Arabic language andrecorded it formally.16 In the Iranian lands, the usages of the ulemawere amajor conduit for bringingArabicwordsintoPersian,andtothisdaythePersianofthemullahstendstobethemostArabized.

On amore popular level, religious sects andgroups proliferated in the towns andvillages of Iranincluding sects thatwere regardedashereticalbybothMuslimsandZoroastrians.Thesegroups,oftenencompassing sub-Mazdakite ideas,were labelledKhorramites,17 a term thatmay derive from awordmeaningribaldorjoyous.SomesuchgroupswereinvolvedintheinitialrevoltofAbuMuslim,butalsoinotherrevolts,includingthoseofSonbadtheMagian(756),Ustad-sis(767–768),al-Muqanna(780)—all mainly centered on Khorasan—and again in the revolt of Papak in what is now Kurdistan andAzerbaijanin817–838.Severaloftheserevoltsshowedmillenarianandotherfeatures(includingananti-Muslimcelebrationofwineandwomen),drawinginpartonMazdaism—featuresthatweretoresurfacelaterinShi‘ism,andSufism.Onwomen,forexample,acontemporarysaidthatsomeoftheKhorramites:

. . .believeincommunalaccesstowomen,providedthat thewomenagree,andinfreeaccesstoeverythinginwhichtheselftakespleasureandtowhichnatureinclines,aslongasno-oneisharmedthereby

Andanother:

Theysaythatawomanislikeaflower,nomatterwhosmellsit,nothingisdetractedfromit.18

AsearlyasthecaliphateofHarunal-Rashid(786–809),theprocessesofdislocationandseparationthatwere tosplit theunitedempireof theAbbasidsbecamemanifest.Provincialgovernors,valuedfortheir localauthorityandretained inplacefor that reason,began topasson theirgovernorships to theirsons,creatinglocaldynasties.Thelatteracquiredcourtsoftheirown,newpolesofculture,andauthority.Astheydidsotheirexpensesbecamegreater,andlesstaxrevenuewassenttothecenter.Theyquicklybecame effectively independent, though most of them still deferred to the caliphate as the continuingcentralauthorityinIslam.

Itisinthenatureofthehistoryofempiresthattheirstorygetstoldintermsoftheirdeclineandfall.Historians are always looking for explanations, causes, and the origins of things. When it comes toempires, this tends tomean that their endcasts a long shadowbackward in time.This couldmake thesystemandinstitutionsoftheAbbasidempire,forexample,lookflawedandfaultyalmostfromtheverybeginning.Thatwouldbemisleading.TheAbbasidperiodwasatimeofenormoushumanachievement,inpoliticaltermsaswellasintermsofcivilization,art,architecture,science,andliterature.Thereleaseofnew ideas and the exchange of old ones within a huge area, held together by a generally benign and

tolerantgovernment,broughtaboutadynamicandhugelyinfluentialcivilization,wayaheadofwhatwasgoingoninEuropeatthetime.

ThefirstoftheregionaldynastiestoestablishitselfasarealrivaltocentralauthoritywasthatoftheTaheridsofKhorasan (821–873), followedby theSaffaridsofSistan (861–1003)and theSamanidsofBokhara(875–999)—alldynastiesofIranianorigin.TheSamanidswerebasedonBokharaandtheregionaround Balkh, claiming descent from the Sassanid prince Bahram Chubin. Each of these dynasties(especiallytheSamanids)andthosethatfollowed(notablytheGhaznavidsandBuyids)tendedtosetupcourtsadornedwithPersianbureaucrats,scholars,astrologers,andpoets.Imitatinginthiswaythegreatcaliphal court of Baghdad, these provincial courts enhanced their own dynasties’ prestige and alsodisguised their tenure of power,which otherwisemight have appeared asmore nakedly dependent onbrutemilitaryforce.Thepatronageofthesecourts,workingontheintellectualandreligiousfermentoftheeasternIranianlandsatatimewhenthepotentialofthenewformofthePersianlanguagewasreadytobeexplored,producedthebeginningsofagreatoutpouringofwonderfulpoeticliterature,includingsomeofthemostsublimepoetryevercreated.ThepoetryissounfamiliartomostWesternreaders,sofreshandsurprisinginitscontent,andsoimportant initseffectonlaterIranianandPersianatecultureacrosstheregionthatitwarrantsmoredetailedattention.

DRUNKWITHLOVE:THEPOETSANDTHESUFIS,THETURKSANDTHEMONGOLSFromtheverybeginning,thegrandthemeofPersianpoetryislove.Butitisawholeteemingcontinentoflove—sexuallove,divinelove,homoeroticlove,unrequitedlove,hopelesslove,andhopefullove.Itisloveaspiringtooblivion,loveaspiringtounion,andloveassolaceandresignation.Oftenitmaybetwoormoreoftheseatthesametime,intermingledandambiguouslyhintedatthroughmetaphor.Othertimeslove may not even be mentioned, but will be present nonetheless through other metaphors—notablythroughanothergreatpoetictheme,wine.

ItispossiblethatthePersianpoetryofthisperiodinheritedideasandpatternsfromalosttraditionofSassanidcourtpoetry—lovepoetryandheroicpoetry—justasFerdowsi’sShahnamehemergedfromaknowntraditionofstoriesaboutthekingsofPersia.Butmostoftheverseforms,alongwiththeimmediateprecedentsofthemesoflove,derivefrompreviousArabicpoetictraditionsandreflecttheexchangeoflinguisticandotherculturalmaterialsbetweenIraniansandArabsintheyearsaftertheconquest.Whiletherearefragmentsofpoetryknownfromearliertimes,thefirstmoresubstantialversesfromknownpoetscomefromtheperiodoftheTaherids.ButthefirstgreatfigurewasapoetattheSamanidcourt—Rudaki:

DelsirnagardadatzebidadgariCheshmabnagardadatchodarmannagariIntorfekedusttarzejanatdaramBaankezesadhezardoshmanbatariYourheartneverhasitsfillofcrueltyYoureyesdonotsoftenwithtearswhenyoulookatmeItisstrangethatIloveyoumorethanmyownsoul,Becauseyouareworsethanahundredthousandenemies.19

Rudaki(whodiedaround940),alongwithotherpoetslikeShahidBalkhiandDaqiqiTusi,benefitedfromthedeliberatePersianizingpolicyoftheSamanidcourt.TheSamanidsgavethepoetstheirpatronage

andgenerallyencouragedtheuseofPersianratherthanArabic.AbolqasemFerdowsi(c.935–c.1020)was less fortunate. He was born in the period of Samanid rule, but later, when the Samanid regimecrumbled,hecameundertheruleoftheGhaznavids,adynastyofTurkicorigin.HisShahnameh (whichcontinued and completed a project begun for the Samanids by Daqiqi) can be seen as the logicalfulfillmentofSamanidculturalpolicy—avoidingArabicwords,eulogizingthepre-IslamicPersiankings,andgoingbeyondanon-Islamicpositiontoanexplicitlypro-Mazdaeanone.SomeoftheconcludinglinesoftheShahnameh,speakingasiffromjustbeforethedefeatatQadesiyyaandthecomingofIslam,echotheearliestMazdaean inscriptionsofDariusatBisitun.This isshocking inaneleventh-centuryIslamiccontext (theminbar,mentioned in the first line, is the raisedplatform, rather likeachurchpulpit, fromwhichprayersareledinthemosque):

They’llsettheminbarlevelwiththethrone,AndnametheirchildrenOmarandOsman.Thenwillourheavylabourscometoruin.O,fromthisheightalongdescentbegins...

...ThenmenwillbreaktheircompactwiththeTruthAndcrookednessandLieswillbehelddear.20

It’snosurprisethenthatFerdowsi’sgreatwork,whenfinished,gotaless-than-enthusiasticwelcomefromtherulingGhaznavidprince,whoseviewsweremoreorthodox.Manyof thestoriespasseddownthroughthecenturiesaboutthelivesofthepoetsareunreliable,butsomeofthemmayatleastreflectsomeaspectsofrealevents.OnestoryabouttheShahnamehsaysthattheGhaznavidsultan,havingexpectedashorterworkofdifferentcharacter,sentonlyasmallrewardtoFerdowsiinreturn.Thepoet,disgusted,split the money between his local wine seller and a bath attendant. The sultan eventually read aparticularlybrilliantpassagefromtheShahnameh,realizeditsgreatness,andsentFerdowsiagenerousgift,buttoolate—asthepackanimalsbearingFerdowsi’streasureenteredhistownthroughonegate,hisbodywascarriedoutforburialthroughanother.

The great themes of theShahnameh are the exploits of proud heroes on horsebackwith lance andbow,theirconflictsofloyaltybetweentheirconsciencesandtheirkings,theiraffairswithfeistywomenwhoareasslimascypressesandradiantasthemoon,androyalcourtsfulloffightingandfeasting—razmobazm.Itisnotdifficulttoreadintothisthenostalgiaofaclassofbureaucratsandscholarsdescendedfrom the small gentry landowners (the dehqans)who had provided the proud cavalry of the Sassanidarmies.Reducednowfromtheswordtothepen,theywatchArabsandTurksplaythegreatgamesofwarandpolitics.

TahamtanchininpasokhavordbazKehastamzeKavusKeybiniazMaratakhtzinbashadotajtargQabajoshanodelnahadebemarg

ThebraveRostamrepliedtotheminturn,“IhavenoneedofKayKavus.Thissaddleismythrone,thishelmmycrown.Myrobeischainmail;myheart’spreparedfordeath”21

The Shahnameh has had a significance in Persian culture comparable to that of Shakespeare in

EnglishortheLutheranBibleinGerman,onlyperhapsmoreso—ithasbeenacentraltextineducationandinmanyhomes,secondonlytotheQor’anandthegreatfourteenth-centurypoetHafez.Ithashelpedtofixandunify the language, to supplymodelsofmoralityandconduct, and toupholda senseof Iranianidentity—reaching back beyond the Islamic conquest—that might otherwise have faded with theSassanids.

ThepoetryoftheShahnameh,anditsthemesofheroismonhorseback,love,loyalty,andbetrayal,hasmuchincommonwiththeromancesofmedievalEurope,anditisthought-provokingthatitfirstattainedfame a few decades before the First Crusade brought an increased level of contact between westernEuropeandthelandsattheeasternendoftheMediterranean.Thereisalsoatheorythatthetroubadourtradition,andthustheimmenselyfruitfulmedievalEuropeantropeofcourtlylove,originatedatleastinpartwiththeSufisofArabSpain.22Butitmayjustbeacaseofparalleldevelopment.

TheGhaznavidsdidnotreverse theSamanidpatternofpatronageandcontinuedtoencouragepoetswriting in Persian.But the later poetswere less strict about linguistic purity andmore content to usecommonplaceArabic loanwords.Furtherwest theBuyiddynasty,originatingamongShi‘aMuslims inTabarestan,hadexpandedtoabsorbMesopotamiaandtakeBaghdad(in945),endingtheindependentruleoftheAbbasidcaliphsandrulingfromthenonintheirname.Butthegreatliteraryrevivalcontinuedtobecenteredintheeast.

Naser-eKhosraw,bornnearBalkhin1003,isbelievedtohavewrittenperhapsthirtythousandlinesofverse inhis lifetime,ofwhichabouteleven thousandhavesurvived.HewasbroughtupasaShi‘a,made thepilgrimage toMecca in1050,and laterbecamean Ismailibefore returning toBadakhshan towrite.Mostofhispoetryisphilosophicalandreligious:

Knowyourself;forifyouknowyourselfYouwillalsoknowthedifferencebetweengoodandevil.Firstbecomeintimatewithyourowninnerbeing,Thencommanderofthewholecompany.Whenyouknowyourself,youknoweverything;Whenyouknowthat,youhaveescapedfromallevil

Bewakefulforonce:howlonghaveyoubeensleeping?Lookatyourself:youaresomethingwonderfulenough.23

FormanyyearstheAbbasidcaliphsandtheotherdynastieshademployedTurkishmercenaries,takenas slaves fromCentralAsia, to fight theirwars and police their territories. Turks had in turn becomeimportantinthepoliticsoftheempire,andonoccasionhadthreatenedtotakecontrol—theGhaznavidshadsucceededindoingsointheeasternpartoftheempire.Butinthemiddleoftheeleventhcenturyaconfederation of Turkic tribes under the leadership of the Seljuk Turks went farther. Defeating theGhaznavidsinthenortheast,theybrokeintotheheartlandsoftheempireandtookBaghdadbeforefightingtheirway fartherwest. In1071 theydefeated theByzantinesandoccupiedmostof the interiorofAsiaMinor.

Centuries of contactwith theAbbasid regime and its successors had Islamized the Turks and hadmadethemrelativelyassimilable.ThesecondSeljuksultan,AlpArslan,hadashischiefvizieraPersian,Hasan Tusi Nizam ol-Mulk (1018–1092), and before long the dynasty was ruling according to thePersianateAbbasidmodel like the others before it.Nizamol-Mulkwrote a book of guidance forAlpArslan’s successor.Called theSiyasat-Nameh,which translates asTheBookofGovernment, it (alongwith the slightly earlierQabus-name)was for centuries themodel for theMirror-of-Princes genre ofliterature,providingmanualsofguidanceforrulers.ItalsoinfluencedEuropeanversionsofthesamekindofthing,downtothetimeofMachiavelliandhisPrincipe.

Nizamol-Mulkwasa friendofOmarKhayyam(c.1048–c.1124/1129)and therearesomefamousstories of dubious veracity about the friendship.24 But it is probably true that when Nizam ol-MulkbecamevizierhegavesomefinancialhelptoOmarKhayyam,andpossiblysomeprotection,too.AmongIranians it is commonplace to say that Omar Khayyam was a more distinguished mathematician andastronomerthanapoet.Toassessthevalidityofthisisliketryingtocompareappleswithbilliardballs.HedidworkonEuclideangeometry,cubicequations,binomialexpansion,andquadraticequations thatexpertsinmathematicsregardasinfluentialandimportant.HedevelopedanewcalendarfortheSeljuksultan,basedonhighlyaccurateobservationsof thesun, thatwasat leastasaccurateas theGregoriancalendarordainedinsixteenth-centuryEuropebytheCatholicchurch.25Anditseemshewasprobablythefirsttodemonstratethetheorythatthenightlyprogressionoftheconstellationsthroughtheskywasduetothe earth spinning around its axis, rather than the movement of the skies around a fixed earth as hadpreviouslybeenassumed.

OmarKhayyam’sdryskepticisminhispoetrymakeshisvoiceuniqueamongtheotherPersianpoets,butalsoreflectsaself-confidencedrawnperhapsfromhispreeminentpositioninhisotherstudies—hisknowledgethatinthemhehadsurpassedwhatwasknownbefore.HisnameisfamousintheWestthroughthetranslationsofEdwardFitzgerald,whichweretakenbyreaderstorepresentaspiritofeat,drink,andbemerryhedonism.This isnotquite right.Fitzgerald’sare free translations,andhisnineteenth-centuryidiom (fine though his verses are), with its dashes and exclamation marks, ohs and ahs, to a degreemisrepresentsthesoberforceoftheoriginals.Here,forexample,isFitzgerald:

“HowsweetismortalSovranty!”—thinksome:Others—“HowblesttheParadisetocome!”Ah,takethecashinhandandwaivetheRest;Oh,thebraveMusicofadistantDrum!

Hereistheoriginal:

GuyandkasanbeheshtbahurkhoshastManmiguyamkeab-eangurkhoshastInnaqdbegirodastazannesyebedar

K’avaz-edoholshenidanazdurkhoshast

Andhereamoreliteraltranslation:

Itissaidthatparadise,withitshouris,iswell.Isay,thejuiceofthegrapeiswell.TakethiscashandletgothatcreditBecausehearingthesoundofthedrums,fromafar,iswell.26

Translatingpoetryisnotoriouslydifficult,andsomewouldsaythatitisavainendeavorentirely.Forexample, thewordkhosh has awide range of relatedmeanings and is found in a series of compoundwords in Persian so that, with those, it takes up several pages in any dictionary. It means delicious,delightful,sweet,happy,cheerful,pleasant,good,andprosperous.Onecanseedifferentshadesofthesemeaningsineachofthethreelinesinwhichitappearsinthispoem.Theformofthepoemisthequatrain,orruba‘i—theplural isruba‘iyat.OtherPersianverse forms include theghazal, themasnavi, and theqasida.

MostofOmarKhayyam’ssurvivingpoetryisintheruba‘iform,buttherehasbeenmuchdoubtastowhichofthethousandormorerubaiyatattributedtohimwereactuallyhiswork.Itseemslikelythatthepoems of others—poems that were of a skeptical or irreligious tendency and might therefore haveattracteddisapproval—wereattributedtohiminordertohavethegraceaccordedhisgreatname.Atthesametime,itmaybethathesetdowndoubtsinhispoemsthatwereonlypartofhis thinkingaboutthedeity.Butonecanreadinhispoemsaruggedhumanisminthefaceoftheharshrealitiesoflife,andanimpatiencewitheasy,consolinganswers,thatanticipatesexistentialism:arecognitionofthecomplexityof existence, the intractability of its problems, and a principled acceptance.His philosophicalwritinglargelyrevolvedaroundquestionsoffreewill,determinism,existence,andessence.27

Nikiobadikedarnahad-ebasharast,ShadioghamikedarqazaoqadarastBacharkhmakonhavalek’andarrah-eaqlCharkhaztuhezarbarbicharetarast

Goodandevil,whichareinthenatureofmankind,Joyandsadness,whichareinchanceandfateDonotattributethemtothemachineryoftheheavens,becauseinreasonThatmachineisathousandtimesmorehelplessthanyou28

Therearedozensofquatrains thatonecouldbringforwardto illustrate thesubtletyandintellectualpowerofthisgreatman,butthiscannotbeabookaboutjustOmarKhayyam.Thefollowingpoembelongsto a collection from an earlymanuscript attributed to Omar Khayyam by the British scholar Arberry,whichsinceArberry’s timehasbeenconsidereddoubtful.But it isknownfromothermanuscripts, too,andmanyscholarsstill includethispoemwithOmarKhayyam’sbest.If it isnotbyhim,itnonethelesspresentsadefiantpersonalmanifestoclosetothespiritheexpressedelsewhere:

Garmanzemey-emoghanehmastam,hastamVarasheqorendobotparastam,hastamHarkasbekhiyal-ekhodgamanedaradMankhoddanam,haranchehastam,hastam.

IfIamdrunkonforbiddenwine,Iam.Andifaworshipperoflove,androguery,andfalsegods,thenIam.Everyonehasdoubtstotheirownmind.Iknowmyself;whateverIam,Iam.29

TheeleventhcenturysawthefirstgreatupsurgeintheuniquemysticalmovementthatisSufism,30andinthispoem,aselsewhere,OmarKhayyamusestermsthatwerecommonplaceinSufipoetryandwereused as key concepts, often metaphorically. Mey-e moghaneh, for example, means Magian wine—forbiddenwineboughtfromtheZoroastrians.Rendmeansawildyoungman,arogueorrake.Kharabatisthe house of ruin, the tavern; and the saqi is the young boywho serves thewine and is the object ofhomoerotic longing. But although some commentators have claimed Omar Khayyam as a Sufi, andnotwithstandinghemayhavehadsomesympathyfortheSufis,hisvoiceistoomuchhisown,toouniquetobesetinanyreligiouscategory.Andhisskepticismistoostrong.

Sufism is a huge and complex phenomenon, with very different aspects at different times and indifferentplaces, fromeleventh-centuryAsiaMinor toNorthAfrica tomodernPakistanandbeyond. Itsoriginsareunclear,butIslamsustainedamysticalelementfromtheverybeginning—asisshown,somewouldsay,bytherevelationoftheQor’antoMohammadhimself,inthewildernessoutsideMecca.Theessence of Sufism was a seeking after precisely this kind of personal spiritual encounter, and anabandonmentofselfandallkindsofworldlyegotisminthepresenceofthedivine.

But in practices and imagery it also partook of the religious turbulence of the centuries after theIslamicconquest, reflectingpopularpre-Islamic ideas and influences, including themystically inclinedmovements of Neoplatonism and gnosticism. These influences, along with a deliberate anarchic andantinomiantendency,setitupfromthestartintensionwiththetext-based,scholarly,urbantraditionoftheulemaandtheurbanpreacherswhosolemnlyreadandre-readtheQor’anandhadithtoassertanewthecorrect definition of shari‘a (Islamic law). There was tension and conflict, and a number of Sufis ormystically inclined thinkers—likeal-HallajandSohravardi, forexample—werecondemnedashereticsby the ulema, andwere executed (in 922 and 1191, respectively). Itmay be that the renewed rise ofSufism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries had something to do with a reaction to the increasingconcentrationofIslamicpracticeandIslamicstudyinthemadresehs,directlyundertheeyeoftheulema,thatwastakingplaceatthistime.

ThesignificanceofSufismwithintheIslamiclandsinthisperiodhassometimesbeenneglected,butinrealityitwasall-pervasive.InPersiaitsculturalinfluenceisindicatedbyitseffectonPersianpoetry,but everywhere in the land there were Sufi khanaqas—lodging houses for wandering Sufis that alsoservedlocalpeopleforreligiousgatherings.InthelargertownstheremightbekhanaqasfordifferentSufiorders, as well as bazaar guilds and other associations that often had Sufi connections. Even smallvillagesmighthavekhanaqas.ThereareparallelsherewiththefriariessetupforthemendicantordersinEurope in theMiddleAges.Like thefriars, theSufiswere intimately involved in thereligious livesofordinarypeopleandwereresponsibleformissionaryactivityinthecountrysideandbeyondPersia.Giventhe low level of literacy at the time, and the fact that the population lived overwhelmingly in thecountryside,itbecomesplainthattheSufiswerecentraltothediffusionofIslamoutsidethetownsandcities.ThecenteroftheiractivitywasinPersia,andespeciallyinKhorasan,buttheyprobablyweretheprime means by which Persianate culture spread and consolidated its popular influence from theBosphorustoDelhiandbeyond.31

ManySufis,inparticularmanyoftheSufipoets,openlyscornedwhattheysawastheself-importantegotismoftheulema.TheSufisprovokedandattackedthemfortheirobsessionwithrulesandtheirvain

prideinobservingthem,whichforgottheselflessnessnecessaryfortruespirituality.Itisnotdifficulttosee why some orthodox Muslims (especially Wahhabis and their sympathizers since the eighteenthcentury) have anathematized and persecuted Sufism. But in the period we are dealing with here, themissionaryactivityoftravelingSufis(knownalsoasdervishes)wasimportant,probablycrucial,intheconversion of newMuslims.Thiswas true in the remoter rural parts likeTabarestan,where orthodoxIslamhadbeenslowtopenetrate,butespeciallyinnewlyconqueredterritorieslikeAnatolia,andamongtheTurksintheirCentralAsianhomelandsinthefarnortheast.

Thefirstgreat theoristofSufismwasal-Ghazali (1058–1111),anativeofTus inKhorasan(thoughthereweremajorSufifiguresmuchearlier,Junayd,forexample,whodiedaround910).TherelationshipbetweenorthodoxSunnismandSufismwasnotoneofsimpleopposition,andal-Ghazaliwasprimarilyanorthodox Sunni of the Shafi‘i mazhhab, who wrote works attacking theMu‘tazilis, Avicenna, and theintroductionofideasfromGreekphilosophy.ButhealsowroteaninfluentialSufiworkcalledKimiya-yesa‘adat—TheAlchemyofHappiness.IngeneralhetriedtoremovetheobstaclesbetweenorthodoxyandSufism,presentingthelatterasa legitimateaspectof theformer.In theearlycenturiesofSufism,Shi‘aMuslimstendedtobemorehostiletotheSufidervishesthantheSunnis.32

Sana’iwasthefirstgreatpoetwithaclearSufiallegiance,andsomehavecomparedhisliterarystylewiththatofal-Ghazali.Sana’i’slongpoemHadiqatal-haqiqa(TheGardenofTruth,completedin1131)isaclassicofSufipoetry,buthewrotealargebodyofpoemsbeyondthat,andinthemitiseasytoseethefusionofthetraditionsoflovepoetrywiththeimpulsesofmysticism:

Sincemyheartwascaughtinthesnareoflove,Sincemysoulbecamewineinthecupoflove,Ah,thepainsIhaveknownthroughloverhoodSincelikeahawkIfellinthesnareoflove!Trappedintime,IamturnedtoadrunkensotBytheexciting,dreg-drainingcupoflove.Dreadingthefierceafflictionofloverhood,Idarenotuttertheverynameoflove;Andthemoreamazingisthis,sinceIseeEverycreatureonearthisatpeacewithlove.33

Here, too, wine has become a metaphor for love, taking the imagery into another dimension ofcomplexity.WhereanorthodoxMuslimmightfavorabstinence(zohd)inaccordancewithreligiouslaw,Sana’isaysthatingoingbeyondlawintoinfidelity(kofr)—leavingbehindhisvenal,carnalsoul(nafs)—theSuficanfindanotherwaytoGod.Thepointisthatbothloveandwinecanbewaysinwhichamanmayforgethimself.Theyare familiarexperiences inwhich thesenseof self ischangedorobliterated.Suchanexperiencecangiveatasteof(andthereforeprovideametaphorfor)thelossofselfexperiencedbythemysticinthefaceofGod—thelossofselfthatisnecessaryforgenuinereligiousexperience,thatisyearnedforastheloverlongsforthebeloved.

TheSeljukperiodproducedaprofusionofpoets,anditisnotpossibletodojusticetothemall,butNizamiGanjavi,whocomposedhisKhosrawvaShirin in1180andLaylavaMajnoun in1188, is tooimportant to be overlooked. Though he wrote many others, both these long poems retold much olderstories—theformeratalefromtheSassanidcourtandthelatterofAraborigin.Botharelovestoriesthatbecamehugelypopular,buttheyhavedeeperresonances,reflectingNizami’sreligiousbeliefs.LaylaandMajnoun fall in love, but then are separated, and Majnoun goes mad (Majnoun means “mad”) andwandersinthewilderness.Hebecomesapoet,writingtoLaylathroughathirdparty:

Ohmylove,withyourbreastslikejasmine!Lovingyou,mylifefades,mylipswither,myeyesarefulloftears.Youcannotimagine howmuch I am “Majnoun.” For you, I have lostmyself. But that path can only be taken by thosewho forgetthemselves.Inlove,thefaithfulhavetopaywiththebloodoftheirhearts;otherwisetheirloveisnotworthagrainofrye.Soyouareleadingme,revealingthetruefaithoflove,evenifyourfaithshouldremainhiddenforever.34

Withouthope inhis love(Layla’s fatherwillnot let themmarry),Majnounspiritualizes it. Ingoinginto the desert, losing his selfhood inmadness, stepping outside all ordinary conventions, andwritingpoetry,hehaseffectivelybecomeaSufi.35Soeventhisovertlyprofanestoryhasaspiritualdimensionthatisnotimmediatelyapparent.Buttohavepsychologicalforce,themetaphorandthespiritualmessagefirstrequireoursympathywiththelovers’predicament.ThepoemisnotsimplyabouttheSufi’sapproachtoGod. It is that, but also a love story—and therein lies its human appeal. It has been translated intoalmosteverylanguageintheIslamicworld,aswellasmanyothersbeyondit.

Faridal-DinAttar,wholivedinNishapurfromaround1158toaround1221or1229,wrotemorethanforty-fivethousandlinesofverseinhislifetime.Establishingtheelementsofa“religionoflove,”AttarstronglyinfluencedallsubsequentSufipoets.Hedevelopedtheideaoftheqalandar, thewildman,theoutcast,whoseonlyguideistheethicofthatreligion:

Harkeradar‘eshqmohkamshodqadamDar-gozashtazkofrvaazislamham

WhoeversetsfootfirmlyforwardinloveWillgobeyondbothIslamandunbelief36

TheclassicofAttar’spoetry is theMantiqal-tayr (TheConferenceof theBirds),oneof thebest-knownPersianpoemsofall.Embeddedwithinthecharmingstoryofthebirdsquestingforthemysteriousphoenix—thesimorgh—isthestoryofShaykhSan‘an,whichbringsoutthefullmeaningofSufisminitslogical extreme.Deliberatelyprovocative and shocking in the Islamic context, the storywas importantandinfluentialinthelaterdevelopmentofSufism.

ShaykhSan‘an is a learned,well-respectedholymanwhohas alwaysdone the right thing.HehasmadethepilgrimagetoMeccafiftytimes,hasfastedandprayed,andhastaughtfourhundredpupils.Hearguesfinepointsofreligiouslawandisadmiredbyeveryone.Buthehasarecurringdream,inwhichhelivesinRum (bywhichwasprobablymeanttheChristianpartofAnatolia,orpossiblyConstantinople,ratherthanRomeitself)andworshipsinaChristianchurchthere.Thisisdisturbing,andheconcludesthattoresolvetheproblemhemustgototheChristianterritory.Hesetsoff,butjustshortofhisgoalheseesaChristiangirl—“Inbeauty’smansionshewaslikeasun....”

Hereyesspokepromisestothoseinlove,Theirfinebrowsarchedcoquettishlyabove—ThosebrowssentglancingmessagesthatseemedTooffereverythingherloversdreamed.

And,assometimeshappens,theoldmanfallsinlove:

“Ihavenofaith”hecried.“TheheartIgaveIsuselessnow;IamtheChristian’sslave.”

His companions try to get Shaykh San‘an to see reason, but he answers them in terms evenmoreshockingandsubversive.Theytellhimtopray,andheagrees—butinsteadoftowardMecca,asaMuslimshould,heaskstoknowwhereherfaceis,thathemayprayinherdirection.AnotheraskshimwhetherhedoesnotregretturningawayfromIslam,andheanswersthatheonlyregretshispreviousfolly,andthathehadnotfalleninlovebefore.Anothersayshehaslosthiswits,andhesayshehas,andalsohisfame—butfraudandfearalongwiththem.AnotherurgeshimtoconfesshisshamebeforeGod,andhereplies,“GodHimselfhaslitthisflame.”

Theshaykh livesforamonthwith thedogs in thedustof thestreet infrontofhisbeloved’shouse,finally falling ill.Hebegsher toshowhimsomepity,a littleaffection,butshe laughsandmockshim,sayingthatheisold—heshouldbelookingforashroud,notforlove.Hebegsagain,andshesayshemustdo four things to win her trust—burn the Qor’an, drink wine, seal up faith’s eye, and bow down toimages.Theshaykhhesitates,butthenagrees.Invitedin,hetakeswineandgetsdrunk:

Hedrank,oblivionoverwhelmedhissoul.Winemingledwithhislove—herlaughterseemedTochallengehimtotaketheblisshedreamed.

Heagreestoeverythingthegirldemands,butitisnotenough—shewantsgoldandsilver,andheispoor.Eventuallyshetakespityonhim.Shewilloverlookthegoldandsilver—ifhewilllookaftersomepigsforayearasaswineherd.Heagrees.

Fromthisextremepoint,thestorytakesamoreconventionalturn,aswasnecessaryifthebookwasnottobebannedanddestroyed.AvisionoftheProphetintervenes,theshaykhreturnstothefaith,thegirlrepentshertreatmentoftheshaykh,becomesaMuslim,anddies.Butthiscannotdrawthestingofthefirstpart of the story—themessage that conventional piety is not enough, that itmay in fact lead down thewrongpath,andthat thepeelingawayofconventional trappingsandthelossofself in loveis theonlywaytoattainahigherspirituality.AsAttarwroteatthebeginning,whenheintroducedthestory:

WhenneitherBlasphemynorfaithremain,ThebodyandtheSelfhavebothbeenslain;ThenthefiercefortitudetheWaywillaskIsyours,andyouareworthyofourtask.Beginthejourneywithoutfear;becalm;ForgetwhatisandwhatisnotIslam...

Takenasawhole, thestoryappearsambiguous,but itcontainsastartlingchallengeto thereligiousconventionsofthetime.37

Attar, the apostle of love, died at some point in the 1220s—massacred along with most of thepopulationofNishapurwhentheMongolsinvadedKhorasanandPersia.TheMongolinvasionswereanunparalleledcataclysmforthelandsofIran.WheretheArabsandTurkshadbeenrelativelyfamiliarandrestrainedconquerors,theMongolswerebothalienandwantonlycruel.

TheSeljukEmpirehadbeensplittowardtheendofthetwelfthcenturybytheriseofasubjecttribefromKhwarezm,whose leaders established themselves as the rulers of the eastern part of the empire.They were known as the Khwarezmshahs. In the early years of the thirteenth century, the rulingKhwarezmshah,SultanMohammad,becamedimlyawarethatanewpowerwasrisinginthesteppelandsbeyondTransoxiana.Therewereimpossiblerumors—true,asitturnedout—thattheChineseempirehadbeen conquered. There may have been some attempts at diplomatic contact, but these were bungled,

resultinginthedeathsofsomeMongolmerchantsandambassadors.Contrarytopopularperception,theMongols were not just a ravening mob of uncivilized, semi-human killers. Their armies were tightlycontrolled, well disciplined, and ruthlessly efficient. They were not wantonly destructive.38 But theirultimate foundation was the prestige of their warlord, Genghis Khan, and an insult could not beoverlooked.AfterthekillingoftheMongolemissaries,whatcamenextinTransoxianaandKhorasanwasparticularly dreadful because of the Mongols’ vengeful purpose. There followed a series of Mongolinvasions, aimed initially at punishingSultanMohammad—who,veering from tragedy toward comedy,fledwestwardtoRay,pursuedbyaMongolflyingcolumn,andthennorthuntilhediedonanislandofftheCaspian coast.These invasions later developed into conquest and occupation.What thismeant for thehaplessIranianscanbeillustratedbywhathappenedatMerv,aftertheMongolshadalreadyconqueredanddestroyedthecitiesofTransoxiana:

. . .onthenextday,25February1221,theMongolsarrivedbeforethegatesofMerv.Toluiinperson[thesonofGenghizKhan],withanescortof fivehundredhorsemen, rode thewholedistancearound thewalls, and for sixdays theMongolscontinuedtoinspectthedefences,reachingtheconclusionthattheywereingoodrepairandwouldwithstandalengthysiege.OntheseventhdaytheMongolslaunchedageneralassault.Thetownspeoplemadetwosalliesfromdifferentgates,beinginboth cases at once driven back by theMongol forces. They seem then to have lost all will to resist. The next day thegovernorsurrenderedthetown,havingbeenreassuredbypromisesthatwerenotinfact tobekept.Thewholepopulationwasnowdrivenoutintotheopencountry,andforfourdaysandnightsthepeoplecontinuedtopouroutofthetown.Fourhundredartisansandanumberofchildrenwereselectedtobecarriedoffasslaves,anditwascommandedthatthewholeof the remaining population, men, women, children, should be put to the sword. They were distributed, for this purpose,amongthe troops,andtoeachindividualsoldierwasallotted theexecutionof three tofourhundredpersons.These troopsincludedleviesfromthecapturedtowns,andJuvainirecordsthatthepeopleofSarakhs,whohadafeudwiththepeopleofMerv,exceededtheferocityoftheheathenMongolsintheslaughteroftheirfellow-Muslims.EvennowtheordealofMervwasnotyetover.WhentheMongolswithdrew,thosewhohadescapeddeathbyconcealingthemselvesinholesandcavitiesemergedfromtheirhidingplaces.Theyamountedinalltosomefivethousandpeople.AdetachmentofMongols,partoftherearguard, now arrived before the town.Wishing to have their share of the slaughter they called upon these unfortunatewretches to comeout into the open country, each carrying a skirtful of grain.Andhaving them thus at theirmercy theymassacredtheselastfeebleremnantsofoneofthegreatestcitiesofIslam....39

ContemporaryeyewitnessesatMervgaveestimatesforthenumberskilledrangingbetween700,000and1.3million.Thesefiguresarehugebutcredible,representingahighproportionofthepopulationofnorthernKhorasanandTransoxianaatthetime.Thenumberswereprobablygreaterthannormalbecause

countrypeopleand refugees from tensandhundredsofmilesaround fled therebefore thesiegebegan.When we talk of the magnitude of twentieth-century massacres and genocides as if they wereunparalleled,we sometimes forgetwhat enormitieswereperpetrated in earlier centurieswith the coldbladealone.Askirtfulofgrain.TheNishapurofOmarKhayyam,Tus,Herat,andothercitiesinKhorasansufferedthesamefate.TheonlyoptionforthecitizensotherthanmassacrewasimmediatecapitulationassoonastheMongolcolumnshoveintosight.

Someplaces,encouragedbyrumorsofresistancebySultanMohammad’sson,Jalalal-Din, triedtohold their townsagainst the invaders,andsuffered terriblyasa result.Butby theendof1231,despitehaving achieved a stringofbrilliant victories against theMongols andothers, and a legendof razm obazmtorivaltheheroesofFerdowsi,Jalalal-Dinwasdead.ItmighthavebeenbetterforthepeopleofIran,atthiscriticaltime,iftheKhwarezmshahhadbeenawisermanwithlesspanache.

KhorasansufferedterriblyagainastheMongolsmovedintopunishthosewhocontinuedtoresist,andtosetup theiroccupationregime. InTus,which theymade theirbase, theMongols initially foundonlyfifty houses still standing.40 The golden age of Khorasan was over, and in some parts of the regionagricultureneverreallyrecovered.Wheretherehadbeentownsandirrigatedfields,thewarhorsesoftheconquerorsandtheirconfederatesnowwereturnedouttograze.WideexpansesofIranrevertedtonomadpastoralism, but these nomads were more dangerous, ruthless mounted warriors of a different kind.Peasants were subjected to taxes that were ruinously high and were collected after the fashion of amilitarycampaign.Manyfledthelandorwereforcedintoslavery,whilethoseartisancitydwellerswhohadsurvivedthemassacreswereforcedtolaborinworkhousesfortheirconquerors.Minoritiessuffered,too.Inthe1280saJewwasappointedasvizierbytheMongols,buthisappointmentgrewunpopular,hefellfromoffice,andJewswereattackedbyMuslimsinthecities,establishingadismalpatternforlatercenturies:“[They]fellupontheJewsineverycityoftheempire,towreaktheirvengeanceuponthemforthedegradationwhichtheyhadsufferedfromtheMongols.”41Itwasagrimtimeindeed.Khorasanwasmoreaffectedthanotherparts,butthegeneralcollapseoftheeconomyhittheentireregion.

TheMongols,whomadeTabriztheircapital,spentthenextfewdecadesconsolidatingtheirconquestsanddestroyingtheIsmailiAssassinsintheAlborzmountains,justastheSeljukshadtriedandfailedtodoformanyyears before 1220.Some smaller rulerswhohad submitted to theMongolswere allowed tocontinueasvassals,andinthewesttherumpoftheSeljukEmpiresurvivedinAnatoliaonthesamebasisas the Sultanate of Rum. In 1258 theMongols took Baghdad. They killed the last Abbasid caliph bywrappinghiminacarpetandtramplinghimtodeathwithhorses.

Yet within a few decades, astoundingly, or perhaps predictably, the Persian class of scholars andadministratorshadpulledofftheirtrickofconqueringtheconquerors—forthethirdtime.Beforelongtheymadethemselves indispensable.AShi‘aastrologer,Naserod-DinTusi,capturedbytheMongolsat theendofthecampaignagainsttheIsmailis,hadtakenservicewiththeMongolprinceHulagu,andservedashisadviserinthecampaignagainstBaghdad.Naserod-DinTusithensetupanastronomicalobservatoryforHulaguinAzerbaijan.Onememberof thePersianJuvaynifamilybecamegovernorofBaghdadandwrotethehistoryoftheMongols;anotherbecamethevizierofalaterMongolIl-Khan,orking.WithinacoupleofgenerationsPersianofficialswereas firmly inplaceat thecourtof the Il-Khansas theyhadbeen with the Seljuks, the Ghaznavids, and earlier dynasties. The Mongols initially retained theirpaganism,butin1295theirBuddhistrulerconvertedtoIslamalongwithhisarmy.In1316hissonOljeitudiedandwasburied inamausoleum that still stands inSoltaniyeh—oneof thegrandestmonumentsofIranian Islamic architecture and a monument also to the resilience and assimilating power of Iranianculture.

Another important invasion took place a little earlier than theMongol invasion of Khorasan—the

invasionandconquestof IndiabyMuslimPersiansandTurks, establishingwhatbecameknownas theDelhiSultanate.WehaveseenalreadythattheParthiansandSassanidsatdifferenttimesinvadednorthernIndia and established dynasties that ruled there. The Ghaznavids and their provincial governors alsoraidedintonorthernIndia,andonesuchgovernor,MohammadGhuri,tookthatpracticeastepfurtherinthe latterpartof the twelfthcentury,conqueringMultan,Sind,Lahore,andDelhi.Aseriesofdynastiesfollowedthereafter,expandingthereachoftheDelhiSultanateeastintoBengalandsouthtotheDeccan,creatingauniqueIndo-IslamicculturethatfusedPersian,Hindustani,Arabic,andTurkicelements,and—in the northwest—the Urdu language. Northern India came under strong Islamic influence. Sufimissionariessettowork,anditbecameanimportantregionforthedevelopmentofPersianatecultureinthefollowingcenturies.

CULMINATION:RUMI,IRAQI,SA‘DI,ANDHAFEZThe reassertion of Persian influence over the conquerors is not the only extraordinary feature of theperiodfollowingtheMongolconquest.Onemighthavethoughtthatthepoetrywouldcometoahalt,oratleast a hiatus, in the grim, blackened aftermath of theMongol conquest.But three of the very greatestPersianpoetsflourishedatthistime,tobefollowedbythefourthalittlelater.Rumiwasbornin1207,Iraqi in 1211, Sa‘di some time in the same decade, and Hafez a century later. Iranians themselvesnormallyconsiderRumi,Hafez,andSa‘ditobe(withFerdowsi)thegreatestoftheirpoets,anditisnotpossibleinasmallspacetodomorethangiveasenseofwhotheywereandthemeresttasteofwhattheywrote. Iraqi is likewise an important figure, especially in Sufism. Together these poets represent theculminationofliterarydevelopmentinPersiansincetheArabconquest.

Jalalal-DinMolaviRumi(normallycalledMawlanabyIranians)wasborninBalkhin1207.Itwasnotagoodtimeorplace.Hisfather,likeothersfearingtheapproachoftheMongols,leftBalkhin1219,initiallyforMeccaonthehajj,latertoKonyainAnatolia.RumispentmostoftherestofhislifeinKonya.Initiallyhelived,ashadhisfather,asanorthodoxmemberoftheulema,preachingandstudyingaccordingto theHanafi school.Healso learnedaboutSufism,but around1244he turned to it entirelyunder theinfluenceofanotherSufimysticandpoet,Shams-eTabrizi,withwhomRumihadan intenseemotionalfriendship(atleast).Then,threeorfouryearslater,Shamsdisappeared,perhapsmurdered.Betweenthattimeandhisowndeath in1273,Rumiwroteabout sixty-five thousand linesofpoetry.Hispoetry is aworldofitsown—ahighlycomplexmysticalworldthathasbecomepopularintheUnitedStatesinrecentyears.SomesayRumi is themostpopularpoet in theUnitedStates today,at least in thesense thathisbooks sell better than those of other poets. Some of Rumi’smost famous lines, which come from theopeningofhismasnavi,expressthelongingofthesoulforunionwithGod:

Nowlistentothisreed-flute’sdeeplamentAbouttheheartachebeingaparthasmeant:Sincefromthereed-bedtheyuprootedmeMysong’sexpressedeachhuman’sagony,Abreastwhichseparation’ssplitintwoIswhatIseek,tosharethispainwithyou:Whenkeptfromtheirorigin,allyearnForuniononthedaytheycanreturn...

...Thereedconsolesthoseforcedtobeapart,Itsnoteswilllifttheveiluponyourheart,Where’santidoteorpoisonlikeitssong

Orconfidant,oronewho’spinedsolong?Thisreedrelatesatortuouspathahead,RecallsthelovewithwhichMajnoun’sheartbled:ThefewwhohearthetruthsthereedhassungHavelosttheirwitssotheycanspeakthistongue...42

And this is thesimple ideaat thecoreofRumi’s thought—theunityofGod, theunityof thehumanspirit with God, and the yearning for reunion with God (Plato puts a similar idea into the mouth ofAristophanesintheSymposium).Rumiexpressesthesameideainadifferentwayinthefollowingruba‘i(theBelovedwasacommonSufitermsignifyingGod):

Ma‘shuqchuaftabtabangardad‘Asheqbemesal-ezarregardangardadChunbad-ebahar-eeshqjonbangardadHarshakhkekhoshknistraqsangardad

TheBelovedstartsshininglikethesun,Andtheloverbeginstowhirllikeadust-mote.Whenthespringwindoflovebeginstomove,Anybranchthatisnotwitheredstartstodance43

ManyofRumi’spoemscontainovertorconcealedreferences toShams-eTabrizi:shams inArabicmeanssun,and the reference isobvious.But thisdoesnotmean that theBeloved is simplyShams; theBelovedisalsoGod,thesun,andinasenseRumihimself.

Fakhroddinal-Iraqi,despitehisname,wasan IranianbornnearHamadan in1211.At the time thatwesternprovincewasknownasIraq-eAjam—theIraqoftheAjam,thenon-Arabs—inotherwords,thePersians.Hencethenameal-Iraqi.ThestoriesaboutIraqi’slifegiveusavividideaofhispersonality,whichwasunashamedlyeccentric.Thisfitswithandaddstothesenseofhispersonalityasconveyedbyhispoems.Iraqishowedanearlyfacilityforlearningandscholarship,buthisheadwasturnedinhisteensbythearrivalinHamadanofsomeSufiqalandar—wildmen.Iraqijoinedthemwithouthesitation:

We’vemovedourbedrollsfromthemosquetothetavernofruin[kharabat]We’vescribbledalloverthepageofasceticismanderasedallmiraclesofpiety.NowwesitwiththeloversinthelaneoftheMagiansAnddrinkacupfromthehandsofthedissolutepeopleofthetavern.Iftheheartshouldtweaktheearofrespectabilitynow,whynot?44

Inanotherpoemhesays:

AllfearofGod,allself-denialIdeny;bringwine,nothingbutwineForinallsincerityIrepentmyworshipwhichisbuthypocrisy.Yes,bringmewine,forIhaverenouncedallrenunciationAndallmyvauntedself-righteousnessseemstomebutswaggerandself-display.45

Iraqiwenttravelingwiththeotherbeggars.Hewrotemanypoemsaboutthebeautyofyoungmenandboys,andthehomoeroticstraininPersianpoetryisespeciallyplaininhiswork.Buthiscontemporarydefenders claimed that he only admired the boys longingly from afar. Eventually, he came under theinfluence of a follower of the Sufi philosopher Ibn Arabi, perhaps the greatest thinker of Islamic

mysticism,whohaddiedin1240.IbnArabi’sthought—steepedprimarilyintheQor’anandthetraditionsofthehadith,butinfluenced

alsobyNeoplatonismandthethinkingofearlierSufis—elaboratedwhatappearsverylikeaversionofPlato’s theory of forms: that phenomena in thematerialworld aremanifestations of original, essentialtruths in a higher sphere (itself an idea possibly derived from IranianMazdaism, aswe saw earlier).Therefore true reality lay paradoxically in the spiritual, metaphysical world beyond, of which thephysicalworldwasamere shadow.Central also to IbnArabi’s thinkingwere ideasof theonenessofGod’screation(wahdatal-wujud)andoftheimagination(khiyal).

AnotherverysignificantconceptthatIbnArabidevelopedfromtheformulaeofearlierthinkerswastheideaofthePerfectMan(al-insanal-kamil).AccordingtothisnotionthesphereofexistencethatisnotGodisdividedbetweenthemacrocosm,theworldbeyondMan,andthemicrocosm,theinnerworldofMan. These twoworlds reflect each other, and through religious contemplation and self-development,Mancan“polishhissoul”untilthetwoworldsarecongruent.Mancanimproveandperfecthimselfuntilhetakesontheformofthedivine,becomingthePerfectMan.46HecanthenbecomeaconduitforthewillofGodintheworld.Thisstateisachievedbyreligiousdisciplineandmysticaldevotion,anideathatwastohavegreatsignificanceinlaterIslamicthinking.AyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniwasfascinatedbytheseideas andwrote one of his earliest books about a later commentary on theFusus al-Hikam (Seals ofWisdom)ofIbnArabi.

Consideralsothefollowingextract,aboutthepossibilityofamysticbeingabletovisitthealternativeEarthofTrueReality:

Thenhemeets thoseFormswhostandandkeepwatchat theentrances to thewaysofapproach,Godhavingespeciallyassignedthemthistask.Oneofthemhastenstowardsthenewcomer,clotheshiminarobesuitabletohisrank,takeshimbythehand,andwalkswithhimover thatEarthand theydo in it as theywill.He lingers to lookat thedivineworksofart;every stone, every tree, every village, every single thing he comes across, he may speak with, if he wishes, as a manconverseswithacompanion....Whenhehasattainedhisobjectandthinksofreturningtohisdwellingplace,hiscompaniongoeswithhimandtakeshimbacktotheplaceatwhichheentered.Thereshesaysgoodbyetohim;shetakesofftherobeinwhichshehadclothedhimanddepartsfromhim...47

Theideathattheworldofexperiencewasamereshadowoftherealworldofformsbeyondhadgreatpotentialformetaphorinspiritualpoetry,andtracesofthisideacanbeseeninmanyofthePersianpoets.They reached their apotheosis with Shabestari, who in hisGulshan-e raz put forward a full-fledgedaesthetic according towhich eyebrows, curls, or the downon the beloved’s upper lipmight representheavenlyormetaphysicalconcepts.

IraqiwasdevotedtotheideasofIbnArabifor therestofhis life.HewrotehisDivineFlashes inexpositionofthem,andwhenhediedin1289hewasburiednexttoIbnArabiinDamascus.Butheneversettleddowntoaconventionallife.OnestorysaysthatwhenhearrivedinCairoonhistravels,thesultanhonoredhimbysettinghimonhisownhorseandgivinghimsomesplendidclothes;butasherodethroughthestreetsaccompaniedbymanyotherscholarsanddignitariesonfoot, Iraqisuddenlysnatchedoffhisturbanandputitonthesaddleinfrontofhim.Seeinghimtravelinginsuchsplendor,butbareheaded,thepeoplewatching laughed.When thesultanheardabout ithewasdispleased,because itmadehim lookridiculous.Iraqiexplainedthathehadremovedtheturbantoavoidsin.Asherodealongitoccurredtohim thatnoonehadeverbeen sohonored, andashe felt his ego riseuphehaddeliberatelyhumbledhimself.48

Some commentators feel that Iraqi’s poetry was better and livelier before his encounter with thethought of Ibn Arabi—that it became overburdened metaphysically afterward. But there is something

especiallytouchingaboutIraqiandhispoetry,especiallyhisearlywork.Itshowsperhapsmoreclearlythan any other Sufi poetry the urge to dispense with the self-regarding piety and the holier-than-thouobservanceofmererulespursuedbytheorthodox.Italsoshocksandprovokes theorthodoxbyblatantfloutingoftheirrules.Inthis,theimpulsedrivingtheSufisisveryclosetotheteachingsofJesusagainstthe Pharisees (“Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!”). Jesus is revered by many IranianMuslims (not just Sufis) for this trait—for speaking from the heart of spirituality and avoiding gettingcaughtupinitstrappings.

WithSa‘diandHafezwebegintorunoutofsuperlatives.BothhavehadaprofoundinfluenceonthethinkingofordinaryIranians,andphrasesfromtheirpoemsarecommonsayings.TeachersofthePersianlanguageused touseSa‘di’sGolestan (GardenofRoses) to teach their pupils, having themmemorizeexcerpts in order to help them absorb vocabulary and remember grammar and patterns of usage. Hisworks were some of the first to be translated into European languages in the eighteenth century. OnepassagefromtheGolestanappearsabovetheentrancetotheUnitedNationsinNewYork:

Bani-Adamaza-yeyek-digarandKedarafarineshzeyekgawharandChu‘ozvibedardavaradruzegarDigarozvharanumanatqarar

Allmenarefellow-membersofonebodyFortheywerecreatedfromoneessenceWhenfateafflictsonelimbwithpainTheotherlimbsmaynotstayunmoved

Anditcontinues:

Tukazmehnat-edigarandighamiNashayadkenamatnahandadami

YouwhoarewithoutsorrowforthesufferingofothersYoudonotdeservetobecalledhuman

Sa‘diwasborninShiraz(acitysavedfromMongoldestructionbythewisedecisionofitsrulertosubmittothemearly),probablysometimebetween1213and1219.Inhispoemstherearemanystoriesabouthistravels,someofwhicharedubious.HewasbackinShirazbyaround1256,anddiedtherein1292. He was familiar with Sufism but was not openly a devotee. His Bustan (The Orchard) is anextendedpoemofmoral tales,notonlyencouragingwisdomandvirtue,humilityandkindness,butalsocommon sense andpragmatism.Someof these features emerge in the following storyofOmar and thebeggar(Omarwasthesecondcaliph,afterAbuBakr—oneofthefourRighteousCaliphsofSunniIslam):

I’veheardtherewasabeggarinanarrowplace,OnwhosefootOmarplacedhisown;Thehaplesspauper,knowingnotwhohewas(Forinangeroneknowsnotenemyfromfriend),Flewathim,saying“Areyoublind,then?”Atwhichthejustcommander,Omar,saidtohim:“BlindIamnot,butIdidslipUnwittingly;pray,remitmysin.”

Howeven-handedwerethegreatonesoftheFaithTodealthuswithsubordinates.Muchwillbemadetomorrowofthosewhocultivatehumility,Whiletheheadsofmightymenhanglowforembarrassment;Ifyou’reafraidoftheDayofJudgement,Remittheslipsofthoseafraidofyou;Oppressnotyoursubordinateswithimpunity,Foroveryourhandliesahandlikewise49

SomehavethoughtthatSa‘di’spragmatismstrayedtoofarinthedirectionofrelativismandamorality,citing for example the well-known dictum from the first story in the Golestan that “an expedientfalsehoodispreferabletoamischievoustruth.”50ButSa‘diisnottheonlyliteraryfiguretohavemadesuchasuggestion—onecoulddrawasimilarmoralfromplaywrightHenrikIbsen’sWildDuckwithoutconcluding that Ibsen was an amoral relativist. Sa‘di’s views are diverse and sometimes appearcontradictory,butthatisareflectionofthecomplexitiesheaddressed.ItisrightthatSa‘dibecameknownforhisepigramsbecausehehadagiftforcommunicatingpithythoughtsinvividlanguage:

Anankepari-ruyoshekargoftarandHayfastkeru-yekhubpenhandarandFi’l-jomleneqabnizbifayedenistTazeshtbepushandonikubogzarand

Thosenymph-faced,sugar-speakingones,Whatapitytheyshouldhidetheirfairfaces.Buttheveilisnotworthlesseither;Theuglyshouldputiton,andthebeautiful,off.51

And:

Yaru-yebekonj-ekhalvatavarshaboruzYaatash-e‘eshqbarkonokhanehbesuzMasturio‘asheqibehamnayadrastGarpardehnakhahikedaraddidehbeduz

EitherchooseacornerofseclusiondayandnightOrlightlove’sfireandletthehouseburn.Concealmentandlovedonotgetonwell.Ifyoudonotwanttheveiltorn,sealupyoureyes52

HafeztoowasborninShiraz,butacenturylater—about1315.“Hafez”isapenname,signifyingthathehadlearnedtheQor’anbyheart;hisrealnamewasShamsal-DinMohammadShirazi.Littleisknownof his life. He died around 1390, when the impact of Timur (Tamerlane) was beginning to be felt—anotherroundofinvasions,warfare,andmasskillingstorivalthatoftheMongolsinferocityandmisery.ThescholarA.J.ArberrybelievedthatoneofHafez’slastghazalswaspromptedbythesenewdisasters:

Againthetimesareoutofjoint;andagainForwineandtheBeloved’slanguidglanceIamfain.Thewheeloffortuneisamarvellousthing:Whatnextproudheadtothelowlydustwillitbring?

’Tisafamoustale,thedeceitfulnessofearth;Thenightispregnant:whatwilldawnbringtobirth?Tumultandbloodybattlerageintheplain:Bringblood-redwine,andfillthecupagain.53

Butbefore the skiesdarkenedagainwith the smokeofwar andmassacre,Hafez took thepreviouspatternsofPersianpoetryandelevatedthemtonew,unsurpassedheightsofexpression.Inthefollowingghazal the familiar images of wine and the Beloved ripple, interfere, overlap, reflect each other, andtherebytranscendtheimmediateeroticism,pointingbeyonddesiretotheworldofthespirit.Itissayingthatifloveisoffered,itmustbetaken;andiftaken,itmustbedrunktothedregsbecauselovedemandsfullcommitment.Onlythencanitstruesignificancebegrasped—thatloveistheessentialgift,theessenceoflife,giventousbeforetime:

Herhairwasstilltangled,hermouthstilldrunkAndlaughing,hershoulderssweaty,theblouseTornopen,singinglovesongs,herwinecupfull.Hereyeswerelookingforafight,herlipsReadyforjibes.ShesatdownLastnightatmidnightonmybed.SheputherlipsclosetomyearandsaidInawhisperthesewords:‘Whatisthis?Aren’tyoumyoldlover—Areyouasleep?’ThefriendofwisdomwhoreceivesThiswinethatstealssleepisatraitortoloveIfhedoesn’tworshipthatsamewine.Ohyouprudes,goaway.StoparguingwiththoseWhodrinkthebitterdregs,becauseitwaspreciselyThisgiftthedivineonesgaveusbeforeEternity.WhateverGodpouredintoourcupWedrank,whetheritwasthewineOfheavenorthewineofdrunkenness.Thelaughterofthewine,andthedishevelledcurlsoftheBelovedOh,howmanynightsofrepentance—likethoseofHafezHavebeenbrokenbymomentslikethis?54

Poems like this unsettlemany Iranians even today.55 Some religious Iranianswill say directly thatthesepoemsarenot reallyaboutwineor erotic loveat all—that themeaning is entirelyona spirituallevel, and that the poets themselves never touchedwine.Whether or not that is true (and personally Idoubt it), the fact is that the poems onlywork if the eroticism and the alcoholic intoxication are real.Rather,theyworkbecausetheyarereal,becausetheyringtrueandspeakdirectlytoourownexperienceasonlygreatliteraturecan.Theyseemtoremindusofsomethingwehadalwaysknownbuthadsomehowforgotten.Otherwisethemetaphorswouldbejustadevice,therebellionagainstconventionnomorethana pose. This poetry has more bite, more impact than that. Hafez wrote the following in a period ofofficious imposition of religious orthodoxy (and some have pointed up its relevance in contemporaryIran):

Bovadayakedar-emaykadehabogshayandGerehazkar-eforubaste-yemabogshayandAgarazbahr-edel-ezahed-ekhodbinbastandDelqavidarkeazbahr-ekhodabogshayand

MighttheyopenthedoorsofthewineshopsAndloosentheirholdonourknottedlives?IfshuttosatisfytheegoofthepuritanTakeheart,fortheywillreopentopleaseGod.56

In later times Hafez was appreciated and translated by Goethe, whose enthusiasm for this poetryreflected thatofmanyotherEuropeans.As for thePersians, they so reveredHafez thathisDivan (theconventional term for a book collecting a poet’s work in one volume) was used as an oracle, andsometimesisstill.Peoplewantingtoknowtheirfortuneopenitatrandominthehopeoftextsthatcanbeinterpretedasoptimisticpredictions.TheonlyotherbookusedinthatwayistheQor’an.

Aybad,hadis-emannahanashmiguSerr-edel-emanbesadzabanashmiguMigunabedansankemalalashgiradMigusokhaniodarmiyanashmigu

Owind,tellhermystorysecretly.Tellhermyheart’ssecretinahundredtongues.Tellher,butnotinawaythatmayoffendher.Speaktoherandbetweenthewordstellhermystory.57

Persiansdidnotstopwritingpoetry in the fifteenthcentury.Thereweremany importantpoetsafterHafez—notablyJami,and laterBidel.By that timeabodyof literatureofunparalleled importancehadbeencreated. It is literatureofalmost inconceivablequantity,greatdiversity, andsublimequality.Onecouldcomparethisbodyofliteraturetoahumanbrainandthinkofitinthewaythatsometheoristsnowconsider human consciousness—that consciousness is not located in any one part of the brain, but isinstead the consequence of the impossibly complex interaction ofmillions of different cells and theirsparking synapses.Somehow,outof thispoetryand thecombinationsand interactionsof the ideasandmetaphorscontainedwithinthememergedtheIraniansoul.

Everyhundredyearsorso,thereadingpublicintheWestdiscoversanotherofthesePersianpoets.In1800itwasHafez,in1900OmarKhayyam,in2000itisRumi.Thechoicedependsnotsomuchonthemerits or true nature of the poets or their poetry, but more on their capacity to be interpreted inaccordancewithpassingWesternliteraryandculturalfashions.SoHafezwasinterpretedtofitwiththemoodofRomanticism,OmarKhayyamwiththeaestheticmovement,andithasbeenRumi’smisfortunetobebefriendedbynumb-brainedNewAgery.Ofcourse,anattentiveandimaginativereadercanavoidthesolipsistic trap, especially if he or she can read even a little Persian.But themirror of language andtranslationmeans that thereadermayseeonlyahazybutconsolingreflectionofhimselfandhis times,ratherthanlookingintothetruedepthsofthepoetry—whichmightbemoreunsettling.

Onthesurface,thereligionofloveoftheseSufipoetsfromeighthundredyearsagomightseemratherdistantandarchaic.ThatisbeliedlessbytheburgeoningpopularityofRumiandAttarthanbythedeepermessageof thesepoets.Darwinistswho, likeRichardDawkins,believeDarwinism ineluctablyentailsatheismmightbeupsetbytheidea,butwhatcouldbemoreappropriatetoanintellectualworldthathasabandonedcreationismforevolutiontheorythanareligionoflove?Darwinismandevolutionarytheoryhavedemonstratedtheintensefocusofalllifeontheactofreproduction,theactoflove.Thespiritofthatactandthedrivebehinditarethespiritoflifeitself.Whatcouldbemorefittingthanareligionthatusestheemotionaldrivebehindthatactasametaphorforahigherspirituality,anditslongingasalongingforunionwiththeGodhead—“ThisgiftthedivineonesgaveusbeforeEternity.”

TIMURAfterabout1300(notablyunder the rulerGhazanKhan) theMongol Il-Khans,becomingIslamizedandPersianized, reversed their extractive, destructive, slash-and-burn style of rule. They began trying toreconstructcitiestheyhaddestroyed,tryingtoresurrectsystemsofirrigationandagriculturethathadbeenabandoned.Theyhadsomesuccess,andthenewcapitalTabrizcertainlyprospered.Azerbaijan,withitswetterclimate,wasfavoredgenerallybytheconqueringhorsemenfor thebetterpastureitoffered.ThegreathistorianRashidal-Din(aconvertedJew)enjoyedthepatronageoftheIl-Khansand,buildingontheearlierworksofJuvainiandothers,wroteahugeanddefinitivehistory.Theculturalflowwasnotalloneway—PersianminiaturepaintingwaspermanentlyinfluencedbyanimportedChineseaesthetic,andtherewereotherexamples.ButIranundertheIl-Khans,forallthesignsofregeneration,wasapoorer,harsherplacethanbefore.TheempireoftheIl-Khansbegantofragmentwithanalmostdeterministicinevitability.Localvassalrulersslowlymadethemselvesindependentofthecenter,ashadhappenedbeforeundertheSeljuksandtheAbbasids.

In themid-fourteenthcenturyinKhorasan,aroundSabzavar,arebelmovementcalledthesarbedari(heads-in-noose)arose.Itdisplayedegalitariantendenciesandco-optedShi‘aandSufielements.58Likesomelaterandearliermovements,thesarbedarishowtheeclecticnatureofpopular,provincialreligioninIranatthistime.Elsewhere,theShi‘aandtheSufistendedtobeinopposition,butthesarbedariseemtohavehadlittledifficultyfusingtheapparentlycontradictorytenetsofthedifferentbeliefsinvolved,andthis creative ferment of popular religion was to prove important later, too. The sarbedari are alsosignificant in another way—they represent again a spirit of popular resistance to the invaders,independentofcontingentdynasticleadership.ThissamespiritwasthereaftertheArabinvasion,atthebeginning of the Mongol period,59 and it appears again later in Iranian history. This might promptquestions about nationalism that could easily absorb the rest of this book.60Whatwe call nationalismtodayisinmyviewtoospecificallyaconstructedphenomenonofthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiestobeconsideredwithoutanachronisminthefourteenthcenturyorotherearlierperiods.ButwehaveseenthattherewasasenseofIranianness,beyondlocalordynasticloyalty, inthetimeoftheSassanidsandbefore;itwaspartofwhatlaterinspiredtheshu‘ubiyya,theSamanids,andFerdowsi.Nationalismisthewrongword,buttodenyanyIranianidentityinthiserarequiressomeseriouscontortionsofevidenceandlogic.

From 1380, the hopeful vassal dynasty builders, the resurgent cities and peasants, and the boldsarbedariwereallalikesubmergedbythenext invadingsurgeofsteppenomadsunderTimur(Timur-elang—TimurtheLame—Tamerlaneor,inMarlowe,Tamburlaine).TimurwasthesonofaminorTurkicvassalinTransoxiana,whosetupafollowingofwarriorsandbuiltatightlydisciplinedarmyexplicitlyonthemodelofthegreatMongol,GenghisKhan.HemarriedaprincessfromthegreatKhanfamilyandcalledhimselfGüregen (whichmeans son-in-law) todrawon theprestigeofhispredecessor.HealsotookMongolprecedentasaprecedentforterror.

Timur established himself first in the cities of Transoxiana, with a base at Samarkand, and theninvaded Persia. Cities were razed, their citizens massacred, and the plunder sent with any valuablesurvivorsbacktoSamarkand,toadornanewparadiseofgardensandgrandbuildings.Tointimidatehisenemies,TimurraiseduppillarsofhumanheadsashemarchedthroughthePersianprovinces—outsideIsfahanalone (where thepeoplehadbeen foolishenough toattack theTimuridgarrison)he loppedoffseventy thousand heads, which were then set in 120 pillars. In his bloody wake the desert againencroachedonabandonedfarmlandsand irrigationworks.Unlike theMongols,Timurconquered in thenameoforthodoxSunniIslam,butthisinnowaymoderatedhisconductofwar.AftertakingPersiaand

defeatingtheMongolsoftheGoldenHordeinthesteppelandsaroundMoscow,hemovedintoIndiaandtookDelhi.Then he turnedwest again,where he conqueredBaghdad (another ninety thousand heads),defeatedtheOttomansultan,capturedhim,andreturnedtoSamarkand.Hediedin1405in themidstofpreparationsforanattackonChina.

There is a story thatTimurmetHafez,but it isprobablyapocryphal.ButTimurdidmeet theArabhistorianandthinkerIbnKhaldun.NohistorianlookingatthehistoryoftheIslamicworldintheperiodcovered by this chapter could avoid noticing the cyclical pattern of dynastic rise, decline, and nomadinvasion.ButIbnKhalduncameupwithatheorytoexplainit.61Histheorybeganwiththeasabiyya, thestrongsolidarityorgroupfeelingofnomadwarriors,fosteredbytheinterdependencethatwasnecessaryinmobiletriballifeintheharshconditionsofdesert,mountains,andthemarginsofthesteppes.Thiswasthe cohesive spirit that made the nomads such formidable warriors, that enabled them to invade anddominate areas of sedentary settlement, and conquer cities. But having done so, their leaders had toconsolidatetheirsupport.Theyhadtoprotectthemselvesagainstbeingsupplantedbyothermembersofthe tribe, and therefore gave patronage to other groups—city dwellers, bureaucratic officials, and theulema. They also used building projects and a magnificent court to impress their subjects with theirprestige, and employed mercenaries as soldiers, because they were more reliable. So the originalasabiyyaof theconquerorswasdilutedand lost.Eventually therulingdynastycametobelieve itsownmythandspentincreasinglyonvaindisplay,weakeningitsstrengthoutsidethecapitalcityandwithinit.Theulemaandordinarycitizens,disillusionedwiththedynasty’sdecadence,becamereadytowelcomeanotherwaveof conqueringnomads,whowould start up a newdynasty and set the cycle off all overagain.

Thetheory—ofwhichtheaboveisagreatlysimplifiedversion—doesnotaddressalltheelementsofthecycleofinvasionsastheyaffectedIran.WehaveseenhowtheprosperityoftheSilkRouteencouragedplundering invasions as well as trade, and how the vulnerability of Iran (and particularly Khorasan)flowed from its central geographical position, just as geography gave it great economic and culturaladvantages.TheAbbasidsandtheirsuccessorswereweakenedrepeatedlybythemeasurestheyusedtotry toovercome thedifficultyofgathering taxes.Officials tended tobecomecorruptandsiphonoff taxrevenue, so the rulers gave the responsibility to tax farmers instead; they then tended to plunder thepeasant farmers, quickly running down the productivity of agriculture. The rulers could grant landholdings(iqta,soyurgal)tosoldiersinreturnformilitaryservice,butthistendedtomeanintimethatthesoldierscametothinkof themselvesasfarmersor landownersrather thansoldiers.Ortheycoulddoasimilarthingonagranderscaleandgrantwholeprovincestotrustedfamiliesinreturnforfiscaltributeandmilitarysupport.Butaswehaveseen,thelikelihoodthenwasthattheprovincialgovernorswouldgrowpowerfulenoughtobecomeindependentandeventakeoverthestatethemselves.

IbnKhaldun’s theorydoesnot fully explain thehistoryof thisperiodon itsown, and itmayapplybettertotheIslamicstatesofNorthAfrica,wherethehistorianlivedformostofhislife.Butitisausefulmodel nonetheless, and it also accounts for some deep attitudes among the people themselves. IbnKhaldundidnotinventthoseattitudes,heobservedthem.Thenomadsoftenwereregarded(especiallybythemselves,ofcourse)ashavingaprimitivemartialvirtue.Thecourtwasregardedasadecadentplacethat tended to corrupt itsmembers.Theulemamightoftenbe regardedas authoritative arbitrators in acrisis.Theseweremental,social,andculturalstructuresthatinthemselveshelpedtoinfluenceevents.

Forourpurposes,themostimportantthingtoemphasizeistheresilienceandintellectualpowerofthesmallclassofPersianscholar-bureaucrats.NostalgicfortheirheroicSassanidancestors,escapingfromofficialduplicityandcourtiershipintoeitherdreamsofloveandgardens,religiousmysticism,thedesignof splendid palaces and mosques, or the complexities of mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, they

bouncedbackfromcrisisaftercrisis,accommodatedtotheirconquerors,madethemselvesindispensableagain,andeventuallyreassertedsomethinglikecontroloverthem.Intheprocess,theyensured(whetherbasedinBaghdad,Balkh,Tabriz,orHerat)thesurvivaloftheirlanguage,theirculture,andanunrivaledintellectual heritage. It is one of themost remarkable phenomena inworld history. Behind the historydescribedinthischapter,theArabconquestandthesuccessionofempires—Abbasid,Ghaznavid,Seljuk,Mongol,Timurid—lies the storyofwhatultimatelyproved tobe amore important empire: the IranianEmpireoftheMind.

AfterTimur,theprocessfolloweditsusualpattern.Theconquerorstookonthecharacteristicsoftheconquered.Timur’ssonShahrokhruledfromHeratandpatronized thebeginningsofanotherPersianatecultural flowering that continued under his successors and produced great architecture, manuscriptillustrations,andpaintedminiatures,prefiguring laterculturaldevelopments in theMoghulandSafavidempires. As others before, the Timurid Empire gradually fragmented into a patchwork of dynasticsuccessor-states. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, two of them—two great confederations ofMongolizedTurkictribes,theAq-QoyunluandtheQara-Qoyunlu(WhiteSheepandBlackSheepTurks,respectively)—sluggeditoutforhegemonyoverthewar-ravagedIranianplateau.TheWhiteSheepcameout on top, but were then overwhelmed by a new dynasty from Turkic Anatolia, the Safavids. But tounderstand theSafavids it is necessary first to go right back to the seventh century again for a deeperunderstandingofthehistoryanddevelopmentofShi‘ism.

4

SHI‘ISMANDTHESAFAVIDS

MenwiserandmorelearnedthanIhavediscernedinhistoryaplot,arhythm,apredeterminedpattern.Theseharmoniesareconcealedfromme.Icanseeonlyoneemergencyfollowinguponanotheraswavefollowsuponwave,onlyonegreatfactwithrespecttowhich,sinceitisunique,therecanbenogeneralisations,onlyonesaferuleforthehistorian:thatheshouldrecogniseinthedevelopmentofhumandestiniestheplayofthecontingentandtheunforeseen.Thisisnotadoctrineofcynicismanddespair.Thefactofprogressiswrittenplainandlargeonthepageofhistory;butprogressisnotalawofnature.Thegroundgainedbyonegenerationmaybelostbythenext.Thethoughtsofmenmayflowintothechannelswhichleadtodisasterandbarbarism.

—H.A.L.Fisher

THEORIGINSOFSHI‘ISMEarlyinOctoberAD6801agroupof less thanonehundredarmedmen,accompaniedby their families,approachedthetownofKufa,southofthepresent-daysiteofBaghdad,ontheriverEuphrates.TheyhadcomefromMecca,hundredsofmilesawayacrosstheArabianDesert.Asthetravelersandtheirleader,Hosein,drewnearthetown,theywereinterceptedbyathousandmountedtroops.Thetravelersagreedtomoveontothenorth,awayfromKufa,escortedbythetroops.ThefollowingdayafurtherfourthousandmenarrivedwithorderstomakeHoseinswearallegiancetothecaliphYazid.Hoseinrefused.Bynowhispeoplewererunningoutofwater,andthesoldiersblockedtheirwaytotheriver.

Afterseveraldaysaneworderarrived:Hoseinandhisfollowersshouldbecompelledtosubmitbyforce. The soldiers formed up in battle order and bore down onHosein’s smaller group. He tried topersuadehispeople tosave themselvesand lethimface theirenemiesalone,but theywouldnot leavehim.Hespoketothetroopsconfrontinghim,reproachingthem.ButhisenemieswereobdurateandsoonafterbegantoshootarrowsintoHosein’scamp.Completelyoutnumbered,Hosein’smenwerekilledonebyoneasthearrowsraineddownamongthetentsandtetheredanimals.Someofthemfoughtbackagainsttheirtormentors,charginginonesandtwosintotheserriedranksthatsurroundedthem,buttheyweresoonkilled.At lastHoseinwastheonlyoneleftalive,holdingthebodyofhis infantson,whohadtakenanarrowthroughthethroat.ThesoldierssurroundedHosein,whofoughtharduntilatlasthewasstrucktothegroundandoneofthemfinishedhimoff.

OfHosein’smale relatives only one of his sons survived (having lain ill in the camp through thefighting).InKufa,Hosein’sheadwasbroughtbeforeYazid’sdeputy,whostruckthedeadman’sface.AbystanderreproachedhimforstrikingthelipsthattheProphetofGodhadoncekissed.

Hoseinwas thegrandsonof theProphetMohammad, through theProphet’sdaughterFatimaandhiscousinAli.ThisaccountofthemassacreatKarbalaoftheProphet’sclosestfamilyhasbeenpasseddownbygenerationsofShi‘aMuslims.Asalways,theremusthavebeenanothersidetothestory.Fromanotherperspective the Umayyad caliphs might look less wicked, more like pragmatists struggling to hold adisparateempire together,andHosein,Ali,and theirpartisansmore like incompetent idealists.But theimportant thing is to understand how theShi‘a themselves later understood the story.Karbalawas thecentral,definingevent in theearlyhistoryofShi‘a Islam.TheshrineofHoseinatKarbala,on the sitewhereithappened,isoneofthemostimportantShi‘aholyplaces.Eachyeartheanniversary(Ashura)isstillmarkedwithdeepmourning,bymassreligiousdemonstrationsandoutpouringsofpiousgrief.EversinceKarbala,Shi‘aMuslimshavebroodedoverthemartyrdomofHoseinanditssymbolism,andhavenursedasenseofgrievance,betrayal,andshame.

Thegreat schismsof theChristian church,betweenEast andWest, and laterbetweenCatholic andProtestant,camecenturiesafterthetimeofChrist.ButthegreatschisminIslamthatstilldividesMuslimstoday,betweenSunniandShi‘a,originatedintheearliestdaysofthefaith—evenbeforeKarbala,inthetimeoftheProphetMohammadhimself.ComparisonswiththeChristianschismsdonotreallywork.Amoreappositeanalogy,asnotedbythehistorianRichardN.Fryeandothers,2canbedrawnbetween,ontheonehand, theemphasisonlawandtraditioninSunniIslamandJudaismand,ontheotherhand, theemphasisonhumility,sacrifice,andthereligioushierarchyinChristianityandShi‘ism.ThepublicgriefofAshuraissimilarinspirittothatwhichonecanstillseeonGoodFridayinsomeCatholiccountries.ThepurposeinmakingcomparisonsbetweenShi‘ismandvariousaspectsofChristianityisnottosuggestthat they are somehow the same (they are not), nor to encourage some kind of happy joining-handsecumenism(naïve),butrathertotrytoilluminatesomethingthatinitiallylooksunfamiliar,andtosuggestbyanalogythatitmaynotbesostrangeorunfamiliarafterall.Oratleast,thatitisnomorestrangethanChristianCatholicism.

The term Shi‘a signifies Shi‘a Ali—the party of Ali. Ali was the Prophet’s cousin, and one ofMohammad’searliestconverts.TheShi‘a(sometimescalledAlidsatthisearlyphase)weresimplythosewho favored rule by both the blood descendants of Ali and the Prophet. Other characteristics anddoctrinesonlydevelopedlater.

Fromthebeginning,Mohammad’sfollowers,theearliestMuslims,hadrunintoconflictwithtemporalauthority.Mohammad, Ali, and the others had been forced to flee fromMecca toMedina when theirrelationshipwith the rulers ofMecca deteriorated into open hostility. This situation recurs again andagaininIslamichistory—particularlyinthehistoryofShi‘ism.MohammadchallengedtheMeccans’wayoflife,callingformoremoralandpiousformsofconductbasedontherevelationofGod’swill in theQor’an.TheMeccanauthoritiesrespondedwithderisionandpersecution.Theconflictbetweenarrogant,worldly,corruptauthorityandearnest,piousausteritywasestablishedasaculturalmodelforcenturies,downtotheIranianrevolutionof1979,andtothepresentday.

Shi‘aMuslimsbelievethatMohammadnominatedAliashissuccessor,ascaliph,afterhisdeath,butthattherightfulsuccessionwasusurpedbyothers.BythetimeAlibecamethefourthcaliph,inAD656,the rulers of Islam had conquered huge territories, from Egypt to Persia, as we saw in the previouschapter.ThismeantgreatnewpowerforsomeoftheleadingfamiliesoftheArabtribes(notablyforsomemembersoftheQurayshfamily,manyofwhomhadopposedMohammadhimselfbeforeMeccasubmittedand converted), but also required the Arab conquerors to adopt new patterns of rule and powerrelationships.

ManyMuslimsdidnotapproveofthechanges,politicaldeals,andpragmaticcompromisesinvolved.Ali,forexample,heldhimselfaloof,maintainingapiouslifeofausterityandprayer.Hebecameanatural

focus fordissentandwas in turn resentedby thosearound thecaliph,bringing forth theauthority/pietyconflictwithin Islamitself for the first time.WhenAlibecamecaliph, thismutualhostility led tocivilwar(fitna).ThenwhenAlitriedtomakepeacein661,someofhismoreradicalKharijitesupportersfeltbetrayedandmurderedhim,whereupontheleaderofhisformeropponents—Mu‘awiya—tookpowerasthefirstUmayyadcaliph.Intime,Mu‘awiyadiedandwassucceededbyhisson—thecaliphYazidthatwasHosein’senemyatthetimeofKarbalain680.

Hosein’srebellionindefianceofYazid’sauthoritywas,asShi‘abelieve,abid topurifyIslamandreturn it to itsoriginalprinciples. Itdrewforce fromHosein’sownblood link to theProphet,butalsofrom theperceived impietyofYazidandhiscourt,wherewinedrinkingwascommonandsomeof theforms of pre-Islamic Byzantine and Persian practices had taken hold. Hosein hoped for support fromKufa, but Yazid’s troops got there first and bullied the Kufans into passivity. Some Shi‘a historiansbelieve that Hosein went to his death at Karbala knowingly and willingly, in the belief that only bysacrificinghimselfcouldhebringabouttherenewalhedesired(anotherpointatwhichsomehavedrawncomparisons with Christianity). The failure of Hosein’s Kufan supporters to help him added a strongsenseofguilttotheShi‘amemoryofKarbala.

After Karbala, the Umayyad dynasty of Yazid and his successors continued to rule at the head ofIslam,andtheconquestofnewterritorycontinued.TogiveanideaofthesenseofshameandgrievancefeltbytheShi‘a,onemighttrytoimaginehowChristianswouldhavefeltiftheleadershipofthechurchafterthedeathofChristhadfallentoJudasIscariot,PontiusPilate,andtheirsuccessors.TheShi‘asawthemselvesastheunderdogs,thedispossessed,thosealwaysbetrayedandhumiliatedbythepowerfulandthe unrighteous (notwithstanding that powerful Shi‘a dynasties arose later, dominating extensiveterritories).A deep inclination to sympathy and compassion for the oppressed—and a tendency to seethem as naturally more righteous than the rich and powerful—has persisted in popular Shi‘ism rightthrough to the present day.The earlyShi‘a regarded theUmayyad caliphs as illegitimate usurpers andhoped for a revolt thatwould bring to power the descendants ofMohammad,Ali, andHosein. Thesedescendantswere theShi‘aEmams, thesidelinedbut legitimate leadersof Islam,analternative lineofdescenttorival thatof theUmayyadandAbbasidcaliphs.Shi‘aMuslimssawthemselvesasamoreorlesspersecutedminoritywithinstatesrunbyandforSunniMuslims.

Despitetheschism,intheearlycenturiestherewasafairlyfreeinterchangeofideas,aconsiderablepluralismofbelief,andconsiderablediversityofopinionamongtheAlidsorShi‘athemselves.Overall,Shi‘atheologyandlawtendedtobelooserthaninSunniIslam,moreopentotheapplicationofreasonintheology,moreinclinedtoafreewillpositionthanadeterministone,andmoreopentosomeofthemoreheterodoxideascirculatingintheIslamicworld.Thiswaspartlytheresultofabroaderhadithtradition,which included the sayings and doings of the Shi‘a Emams. Shi‘a theology also differed because itaddressedproblemsthatwerespecifictotheShi‘a,suchasconductunderpersecution.

ThesixthShi‘aEmam,Ja‘faral-Sadiq,developedastrategyfortheevasionofpersecutionthatwastoprove controversial. The doctrine of taqiyeh, or dissimulation, permitted Shi‘aMuslims to deny theirfaith if necessary to avoid persecution—a special dispensation that has striking similarities with thedoctrineof“mentalreservation”grantedforsimilarreasonsbytheCatholicchurchintheperiodof theCounter-Reformation,andassociatedwiththeJesuits(thoughitoriginatedbeforetheirtime).JustastheJesuitsacquireda reputationfordeviousnessand terminological trickeryamongProtestants (whence inEnglish we have the adjective “Jesuitical”), so the doctrine of taqiyeh earned the Shi‘a a similarreputationamongsomeSunniMuslims.

SomecommentatorsarguethatthedoctrinesofJa‘faral-SadiqreflectedaperiodofShi‘aquietism—aretreatfrompolitics,fromconfrontation,andfromeffortstooverturnthecaliphate.Thisquietism,withits

dispositiontomodestyandunpretentiousvirtue,wasonethreadofShi‘isminthefollowingcenturies(andstillis).ButtherewereShi‘amovementsthatemphaticallydidnotfollowthispattern,includingseveralmajorShi‘arevoltsinJa‘far’slifetime—thesignificantShi‘aparticipationintherevoltofAbuMuslimthatfoundedtheAbbasidcaliphate,forexample.AfterJa‘faral-Sadiq’sdeath(in765)therewasafurtherschism.OnegroupofShi‘a supported Ja‘far’s sonMusa,whileanothergroupacclaimedhisother sonIsmailas theseventhEmam,givingrise to theIsmailior“Sevener”branchofShi‘ismespousedby thelater Fatimid rulers of Egypt. The Ismaili sect also spawned the notorious movement known as theAssassins, a shadowy organization whose doings were much distorted by Western chroniclers. TheAssassins established themselves as a power in the Alborz mountains in the twelfth and thirteenthcenturies,andtheywereespeciallyimportantintheperiodjustbeforeandaftertheMongolinvasionsofthe1220s.

IntheninthcenturyafurtherperiodofconfusionfollowedthedeathoftheeleventhEmam(itwasthedomeoftheshrineoftheeleventhEmam,atSamarrainIraq, thatwasblownupbySunniextremists inFebruary 2006, precipitating a new phase of serious Sunni/Shi‘a intercommunal violence) because itseemedhehadnolivingheir.Themain,non-IsmailistrandofShi‘ismdividedintomanydifferentsectswith different theological solutions to this problem. Eventually the faith coalesced again around theexplanation that the eleventh Emam had had an heir, a son, but that this boy had been concealed or“occluded”shortlyafterthedeathofhisfather,inordertoavoidpersecution.Attherighttime,atimeofchaosandcrisis, thishidden twelfthEmamwould reappear to reestablish the righteous ruleofGodonearth.Theparallelswith theChristiandoctrineof theapocalypseand the secondcomingofChrist areobvious(infact,manyShi‘abelievethatJesuswillaccompanytheHiddenEmamonhisreturn).ButthedoctrinealsocompareswiththeZoroastrianbeliefinaMessiahtocome—theSaoshyant.

Thisdevelopmentaddedafurther,messianic,millenarianelementtoShi‘ism.Butitalsoaddedanewinstability,aselfdoubt,akindofpermanentquestionmarktotheproblemoftherelationofShi‘aMuslimstobothsecularandreligiousauthority.IftheEmamwastheonlylegitimateauthority,thenwhatofaworldwithouttheactivepresenceoftheEmam?Shi‘ismalreadyhadaproblemwithtemporalpower,butnowithadafurtherproblemaboutauthoritywithinShi‘ismitself.

TheHiddenEmamwas the twelfthand last in succession toAli, and thosewhoawaitedhis returnwere calledTwelver Shi‘as. The largest Shi‘a community, the Twelver Shi‘as,were a scattered sect,perhaps better regarded as a tendency,with elements in southernMesopotamia, in central Iran aroundQom,innortheasternIranandCentralAsia,inLebanon,alongthesouthernshoreofthePersianGulf,andelsewhere(todaythereareShi‘ainAfghanistan,Pakistan,andIndiaalso).ButafteraphaseofpowerfulIsmailiandotherShi‘adynastiesliketheFatimids,Buyids,Qarmatians,andothersfromthetenthcentury,Sunni Muslim rulers predominated. Following the Mongol invasions the staunchly orthodox SunniOttomansroseinexorablytocontrolthewesternpartoftheIslamicworld.

THESAFAVIDSBytheendofthefifteenthcenturyamilitantbrotherhoodfromnorthwestIranandeasternAnatolia,madeupofTurkichorsemenandbasedinitiallyatArdebil,hadgrowntomilitaryandpoliticalimportance,andhadbeguntolooktoexpansiononagranderscale.EasternAnatoliaandAzerbaijanatthistimecontainedmanysuchbrotherhoods,moreorlessmilitant,moreorlessexaggeratedorextreme(ghuluww) in theirbeliefs (as perceived by their neighbors), often incorporating elements of Sufism, millenarianism,Shi‘ism, and saint-worship. The beliefs of these brotherhoods have been traced back to pre-Islamic,

Mazdaeanroots,throughtheKhorramitesoftheeighthandninthcenturies.3TheyattractedtheflotsamandjetsamofwarriorsocietyafterthedestructionanddislocationoftheMongolandTimuridinvasions—thedispossessed, the fugitives, the opponents of powerful tribal chiefs, and others. They created analternativecenterofpower,comparableinthatwaytotherebelsarbedariinKhorasanundertheMongolIl-Khans. Further west, in the fourteenth century, a not dissimilar group of Turkish warriors hadestablished thebeginningsof theOttomanEmpire through theprestigeofsuccessful fightingagainst theByzantines.

Thebrotherhood inArdebilwere theSafavids,namedafteroneof theirearly leaders,ShaykhSafi(1252–1334),aSunniandaSufi,whohadpreachedapurifiedandrestoredIslamandanewreligiousorder on earth. It is possible that hewas ofKurdish descent. The early history of the Safavids is anuncertain and complex subject, but it seems his successor Sadr al-Din (1334–1391) organized themovementandcreatedahierarchyandthearrangementsforittoownproperty.Thisturneditfromalooseassociation into a more disciplined organization, one that started to create a wider network of tribalalliancesthroughfavorsandmarriages.UnderthelaterSafavidshaykhsnewgroupingsortribes(oymaq)coalesced,held togetherby thesealliances,andbyreligiousfervor4 (inwhichdevotion to thespiritualandmilitary example of the EmamAli was also an element). Under the leadership of Shaykh Junayd(1447–1460), the Safavids and their followers allied themselves with the Aq-Qoyunlu (White SheepTurks,referredtointheprecedingchapter),thenthedominantpowerintheancientterritoriesofIran.TheSafavidsmadesuccessfulraidsintoChristianGeorgianterritoryanddevelopedintoasignificantmilitaryforce,laterfightingotherlocalMuslimtribalgroups.

After the account of Sufism and Sufi poetry in the previous chapter, the appearance of ferventlywarlikeSufis,intentonconquest,mightbehardtoreconcile.ButSufismwasanextensive,diverse,andmultifaceted phenomenon, and the school of lovewas only onemanifestation of it. SomeSufi shaykhswere learned hermits, wedded to poverty and contemplation. But others were less contemplative andmoreproselytizing,moreghuluww (extreme),moreinclinedtotherealizationofdivinepurposesintheworldthroughworldlyacts,andmoreambivalentaboutviolence.TheobedienceoftheSufipostulanttohisSufiMaster(pir)wasaninstitutioncommontomostSufibrotherhoods,butithadanobviousmilitaryvalueinthemoremilitantones—like,forexample,theSafavids.ThemilitarystrengthoftheSafavidslayinthefightingprowessoftheTurkicwarriorstheyled,knowncollectivelyastheQezelbash,aftertheredhats theywore (Qezelbashmeans “red heads”). Some of theQezelbashwent into battle on horsebackwithout armor, believing that their faithmade them invulnerable.TheSufismofmost of theQezelbashwouldhavebeenunsophisticated,centeringonsomegroupritualsandacollectivemutualloyalty—justastheirShi‘ismmayinitiallyhaveamountedtolittlemorethanareverenceforAliasthearchetypeofaholywarrior.Butitcreatedapowerfulgroupcohesion—asabiyah.

ItisuncertainjustwhentheSafavidsturnedShi‘a;inthereligiouscontextofthattimeandplace,thequestion is somewhat artificial. Shi‘a notionswere just onepart of an eclecticmix.By the endof thefifteenthcenturyanewSafavidleader,Esma‘il,wasabletoexpandSafavidinfluenceattheexpenseoftheAq-Qoyunlu,whohadbeenweakenedbydisputesoverthedynasticsuccession.Esma‘ilwashimselfthegrandsonofUzunHasan,thegreatAq-Qoyunluchiefofthe1460sand1470s,andmayhaveemulatedsomeofhisgrandfather’scharismaticandmessianicleadershipstyle.In1501Esma‘ilandhisQezelbashfollowersconqueredTabriz(theoldSeljukcapital) innorthwesternIran,andEsma‘ildeclaredhimselfshah.Hewasonlyfourteenyearsold.AcontemporaryItalianvisitordescribedhimasfairandhandsome,not very tall, stout and strong with broad shoulders and reddish hair. He had long moustaches (aQezelbash characteristic, prominent in many contemporary illustrations), was left-handed, and wasskilledwiththebow.5

AtthetimeofhisconquestofTabriz,Esma‘ilproclaimedTwelverShi‘ismasthenewreligionofhisterritories.Esma‘il’sShi‘ismtookanextremeform,whichrequiredthefaithfultocursethememoryofthefirstthreecaliphsthathadprecededAli.ThiswasveryoffensivetoSunniMuslims,whoveneratedthosecaliphs,alongwithAli,astheRashidunorrighteouscaliphs.Esma‘il’sdemandintensifiedthedivisionbetween the Safavids and their enemies, especially the staunchly Sunni Ottomans to the west. Recentscholarshipsuggeststhateveniftherewasapro-Shi‘atendencyamongtheQezelbashearlier,Esma‘il’sdeclarationofShi‘ismin1501wasadeliberatepoliticalact.

WithinafurthertenyearsEsma‘ilconqueredtherestofIranandalltheterritoriesoftheoldSassanidEmpire,includingMesopotamiaandtheoldAbbasidcapitalofBaghdad.HedefeatedtheremnantsoftheAq-Qoyunlu,aswellastheUzbeksinthenortheastandvariousrebels.Twofollowersofonerebelleaderwerecapturedin1504,takentoIsfahan,androastedonspitsaskebabs.Esma‘ilorderedhiscompanionstoeat thekebabtoshowtheir loyalty(this isnot theonlyexampleofcannibalismasakindofextremefetishamongtheQezelbash).6

Esma‘ilattemptedtoconsolidatehiscontrolbyassertingShi‘ismthroughouthisnewdomains(thoughtheconventionalviewthat thiswasachievedinashort timeandthat the importofShi‘ascholarsfromoutsideIranwassignificantintheprocesshasbeenputintodoubt7).HealsodidhisbesttosuppressrivalSufiorders.ItisimportanttostressthatalthoughtherehadbeenstrongShi‘aelementsinIranforcenturiesbefore1501,andimportantShi‘ashrineslikeQomandMashhad,IranhadbeenpredominantlySunni,likemostoftherestoftheIslamicworld.ThecenterofShi‘ismhadbeentheshrinecitiesofsouthernIraq.8

Esma‘ilwrotesomepoetry(mostlyintheTurkicdialectofAzerbaijan,whichbecamethelanguageoftheSafavidcourt),anditislikelythathisfollowersrecitedandsanghiscompositionsaswellasotherreligious songs.The followingpoemofEsma‘il’s gives a flavor of the religious intensity andmilitantconfidenceoftheQezelbash:

MynameisShahEsma‘il.IamonGod’sside:Iamtheleaderofthesewarriors.MymotherisFatima,myfatherAli:ItooamoneofthetwelveEmams.Itookbackmyfather’sbloodfromYazid.KnowforcertainthatIamthetruecoinofHaydar[i.e.,Ali]Ever-livingKhezr,JesussonofMaryIamtheAlexanderofthepeopleofthisage9

Inadditiontothesegreatfiguresofthepast,Esma‘ilidentifiedhimselfalsowithAbuMuslim,whohad led the revolt that had overturned the rule of the Umayyads in 750 and established the Abbasidcaliphate.

ButEsma‘il’shopesofwestwardexpansion,aimingtotakeadvantageoftheShi‘aorientationofmanymoreTurkictribesineasternAnatolia,weredestroyedwhentheélanoftheQezelbashwasblownawaybyOttomancannonat theBattleofChaldiran,northwestofTabriz, in1514.AlegendsaysthatEsma‘ilventedhisfrustrationbyslashingatacannonwithhissword,leavingadeepgashinthebarrel.

After this defeat Esma‘il could no longer sustain the loyalty of theQezelbash at its previous highpitch,northeirbeliefinhisdivinemission.Hewentintomourningandtooktodrink.WarsbetweentheSunni Ottomans and the Shi‘a Safavids continued for many years, made more bitter by the religiousschism. Tabriz, Baghdad, and the shrine towns of Iraq changed hands several times. Shi‘a werepersecuted and killedwithin theOttoman territories, particularly in easternAnatoliawhere theywereregardedasactualorpotentialtraitors.TheSafavidsturnedIranintothepredominantlyShi‘astateitis

today,andtherewerespasmodicepisodesofpersecutiontheretoo,especiallyofZoroastrians,Christians,and Jews—despite the ostensible protected status of at least the latter two groups as “People of theBook.”Onecouldmakeaparallelwith theway that religiouspersecution intensifiedeithersideof theRoman/Persian border in the fourth century AD, in the reign of Shapur II, after Constantine madeChristianitythestatereligionoftheRomanEmpire.

The Safavidmonarchs also turned against the Sufis, despite the Safavids’ Sufi heritage. The Sufiswere persecuted to the point that the only surviving Sufi order was the Safavid one, and the othersdisappearedorwentunderground. In the long term, themainbeneficiaryof thiswere theShi‘aulema.ThiswasimportantbecausetheSufishadpreviouslyhadadominantoralmostdominantpositioninthereligiouslifeofIran,especiallyinthecountryside.

TheempireestablishedbyEsma‘il alsocreateda seriesofproblems for itself.Primeamong thesewas the unrulymilitancy of theQezelbash, the suspicion betweenTurks andTajiks (the latter being adisparagingTurkictermforaPersian),andthedivisionbetweentheSufi-inclined,eclecticQezelbashandthe shari‘a tradition of the urban Shi‘a ulema. Gradually all of these were resolved in favor of thePersiansandtheulema,asIbnKhaldunwouldhavepredicted.Esma‘il’ssuccessor,Tahmasp(r.1524–1576), lived through several years of civilwar as aminor, losing territory over his reign to both theOttomans in thewest (includingBaghdad in1534)and to theUzbeks in theeast.Hemoved thecapitalfromTabriztoQazvin,makingitmoresecure,butafterhisdeaththerewascivilwaragain,andatroubledperiod that saw two shahs in succession—beforeAbbas, cleverlymanipulating alliances with chosenQezelbashtribes,tookthethronein1587.

ABBASTHEGREATAbbas’s achievements as shah ranged from military success to institutional reform to the building ofspectaculararchitecturalmonuments—forallofwhichheisusuallyreferredtoasAbbastheGreat.Hewasa talentedadministratorandmilitary leader,anda ruthlessautocrat.His reignwas theoutstandingcreativeperiodof theSafavidera.But thecivilwarsand troublesofhischildhood(whenmanyofhisrelatives were murdered) left him with a dark twist of suspicion and brutality at the center of hispersonality.

Most of Abbas’s innovations and reforms centered on the military. He deliberately sidelined theQezelbashtribes,establishinginsteadthecoreofanewstandingarmybasedinthenewcapital,Isfahan.Thenewarmywaslargelyorganizedaroundtheintroduction—onasignificantscaleforthefirsttime—ofgunpowderweapons,includingup-to-datecannonandacorpsofmusketeers.ManyfeaturesofitechoedOttomanpractice—themusketeersweredesignedtobetheequalsoftheredoubtableOttomanjanissaries.Troops were recruited from among the Qezelbash and from the Persian population of the towns andvillages.ButGeorgians,Armenians,andotherswerealsobroughttoIsfahanforthearmyinlargenumbers—atleastnominallyasslaves,orghulams—andtheloyaltyofsuchsoldiers,farfromhomeandinamoreor lessalienenvironment,whollydependenton theshah,wasmuchmorereliable.ManyGeorgianandArmenian ghulams also served as commanders, bureaucrats, and regional governors. But despite theimprovements, when the shahwent towar the central core of the armywas augmented by provincialQezelbashtroops,whowereusuallyinamajorityinthefield.10

Aswithanypre-industrialstate,policyonlandandtaxationwascloselytiedtomilitarynecessities.TheQezelbashtriballeaderslostouthere,too.Abbastookovermanyofthelandstheyhadpreviouslyenjoyedandeithergavethemovertobeadministeredcentrallybyhisbureaucratsordistributedthemas

tuyul—lands apportioned not to individuals but to state offices, from which office holders drew anincomeaslongastheyheldtheoffice.Usuallytheincomewasonlyaproportionofthetotalyieldofthelandholding.Theideawastomaximizetheloyaltyoftheofficeholderstothestateandtominimizethelikelihoodthat landwouldbepermanentlyalienatedawayfromthecrowntoambitiousmagnates.Staterevenuewasalsoboostedby the tighteningof thegovernment’sgripon trade,especially thesilk trade,basedonsilkproductioninGilan.MostPersiantradeinthisperiodwenteast,toIndia,butsomesilkwasexportedwest toEurope,especiallybyArmenianmerchants.To thesameend,Abbasused theEnglishEastIndiaCompany(thatacquiredtherighttotradeinPersiain1616)totakebackcontroloftheStraitofHormuzfromthePortuguese,andtoreestablishthePersianpresenceinthePersianGulf.11

AweakermonarchwouldnothavelastedlongwiththeQezelbashifhehadattemptedthesereforms.ButAbbascunninglyplayedthetribesagainstoneanother,andhissuccessinwargavehimhugeprestige,makingalmosteverythingpossible.WithhisnewarmyhedefeatedtheUzbeksintheeast—restoringtheborder on theOxus river—and theOttomans in thewest.He tookBaghdad twice. To consolidate hisvictories,especiallyinthenortheast,hesentlargenumbersofKurds,alongwithQezelbashtribesmenliketheQajarsandAfshars,toserveasprotectorsofthenewborders.Thisresettlementpolicyservedalsotoreinforcehisauthorityoverthetribes,whileweakeningtheirindependentpowerbyfragmentingthem.Hemovedprovincialgovernorsfromposttonewpostregularlytopreventanyofthemfromcreatingregionalpowerbasesforthemselves.HealsoresettledmanyArmeniansfromthenorthwesttoasuburbsouthofIsfahan,NewJulfa,whereChristianArmeniansandtheirbishopstilllivetoday.

Thenewcapital, Isfahan,hadbeenasignificantplaceeven in the timeof theSassanids,containingimportantmonumentsandmosquesfromlaterperiods.But todayitstandsasperhaps themostsplendidand impressive gallery of Islamic architecture in the world, and it is substantially a creation of theSafavid period. The central structures, the soaring blue iwans of the shah mosque, the beautifulAllahvardiKhanbridge,theAliQapuandChehelSotounpalaces,theShaykhLotfallahmosque,andthegreatMeidan-e Shah—allwere built or at least begun in the time of ShahAbbas, though otherswereadded later.ThebuildingsassertSafavidpowerandprestigeand their identificationwithShi‘a Islam,resultinginamagnificencethathasrarelybeensurpassed.

One of Abbas’s great successes was simply surviving and ruling long enough for his variousenterprises to bear fruit. But in the process he created a problem—the succession. Successionwas acommondifficultyformanymonarchs.InEurope,theproblemwasthateverysooftenarulercouldnotproduceason.Thiscouldcreateallsortsofdifficulties—attemptsatdivorce(HenryVIII,forexample),attempts to secure recognition for the succession of a daughter ormore distant relative, disputes oversuccessionresultinginwar.IntheIslamicworld,theproblemwasdifferent.Polygamymeantthatkingsdidnotnormallyhaveaproblemproducingason,but theymight,on thecontrary,have toomanysons.This couldmean fierce fightingamongpotentialheirs and their supporterswhen the fatherdied. In theOttomanEmpiresuchbattleswereinstitutionalized—rivalsonswhohadservedtheirfatherasprovincialgovernorswould,onhearingofhisdeath,raceforthecapitaltoclaimthethrone.Thewinnerwouldgetthe support of the janissaries, and would then have the other sons put to death. Later, the Ottomansadoptedamoredignifiedarrangement,keepingthepossibleheirsintheSultan’sharempalaceuntiltheirfatherdied.Butthismeanttheywouldhavelittleunderstandingoforaptitudeforgovernment,andthenewpracticehelpedtoincreasethepowerofthechiefminister,thevizier,sothatthevizierruledeffectivelyasviceroy.Itwasaconundrum.

Many fathers have disagreements and clasheswith their sons, and history is full of feuds betweenkingsandtheircrownprinces.Abbaswasnoexception;hehadcometopowerhimselfbydeposinghisfather. Following theOttoman precedent again, he imprisoned his sons in the harem for fear that they

wouldattempttodethronehim.Buthestillfearedthattheymightplotagainsthim,sohehadthemblinded,and he had one of them killed. Eventually, he was succeeded by one of his grandsons. The unhappypracticeofkeepingroyalheirsintheharemwaskeptupthereafterbytheSafavidmonarchs.

AlthoughAbbas showed reverence for the shrines of his Sufi ancestors inArdebil, his deliberateweakeningoftheQezelbashwasmatched,aftersignsofoppositionfromtheNuqtaviSufis,byexecutionsandotherpunishmentsthatbrokethemtoo.Abbasfavoredinsteadtheulemaandtheendowments(awqaf)that supported them—especially in the shrine cities ofMashhad and Qom. On one occasion he spenttwenty-eightdayswalkingasapilgrimacrossthedesertfromIsfahantoMashhad—toshowhisdevotionand tosetanexample.Since thecontinuinghostilitieswith theOttomansmadeaccess to theshrinesofsouthernIraqdifficultanduncertain,theshah’sexamplehelpedtoswingordinaryPersianShi‘astowardthe Persian shrine cities. More endowments followed the pilgrims, and the grateful ulema alignedthemselvesevermorecloselywiththeSafavidregime.Thesedevelopmentswerealsosignificantforthefuture.Abbashadbeenastuteinhisconstructionofagovernmentalsystemthatprotectedstaterevenue,andhiswasmoresuccessfulthanmostpreviousdynastieshadbeen.Butoverthecenturythatfollowed,moreandmorelandwasgivenovertoreligiousendowments,sometimesmerelyasakindoftaxdodge,sincereligiouspropertywasexemptfromtax.12

Under Shah Abbas the Safavid dynasty achieved a more sophisticated, more powerful, and moreenduringgovernmentalsystemthanthetraditionallandsofIranhadseenformanycenturies.13TheSafavidstate, itsadministration,and its institutionalizingofShi‘ismset theparameters for themodernshapeofIran. In its material culture—in metalwork, textiles, carpet making, miniature painting, ceramics, andaboveallinitsarchitecture—theperiodwasoneofsurpassingcreativityinthemakingofbeautifulthings.ThedominanceofShi‘ismandtheShi‘aulemawasalsoaccompaniedbyaperiodofcreativityinShi‘athought—notably among the thinkers who have been called the School of Isfahan (Mir Damad, MirFendereski,andShaykhBaha’i),andthereligiousphilosophyofthegreatMollaSadra.

MollaSadrawasborninShirazin1571or1572.HestudiedinQazvinandIsfahanasayoungman,being interested inphilosophyand theusual religiousstudiesaswellasSufism.Hewas taughtby twogreat thinkers of the age, Mir Damad and Shaykh Baha’i, and spent some time living near Qom andtraveling before finally settling as a teacher in Shiraz again.His ideas (most notably expressed in thebook known as al-Afsar al-arba‘a—Four Journeys) drew upon the philosophy of Avicenna andNeoplatonism,but alsoon traditionalShi‘a thought andon theSufismofSohravardi (Illuminationism),and IbnArabi.Molla Sadra’s thoughtwas controversial at the time for its leaning towardmysticism,which theulemahad traditionallyopposed.But inexplainingaway thatphilosophical rationalismandpersonalmystical insight shouldbe combined in aprogramof individual reflection and study,14MollaSadra was able to domesticate mysticism and, calling it erfan, make it acceptable to the madresehtradition.15HisthinkinghasbeencentralinIslamicphilosophyinthecenturiessincehistime.

PersianculturalinfluenceintheeasternpartoftheIslamicworldwasstillstrong,anditwasinthesecenturiesthatitfloweredoutsidePersiawiththegreatestbrilliance—inOttomanTurkey(wherePersianwasusedfordiplomaticcorrespondence,andTurkishpoetryfollowedPersianforms),intheKhanatesofCentralAsia,andaboveall inMoghulIndia,wherePersianwasthelanguageofthecourtandawholenewPersianatecultureofpoetry,music,andreligiousthoughtflourished.Somehavecalledthepoetryofthis period Safavid poetry; others, reflecting the fact that much of it, even if written in Persian, wascomposedinIndia,havelabelledittheIndianperiod.Opinionhasalsodividedoveritsquality;thegreatIraniancriticBahardislikedit,andthegeneralviewfromthemid-nineteenthcenturywasnegative—thepoetrywasheldtohavebeeninsipid,makinguseofratherstaleimageryandlackinginrealinsight.Toadegree,thisviewreflectedthemorefavorablejudgmentofthesamecriticsonthemovementofpoetrythat

supplanted theSafavidstylefromthe1760sonward(inPersia, thoughnotelsewhere),andothershavefoundmoremeritintheSafavidpoets.

Whatever thejudgmentsof taste, it isnonetheless truethat therewasaPersianateliterarycultureatthistimethatmaintaineditselffromIstanbultoDelhiandSamarkand.Thisinturnhadastrongimpactoncontemporary and later poetic compositions in Turkish and Urdu, reflecting the wider intellectual,religious, and court influences. But in some ways this Persianate culture was weakest in the Persiancapital,wherethecourtlanguagewasTurkicandmullahstendedtobemoreinfavorthanpoets.16ManypoetsandotherPersiansemigratedtothefabulouslywealthyMoghulcourt.

Asaconsequenceofpolitical instabilityand theexistenceofcompetingpolitieswithin theculturalspaceofPersianateinfluence,therehadbeenbyaccidentconditionsinPersiainpreviouscenturiesthatpermitted considerable (albeit erratic) pluralism of religion and relative freedomof thought.Over theperiod of strong Safavid rule, the central territorial core of the Iranian plateau was kept safe frominvasion,whichafterthetraumaoftheprecedingcenturiesmusthaveseemedaninvaluableblessing.Butsomepreviousfreedomswiltedandnarrowed.

TheShi‘ismoftheSafavidsandtheulemaundertheirrulehadfromthebeginningmorethanastreakofextremismandintolerancewithinit,andthistendencywasintensifiedbythereligiousconflictwiththeOttomans.TheSafavidsfromtheoutsettendedtobemoreearnestlyreligiousthanmanypreviousSunnirulers had been. This is a delicate subject, but it is important to look at it squarely. The Sufis wereincreasingly out of favor, and intellectual life was channeled into the madresehs. There were alwayshangers-onandpseudo-mullahswhocouldattractafollowingamongtheluti(unrulyyouths)ofthetownsby being more extreme than their more reflective, educated rivals; and the perceived history ofpersecution suffered by the Shi‘a did not always prompt a sensitivity to the vulnerability of otherminorities once the Shi‘a became the dominant sect. Notions of the religious impurity (najes) ofunbelievers,especiallyJews,contributedtoageneralworseningintheconditionofminorities,andafter1642therewasaparticularlygrimperiodofpersecutionandforcedconversions.OrderswereissuedthatJewsshouldweardistinguishingredpatcheson theirclothing to identify themselves, that theirwordatlawwasnearworthless,thattheymustnotwearmatchingshoes,fineclothes,orwaistsashes,thattheymustnotwalkinthemiddleofthestreetorwalkpastaMuslim,thattheymustnotenterashopandtouchthings, that theirweddingsmustbeheld in secret, that if theywerecursedbyaMuslim theymust staysilent, and so on.17 Many of these would-be rules (running directly contrary to the spirit of propertoleranceaccorded toPeopleof theBook in Islam,and reminiscentof similarugly rulings imposed inChristian Europe in the Middle Ages and at other times) probably reflect the aspirations of a fewextremistmullahsratherthantherealityaslived.Conditionswouldhavevariedgreatlyfromtowntotownandchangedovertime,buttheywerestillindicativeoftheattitudesofsomeandappearedtolegitimizetheactionsofothers.Asauthorityfiguresinvillagesandtowns,humane,educatedmullahswereoftenthemostimportantprotectorsoftheJews,Christians,andZoroastrians.18Butother,lessermullahsfrequentlyagitatedagainstthesevulnerablegroups.

SomehavesuggestedthatevenamongtheulemathecloserelationshipbetweentheSafavidstateandtheShi‘aclergywasnotahealthyphenomenon.Theover-closerelationshipledsomemullahstooverlookthestrongdistrustofpolitics,kingship,andsecularauthoritythatisdeeplyentrenchedinShi‘ism(andisperhapsoneof itsmostattractivecharacteristics) in theirscramblefor thegood things that theSafavidshahshadonoffer—appointments,endowments,andachancetowieldsomepoliticalauthority.19As isoften the casewith uncheckedprocesses that involve greed, this one brought someof the seniorShi‘aclergytoshipwreckattheendoftheSafavidperiod.

After the death ofAbbas theGreat in 1629, theSafavid dynasty endured for almost a century.But

exceptforaninterludeinthereignofShahAbbasII(1642–1666)itwasaperiodofstagnation.Baghdadwas lost to the Ottomans again in 1638, and the Treaty of Zohab in 1639 fixed the Ottoman/Persianboundaryinitspresent-daypositionbetweenIranandIraq.AbbasIItookKandaharfromtheMoghulsin1648,butthereaftertherewaspeaceintheeastalso.

Militarily, theSafavidstateprobablyreacheditsapogeeunderShahAbbastheGreatandAbbasII.ButdespiteitsclassificationwithOttomanTurkeyandMoghulIndiaasoneoftheGunpowderEmpires(byMarshallG.S.Hodgson),thereisgoodreasontojudgethatthepracticesandstructuresoftheSafavidEmpireweretransformedlessbytheintroductionofgunpowderweaponsthanthoseotherempireswere.CannonandmusketswerepresentinPersianarmies,butasadd-onstopreviouspatternsofwarfareratherthanelementstransformingtheconductofwar,astheywereelsewhere.ThemountedtraditionofPersianlance-and-bow warfare, harking back culturally to Ferdowsi, was resistant to the introduction ofawkwardandnoisyfirearms.Theircavalryusuallyoutclassedthatoftheirenemies,butPersiansdidnottake toheavycannonand thegreater technicaldemandsofsiegewarfareas theOttomansandMoghulsdid.Thegreatdistances, lackofnavigablerivers, ruggedterrain,andpoorroadsof theIranianplateaudidnotfavorthetransportofheavycannon.MostIraniancitieswereeitherunwalledorwereprotectedbycrumblingwallsthatwerecenturiesold—thisatatimewhenhuge,sophisticated,andhighlyexpensivefortificationswerebeingconstructedinEuropeandelsewheretodealwiththechallengeofheavycannon.Persia’smilitaryrevolutionwasleftincomplete.20

Alcoholseemstohaveplayedasignificantpart in thepoorshowingof the laterSafavidmonarchs.FromthetimeofShahEsma‘ilandbefore,drinkingsessionshadbeenapartofthegroupritualsoftheQezelbash, building probably on the ancient practices of theMongols and theTurkic tribes inCentralAsia,butalsoonghuluwwSufipracticeandthePersiantraditionofrazmobazm—fightingandfeasting.There is a story that Esma‘il drankwine in a boat on the Tigris while watching the execution of hisdefeatedfoesafterhisconquestofBaghdadin1508,21andhisdrinkingacceleratedafterhisdefeatattheBattleofChaldiran.Someaccountsevensuggestthatalcoholwasinstrumentalinhisearlydeathin1524.WithinthewiderIslamicculturethatwashostiletoalcohol,itseemsthatincourtcircleswinehadalltheadded allure of the forbidden. One could draw a parallel with the way in which binge drinking is afeatureofBritishandothertraditionallyProtestantsocietieswhosereligiousauthoritiestendedinthepastto frown on alcohol consumption. Shah Tahmasp appears to have stopped drinking in 1532/1533,maintaininghispledgeuntilhisdeathin1576,butalcoholwasblamedbycontemporariesasacauseoracontributoryfactorinthedeathsofhissuccessorShahEsma‘ilII,ofShahSafi(reigned1629–1642),andofShahAbbasII(1642–1666).22

Someofthiscanperhapsbeattributedtoamoralizingjudgmentonrulerswhowerethoughttohavefailed more generally. For writers who disapproved of alcohol, drinking wine was a sufficientexplanation for (or at least a sign of) incompetence, indolence, or general moral weakness and badcharacter.(ShahAbbasIdranktoo,withoutdamaginghisreputation.)Butthereistoomuchevidenceforthedrinkingtobedismissedas the inventionofchroniclers.ThereignofShahSoleimanrepresents theapotheosisofthephenomenon.

Soleiman came to the throne in 1666 and reigned for the next twenty-eight years.A contemporaryreported,

Hewastall,strong,andactive,alittletooeffeminateforamonarch—withaRomannose,verywellproportionedtootherparts,verylargeblueeyesandamiddlingmouth,abearddyedblack,shavedroundandwellturnedback,eventohisears.Hismannerwasaffablebutneverthelessmajestic.Hehadamasculineandagreeablevoice,agentlewayofspeakingandwassoveryengagingthat,whenyouhadbowedtohimheseemedinsomemeasuretoreturnitbyacourteousinclinationof

hishead,andthishealwaysdidsmiling.23

Soleiman’s reignwas for themost part quiet. Some finemosques and palaceswere built, but onecould take those as material symbols of the growing diversion of economic resources into religiousendowments,andoftheblinkered,inward-lookingtendencyofthemonarchandhiscourt.Bothofthesewere to prove damaging in the long run. Soleiman showed little interest in governing, leaving statebusinesstohisofficials.

Sometimeshewouldamusehimselfbyforcingthem(especiallythemostpiousones)todrinktothedregsanespeciallyhugegobletofwine(calledthehazarpishah).Sometimestheycollapsedandhadtobecarriedout.Iftheystayedontheirfeet,theshahmight,forajoke,orderthemtoexplaintheirviewsofimportantmattersofgovernment.24

ShahSoleimanhimselfdrankheavily,despiteoccasionaloutbreaksoftemperanceinducedbyhealthworries and religious conscience.25 His pleasure-loving insouciance was the natural outcome of hisupbringing in the harem.He had little sense of theworld beyond the court and little interest in it.Hemerelywantedtocontinuethelazylifehehadenjoyedbefore,augmentedbytheluxurieshehadformerlybeen denied. But some contemporary accounts say that when drunk he could turn nasty, that on oneoccasionhehadhisbrotherblinded,andthatatothertimesheorderedexecutions.

It is a testament to the strength and sophistication of the Safavid state and its bureaucracy that itcontinued to function despite the lack of a strongmonarch. In other Islamic states this situation oftenpermitted theemergenceof avizieror chiefminister as theeffective ruler. In Isfahan it seems that theinfluenceofotherimportantofficeholders(aswellasthatofMaryamBegum,theshah’sgreataunt,whocametodominatetheharem)wasenoughtopreventanysinglepersonalityachievingdominance.Butastimewenton theofficialsactedmoreandmore in theirownprivateandfactional interests,against theinterestsoftheirrivals,andlessandlessintheinterestofthestate.Bureaucraciesarenotofthemselvesvirtuousinstitutions—theyneedfirmmastersandperiodicreformtoreinforceanethicofserviceiftheyare not to gowrong.And if the officials see theirmasters acting irresponsibly, theywill imitate theirvices.

The influence of the politically inclined ulema at court strengthened as the shah’s involvement inbusiness slumped, and one leading cleric, Mohammad Baqer Majlesi, has been associated with adeliberatepolicyoftargetingminoritiesforpersecution(atleastinthecaseofHinduIndianmerchants)toappeal to the worst instincts among the people and thereby enhance the popularity of the regime.26Persecutionwasepisodicandunpredictable,sometimesconcentratingontheIndiansorJews,sometimeson theArmenians, sometimes on the Sufis, or theZoroastrians, or SunniMuslims in the provinces. Ingeneral, minorities—even Jews and Christians, who should have enjoyed protection as People of theBook—weredisadvantagedatlaw,subjecttoeverydayhumiliations,andvulnerabletotheambitionsofrabble-rousing preachers whomight seek greater fame for themselves by inciting urbanmobs againstthem.TheclericMajlesi’spersonalresponsibilityforaworseningofthesituationfromthereignofShahSoleimanonwardhasbeendisputed(forexample,histreatiseLightningBoltsAgainsttheJewsturnsoutonexaminationtoberathermoremoderateinsettingouttheprovisionsofIslamiclawontheminoritiesthanitstitlemightsuggest27),buthewasaninfluentialfigureandwasbrieflytobecomedominantinthesucceeding reign. His voluminous writings also included strong blasts against Sunnis and Sufis. ThemovementwasbroaderthanjustMajlesi(whomitmayhavesuitedtoappearradicaltooneconstituencyandmoderatetoanother),butitisimportanttorememberthatitrepresentedonlyonestrandofShi‘ismatthetime;otherShi‘aulemawerecriticalofMajlesi’srepressivepolicy.28

AsShahSoleiman’sreigndrewtoaclose,theSafavidregimelookedstrongbuthadbeenseriouslyweakened.Itsmonumentslookedsplendid,buttheintellectualworldofPersia,oncedistinguishedforitstoleranceandvision,wasnowledbynarrower,smallerminds.

5

THEFALLOFTHESAFAVIDS,NADERSHAH,THEEIGHTEENTH-CENTURYINTERREGNUM,ANDTHEEARLYYEARSOFTHE

QAJARDYNASTY

Morghididamneshastebarbareh-eTusDarpishnahadekalleh-eKayKavusBakallehhamigoftkeafsusafsusKubang-ejarashaokojashodnaleh-ekus

IsawabirdonthewallsofTusThathadbeforeittheskullofKayKavus.Thebirdwassayingtotheskull“Alas,alas”Wherenowthewarlikebells?Andwherethemoanofthekettledrums?

—attributedtoOmarKhayyam

According to a story thatwaswidely repeated,whenShahSoleiman laydying in July1694, he left itundecidedwhichofhis sonsshouldsucceedhim.Callinghiscourtiersandofficials,he told them—“Ifyoudesireease,elevateHoseinMirza. If thegloryofyourcountrybe theobjectofyourwishes, raiseAbbasMirza to the throne.”1OnceSoleimanwasdead, theeunuchofficialswhosupervised theharemdecided forHosein because they judged hewould be easier for them to control.Hoseinwas also thefavoriteofhisgreataunt,MaryamBegum,thedominantpersonalityintheharem,soHoseindulybecameshah.

Suchstoriespresenthistorianswithaproblem.Theiranecdotalquality,thoughvivid,doesnotfitthestyle of modern historical writing, and even their wide contemporary currency cannot overcome areluctancetoacceptthematfacevalue.Thedeathbedspeech,theneatcharacterizationofthetwoprinces,and the cynical choiceof thebureaucrats—it is all toopat.But to dismiss it out of handwouldbe aswrongastoacceptitatfacevalue.It ismoresensibletoacceptthestoryasareflectionoftheoverallnatureofmotivationsandevents,eveniftheactualwordsreportedwereneversaid.Thestoryreflectstheimpressionofcasualnegligence,evenirresponsiblemischief,thatweknowofShahSoleimanfromothersources.Astheconsequenceswillshow,italsogivesanaccuratepictureofthecharacterofShahSultanHosein, and themotivation of his courtiers. It is quite credible that ShahSoleiman left the successionopenandthatover-powerfulofficialschosetheprincetheythoughtwouldbemostmalleable.

Initially,ShahSultanHoseinappearedtobeaspiousandorthodoxasMohammedBaqerMajlesi,thepre-eminent cleric at court, could havewished.Under the latter’s influence the bottles from the royalwinecellarwerebroughtoutintothemeidaninfrontoftheroyalpalaceandpubliclysmashed.InsteadofallowingaSufithehonorofbucklingonhisswordathiscoronation,ashadbeentraditional(reflectingtheSufioriginsof theSafaviddynasty), thenewshahhadMajlesidoit instead.Withintheyearorderswent out for taverns, coffee houses, and brothels to be closed, and for prostitution, opium, “colorfulherbs,” sodomy, public music, dancing, and gambling to be banned—along with more innocentamusementslikekiteflying.Womenweretostayathome,tobehavemodestly,andwereforbiddentomixwithmenwhowerenotrelatives.Islamicdresswastobeworn.Thenewlawswereapplieddespitetheprotestsoftreasuryofficials,whowarnedthattherewouldbeahugedropinrevenue,equivalentto50kgofgoldperday,because thestatehadmadesomuchmoneyfromthe taxationofprostitutionandotherforms of entertainment. To make sure the new order was widely publicized, it was read out in themosques, and in some it was carved in stone over the door. A later order stipulated thatMajlesi, asShaykh ol-eslam (the title given to the senior cleric in Isfahan), should be obeyed by all viziers,governors,andothersecularofficialsacrosstheempire.Anyonewhobroketherules,orhaddonesointhepast,wastobepunished.2ItwasakindofIslamicrevolution.

Yetwithin a fewmonthsof his taking the throne,ShahSultanHoseinwasdrinking asmuch as hisfatherhad,andhisgreataunt,MaryamBegum(perhapsaffrontedamongotherthingsatMajlesi’sattackonwomen’s freedoms), had reasserted her dominance at court. The Sufis were eclipsed but not whollysuppressed.Thedecreesdidnotachievetemperanceatcourtandwereprobablywidelyflouted,buttheycontributed to an atmosphere of renewed intolerance and repression ofminorities. Thiswas to proveespeciallydamaginginthefrontierprovinces,whereSunniswereinthemajorityinmanyareas—notablyinBaluchistan,Herat,Kandahar,andShirvan.SuchwasMajlesi’sachievementbythetimeofhisdeathin1699.Otherclericsatcourtfollowedinhisspiritthereafter.

Shah Sultan Hosein was a mild-tempered, well-meaning man. He had no streak of cruelty in hischaracter,andthereisnorecordofhishavingorderedanyexecutionsovertheperiodofhisreign(which,like that of his father, also lasted twenty-eight years). His sequestered upbringing and indolent naturemeantthathedislikedbeingdisturbedorbotheredwithproblems.Theindicationsarethathewaswhatwewould call institutionalized, and as a resultwas lacking in confidencewith theworld outside thepalaceorwithpeoplehedidnotknow.Heenjoyedwineandeating,butotherwisewaspiousandhumane,puttinghisenergiesintoanewcomplexofgardensandpavilionsatFarahabad,southwestofIsfahan.Hiscourtiersandofficialsencouragedhimtoleavestatebusinesstothem.Hisothermaininterestwassex.His emissaries collectedprettygirls fromall overhisdomains (fromanygroupor religionexcept theJews),broughtthemtoIsfahan,anddeliveredthemtotheshah’sharemforhisenjoyment.Afteratime,iftheybecamepregnant, theywouldbe takenawayagain,well furnishedwithmoneyandpresents.Someweremarriedoff toprominentnobles,so thatwhenmalechildrenwereborn, theybecame theheirsofthosenobles.3

Onecouldmakeanargument that theworldwouldhavebeenabetterplace if therehadbeenmoremonarchs like Shah Soleiman and Shah SultanHosein—pacific, passive, interested in littlemore thanbuilding pleasure pavilions,makinggarden improvements, drinking, and silken dalliance.Butwar andpolitics,likenature,abhoravacuum.Persiain1700was,asstatesgo,wellplaced:ithadstrong,naturalfrontiers, and its traditional enemies were either as passive as itself or distracted by more pressingtroubles.Thestateoftheeconomyhasbeendebated,butitnowseemsthatwhatwereoncetakenassignsofeconomicdeclinewereinfactsignsmainlyofthefailureofthestatetoadapttoeconomicchange.4TheexpansionofEuropeantradetodominance,subordinatinganddamagingtheeconomiesofAsia,hadyetto

happen. Persian architects still produced beautiful buildings—the Madar-e Shah madreseh in Isfahanshows the loveliness ofSafavid style in this last phase.The state administration continued to functiondespite the shah’s negligence andwas still capable of raising taxation (albeit less than it should haveraised)andpowerfularmies.But theSafavidstatehada softcenter,and thewiderworldwasno lessharshandcompetitive thanin thedaysof theMongolsandtheirsuccessors.Thestoryof theendof theSafavidsisapowerfulreminderthattheprimeconcernofastateisalways(orshouldalwaysbe)security—what Machiavelli called mantenere lo stato (to maintain the state). The rest—the palaces, thesophisticatedcourt,thereligiousendowments,theparksandgardens,thefineclothes,paintings,jewelry,andsoon,howeverdelightful—weremerefroth.

THEAFGHANREVOLTTheprimeagentoftheSafaviddynasty’sdestructionwasanAfghanoftheGhilzaitribe,fromKandahar,MirVeis.Hewaswealthyandwellconnectedandalsohadareputationforgenerositytothepoorandtohisfriends;thismadehimpopularamongtheAfghans,whovaluedruggedausterityandpietyanddislikedostentation. The oppressive Safavid governor of Kandahar—doubly unpopular because he was aGeorgianassertingShi‘asupremacy—worriedthatMirVeishadenoughinfluencetoorganizearebellionandmade themistake of sending him to Isfahan. ThereMir Veis soon summed up the debility of theregime.

Likemost Pashtun-speaking Afghans,Mir Veis was a SunniMuslim.While in Isfahan he securedpermission from the shah to goon thehajj toMecca,where he obtained a fatwa legitimizing a revoltagainstSafavidrule.AfterhisreturntoKandahar(hecharmedShahSultanHoseinandeasilyconvincedhimofhisloyalty)MirVeiscoordinatedasuccessfulrevoltandkilledtheGeorgiangovernorin1709.Asuccessionofarmiesweresent fromIsfahan tocrush therebels,and there isevidence thatat leastoneviziermadeseriousattemptstogalvanizethestate—amongotherthingsreestablishingtheartillerycorpsthat had ceased to exist in the time of Shah Soleiman. But the expeditions failed, and their failureencouragedtheAbdaliAfghansofHerattorevolt,too.ManeuversbyjealouscourtiersinIsfahanimpededactiveofficialsorremovedthemfromoffice,andtheshahfailedtointervene.Astheprestigeofthestatewilted,Safavidsubjectsinotherterritoriesrevoltedorseceded—inBaluchistan,Khorasan,Shirvan,andtheislandofBahrain.MaryamBegumtriedtoprodtheshahintomoredeterminedactiontorestoreorder,butlittlewasdoneand(mercifullyforher)sheseemstohavebeendeadby1721.

MirVeisdiedin1715,butin1719hisyoungson,Mahmud,raidedontotheIranianplateauasfarasKerman,capturingthecityanddoingterribledamagethere.Encouragedbythissuccess,Mahmudreturnedin1721withanarmyofAfghans,Baluchis,andotheradventurers.Mahmudwasanunstablecharacter,and paradoxically he might not have succeeded but for his instability. He encountered difficulties atKerman andYazd, but rather than turning back as amore cautious leadermight have done, he boldlypressed on toward theSafavid capital.TheSafavid viziermobilized an army against theAfghans thatprobablyoutnumberedthembymorethantwotoone,butonthedayofbattleatGolnabadonMarch8,1722, the Persian commanderswere divided by court faction and failed to support one another in thefighting.ShahSultanHoseinstayedbehind in Isfahan(somethingShahAbbaswouldneverhavedone).HisGeorgianguardsweresurroundedonthebattlefieldandmassacredwhilethevizier’stroopsstoodbyandwatched.ThePersiancannonwereoverrunbeforetheycouldfiremorethanafewshots,andtherestoftheSafavidtroopsfledforthecapital.

The Afghans, perhaps barely able to believe their luck, blockaded Isfahan—their numbers were

insufficientforasuccessfulassaultandtheyhadnoheavyartillerytobreachthewalls.FromMarchtoOctoberthecapitalenduredaterriblesiegethatslowlystarvedtheinhabitantsuntiltheywereeatingshoeleatherandbarkfromthetrees.Therewerealsoreportsofcannibalism.Opportunitiestobringinsuppliesortocoordinaterelievingforcesfromoutsideweremissed,butTahmasp,oneoftheshah’ssons,escaped,andbeganratherineffectuallytocollectsupportersinthenorthernpartofPersia.Finally,onOctober23,the shah rode out of the city on a borrowed horse to his former pleasure gardens at Farahabad andsurrenderedthecityandthethronetoMahmudGhilzai.

AftertheAfghanoccupationofIsfahan,theOttomanTurkstooktheopportunitytoconquerthewesternprovincesofIran, includingTabriz,Kermanshah,andHamadan(thoughnotwithoutfierceresistancebymanyoftheinhabitants).PetertheGreatofRussia,unwillingtoseeOttomanpowerintheregionexpandunopposed,movedsouthonhislastcampaigntooccupythesoutherncoastoftheCaspianSea.Withtheseoccupationscompleted,and in theabsenceofanyobvious focus for resistance, it lookedas though theIranian state established by the Safavids in the early sixteenth centurywas gone for good. In Isfahan,isolated from thebaseofhis support inKandahar and in control ofonly a relatively small part of theprevious Safavid realm, Mahmud grew increasingly unhinged and paranoid. In February 1725 hepersonallymassacredalmost all the survivingmalemembersof theSafavid royal family inoneof thecourtsofthepalace,ceasingtheslaughteronlywhentheformerShahSultanHoseinphysicallyintervened.ShortlyafterwardMahmud,bynowraving,eitherdiedofillnessorwasmurderedandwasreplacedasshahbyhiscousinAshraf.AshrafinitiallymadepromisestoprotecttheabdicatedShahSultanHoseinbuteventuallyhadhimbeheadedtoforestallanOttomanattempttorestorehimtothethrone.

The1720swereamiserabledecadeformanyPersians.IntheterritoriesoccupiedbytheOttomans,somepeoplewereinitiallycarriedoffasslaves(itwaspermissibletoenslaveShi‘asbecausetheSunniOttomans regarded them as heretics). In the area controlled by theAfghans, Persian townspeople andpeasantswere frequentlyattackedandplundered,andAshraf issuedanedictordering that thePersiansshouldbetreatedtheworstofahierarchyofgroups—worsethanChristians,Zoroastrians,orevenJews.5Fightingcontinuedbetweenthevariousoccupiersandthosewhostillresistedthem,andtheeconomywasbadlydisrupted,causingfurtherimpoverishment,hardship,andsuffering.

THESLAVEOFTAHMASPBy this time ayoungwarlord calledNaderQoli, from theoldAfsharQezelbash tribe, had risen fromobscurebeginningsthroughthechaosanddisorderofthetimestobecomealocalpowerintheprovinceofKhorasaninthenortheast.Contemporariesdescribedhimastallandhandsome,withintelligentdarkeyes.Hewasruthlesswithhisenemiesbutmagnanimoustothosewhosubmittedandcapableofcharmingthoseheneededtoimpress.Afinehorsemanwholovedhorses,hewasenergeticandalwayshappiestinthe saddle.Hehad a prodigiously loudvoice; hewasonce creditedwithputting an armyof rebels toflight by the sound of his voice alone—until the rebels heard him giving orders for the attack, theybelieved theywere only confronting a subordinate.6 The Safavid cause regained some impetus in theautumn of 1726when this stentorian commander joined forces with Tahmasp (the son of Shah SultanHosein,whohadbeennamedshahbyhissupportersandhadbeenchasedupanddownnorthernIranbythe Afghans and Ottomans) and reconqueredMashhad, the capital of Khorasan. In recognition of hisservices,TahmaspgaveNader thenameTahmaspQoliKhan,whichmeans “the slaveofTahmasp.” Itwasanhonortobegiventhenameofroyaltyinthisway,butTahmaspQoliKhanwastoproveanover-mightyservant.BycontrastwithNader,Tahmaspcombined thefaultsofhis fatherandgrandfather—he

was an ineffectual, lazy, vindictive alcoholic. The usual upbringing had taken its usual effect. One ofTahmasp’scourtierscommentedthathewouldnevermakeasuccessofhisreignbecausehewasalwaysdrunkandnoonewasinapositiontocorrecthim.7

AfterconsolidatinghispositionbymakingapunitivecampaigntocowtheAbdaliAfghansofHerat,andhavingestablishedhisdominanceatTahmasp’scourt,Naderbytheautumnof1729wasfinallyreadytoattacktheAfghanforcesthatwereoccupyingIsfahan.Aneyewitnessaccountfromthistime,fromtheGreekmerchantandtravelerBasileVatatzes,givesavividimpressionofthedailyexercisesNaderhadimposed on the army to prepare them for battle.We know that he made these routine for his troopsthroughouthiscareer,butnoothersourcedescribestheexercisesinsuchdetail.

Vatatzes wrote that Nader, entering the exercise area on his horse, would nod in greeting to hisofficers.Hewould thenhalt his horse and sit silently for some time, examining the assembled troops.Finally,hewouldturntotheofficersandaskwhatbattleformationsorweaponsthetroopswouldpracticewiththatday.Thentheexerciseswouldbegin:

Andtheywouldattackfromvariouspositions,andtheywoulddowheelsandcounter-wheels,andcloseupformation,andcharges,anddisperseformation,andthencloseupagainonthesamespot;andflights;andintheseflightstheywouldmakecounter-attacks,quicklyrallying together thedispersed troops. . . .And theyexercisedallsortsofmilitarymanoeuvresonhorseback,andtheywoulduserealweapons,butwithgreatcaresoasnottowoundtheircompanions.

Aswellaspracticingmovement information, thehorsemenalsoshowedtheirskillwith individualweapons—lance,sword,shield,andbow.Asatargetfortheirarrows,aglassballwasputatthetopofapole, and the men would ride toward it at the gallop, and try to hit it. Few could, but when Naderperformedtheexercisehewouldgallopalong,openingandclosinghisarmslikewingsashehandledthebowandthequiver,andhitthetargettwoorthreetimesinthreeorfourattempts,looking“likeaneagle.”Thecavalryexerciseslastedthreehours.Theinfantryalsoexercisedtogether:

...theinfantry—Imeanthosethatcarriedmuskets—wouldgettogetherintheirownunitsandtheywouldshoottheirgunsatatargetandexercisecontinuously.If[Nader]sawanordinarysoldierconsistentlyontopformhewouldpromotehimtobealeaderof100menoraleaderof50men.Heencouragedallthesoldierstowardbravery,abilityandexperience,andinsimplewordshehimselfgaveanexampleofstrongcharacterandmilitaryvirtue.8

Vatatzes’s description dwells on cavalry maneuvers and the display of individual weapon skillsbecausetheseweredramatic.Buthisdescriptionofinfantrytrainingandtheexpenditureofcostlypowderandball inexercises issignificantbecause itshowsNader’sconcern tomaximize thefirepowerofhistroops,whichwastoprovecrucial.Thispassagealsomakesplainthecarehetookwiththeselectionofgoodofficers,andtheirpromotionbymerit.Forthearmytoactquickly,intelligently,andflexiblyunderhisorders,itwasessentialtohavegoodofficerstotransmitthem.Threehoursadayofmaneuvers,overtime, broughtNader’smen to a high standard of control and discipline, so that on the battlefield theymovedandfoughtalmostasextensionsofhisownmind.VatatzesshowsthewayNaderimpressedonthemen what they had to do by personal example—a principle he followed in battle, too. Training,firepower,discipline,control,andpersonalexamplewerepartofthekeytohissuccessinwar.Nader’stransformationofthearmywasalreadywelladvanced.

Bytheendof1729Nader’sarmyhaddefeatedtheAfghansinthreebattlesandhadretakenIsfahan.Tahmasp was reinstalled in the old capital as shah. But before Nader agreed to pursue the defeatedAfghans,heforcedTahmasp toconcede theright tocollect taxes tosupport thearmy.Theright to levytaxesenabledNadertoestablishastatewithinthestate,basedonthearmy.

NaderdulyfinishedofftheremnantsoftheAfghanoccupyingforce.HewentontothrowtheOttomanTurks out of western Persia before turning rapidly east to conquer Herat. In all these campaigns hismodernized forces, strong in gunpowderweapons, outclassed their opponents and showed themselvesable toovercome the ferocityof theAfghan cavalry charges and the attacksof theprovincialOttomantroops.ButwhilehewasinHerat,helearnedthatinhisabsenceTahmasphadrenewedthewarwiththeOttomans,allowedhimselftobedefeated,andconcludedahumiliatingpeacewiththeOttomans.Naderissuedamanifestorepudiatingthetreaty,andmarchedwest.Itisstrikingthathedeclaredhimselfpubliclyand sought popular support for his action—amodern moment that argues against those who deny theexistenceofanybutlocalanddynasticloyaltiesinthisperiod.

ArrivinginIsfahaninthelatesummerof1732—andhavingpreparedwhatwastocomewithtypicalcare—Nader fooled Tahmasp into a false sense of security and got him drunk.He then displayed theSafavidshahinthisdisreputablestatetotheShi‘acourtiersandarmyofficers.Theassemblednotables,prompted by Nader, declared Tahmasp unfit to rule, and elevated his infant son Abbas to the throneinstead. Nader continued as generalissimo to this infant, announcing at the coronation his intention to“throw reins around the necks of the rulers ofKandahar,Bokhara,Delhi, and Istanbul” on his behalf.Thosepresentmayhavethoughtthistobevainboasting,buteventsweretoprovethemwrong.

Nader’sfirstprioritywastoattacktheOttomansagainandrestorethetraditionalfrontiersofPersiainthewest andnorth. Inhis first campaign inOttoman Iraqhemet a setback: apowerful army includingsomeofthebest troopsheldcentrallybytheOttomanstatemarchedeast torelieveBaghdad, ledbyanexperiencedcommander.ThiswaswarfareofadifferentordertothatNaderhadexperienceduptothattime.Overconfident,hedividedhisarmyoutsideBaghdad—attemptingtopreventsuppliesgettingthroughtothebesiegedcity—andsufferedaseriousdefeat.Butwithinafewmonths,afterreplacinglostmenandequipment with a ruthless efficiency that caused much suffering among the hapless peasants andtownspeoplewhohadtopayforit,NaderrenewedtheTurkishwar,thistimedefeatingtheOttomanforcesnearKirkuk.Movingnorth,hetheninflictedadevastatingdefeatonanewOttomanarmynearYerevan.Thiswas inJune1735.Atrucewasnegotiatedonthebasisof theoldfrontiers thathadexistedbefore1722, and the Ottomans withdrew. The Russians—Nader’s allies against the Ottomans—had alreadywithdrawn from the Persian lands along the Caspian coast, their regiments having lost many men todiseaseinthehumidclimateofGilan.

NADERSHAHWith the exception ofKandahar,Nader had now restored control over all the traditional territories ofSafavid Persia. He decided the time was right to make himself shah, and he did so by means of anacclamation by all the great nobles, tribal chiefs, and senior clerics of Persia at an assembly on theMoghanplain.Therewaslittledissent,butthechiefmullahwasoverheardspeakingprivatelyinfavorofthecontinuationofSafavidrule,andwasstrangled.The infantAbbaswasdeposed,and theruleof theSafaviddynastyatlastcametoanend.ItisnoteworthythatdespiteNader’slaterreputationfortyrannicalcruelty,andwiththeexceptionoftheunfortunatechiefmullah(whoseexecutioncarrieditsownpoliticalmessage),heachievedhisrisetopoweralmostwithouttheuseofpoliticalviolence.HebroughtaboutthedepositionofTahmaspandthecoronationattheMoghannotbyassassination,butbycarefulpreparation,propaganda,cunningmaneuvering,andthepresenceofoverbearingmilitaryforce—andaboveallbytheprestigeofhismilitarysuccesses.

SomeothersignificanteventsoccurredattheMoghan.Nadermadeitaconditionofhisacceptanceof

the throne that thePersianpeopleaccepted thecessationofShi‘apracticesoffensive toSunniMuslims(especially the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs). This new religious policy served a variety ofpurposes.ThereorientationtowardSunnismhelpedtoreinforcetheloyaltyofthelargeSunnicontingentinNader’sarmy,whichhehadbuiltupinordertoavoidtoogreatadependenceonthetraditionalistShi‘aelement,whotendedtobepro-Safavid.Butalsothenewpolicywasnotaggressivelydogmatic.Religiousminoritiesweretreatedwithgreatertolerance.NaderwasgeneroustotheArmenians,andhisreignwasregarded later by the Jews as one of relief from persecution (though minorities suffered as much asanyone else from his violent oppression and heavy taxation, especially in later years).9 The religiouspolicymade it easier forNader tomake a grab for the endowments ofShi‘amosques and shrines, animportant extra source of cash to pay his troops.WithinPersia,Nader sought only to amend religiouspractices—nottoimposeSunnismwholesale.ButoutsidePersiahepresentedhimselfandthecountryasconvertstoSunnism10—whichenabledNadertosethimselfupasapotentialrivaltotheOttomansultanforsupremacyoverIslamasawhole,somethingthatwouldhavebeenimpossibleifheandhisstatehadremainedorthodoxShi‘a.

The religiouspolicyalso served todistinguishNader’s regimeand itsprinciples from thoseof theSafavids.Hedidthisinotherways,too,notablywithhispolicytowardminorities,andbygivinghissonsgovernorships rather thanpenning themup in theharem.Healso showedmoderation in the sizeofhisharemandissueddecreesforbiddingtheabductionofwomen.Thischangewasprobablydirected,atleastinpart,atpointingupthecontrastbetweenhisruleandthatofthelastSafavids.

Crowned shah,with hiswestern frontiers secure and in undisputed control of the central lands ofPersia,NadersetoffeastwardtoconquerKandahar.Theexactionstopayforthisnewcampaigncausedgreatsufferingand inmanypartsof thecountrybrought theeconomyalmost toastandstill.Nader tookKandaharaftera longsiege,buthedidnotstopthere.Usingtheexcusethat theMoghulauthoritieshadgivenrefugetoAfghanfugitives,NadercrossedtheoldfrontierbetweenthePersianandMoghulempires,tookKabul,andmarchedontowardDelhi.NorthofDelhi,atKarnal, thePersianarmyencounteredthearmyoftheMoghulemperor,MohammadShah.ThePersiansweremuchinferiorinnumbertotheMoghul

forces,yetthankstothebettertrainingandfirepowerofhissoldiers,andrivalryanddisunityamongtheMoghulcommanders,Naderdefeatedthem.HewashelpedbythefactthattheMoghulcommandersweremounted on elephants, which besides proving vulnerable to firearms were liable to run wild—to thedismayoftheirdistinguishedridersandanyonewhohappenedtobeintheirpath.

FromthebattlefieldofKarnal,NaderwentontoDelhi,wherehearrivedinMarch1739.Shortlyafterhisarrivalthere,riotingbrokeoutandsomePersiansoldierswerekilled.Sofarfromhome,andwiththewealth of theMoghul Empire at stake, Nader could not afford to lose control. He ordered a ruthlessmassacreinwhichanestimatedthirtythousandpeopledied,mostlyinnocentcivilians.Priortothispoint,Naderhadgenerally(atleastawayfromthebattlefield)achievedhisendswithoutexcessivebloodshed.ButafterDelhi,hemayhavedecidedthathispreviousscrupleshadbecomeredundant.

With a characteristic blend of threat and diplomacy,Nader stripped theMoghul emperor of a vasttreasureofjewels,gold,andsilver,andacceptedthegiftofalltheMoghulterritorieswestoftheIndusRiver.Thetreasurewasworthasmuchasperhaps700millionrupees.Toputthissuminsomekindofcontext,ithasbeencalculatedthatthetotalcosttotheFrenchgovernmentoftheSevenYears’War(1756–1763),includingsubsidiespaidtotheAustriangovernmentaswellasallthecostsofthefightingonlandandsea,wasabout1.8billionlivrestournois(thestandardunitofaccountinprerevolutionaryFrance).Thiswasequivalenttoabout£90millionsterlingatthetime—closetotheroughestimateof£87.5millionsterling for thevalueofNader’shaul fromDelhi.Someof the jewelshe tookaway—the largest,mostimpressiveones, like theKuh-eNur, theDarya-yeNur, and theTaj-eMah—had a complex and oftenbloodyhistoryoftheirowninthefollowingdecades.

NaderdidnotattempttoannextheMoghulEmpireoutright.HispurposeinconqueringDelhihadbeentosecurethecashnecessarytocontinuehiswarsofconquestinthewest,forwhichthewealthofPersiaalonehad,bythetimeofhiscoronation,beguntoproveinadequate.

Nader’scampaignsareareminderofthecentralityofPersiatoeventsintheregion,inwaysthathaveparallels today. A list of some of Nader’s sieges—Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk,Mosul, Kandahar, Herat,Kabul—hasafamiliarringtoitafter theeventsof thefirstyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury.It isworthrecallingthatPersianswerenotstrangersinanyofthelandsinwhichNadercampaigned.Althoughheandhis Safavid predecessors were of Turkic origin and spoke a Turkic language at court, the culturalinfluence of Persian was such that the language of the court and administration in Delhi and acrossnorthern India was Persian, and diplomatic correspondence from the Ottoman court in Istanbul wasnormally inPersian, too.Persianhegemony fromDelhi to Istanbulwould, in someways,have seemednaturaltomanyoftheinhabitantsoftheregion,echoingasitdidthePersiancharacterofearlierempiresandthepervasiveinfluenceofPersianliterary,religious,andartisticculture.

Nader’sannexationofMoghul territorywestof the Indus, removing thegeographicalbarrierof theAfghanmountains,wasone indicator that his regime,had it endured,mighthave expanded further intoIndia.OtherindicationsincludehisconstructionofafleetinthePersianGulf,whichwouldhavegreatlyfacilitated communications between the different parts of such an empire, and his adoption of a newcurrency designed to be interchangeablewith the rupee. If this had happened—especially if the traderoute throughtoBasra,Baghdad,andbeyondhadbeenopenedup—andif ithadbeenmanagedwisely,NadercouldhaveseenareleaseoftradeandeconomicenergycomparabletothatundertheAbbasidsathousandyearsearlier.Butthatwasnottohappen.

OnhisreturnfromIndia,Naderdiscoveredthathisson,RezaQoli,whohadbeenmadeviceroyinhisabsence, had executed the former Safavid shahsTahmasp andAbbas.Nader’s displeasure at thiswasincreasedbyhisdislikeof themagnificent entourageRezaQoli hadbuilt upwhileNaderhadbeen inIndia. In response, Nader took away his son’s viceroyship and humiliated him. From this point, their

relationshipdeteriorated,andNadercametobelievethatRezaQoliwasplottingtosupplanthim.FromIndia,NadermadeasuccessfulcampaigninTurkestan.Thenhewentontosubduetherebellious

LezgesofDaghestan,buttherehewasunlucky.TheLezgesavoidedopenbattleandcarriedoutaguerrillawar of ambush and attacks on supply convoys.Nader’s troops suffered from lack of food, andNaderhimselfwastroubledbyillness,probablyliverdiseasecausedoriginallybymalariaandexacerbatedbyheavydrinking.Thesickness,whichgrewworseafterhisreturnfromIndia,wasaccompaniedbygreatragesthatbecamemoreungovernableastimewenton.WhilehewasinDaghestaninthesummerof1742,hewastoldthatRezaQolihadinstigatedanassassinationattemptagainsthim.RezaQolideniedhisguilt.ButNaderdidnotbelievehimandhadhimblindedtopreventhisevertakingthethrone.

Nader’sfailureinDaghestan,hisillness,andaboveallhisterribleremorseovertheblindingofhissonbroughtaboutacrisis,akindofbreakdown,fromwhichheneverrecovered.Perhapsbecauseofthepovertyandhumiliationsofhischildhood,Nader’sfamilywereofcentralimportancetohim,andloyaltywithinthefamilyhaduptothattimebeenunquestioned.Ithadbeenoneofthefixedpointsonwhichhehadconstructedhisregime.Nowwiththatfoundationgivenway,Nader’sactionsnolongershowedhisformerenergyanddrivetosucceed,andheunderwentadrasticmentalandphysicaldecline.WithdrawingfromDaghestanwithouthavingsubduedtheLezges tribes,hecallednewforces together—according toplanslaidmonthsandyearsbefore—foranothercampaigninOttomanIraq.

When they gathered, his army numbered some 375,000 men—larger than the combined forces ofAustria and Prussia, themain protagonists in theEuropean theater of the SevenYears’Warwhen thatconflictbeganthirteenyearslater.11Thiswasthemostpowerfulsinglemilitaryforceintheworldatthattime. Itwasalso, in the long term,an insupportablenumberof troopsforastate thesizeofPersia (noIranianarmywouldreachthatsizeagainuntiltheIran/Iraqwarof1980–1988).IthasbeenestimatedthatwhereastherewerearoundthirtymillionpeopleintheOttomanterritoriesintheeighteenthcentury,andperhapsonehundredfiftymillionintheMoghulEmpire,Persia’spopulationwasperhapsaslowassixmillion, having fallen from ninemillion before theAfghan revolt. Over the same period the economycollapsed,asaresultofinvasion,war,andexactionstopayforwar.12

Thearmy,andthetaxationtopayforit,arerecurringthemesinNader’sstory.Wasthisarmyanomadhost, or a modernmilitary force? This points to the wider question of whether Nader’s style of rulelookedbackwardorforward.It isanextrememixture.NaderrepeatedlycomparedhimselfwithTimur,stressing his Turkic origin and Timurid precedents in many of his public statements. He named hisgrandsonShahrokh afterTimur’s son and successor.At onepoint he even removedTimur’s tombstonefromSamarkandforhisownmausoleum,onlytoreturnitlater(unfortunately,itwasbrokeninhalfintheprocess).OnseveraloccasionshedescribedhimselfastheinstrumentofGod’swrathonasinfulpeople,after themannerofearlierAsiaticconquerors,andhisbrutalconductofgovernment—particularlyafterhis returnfromIndia—hasasmuchincommonwith theactionsofanomadwarlordaswith thoseofamodernstatesman.

But he was not in any simple sense a tribal leader, and in many ways he remained an outsiderthroughouthis life.Hewasnotborn into the leadershipof theAfshar tribe towhichhebelonged, andsomeofhismostdeterminedenemiesthroughouthiscareerwerefellowAfshars.Fromthebeginninghisfollowerswerediverse,includingespeciallyKurdsandJalayirtribesmen.LaterherepudiatedhisShi‘aheritage,turnedSunni(atleastforpublicconsumption),anddependedmostheavilyonhisAfghantroops.LikeotherPersian leaders (aswellasNapoleon),hewasclose tohis immediate familyandpromotedthempolitically;butinhiswiderconnectionshewasanopportunist,andthetermAfsharidthatisappliedto him and his dynasty is misleading. The name Nader means “rarity” or “prodigy,” and both areappropriate.Hewassuigeneris,aparvenu.

Naderusedgovernmentcleverly,begananimportantandthoroughreformoftaxation,andhadastrongadministrativegrip.Hisreligiouspolicywasnovelandtolerantinspirit.Oneshouldnotoverstateit,butsomecontemporariesremarkeduponhisunusuallyconsideratetreatmentofwomen.Inmilitarymattershewaswhollymodern.Heestablishedthebeginningsofanavyanditnowseemsplainthatsomethingverylikethebeginningsofamilitaryrevolution,asdescribedintheEuropeancontextbyGeoffreyParker,wasbroughtaboutinPersiabyNaderShah.ItwasunderNaderthatthemajorityoftroopsinthearmywereequipped with firearms for the first time, necessitating a greater emphasis on drill and training—characteristicofdevelopments thathad takenplace inEurope in thepreviouscentury.UnderNader thearmy increasedgreatly insizeandcost,andhewas forced tomake improvements inhiscapability forsiegewarfare.Hebegantoreshapestateadministrationtomakestructuresmoreefficient.TheseareallelementsthathavebeenshowntobetypicalofthemilitaryrevolutioninEurope.

IfNaderhadreignedlongerandmorewisely,andhadpassedonhisruletoacompetentsuccessor,thedrive to pay for his successful army could have transformed the Persian state administration andultimately theeconomy,ashappenedinEurope.Itcouldhavebroughtabout inIranamodernizingstatecapable of resisting colonial intervention in the following century. If that had happened, Nadermighttodaybe remembered in thehistoryof Iranand theMiddleEastasa figurecomparablewithPeter theGreatinRussia:asaruthless,militaristicreformerwhosethiscountryonanewpath.Intheearly1740she seemed set for great things—contemporaries held their breath to see whether he could succeed intakingOttomanIraqandestablishinghissupremacythroughtheIslamicworldasawhole.Hehadalreadyachieved a largepart of that task.Unfortunately,Nader’s derangement in the last fiveyears of his lifemeant that theexpenseofhismilitaryinnovationsturnedPersia intoadesertrather thandevelopingthecountry.Hisinsatiabledemandsforcashbroughtabouthisdownfallandthedownfallofhisdynasty.

Nader’s troops invadedOttomanIraq in1743andrapidlyoverranmostof theprovince,except themajor cities.Baghdad andBasrawere blockaded.Nader brought up a new array of siege cannon andmortars tobombardKirkuk,whichquickly surrendered,but thedefenseofMosulwasconductedmoreresolutely.Nader’snewsiegeartillerypoundedthewallsanddevastatedtheinteriorofthecity,butalotofhismenwerekilledinunsuccessfulassaults,andhenolongerhadthewillorpatiencetosustainalongsiege.Whenhewithdrew,hesentpeaceproposalstotheOttomans.Mosulmarkedtheendofhisambitionto subdue the Ottoman sultan and demonstrate his pre-eminence in the Islamic world. It was anotherimportantturningpoint.

Thelatestroundofforcedcontributionsandrequisitioning,tomakegoodthelossesinDaghestanandprovideforthecampaignof1743,hadcausedgreatdistressandresentmentacrossPersia.RevoltsbrokeoutinAstarabad(ledbyMohammadHasanKhanQajar,whosesonwastofoundtheQajardynastylaterinthecentury),Shiraz,andelsewhere.Earlyin1744,NaderwithdrewtoacampnearHamadan,inordertobe closer to the troubles and coordinate action against them.The insurrectionswereput downwithgreatseverity.ShirazandAstarabadweredevastated,andineachplacetwowhitetowerswereerected,studdedwithnichesthatheldtheheadsofhundredsofexecutedmen.

At length Nader realized that the Ottomans were not going to accept his peace proposals—newOttomanarmieswereadvancingtowardhisfrontiers.Nader’ssonNasrollahdefeatedoneoftheseforces,whileNaderachievedvictoryover theother—nearYerevan, in thesummerof1745.Thiswashis lastgreatvictory,anditwasfollowedbyatreatywiththeOttomansinthefollowingyear.Butbythistime,newrevoltshadbrokenout,drivenbyNader’soppressivepractices:eachplacehevisitedwasransackedby his troops and tax collectors, as if theywere plundering enemies.His demands formoney reachedinsanelevels,andcruelbeatings,mutilations,andkillingsbecamecommonplace.Hisillnessrecurredandfurtheredhismentalinstability.Bythewinterof1746–1747hiscrazydemandsformoneyextendedeven

tohisinnercircleoffamilyandcloseadvisers,andnoonecouldfeelsafe.Hisnephew,AliQoli,joinedarevoltinSistanandrefusedtoreturntoobedience.Unlikepreviousrebels,AliQoliandhiscompanionshadcontactsamongNader’sclosestattendants. InJune1747NaderwasassassinatedbyofficersofhisownbodyguardnearMashhad.Theyburst intohis tent in theharemwhilehewassleeping.Oneof theassassinscutoffhisarmasheraisedhisswordtodefendhimself,andthenanotherslicedoffhishead.13

The short-lived nature ofNader’s achievements is one explanation for his not being better knownoutsideIran,butitisnotasufficientone.WithafewexceptionsNader,havingexcitedmuchinterestandwriting in Europe among his eighteenth-century contemporaries,was largely ignored in the nineteenth.Whyshouldthishavebeenso?

Withoutoverstatingthecase,itseemsplausiblethatitwasbecauseNader’svigorandhissuccessesfitbadlywiththecrudeVictorianviewoftheOrientasincorrigiblydecadentandcorrupt,ripeforandinneed of colonization. From a purely British perspective, his military successes might then have beenthoughttodetractfromthelatervictoriesofCliveandWellingtoninIndia,andtohaveconflictedwiththemyth of the supposedly inherent superiority of European arms (an important element in the edifice ofBritish imperialism).By the latter part of the twentieth century theGreatMen ofHistory—asCarlyledescribedthem—couldnolongerberegardedwiththesameheroworshiptheyhadenjoyedbefore,andthe oblivion to which Nader had been consigned was perhaps deepened by a general distaste forconquerors.

But Nader’s historian, Mirza Mahdi Astarabadi, far from showing distaste, celebrated Nader’svictoriesasasignofthefavorofGod—andofGod’swillthatNadershouldreign.Inthisaswellasinotherrespects,MirzaMahdi’saccountservesasaconduitforNader’sownattitudes.WritingasNader’sofficial historian in Nader’s own lifetime, Mirza Mahdi was never likely to show any radicalindependenceofthought.Anindependentobserverwhomethimdescribedhimas“wise,humble,polite,attentive,andrespectable. . . .”Hishistory ispainstakinglyaccurateaboutdatesandplaces,withonlyoccasional lapses.Having accompaniedNader on his campaigns from the earliest days, hewas in analmost unique position to know the facts ofwhat happened, but he tended to put a favorable gloss onevents.OnoccasionheevenomittedmentionofactionsthatwouldhavereflectedbadlyonNader.

ByfarthegreatestsingleomissioninMirzaMahdi’snarrativewashisfailuretoincludetheblindingof RezaQoliMirza in 1742. It is generally agreed thatMirzaMahdi’s historywas for themost partwrittenasachroniclewhileNaderwasalive.ButsomeyearslaterheaddedasectiondealingwiththelastmonthsofNader’slife,andtheaftermathofhisassassination.Inthissectionthecriticismhehadbeenforced to suppress in Nader’s lifetime flooded out. He described how Nader’s cruelties, instead ofcalminghim,onlymadehimmorefrenzied;andhowmanyofhispeopleweredrivenbyhisoppressiontoabandon their houses and towns and take to thedeserts andmountains, or to emigrate.Thewords thatMirzaMahdiusedtointroducethislastsectionofhishistoryservewelltosummarizeNader’scareer.Hewrote,

FromthebeginningofNaderShah’s reignuntilhis returnfromKhwarezmandhismarch intoDaghestan,hewasentirelyoccupiedwiththecareofhisempireandtheadministrationofjustice,insuchamannerthatthepeopleofIranwouldhavegiven their lives forhispreservation;butafter this timehechangedhisconductentirely.At the instigationofsomehostilespirit, thisunhappymonarchlistenedto ill-intentionedspies,andhadtheeyesofRezaQoli, thebestandthedearestofhissons,tornout.Remorsequicklyfollowedthisrashcruelty,andNaderShahbecamelikeamadman.Thereportsofbadnewsthathereceivedinsuccessionthereafteroftroublesinvariouspartsofhisdominionincreasedhisrage.14

NEWMAPSOFHELL

ThestoryofthedecadesafterNader’sdeathisoneofchaos,destruction,violence,andmisery.Anyonelookingtorestoretheirfaithintheinnategoodnessofhumannaturewoulddowelltoskipthenextfewpages.AfterNader’sassassinationhisnephewAliQolimadehimselfshah,renamedhimselfAdelShah(whichmeansTheJustShah—amisnomer),andsent troopstoNader’sstrongholdatKalat-eNaderi inKhorasan.TheretheymurderedallbutoneofNader’ssonsandgrandsons,andevencutopenthebelliesofpregnantwomenintheharemtofinishoffheirsasyetunborn.

ThearmyNaderhadassembled,withinwhichhehadencouragedcompetitionbetweencommandersandethnicgroups,couldnotholdtogetheroncehewasgone.LikethatofAlexanderafterhisdeath,thearmysplit,followingcharismaticgenerals.ThecommanderoftheAfghans,AhmadKhanAbdali—whomNaderhadreleasedfromprisoninKandaharin1738—foughtNader’sassassinsinthecampandthenleftforhome.Alongthewayheandhismencapturedaquantityoftreasure,includingthefabulousKuh-eNurdiamondthatNaderhadtakenfromDelhi.OnhisarrivalinKandahar,Ahmadwaselectedtobethefirstshahof theDurranidynasty, foundingastatebasedonKandahar,Herat,andKabul thatwas tobecomemodernAfghanistan.InthissenseonecouldsaythatAfghanistanwasfoundedinthemusterlistsofNaderShah.AnotherofNader’scommanders, theGeorgianErekle,whohadaccompaniedhimtoDelhi,wenthome and established an independent kingdom in Georgia.Most of the other ethnic and tribal groupsNader had assembled inKhorasan returned home also, including the smallZand tribe, originally fromLorestan(thoughperhapsultimatelyofKurdishorigin),underoneoftheirleaders,KarimKhan,andtheBakhtiari,underAliMardanKhan.

Adel Shah, who was unable to maintain control in an impoverished country swarming withunemployed soldiers, was deposed after littlemore than a year by his brother, Ebrahim.Other rulersfollowed,onlytobedeposedinturn:Nader’ssurvivinggrandson,Shahrokh;thenaSafaviddescendantofShahSoleiman; thenShahrokhagain(thoughhehadbeenblinded in the interim).Shahrokhremained inplacefrom1750until1796,seeminglywiththeconsentandeventheprotectionofAhmadShahDurrani,whorespectedhimas thedescendantofNader.But fromtheearly1750s theregime inMashhadcouldexertlittleinfluencebeyondKhorasan.15

AdelShah’s brotherEbrahimhad initially controlled Isfahan, but after hemoved eastKarimKhanZandandAliMardanKhanBakhtiaritookoverthewesternprovinces,comingtoanagreementwitheachotherandrulinginthenameofanotherSafavidprince,Esma‘ilIII.Step-by-stepKarimKhanremovedhisrivals,killingAliMardanKhanin1754anddeposingEsma‘ilin1759.KarimKhanstabilizedhisregimeby fightingoff external rivals aswell:AzadKhan, another ofNaderShah’sAfghan commanders,whocontrolled Azerbaijan; and Mohammad Hasan Khan Qajar, who had his power base in Mazanderan.KarimKhanalsofoughttheOttomansandconqueredBasra,somethingNaderShahhadneverachieved.

TheruleofKarimKhanZandcreatedanislandofrelativecalmandpeaceinanotherwisebloodyanddestructiveperiod.IntheyearsoftheAfghanrevoltandthereignofNaderShah,manycitiesinIranweredevastatedbywarandrepression(some,likeKerman,morethanonce—in1719and1747—anditwastosufferterriblyagainin1794).Bymid-centurymostofthebuilt-upareaofIsfahan,theformercapital,wasdeserted and inhabited only by owls andwild animals. In the last years of theSafavids it had been athrivingcityof550,000people,oneoftheworld’slargestcities—similarinsizetoLondonatthetime,orevenbigger.16Bytheendofthesiegeof1722only100,000peoplewereleft.Althoughmanycitizenslaterreturned,thenumberfellyetfurtherduringtheAfghanoccupationandbeyond.By1736therewereonly50,000left.17IthasbeenestimatedthattheoveralltotalpopulationofPersiafellfromaroundninemillionatthebeginningofthecenturytoperhapssixmillionorlessbymid-century—throughwar,disease,andemigration.Populationlevelsdidnotbegintorisesignificantlyagainuntilafter180018(bycontrast, thepopulationofEnglandrosefromaroundsixmillionin1700toaroundninemillionin1800).Tradefellto

one-fifthofitspreviouslevel.19Butdespitethepitifulstateintowhichthecountryhaddescended,themajoroutsidepowers,Russia

andtheOttomanEmpire,didnotinterveneastheyhadin1722–1725.Itwaspartlythattheywerebusyelsewhere,andsurelyalsothattheoutcomeoftheirpreviousattemptshadnotencouragedthemtorepeattheexperiment.

Theeighteenthcenturyhasbeenportrayedasaperiodoftribalresurgence,andthenamesofthemainpartiescontendingforsupremacyformuchofthecentury—Afshar,Zand,andQajar—alonepointinthatdirection.20Manyofthetroopsthatfoughtinthecivilwars,mostofthemhorsemen,wererecruitedfromthenomadictribeswhostillwouldhavecomprisedbetweenone-thirdandone-halfofthepopulation.Themakeup of the tribes was complex and far from static—here were many different terms to expressdifferentkindsofclans,tribalsubdivisions,tribes,andtribalconfederations,andalliancesbetweentribesoccasionallyformed,broke,andreformedinnewcombinations.Inthebestoftimes—forcenturiesifnotmillennia—thetribeslivedinuneasytensionwiththemoresettledpeopleofthetownsandvillages.Thetribesandthetownspeoplewereusuallydividedbyethnicity,language,orreligion,orbyacombinationofallthree.Thetribesmen,livinginmoreruggedmountainandaridterritory,hadruggedattitudestogowiththeirmoremarginalexistence.Theyraisedlivestockandtradedtheirsurplustosupplythetownsandvillageswithwoolandmeat. In return they receivedgoods theycouldnotmakefor themselves—somefoodstuffsaswellasweapons.But inaddition to thismoreopenformofexchange, therewasoftenanexchangeon thebasisof security,one thatwasmoreor lessdisguised.Peasantsmightpay tribute toalocal tribal leader tohave theircrops leftaloneatharvest time,or toavoidraids thatmightotherwiseresultintheirbeingcarriedoffasslaves(especiallyinthenortheast).Ontheotherhand,thelocaltriballeadermighthavebeenco-opted toserveas theregionalgovernor, inwhichcasehewouldcollect taxinsteadofprotectionmoney.But ingeneral, the tribesand their leaders tended tohave theupperhand,which theyexploitedpolitically.Theirpositionofsupremacywasonlydecisivelyoverturnedwhen thetwentiethcenturywasquitewelladvanced.

Karim Khan Zand did not have Nader’s insatiable love of war or his lust for conquest, and hisgovernmental system was less highly geared. After removing Esma‘il, Karim Khan refused to makehimselfshah,rulinginsteadasvakil-era‘aya(deputyorregentofthepeople)—amodern-soundingtitlethatprobablyreflectedhisawarenessofthewearinessoftheIranianpeopleandtheirlongingforpeace.He restored traditional Shi‘ism as the religion in his territories, dropping Nader’s experiment withSunnism.KarimKhanchoseShirazashiscapital,andbuiltmosques,elegantgardens,andpalaces thatstillstand—erasingthescarsoftherevoltof1744andbeautifyingthecitythathadbeenthehomeofSa‘diand Hafez. Karim Khan ruled there until his death in 1779. He was a ruthless, tough leader, as wasnecessary in those harsh times, but he also acquired an enduring reputation formodesty, compassion,pragmatism, and good government, unlikemost of his rivals.His reputation shone the brighter for thesurroundinguglinessandviolenceofhistimes.

RENEWEDWARAfterKarimKhan’sdeath,Persia lapsedagain into themiseryofcivilwar.This time thestrugglewasbetweenvariousZandprinceson theone sideand theQajars,based inMazanderan,on theother.TheQajarswereunitedbyAghaMohammadKhan(sonofMohammadHasanKhanQajar),whohadfallenintothehandsofAdelShahin1747or1748andhadbeencastratedatAdelShah’sorderswhenhewasonly fiveor sixyearsold.After thatAghaMohammadwaskept as ahostagebyKarimKhanbutwas

treatedkindly.21AghaMohammadgrewuptobeafiercelyintelligent,pragmaticman,butalsogrimandbitter,withabadtemperandaviciouscruelstreakthatgrewworseashegotolder.Hewasneverabletoovercome the loss of his manhood. Contemporary illustrations depicted him as looking drawn andbeardlessasasignofit.

WhenKarimKhan died,AghaMohammad escaped to the north,where he successfully conciliatedotherbranchesoftheQajartribethathadpreviouslyfeudedwithhisfamily.Buthehadtofighthisownbrotherstoestablishhisdominance.AghaMohammad’srisewasmuchmorefirmlybasedonhislineageandontheQajartribethanthatofNaderShahhadbeenbasedontheAfshars.Oncehissupremacywithinthetribewasachieved,AghaMohammadejectedZandforcesfromMazanderanandbegancampaigningsouth of theAlborzmountains,with the help of theYomutTurkmen allies that had long supported hisfamily.ButwhenhearrivedoutsideTehran,thegateswereclosedagainsthim.ThecitizenspolitelytoldhimthattheZandswereinchargeinIsfahan.ThatmeantthatthepeopleofTehranhadtoobeytheZands,but it also implied that ifAghaMohammadKhan could take Isfahan, theywould obey him, too.AghaMohammadmarchedon to Isfahan, taking it in the earlypart of1785.Hewas thenduly accepted intoTehraninMarch1786,afterothersuccessfulcampaigninginthewest.Fromthenonitbecameclearthatheintendedtoestablishhimselfasrulerofthewholecountry,andTehranhasbeenthecapitalsincethattime.

TherewastobemuchmorefightingbeforeAghaMohammadcouldrulesupreme,andhewasstillfarfromsecureinthesouth.Isfahanchangedhandsseveraltimes.ButtheZandscouldnotdeliveraknockoutbloweither, and in January1789 their leader (Ja‘farKhan)wasassassinated.The ruling familyof theZandsthenfoughtamongthemselvesfortheleadership,untilLotfAliKhanZand,ayounggrand-nephewofKarimKhan,enteredShirazinMay1789,establishinghiscontrol.

LotfAliKhanwasyoungandcharismaticandanaturalfocusforthehopesofthosewhorememberedtheprestigeofhisgreat uncle, butmilitarilyhewas at adisadvantage from the start.He foughtoff anattackbyAghaMohammadinJune1789,butwhenhemadeamoveonIsfahanin1791Shirazrevoltedagainsthimbehindhisback.He returnedbutwasblocked fromre-enteringhis formercapitalandwasforcedtolaysiegetothecity.TheShirazissentforhelptoAghaMohammad—andsentLotfAliKhan’sfamilyasprisonerstohimtoo.LotfAliKhanwasabletodefeatacombinedforceofQajarsandtroopsfromShiraz,butthecitystillheldout.Thenin1792AghaMohammadhimselfmarchedsouthwithalargearmy.BythistimeAghaMohammadwasshowingsomeofthefierceangerandviciouscrueltyforwhichhelaterbecamenotorious.AtonepointhesawacoinmintedinLotfAli’snameandbecamesoenragedthathegaveordersfortheZand’ssontobecastrated.

LotfAliKhannownearlybroughtoffacoupthatcouldhavewonhimthewar.AsAghaMohammadapproachedShiraz,hecampedwithhisQajartroopsneartheancientsitesofPersepolisandIstakhr.Afternightfell,LotfAliapproachedthecampwithasmallerforceandattackedfromseveraldirectionsinthedark. Chaos erupted. Lotf Ali sent thirty or fortymen right into the camp, penetrating as far as AghaMohammad’sprivatecompound,whichwasdefendedagainstthembyafewmusketeers.AtthispointoneofAghaMohammad’scourtierswenttoLotfAliandtoldhimthatAghaMohammadhadfled.Thebattleappeared to be over andLotfAliwas persuaded that further fightingwould only risk his own troopskilling one another in the dark. He ordered hismen to sheathe their sabres.Many of them dispersed,plunderedthepartsofthecamptheywereincontrolof,andleftthescenewiththebooty.ButwhendawncameLotfAlidiscovered tohishorror thatAghaMohammadwas still there.Hehadnot fled, and theQajartroopswereregroupingaroundhim.Withonlyonethousandofhisownmenstillwithhim,LotfAliKhanwassurroundedandoutnumbered.Hequicklywithdrew,fleeingeastward.22

FromthispointonLotfAliKhan’ssupportbegantodwindleaway.HecapturedKerman,butAgha

MohammadKhanmovedagainstthecityandbesiegedit.TheQajarsbrokeintothecitybytreacheryinOctober1794andLotfAliKhanfledtoBam.AghaMohammadorderedthatthewomenandchildrenofKermanbegivenovertohissoldiersasslaves;thesurvivingmenweretobeblinded.Toensurethathisorderswere followed, hedemanded that themen’s eyeballs be cut out, brought tohim inbaskets, andpoured out on the floor. There were twenty thousand of them. Sir JohnMalcolm recorded that theseblindedvictimswere later to be foundbegging acrossPersia, telling the story of the disaster that hadbefallentheircity.23

LotfAliKhanwasbetrayed inBamandwas taken inchains toAghaMohammad,whoorderedhisTurkmenslaves todo tohim“whathadbeendoneby thepeopleofLot.”After thegangrape,LotfAliKhanwasblindedandsenttoTehran,wherehewastorturedtodeath.24

Agha Mohammad Khan was now the undisputed master of the Iranian plateau. He turned to thenorthwest, where hemarched intoGeorgia and reasserted Persian sovereignty. In September 1795 heconqueredTbilisiafterafuriousbattleinwhichtheGeorgiansseemedtobewinningatseveralpoints,despite their inferior numbers.Thousandsweremassacred inTbilisi, and fifteen thousandwomen andchildrenweretakenawayasslaves.ButthekingofGeorgiahadputhimselfunderRussianprotectionin1783,andthedestructionofTbilisicausedangerinStPetersburg.Lateron,itwastobringhumiliationforPersiaintheCaucasus.

Inthespringof1796AghaMohammadhadhimselfcrownedontheMoghanplain,whereNaderShahhad assumed the same dignity exactly sixty years earlier. At the coronation Agha Mohammad worearmbandsonwhichweremountedtheDarya-yeNurandtheTaj-eMahjewelstakenfromLotfAliKhan,whichhadpreviouslybelongedtoNaderShah.AghaMohammadKhanlikedjewels.AfterthecoronationhemarchedeasttoKhorasan,whereheacceptedthesubmissionofShahrokh,NaderShah’sgrandson.HehadShahrokhtortureduntilhegaveupmorejewels,alsofromthetreasureNaderhadbroughtawayfromDelhi.Shahrokhdiedofthetreatmentshortlyafterward,inDamghan.

AghaMohammadShahhadnowresumedcontrolof themain territoriesofSafavidPersia,with theexceptionoftheAfghanprovinces.Buthedidnotenjoythem,orhisjewels,forlong.InJune1797,whilecampaigninginwhatisnowNagorno-Karabakh,hewasstabbedtodeathbytwoofhisservants,whomhehadsentencedtobeexecutedbutunwiselyleftaliveandatlibertyovernight.

RELIGIOUSCHANGE:SEEDSOFREVOLUTIONEighteenth-centuryPersiawasnot just a placeofmassacre andmisery.Many if notmost places awayfromthemajor townsandcitiesprobablycontinued in relative tranquillity formostof theperiod.Andother developments were at work—changes in Shi‘a theology and in the religious-social structure ofShi‘ism—thatweretohavecrucialimportanceinthelongerterm.Theoldargumentbetweentraditionandreason,whichhadrolledbackandforthinaSunnicontextbetweentheMu‘tazilisandtheiropponentsinthe timeof theAbbasids, resurfaced in thesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies inadifferent form.Thisdispute,betweenwhatcametobecalledtheAkhbariandUsulischools,wasnottoberesolveduntilthenineteenthcentury.

TheAkhbarisassertedthatordinaryMuslimsshouldreadandinterprettheholytextsforthemselves,withouttheneedforintermediaries.Thetraditions(hadith)—especiallythetraditionsoftheShi‘aEmams—werethebestguide.TheUsulisrejectedthisdoctrine,sayingthatauthoritativeinterpretation(ijtihad)on the basis of reason was necessary and required extended scholarly training, which could only beachievedbyspecially talentedscholarsamongtheulema,calledmojtaheds.Almostallareasofhuman

conductwereopentoijtihad(theAkhbarishadtakentheviewthatdisputesthatcouldnotberesolvedbyprecedentsintheholytextswouldhavetobereferredtothesecularpowers).

TheUsuliseventuallywontheargument, thanks largely to the leadershipof thegreatmojtahedAqaMohammadBaqerBehbehani(1706–1790).ButtheAkhbaris,whoseviewswereclosertotheorthodoxyof Sunnism, had a moment of near-triumph during the reign of Nader Shah, supported by Nader’sambiguous but broadly pro-Sunni policy.25 The dispute was not fully resolved until the early Qajarperiod,bywhichtimeatheoryofinterpretationandahierarchyhaddevelopedonthisbasis:eachShi‘aMuslimhadtohaveamarja-etaqlid,an“objectofemulation”orreligiousrolemodel.Thishadtobealiving person, a mojtahed, which in practice meant only one or two of just a fewmojtaheds in eachgeneration.Assomewerethuselevated,ahierarchyofmojtahedscametobecreated.Thesenior,moreauthoritativeamongthembecameknownashojjatoleslam (proofofIslam),ayatollah(signofGod),or,later,grandayatollah.Justasinothercontexts,competitionforthetitlesproducedakindofinflation:26asmorepeopleacquiredtheoriginaltitles,new,moreexaltedoneshadtobeinvented.

In this way, a religion that—in the absence of the hidden Emam—formally still asserted theillegitimacyofallauthorityonearthparadoxicallycametogiveafewreligiousscholarsgreatpotentialpower. This power eventually came to flex its muscles not just in religion but also in politics. ThepositionoftheulemawasfurtherstrengthenedbythefactthattheleadingmarjasoftenlivedinNajaforKarbala inOttoman Iraq, beyond the reach of the Persian authorities. Shi‘ism acquired a hierarchicalstructure,comparabletothoseoftheChristianchurches,butmarkedlydifferentfromthelesshierarchicalarrangements of Judaism and Sunni Islam. The combination of beliefs—in the illegitimacy of secularauthority,intherighteousnessoftheoppressed,andinthelegitimacyofanorganizedhierarchyofclerics—lookswiththebenefitofhindsightlikearecipeforeventualreligiousrevolution.

Therewas—is—a further important element in this religious culture: the variousmanifestations ofpopularShi‘ism, includingmost importantly theAshuraprocessionsandthe ta‘zieh.Everyyear,on theanniversaryofthemartyrdomoftheEmamHoseinatKarbala,Shi‘aMuslimsinIranandelsewheretakepartinprocessionsthroughtownsandvillagestocommemoratethebittereventsofthatday.Thebestwayto think of these is as reenacted funeral processions, inwhich devotion to and identificationwith themartyrsofKarbalaisasvividandstrongasthefeelingforthedeadatarealfuneral.Bazaarguildsandstrongmen from the zur-khaneh (the house of strength—traditional associations of men who gather tobuild their fitness through juggling heavy clubs, wrestling, and other sweaty pursuits, but often withreligious overtones) compete to display their devotion and grief. Some carry large symbolic coffinsrepresentingthecoffinofHosein,orhugemultipointedsymbolicbannersrepresentinghiswarstandard.Othersbeatthemselveswithchains.Somealsocuttheirheadswithswords,butthisisanexcessthathasbeenincreasinglyfrowneduponbythereligiousauthorities.TheAshurademonstrationsbuildacollectivesense of grief, bitterness, injustice, and guilt (the last from the failure of theKufans to saveHosein),relivingemotionally thegrimeventsofKarbala.Westernnewsmedia find imagesof theseprocessionsirresistiblewhentheyneedtoillustrateaccountsofShi‘areligiousfanaticism,buttheemotionsofgriefandguiltandthesymbolicrepresentationsofsuffering(eventhebloodinsomecases)are—asmentionedearlier—strikinglysimilartothoseintraditionalGoodFridayprocessionsinmanyCatholiccountriesinEuropeandelsewhere.Itwouldbepossibletointerleavefilmsequencesofbothinsuchawaythatthegloom,tears,andintensityoftheparticipantswouldbealmostindistinguishable.

Theta‘ziehisaformofreligiousstreettheater,uniqueintheIslamicworldbutsimilarinspiritandfunction to the religiousmysteryplaysofmedievalEurope.Again, theusual theme isKarbala, but theperformancemayfocusondifferentaspectsofthedrama.Theperformersrecitefamiliarlinesdescribingtheactionandtheaudiencemayjoinin.Thosewatchingexperienceandshowtearsandintenseemotion.

Theta‘ziehnormallyoccursinthemonthofMoharramandAshura,butrowzeh-khans(preachers)usedtoreciteimpromptuversionsatanytimeoftheyear.ThroughthenineteenthcenturymanyeminentIranianserectedbuildings,asactsofpiety,tohousetheta‘ziehperformances.Previouslytheyhadtakenplaceintentsoronstreetcorners.27

AllthesemanifestationshaveservedtoremindShi‘aMuslimsofthecentraleventsoftheirreligion.ButtheyhavealsoreinforcedacommitmenttocollectivereligiousfeelingbasedonthesenseofinjusticethatmanyoppressedanddowntroddencommunitiesofShi‘ashavefeltatdifferenttimesandplaces.Theemotions and the custom of street processions may serve as a kind of precedent, or template, forcollectiveactionandcollectivesolidarity,ashasappearedatseveralpointsinIranianhistory.

But to characterize the grief of Ashura as a kind of training ground or launch pad for streetdemonstrations or even mob violence (notwithstanding that such have happened, in exceptionalcircumstances) would be a gross distortion. The more normal association in Shi‘ism is with passivemelancholy,modesty, abelief in the righteousnessofhumble self sacrifice, and in thevirtueofquietlydoinggoodinadversecircumstances.

TheeighteenthcenturyintheIslamicworld(theconceptitselfisquestionable—inIslamictermsweare talkingmainly about the twelfth century, though the centuries do not exactly correspond in the twocalendars)hasoftenbeendepictedasaperiodofdeclineanddecadence.Itiseasytoseewhythatwasthe case—the Ottoman Empire lost territory, the Safavidmonarchy collapsed, and so did theMoghuldynasty,ushering in theperiodofEuropeancolonialdominance.Theseare facts thatcannotbedenied.But therewere important signsofchange,development, andvigor in the Islamicworld thathaveoftenbeenoverlooked.Someofthemweresignificantintheirownright,whileotherscontainedtheseedsofmajorfuturedevelopments.WehavealreadylookedattheimportanceofthereignofNaderShah,thoughits significance emerges more fully in the light of the Persian/Russian wars of 1804–1828. Also, theAkhbari/Usulidisputeand itsoutcomewere important for thefuturedevelopmentof theShi‘aulemainIran,andtheIranianrevolutionsofthetwentiethcenturycannotbeproperlyunderstoodwithoutthem.

ButtherewereothersignificantdevelopmentsintheIslamicworldinthisperiod—notablytheriseofWahhabisminArabia.Accordingtosomeaccountsthemovement’sfounder,Abdal-Wahhab,studiedforatimeinIsfahan,thoughthisseemsdoubtful.28Hiswasa trulyfundamentalistmovementwithinSunnism,onedeeplyhostiletoSufism,Shi‘ism,anyrealorapparentkindofdeparturefrommonotheism,andanyformofwhatitcalled“innovation”—allofwhichitconsideredheretical.WahhabisminsistedonareturntowhatitsexponentsconsideredtobetheearliestprinciplesofIslam,asexemplifiedbyMohammadandhis earliest converts. In alliance with the Al-Saud family, devotees of Wahhabism made progress inArabiauntiltheearlynineteenthcentury,destroyingshrinesandtombsintheirfervor,andsackingKarbalaitselfin1802.ThatwasadeepshockandagreatinsulttoShi‘aMuslims.By1818OttomanforceshaddefeatedtheAl-Saudandreassertedtheircontrolof theArabianpeninsulaandtheholyplaces.But theAl-Saud and theWahhabis returned to take control of most of the Arabian peninsula in the twentiethcentury.

FATHALISHAHAfterthedeathofAghaMohammadShah,Persiacouldagainhaveslidintochaosandcivilwar,ashadhappenedafterthedeathofKarimKhanZand.ThatthisdidnotoccurwaslargelyduetotheforesightofAghaMohammadShahinthe1780sandafter,asheresolvedfeudswithintheQajartribeandpreparedthesuccessionforhisnephewFathAliKhan,andforFathAliKhan’ssonAbbasMirza.29Therewere

some disturbances in Azerbaijan, and FathAli Khanmarched to assert his authority. He defeated hisenemiesnearQazvin,andwentontopunishtheoldshah’smurderersandhaveAghaMohammad’sbodyburiedinNajaf.Hethenhadhimselfcrowned,onMarch21,1798,atthefeastofNoruz,theNewYear.

FathAliShahhas someprominence in thehistoryof Iran for avarietyof contingent andunrelatedreasons.OneisthatitwasduringhisreignthatEuropeanssuddenlybegantravelingtoandreportingbackfromPersia in largernumbers,bothas touristsandas state representativesoperatingoutofdiplomaticmissions.ThiswasbecauseFathAliShah’sreigncoincidedwiththerevolutionaryandNapoleonicWars,andtheEuropeanpowerswerereachingoutincompetitionwithoneanothertofindnewallies.Anotherreason is thatFathAliShahencouragedanewwaveofportraitpainting, the favorite subjectofwhichwas himself, resplendent withwaist-long black beard and spangledwith jewels from belt to arms tocrown.Soawealthofarrestingimagesofhimhavesurvivedtothepresentday.UnlikehisuncleandotherpredecessorslikeKarimKhanZandandNaderShah,FathAliShahlovedmagnificence.Afurtherclaimtofamewashisprodigiousfatheringofchildren—ithasbeencalculatedthathehadbytheendofhisreignatotalof260sonsby158wives.Finally,hereignedforarelativelylongtime—thirty-sevenyears—andfromthatfactalonehelatersymbolizedanera.

SomeofthesefactorshavecombinedtogiveabroadlynegativeimpressionofFathAliShahthatmaynot be wholly justified. Many of the Europeans who reported back about Persia at his time madeinvidiousandsometimesignorantandprejudicedcomparisonsbetweenPersiaandEurope.Manyofthemdid not fully realize the degree of the trauma and destruction Persia had suffered over the previouscentury,nor theverydifferentnatureofstateandgovernment inPersia.Theother inescapablefactwasthatPersialostlargeswathesofvaluableterritoryintheCaucasustotheRussiansduringthereignofFathAliShah,andtheperformanceofhisarmiesinthewarsagainstRussiawasforthemostpartpoor.

But fromanother perspectiveFathAliShah’s reign looksmore successful.Buildingonhis uncle’sachievements,heavoidedseriouscivilwar(nosmallthinginitself),andhisreignsawamodestrenewalof economicactivity andprosperity.Persia lost territorybutpreservedher independence, andkept thebulk of her lands free fromwarfare in a dangerous and destructive period of international conflict. Itcould have been worse. Sir John Malcolm, probably the most knowledgeable and balanced foreignobserverofPersiaatthistime,wrotein1814,

FortunatelyPersiaisatpresenthappierandmoretranquilthanithasbeenforalongperiod;anditsreigningmonarch,whohas alreadyoccupied the throne seventeenyears, by the comparativemildness and justiceofhis rulehas alreadyentitledhimselftoahighrankamongtheKingsofPersia.30

ENCOUNTERWITHTHEWEST:DIPLOMACYANDWARThestoryofPersia’sdealingswith theWesternpowers in the reignofFathAliShahwouldbealmostcomical if the consequences, both short and long term, had not proved so damaging. From theperspectives of the individual European states themselves, their conduct was logical, if shortsighted,givenwartimenecessity.FromaPersianperspective,itlooksfickleandcrass.

But itbeganwell: thefirstEuropeanmissionsuccessfully toagreetoa treatywasfromtheEnglishEast IndiaCompany(EIC),and theyknewhowtohandle things. In1800 thecompanysentaveryableyoung man, the future historian JohnMalcolm, with a retinue of some five hundred men, including amilitaryescortofonehundredIndiancavalry.Thealmost royalprogressof thiscaravanmadeastrongimpression,asdidthelavishgiftsthecompanycouldaffordtosendwithit.ThegovernmentofIndiaanditscounterpartinLondonhadbeenshockedbyNapoleon’sinvasionofEgyptin1798,andalarmedbya

FrenchmissiontoTehranin1796.TheyweredeterminedtomakeanalliancewithPersiatosecurethewesternapproachestoIndia.ThealliancecouldalsobeusedagainstthedangerofAfghanincursionintonorthern India. In January1801political and commercial treatieswere signed, according towhich theFrenchweretobeexcludedfromPersia,andFathAliShahagreedtoattacktheAfghansiftheAfghansmadeanyincursioninIndia.TheBritishagreedtosend“cannonandwarlikestores”iftheAfghansortheFrench were to attack Persia. The company’s commercial privileges in Persia were confirmed andenhanced,andasolidAnglo-Persianallianceseemedtobetakingshape.31

ButthebigquestionmarkoverthetreatieswasRussia,whichwasamoreimmediateconcernforthePersians thanFrance.AfterAghaMohammad’smassacreatTbilisi in1795, theRussiansestablishedaprotectorateinGeorgia,stationedtroopstherein1799,andlaterabolishedtheGeorgianmonarchyafterthe death of its king—effectively annexing the territory. Fath Ali Shah continued to declare Persia’ssovereigntyoverGeorgia,tonoavail,andRussiangeneralsspeculatedaboutpushingtheRussianfrontierfarthersouth,totheAraxes.In1804,ledbyabrutalgeneralcalledTsitsianov,theRussianssetaboutitinearnest, takingGanja andmassacring asmany as three thousand people there (including five hundredMuslims who had taken sanctuary in a mosque). They fought an inconclusive battle against Fath AliShah’s sonAbbasMirzaoutsideYerevan.But asNaderShahhaddiscovered tohis cost, andasmanylater Russian military men including Tolstoy and Lermontov were to confirm, the Caucasus was anawkwardplace togo soldiering.Thewarprovedmoredifficult thanTsitsianovhadanticipated, andalittlelaterthePersianssucceededinkillinghimbyatrick.TheRussianssuggestedsomenegotiationswiththePersiangovernorofBaku,but thePersiangovernor, suspectingbad faith,madepreparations for anassassination. Tsitsianov and the governor both went to the appointed meeting place with just threeattendantseach,butwhentheyarrivedthegovernor’snephewshotTsitsianovthroughthechest.32

Inthemeantime,BritishinterestinPersiahadfaded.Itwascomplicated:afterashortpeacebetweenBritain and France, hostilities reopened between them, and whereas before 1801 the British hadsuspectedRussiaofwantingtocooperatewiththeFrenchagainstIndia,theynowsecuredanalliancewithRussiaagainstNapoleon.FathAliShahinvokedtheTreatyof1801andaskedtheBritishforhelpagainstRussia in the Caucasus, but the British valued their northern ally more than their Persian one. Theyignoredtherequest.

Seeing an opportunity, the Frenchmade overtures to the Persians and inMay 1807 FathAli ShahagreedtosigntheTreatyofFinckensteinwiththem(thetreatywassignedinEastPrussia,asNapoleon’sarmyrecoveredfromthebloodyBattleofEylauandpreparedforarenewedattackontheRussians).ThiswasamirrorimageoftheprevioustreatywiththeBritish:thePersiansagreedtoexpeltheBritishandtoattack India;Napoleon recognized Persian sovereignty overGeorgia and promisedmilitary assistanceagainst theRussians; and amission under theFrenchmanClaudeMatthieu,CountGardane, set out forTehran to fulfill those terms. But before Gardane could get there Napoleon defeated the RussiansdecisivelyatFriedlandinJune1807,andsignedatreatyofalliancewiththeRussiantsaratTilsitthenextmonth.Thediplomaticdanceswungaround,andthepartnerschangedagain.

WithaFrenchmilitarymissioninTehrantrainingupaPersianarmytoinvadeIndia,theBritishwereimpressedoncemorewiththeurgencyofanalliancewithFathAliShah.ButbecausethegovernmentinLondonandtheEastIndiaCompanygovernmentinIndiacouldnotagreeonwhichshouldtakeprecedenceinpolicyonPersia, theysent twocompetingmissions—onefromLondonunderSirHarfordJones,andonefromBombayagainheadedbyJohnMalcolm.MalcolmgottoPersiafirstbutwasallowednofartherthanBushire,becauseofFathAliShah’scommitmentstotheFrench;MalcolmsailedbacktoBombayinJuly1808afterthreefruitlessmonths.Meanwhile,CountGardanewasinanimpossibleposition,trainingPersianswhoseonlyrealinterestwasinthecontinuingwarwithRussiaandthere-conquestofGeorgia.

AndRussiawasnowFrance’sally.HarfordJonessucceededwhereMalcolmhadfailed,reachingTehraninMarch1809.Gardane,bynowdiscredited,flittedoutofthecountryamonthlater,abandoningFrance’scommitmentstoPersia.

JonesandthePersianssignedaTreatyofFriendshipandAlliancethatwentfurtherthantheTreatyof1801andgave thePersiansmorewatertightguarantees.ThePersianswere to receivehelpagainstanyinvadingEuropeanpower,evenifBritainhadmadeaseparatepeacewith thatpower,providedPersiawasnottheaggressor.ThehelpwastobeintheformofBritishtroops,orfailingthat,subsidies,cannon,muskets, and British officers. For his part, the shah undertook not to do anything to endanger BritishinterestsinIndia,andtogivemilitaryassistanceincaseofanattackbytheAfghans.

ButalthoughtheBritishencouragedFathAliShahtocontinuethecostlywarwiththeRussians,whenNapoleonattackedRussiain1812BritainandRussiaagainbecameallies,andBritain’senthusiasmforhelping Persia against the Russians evaporated. The war in the Caucasus was now, for Britain, anembarrassmentthatneededtidyingup.AlthoughthePersiansfoughthardwithsomesuccessesunderFathAli’ssonAbbasMirza,theirfailuresweremoredamaging,culminatinginOctober1812inaheavydefeatatAslanduzontheAraxes.BritainservedasamediatorforapeacesignedatGolestaninOctober1813.Thetreatywasaterriblehumiliation.PersiakeptYerevanandNakhichevan,butlosteverythingelsenorthof theAraxes, includingDaghestan,Shirvan, andGeorgia, and cities that hadbeenpart of thePersianEmpireforcenturies—Darband,Baku,Tblisi,andGanjaamongthem.33 Italsoincludedprovisionsthatonly the Russians couldmaintain warships on the Caspian Sea, and that Russia would recognize andsupportthelegitimateheirtothethroneofPersia.ThislastpointgavetheRussiansalocusformeddlingin the royal succession,whichwas to prove seriouslydamaging.When the termsof the treatybecameknown, theycausedanger inPersia andcalls for renewed jihadagainst theRussians, ledbybellicosemullahsinthetowns.AbbasMirzaregardedthetreatyonlyasatruce,andredoubledhiseffortstoturnthearmyhecontrolledinAzerbaijanintoamodernizedforcethatcouldfighttheRussiansonequalterms.

Itdidn’twork.Warwas renewedwithRussia in1826,afteraperiod inwhichAbbasMirzadrewfurther help from theBritish (whowith the final defeat ofNapoleon in 1815 grewmore anti-Russianagain), and another aggressive Russian general, Yermolov, did his best to alienate the new subjectpopulations—over-interpreting the terms of the Golestan treaty and further irritating the Persians.Yermolov proved more belligerent in peace than in war, and the Persians made some initial gains,marchingtowardTbilisianduptheCaspiancoast.ManylocalleaderswentovertothePersianside,andYermolov abandonedGanja.But soonRussian reinforcements arrived undermore active commanders.Oncewarwasbegun, theBritish refused furtherhelp,pointing to theclause in theTreatyof1809 thatexemptedthemfromdoingsoifPersiaweretheaggressor.BeforetheyearwasoutthearmiesofAbbasMirzaandhisbrotherMohammadMirzaweredefeated inseparatebattles,Ganjawasretaken,and thePersianswerebackwheretheyhadstarted.In1827theRussiansadvancedfarther,takingYerevanatthebeginningofOctoberandTabrizlaterinthemonth.

ThemountainsandforestsoftheCaucasuswereidealcountryforguerrillawarfare,andif,especiallyinthissecondwar,whenthelocaltribeswereill-disposedtowardtheRussians,thePersianshadfoughtinthatway,theymighthavebeenmoresuccessful.TheLezgeshadfoughtoffNaderShahwithguerrillatactics in the1740s,andthey(with theChechens)wouldgive theRussiansenormousdifficulties in thelongwars theyfought in thedecadesafter1830.But thePersianshadseen themselvesasequalsof theRussians,andhadaspiredtofightthemintheopenfield.Theydisdainedtofightthehit-and-runwaroftheragged Sunni tribesmen of theCaucasus,whose overlords they had been for centuries. Thatwas theirmistake;theywerenotflexibleenough,andmisjudgedthemeasureofRussianmilitarysuperiority.

PeacewasconcludedatTurkmanchaiinFebruary1828,withevenmorehumiliatingtermsthanthose

ofGolestan.Persia lostYerevan,and theborderwassetat the riverAraxes.Persiahad topayRussiatwentymillionrublesasreparationsandallcaptiveshadtobereturnedtoRussianterritory—eveniftheyhadbeentakentwentyormoreyearsbefore.Accordingtocommercialagreementsmadeatthesametime,Russian merchants were to be allowed to operate freely in Persia, and (these provisions were aptlynamedcapitulations)wereeffectivelyexemptfromPersianjurisdiction.34

The treaty had a violent and undiplomatic postscript. A distinguished literary man and friend ofPushkin, Alexander Griboyedov, arrived in Tehran as RussianMinister Plenipotentiary and set aboutenforcing the terms of the treaty, being particularly exercised about the provisions over the return ofcaptives.HesetaboutextricatingfromPersianfamilieswomenwhohadbeentakencaptiveasChristiansbutwhohadsubsequentlyconverted.Someof thesewomenwere less thankeen toberescued,and theRussians’interferenceinprivatePersianhouseholdsgavegreatoffense,whichwaswhippedupfurtherbyradicalmullahs.AmobgatheredoutsidetheRussianembassyonJanuary30,1829.OneaccountsaysaCossackontheroofshotaboyinthecrowd.35ThemobbrokeinandfoundandmurderedanArmenianeunuchwhohadpreviously served the shah.Twowomenwere alsodragged away, and several of thecrowdwerekilledinthefightingastheCossackswhoservedasguardstriedtoprotectthebuilding.Thebodieswerecarriedawaytothemosques,butlaterthemobreturned,brokeinagain,andmassacredalltheRussiansexceptone,whoescapeddressedasaPersian.Griboyedovwasapparentlyconvincedthattheshahhimselfwasbehindtheattacks.ItseemshislastwordswereFathAliShah!Jem’enfous!36

FathAliShahcouldperhapshavetriedhardertocontrolthesituationthatledtothekillings,butitismost unlikely that he was in any serious way to blame (some Russians have blamed the Britishambassadoralso,forincitingthemob,whichillustratestherivalrybetweenthetwopowersinPersiabythistime,buthasnobasisinfact).FathAliShahhadtosendamissiontoSt.Petersburgtopresenthisapologiesandsmooththingsover.

ThePersian/RussianwarsandtheirconsequencesillustratedanumberofimportantrealitiesaboutthestateofFathAliShah’s realm.Militarilyandeconomically, itwasnomatch for theEuropeanpowers.ThearmyAbbasMirzaledintotheCaucasusin1826wasthirty-fivethousandstrong,whichwaslargebycomparisonwiththosethathadfoughtthecivilwarsfortyyearsearlier,buttheRussianshadlostalargernumber of men as casualties in a single day when they fought Napoleon at Borodino in 1812. TheRussianshadsomedifficultiesgettingtroopstotheCaucasusandinsupplyingthemoncethere,buttheirreservesofmanpowerandwarmaterialswereimpossibleforthePersianstoequal—evenifthePersianscouldhavecomeuptotheRussianstandardofdrill,training,andstaffwork.

The point was not that the Persians were bad soldiers, nor really that they had fallen behindtechnologically(notyet).ItwasjustthattheQajarstatewasnotthesamekindofstate,norwasittryingtobe.37 It controlled its territory loosely, through proxies and alliances with local tribes. The statebureaucracywassmall,revolvingaroundthecourtmuchasithadinthedaysoftheSafavids.Ithasbeenestimated that between a half and a third of the population were still nomadic or semi-nomadicpastoralists.38 Provincial governors were often tribal leaders. They ruled independently, with littleinterferencefromthecapital,andsenttherewhattaxrevenuewasleftaftertheyhaddeductedtheirownexpenses,whichwasnotusuallyverymuch(AbbasMirza’sarmywaslargelyrecruitedandpaidforfromtheprovinceofAzerbaijaninwhichhewasgovernor).Toraisemoneyforthewars,FathAliShahhadalienated crown lands, increasing the devolved tendency. Nader Shah would have handled mattersdifferently, but the apparent lesson of his reign was that ambition, greater integration, centralization,militarism, and higher taxationwent together—they alienated important supporters, created oppositionand revolt, and led to civilwar.AllPersian rulers afterNader, fromKarimKhanZandonward (evenAghaMohammadShah),seemedtohaveabsorbedthatlesson.TheyrejectedNader’smodelandacceptedamoredevolvedstateasthepriceofstabilityandpopularconsenttotheirrule.

The other side of the story is thatmost Iranians at the time probably preferred it thisway. In thesmallertownsandvillagesofthecountry(wheremoststilllived),thewarsinArmeniaandShirvanwerealongwayoff,andtherewouldhavebeenonlysporadic(andinaccurate)newsofthem.ThecivilwarsbetweentheQajarsandtheZands,letalonetheearlierrevoltsinthetimeofNaderShahandtheAfghans,hadaffectedmanymoreIranianseitherdirectlyorindirectlythrougheconomicdislocation.Thoseterribleeventswerestillwithinlivingmemory,andmostIranianswouldhavebeengratefultohavebeensparedthem.UnderFathAliShahsomemoderateprosperityreturnedtothesetraditionalcommunities.

ButthepopularagitationforwarandthemurderofGriboyedovshowedtheinfluenceofthemullahs,and the closenessof someof them to at least one important strandof popular feeling in the towns (asalways, one shouldbewaryof assumingall themullahs thought the sameway—theydidnot). In later

decades, as other European powers demanded, secured, and exploited the same privileges as thoseaccorded the Russians at Turkmanchai, popular feeling became more and more bitter at the apparentinabilityoftheQajarmonarchytoupholdPersiansovereigntyanddignity.

6

THECRISISOFTHEQAJARMONARCHY,THEREVOLUTIONOF1905–1911,ANDTHEACCESSIONOFTHEPAHLAVIDYNASTY

Whateverhappenswillbefortheworse,andthereforeitisinourinterestthataslittleshouldhappenaspossible.

—LordSalisbury,writingaboutPersianaffairsinDecember1879

[Aya]maraazmumsakhta-and?Arewemadeofwax?

—Naserod-DinShah,March18551

FathAliShahdiedin1834,shortlyafterthedeathofhisson,AbbasMirza,whohadbeenhisdesignatedheir. This meant that another son, Mohammad, took the throne. Mohammad Shah’s accession wassupportedbyboththeRussiansandtheBritishandwasachievedpeacefully—theyjudged,correctly,thathewould uphold the treaties that gave them their privileges within Persia. But his reign brought fewbenefitsfor thePersianpeople.Hemadelittlerealeffort todevelopthecountryordefenditsessentialinterests,despitetheincreasinglymanifestdevelopmentalgapbetweenPersiaandEurope.Hisfirstprimeministerwasareformer,buttheshahhadhimstrangledin1835.PersianmerchantsbegantoprotestthefactthatcheapEuropeanproducts,especiallytextiles,werecomingontoPersianmarketswithlowornotariffsandwereundercuttingdomesticcraftsmen,destroyingtheirlivelihoods.Predictably,themerchantswhomadeaprofitfromhandlingtheimportskeptquiet.

Perhaps partly in reaction to the defeat in war, the humiliating treaty of Turkmanchai, and theincreasingandunwelcomepresenceofforeignersandforeigninfluences,therewereattacksonminoritiesinthe1830s—especiallytheJews.Thesetendedtobeled,asatothertimes,bypreachersormullahsofmarginal status who disregarded the established, humane, and dignified precepts of their faith for thetemporarypopularitythatcouldaccruefromextremismandhatred.AseriousattackbyamobinTabrizin1830seemstohaveresultedinthedeathorflightofmostofthepreviousJewishpopulationthere.Itmayhavebegun(likesimilarcasesinmedievalEurope)withafalseallegationthataMuslimchildhadbeenmurdered by a Jew.2 Other such attacks followed elsewhere in Azerbaijan, prompting Jews to beginavoidingthewholeprovince.TherewerealsoforcedconversionsofJewsinShirazandotherplaces:inMashhadin1839ariotbrokeoutandmanyJewswerekilledbeforemoderateShi‘aclergyintervened.The Jews were then forced to convert or flee.3 For many years the converts, called jadidi, kept tothemselvesintheirowncommunities;manysuchconvertsstillobservedJewishritesinprivate,andsome

eventuallyreverted toJudaism,riskingbeingaccusedofapostasy if theydid.Later in thecentury thereweresimilaroutbreaksatBabolontheCaspianSea(in1866)andinHamadan(1892).4JewishandothertravelersrecordedthattheJewstheysawweregenerallylivinginpoorghettoesandweresubjecttodailylow-level intimidationandhumiliation, though theirpositionmayhave improved toward theendof thecentury,insomeplacesatleast.TherewaspersecutionelsewhereintheIslamicworldatthesametime,andsomehavesuggestedthattheimpactofEuropeananti-Semiticwritingswasafactor.5NodoubtonlyasmallminorityofMuslimswereactivelyinvolvedinattacks,andthereisevidencethatsomeulemaandothersdidwhattheycouldtopreventorlimitthem.Butasinothertimesandotherplaces,itcouldnothavehappenedatallwithoutthemajoritypreferringtolookaway.TheArmeniansseemgenerallytohaveavoidedthisdegreeofpersecutioninthisperiod.

Despite theiragreementon thesuccession, in the timeofMohammadShahtheBritishandRussianswerestillrivalsinPersia,Afghanistan,andCentralAsia.ThisrivalrycametobecalledTheGreatGame.Before the war of 1826–1828, the British had supported the Persians against the Russians; now theRussiansencouragedMohammadShahtotakecompensationforPersia’slossofterritoryinthatwarbygrabbingback theformer territoriesofHeratandKandahar in theeast.MohammadShahsent troops toHeratin1837,besiegingtheplaceforafewmonths.6But theBritish,whodislikedtheprospectofanyencroachment in Afghanistan that might threaten India or make Russian access to India any easier,occupied Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf and demanded thatMohammed Shah quit Afghanistan. Hewithdrewin1838andmadefurthertradingconcessionstoBritaininanewtreatyin1841.

Hajji Mirza Aqasi, Mohammad Shah’s second prime minister (who had been instrumental in theremovalandkillingofthefirst),waspro-Sufiandencouragedtheshahtofollowhisexample.FathAliShahhadalwaysbeencarefultoconciliatetheulema,butMohammadShah’sSufiinclinationsmadehimdeeply unpopular with them, bringing forward again the everlatent Shi‘a antagonism toward secularauthority.

THEBABIMOVEMENT,NASEROD-DINSHAH,ANDAMIRKABIRAnother development during the reign of Mohammad Shah was the appearance in Iran of the Babimovement,whicheventuallygaverisetotheBaha’ireligion.Thisoriginatedaroundtheyear1844,whichwas1260intheMuslimcalendar—ayearthathadbeenlongawaitedastheone-thousandthanniversaryofthedisappearanceofthetwelfthEmam.Sincetheeighteenthcentury,followersofabranchofShi‘ismcalledShaykhismhadspeculatedthattheremustbeagate(“Bab”)throughwhichtheHiddenEmamcouldcommunicatewiththefaithful.ThisBabwasexpectedtotaketheformofaperson,andastheyear1260approached,someShaykhisgrewincreasinglyexcitedthattheBabmightberevealedinthatyear.Whenthe time finally came, some people identified a particular pious young man from Shiraz, Seyyed AliMohammad,astheBab.InMay1844hedeclaredthathewasindeedtheBabandbeganpreachingagainsttheshortcomingsoftheulema.Headvocatedbettertreatmentofwomen(therebyattractingmanyfemalefollowers), recommended that the Islamic ban on interest be lifted, argued that judicial punishmentsshouldbemade less harsh, andurged that children shouldbebetter treated.Fromoneperspectivehisteaching looksprogressive; fromanother it appearsas littlemore than theconventional teachingof themilderstrandoforthodoxShi‘ism.Butin1848theBabandhisfollowersbeganpreachingthattheBabwasinfacttheHiddenEmamhimself,andthattheirfaithwasanewbelief—onesupersedingthepreviousrevelationofIslam.Thischangedtheposition,puttingtheBabisandtheulemaindirectconflict.TheBabwassoontakenintocustody.

OneofthemostremarkableandradicaloftheBab’sfollowerswasawomanfromQazvin,Qorratal-Ain, who discarded the veil as a sign that shari‘a law had been set aside. She was a poet, debatedtheologywiththeulema,andpreachedtheemancipationofwomen.ShewassentintoexileinIraqatonepoint,butlaterreturned.LiketheBab,shewasarrested.Butunlikehim,shewasstillabletospeaktoherfollowerswhileunderhousearrest.

WhenMohammadShahdiedin1848hisseventeen-year-oldsonNaserod-Dintookthethrone,againwith the supportof theRussiansand theBritish.Theboywas thoughtfuland intelligent inappearance,with largedark eyes and a dreamy tendency; he could losehimself for hours in booksofPersian folktales.7

Butaftertheaccessionofthenewshah,therewererevoltsinvolvingBabisinFars,Mazanderan,andin Zanjan, which were crushed by the government with great severity. Following these disturbances,whichhavebeenlinkedtosocialupheavalselsewhereintheworldatthistime,theBabwasexecutedinTabrizin1850.Thestoryisthatthefiringsquadhadtoshoottwice,becausethefirsttimethebulletsonlycut the ropes binding him, setting him free.Animosity between theBabis and themonarchy escalatedrapidly.InAugust1852threeBabistriedtoassassinatethenewshah.Althoughtheyfailed,therewasaharshbacklash.LaterthatsameyearQorratal-Ainwaskilledbyhercaptors,alongwithmostoftheotherleadersof themovement,and theBab’sfollowerswereviciouslypersecutedashereticsandapostates.Thenewfaithappeared tobeachallenge toboth thesecularand the religiousauthorities,andas suchstoodlittlechance,despiteconvertingquitelargenumbers.ManythousandsofBabisdied,andothersleftthecountry.

The movement continued to grow in exile. In the 1860s it split, with a new leader, Baha’ullah,announcinghimself as thenewprophet (“HeWhomGodShallMakeManifest”)predictedby theBab.MostBabisfollowedBaha’ullah,andsincethattimehismovementhasbeenknownastheBaha’ifaith.WithinIran,Baha’ishavebeenpersecutedandkilledinalmosteverydecadesincethattime.

ThestoryofQorratal-Ainandheradvocacyofwomen’semancipation isan importantpoint in thehistory ofwomen inPersia, and therefore for the story of Iranian society as awhole.There are somesurpriseshere.Fromourviewpointintheearlytwenty-firstcentury,withtheIslamicregimeinpowerinIranandwithwhatisoftenperceived(notentirelyaccurately)asatraditionalroleforwomenreimposedsincetherevolutionof1979,onemightassumethatbeforethetwentiethcenturyallIranianwomenwereclosetedathomeandneverwentoutexceptwhenheavilyveiled.Butthisisnotatallthecase.Beforethesocialchangesbroughtbyindustrializationandurbanization, thestructureofsocietywasverydifferent.Before 1900, up to half the population were nomadic or semi-nomadic, and in such societies, tightlyintegrated and often living at both the geographical and economic margins, women’s roles were ofnecessitymoreequalandlessrestricted.Broadlyspeaking,womenoversawthedomesticarrangementswhile men ranged widely looking after the flocks. But with the men away, the women had to makeimportantdecisions,oftenasagroup,andbearresponsibility.Whentimecametomove,everyonehadtotakeanactivepart.8Traditional tribal costumesvaryenormouslyacross Iraneven today,andareoftencolorfulandeye-catching,withnoveilinsight.

Oftheremainderofthepopulation,themajoritywerepeasantfarmersandlaborers.Butamongthesepeople, too,women had an essential economic role and some independence (insofar as anyone in thepoorerclassescouldproperlybethoughtofasindependent).Womenhadtoworkhardinthefieldsandprobablydidthemajorityoftheroutinework—ofallbuttheheaviestsort.Again,aveiloftheenvelopingchadorkindwasnormallyquiteincompatiblewiththatsortofactivity.

Even in the townsandcities, themajorityofpeoplewere relativelypoor, and in thosehouseholdsmostwomenwouldhavehadtoworkoutsidethehome.Andthereweresignificantnumbersofprostitutes,

towhomtherulesofrespectabilitycertainlydidnotapply.Sothesetupwemightthinkofastypical—ofheavilyveiledwomenseldomleavingthehomeandeveninthehomekeptapartfrommaleswhowerenotrelatives—was in fact atypicalbefore1900.When itdidoccur, itwas limited tomiddle-orhigh-classfamiliesintowns(preciselytheclassthatloomslargehistorically,beingthebook-writing,book-readingclass—perhapsonlyfourpercentor lessof familiesoverall).But thatarrangementwas,orbecame,anaspirationformanymenwhocouldnotaffordtomakeitareality.Onecouldthinkoftheheavyveilasakindofelitefetish,similartosomeofthefashionsofnineteenth-centuryEuropethatimmobilizedwomen,beingwhollyimpracticalandincompatiblewithworkofanykind.Foraman’swifetobeoutofthehouseandoutofhiscontrol,especiallyinthetowns,perhapspartlybecauseofthepresenceofprostitutesinthetowns,potentiallyexposedhimtoderisionandridicule.Butforhertobekeptathomeandtoemergeonlyveiledwasexpensiveandasignof theman’sstatus.ItwouldbeeasytooverlookorunderestimatethesignificanceandimplicationsofthistropeamongmeninIraniansocietyandelsewhere.Ratherthanbeingan outgrowth of traditional religion and society—there is little justification for it in theQor’an or theearliest hadith, which originated in different social circumstances—it may largely underpin them.Possessionofmaterialgoodshaditspatternsanditssocialconsequences,butsoalsodidthepossessionofwomen.

Asthepopulationlaterbecamesteadilymoreurbanandinsomewaysatleastmoreprosperous,morewomenweremorerestricted,stayedinthehomemore,andworetheheavyveil.Butweshouldnotthinkofthosearrangementsas typicalofpre-industrialIran;onecouldaccuratelysaythatfor themajorityofIranianwomen,theywereatwentieth-centuryinnovation.

The conflict with the Babis around the time of Naser od-Din’s accession was only one of theproblemshehadtodealwith.TherewasaseriousrevoltinKhorasanthattooktwoyearstoovercome,anarmymutinyinTehran,andseriousinfightingbetweenofficialsatcourtinwhichtheRussianandBritishambassadors both meddled, anxious that each might outdo the other. In this confused and dangeroussituation,theshah’sfirstminister,AmirKabir,attemptedtosteerthegovernmentinareformingdirection,urgingtheshahtotakeapersonalinterestinthedetailsofgovernment.Kabir’sinfluenceovertheyoungshahstemmedfromthetimehehadspentwithhimasNaserod-Din’sright-handman,whenNaserod-Dinhad been crownprince and governor ofAzerbaijan.Kabirwas disliked by theRussians because theythoughthimtobepro-British,buttheBritishwerenonetookeenonhimeither.9

An able and intelligent man, Amir Kabir was dedicated to the interests of the monarchy and thecountry.Hemadeareviewoffinancesandenforcedaretrenchmentinstateexpenditures,especiallyonpaymentsandpensionstocourtiers.Thisinevitablymadehimunpopularwithsomemembersofthecourt.He set up a state-funded school or polytechnic alongwestern lines—theDar al-Funun,which in lateryears collaborated to publish translations ofWestern technical books and literature—and organized athoroughgoing reform of the army to bring it properly up-to-date.He set about some improvements inagriculture, and even tried to build some factories for manufactured products. All this was achievedwithinthreeyears,showingwhatwaspossibleandpromisinggreaterthingsforthefuture.ButthethicketsofcourtpoliticsprovedtoomuchforAmirKabir.HemadethemistakeoftryingtointercedewithNaserod-Dinonbehalfof theshah’shalf-brother,aneffort thatoffendedboth theshahand theshah’smother,who had significant influence at court. In time, Amir Kabir’s critics succeeded in eroding the shah’sconfidence inhim,withoutwhichhewaspowerless. InNovember1851AmirKabirwasdismissedasprimeministerandsenttoKashan.Atthebeginningof1852Naserod-Din,influencedbyhiscourtiersandrelativesand following theprecedent setbyhisgrandfatherand fatherbeforehim,hadhis former firstministermurdered.WhenAmirKabirdied,sodidhopeforanykindofseriouspushfordevelopmentinPersia, at a timewhen elsewhere in theworld, not just inEurope, themotors of industrialization and

majorstructuralchangewereaccelerating.

UGLYSISTERS:RUSSIA,BRITAIN,ANDTHECONCESSIONSAnewfirstminister,MirzaAghaKhanNuri,tookAmirKabir’splaceandprovedmoretothelikingofthecourt:hewasascorruptandreactionaryastheycouldhavewished,andnofurtherreformwentforward.LaterinthedecadetheRussiansgainedinfluence,andanotherPersianarmysetouttoreconquerHerat.Thistimetheysucceededintakingthecity(inOctober1856),buttheyalsoprecipitatedwarwithBritain.BritishtroopslandedatBushireanddefeatedPersiantroopsthere,andagainthePersianswereobligedtomakepeace.ThePeaceofParis,signedinMarch1857,stipulatedthatPersiamustabandonallclaimtoAfghanterritory.In1858,Nurifellfromoffice,andfromthattimeNaserod-DinShahruledashisownfirstminister,butheneverfoundfullysatisfactoryarrangementsfordoingso.10

Throughout this period and the decades that followed, the British and Russians interfered soinsistentlyinPersiangovernmentthatinsomerespectstheshah’sindependenceappearedmerelynominal.That thiswasnotmademoreobviouswasonlydue to the shah’sunwillingness topursueprojects thatmightdispleasetheEuropeanpowers.Hewaswillingtooffendoneof thematanytime—ifhehadthesupportof theother—butcouldnot afford toalienateboth together.Thus, for example, at a timewhenrailways—rightlyseenastheveryembodimentofprogress—werespreadingallovertheglobe,yieldingbenefits for communications and commerce that could have been highly valuable for Persia too,particularly sogiven thehugedistancesand impossible roadsof the Iranianplateau,no railwayswerebuilt. TheBritish andRussians disliked the idea for strategic reasons; railways could have deliveredhostilearmiesmorerapidlytotheirrespectiveborders.BytheendofNaserod-Din’sreignin1896therewas still only one railway in Persia. Itwas a narrow-gauge line built by theBelgians, running out ofTehrantoalittleshrinetownfivemilesaway—theshrineofShahAbdol-Azim—whichwastoproveafatefulbackdroptoseveralimportanteventsoverthenextfewyears.11

Whatwere the real interestsofBritainandRussia inPersiaat this time?Howdamagingwas theirinvolvement?Thereareanumberofdifferentelements to thesequestions.BritainandRussiastoodfordifferent things in thenineteenthcentury,andfordifferentaspectsof theEuropeanmodel.Britainstoodfor, or appeared to stand for, progress, liberalism, science, commerce, and improvement. In contrast,RussiastoodforthetraditionalorderinEurope—fortheadaptationofmoderntoolstomaintainthestatusquooftheolddynasticmonarchies,fortheOrthodoxChristianchurch,andagainstpoliticalradicalism.BothhadtheirattractionsfordifferentinterestsandgroupsinPersia.Butbothstates,whateverimpressiontheymighthavegiven,wereprimarilyconcernedwiththeirownstrategicinterests,inwhichtheinterestsofthePersianshadlittlepart.Bothhadother,greaterpriorities.AndbothloomedmuchlargertoPersiansthandidPersiainthecalculationsofeither.Eachpowerwouldedgeaheadoftheother, if itcould,butwas normally content to reach amodus vivendi with the other over Persia—which meant stasis andavoidingsurprises.Thisrivalrywasgoodinoneway:itmadeitdifficultforeitherpowertotakePersiaasacolony.OnecouldclaimthatBritainpreventedRussiafromoverwhelmingPersiaaltogether in thenineteenthcentury,andviceversa.ButthenegativewasthatbothpowersweresuspiciousofchangeorofvigorousPersianreformerswhomightshakethingsuporgiveanadvantagetotheirrival.Astimewenton,theshahwasmoreandmoresuspiciousofchangeandreform,too.Theresultwasstagnation.

Afteradecadeofpersonal rule, in1871 the shahappointeda firstministeragain.ThiswasMirzaHoseinKhan,whohadservedtheshahoverseasasadiplomat,notablyinIstanbul,wherehehadseentheeffectsofsomeoftheTanzimatreformsintheOttomanEmpire.Convincedthatsimilarchangeneededto

happeninPersia,heencouragedNaserod-DinShahtotravelsothathecouldseeforhimselfsomeofthedevelopments takingplace inothercountries. In1872MirzaHoseinKhansucceeded inpersuading theshahtoagreetowhatwascalledtheReuterconcession.Thiswasaremarkableinitiative,ablueprintfordevelopmentofthemostsweepingkind,includingarailwayfromtheCaspiantothesouth,miningrights,andallkindsofindustrialandothereconomicimprovements.Itcouldhavebroughtbenefits,butthetrade-offwasthatitabandonedahugeswathofsovereignrightstotheforeignerputtingupthemoneyforthoseimprovements:theBarondeReuter,aBritishJewborninGermanyandthefounderoftheReutersnewsagency.Inreturnfortheconcession,theshahreceived£40,000asanadvance.

Overthepreviousdecades,theIranianeconomyhadchangedandshiftedinresponsetoanincreasingpenetration of markets by foreigners. Many Iranian products proved unable to compete with cheapimports,whileagriculturebeganproducingmoreforexport(cottonandopium,forexample).Thereducedcapacity fordomestic foodproduction contributed to anumberof severe famines, especially in1870–1871, inwhichithasbeenestimatedthatuptoone-tenthof thepopulationperished.12Thechanges leftmanypeopleangryandcontributedtotheoppositiontotheReuterconcession.TheshahreturnedfromavisittoEuropein1873topowerfuldemandsfortheremovalofMirzaHoseinKhan,andhedulywent.

TheReuterconcessionwasalsostronglydislikedbytheRussians,andtheshahhaddiscoveredwhileinEuropethattheBritishwerenobetterthanlukewarmaboutit.Alongwiththedomesticopposition,thiswasenoughfortheshahtofindanexcusetocancelitinthesameyear.Buttherefollowedanextendeddispute over the advance,which the shah held on to.Eventually, in 1889,Baron deReuterwas givenanother concession in compensation—hewas allowed to set up the ImperialBank of Persia,with theexclusiverighttoprintpapercurrency.Uptothattime,theBritishwereabletousetheReuterdisputetopreventRussianproposalsforarailwayfromgoingahead.Butin1879theRussianshelpedtheshahsetuptheIranianCossackBrigade,whichwasledbyRussianofficers.Thisbecamethemostmodern,best-disciplined armed force in the country, and was loyal to the shah—but it was also an instrument ofRussianinfluence.

Foraperiodinthe1870s,theBritishgovernmentconsideredamorepositiveattitudetowardPersia,whichcouldhaveresultedinPersiabecomingagenuineallyratherthanadupeandacat’s-paw.13ThisepisodewaspromptedbyRussianconquestsinCentralAsia—notablythesurrendertothemofKhivain1873—butalsobythedeteriorationofBritishinfluenceinAfghanistan.In1879theforeignsecretaryLordSalisbury, briefly setting aside the policy of “masterly inactivity” governing Britain’s attitude to theborders of India, considered a plan thatwould have givenHerat toNaser od-Din Shah, alongwith asubsidyfromtheBritishgovernmentandhelpwithinternalreforms.Persiawouldhavebecomeapartnerandanally,anessentialelementinBritain’scolonialdefensesratherthanatheaterforspoilingactionstopreventtheRussiansgaininginfluence.ItwouldhavebeeninBritain’sintereststohelpbuildupPersia,ratherthankeepingPersiadown.TalkswentonbetweentheBritishandthePersiansinLondon,ledonthePersiansidebyMalkomKhan,headofthePersiandiplomaticmissionthere.ButintheendNaserod-DinShahbrokeoffthenegotiations.TheBritishbelievedthatthiswasbecausetheRussianshadintervenedtoblock them.The liberal government that followedwas not inclined to take up the talks again, and theopportunitywaslost,buttheepisodeshowsthattherealpolitikpursuedbyBritainvis-à-visPersiawasnot necessarily the inevitable and logical corollary to their imperial position. A cynical policy, or apolicyofrealpolitikasitsproponentswouldcallit,maysometimesbepursuedoutoflazinessandlackofimaginationratherthananythingelse.Thecynicalpolicymakercannotpredictthefutureanymorethanthemoralistcan,butheknowsthatatleasthecannotbeaccusedofstarry-eyedidealism.Sometimesthatedgeisallittakestoallowthecynictodominate.Trulyfarsightedpoliticianssometimesinsistthatifyougettheprinciplesright,thenthesmallchangeofpolicywilllookafteritself.Butoftentheprinciplesgetlost

alongtheway,andcynicismandshort-termismprevail.ThecynicismofBritishpolicyinPersiawastodogreatdamageinthelongerterm.

MalkomKhanwasasignificantfigureinthelatterpartofthenineteenthcentury.Hewasbornin1833,thesonofanArmenianfatherwhohadconvertedtoIslam,andwhohadsoadmiredSirJohnMalcolmthathenamedhissonafterhim.MalkomKhanwaseducatedinParis,andonhisreturntoPersiataughtattheDar al-Funun. But the shah became suspicious of his reforming ideas and his influence, and his laterserviceasadiplomatoutsideIranhadsomethingof thecharacterofexile.Eventually,at theendof the1880s, Malkom Khan fell from favor altogether. He stayed on in London to produce the newspaperQanun,whichpressed foranend toarbitrarygovernmentand for theestablishmentof the ruleof law,basedonaconstitution.ThispaperwasdistributedinIranandwaswidelyreadamongtheeducatedelite.AfterNaserod-Din’sdeath,MalkomKhanwasreconciledtothegovernment.Hediedin1908.

Reform-mindedofficialscontinued tocomeandgo inPersia throughthe1880s,butwithout thefullsupportoftheshahtheywereunabletogetanytraction.Theshahcontinuedtonegotiateconcessionstoforeigners,butin1890hewenttoofarwithatobaccoconcession,grantingmonopolyrightstoaBritishcompany thatenabled them tobuy, sell, andexport tobaccowithoutcompetition.Thisdrewoppositionfromaformidableallianceofopponents:landlordsandtobaccogrowers,whofoundthemselvesforcedtosellatafixedprice;bazaartraders,whosawthemselvesoncemorefrozenoutofalucrativesectoroftheeconomy; the readership of new reform- andnationalist-orientednewspapers operating fromoverseas;and theulema,whowerecloselyaligned to thebazaar tradersanddisliked the foreignpresence in thecountry. This combination of interests became the classic pattern, repeated in later movements.Coordinatedlargelythroughthenetworkofconnectionsbetweenthemullahsacrossthecountry(makinguseof thenewtelegraphsystem),massprotestsagainst theconcession tookplace inmostof themajorcities in1891.Theyculminated insomethinglikearevolt inTabrizandademonstration inTehranthatwas fired on by troops, leading to further demonstrations.One of themost importantmojtaheds,HajjiMirzaHasanShirazi,issuedafatwainDecember1891callingforanationwideboycott,andthiswassowidelyobeyedthateventheshah’swivesstoppedsmoking.Earlyin1892thegovernmentwasforcedtocanceltheconcession,incurringalargedebt.

Naserod-Dinwasbruisedbythefuroroverthetobaccoconcession.Fromaroundthistimeonward,the Russian interest tended to predominate at court, and the shah followed a more repressive policy,restricting contacts with Europe, banning the Persian-language newspapers imported from overseas,limitingtheexpansionofeducationthathehadearlierchampioned,andagainfavoringreactionary,anti-reformministers.Somecontemporaryobservers apparently said the shahnowpreferred courtierswhodidnotknowwhetherBrusselswasaplaceoravegetable.14

JAMALAL-DINAL-AFGHANIBythelatterpartofthenineteenthcenturysomethinkersinIran,andintheMiddleEastmoregenerally,had gone from an initial response to the West of bafflement, reactionary resentment, or uncriticaladmirationtoadaptation,resistance,orreform.NotableamongthesewasJamalal-Dinal-Afghani,whodespitehisnamewasprobablyborninIranandbroughtupasaShi‘ainthe1830sand1840s.Laterhetraveledwidely,includinginIndia,Afghanistan,Europe,andEgypt,andhelivedinEgyptforsomeyearsinthe1870s.It isthoughtthatheadoptedthenameal-AfghaniinordertobeacceptedmoreeasilyinaSunnimilieu.InalltheseplacesheattractedafollowingforhisstrongresistancetoEuropeaninfluences.Al-Afghaniwasenergeticandcharismatic,withatalentforgettingaccesstopowerfulpeopleinavariety

ofcountries.Buthealsotendedtobebumptiousandseemstohavedislikedwomen.More specifically, al-Afghani opposedBritish influence,whether inAfghanistan, Egypt, Sudan, or

Iran.HewasmoreambivalentabouttheRussians.HewantedtoseearevivalintheIslamicworldandbelievedthatthemessageofIslamhadtoberevisedinthelightofreason,toadapttodifferentconditionsindifferenttimes.HeassertedthattherewasnothinginconsistentbetweenIslamandreform,orIslamandscience.Thescientificand technologicalachievementsof theWestcouldbeequaledorsurpassedbyasciencebasedon Islam.But al-Afghani’s attitude even to Islamwas ambivalent, andhismessagewasdifferentfordifferentaudiencesatdifferenttimes.ThereareundercurrentsofShaykhismandmysticisminhisthinkingthatprobablyreflecthistraditionaleducation.Yethewasapoliticianandapragmatistratherthan an ascetic or religious dogmatist, and he did not have a reputation for personal holiness. Hisflirtations with various contemporary governments in Islamic countries usually ended badly, but hebecame amajor influence on later thinkers of Islamism—especially in Egypt and in Iran—though hisideas were too boldly innovative to be accepted by the classically trained ulema, whether Shi‘a orSunni.15

Al-AfghanireturnedtoIraninthe1880sattheinvitationoftheshah,butwhentheymettherewasnomeetingofminds.Al-Afghani’sideasweretoostronglyanti-Britishfortheshah,atleastatthatstage.Al-Afghani leftagainandreturnedagain,butwaseventuallyforcedoutof thecountry—toIraq, in1891—afterpamphletsappeared,apparentlyunderhisinfluence,attackingconcessionstoforeigners.

From Iraq, al-Afghani was an influence in the campaign against the tobacco concession,corresponding inparticularwith themojtahedHajjiMirzaHasanShirazibefore the clericordered thetobacco boycott. Al-Afghani was active thereafter with the two main Persian newspapers printedoverseas,QanunandAkhtar,publishedinLondonandIstanbul,respectively.WhilehewasinIstanbulin1895,hewasvisitedbyaPersianex-prisonercalledMirzaRezaKermani.Theydiscussedfutureplans,andKermanilaterreturnedtoIran.OnMay1,1896,KermanishotandkilledNaserod-DinShah,havingapproachedhimwithapetitionwhiletheshahwasvisitingtheshrineofShahAbdol-Azim.Naserod-Dinwasburiedthereshortlyafterward.KermaniwasexecutedbypublichangingthefollowingAugust,andAl-Afghanidiedofcancerin1897.

OneaspectoftheassassinationillustratesthecomplexityofattitudestowardJewsinIran.Apparentlyinhis interrogationKermani said thathehadhadan earlieropportunity tokill the shah,whilehewaswalking inapark,andhadnotdoneso—despite thefact thathecouldeasilyhaveescapedbecauseheknewthatanumberofJewshadbeenintheparkthatdayandthattheywouldbeblamedforthekilling.KermanididnotwanttheassassinationtobeblamedontheJewsanddidnotwanttoberesponsiblefortheriotsandattacksonJewsthatmightfollow.16Foreveryanti-Semiticpreacherorrabble-rouser,thereweremanyeducated,humaneIranians—clericsandothers—forwhomitwasamatterofconsciencetodowhat they could to help the Jews and other minorities, irrespective of the radicalism that mightcharacterizetheirotherbeliefs.

Thesuddendeathoftheshahcouldhavebroughtdisorderandconfusion.Butforatimecourtierswereabletoconcealwhathadhappened,andtheCossackBrigadekeptorderinTehranuntilNaserod-Din’sappointedsuccessor,hissonMozaffarod-Din,couldarrivefromTabrizandassumethethrone.

THESLIDETOREVOLUTIONMozaffarod-Dinwassickwhenhebecameshahandwassurroundedbyagaggleofgreedycourtiersandhangers-on.TheyhadwaitedalongtimewithhiminTabrizfortheirchancetotakeoverinTehran,and

theshahdidnothavetheenergyorforceofpersonalitytokeepthemincheck.Initiallyhehadareformingprimeminister,Aminod-Dowleh,whowasespeciallyactive in improvingeducation.Heopenedmanynewschools,includingschoolsforgirls.Censorshipwaslifted,andtheshahpermittedtheformationofculturalandeducationalassociations.Mostofthisnewactivitywasindependentofthestateandhadlittlefinancialcosttothegovernment.Butthisshahhadtopaymoreforthecourtthanhisfatherhad,inadditiontohisownfrequentandexpensivetripstoEuropeformedicaltreatment.Withtheexceptionofthedebtincurred after the cancellation of the tobacco concession,Naser od-Din had succeeded in keeping thestatefinancesinorder.ButstatedebtaccumulatedunderMozaffarod-DinShah,necessitatingnewloansfrom theRussiansand thegrantingofnewmonopolisticconcessions.OneofPrimeMinisterAminod-Dowleh’smoney-raisinginnovationswastheintroductionofBelgiancustomsadministrators,butin1898theshahdismissedhimafterhe failed to secureaBritish loan.Anewprimeminister,Aminol-Sultan,cameinandsetupJosephNaus,aBelgian,ascustomsminister.AstimewentonNauseffectivelybecamefinanceminister.17

The new customs arrangements were unpopular with many bazaar merchants, who seemed to bepayingmorethanbefore—andalsomorethanforeigntraders.Notonlythat,theywerepayingthemoneytoforeigners.TheRussianloanswereunpopular.Theulemadislikedthenewschools,whichweakenedtheirtraditionalgriponeducation.Theyalsotookadimviewoftheshah’stripstoEurope.Theliftingofcensorship and the freedom to form associations made criticism of the government easier and morepublic. This gratified the inclinations of a new intelligentsia, a diverse mix of liberal, nationalist,socialist,andIslamicreformistelements,allofwhomtendedtobehostiletothemonarchyfordifferentoroverlappingreasons.Itwasatimeofchangeandferment,butalsoresentmentandunease.

Amongotherconcessionsgrantedaroundthistime,forfisheriesandotherrights,wasonein1901toanotherBritishentrepreneur,WilliamKnoxD’Arcy.Thisconcessionwastoprovemuchmoreimportantthanwasapparentinitially:hewasallowedtoexplorethesouthernpartofthecountryforoil.

TheBritish,feelingtheirlossofthelatestroundinTheGreatGame,decidedin1902/1903toliaisewith some members of the ulema, notably Ayatollah Abdollah Behbehani, to oppose the customsarrangements, including theBelgianadministratorsandtheRussian loans.Moneychangedhands.Therewasagitationbytheulemainseveralcities,butitturnedagainstforeignersandnon-Muslimsingeneral.Riots in IsfahanandYazd in the summerof1903 led to thekillingof severalBaha’is, and therewereattacksonJewsandChristianminorities,too.

Thefollowingyeartheharvestwasbad.Next,theoutbreakoftheRusso-Japanesewar,followedbythe1905 revolution inRussia, interrupted imports from thenorth andmade themmore expensive.Thesignificance of the outcome of the war, in which the Japanese inflicted a humiliating defeat on theRussians (with the help of British-built battleships), was eagerly taken in by Iranian intellectuals, forwhomitdemonstratedthatthedominanceoftheimperialistEuropeanswasnotunshakeable.Meanwhile,thedisruptionofcommercemeantthatinnortherncitieslikeTabrizandTehranwheatpricesintheearlymonths of 1905 went up by ninety percent, and sugar prices went up by thirty-three percent. Thegovernmentwas hit hard, fiscally, because its customs revenueswent down. The shah tried to secureanother Russian loan andwas offered £350,000, but the conditionwas that he should accept Russiancommanderstoleadallofhismilitaryunits.Rejectingtheseterms,theshahinsteadraisedinternaltariffsandpostponedpaymentstolocalcreditors,increasingyetfurtherthepressureonthebazaarmerchants.18Thegovernment’sfinancialproblemsalsomeantthatthesalariesofsomeulemawentunpaid.

In Tehran in June 1905 therewas a demonstration in themourningmonth ofMoharram that fusedeconomic and religious elements in away thatwas to become typical. Two hundred shopkeepers andmoneylendersclosedtheirbusinessesandwalkedtotheshrineofShahAbdol-Azim,protestingagainst

the latest damaging government measures and demanding the removal ofMonsieur Naus, the Belgiancustoms chief. The demonstrators passed around offensive pictures of Naus dressed as a mullah at afancy-dressparty.Theshah,stillsickandsuffering,talkedtotheprotestorsandpromisedtosatisfytheirdemands when he came back from his imminent trip to Europe. But this did not happen, and amoreseriousprotestbrokeoutinDecember1905aftertwosugarmerchantsfromtheTehranbazaarweregivenbeatingsonthefeetattheordersofthegovernorofTehran;theiroffensehadbeenchargingtoomuchforsugar.Oneof themenwas a revered elder of the bazaarwhohadpaid to repair the bazaar and threemosques.Hisprotests—thathewasnotprofiteeringandthatthepriceswerehighbecauseofthesituationinRussia—availedhimnothing.

Againthebazaarclosed,andthistimetwothousandormoremerchants,religiousstudents,ulema,andotherswent—ledbythemojtahedsBehbehaniandSeyyedMohammadTabatabai—totheshrineofShahAbdol-Azimandtooksanctuarythere.

From the shrine they issued theirdemands: removalof thegovernorwhohadordered thebeatings,enforcement of shari‘a law, dismissal of Naus, and the establishment of a representative assembly oradalatkhaneh(HouseofJustice).Initiallythegovernmentwasdefiant.Butthebazaarstayedclosed,andafteramonththeshahdismissedthegovernorandacceptedtheprotestors’demands.

But there was no attempt to convene the House of Justice in the followingmonths. Further streetprotests occurred in the summer of 1906, after the government had tried to take action against someradical preachers, and one of them—a seyyed, someone believed to be descended from the ProphetMohammad—wasshotdeadbythepolice.Thiskillingcreatedahugeuproar.AyatollahsBehbehaniandTabatabai,accompaniedbytwothousandulemaandtheirstudents,leftTehranforQom(thenasnowthemaincenterfortheologicalstudyinthecountry),andalargergroupofmerchants,mullahs,andotherstooksanctuaryatthegroundsofthesummerresidenceoftheBritishlegationatGolhak,thennorthofTehran.TheBritishchargéd’affairesrespectedthePersiantraditionofsanctuary,orbast,andthenumbersthereeventually reached fourteen thousand. Their accommodation and other needs were organized by thebazaarmerchants’guilds.Thismeantthatboththeulemaandthebazaarwereonstrike,whicheffectivelybrought the capital to a standstill. Meanwhile, the Golhak compound became a hotbed of politicaldiscussion and speculation, with liberal and nationalist intellectuals joining in and addressing theassembled crowds. Many of these began to speak of the need to limit the powers of the shah byestablishinga constitution (mashruteh), and the demand for aHouse of Justice becamemore specific,shifting to a call for a properly representative national assembly. Coordinated by the ulema, similargroupsfromtheprovincessentmanytelegramstotheshahinsupportofthesedemands.

MASHRUTEHOnAugust5,1906,nearlyamonthafter the firstprotestors took refuge inGolhak—andmenacedbyapotentialmutinyamongtheCossackBrigade,whomtheshahhadbeenunabletopay—Mozaffarod-DinShahgaveinandsignedanorderfortheconveningofanationalassembly,orMajles.ItconvenedforthefirsttimeinOctober1906andrapidlysetaboutdraftingaconstitution,thecentralstructureofwhichtookthe formofwhatwere called theFundamentalLaws.Theywere ratified byMozaffar od-DinShahonDecember30,andhediedonlyfivedayslater.Thecreationofaconstitutionwasamajorevent,notjustinIranianhistorybutalsoinregionalandworldhistory.Inthe1870sinTurkey,amovementoftencalledthe Young Ottomans had established a kind of national assembly in an attempt to recast the OttomanEmpire as a constitutional monarchy, but the experiment had only lasted for a couple of years. The

constitutional movement in Iran had a more enduring effect, and even though its revolution is oftendescribed as a failure, the Majles survived, and the movement’s achievements influenced eventsthroughout the rest of the twentieth century.And the initial success of the revolutionwas achieved bypeaceful,dignifiedprotest—almostwhollywithoutbloodshed.

TheMajles was elected on the basis of partial suffrage, on a two-stage system, and representedprimarilythemiddleandupperclassesthathadheadedtheprotestsinthefirstplace.Theelectorswerelandowners(onlyaboveamiddlingsize),ulemaandtheologicalstudents,andmerchantsandbazaar-guildmembers with businesses of average size or above. In each region, these electors chose delegates toregional assemblies, and those delegates nominated the 156Majlesmembers (except inTehranwheretheywereelecteddirectly).Numerically, theMajleswasdominatedby thebazaarmerchantsandguildelders, and it divided roughly into liberal,moderate, and royalist groupings—ofwhich themoderateswerethemostnumerousbyalargemargin.AyatollahsBehbehaniandTabatabaisupportedthemoderatesbutwere not themselvesMajlesmembers. Outside theMajles, both in the capital and in the regionalcenters,theelectionsstimulatedthecreationoffurtherpoliticalsocieties(anjoman),someofwhichgrewpowerful and influenced the deliberations of the Majles itself. Some of these societies representedoccupations,othersregionslikeAzerbaijan,andstillothersethnicorreligiousgroupsliketheJewsandArmenians. There were political societies for women for the first time. A great upsurge in politicalactivityanddebatetookplaceacrossthecountry,resultinginanexpansionofthenumberofnewspapers—fromjustsixbeforetherevolutiontomorethanonehundred.19Thisupsurgewasdisturbingtothemoretraditionminded,especiallythemoreconservativemembersoftheulema.

TheMajlesexpectedtogovern,andtogovernonnewprinciples.Theconstitution(whichremainedformallyinforceuntil1979,andwasbasedontheBelgianconstitution)statedexplicitlythattheshah’ssovereigntyderivedfromthepeople,asapowergiventohimintrust,notasarightbestoweddirectlybyGod.Thepoweroftheulema,andtheirframeofthought,wasalsomanifestintheconstitution.Shi‘ismwasdeclaredtobethestatereligion,shari‘alawwasrecognized,clericalcourtsweregivenasignificantrole, and therewas tobea five-mancommitteeof seniorulema to scrutinize legislationpassedby theMajles, to confirm its spiritual legitimacy (that is, until the reappearanceof theHiddenEmam,whoseproperresponsibilitythiswas).Butthecivilrightsofnon-Shi‘aminoritieswerealsoprotected,reflectingthe involvement of many Jews, Babis, Armenians, and others in the constitutional project. Jews andArmenianshadtheirownprotectedseatsfortheirrepresentativesintheMajles(thoughthefirstJewishrepresentativewithdrewafterencounteringanti-SemitismfromothermembersoftheMajles,andtheJewsthereafterchoseBehbehani to represent them—another importantexampleofamojtahedsympathetic totheJewishminority20).

Allrevolutionsareaboutmovementandchange—thatisobvious.Theyarealsoaboutleadership.TheConstitutionalRevolutionmarkedtheeffectiveendoftheQajareraofgovernment,andpromisedtousherin a period of government undermore regular, legitimate,modern principles. Instead, for a variety ofreasons,manyofwhichhadnothingtodowiththerevolutionitself,itinauguratedaperiodofconflictanduncertainty. It was still a major change, a watershed. But in addition to that kind of change, mostrevolutions bring their own dynamic of change within the human groupings and systems of valuesinvolved in the revolution. The players in the revolution find their expectations, assumptions, andillusionschallengedand,insomecases,subvertedoroverturnedbytheprogressoftherevolution itself.Aswithotherrevolutions,notablytheFrench,theConstitutionalRevolutioninIranprovidedaplaygroundforthelawofunintendedconsequences.

Theprimerevolutionaryclassesweretheulemaandthebazaarimerchants,whosemotivations,ifnottheir mode of expressing them, were at root conservative. They wanted the removal of foreign

interferenceandarestorationof traditionalpatternsofcommerceandreligiousauthority.Intheearliestphaseoftherevolution,theulemawereincharge.Itwastheirauthoritythatgavetheprotestsauthority,anditwastheirhierarchyandtheirsystemofrelationshipsthatorganizedandcoordinatedtheprotest.ButoncetheprotesterswereinstalledintheBritishlegation,itwasaquestionof“wherenext,”andtheulemahadnoclearanswer.ThesimpleremovalofministersandobjectionableQajarinitiativeswasplainlynotenough;theshah’sgoodfaithcouldnotbereliedupon,andpreviousprotestshadfailedtosecurefuturegood behavior. The call for a constitution was not just for a vague construct, the pet project ofWesternizers;itwasmanifestthatthecountryneededtocommititselftoapermanentchangeofdirectionmoredefinitivethananythingtriedbefore.Theconstitutionreallywasanideawhosetimehadarrived—eventheleadersoftheulemainitiallyembracedit,despiteitsbeingclearlyaWestern-inspiredidea.Buttheiracceptance,whetherornottheyrealizeditstraightaway,effectivelyhandedovertheinitiative,andtherefore the leadership, to the owners of the constitutional idea: the liberals and nationalists whosemodelsweresecularandWestern.ManyofthesemenweremembersofthestatebureaucracyandwerespiritualheirsofAmirKabir.TheywereeagerforreformofthestatealongWesternlines,especiallythestate’sfinances,butalsoitseducationandjusticesystems.Onecouldthinkofthemasanewintelligentsia,suddenlygrownintoimportancetorivalthetraditionalintelligentsia, theulema.Theyweretobefounddisproportionally among the Majles delegates from Azerbaijan and Tabriz, and one of their mostprominentleaders,SeyyedHasanTaqizadeh,wasfromthatregion.Theiragendaextendedbeyondjustaconstitution.Itsoonbecameincreasinglyclear tomanyulemathat therevolutionwastakingadirectiontheyhadneitheranticipatednorwanted.

Mozaffar od-Din Shah’s successor was his sonMohammad Ali Shah, whose instincts were moreautocraticthanthoseofhisfather.Althoughhetookanoathofloyaltytotheconstitution,hewasresolvedfromthestarttooverturnitandrestorethepreviousformofuntrammeledmonarchy.Through1907andthefirsthalfof1908theMajlespassedmeasuresforthereformoftaxationandfinance,aswellaseducationand judicial matters. The latter were particularly disturbing to the ulema, because they saw theirtraditionalroleencroachedupon.

The figureofShaykhFazlollahNuri symbolized the changeofmind amongmanyof theulema andtheirfollowersatthistime.NurihadbeenaprominentTehranimojtahedin1905,supportingtheprotestsof 1905–1906.But by 1907hewas arguing that theMajles and its planswere leading away from theinitialaimsoftheprotesters—thatitwasunacceptablethatsacredlawshouldbetamperedwith.ItwasalsounacceptablethatotherreligiousgroupsbetreatedequallywithMuslimsbeforethelaw,andthattheconstitutionalistswereimporting“thecustomsandpracticesoftheabodeofunbelief”(i.e.,theWest).Atone pointNuri led a group of supporters into bast at the shrine of ShahAbdol-Azim.From there hisattacksontheconstitutionalistsgrewstronger,andheexpressedopensupportforthemonarchyagainsttheMajles, which he denounced as illegitimate. He also railed against Jews, Bahais, and Zoroastrians,exaggeratingtheirpartintheconstitutionalistmovement.Agroupofclericssenttelegramssupportinghimfrom the theological center in Najaf.21 Other mojtaheds, like Tabatabai, were more willing to acceptWesternideasintotheframeworkofpoliticalstructuresthatweretogovernhumanaffairsintheabsenceoftheHiddenEmam.ButitisprobablyalsofairtosaythatNuriunderstoodbetterthanmanyoftheulemathedirectionthatconstitutionalismwasleading,andfromhisperspective,thedangersofit.Thegeneralfermentofideasprecipitatedbytherevolutionandtheyearsofdissentbeforeithadaffectedtheulematoo.Theulemahadneverbeenaunitedblocofopinion(nomorethananygroupofintellectualseveris).Eventually, another leading cleric, Khorasani, attacked Nuri from Najaf, declaring him to be a non-Muslim.

Just as the fighting around Troy in the Iliad is paralleled by the disputes of the gods on Mount

Olympus, so the struggle between radicals and conservatives in Tehran was paralleled by a strugglebetween themojtaheds inNajaf.Before 1906, themost eminent of these—themarja, or religious rolemodel,formanyShi‘aMuslims—wasMohammadKazemKhorasani,whohadsupportedtheconstitutionandthelinetakenbyTabatabaiwhentherevolutioncame.Butthefermentcausedamongtheulemabytherevolution was such that as Nuri came to prominence in Tehran, Khorasani lost ground to a moreconservativerival,SeyyedMohammadKazemYazdi.Thisshifttookconcreteformatprayer:followerssatbehindtheirchosenmarja,andoneaccountsaysthatwhenthestrugglewasatitsheightonlythirtyorsostillprayedbehindKhorasani,while several thousand took theirplacebehindYazdi.Lateron therewasriotinginNajafbetweenthesupportersofthedifferentfactions.22

In June 1908 the shah, deciding that feeling hadmoved far enough in his direction for him to act,launchedtheCossackBrigadeinanattackagainsttheMajles.Thetroopsfiredshellsatthebuildinguntilthedelegatesgavein,andtheassemblywasclosed.Manyleadingmemberswerearrestedandexecuted,whileothers,likeTaqizadeh,escapedoverseas.Theshah’scoupwassuccessfulinTehran,butnotinallthe provinces. In Tabriz, delegates from the constitutionalist regional assembly and their supporters(notablythecharismaticex-brigandSattarKhan)successfullyheldthecityagainsttheroyalgovernorandhisforces.

In1907,newlyalliedtoeachotherandtoFrance,andconcernedatGermany’sburgeoningoverseaspresence,BritainandRussiahadfinallycompoundedtheirmutualsuspicionsandreacheda treatyovertheirinterestsinPersia.Thetreatyshowednorespectforthenewconditionsofpopularsovereigntyinthecountry,showingthattheapparentBritishprotectionoftherevolutionariesintheirlegationin1906hadhadlittlerealsignificance.ThisnewtreatydividedPersiaintothreezones:azoneofRussianinfluenceinthenorth,includingTabriz,Tehran,Mashhad,andIsfahan—mostofthemajorcities;aBritishzoneinthesoutheast,adjacenttotheborderwithBritishIndia;andaneutralzoneinthemiddle.

One consequence of the treaty was that the Russians, intolerant as ever of any form of popularmovement,feltobligedtosendintroopstorestoreQajarruleinTabrizaftertheshah’scoupofJune1908.But some of the revolutionarieswere able to escape toGilan and continue their resistancewith otherlocalsthere.InJuly1909theymadeamoveonTehran,coordinatedwithamovefromthesouth,whererevolutionariesinIsfahanhadalliedthemselveswiththeBakhtiaritribeandsuccessfullytakenoverthatcity.MohammadAliShahfledtotheRussianlegation,wasdeposed,andwentintoexileinRussia.Hewasreplacedbyhisyoungson,Ahmad,thoughAhmadwasnotcrowneduntilJuly1914.

The constitutionalistswere back in control oncemore, but the revolutionhad entered a new,moredangerousphase.AnewMajles came in (on a newelectoral law,whichyielded amore conservativeassembly),butthedivisionsbetweentheradicalsandtheconservativeshaddeepened.Theviolencethathadreinstated therevolutionalsohad itseffect—manyof thearmedgroups thathadretaken thecapitalstayedonthere.SeveralprominentBakhtiaristookofficeinthegovernment.Theulemaweredividedandmanysidedwith the royalists,effectively rejecting thewholeprojectofconstitutionalism.Butwithinafew days the leader of the conservative ulema, Nuri, was arrested, tried, and hanged for his allegedconnectionswiththecoupofJune1908.Therewereaseriesofassassinationscarriedoutbybothwingsofpoliticalopinion—Behbehaniwaskilled,andlaterSattarKhan.Theradicals—thedemocraticpartyintheMajles—foundthemselvesdenouncedbybazaarcrowdsashereticsand traitors,andsomeof them,includingTaqizadeh,wereforcedintoexile.RumorsranaroundthattherewasaBabiconspiracybehindthe democrats, and there were attacks on the Jews—in Kermanshah in 1909, and Shiraz in 1910,instigatedasusualbypreachersandmarginalmullahs.Alater,seriousriotagainsttheJewsinTehranin1922wasput downbyRezaKhan.23 Therewas disorder inmanyprovinces. It became impossible tocollect taxation, tribal leaders took over in some areas, and brigands became commonplace.To try to

addressthis,andtoredresstheinfluenceoftheRussian-officeredCossackBrigade,theMajlessetupagendarmerietrainedbySwedishofficers.

PRINCECHARMINGPushingforwarddespitethesestorms,thegovernmentappointedayoungAmerican,MorganSchuster,asfinancialadviser.Schusterpresentedclearsighted,wide-rangingproposalsthataddressedlawandorderandthegovernment’scontroloftheprovinces,aswellasmorenarrowlyfinancialmatters,andhebeganto put them into effect. Fulfilling Iranian (or at least some Iranian) aspirations in ways that Britishrealpolitikhaddisappointed them, theUnitedStates in thisphase looked like thepartner Iranhad longhoped to find in the West—antifeudal, anticolonial, modern, but not imperialist—a truly benevolentforeign power that would, for once, treat Iran with respect, as an agent in her own right, not as aninstrument.Peoplehavesuggestedthatthereareonlyalimitednumberofstoriesinliteratureandfolklore—thatallthegreatvarietyevertoldcanbereducedtojustahandfulofarchetypalplots.Ifthatisso,andifwethinkof theBritishandtheRussians in thenineteenthcenturyas theuglysisters, thenat this timeMorgan Schuster and hisUnited States looked like PrinceCharming. But the storywas not to have ahappyending.

TheRussiansobjectedtoSchuster’sappointmentofaBritishofficertoheadupanewgendarmerie,fortaxcollection,onthebasisthatitshouldnothavebeenmadewithintheirsphereofinfluencewithouttheirconsent,and theBritishacquiescedwith theirugliersister.Schusterassessed,probablycorrectly,that the deeper Russian motive was to keep the Persian government’s affairs in a state of financialbankruptcy, and thus in apositionof relativeweakness (as supplicant forRussian loans), thebetter tomanipulatethem.AnydeterminedefforttoputthegovernmentofPersiaonasoundfinancialfooting,asSchuster’s reforms threatened to do, was a threat to Russian interests. The Russians presented anultimatum:Schusterhadtogo.AgroupofwomensurgedintotheMajlestodemandthattheultimatumberejected,andtheMajlesagreedwiththem,insistingthattheAmericanshouldstay.ButtheRussianssenttroopstoTehranandastheydrewnear,theBakhtiarisandconservativesinthecabinetenactedwhathasbeencalledacoup,anddismissedbothSchusterandtheMajlesinDecember1911.24

SchusterlaterwroteabookabouthistimeinIrancalledTheStranglingofPersia,inwhich,despitewhat today readssometimeswitha ratherprosy,evangelical style,heexpressedhisadmiration for themoral courage and determination of the people he worked with in the period of the ConstitutionalRevolution. The book explains much about the revolution, and about Persia at the time. But it alsoilluminatesSchuster’sattitudesaboutthecountryandthereasonsheand,byextension,theUnitedStatesweresohighlyregardedbyIranians.HewroteoftheMajlesthatit

...moretrulyrepresentedthebestaspirationsofthePersiansthananyotherbodythathadeverexistedinthatcountry.Itwas as representative as it could be under the difficult circumstanceswhich surround the institution of theConstitutionalGovernment. Itwas loyally supportedby thegreatmassof thePersians, and that alonewas sufficient justification for itsexistence.TheRussianandBritishGovernments,however,wereconstantlyinstructingtheirMinistersatTeherantoobtainthis concession or to block that one, failing utterly to recognise that the days had passed in which the affairs, lives andinterestsoftwelvemillionsofpeoplewereentirelyinthehandsofaneasilyintimidatedandwillinglybribeddespot.25

Itwouldbe incorrect toputall theblamefor theoutcomeof theConstitutionalRevolutiononto theforeigners.TherevolutionhadbroughtforwardviolenceandrancorbetweenthegroupsrepresentedintheMajles,andthedivisionscontributedtotheeventsofDecember1911.Onecouldspeculate,notleaston

thebasisof theuseof terrorbyotherrevolutionariesinotherrevolutions, that if therevolutionhadnotbeen cut off at that point, the violencemightwell have gotten a great dealworse, possiblywith verydamaginglong-termeffects.Butthatistospeculatetoofar.Wedonotknowhowitwouldhaveturnedout.Revolutions may have family resemblances, but they have no timetable and no blueprint, and theConstitutionalRevolutionaroseoutofdistinctiveanduniquepolitical and social circumstances.Therewere,ontheotherhand,manypositiveelementsinthesituationasitwasbeforeDecember1911aboveall that at last, as Schuster pointed out, the country had a truly popular government, and that it wasaddressing as a priority the fundamental problem of the fiscal structures. Revolutionaries and peopleshowed a strong solidarity against external meddling, a powerful enthusiasm for constitutionalgovernment,andfortheirelectedMajles.Thisenthusiasmhadbeenstrongenoughtooverturnonecoupalready,andwasstrongenoughtosustaintheprinciplesofconstitutionalismlater,too,notablyin1919–1920. It gives the lie to thosewho condescendingly suggest that Iran, orMiddle Eastern countries ingeneral, are somehow culturally unsuited to constitutional, representative, or (later) democraticgovernment.When those formsofgovernmentwereoffered, Iraniansgrabbed themwithbothhands,asotherpeoplesinvariablyhaveinothertimesandplaces.

PERSIA,OIL,BATTLESHIPS,ANDTHEFIRSTWORLDWARThrough this period, even before theBritish legation had been used for sanctuary by the protesters in1906,newdevelopmentshadbeenatworktoreshapeBritain’sattitudetoIran.Sinceatleasttheturnofthecentury,Britain’straditionalrivalrieswithFranceandRussiahadbeenreplacedbyanawarenessofthedangerofthegrowingpowerandbelligerenceofGermany.FranceandRussiaalliedwitheachother(by implication,againstGermany) in1894;BritainandFranceallied in1904;andBritain,France,andRussia allied all together in 1907 (the Triple Entente). Particularly sharp forBritainwas theGermanprogram of naval shipbuilding over this period. Since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Britain hadmaintainedanunrivaleddominanceoftheworld’soceans—anessentialsupporttoherworldempire.ButunderEmperorWilhelmIItheGermansbeganbuildingmodernwarshipsatarapidrate,threateningtheRoyalNavy’sdominance.BritishshipyardsbegantoturnoutshipstomatchtheGermanprogram.In1906theBritishlaunchedHMSDreadnought,whichwassaidtohaverenderedallpreviouswarshipsobsoletebyitscombinationofspeedandthecoordinatedfirepowerofitssimplifiedarmament.In1912theBritishnavy switched from coal to oil as fuel; oil burnedmore efficiently and was less bulky. But whereasBritainhadhugedomesticreservesofcoal,oilhadtobesoughtelsewhere.UnderthetermsoftheD’Arcyconcession,largequantitiesofoilhadbeendiscovered—thefirstoiltobefoundintheMiddleEast—in1908nearAhwazinKhuzestan,insouthwestIran.

PersiahadfordecadesbeenofimportancetoBritainforthesakeofthenorthwestfrontierofIndia,perhaps of declining importance, especially after the Triple Entente. But now the oil reserves ofKhuzestan became vital for the security of the whole British Empire. Britain’s sphere of influenceaccordingtotheagreementwithRussiawasquicklyextendedwestwardtoincludetherestofthePersianGulfcoastandtheoilfields.TheAnglo-PersianOilCompanywasformedtoexploittheoil,andin1914theBritishgovernmentboughtupamajorityshareinit.

Partlybecauseoftheoil,butalsobecauseBritain’srivalsfellawayonebyoneoverthefollowingyears,BritaingraduallybecamethedominantexternalpowerinIraninthedecadethatfollowed1911.Itwasaperiodofdeepeningchaos,poverty,andsuffering.TheRussiansfiredonrevolutionariesinseveralof thecities in theirnorthernzonein theaftermathof thecoupofDecember1911,notably inMashhad.

ThereprotesterstooksanctuaryintheshrineoftheEmamReza,onlyfortheRussianartillerytoshelltheshrineitself—anactofsacrilegeandhumiliationthatwasdeeplyfeltthroughoutthecountry.TheBritishEmbassyreportedin1914thatthecentralgovernmenthadlittleinfluenceoneventsoutsideTehran.26TheBritishand theRussiansexercisedadegreeofcontrol in their respectivezones,but theirgripwas farfromabsolute.ThiswasshownbythesuccessoftheJangalimovementinGilan(Jangalmeansforest,anallusion to the dense forests of the Caspian coast) under the charismatic leader Kuchek Khan, whichcontinuedtosustainsomeofthespiritofindependencethathadinspiredtherevolution.

Therevolutionisusuallysaidtohaveendedin1911,butthisdateisratherartificial.Theconstitutionestablishedby the revolutionwasnotoverturned,andanewMajlesconvened inDecember1914.Thespiritof the revolutionand the idealsandexpectationsof theconstitutionalistswerenotcrushed.Theyresurfacedagainandagainintheeventsthatfollowed.TherevolutionwasawatershedinthehistoryofIran, as the episode in which previously more or less inchoate strands of thinking and opinion cametogether in concrete political form, shifted, changed, and acquired permanent significance. It also had,withthefocusofpopulardebateinTehranandtheroleofregionalassembliesinsendingdelegatestotheMajles, a centralizing and unifying effect, strengthening the nationalist sympathies of many of thosedelegates.TherevoltsinGilan,andlaterAzerbaijan,hadnational,notseparatistaims.Therecouldbenogoingbacktothepre-1906stateofthings.

DuringtheFirstWorldWar,despitethegovernment’sdeclarationthatPersiawasneutral,thecountrywas divided up by the different players that maintained troops in different sectors. There were theRussiansinthenorth,butalsotheJangalis.InTehrantherewerethetroopscontrolled,atleastnominally,bythegovernment—theCossackBrigadeandtheSwedishgendarmerie.SetagainsttheRussiansweretheOttomansandtheirallies,theGermans.TheOttomansmadeanincursionintothecountryinthewestandnorth.Forthemostpartnoneofthesearmedelementswasstrongenoughtocontrollargeareasofterritoryor to establishoverall supremacy.Most of the fightingwas low in intensity and indecisive.But in thenorthwesttheOttomansandtheRussiansfoughteachothermoreaggressively,doingmuchdamagetothevillages and the local population.A revived rump of the constitutionalistmovementwas set up underOttomanandGermanprotection inKermanshah, and foraperiod in1915prospects for thismovementlookedgood.TheOttomansweredoingwell in thenorth, and theGermans,whowere alliedwith theQashqai and others in the south, also made considerable progress. The British pulled out of theirconsulatesinHamadan,Isfahan,Yazd,andKerman.

But in the south the British set up a force called the South Persia Rifles in the spring of 1916,primarilytoprotecttheoilfields.TheyalsohadacloserelationshipwiththeBakhtiari,aswellaswithsome of the Arab tribes of Khuzestan and those of the Khamseh confederation. Despite the skillfulguerrilla war masterminded by the brilliant German adventurer Wilhelm Wassmuss, who has beencomparedtoLawrenceofArabia,theBritishslowlyregainedtheupperhand,andthesituationinIran,asinthewiderwar,turnedagainsttheGermansandtheOttomans.ThiswasdespitetheRussiansandtheirtroopsbeingremovedfromtheequationaftertheOctoberrevolutionof1917.BythetimeofthearmisticeinNovember1918,WassmusswascapturednearIsfahan,andtheBritishwereresurgentinPersia.

Attheendofthewar,thecountrywasinaterriblestate.Therehadbeenaseverefamineintheyears1917and1918,partlyas a resultof thedislocationof tradeandagriculturalproductioncausedby thewar.Theeffectof theRussianRevolutionon tradewasdevastating.Before1914,sixty-fivepercentofforeigntradehadbeenwithRussia,but thisfell tofivepercentby theendof theFirstWorldWar.Thefaminewasfollowedbyaseriousvisitationoftheglobalinfluenzaepidemicin1918–1919,andtyphuskilledmanyaswell.Brigandswerecommon.AlthoughtherewereBritishtroopsinseveralpartsofthecountry,many tribalgroupshad takenuparms, and the Jangaliswere still incontrolofmostofGilan.

Having begun as pro-constitutionalist, the Jangalis came under Russian Bolshevik influence. In thesummerof1918,withthehelpofsomeBolsheviks,theyhadforcedaBritishforceunderGeneralLionelDunsterville toretreatfromaconfrontationinGilan.Bythis timeDunstervillehadlearnedrathermoreabout theJangalis thanhehadknown inJanuary1918,beforehe tookuphisduties inPersia,whenhewroteinhisdiary,

IgetawiretosaythatEnzeli,mydestinationontheCaspianSea,hasbeenseizedbysomehorridfellowscalledJangalis(averysuggestivename)whoareintenselyanti-Britishandareinthepayof[the]Germans.27

But thepoliticaldislocation(ifnot theeconomicdistress)was lessgravethanitmightappear.Thedevolvedruleoflocaltriballeadershad,afterall,beenprettymuchthenormalstateofaffairsundertheQajars.Someaccountsoftheperiodsuggestthattherewasadisillusionmentwithconstitutionalismandayearningforstronggovernment.Butitisnotfullyclearthateitherwasageneralmood,northatthetwonecessarilywenttogether.28

In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain was juggling a series of complex and weightyproblemsovertheterritoryoftheMiddleEast,theresolutionofwhichwouldbefatefulforthefutureinseveraldifferentcontexts.ThesizeandshapeofpostwarTurkeyhadtoberesolved,aswellasthenatureandbordersofthepost-OttomanstatesinPalestine,Syria,andIraq.TheBritishwereconcernedalsotocontain,orifpossibleoverturn,thenewcommunistregimeinRussia.Allofthiscameatatimeofgreatlyreduced financialmeans, asa resultof thecripplingdebt incurredduring thewar, andwith theUnitedStates under Woodrow Wilson preaching a new philosophy of international relations—essentially ademocratic principle of self-determination—that appeared to undermine the very foundation ofBritishimperialism. IraniannationalistswelcomedWilson’sprinciples,andagainwereencouraged to thinkofthe United States as Iran’s great hope among the great powers. But like otherMiddle Eastern states,notablyEgypt,representativesoftheIraniangovernmentwererefusedaccesstothepeacenegotiationsatVersailles.

ANGLO-PERSIANNON-AGREEMENTANDREZAKHANSoBritain,havingwonthewarandhavingachievedsupremacyinPersia,wasoverstretched—toomanycallsontooscarcemeans,andwithimportantdistractionselsewhere.TheBritishforeignsecretaryatthetime, Lord Curzon, knew Persia well and had written a thoughtful, magisterial book,Persia and thePersianQuestion,onthebasisofhistravelsin1889–1890.ButalthoughthatbookwassympathetictothepeopleofIraninmanyrespects,Curzonseemstohaveoverlookedsomeofitsguidingprinciples,andtohavefailedtoabsorbthesignificanceoftheconstitutionalistperiod.29In1919heproposed—or,rather,heattemptedtoforcethrough—anAnglo-PersianAgreementthatwouldhavereducedPersiatothestatusofa protectorate (parallel with the mandate arrangements being set up at the same time for Iraq andPalestine), with the military and fiscal responsibilities of government given over to the British. Theagreement was rather like earlier concession agreements writ large: security guarantees, promises ofinfrastructuredevelopmentforthePersians,andadollopofcash(aloanoftwomillionpoundssterling—much of which would have been absorbed by the salaries of various British officers, officials, andadvisers).

ThegovernmentoftheyoungAhmadShahobliginglyacceptedtheagreement(itwassignedinAugust1919),butwhenitsdetailsbecameknownitwasthoroughlyunpopular,overthewholerangeofopinion

from democrats to the ulema. Although the agreement might have yielded some benefits for thedevelopmentofthecountry,itwasfurtherdiscreditedbytheplentifulbribeswithwhichtheBritishwererumoredtobesmoothingitspassage.Allsectorsofopinioncondemnedtheagreement,fromsocialistsandnationalist formermembersof theMajles to leadingmojtahedsblastingitbytelegramfromKarbala.ArevoltbrokeoutinAzerbaijan,assertingdemocratconstitutionalistprinciplesandrenamingtheprovinceAzadistan (“freedom land”); it was not put down until September. The shah’s government sent fiveleadingmembersof theMajles into internalexile,butgraduallyeven thegovernmentsignatoriesof theagreement began to recognize the opprobrium heaped on it from all sides, and avoided convening aMajlestoratifyit—withoutwhichitcouldnot,undertheconstitution,belegallyapplied.TheBritishtriedtoapplytheprovisionsoftheagreementwilly-nilly,bringinginBritishofficerstocommandarmyunits,butsucceededonlyinhasteningthecollapseofthegovernmentandtheresignationofthefirstministerinJune1920.30

InLondon,LordCurzonstillexpectedtobeabletoforcethroughtheAnglo-PersianAgreement.Butlocal British commanders on the ground thought differently—to them and everyone else in Iran, theagreementlookedlikeadeadduck.TheBritishforcesthathadbeencommandedbyDunsterville—forceswhichhadbeenresistedsuccessfullybytheJangalisandtheirBolshevikallies—werecommandedfromOctober1920byGeneralIronside.BothmenembodiedcertainEdwardianvirtues,andbothhadliteraryconnections: Dunsterville was themodel for Kipling’s Stalky, and it has been suggested that IronsideinspiredJohnBuchan’sheroRichardHannay.

TheBritish troops (nowbased inQazvin)wereunpopularwith thePersiansand,after their retreatfromGilan,weresomewhatdiscredited—adangerouscombinationnotcalculatedtooverawenationalistdislike.Ironsidewasanintelligent,tough,decisivecareersoldierandhadbeengiventheresponsibilityof helping reequip the Cossack Brigade, now grown to division strength, which had also recentlywithdrawn from the Caspian coast to a position near Qazvin. He decided almost as he took up hisappointment toexceedhisorders.With the reluctantagreementof theshah,hedismissed the remainingRussianofficersoftheCossackcorps,judgingthatalthoughthePersiantroopsweregood,soundsoldiers,the Russian officers were demoralized, anti-British, and susceptible to Bolshevik infiltration. WhenCurzonfoundout,hedidnotapprove,butbythenitwastoolate.IronsidereassuredthePersianCossacksthathehadnointentionofimposingBritishofficersonthem,andPersianofficerswereappointed.Actingthroughhissecond-in-command,LieutenantColonelSmyth,Ironsidethenselectedaformersergeant,RezaKhan, as the most effective soldier, and arranged matters so that Reza Khan became the de factocommander.Ironsidewasworriedthat,astimewenton,thepositionoftheBritishwoulddeteriorate.TheBolsheviksmightmoveonTehran,andifthathappened,thePersianCossacksmightsidewiththem.HethoughtthatperhapsitwouldbebettertolettheCossackstakeoverwhiletheBritishwerestillinastrongposition.TheBritishtroopscouldthenmakeapeacefulwithdrawal.Shortlyafterward,inJanuary1921,Ironsidewroteinhisdiary,

Personally,IamofopinionthatweoughttoletthesepeoplegobeforeIdisappear....Infact,amilitarydictatorshipwouldsolveourtroublesandletusoutofthecountrywithoutanytroubleatall.31

ThewholequestionofBritain’sroleatthispointiscontroversial,butthereisnodirectevidenceofaplot as such. The idea that the world of politics revolves only through the agency of plots andconspiraciesisdangerouslymisleading.Ironsideknewwhathewanted—hewantedBritishtroopsoutofPersia(hewaspersonallyduetoleaveinApril,buthisdeparturedatewasbroughtforwardtoFebruary18)—andhehadalightertouch.AllhereallyhadtodowaslettheCossacksunderstandthattheBritish

wouldnotinterveneiftheyactedagainsttheirgovernment.HefeltnopressingneedtoconsultLondonortheBritishministerinTehran.Ironsidehadaneyeforanablesoldier;eventsweretoshowthathealsohadacannypoliticalsense,andhischoiceofRezaKhanshowedthat,too.RezaKhanalsoprovedtohaveasharperpoliticalsensethanexpected,orthanordinarysoldiersareusuallycreditedwith.

OnFebruary16,1921,RezaKhanmarchedtwenty-fivehundredofhisCossacksfromtheircampnearQazvintowardTehran.OnFebruary21,hewasabletotakethemintothecapitalwithoutopposition,andtheshahallowedhimtosetupanewgovernmentheadedbyanationalistjournalist,SeyyedZiaTabatabai—nottobeconfusedwiththemojtahedSeyyedMohammadTabatabai,whohaddiedin1918.RezaKhanbecameSardar-eSepah,commanderofthearmy.AfewmonthslaterTabatabaifellfrompower,havingalienatedboth theshah,byreducing thecourt,andRezaKhan,byproposing theappointmentofBritishofficerstothearmy.RezaKhanhadmanagedintheinterimtomakenewfriendsandbroadenhissupport.NowheenhancedhispositionandbecameMinisterforWar.

Later in thesameyearRezaKhanmovedagainst theJangalis inGilanandquicklyovercame them,theirSoviet allieshavingdepartedunder the termsofanew treatywith thePersiangovernment.Theirleader,KuchekKhan, took refuge in themountainsbutdied in the snow;whenhisbodywas foundhishead was brought to Tehran. After this important early success, Reza Khan’s priorities turned toregularizing state revenue, strengthening the armed forces, and enforcing government control over thewholeterritoryofPersia.ThislasttaskmeanttoughactionagainsttribesliketheBakhtiariandtheLors,andlatertheShahsevaninAzerbaijanandtheTurkmeninthenortheast.HealsoactedagainstoneoftheArabtribesalliedwiththeBritishinthesouthwest,andwasagainsuccessful.TheseactionswerepopularwithmostPersiansbecause the tribeshadsooften facilitated foreign interventions.Also therewas theancient, uneasy hostility between tribesmenon the one hand, and the peasants and townspeople on theother.

ThefourthMajlesconvenedin1921,andRezaKhanwasabletokeepthembroadlysupportiveofhisreformprogramsbyallyingwithconservativeelements.In1923hemadehimselfprimeminister,andtheshahwentonwhatwas toproveanextendedholiday inEurope.At theendof theyear, a fifthMajlesconvened, laterapprovingacontroversial initiative to introduceconscription,after theulemahadbeenconciliatedwith an exemption for religious students. In 1924,RezaKhan (inspired by the example ofAtatürk’sreformsinTurkey)encouragedamovementtocreatearepublic,andacquiredfourRolls-RoycearmoredcarstohelphimkeeporderinTehran.Buthemisjudgedthemoodofthecountryandhadtostagearesignationforatime,abandoningtherepublicanproject.In1925,RezaKhanconsolidatedhissupportby visiting Najaf on pilgrimage, temporarily concealing hisWesternizing intentions. He also took thename Pahlavi, which resonated with nationalists as the name of theMiddle Persian language of pre-Islamictimes.TheMajlesdeposedAhmadShahandtheQajardynastyinOctober,afterAhmadShahhadletitbeknownthatheintendedtoreturntothecountry.Shortlybeforetheendoftheyear,aconstituentassemblyagreedtoachangeoverfromtheQajartothePahlavidynasty,andRezawascrownedshahearlyin1926.AhmadShahneverdidreturnanddiedinParisin1930.

Reza Khan’s rise to power was facilitated in 1921 by local British commanders for their ownreasons,butitisincorrecttoseehissuccessasasuccessforBritishforeignpolicy,orhimasaBritishstooge. On the contrary, Ironside supported an action by Reza Khan precisely because he perceivedcurrentBritishpolicytohavefailed.RezaKhantookadvantageofIronside’swillingnesstogivehimhischance,butmadenocommitmenttofuturepro-Britishalignment,andthereisnoindicationthatIronsideexpectedoraskedforanysuchguarantees.Thecoupof1921anditsaftermathcameaboutasaresultofatemporarycoincidenceofinterests.

AsforthepeopleofIran,itisnotentirelycorrecttoseeRezaKhan’ssuccessastheoutcomeofthe

desire of the people for a strong man on a white horse to overcome political chaos, after a faileddemocraticexperiment.Theperiod1921–1926hasbeencomparedwiththeperiodofregencyleadinguptoNaderShah’scoronationin1736, inwhichhetoopreparedthewaywithmilitarysuccesses;but thecomparison,thoughattractive,isnotentirelyapposite.TheConstitutionalRevolutionhadaimed,amongother things, atmodernization, centralization, stronggovernment, andanend to foreignmeddling in thecountry.RezaKhanbecameshahin1925–1926withtheconnivanceoftheMajles,becausetheyjudgedhewould fulfill those purposes, where earlier attempts by others had failed. He largely justified theirconfidence in him. But his reforming success was achieved at the expense of liberal, representativegovernment.HewastoanextentthenemesisoftheConstitutionalRevolution,buthewasalsothechildofit.32

7

THEPAHLAVISANDTHEREVOLUTIONOF1979

IsitnotpassingbravetobeakingAndrideintriumphthroughPersepolis?

—ChristopherMarlowe

RezaKhanwasaboutforty-twowhenhebecameSardar-eSepahafterthecoupin1921.Althoughtherewasmuchsuppositionandmythmakingafterhebecameshah,littleisknownforsureofhisoriginsbeyondthathewasborninthevillageofAlashtinthethicklywoodedSavadKuhregionofMazanderan.SomehavesuggestedthathisfamilyhadTurkicorigins,othersPashtun.Itseemshisfatherdiedwhenhewasstill an infant, and his mother brought him to Tehran, where he grew up in her brother’s household.Throughtheuncle’sconnectionswiththeCossackBrigade,theyoungRezawasabletoenlistwiththemwhenhewasfifteen.Hegrewuptobetallandtough,withagrimexpressionandaheavyjaw.Someofthebetter-educated technocrats thatheappointed to fulfillhismodernizationprogramfoundhismannerandspeechembarrassinglycrude,andsomesneeredathislackofculture.Butnonewouldhavedonesotohisface,andmostfoundhispresencedaunting.1

MANOFACTIONRezaKhan’sattitudesandmotivationsemergeaboveallfromhisactions.Hecametopowernotjusttobeshah or to preside, as the Qajars had done—he disdained their ineffectual style of rule. The Pahlavimonarchywasanoddkindofmonarchy,withnorealrootsintradition.ItwasestablishedonlyafterRezaKhanhadfailedtosetuparepublic.Tohim,beingshahwasameanstoanend,notanendinitself.Andhisunderlyingpurposewastocontrolthecountry,tomakethecountrystrong,todevelopitsothatitcouldbetrulyindependent,tomodernizeitsothatitcoulddealwiththegreatpowersonanequalbasis,tohaveastrongarmytoresist foreign interventions,and to imposeorder internallyso that,as inothermoderncountries, the state enjoyed sole control.These aims, and the autocraticmethods used to realize them,reflectedhismilitarybackgroundand theRussian influencehehad livedwith in theCossackBrigade.Initially he had to compromise with the Majles, but time would show that he was no friend to freepoliticalexpression.Inaddition,hehadamodel,KemalAtatürk,whoafterasuccessfulmilitarycareerhadestablishedhimselfasthesupremeauthorityinTurkeyonsecular,nationalistprinciples,backedbyastrongarmy.Withgreatdetermination,Atatürkhadsetaboutaplanforstate-directedindustrializationandeconomicdevelopment.MuchhasbeenmadeofRezaShah’sconnectionswithfascism,butthiswasthe

ageofdictators,whetherfascist,communist,orotherwise.RezaShahhadlittleneedtolookfurtherafieldthanTurkey—notinthe1920s,atleast.

In1926Iranwasstillacountryofpeasantvillages,tribes,andsmalltowns(inthatorder),withlittleindustryandanoverallpopulationofonly twelvemillionpeople, theoverwhelmingmajorityofwhomwere illiterate. Patterns of trade and the economic life in the bazaars had adapted to thewiderworldeconomy;inTehranandothermajorcities,thereweresomeofthesuperficialtrappingsofmodernity—streetlights,motor vehicles, andpaving.But in thegreat expansesbeyond, little had changed since thetimeofNaderShah.

AmongthetransformationsimposedbyRezaShah,thefirstandmostcentralwastheexpansionofthearmy.Thearmywastheshah’shighestpriorityandgreatestinterest,andmostoftheotherdevelopmentshe imposedcanbe explained in terms of the support they gave to the goal ofmaking the army strong,efficient,andmodern.Theplanforanarmyoffivedivisions,with ten thousandmenperdivision,wasannounced in January1922, but problemswith conscription, finance, and equipment persisted, and theforcewas still twentypercentunderstrength in1926.Despiteapprovalof theconscription law in June1925,therewasgreatoppositiontoitsimplementation,especiallyamongtribalgroups.Themeasurewasnotproperlyapplieduntil1930,andnotimposedproperlyonthetribesuntilthemid-1930sorlater.Butby the late 1930s the army stood atmore than one hundred thousandmen,with reserves theoreticallytakingpotentialstrengthuptofourhundredthousand.2

Despite thesefigures, theefficiencyof theforces(outsideTehran,wherethestandardof thecentraldivision was rather higher) was not impressive. For local actions against the tribes, provincialcommandersstillrecruitedtribalcontingentsonanadhocbasis,ashadbeendoneforcenturies.Moraleoftheordinaryconscriptswaslow.Theywerenotwellpaid—mostofthelargesumsspentonthearmywent to buy equipment, including tanks (from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia), artillery (fromSweden),andaircraft(anairforceof154airplanesby1936),aswellasriflesandothermaterial.Fortypercentofgovernmentexpenditurewenttothearmy,eveninthe1920s.Lateritreceivedalmostallofthegrowingincomefromoil,thoughtheoverallproportionofstaterevenuespentondefensefellasthesizeofthetotalbudgetrose.3From1922to1927,statefinanceswereorganizedbyanotherAmerican,ArthurMillspaugh(afternegotiationsinwhichtheIranianshadtriedtogetSchustertoreturn).Butalthoughtheirrelationshipwas initially good, and theAmerican had public approval to a degree noBriton or otherforeignercouldhaveexpected,theshaheventuallygrewresentfulattherestrictionsMillspaughplacedonhis military spending. They argued, and Reza Pahlavi declared: “There can’t be two shahs in thiscountry.”4Millspaugh’spositionbecameimpossible,andheresignedin1927.

Asecondmajoreffortbythenewregimewasintheimprovementoftransportinfrastructure.In1927therewereanestimatedthirty-onehundredmilesofroadsfitformotortransport,nearlyathirdofwhichhadbeenbuiltbyforeigntroopsduringtheFirstWorldWar;by1938thereweresomefifteenthousandmilesofroads.Whereasin1925Iranhadonlyaboutonehundredfiftymilesofrailways,by1938therewerealittlemorethanonethousand.Butbythattime,thelessexpensivehighwaytransportwastendingtosupplantrail.

RezaShahinvestedinindustryasimilaramounttothatinvestedinrailways.Thiswasespeciallytrueof industries aimed at substitutingdomestic production for imports—textiles, tobacco, sugar, andotherfood and drink products. Over half of the investment came from private capital.5 It was not a hugetransformationbycomparisonwithwhatwasbeingachievedinTurkey—letaloneStalin’sRussia.Butitwasimpressive,nonetheless,especiallygiventhelowbasepointfromwhichRezaShahhadstarted,andthefailuresofthepast.

Moreimpressive,andinthelongrunprobablymoreimportant,wastheexpansionofeducation.Total

school attendancewent from 55,131 in 1922 to 457,236 in 1938. In 1924 therewere 3,300 pupils insecondaryschools;by1940thenumberhadrisento28,200.Theschoolsystemwasfarfromuniversal,and it neglected almost all the rural population (though therewas a small but successful initiative forschoolsintribalareas).Thesystemhasbeencriticizedforbeingoverlynarrowandmechanical,teachingthroughrotelearningandlackinginintellectualstimulation.Butthisreflecteditsmainpurpose:toeducateefficient and unimaginative army officers and bureaucrats. Reza Shah did not want to educate a newgenerationoffreethinkerswhowouldopposehisruleandencourageotherstodoso.Butaselsewhere,educationprovedaslippery thing,andmanyeducated in thiswaynonethelesswenton todisputeRezaShah’ssupremacyinjustthewayhehadsoughttoavoid.Throughthe1930s,asmallbutsignificanteliteweresentongovernment-fundedscholarshipstostudyatuniversitiesabroad(especiallyinFrance),andin1935thefoundationwaslaidforauniversityinTehran.In1940therewere411graduates,andin1941theuniversityawardeditsfirstdoctorates.6

From the point at which he became shah, Reza inexorably strengthened his own position and theautocraticnatureofhisregime.AlthoughhecametopowerwiththeagreementoftheMajles,opponentslike Mohammad Mossadeq (a future prime minister) and Seyyed Hasan Modarres (the leadingrepresentativeoftheulemaintheMajles)hadpredictedthathewoulderodetheliberalelementsoftheconstitution. Mossadeq held firm to his position and was later imprisoned. But after Reza Shah’scoronation,Modarresandothersattemptedtomakeacompromisewithhimthatwouldleavesomespacefor theMajles, and for constitutionalgovernment.Constitutionalists tookoffice asministers, including,later,HasanTaqizadeh,whohadbeenprominent in1906–1911.But fewof themhadhappycareers inoffice.Aseriesofministersweresacked,imprisoned,orbanished,sometimesfornoclearreasonotherthantheshah’ssuspicions—orhisneedtoasserthispersonalauthority.Modarreshimselfdidnotacceptoffice, but his compromise failed, he was arrested in 1928, sent in custody to Khorasan, and wasmurdered thereatprayer in1938.LoyalministerssuchasTeymurtash,Firuz,andDavarwerearrestedandmurdered in prison or induced to commit suicide.Taqizadehwas fortunate to be sent overseas insemi-banishmentinstead.

Writers and poets also suffered, as censorshipwas tightened and freedomof expression curtailed,stranglingtheburstofliteraryoutputthathademergedintheearlydecadesofthecentury.

SadeqHedayatwas one of themost distinguishedwriters of the twentieth century in Iran.Born in1903 in Tehran, he studied in France in the 1920s. As a young man, he became an enthusiast for aromanticIraniannationalismthatlaidmuchoftheblameforIran’sproblemsontheArabconquestoftheseventhcentury.Hisshortstoriesandnovellas—Talab-eAmorzesh(SeekingAbsolution),Sag-eVelgard(StrayDog),andhisbest-known,Buf-eKur(TheBlindOwl)—combinedtheeveryday,thefantastic,andthe satirical. Hedayat’s work rejected religion, superstition, and Arabic influence in Iranian life(sometimesinunpleasantlyvividterms)butinaninnovative,moderniststylethatthroughitsrelentlesslyhonestobservationofeverydaylifereachesthehigheststandardsofworldliterature.HetranslatedKafka,Chekhov,andSartre intoPersianandwasalsoanenthusiast for thepoetryofOmarKhayyam.Hedayatcommitted suicide in Paris in 1951; his works were banned in their entirety by the Ahmadinejadgovernmentin2006.7

Anotherliteraryfiguretodiein1951wasMohammadTaqiBahar,himselfapoetbutalsothegreatcriticofPersianpoetry.Putting forwarda theoretical structure for the literaryhistoryofPersia,Baharidentified in particular a revival (bazgasht) in the latter part of the eighteenth century, inwhich poetsdeliberatelyrejectedtheSafavidstyleinfavorofareturntothestyleofthetenthandeleventhcenturies.InBahar’sown lifetimeanothernewwaveofpoetic stylecame in, linked like the innovativeproseofHedayattothechangeinattitudesintheperiodoftheConstitutionalRevolution.Thefirstgreatexemplar

ofthischangewasNimaYushij,wholivedfrom1895to1959.Nimawroteinanewway,breakingmanyoftherulesofclassicalPersianpoeticform.Heusednewvocabularyandnewimagesdrawnfromdirectobservationofnature.Formanyyearshisfreerstyleofpoetrywasresistedbythemoretraditionminded.Butlateritfoundacceptance,becomingthemodelforyoungerpoets—notablyForughFarrokhzad(1935–1967).8

RezaShahvisitedAtatürkinTurkeyin1934,andthevisitsymbolizedtheparallelsbetweenthetworegimes.Thenationalist,modernizing,secularizing,Westernizingfeaturessharedbybothwereobvious.RezaShah’seducationpolicysupportedthefoundingofgirls’schools,andhebannedtheveil.HewantedIranandtheIranianstolookWesternandmodern—men,too,hadtowearWesterndress,andatonepointhedecreed thatall shouldwearWesternheadgear,with theresult that thestreetsweresuddenlyawashwithfedorasandbowlerhats.9AsinTurkey,theshahsetupalanguagereformtoremovewordsnotofPersianorigin,andtoreplacethemwithPersianwords.Then,inordertodifferentiatehisregimefromthedecadentstyleandnationalhumiliationsoftheQajarperiod,in1935heorderedthatforeigngovernmentsshoulddropthename“Persia”inofficialcommunicationsanduseinsteadthename“Iran”—theancientname that had always been used by Iranians themselves. In 1927/1928 he ended the capitulations,accordingtowhich,sincethetreatyofTurkmanchai,foreignershadenjoyedextraterritorialprivilegeinIran,beingfreefromthejurisdictionoftheIranianauthorities.

ButRezaShah did not pursue theWesternizing agenda as far asAtatürk. For example, despite thelanguage reform, there was no change of alphabet to the Roman script, as was done in Turkey. Andalthough he achieved the removal of some of the worst abuses of foreign interference in Iran, heeventuallyhadtoacceptthecontinuationofBritishexploitationofoilinthesouth—adealthatbroughtapoor return (sixteen percent of profits) in proportion to the real value of such an important nationalresource. In 1928, the courtministerTeymurtash—the shah’s closest adviser at the time—wrote to theAnglo-PersianOilCompany,announcing that the termsof theoriginalD’Arcyoilconcessionhad toberenegotiated. The negotiations swung back and forth over the next few years, and in 1932 the shahintervened,unilaterallycanceling theconcession.TheBritish sent additional ships to thePersianGulf,andtookthecasetotheInternationalCourtofJusticeinTheHague.Shortlyafterwardtheshah,frustratedby the failure of the negotiations, sacked Teymurtash, imprisoned him, and in October 1933 had himmurdered there. Eventually a deal with Britain was patched up, only modestly increasing the Iraniangovernment’s share of the profits to twenty percent. The duration of the concession was extended to1993.10

Atatürk’sTurkeywasnotsubjecttoanysuchforeignexploitation.AndwhereasAtatürkretainedhispersonalpopularitytotheend,bytheendofthe1930sRezaShahhadalienatedalmostallofthesupporthehadbeengivenwhenhe tookpower.Theulemahadseenmuchofwhat theyhadmost feared in theConstitutional Revolution—especially in education and the law—enacted without their being able topreventit.Bytheendofthe1930s,theirprestigiousandlucrativeroleasjudgesandnotarieshadbeenreformed away. They hated the rulings on Western dress and the veil, and a protest against thesedevelopments in 1935 had led to a massacre in the shrine precincts of the Emam Reza at Mashhad:several hundred people were machine-gunned by the shah’s troops, further deepening the regime’sunpopularity.11 The bazaarmerchants disliked the statemonopolies on various items that the shah hadbroughtintobooststaterevenue.Liberalsandintellectualswerealienatedbytherepression,censorship,and theclosureofnewspapers, let alone themurders inprisonofpopularpoliticians.Therewasevendissentwithinthearmy.Sowhenanewwarbroughtanewcrisis,RezaShahhadfewfriendsleft.12

NEWMASKS,SAMEOLDUGLYSISTERSItisusuallysaidthattheBritishandtheRussianstookoverinIranin1941becauseRezaShahhadshownhimself to be pro-German and pro-Nazi, and the Allies feared that if they did not move in, then theGermans would. But the situation was more complex than that. At the time of the Anglo-Sovietinterventionof1941,noGermanarmedforceswere threateningIrandirectly.TheGermanpush to takeBakuandtheCaucasusoilfieldsonlycamelater,inthesummerof1942.Theshahhimself,despitehavingencouraged the Germans earlier to a certain extent, had been resisting German influence within thecountry.

ButwhenBritain and the SovietUnionwere thrown into alliance in 1941 byHitler’s invasion ofRussia (in June),Britain’sposition in theMiddleEastwas lookinguncertain.Thecrucial interests forBritainwere the SuezCanal and the Iranian oil fields.Having defeated an Italian effort to break intoEgypt fromLibya in 1940,British forces inNorthAfricawere put on the defensive by the arrival ofRommelandtheGermanAfrikaKorps.Inthespringof1941theyhadtoretreatbacktowardAlexandria,leavingagarrisontobesurroundedinTobruk.Ataboutthesametime,inApril,therewasananti-Britishrevolt in Iraq, encouraged by the Germans and assisted by Luftwaffe aircraft. This necessitated aninterventionbyBritishtroops,whocompletedtheiroccupationofthecountrybytheendofMay.InJune,rattled by these developments, Britain sent British and Free French troops into Lebanon and Syria tounseattheNazi-alignedVichyFrenchgovernmentsthere.

Seeninthatcontext,theBritishandSoviettakeoverofIraninAugust1941looksmorelikepartofarounding-outof strategicpolicy in the region,at aparticularlydangerousanduncertainmoment for theAllies—partoftheinexorabletotalizinglogicofthewaritself.ButIrandidhavemajorsignificanceinanother aspect. Hitler’s successes—from Norway to Denmark to Poland to France to Yugoslavia toGreece,in1940andtheearlypartof1941—meantthattheavenuesforBritainandtheSovietUniontosupport each other were restricted to the hazardous Arctic route to Murmansk in the north, or somesouthernalternative.AndonceHitler’sBarbarossaoffensivehadsweptallbeforeitinByelorussiaandtheUkraine,theSovietsurgentlyneededsuppliesfromtheWesttohelpequipthenewarmiestoreplacetheSoviet troops thathadbeenherdedoff intoGermancampsor slave-labor factories as prisoners ofwar.TheroutefromthePersianGulftotheCaspian,arduousandlongthoughitwas,appearedtobeananswer.Bytheendofthewar,morethanfivemilliontonshadbeentakentoRussiathroughIran,bybothroadandrail—thoughthiswasarelativelysmallpartoftheoveralleffort.

RezaShahhadflirtedwiththeNaziregimeinthe1930s,andGermandiplomatshadencouragedwhatthey saw as the shah’sAryanization of the language.Through the 1930smoreGerman technicians andengineersarrivedinIran—theshahfavoredthemasanalternativetotheBritish,whoweredislikedandsuspectedbymanyIranians.ButtheshahwasashostiletopossibleGermanmeddlinginIranashewastoforeignmeddlingofanyotherkind.Healsohadastrongdislikeforanynascentpoliticalmovements—fascistorcommunist—thatmightopposehisgovernment.Asmallgroupofapparentlypro-fasciststudentswerearrestedin1937,andtheirleaderwaslatermurderedinprison.In1940thepoliceshotaprominentZoroastrianinthestreetbecausehissonhadmadepro-NazibroadcastsinGermany.AgroupofMarxistswerealsoarrestedin1937;mostofthemweregivenharshprisonsentences,andlaterwentontoformthepro-CommunistTudehparty.13Thesedevelopments reflected thebitterpolarizationofpoliticsbetweenfascismandcommunisminEuropeatthetime.Someoftheseradicalswerefromthatsmallelitewhohadbeen educated at European universities at the government’s expense. An upsurge of ugly anti-Semiticjournalism contributed to a period of increased anxiety for Iranian Jews in the 1930s—andmay havecontributedtoanincreaseinJewishemigrationtoPalestine—butthenotionofarisingtideofpro-Nazi

and pro-German feeling among people and government before August 1941 has sometimes beenoverstated.ThehistorianErvandAbrahamianhassuggested that theAllied interventionmayhavebeennot so much to remove a pro-Nazi shah as to forestall a pro-German coup against the shah, as hadhappenedinIraq.14

TheAllied demand that Iran should expelGerman nationalswas nonetheless the immediate casusbelli.Afterthedemandwasrefused,theAlliedinvasionofIraninAugust1941metonlytokenoppositionfromthearmyonwhichRezaShahhadspentsomuchattentionandmoney(thisiswhereacomparisonwith Nader Shah finally breaks down), and after three days he ordered his troops to cease furtherresistance.BritishandSovietforcesmetincentralIranandenteredTehranonSeptember17,1941.

Theshahabdicatedinfavorofhisson,MohammadReza,andtheAlliesmaintainedtheircontroloverthecountryuntilaftertheendofthewarin1945.ItseemsthatRezaShah’srelationshipwithhissonhadbeen something like that between a senior officer and a subordinate. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi waseducatedinSwitzerlandinthe1930s,whichdidnotbringhimanyclosertohisparentsortothepeoplehewasgoing to rule.MohammadRezahada sharpmindbutwassocially shyanddiffident—a legacyfromhiseducationandhisrelationshipwithhisharshfather.

TheAlliesweretheimmediatecauseofRezaShah’sabdication,buthisremovalwaswelcomedbymost Iranians, and some have suggested that his unpopularity would havemade it impossible for theAllies to rulewithhimstillon the throne—even ifhehadaccepted thatarrangement.15Rezawent intoexileinSouthAfrica(wherehediedinJuly1944).

In December 1941 the United States joined the Allies against Germany and Japan, and in 1942AmericantroopsjoinedtheBritishandRussianforcesoccupyingIran.Attheendof1943Tehranhostedthe first great conference of the leaders of the three Allied powers. Among the arrangements thatChurchill, Stalin, andRoosevelt agreed upon for the conduct of thewar—including opening a secondfront inwesternEurope in1944—was thecommitment towithdrawfromIranwithinsixmonthsof thewar’send.

Ripples from the terrible events of the Holocaust also reached the country. In 1942 a group oforphanedchildren—refugeesfromtheJewishghettoesandshtetlsofPolandwhohadescapedintoRussiaonlytobeinternedinSiberiaandthensentbytrainsouthward—arrivedinIranontheCaspiancoast,aftermanybitterhardships.Theywerebrought toTehran,where theyweregivenhelpbytheIranianJewishcommunityandbyZionistorganizations.Havingrecoveredfromthepoorconditioninwhichtheyarrived,848childreneventuallymadetheirwaytoPalestine.16

Atthesametime,adescendantoftheQajarroyalfamily—Abdol-HoseinSardariQajar,whohasbeencalledtheIranianSchindler—waslookingaftertheIranianEmbassybuildinginParisaftertheembassy’smainfunctionshadmovedtoVichy.Sardariwasleftasupplyofblankpassports,andwhenJewsinParisbegantoberoundedupbytheNazisin1942,hebeganissuingthemtoIranianJews,manyofwhomhadlived inParis for someyears.He also secured an assurance from theGermanauthorities inParis thatIraniancitizenswouldnotbedetainedorharmed.ButasthemeasuresagainstJewsinParisintensified,FrenchJewswithnoIranianconnectionsbegantocometohimtoo,desperateforhelp.BecomingawareoftheenormityofthecrimebeingperpetratedbytheNazis,Sardarigavehispassports—morethanfivehundred of them—to those Jews as well. After the war, Sardari’s government charged him withmisconductover thesepassports,buthewasgivenapersonalpardonbyMohammadRezaShah.WhenaskedlateraboutwhathehaddonefortheJewsinParis,SardariapparentlysaidithadbeenhisdutytohelpIraniancitizens.WhenaskedabouttheJewswhohadnotbeenIranians,hesaid,“Thatwasmydutyasahumanbeing.”17Sardaridiedin1981and,in2004,wasposthumouslygivenanawardbytheSimonWiesenthalCenter.

Whilethewarcontinued,AlliedtroopsmaintainedtheircontrolinIran,andthepowersofthePahlavigovernmentwere severely limited.ButMohammadRezaShahhad confirmed at his coronation that hewould rule as a constitutional monarch, and in 1944 elections were held for the first genuinelyrepresentativeMajlessincethe1920s.Manyfamiliarfiguresfromtheconstitutionalistperiodreappeared—notably Seyyed Zia Tabatabai andMohammadMossadeq, as well as some of the same nationalistlandownersandofficialswhohadbeenactiveinpoliticsbeforeRezaKhanbecameshah.Theyhadjustgrownolder.

The humiliation of the invasion, the presence of the Allies, the food shortages, the economicdisruption caused by the war, the weakness of the government—all of it helped to stimulate anotherupsurge in political activity, especially nationalistic feeling. One focus of this was again the unequaldistributionoftheAnglo-IranianOilCompany’s(AIOC)profits(thecompanyhadchangeditsnamefromAnglo-PersianinrecognitionoftheShah’srequestthatthecountrybeknownasIran).TheIranian-basedindustrywas thebiggestandbestdeveloped in theMiddleEastat the time.But through taxationof theAIOCintheUnitedKingdom,theBritishgovernmentgarneredmoreprofitfromtheIranianoil industrythantheIraniangovernmentdid(nearlydoubleovertheperiod1932–195018).TheAlliedoccupationwasunpopular,buttheBritishandRussiansweremoreunpopularthantheAmericans.Asignofthiswasthatanother figure from the past,ArthurMillspaugh, returned inNovember 1942 to his old job of runningIranian state finances.AlthoughMillspaugh set toworkwith his usual diligence, he showed a lack ofsensitivitytothepoliticalandsocialconditionsofIranatthetime.Hisattemptstoendfoodsubsidiesandtoprivatizestateinstitutionseventuallymadehimunpopular,andledtohisresignationtwoyearslater.

The shah tried to appeal topro-American feeling, and to theUnitedStates for support.Hemadeaspeech drawing a comparison between Iranian nationalism and Iran’s struggle for independence, andAmericannationalismandAmerica’sstruggleforindependence—fromtheBritishEmpire,ofcourse.Intheheightened intensityofpoliticaldebateunder theAlliedoccupation, theyoungshah felt theneed toappeal topopularopinion.Asduring theconstitutionalistperiod,newnewspapers—andthis time,newpoliticalparties—proliferated.By1943, therewereforty-sevennewspapers inTehran(therewouldbesevenhundredby1951).19Ofthenewparties,themostsignificantwasthefoundingin1941ofthepro-CommunistTudeh,whichreorientedtheintelligentsiainapro-Tudeh,Marxist-leaningdirection.20Radioownershipwasalsoexpandingrapidly,exercisingafurtherintegratinginfluenceandfocusingtheattentionevenofisolatedvillagersonnationaleventsanddiscussions.

Asthewarcametoanend,doubtsbegantoariseoverwhetherornottheSoviettroopswoulddepartfromAzerbaijan.MakinguseofthesocialdemocratictraditionintheregionandthestrongpositionoftheTudehparty there, theRussianspursuedan imperialisticpolicy thatprefiguredandhelpedbringon theconfrontation of the Cold War. They encouraged pro-Soviet secessionist movements in Azerbaijan—KurdishaswellasAzeri(therewasmoreseriousenthusiasmforsecessionamongtheKurdsthanamongtheAzeris),withtheaimofre-creatingtheresomethingliketheoldRussiansphereofinfluenceof1907–1914.BythebeginningofJanuary1946BritishandAmericantroopshadleftIran,buttheSovietswerestill there in Azerbaijan, posing as protectors for Tudeh and the secessionists (there had been someattacksonTudehofficeselsewhereinthecountry)andconfrontingtheIranianarmyonthemarginsoftheprovince. Nationalist feeling in Tehran about the situation in the northwest was intense. RespectedintellectualslikeAhmadKasraviwroteofthedangerthatthecountrycouldsplitupentirely.

Kasravi,borninTabrizin1890,wasinitiallytrainedinaseminaryandwasinvolvedinthedramaticevents of the Constitutional Revolution in Azerbaijan. But he rejected his religious training when helearned that the comet he saw in 1910 had been predicted by European astronomers as the return ofHalley’scomet, lastseenin1835:“Iwaspleasedandhappythat inEurope,knowledgehadfalleninto

suchalucidpath.”Kasraviturnedfromaclericalpostulantintoawickedlyintelligentcriticoftheulema—but also a critic ofmany other aspects of contemporary Iranian society. His pamphletWhat Is theReligion of the Hajjis withWarehouses? attacked the pious posturing of merchants who shamelesslypursuedthesharpestofpractices in theircommercialdealings.Another,entitledHasanIsBurningHisBookofHafez,attackedthedisposition,ashesawit,ofmanyIranianstosubstitutequotationsfromthegreatpoets forgenuine thought.Devoted to theprinciplesof constitutionalismand seculargovernment,KasraviwasanationalistwhoattackedthelinguisticandotherdivisionsthatdividedIraniansand,inhisopinion,hadmadethemweak.HeworkedformanyyearsintheMinistryofEducationandasajournalistandwriter. In1946hewasassassinatedbyagroupofIslamicextremists, followersofamanwhohadchosentocallhimselfNavvabSafavi.21

Kasravi is significant for a number of reasons. He stands for a certain strand of thinking in Iran,typicalofthePahlaviperiodinsomeways,thatbecameimportantagaininthe1960sand1970s,whichrejected the backwardness of Shi‘ism and blamed it for many of the weaknesses and failures of thecountry.HisthinkingwasinfluentialamongthemiddleclasseswhobenefitedfromtheopportunitiesthataroseunderthePahlavis.

His disapproval of the cult of Persian poetry is interesting because it again shows the culturalcentralityofthegreatPersianpoets—andpointstotheambiguityinIranianculturethattheyexpressedandperhapssustained.RoyMottahedehwrote:

Infact,PersianpoetrycametobetheemotionalhomeinwhichtheambiguitythatwasattheheartofIranianculturelivedmostfreelyandopenly.WhatPersianpoetryexpressedwasnotanenigmatobesolvedbutanenigmathatwasunsolvable.InPersian poetry of anyworth nothingwasmerely something else; the inner space of the spirit inwhichPersian poetryunderwentitsthousandtransformationswasultimatelyaplacewherethisambiguouslanguagereachedaprivateemotionalvaluethathadtoremainprivate,becausetodecodeitasmereallegory,toreexpressitinanyformofexplanatoryparaphrasewouldbetoplaceitbackinthepublicdomainand,therefore,intherealminwhichitwasintendedtoremainambiguous.22

Eventually,aftera tenseperiodofnegotiationsandpressurefromtheUnitedStatesandBritain, theSovietsannouncedtheirintentiontowithdrawfromIran.BytheendofMay1946,theirforcesweregone.Iranian troops then marched in and reimposed central government control—with some brutality. TheepisodediscreditedtheSovietUnionformanyIranians,butnotsothemembersofTudeh.Thepartygrewin influence, took places in the government cabinet and helped to bring forward new labor laws, setmaximumworkinghours,andestablishedaminimumwage.Butin1949Tudehmemberswereaccusedofinstigatinganassassinationattemptagainsttheyoungshah.Afterthatthepartywasbanned,andcouldonlymake its influence felt throughundergroundactivityor throughsympatheticwritersand journalists.TheUnitedStates,profiting from theRussians’unpopularity, increased itspresencebybringing inadvisersandtechniciansandbysupplyingtrainingassistancetothearmy,aswellasotheraid.NationalistfeelingwasgratifiedbytherestorationofIranianterritorialintegrityinAzerbaijan,andattentionturnedbacktoothergrievances—especiallytothequestionofoil.

MOSSADEQThe assassination attempt of 1949 against the Shah precipitated an extended period of crisis,demonstrations, andmartial law. In 1950 the shah appointed a new primeminister, Ali Razmara, butRazmara was not popular; he was suspected of pro-British sympathies, and his military backgroundencouragedconcernthattheshahintendedareturntothemilitaristic,autocraticstyleofgovernmenthis

father had favored in the 1930s. Over the same period, Mohammad Mossadeq assembled a broadcoalitionofMajlesdeputiesthatcametobecalledtheNationalFront.Itwasorganizedaroundacentraldemand for oil nationalization, and Mossadeq was also widely believed to have reached anaccommodationwithTudeh.Theshah’sgovernmentattemptedtonegotiatewiththeAIOCforarevisionofthetermsoftheoilconcession,buttheAIOCwereslowtoacceptthefifty-fiftysplitofprofitsthathadbecome thenorm inoilagreementselsewhere in theworld.TheNationalFrontand itsdemand foroilnationalizationweregreatlystrengthenedinMajleselectionsin1950,andinMarch1951Razmarawasassassinated by the same extremist Islamic group that had murdered Kasravi. It was inevitable thatMossadeq,asthemostpopularpoliticianinthecountry,wouldbecomeprimeminister.

Mossadeq was nearly seventy in 1951. He had Qajar ancestry and had studied in Paris andSwitzerland,takingadoctorateinlaw.HavingleftthecountryinprotestattheAnglo-PersianAgreementof1919,hehadopposedRezaShah’saccessiontopowerandhadbeenimprisonedforit,beforereturningtoprominenceinthe1940s.HiswholelifehadbeendedicatedtothecauseofIraniannationalintegrityandconstitutionalgovernment.Underhisleadership,theMajlesvotedonMarch15,1951,tonationalizeIranianoil.OnApril28theynamedMossadeqprimeminister.

But nationalization created an impasse, asBritish technicians left theoil installations inKhuzestanandtheBritishgovernmentimposedablockade.Nooilcouldbeexported.Insteadofcontributingtothenationalrevenue,themaintenanceofoil installationsandthesalariesofoilworkersbecameadrainonfinances,graduallycreatingalargedebtandwidereconomicproblems.MossadeqtraveledtotheUnitedStatesinhopesofgettingaloan,buthewasrefused.U.S.oilcompaniesjoinedaboycottofIranianoil,andtheU.S.governmentwasincreasinglyconcernedattheapparentinvolvementofcommunistsintheoilnationalization movement (Tudeh had led strikes and demonstrations). In hindsight, the U.S. positionseems strange, given the plain fact that nationalization enjoyed broad support acrossmost classes andshades of opinion. But the movement was vocally anti-British, and some voices anti-Western. In theatmosphereofthetimes,especiallyaftertheadventoftheEisenhoweradministrationandofSenatorJoeMcCarthy, the involvementofanundergroundcommunistmovementwithSovietsupportwasenough todamnthewholephenomenoninU.S.eyes.

Despitedeepeningeconomicdifficultiesandthedisappointingrealizationthathecouldexpectnohelpfrom the United States in his confrontation with the British, Mossadeq continued as prime minister,enjoyingmassivesupportbothinMajlesandinthecountryitself.Buttensionsbetweendifferentelementsof theNational Front coalition increased, as did the apparent strength of Tudeh, and thereweremoredemonstrations.Thegovernmentbroughtinnewreforms,includingmeasuresthatchangedtherelationshipbetweenlandlordsandpeasantsinfavorofthelatter,andMossadequsedhissupporttopursueanolderagendaoflimitingthepowerofthemonarchy.Butinthesummerof1952whenMossadeqdemandedtheright toappoint theministerofwar todealwith the increasingunrest, the shah refused,andMossadeqresigned.Hissuccessor immediatelyannouncednegotiationswith theBritish to resolve theoildispute,andthecountryeruptedindemonstrationsofdisapprovalinwhichTudehtookaprominentrole.TheshahquicklycavedinandreappointedMossadeq,whobrokediplomaticrelationswithBritainaltogetherattheendoftheyear.BythistimetheBritishwereencouragingtheUnitedStatestocooperateinengineeringacouptogetridofMossadeq.

Finally, inAugust1953, theplanwentahead:Mossadeqwas tobe removedasprimeministerandreplacedwithGeneralZahedi,aferventmonarchist.Buttheplotmisfired.Mossadeqfoundoutaboutthecoup,probably throughTudeh, andwas able to forestall it.The shah fled the country and anti-royalistriotingbrokeout.Mossadeqsent inpoliceandtroops tocontrol theriots,andtheysucceeded,but theyalso alienatedmany ofMossadeq’s own supporters, aswell as Tudeh. Sowhen a new demonstration

appeared two days later onAugust 19, this time againstMossadeq, his supporters stayed away. ThisdemonstrationincludedsupportersofAyatollahAbol-GhasemKashani—previouslyloyaltotheNationalFront,butnowontheotherside—fromthebazaar,andpeoplepaidtoparticipatebytheCIA,whichhadgiventhecoupthecodenameOperationAjax.ManymembersofthemurkysouthTehranunderworldtookpart, includinggang leaders likeSha’banJa‘fariBimokh(Sha‘ban theBrainless).23 In thewakeof thisdemonstration Mossadeq was arrested, the army and Zahedi were in control, and the shah returned.Mossadeqwas triedandconvictedof treasonbyamilitarycourtbutwasallowed to liveunderhousearrestuntilhediedin1967.

ThecoupcouldperhapsnothavehappenedwithoutmistakesofMossadeq’sownmaking—andinfactitnearlyfailed.ButitcertainlywouldnothavehappenedwithouttheinterventionoftheBritishSISandtheAmericanCIA.24Althoughthestoryofthecoupdidnotemergeformanyyearsandperhapshasnotdonesofullyevennow,Iraniansblamed these twoagenciesat the timeandhavedonesobitterlyeversince.TheideathateverythingthathappenedinIranianpoliticswasmanipulatedbyahiddenforeignhandwas again reinforced, fathering dozens of improbable conspiracy theories in later years. Mossadeqbecameanationalheroacrossmostideological,class,andreligiousboundaries.

Thecoupalsohadsignificanceinanumberofotherways.ItestablishedtheUnitedStatesinIranastheprimeallyandprotectorofthePahlaviregime,anditachievedtheaimofeclipsingSovietcommunistinfluence. But it also took away much of the enchantment the United States had previously enjoyedpopularlyasavirtuousalternativetotheolderpowers.Thesignificanceoftheeventtooksometimetosink in.For awhile some Iranians still believed,orhoped, that theAmericanshadbeendupedby theBritish, and that fundamentalU.S. valueswould reassert themselves.But theUnitedStateswasPrinceCharmingnomore.One coulddrawaparallelwithBritish decisions in the 1870s and at other times,whichappearedtoserveimmediateshort-termBritishinterestsbuttreatedIranasaninstrumenttootherends rather thanwith the respectdueapartner. In the long run, aswithBritishactions in thepreviouscentury, theremovalofMossadeqdamagedU.S. interests inamuchmoreseriousway thancouldhavebeenimaginedatthetime.

Theeventsof1951–1953alsoalienatedmanyIraniansfromtheyoungshah,makingpopularsupportfor him in subsequent decades equivocal at best. Beyond Iran, the significance of the struggle tonationalizeIranianoilwaswidelyfeltintheMiddleEast.Itisgenerallyaccepted,forexample,thattheepisodeplayedanimportantpart in the thinkingofEgypt’sJamalAbdal-Nasser(Nasser),whoinJuly1956followedtheexampleofMossadeqandnationalizedtheSuezCanal.ItwouldnotbethelasttimethatIran,forbetterorworse,wouldindicateinadvancethewayeventswouldunfoldintheregionmorewidely.

But theMossadeqeradisillusionedmanyyoungIraniansaboutpoliticsand thechances forchange.OnesuchwasJalalAl-eAhmad,acomplexmanwhowasagainstmanythings,andonlyambiguouslyinfavorofafew.HehadbeenbornintoanulemafamilyinTehranin1923,butturnedagainstareligiouscareer(havingreadKasravi)andlaterbecameaMarxistundertheinfluenceofKhalilMaleki,oneofthegrouparrestedbyRezaShahin1937.ButinthelongrunAhmadwastoocriticalandtooindividualisticto be a conventionalMarxist.LikeMaleki, he disliked thewayTudeh had to toe theSoviet line afterWorldWar II.He actively supportedMossadeq, but after his fall renounced politics dramatically andpublicly.LikeKasravi,hehadanaversiontothetraditionsofclassicalPersianliterature,favoringaleanstyleofwritingthatechoedthecolloquialPersianofordinarypeople.Themost influentialofhis ideaswas that of gharbzadegi—often translated as “Westoxication” or “West-strickenness”—which he putforward in talks andabookwith that title in1962.This attacked theuncriticalway inwhichWesternideashadbeenaccepted,advocated,andtaughtinschools.Theresult,saidAl-eAhmad,wasthecreation

ofapeopleandaculturethatwereneithergenuinelyIraniannorproperlyWestern.FollowingastorybyMawlanaRumi,hecomparedittoacrowthatonedaysawtheelegantwayapartridgewalked.Thecrowtriedtoimitatethepartridgeandfailed,butkepttrying,withtheresultthatheforgothowtowalklikeacrow—butneversucceededinwalkinglikeapartridge.

Astimewenton,Al-eAhmadwasincreasinglydrawnbacktoreligion(havinginitiallyfollowedthescornful,satiricalexampleofHedayat),buthealwaysdislikedthesuperstitionandemptytraditionalismofmanyof theulema—“satisfiedtobethegatekeeperat thegraveyard.”Later,hedrewattentionto thewayoilwealthwasspentonimportedabsurdities thatearliergenerationsofIranianscouldneverhaveimaginedtheycouldwant,andtotheartificial,inventedhistoricalheritagepresentedbyMohammadRezaShahasthebackdroptothePahlavimonarchy.Al-eAhmadbroughtsomeofthejadedanomieofWesternmodernismtoIranianliterature,whilekeepingastronglyIranianvoice.HetranslatedSartreandCamusintoPersian,buthisfirmattachmenttointellectualhonestyandhissearchforanauthenticwaytolivedidnotborrow fromanyone.Hediedyoung in1969, andhis status as amodernist herowasonly slightlyweakenedbyhiswifeSiminDaneshvar’slaterrevelationsofhisgrumpyselfishnessintheirmarriedlife.HewasastronginfluenceonawholegenerationofIranianintellectualswhowerehiscontemporaries,andonthosewhocameafterhim.25

THERULEOFMOHAMMADREZASHAHANDTHEWHITEREVOLUTIONTheMossadeqcoupendedtheperiodofpluralismthathadbegunwiththefallofRezaShahin1941,andinauguratedanextendedperiodinwhichMohammadRezaShahruledpersonallywithfewconstitutionallimitations. The oil dispute was resolved with an arrangement that gave the Iranian government fiftypercentof theprofits,outof a consortium inwhich theU.S. companieshada fortypercent stake,nowequal to that held by theAIOC (renamedBritishPetroleum in 1954—BP).The increasedoil revenue,whichgrewas the industrydeveloped, permitted a big expansionof government expenditure.Muchofthis,asinthetimeofRezaShah,wasspentonmilitaryequipment—augmentedby$500millionofU.S.military aidbetween1953 and1963.Many in government circles felt that toomuchmoneywasbeingspent on the military budget, and in 1959 that dispute contributed to the resignation of Abol-HassanEbtehaj,headofthePlanningandBudgetOrganization.26InreturntheshahalignedhimselfunequivocallywiththeWest,anddiplomaticrelationswithBritainwererestoredin1954.Butfrom1953onwarditwasplaintoallthattheUnitedStateswasnowthedominantexternalpowerinIran.

Afterthecoup,theshah’sgovernmentkeptatightgriponpolitics.CandidatesfortheelectionstotheeighteenthMajlesin1954wereselectedbytheregime,andtheassemblyproveddulyobedient.In1955theshahdismissedZahediandeffectively tookcontrol intohisownhands.Mossadeq’sNationalFrontwas disbanded, and Tudeh sympathizers were relentlessly pursued by a security agency (known from1957asSAVAK)thatgrewincreasinglyefficient,withhelpfromtheCIAandtheIsraelisecretservice,Mossad. It also grew increasingly brutal. Two puppet political parties were set up for the Majles,controlledbytheshah’ssupporters—Melliyun(NationalParty)andMardom(People’sParty)—satirizedasthe“Yes”partyandthe“Yessir”party.27ImportantmembersoftheulemalikeKashani,andtheprimemarja-etaqlidAyatollahBorujerdi,hadsupportedthecoupof1953becausetheydislikedwhattheysawasMossadeq’ssecularizingtendencyandtheinfluenceofTudeh.Thereafter,theycontinuedtosupporttheshah, and relations between the shah andBorujerdi in particularwere cordial.Butmanyother clericsgrewmoreuneasyandhostileastimewenton.

The population of Iran had expanded from around 12million at the beginning of the century to 15million in1938, and19.3million in1950; itwould jump to27.3millionby1968and33.7million in1976.Thoughtheregimeinvestedheavilyinindustryandeducation,theruralareasstill laggedbehind.Therewasalsosubstantialprivateinvestment,andbetween1954and1969theeconomygrewonaveragebysevenoreightpercentayear.28Aswellasmilitaryexpenditure,alotofgovernmentmoneywasspentonbig, showy engineering projects, like dams—dams that sometimes never linked up to the irrigationnetworks that hadbeen their justification.As in anyother timeofmajor change, the newoften lookedcrass against the dignity of the old that was being pushed aside, and the benefits of change weredistributed unequally. But therewas a general improvement inmaterial standards of living. The new,educatedmiddle class expanded, encompassing entrepreneurs, engineers, andmanagers aswell as theolderprofessions—lawyers,doctors,andteachers.

In 1957 a British diplomat with more than ordinary perspicacity wrote the following of Tehran,prefiguring the tensions that came into higher relief in the 1960s and 1970s—and making an earlydifferentiationbetweenthecharacteroftheWesternizednorthofthecity,andthatofthemoretraditional,poorersouth:

Here themullahspreacheveryevening topackedaudiences.Mostof thesermonsare revivalist stuffofahighemotionalandlowintellectualstandard.Butcertainwellknownpreachersattracttheintelligentsiaofthetownwithreasonedhistoricalexposésofconsiderablemerit. . . .TheTehran thatwesawon the tenthofMoharram[i.e.Ashura] isadifferentworld,centuries and civilisations apart from the gawdy superficial botch of cadillacs, hotels, antique shops, villas, tourists anddiplomats,wherewerunourdailyround...butitisnotonlypoverty,ignoranceanddirtthatdistinguishtheoldsouthfromtheparvenunorth.Theslumshaveacompactself-consciousunityandcommunalsense that is totally lackingin thesmartdistrictsofchlorinatedwater,macadamedroadsand(fitful)streetlighting.Thebourgeoisdoesnotknowhisneighbour:theslum-dweller is intensely conscious of his.And in the slums the spurious blessings ofPepsiCola civilisation have not yetdestroyedtheoldwayoflife,whereeveryman’scomfortandsecuritydependonthespontaneous,un-policedobservationofa traditional code.Down in the southern part of the citymanners andmorals are better and stricter than in the villas ofTajrish:an injury toaneighbour,apassatanotherman’swife,abrutality toachildevokespontaneous retributionwithoutbenefitofbarorbench.29

In1960theshahputforwardaproposalforlandreform,butbythistimetheeconomywasslowingdown, and the U.S. government (after January 1961 the Kennedy administration) was putting somepressure on the shah to liberalize.Many of the senior ulema disliked the land reformmeasure (theirextensive land holdings from endowments appeared to be threatened, and many considered theinfringementofpropertyrightstobeun-Islamic),andBorujerdideclaredafatwaagainstit.Themeasurestalled.PromptedbytheU.S.,thelhahliftedthebanontheNationalFront,andtheircriticisms,alongwiththeeconomicproblems,ledtostrikesanddemonstrations.Atthebeginningof1963theshahregainedtheinitiativewithapackageofreformsannouncedastheWhiteRevolution.Thisincludedarenewedpolicyof land reform,privatizationof state factories, female suffrage,anda literacycorpsofyoungeducatedpeople toaddress theproblemof illiteracy in thecountryside.Despiteaboycottby theNationalFront(whichinsistedthatsuchameasureshouldhavebeenpresentedandappliedbyaconstitutionallyelectedMajles), the program received huge support in a referendum—5.5million out of 6.1 million eligiblevoterssupportingit.30Theprogramwentahead,augmentingandbroadeningthechangesinthecountrythatwerealreadyafoot.

Butearlyin1963aclericlittleknownoutsideulemacircles,AyatollahRuhollahKhomeini,begantopreachinQomagainsttheshah’sgovernment.Heattackeditscorruption,itsneglectofthepoor,anditsfailure touphold Iran’s sovereignty in its relationshipwith theUnitedStates—andhealsodisliked theshah’ssaleofoil toIsrael.Khomeinimade thismoveata timewhen, following thedeathofAyatollah

Borujerdiin1961,manyIranianShi‘awereunclearwhomtofollowasmarja-etaqlid.InMarch,ontheanniversaryofthemartyrdomoftheEmamJafarSadeq,troopsandSAVAKagentsattackedthemadresehwhere Khomeini was preaching and arrested him, killing several students at the same time. He wasreleased shortly afterward but continued his attacks on the government.Hemade a particularly strongspeechonJune3,whichwasAshura,andwasarrestedagaintwodayslater.31Whenthearrestbecameknown, there were demonstrations in Tehran and several other major cities. Drawing force from theintenseatmosphereofmourningforEmamHosein,thesedemonstrationswererepeated,andtheyspreadwidely in the days that followed. The shah imposed martial law and put troops on the streets, buthundreds of demonstrators (at least) were killed before the protests ended. These deaths, especiallybecausetheytookplaceatAshura,invitedcomparisonwiththemartyrsofKarbalaontheonehand,andthetyrantYazidontheother.

Khomeini was released in August. But despite SAVAK announcements that he had agreed to keepquiet,hecontinuedtospeakout,andhewasrearrested.Finally,hewasdeportedandexiledin1964afteraharshspeechattackingboththeIranianandU.S.governmentsforanewlawthatgavetheequivalentofdiplomaticimmunitytoU.S.militarypersonnelinIran:

TheyhavereducedtheIranianpeopletoalevellowerthanthatofanAmericandog.IfsomeonerunsoveradogbelongingtoanAmerican,hewillbeprosecuted.EveniftheShahhimselfweretorunoveradogbelongingtoanAmerican,hewouldbeprosecuted.ButifanAmericancookrunsovertheShah, theheadofstate,noonewillhavetheright tointerferewithhim....32

Shortly after thenew lawwaspassed in theMajles, a newU.S. loanof $200million formilitaryequipmentwasagreed—aconjunctionalltooreminiscentofthekindsofdealsdonewithforeignersinthereignofNaserod-DinShah.InitiallyKhomeiniwentinexiletoTurkey,thentoIraq,andeventually(aftertheshahputpressureontheIraqigovernmenttoremovehimfromtheShi‘acenterinNajaf)toParisin1978. Protest in Iran died down, aside from occasionalmanifestations at TehranUniversity and frommembersoftheulema.Fortheshah,themessagefromtheepisodeappearedtobethathecouldgovernautocratically and overcome short-term dissent with repression. In the longer term, he believed, hispoliciesfordevelopmentwouldbringbenefitstoordinarypeopleandsecurehisrule.

KHOMEINIRuhollahKhomeiniwasborninSeptember1902inKhomein,asmalltownbetweenIsfahanandTehran.Hecame froma familyof seyyed (descendantsof theProphet)whosepatriarchshadbeenmullahs formany generations, and may originally have come from Nishapur. In the eighteenth century one of hisancestorshadmovedtoIndia,wherethefamilyhadlivedinKintur,nearLucknow,beforehisgrandfather—knownasSeyyedAhmadMusaviHindi—movedbacktoPersiaandsettledinKhomeininabout1839.Hebought a largehouse there andwas amanofproperty and status.Ahmad’s sonMostafa studied inIsfahan,Najaf,andSamarraandmarriedthedaughterofadistinguishedclericalfamily.Mostafabelongedtotheupperechelonsoftheulema,acutabovethemullahswhohadtomakealivingasjobbingteachers,legalnotaries,orpreachers.Thismadehimanimportantfigureinthearea,anditseemsthatitwaswhilehewasattemptingtomediateinalocaldisputethathewasmurderedin1903,whenRuhollah,histhirdson,wasonlysixmonthsold.33

Ruhollah grew up inKhomein through the turbulent years of theConstitutional Revolution and theFirstWorldWar,overwhichperiodKhomeinwasraidedanumberoftimesbyLoritribesmen.In1918

hismother died in a cholera epidemic, leaving him an orphan as hewas about to enter the seminarynearbyinSoltanabad.Itmaybethattheabsenceofhisfatherasachildandbecomingorphanedasayouthadded impetus to the youngKhomeini’s ambition and drive to excel in his studies. Later hemoved toQom,whereasastudentofShaykhAbdolkarimHaeriheworetheblackturbanofaseyyed.InQomhereceivedtheconventionaleducationinlogicandreligiouslawofamullah,becomingamojtahedinabout1936.34 Itwas a young age for such an accomplishment, and a sign of his promise. From that time hebegan to teach and write. He was always a little unconventional, having an interest in poetry andmysticism (erfan) thatmore conservativemullahswould have disapproved of.He readMolla Sadra’sFour Journeys and the Fusus al-Hikam of Ibn Arabi, and his first writings were commentaries onmysticalandphilosophicaltexts.Inthe1930shestudiedphilosophyanderfanwithMirzaMohammadAliShahabadi, who as well as being an authority onmysticism believed in the importance of explainingreligiousideastoordinarypeopleinlanguagetheycouldunderstand.ShahabadiopposedtheruleofRezaShahandalsoinfluencedKhomeini’spolitics.35

Khomeinihada strong senseofhimself aswell as thedignityof theulemaas a class, andalwaysdressedneatlyandcleanly—notaffectinganindifferencetoclothesorappearanceassomeyoungmullahsdid.Hestruckmanypeopleasaloofandreserved,andsomeasarrogant,buthissmallcircleofstudentsandfriendsknewhimtobegenerousandlivelyinprivate.Forhispublicpersonaasateacherandmullahitwasnecessary forhim to exemplify authority andquietdignity.Through the1940sand1950s, ashecontinuedtoteachinQom,itisperhapscorrecttothinkofKhomeiniastakingapositionbetweentheanti-colonial and anti-British activism of Ayatollah Kashani on the one hand, and the more conservative,withdrawn,quietist, lesspolitically interventioniststanceofAyatollahHoseinBorujerdion theother.36ButKhomeini’scombinationofintellectualstrength,curiosity,andunconventionalitymadehimdifferentfromeither.Potentiallymorecreativeandinnovative,hestillforthetimebeingdeferredtohissuperiorsin the hierarchy of the ulema.Khomeiniwasmade an ayatollah after the death ofBorujerdi inMarch1961,bywhichtimehewasalreadyattractinglargeandincreasingnumbersofstudentstohislecturesonethics.Hewasregardedbysomeofthemastheirmarja,theirobjectofemulation.

The events of 1963–1964madeKhomeini the leading political figure opposed to the shah—alongwithMossadeq,whowasstillunderhousearrestand thuseffectivelyneutralized.Khomeini, thoughhedisapprovedofconstitutionalisminprivate,hadbeencarefultospeakpositivelyabouttheconstitutioninpublic.37HisattackonthenewlawgoverningthestatusoftheU.S.militarywascalculatedtowinovernationalists, some of whommight previously have been suspicious of a cleric. Intellectuals likeAl-eAhmad gave him their enthusiastic support. He was already applying the political method by which,through addressing popular grievances and avoiding pronouncements on issues that might divide hisfollowers,hewouldlatermakehimselfanationalleader.

Butfrom1964KhomeiniwasoutofIranand,toallappearances,outofIranianpolitics.Inasense,Iranianpoliticswas itself exiled, takingplaceamong Iranian studentsandothers livingabroad.WithinIran thepresswascontrolledandcensored, theelectionscontinued tobe rigged, andSAVAKpursued,arrested,andimprisonedTudehactivistsandotherdissidents.

OILBOOMANDEXPANSIONThelandreformprogramwentaheadfrom1963,butwithmixedresults.Thelandlordswhoweretobeexpropriatedwere allowed to keeponly one village each, but some landlordswere able to evade theprovisions—bygiving theirproperty torelatives, forexample,orbycreatingmechanizedfarms,which

wereexempt.About twomillionpeasantsbecame landowners in theirown right for the first time,andsomewereabletosetthemselvesuponaprofitablefooting.Butformanymoretheholdingstheyweregiven were too small to make a living, and there were large numbers of agricultural laborers who,because they had not had cultivation rights as sharecroppers before the reform, were left out of theredistributionaltogether.Becausethereformwasaccompaniedbyageneralpushforthemechanizationofagriculture, there was suddenly less work for these laborers anyway. The net result was ruralunemploymentandanacceleratingmovementofpeoplefromthevillagestothecities,especiallyTehran,insearchofjobs.Ithasbeensuggestedthattherateofinternalmigrationreachedeightpercentperyearin1972–1973,38andby1976Tehranhadswelledtobecomeacityof4.5millionpeople.

InTehranthesepeoplewenttopoorerpartsonthesouthernedgeofthecity,towhatwerelittlebetterthanshantytowns.Theytendedtosettledowningroupsfromthesamevillageorarea.Oftentheywouldknow amullah also from the same area, and hewould be accorded added authority in the prevailingcircumstancesofdislocationanduncertainty.39

Between1963andthelatterpartofthe1970s,IranenjoyedahugeeconomicboomthatsawpercapitaGNP rise from $200 to $2,000.40 Industrial output increased dramatically in new industries like coal,textiles,andthemanufactureofmotorvehicles,andlargenumbersofnewjobswerecreatedtoabsorbtheincrease inpopulationand the largenumbers leavingagriculture. Industrialwageswere low,however.Government spending expanded education and health services too—the number of children in primaryschoolswentfrom1.6millionin1963tomorethan4millionin1977;newuniversitiesandcollegesweresetupandenrollmentrosefrom24,885to154,215.Studentsatforeignuniversitiesgrewinnumberfromfewer than 18,000 to more than 80,000. The number of hospital beds went from 24,126 to 48,000.Improved living conditions, sanitation, and health services all contributed to a big drop in the infantmortalityrateandaspurtinpopulationgrowththatcontinueduntil the1990s.Inthemid-1970shalfthepopulationwere under sixteen, and two-thirdswere under thirty. Thiswas to be the generation of therevolution.41

InvestmentrosedizzyinglyasIranbenefitedfromawindfallbonanzaofoilincome—especiallyaftertheshahrenegotiatedtermswiththeoilconsortiumtogivehimselfmorecontroloverproductionlevelsandprices.Thenin1973theoilpricedoubledaftertheYomKippurwar,anddoubledagainattheendoftheyearwhentheshahledtheotherOPECcountriestodemandhigherpricesontheclaimthatoilhadnotkeptpacewith thepriceofother internationally tradedcommodities.Yetmoremoneypumped into thesystem, though a large amountwent back to theWest—especially to theUnited States and theUnitedKingdom—inreturnforquantitiesofnewmilitaryequipment.TheshahboughtmoreChieftaintanksfromtheUKthantheBritisharmyowned,andtheverylatestF-14fightersfromtheUnitedStates.

But the economywas overheating, there was toomuchmoney chasing too few goods, there werebottlenecks and shortages, and inflation rose sharply—especially on items like housing rent andfoodstuffs,andespeciallyinTehran.Initially,theshahblamedsmalltradersforthepricerises,andsentgangs(backedbySAVAK)intothebazaarstoarrestso-calledprofiteersandhoarders.Shopswerecloseddown,twohundredfiftythousandfineswereissued,andeightthousandshopkeepersweregivenprisonsentences—none ofwhich altered the underlying economic realities by one iota.The arrests and finesjoined a list of grievances felt by the bazaari artisans andmerchants, who were already seeing theirproductsandbusinessesedgedasidebyimports,newfactories,suburbanstores,andsupermarkets.

Therewasasense, includingingovernment, that thedevelopingeconomyhadrunoutofcontrol.Inmid-1977anewprimeministerintroducedanew,deflationaryeconomicpolicydesignedtorestoresomestability.But the resultwas a sudden jump inunemployment, as thegrowingnumberof arrivals in thecities either lost or failed to find jobs. Inflation and the sudden faltering of the economy were felt

particularlybythepoor,buttosomeextentbyeveryone.Rentswerehighforthemiddle-classengineers,managers, and professionals in Tehran, and those with a stake in new businesses felt the impact ofdeflationacutely.

Tehraninthe1970swasastrangeplace.Largenumbersofverywealthypeople—manywealthytoadegreemostEuropeanscouldonlydreamof—livedhardbypeoplepoorerthancouldbeseenanywherein western Europe. The city was already largely a city of concrete, with only a core of a few olderpalacesandgovernmentbuildings.Butdespitethetrafficandtheugliness,theolderIranwasstillthereinthechadorsonthestreetsandthecalltoprayeratdusk.TheWest,andespeciallytheUnitedStates,wereconstantpresences, fromtheCoca-ColaandPepsionsaleeverywhere toAmericancarsandAmericanadvertising,butconstantalso(alongsidecontinuingadmirationforAmericaandanassociateddesireforeconomicdevelopment)wereatensionandadistasteforthatAmericanpresence.

TherewereAmericanseverywhereinTehraninthe1970s.AuthorandprofessorJamesA.Billhasestimatedthatbetween800,000and850,000AmericanslivedinorvisitedIranbetween1944and1979,andthatthenumberresidentthereincreasedfromfewerthan8,000in1970tonearly50,000in1979.Tenthousand were employed in defense industries around Isfahan alone. There were of course someAmericans living in Iranwhomadeaneffort tounderstand thecountry,butmanydidnot.For themostpart,theAmericanslivedentirelyseparatelives,oftenlivingonAmerican-onlycompoundsandshoppingintheU.S.commissary(thebiggestofitskindintheworld).ManyBritishexpatriateslivedinasimilarway.TheAmericanschoolinTehranadmittedonlychildrenwithU.S.passports(unusualbycomparisonwith American schools in other countries), and occasional suggestions that the children be taughtsomething about Iran generally failed—a school boardmember said in 1970 that the policy had been“KeepIranOut.”Inthemid-1960sanAmericanhospitalinTehrantookonsomewell-educatedIraniannursestosupplementitsstaff.TheIranianswerenotallowedtospeakinPersian,evenamongthemselves,andwereexcludedfromthestaffcanteen,whichwaskeptforU.S.citizensonly.TheIraniannurseshadtoeatinthejanitor’sroom.ThehospitalcaredonlyforAmericanpatients,andonedaywhenadesperateIranianfathertriedtobringinhischild,whohadjustbeenseriouslyinjuredbyacarinthestreetoutside,hewas sent away to find transport to anotherhospital.OtherAmericans,notably thosewith thePeaceCorps,workedalongsideordinaryIraniansandweremuchappreciated.ButthemajoritywereinIranforthemoneyandthelavishlifestyle,whichtheycouldnothaveaffordedathome:

Asthegoldrushbeganandthecontractsincreased,theAmericanpresenceexpanded.TheverybestandtheveryworstofAmericawere on display in the cities of Iran.As time passed and the numbers grew, an increasingly high proportion offortunehunters,financialscavengers,andthejoblessanddisillusionedrecentlyreturnedfromSoutheastAsiafoundtheirwaytoIran.Companieswithbillion-dollarcontractsneededmanpowerand,undertimepressure,recruitedblindlyandcarelessly.InIsfahan,hatred,racismandignorancecombinedasAmericanemployeesrespondednegativelyandaggressivelytoIraniansociety.42

Iranians returned the compliment. Incidents betweenU.S. residents and Iranians led to newspaperarticlesaboutdrunkenandlewdAmericans,encouraginganti-Americanattitudes.

TherewasalsoanotherkindoftensionwithinIraniansociety.TheyoungmenofsouthTehran,newlyarrived from traditional communities in the countryside and either having no jobs or only poorly paidones,saw(iftheytookabusortaxiuptown)prettyyoungmiddle-classwomensashayingupanddownthestreets flush with money, unaccompanied or with girlfriends, dressed in revealing Western fashions,flaunting their freedom,money, beauty, and from a certain point of view immorality.43 On billboards,garishdepictionsofhalf-dressedwomenadvertisedthelatestfilms.Status,andthelackofit,isnotjustaboutmoney; it isalsoaboutsexanddesire.Tehranwasaplaceofaspiration,but in the late1970s it

becameformanyaplaceofresentment,frustrateddesire,anddisappointedaspirations.InaninspiredpassageRoyMottahedehdescribedthistimeinTehranasthetimeofmontazh,when

importedthingswerebeingassembledandputtogetherinthecity,oftenratherlessthansatisfactorily,andnever quite complete—a timewhen everything inTehran seemed to be “intimately connectedwith theairport”:

...injoking,Tehraniscalledallsortsofjerry-builtIranianversionsofforeignideastrueexamplesofIranianmontazh.44

The most obvious examples of montazh were the ubiquitous Paykan cars assembled just outsideTehranfromimportedparts(tothedesignoftheBritishHillmanHunter),butthesameprinciplecouldbeseenorimaginedatworkelsewheretoo:incorruptpropertydeals,inbigbuildingsputupwithoutenoughcement,inthechaotictraffic,andinthenewplaquesandstatuesoftheshahthatappearedeverywhere.

As the 1970s advanced, the political culture of the shah’s regime became more repressive andhardenedontheonehand,andmoreremoteandattenuatedontheother.SAVAKhadanewtargetinthoseyears—radicalmovementspreparedtouseviolenceagainsttheregime.ThisnotablyincludedtheMarxistFedaiandtheMojahedin-eKhalqOrganization(MKO),bothofwhichfusedIslamandMarxism.SAVAKexpanded, and its use of torture became routine. In 1975Amnesty International pronounced the shah’sgovernmenttobeoneoftheworld’sworstviolatorsofhumanrights.TheprevioustwotamepartiesintheMajlesbecameone,calledRastakhiz(Resurgence),witharolesimplytosupportandapplaudtheshah’sefforts.Politicsbecameamatterofwhocouldbemostsycophantictotheshahinpublic:

TheShah’sonlyfaultisthatheisreallytoogoodforhispeople—hisideasaretoogreatforustorealizethem.45

The shah himself rarely met ordinary Iranians. He went from place to place by helicopter and,following various assassination attempts, viewed parades and other events from inside a specialbulletproof glass box. In 1971 he held an event at the historic sites of Persepolis and Pasargadae tocelebrate,supposedly,thetwenty-five-hundredthanniversaryoftheIranianmonarchy.Thiswasfoliedegrandeur on a sublime scale. Heads of state from around the world were invited, but those frommonarchies were given precedence. So Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was specially honored, whilePresidentPompidouofFrancewassetlowintheprecedenceorder.Pompidoutookumbrageandsenthisprimeministerinstead.46ThousandsdressedupasancientMedesandPersians,televisioncoverageoftheeventwasbeamedaroundtheworldbysatellite,andthedistinguishedguestsdrankchampagneandotherimportedluxuries(thecateringwaslaidonbyMaxim’sofParisinthreehugeair-conditionedtentsandfifty-ninesmallerones,andtwenty-fivethousandbottlesofwinewereimportedfortheevent—rumorsofthe overall cost ranged as high as $200million47). The shahmade a speech claiming continuity withCyrus,andarebirthofancientIraniangreatness.

ButtheAchaemenidsmeantlittletomostIranians—theyhadprobablyneverbeentoPersepolis,andwhat theyknewofancient Iranrevolvedaround thestoriesofFerdowsi’sShahnameh rather thanwhatmightormightnotappearinHerodotus,orhadbeendiscoveredatarchaeologicalsites.Therehadlongbeen an anticlerical, secularizing strand of nationalist thinking that appealed to the pre-Islamic,monarchicaltraditionofIran,butitwasaslenderreedtocarrythisburdenofregimeself-projection.FormosttheIranianheritagewasanIslamicheritage,andthejollificationsatPersepolisleftthemnonplussed.KhomeinidenouncedtheeventfromIraq,thunderingthatIslamwasfundamentallyopposedtomonarchyinprinciple, that thecrimesof Iraniankingshadblackened thepagesofhistory,and thateven theones

rememberedasgoodhadinfactbeen“vileandcruel.”48TheshahalsoreplacedtheIslamiccalendarwithacalendarthattookyearoneastheyearoftheaccessionofCyrus,whichagainleftmostIraniansirritatedandbaffled.

ForsomemembersoftheminoritiesinIran,thereignofMohammadRezaShahwasagoodtimeofrelativefreedomandabsenceofpersecution,inwhichsomeJewsandBaha’isinparticularwereable—especially through their cultural emphasisoneducation—toachieveadegreeofprosperity.ButpoorerJewsinsometownscontinuedtosufferassecond-classcitizens,49andthroughthisperiodmanyIranianJews emigrated to theUnitedStates and Israel.The shahhadpassed a newFamilyProtectionLaw in1967,whichmadedivorcelawfairerandmoreequal,andinparticularmadechildcustodydependentonthemeritsofthecaseincourtratherthansimplygivingcustodytothefather.

Theshah’srulewasamixtureoffailuresandsuccesses—neitherallonenoralltheother.Someofthevaunted economic and developmental achievements were impressive, while others were shallow andsuperficial.Butintheendtheimportantfailureswereprimarilypolitical—theshahhadnoprogramforrestoringrepresentativegovernment,andhisonlysolutionfordissentwasrepression.Ifhehadsucceededinmakingthemonarchytrulypopular,perhapshecouldhavesustaineditforatime.InsteadthemonarchybecamemoreremoteanddisconnectedfromtheattitudesandconcernsofordinaryIranians. Inasense,paradoxicallyperhapspartlyasaresultofcombatingundergroundMarxistsforsolong,theshahmadethemistakeofaMarxistanalysis:hethoughtthatifhecouldjustsecurematerialprosperitythroughsuccessfuldevelopment, theneverythingelsewouldfallhappilyintoplace.Butfeweconomiesdelivercontinuoussustainedgrowthindefinitely.

In1977theshah,ifnotactuallyunderpressurefromthenewCarteradministrationintheUnitedStatesthen certainly aware that the Carter people were less sympathetic to repressive allies than theirpredecessorshadbeen,beganslowly to relaxsomeof the instrumentsof repression. InFebruarysomepolitical prisonerswere released.Later on, court ruleswere changed to allow prisoners proper legalrepresentation and access to civilian rather than military courts. The shah met representatives fromAmnestyInternationalandagreedtoimproveprisonconditions.InMayagroupoflawyerssentalettertothe shah protesting at government interference in court cases. In June three National Front activists,including Karim Sanjabi, Shahpur Bakhtiar, and Dariush Foruhar, sent a bolder letter to the shahcriticizingautocraticruleanddemandingarestorationofconstitutionalgovernment.LaterthatmonththeWriters’Association,repressedsince1964,resurrecteditselfandpressedforthesamegoals—aswellasfortheremovalofcensorship(manyoftheleadingmemberswereTudehsympathizersorbroadlyleftist).In July the shah replaced Amir Abbas Hoveyda, his prime minister for twelve years, with JasmshidAmuzegar,whowasperceivedtobemoreliberal.Intheautumnmorepoliticalassociationsformedorre-formed—including theNational Front, under the leadership of Sanjabi,Bakhtiar, and Foruhar; and theFreedomMovement,closelyalliedwiththeNationalFront,underMehdiBazarganandEbrahimYazdi.50

On November 19 the Writers’ Association held a poetry evening—the tenth in a series of suchevenings—attheGoetheInstitut.Abouttenthousandstudentswerepresent,andthistimethepolicetriedtobreakitup.Whenthestudentspouredintothestreetstoprotest,thepoliceattackedthem,killingone,injuringseventy,andarrestingaboutahundred.Butonthisoccasionciviliancourtstriedthestudentsandquicklyacquittedthem.

While in exile,Khomeinikeptupa streamofmessagesand speechescriticalof the regime,whichwere smuggled into Iran and distributed, often using cassette tapes. Having developed his theory ofoppositionintoafullblowntheoryforIslamicgovernment,hesetthisoutinabook,basedonlectureshegaveinNajafin1970,withthetitleHokumat-eEslami:Velayat-eFaqih(IslamicGovernment:Regencyof theJurist).51 In this text theUsuli thinkingof theprevious two centuries—a lineof thought that had

helpedtheulemadevelopahierarchyandhadallowedthemineffecttostandinfortheHiddenEmam—wasdevelopedtoitslogicalextreme:permissionfortheulematoruledirectly.Thiswasthemeaningofthetermvelayat-efaqih,whichneedsexplaining.Avaliwasaregentordeputy,someonerepresentingthepersonwithrealauthority—itwasthetitletakenbyKarimKhanZandintheeighteenthcentury,whenheforbore to make himself shah. Velayat meant regency, guardianship, or deputyship—or rather, byextension,theauthorityofthedeputyorregent.Thetermfaqihsignifiesajurist,anexpertinIslamiclaw—fiqh.Thelogicoftheconceptwasthattheshari‘a,derivedfromthewordofGodandtheexampleoftheProphet,wastheretoregulatehumanconduct,andwastheonlylegitimatelaw.IntheabsenceoftheHiddenEmam,themojtahedsweretherightpeopletointerpretandapplytheshari’a.Soobviously,theyweretherightpeopletorule,too.Whoelse?Fromthispointonward,KhomeinidemandedtheremovaloftheshahandtheestablishmentofIslamicgovernment.Hedeliveredclearandconsistentdemandsthatthewholecountrycouldunderstand(atleasttheythoughttheycould—whatexactlyIslamicgovernmentmightmeaninpracticeremainedlessclear),andthatincreasinglymadehimthefocalpointforoppositiontotheshah.

Theprincipleofvelayat-efaqihwasnotacceptedbytheulemaasawhole—indeednotacceptedbyverymany.But since the FirstWorldWar the ulema had been jostled and edged out ofmany of theirtraditional roles of authority in society by the secularizing Pahlavimonarchy.UnderMohammadRezaShahtheregimeevenattempted,inthelate1960sand1970s(aspartoftheWhiteRevolutionprogram),toreplace the traditionalulemawithanewreligious structureofmosquesandmullahsanswerable to thestate. There was little popular enthusiasm for the state religion (din-e dawlat), but it succeeded inalienating the ulema as a whole even further from the shah. AyatollahsMontazeri and Taleqani werearrested and sentenced to internal exile after disturbances at TehranUniversity and inQom in 1970–1972.52ButwhereTudeh, theNational Front, and the violent radicalswere battered and disrupted byyears of conflict with SAVAK, the informal nationwide network of mullahs and religious leaders—reachingintoeverysocialclass,everybazaarguild,andeveryvillage—wasstillthereinthelate1970s,asithadbeenin1906.Itscontinuingpresencereflectedtheenduringpowerofthisalternativesourceofauthority in Shi‘a Iranian society. In the theory of velayat-e faqih and Khomeini, the ulema had thedefiningpoliticalprincipleandtheleaderthattheyhadlackedin1906.

Bytheendof1977theshahhadalienatedtheulema,alienatedthebazaaris,andhadcreatedalarge,poor,deracinatedworkingclassinTehran.Hehadalsoalienatedmanyoftheeducatedmiddleclasses—hisnaturalsupporters—throughhisrepressionandabusesofhumanrights.SomeofthesehadinadditionbeenradicalizedbytheirexperienceofleftistpoliticsinEuropeinthelate1960sand1970s.Buttherewasanotherimportantinfluenceonthethinkingofthisgeneration—AliShariati.

Shariatiwasbornin1933,nearSabzavarinKhorasan.Hegrewuptobealively,highlyintelligent,extrovertedyouthwith a strong senseofhumor, someonewhoenjoyed ridiculinghis teachers.Hewasinfluencedbyhis father,whohadbeen an advocateof progressive Islam inhis own right, but alsobywriterslikeHedayatandWesternthinkerslikeSchopenhauerandKafka.LaterShariatiwenttoMashhadUniversity, and then to Paris, where he studied under Marxist professors, read Guevara and Sartre,communicated with the Martinique-born theorist and revolutionary activist Frantz Fanon, and took adoctorateinsociology(in1964).HispoliticalactivismalsoattractedtheattentionofSAVAK.ReturningtoIranin1965,hetaughtstudentsinMashhadandlaterinTehran,attractinglargenumberstohislectures,andwroteaseriesofimportantbooksandspeeches.ThegeneralmessagewasthatShi‘ismprovideditsownideologyofsocialjusticeandresistancetooppression.ThishadbeenmaskedbyafalseShi‘ismofsuperstitionanddeference tomonarchy(BlackShi‘ism,SafavidShi‘ism),but theessential truthsof thereligionwere timeless, centering on themartyrdomofHosein and his companions. Shariatiwas not a

Marxist, but he could be said to have recast Shi‘a Islam in a revolutionarymold, comparable to theMarxistmodel:“EverywhereisKarbalaandeverydayisAshura.”53Fortheshah’sregime,hewastoohottohandle.Hewasimprisonedin1972,releasedin1975,keptunderhousearrest,andallowedtogotoEnglandin1977.Hedied there thatJune,apparentlyofaheartattack, thoughmanyIraniansbelievehewasmurderedbySAVAK.Khomeiniwouldnever endorseShariati’s thinkingdirectly, butwas carefulnevertocondemniteither.Shariati’sradicalIslamism,bothfullyIranianandfullymodern,wasastronginfluenceonthegenerationofstudentsthatgrewtoadulthoodinthe1970s.54

Throughtheinflationandtheeconomicslumpanddeflationthatfollowed,manyIranians—includingwell-offones—hadcometodoubt theirassumptionsaboutsteadygrowthandeconomicsecurity.Therehadalsobeenanumberofincidentsinwhichtheshahhadmadehimselflookfoolishoroutoftouch—thelatest came on his visit to Washington at the end of 1977, when TV cameras caught him clinkingchampagneglasseswithPresidentCarterandweepingfromteargasontheWhiteHouselawnwhenthewindblewthewrongwayfromanearbydemonstrationagainsthisvisit.Anautocratcangetawaywithmanythings,butlookingfoolishundercutshiminthemostdamagingway.

REVOLUTIONInJanuary1978anarticleappearedinthepaperEttela‘at,attackingtheclergyandKhomeinias“blackreactionaries.”Thearticlehadbeenwrittenbysomeonetrustedbytheregimeandapprovedbythecourt,but had been refused by the more independently edited paperKayhan. It twisted facts and inventedfictions,suggestingthatKhomeiniwasaforeigner(fromhisgrandfather’sbirthinIndiaandname,Hindi),a former British spy, and a poet (the last was true, and was intended to detract from his clericalseriousness because most ulema, with some backing from the Qor’an, disapproved of poetry).55 Thearticle immediatelypromptedaprotestdemonstration inQom, inwhich thousandsof religiousstudentsheaped abuse on the “Yazid government” and demanded an apology, a constitution, and the return ofKhomeini.Therewereclasheswiththepoliceandanumberofstudentswereshotdead.ThefollowingdayKhomeini,bynowinParis,praisedthecourageofthestudentsandcalledformoredemonstrations.AyatollahShari‘atmadari,oneofthemostseniormarjasatthetime,condemnedtheshootings.

Afteratraditionalmourningperiodoffortydays,thebazaarsanduniversitiesclosed,andtherewerepeacefuldemonstrationsintwelvecities,includinginTabriz,whereagainthepolicefiredonthecrowd,causingmore deaths. The forty-day rhythm continued, like a great revolutionary lung, with the almostunanimous supportof theulema (thoughmanyof the clerics called formourners to attend themosquesratherthantodemonstrate).Thedemonstrationsgrewlargerandmoreviolent,withsloganslike“deathtotheshah.”AftertheendofMaytherewasalull(amongotherreasons,AyatollahShari‘atmadarihadurgedpeople against further street demonstrations to avoidmore deaths), but therewas a violent incident inMashhadinJulywherepolicefiredonacrowd.OnAugust19theRexCinemaburneddowninAbadan,anincidentthatisstillcontroversial.About370peoplediedinthefire.Governmentandoppositionbothaccused each other, but events, trials, and investigations in later years indicate that a radical Islamicgroupwith connections to ulema figureswas responsible.56At the time, themoodwas such thatmostblamedSAVAK.

Bythattimethedemonstrations,whichuptothenhadlargelybeenanaffairformiddle-classstudentsandmembersofthetraditionalbazaarimiddleclass,werebeingaugmentedbystrikesandotheractionsby factoryworkers—promptedby thegovernment’sdeflationarypolicies.57 InAugust thereweremanylarge demonstrations in the month of Ramadan, andmore in early September. The shah’s government

banned the demonstrations and imposedmartial law, but on September 8 there were huge protests inTehran and other cities. Barricades were set up in the working-class areas of south Tehran. Thegovernmentsentintanksandhelicoptergunships;thepeopleonthebarricadesrespondedwithMolotovcocktails. In Jaleh Square an unarmed crowd refused to disperse and were gunned downwhere theystood.

September8wasthereaftercalledBlackFriday,andthedeathsincreasedthebitternessofthepeopletowardtheshahtosuchapitchthatcompromisebecameimpossible.Allthatwasleftwastheimplacabledemand that the shah should go—the demand upon which Khomeini had insisted since 1970. By theautumnmostotheroppositiongroupshadalliedthemselvestoKhomeiniandhisprogram.KarimSanjabiandMehdiBazarganflewtoParis,metwithKhomeini,anddeclaredtheirsupportforhiminthenameoftheNationalFront and theFreedomMovement.Demonstrations and riots continued.The shah,bynowincreasinglyillwithcancer,thoughthisremainedunknowntothepublic,veeredbetweenmorerepressionandconcessions,includingthereleaseofpoliticalprisonersandthedissolutionoftheRastakhizparty.Heappearedontelevisiontosaythatheunderstoodthemessageofthepeople,wouldholdfreeelections,andwouldatoneforpastmistakes.58

Butitwasalltoolate.Asautumnwentintowinter,moreandmoreworkersspentmoreandmoretimeon strike. The violence intensified again at the beginning ofMoharram in December. In Qazvin, 135demonstratorsdiedwhentanksdroveoverthem.OnthedayofAshuraitself,December11,morethanonemillion people demonstrated in the streets of Tehran.AfterAshura, street gangs roamed the capital atwill.Thereweremore andmore signs that the army,which had experiencedmass desertions,was nolongerreliable.Bythistime,PresidentCarter’ssupportfortheshahwasclearlyonthewane,andmanyAmericanswere leavingIranafterattacksonU.S.-ownedofficesandeven theU.S.Embassy.Theshahhadlostcontrol.OnJanuary16,1979,heleftthecountry.OnFebruary1,KhomeiniflewbacktoTehran.

8

IRANSINCETHEREVOLUTIONIslamicRevival,War,andConfrontation

WhentheexistenceoftheChurchisthreatened,sheisreleasedfromthecommandmentsofmorality.Withunityastheend,theuseofeverymeansissanctified,evencunning,treachery,violence,simony,prison,death.Forallorderisforthesakeofthecommunity,andtheindividualmustbesacrificedtothecommongood.

—DietrichofNieheim,BishopofVerden,1411(quotedbyArthurKoestlerinDarknessatNoon)

IntheAirFrancepassengerjetthatAyatollahKhomeinitookfromParistoTehran—beforeitwasevenclearthattheaircraftwouldbeallowedtoland—aWesternjournalistaskedhimwhathisfeelingswereaboutreturningtoIran.HerepliedHichi—“nothing.”1ThisgrumpyresponsetounimaginativejournalismdidnotdemonstrateadeepindifferencetoIranorthewell-beingoftheIranianpeople,ashassometimesbeenclaimed.Khomeini’sreplyhasagnomicqualitythatchallengesinterpretation.

Whether one approves of Khomeini or not, it is indisputable that when he arrived in Tehran onFebruary1,1979,hewasthefocalpointofthehopesofawholenation.Insomesensetheyreflectedhimandhe them—at thatmoment,at least. Itmaybe that theeuphoriccrowdswelcominghimnumberedasmanyas threemillion.ThiswasinaccordancewithKhomeini’ssenseofhimself—his ideaofspiritualdevelopmentwas that of IbnArabi’s PerfectMan.2 Through contemplation, religious observance, anddiscipline,hisaimwastoapproachthepointatwhichhisinnerworldreflectedtheworldbeyondhimself—and,inturn,reflectedandbecameachannelforthemindofGod.Ashelefttheaircraft,hiscarmadeitsdifficultwaythroughthecrowdsfromtheairporttotheBehesht-eZahracemeteryforKhomeinitohonorthemartyrskilledinthedemonstrationsofthelastfewmonths.Ashepassed,thepeoplechantednotjust“AllahuAkbar”(GodisGreat)butalso“Khomeini,OEmam.”InShi‘amysticism(erfan),theEmamandthePerfectManwereoneandthesame.NohumanbeingsincethedisappearanceoftheTwelfthEmamhadbeenacclaimedwiththetitleEmam(manyseniorulemaneveracceptedthetitleforKhomeini).3ThefollowersandthecrowdswerenotsayingdirectlythatKhomeiniwastheHiddenEmamreturnedtoearth,butitwasveryclosetoit.Centuriesbefore,theArabpoetFarazdaqsawthefourthEmamatMecca,andafterwardwrote:

Helowershisgazeoutofmodesty.Otherslowertheirgazeforaweofhim.Heisnotspokentoexceptwhenhesmiles.4

This iswhyKhomeinianswered thepushy journaliston theaircraftashedid.Themojtahedon thepathtobecomingthePerfectManhadnoplaceforfeelingsorthemanifestationoffeelings.Hewasatonewiththecrowds,andtheywithhim,andbothwithGod.Orsotheybelieved.

The revolution of 1979 was not solely—and perhaps not even primarily—a religious revolution.Economicslumpandmiddle-classdisillusionmentwiththecorruptionandoppressionofaregimemanyhad previously supported were important factors, as was a nationalistic dislike of the unequalrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.ButtherevolutiondrewgreatstrengthfromitsShi‘aform,whichlentcohesion and a sense of common purpose to disparate elements—even those that were not overtlyreligious—andfromtheclarityandcharismaofKhomeini,whichalbeit temporarilygaveanotherwisedisunitedcollectionofgroupsandmotivationsacenterandaunity.Unlikeotherrevolutionsinhistory—notably theBolshevik revolutionof1917—the Iranian revolutionwasgenuinely apeople’s revolution.Theactionsofalargemassofpeoplewerecrucialtotheoutcome,andtheimmediateoutcome,ifnotthelonger-termresult,wasagenuineexpressionofthepeople’swill.

InhislastweekstheshahhadappointedtheNationalFrontleaderShapurBakhtiarasprimeminister,andBakhtiarhadannouncedaprogramofmeasuresinanattempttorestoreconstitutionalgovernmentandsomestability, including free elections (Bakhtiarhadbeen imprisonedby the shah for severalyears atdifferenttimessince1953).ButtheNationalFronthaddisownedBakhtiar,andKhomeinihadpronouncedhisgovernmentillegal.Maintainingthisline,uponhisarrivalKhomeinionFebruary5appointedhisownprimeminister from the FreedomMovement,Mehdi Bazargan. Revolutionary Committees (Komitehs)weresetupandbegancooperatingwithdeserters fromthemilitary,Tudeh, theFedai,and theMKOtotake arms and attack buildings associatedwith the regime, including police stations and the SAVAK’snotoriousEvin prison.After a last stand by somemembers of the Imperial guard, on February 11 themilitarygaveinandannouncedthattheywouldremainneutral.5Bakhtiarresignedandwentintohiding;

heleftthecountrytwomonthslater.Fromthatpointon,therevolutionarieswereincontrol.TheKomitehsroundedupsenior figuresof thePahlavi regime,anda revolutionary tribunaloperatingoutofaschoolclassroomhad themexecuted, including,onFebruary15, the formerheadofSAVAK,GeneralNassiri.KhomeinihimselfheadedaRevolutionaryCouncilthatmaintainedcontactwiththeKomitehsthroughtheconnectionsbetweenmullahs.Inthatwayhebeganinexorablytoremoveallrivalstohisvisionforthefutureofthecountry.

Komitehswere set up all over Iran, but not all of themwere so susceptible toKhomeini’s centralcontrol.Inthenorthwestinparticular,withitsownregionalandleftisttradition,revolutionaryenthusiasmturned toward a drive for greater regional autonomy. Kurdistan plunged into outright rebellion andseparatism. In the1970s theshahhadsupported theKurds in Iraq inarmedresistanceagainst theIraqigovernment, but his support was intended only as leverage to pressure the Iraqis into concessionselsewhere.HedroppedtheKurdsassoonas itwasconvenientforhim,andtheKurds inIraqsufferedterribly as their revolt was crushed. The episode again stimulated Kurdish nationalism, which hadmotivated previous separatist movements within Iran in the 1920s—under the charismatic leaderSimko/Simitqu—andagaininthe1940s.OfthemanyethnicandreligiousminoritiesofIran,theKurdsarethegroupwiththemostdevelopedsenseofaseparatenationalidentity,withstronglinkstotheKurdsofIraq, Turkey, and Syria. The Kurdish insurrection in Iran that followed the revolution was eventuallycrushed,butnotwithoutmorebittersuffering—prefiguringtheevenworsetreatmentthatwasvisitedontheKurdsofIraqlaterinthe1980s.

Even before he returned to Iran, Khomeini had beenmaking speeches critical of the shah’s leftistopponents.AttheendofMarch1979hesetthesealontheremovaloftheshahandtheestablishmentofastate based on Islamic principleswith a referendum that returned ninety-seven percent support for theestablishment of an Islamic republic. In May Khomeini established the Revolutionary Guard Corps(Sepah-ePasdaran)asareliablemilitaryforcetobalancethearmyandtosupplementthegangsofstreetfightersthatbecameknownasHezbollah—thepartyofGod.Theextensivepropertyoftheshah’sPahlaviFoundation was transferred to a new Bonyad-e Mostazefin (Foundation for the Oppressed), whichbecameavehiclebothfortheprojectionoftheregime’ssocialpoliciesandforpoliticalpatronage.

Theexecutionsofoldregimemembersshockedmoderatesandliberals(includingBazargan),aswellasmanyofthosearoundtheworldwhohadinitiallywelcomedthefalloftheshah.Thekillingsstoppedforatimeinmid-March,butcontinuedagaininApril,whenHoveydawasshot.Khomeinihadinitiallycalledformoderation,butacquiescedtothepressurefromyoungradicalsurgingrevengeforthedeathsofthe previous year. The young Islamic radicals were his weapon against the rival groups that hadparticipatedintherevolution.6InAprilandMayKhomeiniwasgivenasharpreminderoftheseriousnessof thestruggleandtheconsequencesoffailure,whenseveralofhisclosesupporters, includingnotablyMortezaMotahhari,wereassassinated.

TheShi‘aulemahadprobablyneverbeenaspowerful as itwas at themomentKhomeini returnedfromexile.ButKhomeiniwassomethingofaparvenuamongtheseniorulema,andtheIslamicregimehecreated reflected his highly individual personality at least as much as it did the nature of traditionalShi‘ism.Atthetimeoftherevolutiontherewereotherseniorfigureswhocommandedgreatrespect,butwhowerepushedasidebytheenormouspopularityofKhomeiniimmediatelyafterhisreturnfromexile.The most prominent of these was Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari‘atmadari, who argued for a moremoderatelinein1979andwasquicklysilenced.Someofhissupporterswereexecuted.Khomeinilaterrescinded Shari‘atmadari’s status asmarja-e taqlid—a wholly unprecedented step. The principle ofvelayat-e faqihwas still a dubious novelty formany seniorShi‘a figures, several ofwhom spoke outagainst it in 1980–1981. But they too were intimidated into silence. Khomeini and his supporters

successfullyconsolidatedtheircontrol,basedontheprincipleofvelayat-efaqih,butitnevercommandeduniversal support among the Iranian ulema.7 A reassertion of Islamic values followed—including areappearanceofulemaasjudges,andareapplicationofshari‘alaw.Althoughthishasbeenmoderatedinsome respects by laws passed centrally, some extreme practices like stoning for adultery (thoughinfrequent)havecontinuedandhaveattractedinternationalcriticism.

Bytheautumnof1979theliberalsandmoderateswerelookingincreasinglymarginalized.Overthesummer,KhomeinihadformedtheIslamicRepublicParty(IRP),andthefirstdraftoftheconstitution,puttogether by Bazargan—similar to the constitution of 1906, minus the monarch—had been radicallyrewrittenbytheAssemblyofExperts,whichwasdominatedbyulemaloyaltoKhomeini.TheAssemblyofExpertshadcome togetherafteranelectionmarredby liberaland leftistboycottsandallegationsofrigging.InitsfinalformtheconstitutionsetupthesystemthatstillrunsIrantoday,andwhichstillreflectsKhomeini’sideaofvelayat-efaqih:thatday-todaygovernmentshouldbesecular,butwithultimatepowerin thehandsof a religious leader committed to Islamicgovernment.The constitution set up an electedpresidency, an elected Majles, and elected municipal councils, but it also established a Council ofGuardians(twelveclericsandjurists)tovetandapprovecandidatesbeforetheycouldrunforelection,andtoapproveorvetolegislationpassedbytheMajles.Aboveall,itconfirmedKhomeinihimself,andhissuccessors,inthesupremepositionintheconstitution.Hehadtherighttoappointhalfthemembersofthe Guardian Council, to approve the appointment of the president, and to appoint the head of theRevolutionary Guard Corps and the other heads of the armed forces. While Khomeini used theconstitution to consolidate his gains, he was prepared throughout to use violent, extra-legal means tosecurehisends,totakeandkeepthepoliticalinitiative,andleavehisopponentstodebateovertherightsandwrongsofwhathadhappened.Thislastwasaprincipleheclaimedtohavetakenfromtheclericalpoliticianofthe1920s,Modarres:“Youhitfirstandletotherscomplain.Don’tbethevictimanddon’tcomplain.”8

Press freedom was also curtailed over the summer, in a concerted campaign. Hezbollah attackednewspaperoffices,aswellastheofficesofpoliticalparties,fortynewspaperscloseddown,andtwoofthe biggest—Ettela‘at andKayhan—were taken over by the Bonyad-e Mostazefin. At the same timeSAVAK,aftertheremovalofitschiefsandofficersbyonemeansoranother,wasslowlybeingturnedintoan agency of the Islamic state (along with Evin prison). In 1984 it was renamed the Ministry ofIntelligenceandSecurity(MOIS).

InNovember1979,promptedbythenewsthattheshahhadbeenallowedintotheUnitedStatesfortreatmentofhiscancer(whichfinallykilledhiminJuly1980),studentsbrokeintotheU.S.Embassyandtook the diplomats there hostage. Initially people thought this was just another student demonstration(somethingsimilarhadhappenedinFebruary),butwhenKhomeinibackedthestudentsandacontinuationofthehostagecrisis,BazarganandhisfellowFreedomMovementpoliticiansresigned.Earlyin1980anewpresident,Abol-HasanBaniSadr,was electedunder thenewconstitutional arrangements.Hehadgeneralsupport,includingfrommiddle-classliberals.Forthenextyearandahalfhestrovetoresolvethehostage crisis, and to uphold principles of conventional legality and secular government. But likeBazarganbeforehim,heultimatelyfailedandin1981wasimpeachedbyKhomeini.

Khomeinimeanwhile exploited the hostage crisis to preserve a revolutionary fluidity and sense ofcrisis that enabled him towrong-foot his opponents.He ordered purges to remove civil servantswhowere suspected of secularist or antirevolutionary attitudes, closed the universities to eject leftists andimpose Islamic principles (they reopened, initially on a much reduced basis, in 1982), and used theKomitehs and Hezbollah to force women to wear the veil. The sense of continuing crisis was onlyenhanced by President Carter’s attempt to send helicopters to rescue the hostages inApril 1980. The

humiliation of the hostage crisis, the failed rescue, and the subsequent failure of Carter’s reelectioncampaign all combined to entrench in ordinary Americans a hostile attitude to Iran that still hampersattemptsatrapprochementbetweenthetwocountries.(ThehostageswereeventuallyreleasedjustafterCarterleftofficeinJanuary1981.)MostIranians,includingradicalswhosupportedtheactionatthetimeandsomewhoparticipatedinit,todayagreethattakingthehostageswasabadmistake.

IntheearlyyearsoftherevolutionKhomeiniandtheIRPhadtofightoffsomeformidableenemies,bothinternalandexternal.Butineachcase,truetohisguidingprinciples,ittendedtobeKhomeiniwhotooktheinitiative,hittinghisopponentswithpreemptivestrikes—atleasthisinternaladversaries.IthasbeenarguedthatterrorandrepressionwereforcedontheIranianrevolutionaries—whootherwisewouldhavebeenhumaneandtolerant—bytheturnofevents, thepressureofwar,andtheviciousnessof theirenemies.Butthisargumentdoesnotstanduptoscrutiny.Althoughhewasreactingtoeventsinasuppleway,fromthebeginningKhomeiniwasfullyawarethatifheallowedhisenemiestotaketheinitiative,hemightnotgetasecondchance.Heruthlesslyeliminatedhisopponents.

The two most serious challenges were from the MKO and Saddam Hossein. Having initiallysupported the revolution, theMKOwere attacked byKhomeini in November 1980 (he labelled themmonafeqin,thehypocrites—atermthatrecalledthosewhohadapostatizedafterdeclaringloyaltytotheProphetMohammad).HehadtheirleaderimprisonedfortenyearsonachargeofspyingfortheSovietUnion,9 andHezbollahisattacked thegroup’sheadquarters.TheMKOfoughtbackwithdemonstrationsandstreetviolence,and thenwithbombs,managing tokillmanyofKhomeini’ssupportersbefore theirleadershipwasdriven into exile.Twobombsat theheadquartersof the IRP in June1981killed someseventyofKhomeini’sclosestcompanionsandadvisers,includinghisright-handman,AyatollahBeheshti.Large numbers ofMKO supporterswere killed (asmany as several thousand, some of them executedpublicly)orimprisoned.10Fromexile,atfirstinParisandlaterinIraq,theMKOkeptupitsoppositionand its violent attacks.But in time it dwindled to take on the character of a paramilitary cult, largelysubordinatedtotheinterestsoftheBaathistregimeinIraq.

KhomeiniandhissupportershadalsobeenfightingmovesforautonomyinAzerbaijan,andthearmedrebellionby theKurdishDemocraticParty (KDP) in IranianKurdistan, a rebellionnot finally crusheduntil1984.ThelastmajorpoliticalgroupnotalignedtoKhomeiniandhisfollowerswereTudeh,withwhommostoftheFedaihadalliedthemselvesafterasplit.TheyhadsupportedKhomeinionthewooden-headed Marxist basis that the revolution of 1979 was a petty-bourgeois revolution that would be apreludetoasocialistone.In1983KhomeiniturnedonTudeh,accusingthemofspyingfortheSovietsandplotting to overthrow the Islamic regime. Seventy leading members were arrested; there were someexecutionsand televisedconfessions.Tudehand theFedaiwerebanned, leaving the IRPand thesmallFreedomPartyastheonlyonesstillpermittedtooperate.TheFreedomPartycontinuestothisdayinveryrestrictedcircumstancesunderitsleaderEbrahimYazdi.

WARInSeptember1980SaddamHossein’sforcesinvadedIran,beginninganeight-yearwarandintensifyingpressureon theIranianregime.Opiniondiffersover theoriginsof theIran/Iraqwar—whetherSaddamopportunisticallyattackedIranatamomentofperceivedIranianweakness,inthehopeofsnatchingsomequick gains in theShatt-alArab and elsewhere (attempting to put right a border dispute that had beenresolved unfavorably for Iraq in the previous decade) or whether Iranian religious/revolutionarypropagandain1979/1980,apparentlydirectedatstartingarevolutionamongIraqiShi‘asanddestroying

hisregime,lefthimlittlechoice.ButSaddamwastheaggressor,invadingandoccupyingIranianterritory.By theendof that immenselydestructivewar, Iranian talkofexporting religious revolution (oneof thefewconcreteresultsofwhichwastheIraniancontributiontotheestablishmentofHezbollahinLebanonin the early 1980s) had faded. Asmany as onemillion Iranians were killed or injured, and a wholegenerationwasstampedanewwiththesymbolismofShi‘amartyrdom.InadditiontotheregulararmyandthePasdaran,largenumbersofBasijvolunteerswererecruited,includingboysasyoungastwelve.TheregimeconstantlyharpedonAshura,Hosein,andKarbalatomaintainsupportforthewarandtomotivatethe troops. The huge casualties on the Iranian side resulted partly from the human wave tactics theyemployedagainst theIraqis,whowerenormallybetterequipped.The technological imbalancewas theresultofthepolicyofWesternnationswho,despitetheirdeclaredneutrality,sentavarietyofup-to-dateweapons to the Iraqiswhile keeping the Iranians starved of spare parts for theweapons the shah hadbought in thepreviousdecade.Thearsenal supplied to Iraq includedchemicalweapon technology thatwasusedagainstIraniansoldiersaswellasKurdishciviliansinthenorthofIraq,whomSaddamtreatedasrebels.ThewaralsohadtheeffectofphysicallydividingIranianShi‘asfromtheshrinecitiesofNajaf,Karbala,andSamarra.

Iraqigainsattheoutsetofthewar,whichcausedhugedamageinKhuzestanandtheflightofhundredsof thousands of refugees,werewiped out by an Iranian counteroffensive in the spring of 1982,whichrecapturedKhorramshahrandforcedSaddamtowithdrawtotheborder.ButtheIraniansthenamplifiedtheirwaraims,demandingtheremovalofSaddamandhugewarreparations.ThereafteritwastheturnoftheIraqistogoonthedefensive,buttheIranianswereabletomakeonlyminorterritorialgains,themostnotablebeingthecaptureoftheFaopeninsulainFebruary1986.ThehopeofaShi‘auprisingtosupportthe Iranian attacks in southern Iraq proved an illusion—like Saddam’s hope of an Arab uprising inKhuzestanin1980—andthelandwarbecameastalemate.

Beginningin1984SaddamattackedIranianshippinginthePersianGulf,tryingtodamageIran’soilexports.TheIraniansrespondedinkind,resultinginwhatbecameknownastheTankerWar.TheUnitedStates and other noncombatant nations moved ships into the Persian Gulf to protect shipping ininternational waters, but in July 1988 a U.S. warship, USS Vincennes, under a disastrously gung-hocommander,sailedintoIranianterritorialwatersinpursuitofsomeIraniangunboatsandafteraseriesofbungles shot down an Iranian civilian airlinerwith a pair of surface-to-airmissiles, killing 290. TheReagan administration gave explanations that contained more misleading inaccuracies and self-justifications thancontrition,and laterawarded thecommanderofVincennes a campaignmedal.ManyIraniansstillbelievethatthedestructionoftheairlinerwasnotanaccidentbutadeliberateact.Anotherless-than-gloriousepisode in theU.S./Iran relationship tookplaceearlier, in1986,whenU.S.officialsbrought a pallet of spare parts for Iran’s Hawk ground-to-air missiles from Israel to Tehran (plus achocolatebirthdaycakefromakosherbakeryinTelAvivandotherpresents)inwhatlaterbecameknownastheIran/Contraaffair.Theexposureandfailureoftheventurestoodasanotherwarningoftheperilsofmakingcontactbetweenthetwocountries,andofthedivideofmisunderstandingbetweenthem.11

Asstalemateprevailedinthelandwar,theIraniansandIraqisbombardedeachother’scapitalsandother towns indiscriminately with long-rangemissiles, and with bombs dropped from aircraft, killingmanycivilians(theWaroftheCities).Towardtheend,Iraqhadtheupperhandintheseexchanges,andinthelandwarwasabletoretakeIraqiterritoryatFaoandelsewhere,bringingthefrontlinebackalmostexactlytowhereithadbeeninSeptember1980.Finally,withtheterriblecostofthewarmountingandnosignof the dreamof aMarch toKarbala being realized,Khomeiniwas persuadedbyMajlesSpeakerAkbarHashemiRafsanjani to acceptwhatKhomeini called the chalice of poison.Rafsanjani, perhapsrightforthewrongreason,hadusedtheVincennes incident toinsist that theUnitedStateswouldnever

allowIrantosucceedinthewar.KhomeiniallowedPresidentKhamenei(electedin1981andreelectedin1985)toannounceinJuly1988thatIranwouldacceptUNresolution598,whichcalledforacease-fire.

DEATHANDRECONSTRUCTIONKhomeinidiedonJune3,1989,andhisfuneralattheBehesht-eZahracemeterydrewcrowdsandscenesofmassemotioncomparableonlywiththosethathadgreetedhisreturnfromexile tenyearsbefore.Atonepointthecoffinhadtoberescuedbyhelicopterfromdistraughtmournersseekingpiecesofhisshroudasrelics.Khomeini’slastmonthshadbeenovershadowedbytheharddecisiontoendthewarwithIraq,and this may have affected his health, but he was also suffering from cancer and heart disease. OnesignificanteventintheselastmonthswaswhatisconventionallycalledthefatwaagainstSalmanRushdieinFebruary1989(somehavesuggesteditwouldbemoreaccuratelydescribedasahokm—areligiousjudgment). It seems thatKhomeini had beenmade aware ofRushdie’s bookThe Satanic Verses somemonths earlier, but had dismissed it as unimportant (he had not even banned it from being imported).Reconsidering thequestion later—afterdemonstrationsbyMuslims inBritainandriots inKashmirandPakistan—hethendeliveredthefatwaasadeliberateact,toreasserthisandIran’sclaimtotheleadershipof Islam.12 Itwas another classicKhomeinimove, one that trumpeted Iran’s Islamic and revolutionaryuniqueness. But it also made more difficulties for those whomight have wanted to bring Iran out ofisolationintosomekindofnormality.

AnothereventoccurredintheselastmonthsthatillustratesagainthedegreetowhichKhomeinihadbeen(andremained)anenigmaevenamongtheulema.EarlyinJanuary1989KhomeinisentalettertotheSovietleaderMikhailGorbachev,observingaccuratelythatcommunismnowbelongedinthemuseumofhistory.Beforehefellintothesnareofmaterialisticcapitalism,Khomeinisaid,GorbachevshouldstudyIslamasawayoflife.Atfirstimpressionthisseemsanoddsuggestion,butperhapsKhomeinisensedanaffinitywithGorbachev—asanunconventionalthinkerhemmedinbyunsympatheticandlessimaginativeminds. The form of Islam that Khomeini recommended upset many of his ulema colleagues—hecommendedtoGorbachevnottheQor’annoranyoftheconventionalworksbutinsteadthewritingsofIbnArabi, Avicenna, and Sohravardi.With the letter he sent three of his closest companions and pupils,versedinIslamicmysticism.Whateverhisprivatethoughts,GorbachevthankedthemandexpressedhisprideathavingreceivedapersonalletterfromtheEmam.ButtheletterattractedcriticismfromclergyinQom, some of whom upbraided Khomeini in an open letter for having recommended mystics andphilosophers.Khomeinirespondedwitha“lettertotheclergy”thatventedthefrustrationsofalonglifespentenduringthecriticismofmoretradition-mindedmullahs:

This old father of yours has sufferedmore from stupid reactionarymullahs than anyone else.When theologymeant nointerferenceinpolitics,stupiditybecameavirtue.Ifaclergymanwasable,andawareofwhatwasgoingon[intheworldaroundhim],theysearchedforaplotbehindit.Youwereconsideredmorepiousifyouwalkedinaclumsyway.Learningforeign languageswas blasphemy, philosophy andmysticismwere considered to be sin and infidelity. . . .Had this trendcontinued,IhavenodoubttheclergyandseminarieswouldhavetroddenthesamepathastheChristianChurchdidintheMiddleAges.13

Before the revolution, ascent through the ranksof themojtahedshadbeen an informal process, butthrough the 1980s it became much more structured—policed and controlled by Khomeini and hisfollowers.14 As the hierarchy of Iranian Shi‘ism came under control, so did doctrine: Khomeini was

attemptingtocreateoutofthepreviouspluralityaconformismtoasingleideaofShi‘ism.Inthe1990sthisdevelopmentwentfurther.Examinationsweresetupforaspiringmojtaheds,andpoliticalloyalty—and adherence to the velayat-e faqih—became more important than piety, depth of religiousunderstanding,intellectualstrength,ortheapprovalofaloosegroupofseniorclerics,ashadpreviouslybeenthecase.Anewgroupofpoliticalayatollahs,selectedinthisnewway,proliferated.15Others,moredeservingintraditionalterms,remainedmeremojtaheds.

Thismeantthattherevolutionhadinstitutedareligioncontrolledbythestateandsubordinatedtostateinterests.Thesituationwasoddlysimilar,fromthatperspective,tothedin-edawlattheshahhadearlierattemptedaspartoftheWhiteRevolution—withthedifferencethatthisstatewasheadedbyamojtahedrather thanamonarch.Bythemidto late1990ssomeindependentvoiceswarnedof thedangersof theneworder.Notableamong themwas the thinkerand theologianAbdolkarimSoroush,whocalled forasecular government and predicted that, otherwise, the compromises and hypocrisies of politics andgovernment would discredit religion in Iran and alienate the young.16 This is precisely what hashappened.Thecorollaryhasbeenanundergroundresurgenceamongintellectualsofthenationalismofthe1920sand1930spattern, idealizingpre-Islamic Iranandblaming failuresofdevelopmenton theArabconquest—appearing, ironically, tocelebrate theCyrus-nostalgiamosthadrejectedfromthe lipsof thelastshah.17

Another voice to take a similar line has been AyatollahMontazeri.18 After the death of Beheshti,Montazerihademergedinthe1980sasthefiguremostlikelytosucceedKhomeiniasSupremeLeader.MontazerihadbeenaloyalsupporterofKhomeini,andanimportanttheoristfortheprincipleofvelayat-efaqih.Buttowardtheendofthe1980shefelloutwithKhomeini.Thedetailsofthisarenotentirelyclear.Montazeri certainly sent a brave letter toKhomeini protesting themassacre in prison of thousands ofpoliticalprisoners,mainlyformermembersoftheMKO.Themassacrefollowedafinal,absurd,doomedoffensive by MKO military units from Iraq into Iranian territory just after the July 1988 cease-fire.Montazeri’slettertoKhomeiniwaspublished:

Threedaysago,areligiousjudgefromoneoftheprovinces,whoisatrustworthyman,visitedmeinQomtoexpressconcernaboutthewayyourrecentordershavebeencarriedout.Hesaidthatanintelligenceofficer,oraprosecutor—Idon’tknowwhich—wasinterrogatingaprisonertodeterminewhetherhestillmaintainedhis[old]position.Washepreparedtocondemnthe hypocrite organisation [the Mojahedin]? The prisoner said “Yes.’” Was he prepared to take part in a [television]interview?“Yes,”saidtheprisoner.WashepreparedtogotothefronttofighttheIraqis?“Yes,”hesaid.Washepreparedtowalkintoaminefield?Theinmaterepliedthatnoteveryonewaspreparedtowalkoverminesand,furthermore,thenewlyconvertedcouldnotbeexpectedtodoso.Theinmatewastoldthatitwasclearthathestillmaintainedhis[old]position,andhewasdulydealtwith.Thereligiousjudge’sinsistencethatadecisionshouldbebasedonaunanimous,notamajority,votefellondeafears.Hesaidthatintelligenceofficialshavethelargestsayeverywhereandinpracticeinfluenceothers.YourHolinessmighttakenoteofhowyourorders,thatconcernthelivesofthousandsofpeople,arecarriedout.19

SomebelievethattherealriftwasovertheIran/Contraarmsdeal—thatMontazeriwasleftinthedarkoverthediscussionswiththeUnitedStatesandreactedbadlywhenhefoundout.Healsocriticizedthefatwa againstRushdie, saying that foreignerswere getting the impression that Iranianswere interestedonly inmurdering people.Whatever the details, shortly beforeKhomeini’s death in June 1989 it wasmadeknownthatMontazeriwouldnot followKhomeiniasSupremeLeader. Instead,Khomeini’scloseconfidantAliKhameneitooktherole,havingbeenpromotedsuddenlyfromhojjatoleslamtoayatollah—despite having had no very distinguished reputation as a scholar previously (several senior ayatollahsprotestedatKhamenei’selevation,withtheextraordinaryresultthathebecameSupremeLeaderbutonlyamarjaforShi‘asoutsideIran).SincethattimeMontazerihaslivedmainlyunderhousearrest,andhas

made several statements against the conduct of the regime—arguing for a more limited role for thevelayat-e faqih, for properly constitutional and democratic government, and an end to human rightsabuses.

Despite the effortsof the regime tomarginalizehim,Montazeri is still themarja-e taqlid formanyreligious Iranians, along with others who keep a certain distance from the regime. Another importantexampleisGrandAyatollahYousefSanei,whohasstateddirectlythat thepossessionoruseofnuclearweaponsisunacceptable,andthatIrandidnotretaliatewithchemicalweaponsagainstSaddambecausemarjasconcurredthatweaponsofmassdestructionasawholewereunacceptable.Saneihasalsoissuedafatwaagainstsuicidebombings.AlthoughShi‘asmayhavebeenresponsibleforthedevastatingsuicideattackagainsttheU.S.marineheadquartersinBeirutin1983,LebaneseHezbollahlaterstoppedusingthetacticandsincethentomyknowledgeShi‘aMuslimshavenotperpetratedsuicideattacks.

ThesearejustafewillustrationsoftheimportantfactthatIranianShi‘ism,letaloneShi‘ismoutsideIran,isbiggerthanthecurrentIranianreligiousleadership—somethingobserversfromoutsidetheregiontoooftenfailtoregister.InrecentyearsdissentfromtheregimepartylinehasgatheredstrengthamongtheIranian ulema, and reform-minded thinkers likeMohsenKadivar andMohammadMojtahed Shabestarihavegaineda following for their attempts to address currentproblemswithinan Islamiccontext in anintellectuallyhonestandrigorousway.20 Inasense,Shi‘ismisdoingsomethingthereligionhasalwaysdone—legitimizinganalternativepoleofauthoritytothatpowerwieldedbythedominantregime.Atthesame time, the moral authority of the ruling clique has withered just as the moral authority of theBolshevikswithered.

Severalcommentatorshave remarkedupon thecaesura in Iranianpoliticscreatedby theendof theIran/Iraqwarand thedeathofKhomeini.21The thirdevent thatmarked thischangewas theelectionofRafsanjani, theformerMajlesspeaker,aspresident, inAugust1989(replacingKhamenei,whobecameSupremeLeaderinplaceofKhomeiniinJune).Ashebecamepresident,Rafsanjaniannouncedaneweraof reconstruction. Ali Ansari has called it themercantile bourgeois republic, the period inwhich thebazaari middle class—long the bedrock of support for the political ulema—finally came into theirkingdom.

The war had done huge damage to the Iranian economy and to the living standards of ordinaryIranians.Percapitaincomehadfallenbyatleastfortypercentsince1978.22Intheborderareaswherethefighting had taken place, some 1.6million people had beenmade homeless, and refineries, factories,governmentbuildings,roads,bridges,ports,andirrigationworkshadallbeendestroyed.Thecountryasawholehadtolookafterlargenumbersofbadlyinjuredex-servicemen,includingpeoplesufferingfromtheafter-effectsofchemicalweapons,manyofwhomstillsuffertoday.Inaddition,therewererefugeesfromIraq—a largenumber fled to Iran after the firstGulfWar in1991,when theUnitedStates and theUKencouraged a Shi‘a revolt, and then stood aside while Saddam massacred the rebels—and fromAfghanistan,wherefightinghadbeenragingsincetheSovietinvasionof1979.Bytheendofthe1990s,Iranwashostingmore than twomillion refugees.Unlike Iraq, Iranhad comeout of thewarwithout aserious debt burden, but the need for reconstruction was great, and Iran’s continuing internationalisolationwasahandicap.

Thewarhadanimportantunifyingeffectinthecountry,andthesacrificesmadebyordinarypeopleenhancedtheirsenseofcitizenshipandcommitmenttotheIslamicrepublic.Thewarwasthefirstmajorconflict involving largenumbersofordinary Iranianssince theearlynineteenthcentury—perhapssinceNaderShah.Butthecommitmentandsacrificeswerenotablankcheck.Peopleexpectedsomethingbackwhen thewarwas over. Rafsanjani promised them precisely this as hewas elected. In particular, hepromised development and an improvement in living standards for the poorest—themostazefin—upon

whom,asusual,theheaviestburdenshadfallen.But therewasdisagreementabout thepolicymeanstoachievethesegoals,andresultsweremixed.

Sincetherevolution,forthenecessityoftheprosecutionofthewarbutalsotoservethedeclaredaimofgreatersocialequality,theregimehadfollowedbroadlystatisteconomicpolicies.NowRafsanjani,truetohisbazaarioriginsandsympathies,triedtobuildtheeconomybypursuinggreatermarketfreedom.Butdisagreementswithin the regimehampered the effort—inparticular, privatizationmeasureswent aheadand then were halted, amid accusations of mismanagement and corruption. Some progress and someexpansion of the economy were achieved, but less than had been hoped. Industrial and agriculturalproductionincreased,asdidexports—especiallyagriculturalexports,and,notably,pistachioexports,inwhichRafsanjani’sownfamilyhadasignificantstake.Buttheeconomyremainedheavilydependentonoil, the oil industry remained inefficient for lack of international help to secure the most up-to-datetechnology,andthathelpwasfurtherblockedbyU.S.economicsanctions,whichsharpenedthroughthe1990s as part of the policy of dual containment applied to both Iran and Iraq.Much investment in theeconomywent intoaconstructionboom,whichbenefited the investors,but lessso themostazefin, ifatall.23

By the midpoint of Rafsanjani’s second term (1993–1997), there was widespread disappointmentwithhisefforts.Livingstandards,especiallyforthelesswelloff,hadnotimprovedinthewaythepeoplehadbeenledtohope.Unemploymentwasincreasing,partlyasaresultofsluggisheconomicperformancebut also because the population had continued to expand dramatically over the previous twenty years.Iran’srateofpopulationgrowthwasoneofthehighestintheworldinthisperiod—thetotalwentfrom33.7millionat the timeof the1976censusto48.2millionin1986andtoanestimated68.5millionin2007—thoughtherateofincreasehasnowmoderated.Tehrangrewtoacityofsome12millionpeople.Throughout the1990s largenumbersofnewwould-beworkerswere comingonto the jobmarket eachyear.

Despite the problems, the first eighteen years of the Islamic republic had achieved importantbeneficial results for many ordinary Iranians. A determined push to improve conditions for the ruralpopulation succeeded where the Pahlavi regime had largely failed, introducing piped water, healthservices,electricity,andschoolseveninsomeofthemostremotedistricts.Lifeexpectancyliftedsharply,along with literacy rates (now around eighty percent—eighty-six percent for men and seventy-threepercent for women). Perhaps the most important improvement, reflected in the literacy rate, was ineducation. Primary education was, at last, effectively extended to all. Iran is a country with a strongculturalappreciationofliteracy,education,andintellectualattainment,andfamiliesmadethemostofthenewopportunities.

The effect of the revolution on the position of women was typically mixed. They lost the bettertreatment at divorce that the last shah had introduced, whichmeant that fathers in principle got childcustody—althoughinpractice,asZibaMir-Hosseini’sfilmDivorceIranianStyledemonstrated,womenoftenmanage to findways around this principle in the divorce courts.24Butwomen retained the vote.Whilepolygamyandchildmarriageweremade legal again, theyalmostneverhappen, except in someSunni areas likeBaluchistan. The imposition of the veil, alongwith encouragement from the religioushierarchy, allowed tradition-minded fathers to let their daughters attend schools,whichwere normallyestablishedonasingle-sexbasis.Girlstooktothisnewopportunitywithsuchenergyandapplicationthatnow sixty-six percent of students admitted to Iranian universities arewomen.25 Given the pressure onfamiliestomakeendsmeet,manyofthesewomentakeupjobsafteruniversityandworkalongsidemen,andcontinuetodosoevenaftermarriage(thoughmanyalsolanguishinunemployment).Someobservers,notablyFarahAzari,have remarkedupon theway thatorthodox, traditionalShi‘ismhasworked in the

pasttorepresswomenandfemalesexualityinIran,linkingthattomaleanxietyinperiodsofsocialandeconomicchange.Therearestillbookstobewrittenontheotherdistortionsthishascausedhistorically.26Thesuccessofwomen’seducation,andthegreatlyexpandedimportanceofwomenintheworkplaceandintheeconomy,isahugesocialandculturalchangeinIran—onethatintime,andcombinedwithotherfactors,islikelytohaveprofoundconsequencesforIraniansocietyasawhole.Surveyshaveindicatedthatthisisalreadyemerginginmoreliberalattitudestowardeducation,thefamily,andwork.27Thereareparallelchangesinattitudeawayfromreligiontowardmoresecular,liberal,andnationalisticpositions.28Someclericsamongtheulemaarechallengingthereligiousjudgmentsonthestatusofwomenthatwerepushed through into law at the time of the revolution. These developments are not peripheral but areabsolutelycentraltothefutureofthecountry.

REFORM?WomenweresomeofthestrongestsupportersofPresidentKhatami,whowaselectedinMay1997withareformist program. Without attacking the velayat-e faqih, Khatami called for proper constitutionalgovernmentand forahalt toextra-judicialviolence.Hesaidseveral times thathebelievedhis reformprogramwas the last chance for the Islamic republic—that if reformwere blocked, the peoplewoulddemandseculargovernmentandoverturnthetheocraticregimealtogether.Buthisreformswereblocked,andtheregimebecameincreasinglyunpopular,especiallyamongyoungpeople.Levelsofattendanceatmosqueshaveplummeted.Overthelastdecadethehard-lineregimehasbecomemoreandmoreovertlyself-serving,cynicallyusingitsreligioustrappings,andmanipulatingelectionstokeepvestedinterestsinpower.

Khatami’s electionwas anunpleasant surprise for thehard-line leadership (theyhad supportedhisopponentNateqNuri),andtheyseemedtotakesometimetoadjusttothechangedconditionsofpoliticsthat followed. Khatami won seventy percent of the vote in an election that captured the nationalimaginationasnonehaddoneforyears.ThisvictoryenergizedanewgenerationofyoungIraniansandgave themhope for the future.Unfortunately,Khatamiwasoutmaneuveredbyhis opponents, and thosehopesweredisappointed.Somehavesuggestedthathewasastoogeforthehardlinersallalong,butitismoreplausible thathewas just abit toonice forpolitics—toounwilling,at thecrucialmoment in thesummerof2000,toriskaconfrontationwiththehard-linersthatcouldhaveturnedviolent.

OnequestioninIranianforeignpolicythatalwayslurkedinthebackgroundthroughthisperiodwasthat of a resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and theUnitedStates.On several occasionsPresidentKhatamimadestatementsthatseemedtosuggestanopennesstorenewedcontactwiththeUnitedStates,notably inan interviewwithChristianeAmanpourofCNN,broadcast in January1998.29But itappearedthatablockonrenewedrelationswithAmerica,likeIran’shostileattitudetowardIsrael,wasashibboleththehard-lineelementsintheIranianregimewereunwillingtodiscard—asignofkeepingfaithwith the revolution.Some internationalcommentators speculated thatafter the improvementofUK/Iranrelationsintheautumnof1998,BritainwouldactasanhonestbrokerbetweenIranandtheUnitedStates,but this did not happen. It was difficult too for the U.S. government to make a serious effort atrapprochement,thoughPresidentBillClintonandSecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbrightmadeanumberofconciliatorystatementsin1999and2000.

ThemurdersofwritersanddissidentsinNovemberandDecember1998—eventsthatbecameknownafterward as the serial murders—were widely seen as an attempt by operatives within theMOIS toconfrontanddiscreditPresidentKhatami.ThevictimsincludedDariushForuhar,hiswifeParvaneh,and

otherveteransoftheinitialphaseoftherevolution.OneversionofeventssaysthatKhatamiwasbroughtatapethatrecordedatelephonecallinwhichthekillers—withParvanehaudibleinthebackground—hadaskedtheirbosseswhattheyshoulddoabouther,becauseherhusbandwasalreadydead.WhenKhatamisuccessfullyfaceddownthatconfrontationandsecuredthearrestofSaeedEmamiandsomeoftheotherperpetrators,followingupwithapurgeoftheMOIS,manyjudgedthathehadstrengthenedbothhisownpositionandthereformprocess.ButthearrestswerefollowedbythedetentionofthirteenJewsinShirazonespionagecharges,andagainitseemedthatdisgruntledMOISofficialshadarrestedinnocentpeopleinordertoportraytheorganizationasbravelyresistingsomekindofZionistplot.ThearrestsalsohadtheeffectoffurtherembarrassingKhatami’seffortsatinternationalrapprochement.MOISclaimedatthetimethatanumberofMuslims(nine,eight,three,ortwoaccordingtodifferentstatements)hadbeenarrestedinconnectionwiththesamecase.Butdetailswerehazy,anditseemsthatthiswasascreentodisguisetheanti-Semiticaspectoftheaction.EventuallyalltheJewswerereleased,butsomehadbeenconvictedintheinterimofspyingforIsrael(forwhichthepenaltycanbedeath),andsomeofthereleaseswereonlyonaprovisionalbasis.ThatmeantthatthemenmightberearrestedshouldtheMOISfindthatconvenient.

ThequestionofthedetaineesandtheiruncertainfutureattractedrenewedcriticismofIranandIran’shuman rights record internationally. It also threw into harsh relief the situation of Jews in the Islamicrepublic.WhiletherearestillmoreJewsinIranthananywhereelseintheMiddleEastapartfromIsrael,ithasbeenestimatedthatwhenIsraelwasestablishedin1948,therewereatleast100,000JewslivinginIran.By1979,therewere80,000,andtodayestimatesvarybetween25,000and35,000.30Thisdeclineismainly explained by the emigration of Iranian Jews to Israel and theUnitedStates especially. Plainly,therewerebothpullandpushfactorsinvolvedinthatemigration,buttherateofemigrationacceleratedrapidlyafter1979.Aftertherevolution,inaccordancewiththeIslamicinjunctiontoprotectthePeopleofthe Book, Khomeini held meetings with Jewish representatives and decreed that Jews should beprotected.TheconstitutiongavetheJewishcommunityafixedrepresentationofonedeputyintheMajles(theArmenianChristiansandZoroastriansaretreatedinasimilarway,except that theArmenianshavetwodeputies).Someofthestipulationsintraditionalshari‘alawabouttheinferiorlegalstatusofJewsand other non-Muslims have been changed to make their treatment more equal, but many unequaldistinctionsremain.TheseincludetherulethataconverttoIslaminheritseverythingwhenarelativedies,whileotherclaimantswhodonotconvertgetnothing.UndertheIslamicrepublictheoldanti-Semitismofsomehassimplydressed itself inanti-Zionistclothes (notwithstanding thatmanyordinary Iranians feelgenuine indignation at Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians). Many Jews feel that the political anti-Zionism of the regime has made anti-Semitism respectable, in the newspapers and in petty acts ofpersecution—for example, demands that Jews donate to anti-Zionist causes. The Jewish communitygenerallysurvives,asatothertimesinthepast,bymakingthemselvesunobtrusiveandavoidingtrouble.GiventheancienthistoryoftheJewsinIran,andtheirrichanduniqueIranianJewishculture,thisisasadsituation.IntheUnitedStatesandIsrael,manyIranianJewishfamiliesstillupholdIraniantraditions—thecelebrationofNoruz,forexample—andstillspeakPersian.

Thepositionof theBaha’ishasbeenworse,andmanyBaha’ishavebeen imprisonedandexecutedsince 1979 (one accusation leveled at them is that they have Zionist connections). Baha’is have beensubjecttointimidationandarrest,andtoforcedconversion.HavingbannedthemfromattendinguniversityasBaha’is,agentsof theregimesubsequentlyattackedthosewhohadsetupandparticipatedinBaha’istudycircles.

Although some in the West were disillusioned when President Khatami sided with the hard-lineleadership in the summerof1999and let thembreakup studentprotests, it seemed thatmany Iraniansagreedwithhimthatevolutionarychangewasbetter thanrunawayviolence.Therewasgoodreason to

thinkhewasright:aftertheexperienceofonerevolution,itwasunderstandablethatKhatamiandmanyotherIranianswereunwillingtorisktheirhopesforchangeontheoutcomeofstreetviolence.31Throughall this period, the vigor of the expanded free press in Iran encouraged the belief that reformwouldprevail.

With the election of the strongly reformist sixthMajles inMay 2000 (reform-oriented candidatessecured 190 seats out of 290),manyobservers thought the reformerswere at last in the driver’s seat.Some people speculated that Iran might nowmove in the direction of a moderated form of religioussupremacy,withtheclericalelementinthesystemguidingoccasionallyfromthebackground,ratherthantakingadirectroleasithadsince1979.Butinretrospect,itseemsthattheattacksonformerPresidentRafsanjani in that election campaign were a decisive error by the reformist press, in which theyoverreached themselves and drove an embittered Rafsanjani, who had previously tried ratherineffectuallytoarbitratebetweenthetwocamps,overtothehard-lineside.Beginninginthesummerof2000, hard-line resistance to the reformist program stiffened and became more competent, perhapsreflecting Rafsanjani’s advice. A sustained and targeted series of arrests and closures brought thefloweringofthefreepresstoanend.32SupremeLeaderAyatollahAliKhameneiintervenedpersonallytoprevent the newMajles from overturning the press law that facilitated this crackdown (passed by thepreviousMajles in the lastmonthsof its term).And theMajlesgenerally found themselvesblockedbyhard-lineelementsintheIraniansystemfrommakinganysignificantprogresswiththereformprogram.IfeverKhatamimissedthechancetoconfrontthehard-lineleadershipoverhispopularmandateforreform—aconfrontationthatwasprobablyunavoidableifthereformprojectwastosucceed—thiswassurelythetime.Butthemomentpassed,thefreepressfaded,andthehard-linepartyregainedconfidence.Thetesting of the Shahab III medium-range missile in July 2000 also marked a new phase of sharpenedinternationalconcernoverIranianweaponsprogramsandnuclearambitions.

9

FROMKHATAMITOAHMADINEJAD,ANDTHEIRANIANPREDICAMENT

“Theempiresofthefuturearetheempiresofthemind.”

—WinstonChurchill(speechatHarvardUniversity,September6,1943)

Since 1979, Iran has followed a lonely path of resistance to the global influence ofWestern values—particularlythatoftheUnitedStates.OnecouldseethisasareflectionoftheIranians’continuingsenseoftheiruniquenessandcultural significance.The Iranian revolution in1979was theharbingerof Islamicrevival more widely, showing that previous assumptions about the inevitability of development on aWesternmodelintheMiddleEastandelsewherehadbeenmisguided.Asoftenbefore,othersfollowed,forbetterorworse,whereIranhadled.Somehopedinthelate1990sthattheKhatamireformmovementmightshowthewayoutof Islamicextremismat theotherend,butalthough there isgoodevidence thatIraniansaretodaymoreskepticalofreligiousleadershipandmoreinclinedtosecularismthanmostothernationalitiesintheMiddleEast,1thathopeappears,atleastforthemoment,tohavebeenpremature.

ThefailureoftheWestfullytotakeadvantageoftheopportunityofferedbyareformistpresidentinIranalreadylookslikeabadmistake.OnesuchopportunitycameaftertheSeptember11,2001,attacksinthe United States when members of the Iranian leadership (not just Khatami, but also Khamenei)condemned the terrorist action in forthright terms, and ordinary Iranians showed their sympathieswithcandlelit vigils in the streets of Tehran—more evidence of themarked difference of attitude betweenIraniansandotherMiddleEasternpeoples.AnotheropportunitycameafterIrangavesignificanthelptothecoalitionforcesagainsttheTalibanlaterin2001,helpingtopersuadetheNorthernAlliancetoacceptdemocraticarrangementsforpost-TalibanAfghanistan.2In2002IranianswererewardedwithPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’s“AxisofEvil”speech,whichlumpedIranwithIraqandNorthKorea.Finally,theBushadministrationignoredanIranianoffer in thespringof2003(shortlyafter thefallofBaghdad),via theSwiss,forbilateraltalkstowardaGrandBargainthatappearedtopromiseapossibleresolutionofthenuclearissueanddefactoIranianrecognitionofIsrael.

The purpose of all this is not to reinforce the cringing sense of guilt that bedevils manyWesternobserverswholookattheMiddleEast.ItisnotAllOurFault,andnodoubtiftheIranianshadbeeninthepositionofstrengththatBritainwasbetween1815and1950,orthattheUnitedStateshasbeeninsincethen,theywouldhavebehavedasbadly,andquitepossiblyworse.TheIraniansalsomissedopportunitiesfor rapprochement in theKhatamiyears.But toooftenwehavegotten thingswrong,and thathashadacost.ItisimportanttoseeeventsfromanIranianperspective,toseehowwegotthingswrong,andtosee

what needs to be done in order to get them right. The most important thing is this: if we makecommitmentsandassertcertainprinciples,wemustbemorecarefultomeanwhatwesayandtoupholdthoseprinciples.

The Iranian reactionafter9/11 shows inhigh relief theapparentparadox in Iranianattitudes to theWest, ingeneral,and to theUnitedStates, inparticular.Aswehaveseen, Iranianshave realhistoricalgroundsfor resentment thatareunique to Iranand thatgobeyond theusualposturesofnationalismandanti-Americanism.ButamongmanyordinaryIraniansthereisalsoalikingandrespectforEuropeansandAmericans thatgoeswellbeyondwhatone findselsewhere in theMiddleEast.Tosomeextent this isagainafunctionoftheIranians’senseoftheirspecialstatusamongotherMiddleEasternnations.Plainly,different Iranianscombine theseattitudes indifferentways,but thebestway toexplain thisparadox isperhapstosaythatmanyIranians(irrespectiveoftheirattitudetotheirowngovernment,whichtheymayalsopartlyblameforthesituation)feelsnubbed,abused,misunderstood,andletdownbytheWesternersthey think shouldhavebeen their friends.This emerges indifferentways—including in the rhetoric ofpolitics,asisillustratedbyapassagefromatelevisedspeechbySupremeLeaderKhameneionJune30,2007:

Why,youmayask,shouldweadoptanoffensivestance?Areweatwarwiththeworld?No,thisisnotthemeaning.Webelieve that the world owes us something. Over the issue of the colonial policies of the colonial world, we are owedsomething.As far as our discussionswith the rest of theworld about the status ofwomen are concerned, theworld isindebtedtous.OvertheissueofprovokinginternalconflictsinIranandarmingwithvarioustypesofweapons,theworldisanswerabletous.Overtheissueofproliferationofnuclearweapons,chemicalweaponsandbiologicalweapons,theworldowesussomething.3

The troubled course of the relationship between Iran and the West has entered a new and moreconfrontational phase under President Ahmadinejad. His June 2005 election campaignwas successfulbecause,withtheorganizationalbackingofthePasdaran,hearticulatedthediscontentofthepoorandtheurbanunemployed,manipulatingyetagainShi‘aindignationat thearroganceofpower.Hisopponent inthe final stage of the election was former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who for many Iraniansrepresented theworst of the corrupt cronyism of the regime.Butmany voted forAhmadinejad simplybecauseforoncetheyhadachancetovoteforsomeonewhowasnotamullah.Mostforeignobservers,often unduly influenced by their contacts in prosperous, reform-inclined north Tehran, were takencompletelybysurpriseattheresult.PriortohiselectionAhmadinejad,whohadvisitedpoorerpartsofthecountrythathadnotseenapoliticianforyears,emphasizedeconomicandsocialissues;hisreligiousenthusiasm and his urge to cut a figure in international relations has blossomed only since then. Theelectionwasfarfromfairorfree—manyreformistsopenlyboycottedit,inprotestattheexclusionoftheircandidatesbytheGuardianCouncil.InthesecondroundAhmadinejadreceivedatmostsixtypercentofthevoteinasixtypercentturnout—lessthanfortypercentofthetotalnumberofelectors.Inthefirstroundoftheelections,withawiderfieldofcandidates,hewasthefirstchoiceofonlysixpercentofthevoters.

In the summerof 2005NiallFergusonwarned thatAhmadinejad couldbe theStalin of the Iranianrevolution.Ahmadinejadmayhave the instinctsandaspirationsofaStalin,but thepoliticalposition inIranisnotsoopentohisambitions,andheseemsunlikelytoproveafigureofthesamefierce,sinisterintelligence.FormonthstheMajlesblocked—intheend,successfully—hisappointmentoffavoritesandhangers-ontohiscabinet.Itseemedunlikelythen,andseemsevenmoreunlikelynow,thatAhmadinejadcandeliver onhis promises to the poor.His economicmanagement has beenheavily criticizedwithinIran, and his introduction of gasoline rationing in the summer of 2007 seems likely to undercut hispopulismfurther.Aftertheintroductionofthegasrationing,apollappearedtoshowthat62.5percentof

thepeoplewhovotedforAhmadinejadin2005wouldnotdosoagain.4ButifthenuclearconfrontationwiththeWest,forwhichhehasbeenthefigurehead,leadstosanctions,itcouldgivehimandtheregimeasawholeanalibifortheirfailureyetagaintodeliverontheeconomyandjobs.

Some observers of the situation in Iraq and Iran have warned apocalyptically of the danger of anuclear-armed Iran controlling a Shi‘a-dominated Iraq, a resurgent Shi‘aHezbollah inLebanon, and arising (Sunni) Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza, combined with Iranian-backed Shi‘a movementserupting in Bahrain and along other parts of the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. This is not acombinationthatIsrael(letaloneothers)canaffordtobecomplacentabout,andthethreatsofPresidentAhmadinejad,evenifmorerhetoricthanreal,arestillsignificantandinfluential.

Butallisnotquiteasitmayseem.InthewiderMiddleEast,withthepossibleexceptionofHezbollahin Lebanon, Shi‘as show little enthusiasm for Iranian-style Islamic rule. For Shi‘ism as a globalphenomenon, the velayat-e faqih looks increasingly like a radical step too far, and otherwise themostextremevoices in Islamcome from theSunni side.Under the influenceofAl-Sistani andMoqtada al-Sadr, IraqiShi‘ashavemaintainedan independent line, thoughmoreattacksandprovocationsbySunniinsurgentsmaypushthemfurtherintothearmsoftheIranians.IranhasaninfluenceonShi‘aIraq,andtheIranianstendtoseethemselvesastheprotectorsoftheIraqiShi‘as—astheydoforShi‘aselsewhere.Butthe Shi‘ism of southern Iraq, centered on the great shrines of Najaf (the tomb of Ali), Karbala, andSamarra,hasanauthorityofitsown,independentofIranianShi‘ism,whichiscenteredonthetheologicalschools ofQom. Iraqi Shi‘as do not necessarily trust the Iranians.Andmany ordinary Iranians do notmuch like seeing their government spendingmoney and effort onbehalf of foreigners—whether Iraqis,Lebanese,orPalestinians—whenplentyofIranianslackjobs,housing,anddecentlivingconditions.

TherulingregimeinIranhasmanyfaults,butitismorerepresentativethanmostintheMiddleEastoutside Israel (though the trend is not encouraging—theMajles elections of 2004 and the presidentialelectionsof2005weremore interferedwithand less free thanpreviouselections).Despite repressivemeasuresbythestate,IranisnotatotalitariancountryliketheSovietUnionduringtheColdWar.Itisacomplexpolity,withdifferentpowercentersandshadesofopinionamongthoseinpower.Thereisspacefordissent—withincertainboundaries.Iranstillhasthepotentialforself-generatedchange,ashasbeenrecognized by observers from Paul Wolfowitz to Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last shah. ImportantindependentIranianfigureslikeShirinEbadianddissidentslikeAkbarGanjihaveurgedthatIranbeleftalonetodevelopitsownpoliticalsolutions.OnetheoryofIranianhistory,advancedbyHomaKatouzianandothers,5isthatIranlurchesfromchaostoarbitraryautocracyandbackagain.Thereiscertainlysomeevidenceofthatintherecord.Perhapsincreasedpoliticalfreedomwouldmerelyunleashchaos,andnodoubt there are pragmatistswithin the current Iranian regimewhomake just that argument for keepingthingsastheyare.Onecouldinterpretthecrisisofthereformmovementin2000,followedbythepresscrackdown, as another episode in theKatouziancycle.There are signsofdisillusionment andnihilismamongmanyyoungIraniansafterthefailureoftheKhatamiexperiment.6ButIdon’tbelieveinthatkindofdeterminism.ThereisrealsocialandpoliticalchangeafootinIran,inwhichthenaturaldynamictowardgreater awareness, greater education, and greater freedom is prominent. Other Europeans in theseventeenthcenturyusedtosaythatEnglandwasahopelesslychaoticplace,fullofincorrigiblyviolentandfanaticalpeoplewhoclamoredtocutofftheirking’shead.AcenturylaterEnglandwasthemodeltoothersforfreedomunderthelawandconstitutionalgovernment.7

Therearegroundsforsomecautiousoptimism.ThepreparednessofIranandtheUnitedStatesinthespringof2007tospeaktoeachotheropenlyanddirectlyforthefirsttimesincethehostagecrisisisinitself agreat step forward that looked impossible—from theperspectiveofboth sides—ayearor twoago.ThetalksareaboutIraq.ApriorityforthosetalksmustbetoinduceIrantoendtheattacksonU.S.

andBritishservicemeninIraqbyShi‘amilitiathathavecausedtoomanydeathsandterribleinjuries(thefrequencyoftheattacksseems,inthewinterof2007/2008,tobediminishing).ButattemptstolayamajorpartoftheblameforthecurrentproblemsinIraqatthedooroftheIranianshavebeendishonest.WhentheU.S. government presented a dossier in February 2007 detailing allegations that Iran had suppliedcomponents for explosive devices to attack coalition armored vehicles, the number of deaths theyconnectedtosuchattackswas187,andthevalidityoftheallegationswasdisputed.8Atthattimethetotalnumber of casualties among U.S. and coalition servicemen in Iraq was more than three thousand.Overwhelmingly, coalition servicemen have been killed andwounded not byShi‘amilitias backed byIran, but bySunni insurgents backedby—whom?Presumablyby elementswithin countries like JordanandSaudiArabia.9Butwedon’thearsomuchaboutthat.IranhasbeenaccusedoftryingtodestabilizethenewIraqigovernment.ButwhywouldIranwishtodothatwhenIraqiShi‘assympathetictoIranarerunningthatgovernmentalready?LikethecaptureoftheBritishsailorsandmarinesinthespringof2007,Iranian involvement in Iraq is better explained not as aggrandizement aimed at any other outcome, butratherasareminderfromtheIranianstotheUnitedStatesandBritainthatIranhaspermanentinterestsonher borders. The Iranian regime, as pragmatism would suggest, has always insisted on its desire forstabilityinbothIraqandAfghanistan.

Itdoesnotlooklikeagoodtime,withAhmadinejadinpower,fortheWesttoattemptarapprochementwithIran.Butwilly-nilly,theUnitedStatesandBritainneedIranianhelpinIraqandAfghanistan,andinthe region in general. This is a simple reflection of the fact that Iran is a permanent and importantpresenceintheMiddleEast,andthatIranhasbeentheprimebeneficiaryoftheremovaloftheTalibanandSaddam,Iran’sformerenemies.ThepresentgovernmentofIranisfarfromperfect,butthereareothergovernments in theMiddleEast that are as bad orworse—ondemocracy or human rights—whomwehavefewscruplesaboutdescribingascloseallies.IfwecandealrespectfullywithIranasapartnerandanequal—andnotmerely, as toooften in thepast, asan instrument to short-termendselsewhere—wemightbesurprisedathowfareven thecurrenthard-line regimewouldgo in takingup thepartnership.Then we would see the beneficial effects a better relationship could have within Iran. The Iranianleadership is not justAhmadinejad, andhis leverage in the Iranian system is less than it appears.Thewiderleadershipcircle—thosewhocoordinatedecisionsintheSupremeNationalSecurityCouncil—issubstantiallythesameasitwasin2003,whenitauthorizedtheGrandBargainoffer.

There are many bleak aspects to the current situation in Iran. The arrests of women and visitingacademics in the spring of 2007 were yet another retrograde step. Arrests to enforce the dress code(whichrelaxedsignificantlyintheKhatamiperiod)andpreventso-calledimmoralityinpublic,suchasacoupleholdinghandsorkissing, intensifiedat thesame time.10Khatami’spurgeof theMOIShasbeenreversedandmanyofthosesuspectedofcomplicityintheserialmurdersof1998havereturned.Peacefuldemonstrationsarebrokenupanddemonstratorsarrestedandheldforextendedperiods.Itissadbeyondwordsthatthepresidentofacountrywithsuchadiverseandprofoundintellectualheritage—andsuchanancient and important Jewish presence—should seek to make a splash with a conference for aninternationalragbagofwild-eyedHolocaustdeniersandanexhibitionofoffensiveandinanecartoons.But the propensity of the Iranian regime toHolocaust denial did not beginwithAhmadinejad, just asIranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and their attacks on Israel, goes back many years.Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be wiped off the map—or according to a more precise translation,“erasedfromthepageoftime”—wasfoolishandirresponsible.11HispositionontheproblemofIsraelandthePalestinians—thatIsraelwascreatedforEuropeanJewsasamanifestationofEuropeanguiltaftertheNaziHolocaust,andthattheIsraelisshouldgobacktoEurope—wasignorantandcrass.TheJewsofIsraelcamefromawidevarietyofcountriesoveralongperiod,includinglargenumbersinthelasttwo

decades from the former Soviet Union. Plainly the shock of the Holocaust was one factor in theestablishmentofIsrael,butsotoowasthepoorpositionofJewsinIslamiccountriesatthattime.IntheyearsimmediatelyaftertheestablishmentofthestateofIsraelin1948,roughlyequalnumberscamefromIslamiccountriesontheonehand,andfromEuropeontheother(including,forexample,around260,000fromMorocco,129,290fromIraq,29,295fromEgypt,229,779fromRomania,156,011fromPoland,and11,552 fromGermany in the period 1948–195512).Of course,many tens of thousands of Iranian Jewswent to Israel in thoseyearsalso. In thatperiodJews in theMiddleEast, justasmuchas theJewsofEurope,wereseekingacountryinwhichtheycouldbemastersoftheirowndestiny—inwhichtheycouldresistpersecutionwiththeirownmeans,asopposedtohopinguncertainlyforthefriendlyinterventionofnon-Jewishstatepowers,ashadalwaysbeenthecaseintheDiaspora.Anti-SemitismhadnotbeenjustaEuropean phenomenon, and in some degree the present problem of relations betweenMuslims in theMiddleEastand Israelis ismerelya transformedand relocatedversionof theoldproblemofhow themajorityof Islamicpeoplesof theMiddleEast related to theminorityof Jews (andotherdhimmis) intheir midst. Notwithstanding the real need for a solution to the suffering of the Palestinians, forAhmadinejadtoexpecttheIsraelistoreturntotheirformerstatusassecond-classcitizensandvictimsintheMiddleEastisunrealisticpoliticalposturing.

THENUCLEARDISPUTEAhmadinejad’sprovocativeremarksaboutIsraelsoundedthemorethreateningbecauseofthecontinuingdisputeover Iran’s nuclear program.MostWestern states suspected Iranof trying to acquire a nuclearweaponcapability,which,ifacquired,wouldhavebeenacontraventionofIran’scommitmentsundertheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)andassociatedagreements.TheIraniansclaimedthat theyhadnonuclearweaponambitionsandsaid,correctly,thattheotherNPTsignatorystateswereboundtoassistIran’s civil nuclear program under their NPT commitments. The International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) found no clear evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapon program. But after the discovery ofundeclarednuclearsitesatArakandNatanzin2002,theIAEAsaidthattheIranianshadrepeatedlyfailedtomeet safeguardsobligations and that it couldnot be confident that therewereno further undeclarednuclearactivitiesormaterialsinIran.TheIAEA’schairman,Dr.MohamedElBaradei,calledforgreatercooperation and openness from the Iranians to dispel legitimate suspicions about an Iranian nuclearweaponprogram.OtherspointedoutthatIranhadnotbeenobligedtodeclarethesitesatArakandNatanzbecause theywere not yet operational. In the autumnof 2005, the IAEAdeclared that Iranwas not incompliancewiththeNPTSafeguardsagreement.Afterthat,theUNSecurityCouncilcalleduponIrantosuspenduraniumenrichmentandthenimposedsanctions.

UraniumenrichmentisachievedbyspinninguraniumgasinacentrifugetoseparatethemorefissileUranium-235isotopefromthelessfissileUranium-238isotope.Uranium-235is the isotopeneededfornuclearreactions,anduraniumcontainingahigherthannormalproportionofUranium-235isdescribedas“enriched.”Uraniumenrichedtobetweentwoandthreepercentissatisfactoryforacivilnuclearreactorbutneedstobefurtherenrichedtoninetypercentormoreforanuclearweapon.Thisistheproblem:civiluraniumenrichmentisalegitimateactivityundertheNPT.Butoncetheenrichmentprocesshasbegun,thedifferencebetweenenrichmenttolevelsconsistentwithciviluseandthelevelsnecessaryforweaponsisdifficulttoverifyfromoutside.IranhasbeenenrichinguraniumsinceApril2006,andestimatesforthetime needed to gather enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb range from two to eight years,dependingonthenumberofcentrifugesandtheefficiencyoftheoperation.

TheIsraeliandU.S.governments,amongmanyothers,madeplainearlyonthattheywouldnotacceptIran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. But within Iran, Ahmadinejad and other politicians presentedoppositiontotheirprogramasWesternblockingofIraniancivilnuclearpower,andthedisputeproducedanupsurgeofnationalistfeelinginfavorofIran’srighttonuclearpower.Thisshadedambiguouslyintosupport in somequarters for Iran tobe a nuclear power—that is, a powerwithnuclearweapons, likePakistan, India, Israel, France,Russia,China, theUK, and theUnitedStates.Meanwhile, as the clockticked and the centrifuges spun, Israelwarned that itwould takemilitary action to destroy the Iraniannuclear (weapon)programif itwasnothaltedbyothermeans.Someof the rhetoricagainst Iran in theUnitedStatescouldbedismissedasignoranceandpoliticalscaremongering.Israeliconcernscouldnot.

If the Iranian leadership had been determined to acquire a nuclear capability, even Israeli orU.S.bombingcampaignscouldhavenotstoppeditindefinitely—theprocessescouldhavebeendispersedandconcealed in deep underground bunkers, if they had not been already. But the declaration by Iranianreligiousleadersagainstownershipofnuclearweaponscountedforsomething.AcapabilitytoproduceanuclearweaponincircumstancesofanacutesecuritycrisiswouldhavebeenalmostasdesirablefortheIranianregimeasaweaponitself:itwouldhavehadmostofthedeterrenteffectofanactualweapon—andtheonlyrealutilityofnuclearweaponsisdeterrence.ThatmayhavebeentherealIranianaim(verymuch with the experience of the Iran-Iraq War in mind)—but even that may not have been a fixed,determinedaim.IfIranhadbeenabletonormalizeitsrelationswiththeUnitedStates,removethethreatofregimechange,andobtainevenalimitedversionofthesortofsecurityguaranteesU.S.alliesenjoy,theperceived need for a nuclear weapon capability would have been much reduced, if not removedaltogether. Thatmay have been part of the significance of theGrandBargain offer of 2003.After theNational Intelligence Estimate of November 2007, and the revelation it contained, that the U.S.intelligence agencies collectively believed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapon program in 2003,tension eased and the possibility of negotiation toward a resolution of the nuclear dispute andnormalizationof relationsbecamea littlemore realistic.At least thedangerof conflict receded, for atime.

EMPIREOFTHEMIND?Thedeeper,reflective,humaneIranisstilltherebeneaththethreateningmediaheadlines.Iraniancinemaisoneofthemostremarkablephenomenaofthecountrysincetherevolution.BannedfromthethemesofviolenceandsexregardedbyHollywoodasindispensable,Iranhasproducedacinemaofuniquepoeticartistry anduniversal appeal thathaswonmany internationalprizes.Directors likeAbbasKiarostami,Jafar Panahi,MohsenMakhmalbaf, and his daughter SamiraMakhmalbaf have become internationallyrecognized throughfilms likeTheApple,10,TasteofCherry,TheCircle,Blackboards,andColourofGod.Manyofthesefilmsdevelopsubjectsdealingwiththemistreatmentofwomen,thevulnerabilityofchildren, the effectsofwar, thedistortionsof Iranianpolitics and society, andother themescriticalortendingtobecriticaloftheIslamicregime.SomesaythatmanyIranians,especiallyyoungIranians,neverwatchthesefilms,choosinginsteadtoseeHollywood-stylefilmromancesthatnevergetanoutingintheWest.But this cinema nonetheless shows the enduring greatness, the potential, the confidence, and thecreativepowerofIranianthoughtandexpression.

Iran and Persian culture have been hugely influential in world history. Repeatedly, what Iran hasthoughttoday,therestoftheworld(orsignificantpartsofit)hasbelievedtomorrow.AtvariousstagesIranhas trulybeenanEmpireof theMind, and in a sense it is still—Iranianculture continues tohold

togetheranethnicallyandlinguisticallydiversenation.IranispoisednowtotakeonabiggerroleinIraq,Afghanistan,andtheregiongenerallythanithastakenformanyyears.ButisIrananempireofthefuture?Inotherwords,canIrantaketheroleofimportanceandinfluenceintheMiddleEastandthewiderworldthatisherdue?

Thishastobeconsidereddoubtful.Oneelementofthedoubtiswhetherthewiderworldcommunitywill allow Iran that role. But another doubt, the main doubt, is whether today’s Iran, governed by anarrow and self-serving clique, is capable of that wider role. In the past, at its best, Iran attained aposition of influence by fostering and celebrating her brightest and bestminds—by facing complexityhonestly, with tolerance, and by developing principles to deal with it. Today Iran is ruled bymerelycunning minds, while the brightest and best emigrate or are imprisoned, or stay mute out of fear. Agenerationofthebest-educatedIraniansinIran’shistoryhavegrownup(morethanhalfofthemwomen)onlytobeintimidatedandgagged.Iran’sinternationalpositionhasbeenoneofextremeisolationforovertwenty years, andwhen one of Iran’s sharpest andmost humaneminds, Shirin Ebadi, won the NobelPeacePrizein2003,theenthusiasmwithwhichshewasfetedinthewideworldcontrasteddismallywiththeway shewas ignored by the Iranian government on her return. Since 1979 Iran has challenged theWest, andWestern conceptions of what civilization should be. That might have been praiseworthy initself,haditnotbeenforthesufferingandoppression,thedishonestyanddisappointmentthatfollowed.CouldIranoffermorethanthat?Irancould,andshould.

EPILOGUE

Sincetheearlyeditionsofthisbookwerepublishedinlate2007andearly2008,eventsinIranandaboutIranhavecontinued toattractattentionaround theworld.Butevents in thewiderworldhavehad theireffectinIran,too.TheelectionofPresidentBarackObamaattheendof2008createdanewpredicamentfor the rulinggrouparoundSupremeLeaderAliKhamenei.Obama’searlydeclarationsofopenness todirect talkswith the Iranians, his preparedness to speak of the Islamic republic as such rather than incircumlocutory terms that avoided appearing to recognize the regime, as previous administrations haddone,andhiscleverlycraftedNoruzmessageinMarch20091challengedthestalerhetoricoftheIranianregimeand forced them tocontemplate a change in theirownpoliciesof intransigence.Butboth sidesknew that little could be expected to shift in the U.S.-Iran relationship in advance of the IranianpresidentialelectionscheduledforJune2009.Manypeople,bothoutsideIranandwithin,hopedthattheelection would produce an Iranian leader with a new, positive outlook to complement Obama’s,permittingsomerealprogressatlonglast.

Itwasnottobe.Onceagain, theIranianpresidentialelectionproducedasurprise—all themoresobecausethistimethesurprisewasofadifferentorderaltogetherfromthesurprisesofpastelections.In1997andin2005,surpriseoutsidershadwontheelections.Thistimethesurprisewasintheconductofthe election itself,which led toweeks of demonstrations and unrest of an intensity not seen since therevolutionof1978–1979.

In the last week before election day on June 12, many observers discerned a growing wave ofenthusiasm for the leading opposition candidate,Mir-HoseinMousavi.Mousavi had served as primeminister during the Iran-IraqWar, but, likeKhatami before him, he appeared to have neither the trackrecord nor the charisma of someone likely to shake the foundations of the state. The perception of adevelopingmovementbehindMousaviwasreinforcedbyearlyindicationsofahighturnout,suggestingthat pro-reform voters who had boycotted the election in 2005 had turned out to vote this time. Butalthoughthevotes,whentheywerecounted,certainlyshowedahighturnout—eighty-fivepercent—theygave Ahmadinejad a whopping sixty-three percent of the vote, well over the fifty percent thresholdneededtowinthepolloutright(lessthanfiftypercentwouldhavemeantasecondroundofvoting,witharun-offbetweenthetwocandidateswhohadwonmostvotesinthefirstround).

In assessing the outcome of the election, it is necessary to be clear that no one has yet producedconclusiveproofthattheresultswerefalsified.Buttherewereanumberofsuspiciousindications.Onewas that previous precedents for release of the resultswere abandoned—normally results emergedbyregion, but this time successive announcements were made on the basis of a larger number of votescountedeachtime,forthecountryasawhole—andeachtimetheproportionofeachnewtrancheofvotesgoingtoeachcandidatewassuspiciouslysimilar.Thedistributionofvotesforeachcandidate,whenthefinal results were out, showed again the same suspicious consistency across rural and urban voting

districts,andinthosedominatedbyreligiousandethnicminorities—asifsomeonehadpickedfiguresforthefinalresultandhadthenappliedthatformulatoeachpartofthecountryinarbitraryfashion,withthehelpofacomputerprogram.AgainstallpreviousexperienceinIranianelections,therewasnosignificantsignofaswingtowardcandidatesintheirhomedistricts:theproportionalformulaheldupeventhere.

The regime’shandlingof the results deepened suspicions to thepoint atwhich the election lookedincreasinglylikeacoupcarriedoutbytherulinggroup tokeepAhmadinejad inoffice.Severalmonthsbefore the election, Supreme Leader Khamenei had made statements supportive of Ahmadinejad thatalreadymarkedadeparturefrompreviouspractice.Aftertheelectionresultscameout,KhameneispokeforcefullyinsupportofAhmadinejad’sreelectionwithinafewhours,acclaimingitasadivinejudgment;previouslytheSupremeLeaderhadwaiteduntil theGuardianCouncilratifiedtheresult,whichusuallytookthreedays.Evenbeforethefinalresultswereknown,inthesmallhoursofthemorning,policeandtroopswereonthestreetstoforestalldemonstrations.TheysurroundedtheInteriorMinistry(fromwhichthe results were being announced) and Mousavi’s campaign headquarters, severely hampering theoppositionmovement’scommunicationsandtheirabilitytorespondtoevents.

Over the followingweeks a number of rumors emerged that, taken together,may go someway toexplain how the election turned out as it did. It seems that the ruling clique became increasinglyconcernedinthespringof2009thattheelectionsmightdevelopabandwagoneffectcomparabletothatwhich resultedwith the election of President Khatami in 1997—an outcome theywere determined toavoid. One version says that the government conducted a secret poll that showed an outright win forMousavi. Several reports purporting to come from dissidents in the Interior Ministry alleged thatreformist-orientedstaffwerepurgedandswiftlyreplacedbyAhmadinejad’ssupporters,whosetaboutaplantofalsifytheresults.TherewereanumberofsuggestionsthattheclericmostcloselyassociatedwithAhmadinejad—AyatollahMesbahYazdi—hadissuedarulingthatallmeanswerelegitimatetoensurethecontinuationoftheprevailingformofIslamicgovernment.

It is plain thatmanyvoters turnedout forAhmadinejad on June12.Theusual judgment is that hissupport was strongest in the countryside and among the poorer sections of the electorate. Voters whodistrustedboththeregimeandtheperceivedurbansophisticationoftheoppositioncandidates,andstillweredisenchantedwiththereformists,mayhavevotedforAhmadinejadbecause,unlikeotherpoliticians,helookedandsoundedlikethem—theyunderstoodhimandfelttheycouldtrusthiminspiteofhisfailureto reverse worsening economic conditions and standards of living in his first term. Many IranianssupportedhisstrongstanceagainsttheWestandinfavorofIran’srighttoacivilnuclearprogram.Inthecountryside it was also easier for the regime to coerce voters—whether by increases in salaries justbefore the election, or by threats. But one should not go too far (as some have) in characterizing theelection as a confrontation between an urbanized, westernized, vocalminority and a relatively silent,ruralmajority.ThepopulationofIranin2009wasmorethansixtypercenturban.

Whateveronemaybelieveaboutwhathappened,thereactionwasimmediateandstrong.ThousandsofIraniansturnedoutonthestreetsofTehranandothercitiestoprotest,wearingscarvesorbandanasingreen, the color of theMousavi campaign.Within a few days, the number of protesters had grown tohundredsofthousands,withestimatessayingamillionormoreonMonday,June15.Theirnumbersandtheirdiverseoriginsbeliedthethoughtthatthiswasmerelysourgrapesfromanisolatedgroup.Europeanand U.S. news media reported excitedly that these were the biggest demonstrations in Iran since therevolution. In the evenings, Iraniansgatheredon rooftops to shoutAllahuAkbar, as they had in 1978–1979.

Respondingonthefirstweekendofthedemonstrations,AhmadinejadreferredtothedemonstratorsasKhasoKhashak—dustandtrashorflotsamandjetsam—thatwouldbesweptaway.Buttheydidnotgo

away.Despitebeatingsandarrestsandeffortsbytheregimetopreventanyreportingoftheprotests,theycontinued,andIraniansfoundwaystogetreportingoutofIran, includingthroughnewInternetchannelslikeFacebookandTwitter.

OntheeveningofJune20,ayoungwomancalledNedaAgha-Soltangotoutofhercar,whichwasobstructed by the protesting crowds on Kargar Avenue in central Tehran, to escape the heat. Soonafterward, shewas shot in the chest anddespite the efforts of those aroundher, including a doctor, tostanch the flow of blood, shewas deadwithin a fewminutes.Bystanders filmed the event onmobiletelephones,andtheimageswentaroundtheworldonYouTube.Nedabecameasymboloftheprotestsandofthebrutalityoftheregime’sconduct(regimespokesmenlaterclaimedthatshehadbeenshotbytheCIAorotherforeigners).Despitethedwindlingofthestreetprotestsinlaterweeks,underpressurefromthepoliceandtheBasijmilitia,demonstratorsturnedoutagaininlargenumbersonJuly30,thefortiethdayafterherdeath,toprotestagainsttheshooting.2ThereweredemonstrationsagainonSeptember18,whenthe regime attempted to hold its usual event (Qods day—Jerusalem day) to show support for thePalestinians against Israel. Opposition demonstrators, making use of the fact that the color used tosymbolizethePalestiniancause,likethatoftheMousavicampaign,wasgreen,appearedagainenmasse,tookovertheeventandshouteddowntheofficialslogans.

OnNovember4thedemonstratorsdiditagain,takingovertheofficialeventtomarkthirtyyearssincetheoccupationoftheU.S.embassyin1979.ThousandsofprotestersappearedinTehran,defyingarrestbythe police and the Basij, and there were similar manifestations in Isfahan, Rasht, Shiraz and Tabriz.Insteadof thewearyregimemantraofmargbarAmrika (death toAmerica),somecalled insteadmargbarhichkas—deathtonobody.

As the disturbanceswent on, so the number of arrests and prisoners in custody grew.Through thesummerandautumnuglystoriesspreadofthetortureanddeathofprotestersincustody.Estimatesofthenumberofdeathsmountedtoseveralhundred.AttheendofJulytheSupremeLeaderorderedtheclosureof the Kahrizak detention center after protests from opposition figures about torture, and the death ofMohsenRuholamini,thesonofaprominentconservativepolitician.InNovemberayoungdoctor,RaminPourandarzjani,whohadseenRuholaminishortlybeforehisdeathandhadbeenpressuredtosaythathehaddiedofmeningitis,himselfdiedinsuspiciouscircumstancesatTehranpoliceheadquarters.

SomeWesterncommentatorsdeclaredthattheoutcomeoftheelectionwasimmaterialbecausetherewas little to choose between the policy intentions of the two main protagonists, Mousavi andAhmadinejad.Thatmissedthepoint.Mousaviandhisreformistsupporterswerenotlookingtooverturnthe Islamic republic, but what had happened was no less important for the fact that they were notfollowingaWestern-inspiredagenda.Byfalsifyingtheelectionresults(aswaswidelybelievedtohavehappened),theregimehadgonemuchfurtherthaneverbeforeinsubvertingtherepresentativeelementintheIranianconstitutionandhadprecipitatedacrisisovertheverynatureoftheIslamicrepublic.

Important figures like former presidentsRafsanjani andKhatamiwere openly critical ofwhat hadhappened. The opposition candidates Mousavi and Karrubi refused to be silenced. Several leadingclericscriticizedtheconductoftheelection,andothersstayedpointedlysilent.Thecrisiswasnotjustaconfrontationbetween the regimeanda sectionof thepopulace; itwasalsoa crisiswithin the regimeitself.TheSupremeLeaderAliKhameneiwasforcedtotakeamorepartisanpositionthaneverbefore,abandoningthenotionthathisofficeputhimaboveday-to-daypolitics.Thedemonstratorsrewardedhimwith the chantmarg bar diktatur (death to the dictator). His position was weakened.Many Iranians,particularlyGreenMovementsupporters,felttheywerenowbeingruledunderthethreatofnakedforce,undertheaegisofarulinggroupwhoseclaimtoIslamiclegitimacyhadwornverythin.

In the meantime, the regime blamed Western governments for instigating the demonstrations,

presenting the Obama administration with a sharpened dilemma: should America pursue its policy ofdétentewitharegimethathadjust,inthejudgmentofmanyofitsowncitizens,stolenanelectioninsuchabare-facedmanner?ThelogicofengagementwithIranhadnotdependeduponthevirtueorotherwiseofthe Iranian regime, and cautious attempts to engagewith the Iranians continued.But revelations in theautumnthatshowedtheIraniangovernmenthadbeenconstructingauraniumenrichmentfacilityatFordownearQomandwasconductingnewmissiletestsincreasedthepressurefornewsanctions.

The election and its aftermath further strengthened the position of the Revolutionary Guard corps—Sepah-ePasdaran.TheircloserelationshipwithPresidentAhmadinejadwaswellknown,and thereweremanyreports(asin2005)oftheirengagementintheelectioncampaigninhisinterest.Theregime’sdependenceonthemtofacedownoppositionandkeeptherulinggroupinpowerwasonlyintensifiedbythe outcome of June 12. The role of the Revolutionary Guard in every aspect of Iranian life, andespecially in the economy, had been increasing and strengthening for many years. It was emphasizedfurtherinOctober2009whenacompanylinkedtotheRevolutionaryGuardspaidtheequivalentofUS$8billion foracontrollingshare in thestate telecommunicationsmonopoly.Thecountrywasbeginning tolook more and more like a military dictatorship—a tighter and more effective version of what therevolutionhadbroughtdownin1979.AftertheJune12election,AyatollahMontazericommented,“WhatwehaveisnotIslamicrepublicbutmilitaryrepublic.”3

OnDecember19,2009,Montazeridied inhis sleepat theageofeighty-seven.Therewere furtherdemonstrations associated with his funeral in Qom on December 21, and pro-regime thugs attackedMousavi andKarrubi there in the street.More demonstrations tookplace onDecember 27, the dayofAshura, inIsfahan,KermanshahandShirazaswellas inTehran;4oppositiondemonstratorswereagainattacked,andMousavi’snephewwasshotandkilled.OnFebruary11,2010(theanniversaryofthefinaltriumph of the revolution in 1979), the regime countered the opposition’s practice of using familiarcalendardatestotakeoverofficialeventsbyclosingdownInternetserversandmobilephonenetworksandclosingoffaccesstoAzadiSquaretoallbutpro-regimesupportersbusedinfromoutside.TherewasanotherattemptonFebruary14,2011—againtheregime’stacticsoffloodingthestreetswithpoliceandBasij,preventingsmallgroupsfromcoalescingintolargerones,andclosingdowntelephoneandInternetcommunicationsprovedeffective.Thatattemptwas the last forsome timeby theopposition toexpresstheir continuing disapproval of the regime on the streets. The hardline leadership took Mousavi andKarrubiintohousearrest,wheretheyremainatthetimeofthiswriting(December2015).LargenumbersofreformistsleftthecountryandwentintoexileafterJune2009,andanunknownadditionalnumberarestillinprison.

InJune2015apollwastakeninIranabouttheeventsof2009andattitudestotheGreenMovement.Onehas tobecautiousaboutallpolling,especiallypollingwithinIran(where thosepolledoftenhavereal concerns about anonymity), but the results are nonetheless of interest. Of those polled, fifty-ninepercentsaidthattheybelievedtheresultsofthe2009electionwereaccurateandthatnofraudhadtakenplace;nineteenpercent said therehadbeen fraudby thegovernment, and twenty-twopercent said theydidn’tknoworcouldnotcomment.Thepollalsoindicatedthatbetter-educated,urbanIraniansweremorelikelytodoubttheoutcomeoftheelection,anditfoundthatexactlythesameproportionsofthosepolled(28 percent in each case) used the term “GreenMovement” as used the term “Sedition” (the Iraniangovernment’stermforthosewhodemonstratedagainstthe2009electionresult).5HoweverskepticalonemaybefromoutsideIran,onemustaccept thatasignificantproportionof Iranians,perhapsamajority,believe that the outcome of the election was valid. The election produced, or reflected, among otherthings,asignificantdivisioninIraniansocietyitself.

Thecrisisof2009threwintohighreliefanumberofimportantquestionsaboutasubjectoftenclose

totheheartsofacademics—thelegitimacyofgovernment.Theeventsof2009damaged the legitimacyof the Islamic regime in Iran,andespecially thatof its

Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. But when the regime still commanded the loyalty of the securityapparatus, the Basij and the Revolutionary Guard, how much did that matter? Many observers haveinsistedthatIranisnotatotalitarianstate,liketheformerSovietUnion.TheelectionofJune2009tookIranclosertototalitarianism,butnotalltheway.Onepointertothat,withoutminimizingtheabusesthattookplaceorthebraveryoftheoppositioninthefaceofthem,wasthereluctanceoftheregimetousethefull forceavailable to itagainst thedemonstrators.Theeventsof theso-calledArabSpringfrom2011onward provided a comparison (some Iranians have claimed that the demonstrations of the GreenMovement were the precursors of and the inspiration for what happened in Tunisia and Egypt). TheIranianregimeusedbrutality,butitdidnotgotowarwithitsownpeoplelikeGaddafi inLibyaortheAssadregimeinSyria.Foralongtime,MousaviandKarrubiwereallowedtoremainatlarge,speakingout againstwhat had happened.The regime stillwanted tomaintain its own self-image of democracy.Whenhecameunderpressure,KhameneicloseddownKahrizak.Sotherewasstilluncertaintyabouthowfartheregimewouldgoinitsrepression,andwhetheritssecurityinstrumentswouldobeyitifitwenttoofar. The revolution, like most revolutions, ended in strengthening the Iranian state, but the regime’sunderstandingofitsownoriginsinpopularstruggleagainsttyrannystillactedasarestrainingfactor.

Inaddition,politicsinIranhasarubber-ballquality.ItisasifyousqueezepoliticsinIraninonearea,itbulgesoutirrepressiblyinanother.

ThisshowedagaininthepublicrowbetweenKhameneiandAhmadinejadthatbrokeoutinthespringand summer of 2011.Beginningwith a dispute overAhmadinejad’s attempt to dismiss hisminister ofintelligence,HeydarMoslehi,itdevelopedintoamajorrift,withthedangerousaccusationof“deviance”leveledatAhmadinejad,andthearrestofsomeofhisassociates(someofthelatter,bizarrely,werealsoaccusedof sorcery).Given the lengths towhichKhameneihadgone todefendAhmadinejad’s electionresult in2009, fewwouldhavepredicted thatwithin twoyears theywouldbeas estranged fromeachotherasKhameneiandKhatamihadbeenin2000.

If therewere limits to the degree that the statewould use its coercive power, therewere perhapslimits also to the lengths Iranianswereprepared togoagainst the regime.After June2009 thereweremanyreiterationsoftheopposition’scommitmenttononviolence,andithasbeenacommonplacetohearIranianssaythattheyhaveexperiencedonerevolutionandtheydonotwantanother.InIranianpolitics,theprincipleofnonviolencemayyetproveastrengthratherthanaweakness,butthereformmovement,generally,sincethe1990s,hasoftenprovedham-fistedatusingittoachieverealpoliticalresults.

The crisis of 2009was asmuch a crisiswithin the regime as a confrontationbetween regime andcitizens.ThewaythatRafsanjaniappearedtohavebeenmarginalizedafter2009wasameasureofthat.OneelementinthesuccessoftheIranianregimeinsurvivingsincetherevolutionhasbeenthewaythatitsinstitutionshaveadaptedtoabsorbfactionanddissent.Khomeinihimselforganizedandreorganizedthesystemandshiftedhisinterventionstofavorfirstonefactionandthenanother,toachievethateffectandtokeepadiversityofelementsandfactionsinplay.Butbetween2009and2013,thehardlineRightmadethemselvesdominant,excludedtheLeftandthereformists—includingalargenumberofprominentformerregime adherents and supporters—subverted revolutionary institutions, became ever more reliant onnakedforce,andfelltosquabblingamongthemselves.

Intheautumnof2011,theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)producedanewreportontheIranian nuclear program. When it at length emerged, there was not all that much new in it, and inparticular itdidnotoverturn the2007National IntelligenceEstimate (NIE) judgment that Iranianworktoward a nuclearweapon had ceased in 2003.But itwasmuch trailed in advance as likely to reveal

threatening new facts about the Iranian program, andwas used, alongwith other causes of tension, tojustifynewsanctionsmeasures.Theseweremuchmoreseriousthanpreviousmeasures,largelyblockingIranofffromtheinternationalbankingsystemandmakingitmuchmoredifficulttoexportoil.TheIranianrial lost half of its valueby January2012, and fell further afterwards.Thenew sanctionswerehighlydamaging to the already weak Iranian economy; inflation soared and many imported goods becameunaffordable.Ordinarypeoplefoundtheycouldnotpayforstaplefoodslikericeandchicken.

Mostobserversexpected,giventhecontinuingtightcontroloverpoliticalactivityandgeneral tenseatmosphere,thatthepresidentialelectionofJune2013wouldfollowthepatternofthatof2009,withtheregimemanipulating theprocess tosecure theelectionofacandidatealignedwith theSupremeLeaderandhiscircle.Thisexpectationseemedtobeconfirmedwhenthecandidates listwasvetted inMaytoexcludeRafsanjani.Thiswasashock—Rafsanjanihadbeenhumiliatedatelectionsin2000and2005bytheelectorate,but for the formerpresident tobevetoedby theGuardianCouncil seemed toemphasizeeven further the degree to which the system had swung to the right, narrowing its base of support.Rafsanjaniwasseeminglybeingpunishedforcriticalstatementshehadmadeintheaftermathofthe2009election.Ahmadinejad’spreferredcandidatewasalsoexcluded,effectivelyconsigninghimandhisbrandofpoliticstooblivion.

But the listofcandidateswas interesting inotherways, too.Of theeight that theGuardianCouncilapproved,therewerefivehardlineconservatives(Jalili,Qalibaf,Rezai,VelayatiandHaddad-Adel),onemoderateconservative(Rouhani)andtworeformists(ArefandGharazi).Qalibaf,VelayatiandRezaihadall lost inpreviouspresidentialelections,ArefandGharaziwerenotprominentorcharismaticfigures,and Rouhani, though well known as a diplomat and nuclear negotiator, had never cut a big figure inpopularpolitics.Butthreeofthecandidateshadseriousforeignpolicyexperience(Velayati,RouhaniandJalili)andevenatthisearlystageitlookedasthoughtheregimewantedtoemphasizetheforeignpolicyangle,presumablywithaviewtofindingasolutiontothenuclearproblem,andrelieffromsanctions.

UntilthelastdaysbeforethepollonJune14,theelectioncampaigndidnotcatchfireinthewaythe2009 election had, and many felt that the televised debates were for the most part lackluster bycomparison with four years earlier. The crisis over the economy, sanctions and the nuclear programdominatedthecampaign.Jalili,whohadbeenthechiefnuclearnegotiatorunderAhmadinejad,appearedatfirsttobethepreferredregimecandidate.ButinonehighlysignificantmomentinthedebatesVelayati(of all the candidates perhaps the one closest to Khamenei himself) criticized Jalili’s conduct of thenuclear negotiations for being excessively obstructive and unimaginative—an unprecedented publicdisplayofdisagreementwithinthehighestcirclesoftheregimeonthemostsensitiveandvitalmattersofstate security.Given that Jalili had been following the approved regime line in the negotiations at thetime,thecriticismwasalsoratherunfair,butitwasanotherindicationofthewaythatpolicywasshifting.

As election day drew closer Aref and Haddad-Adel dropped out, and Aref gave his support toRouhani,helpingRouhani’seffortstopresenthimselfasacandidatenotjustformoderatesandthosewhomight have voted for Rafsanjani but for reformists also. Rouhani made statements in favor of femaleequality, release of political prisoners, and free speech, all ofwhichwere aimed at gathering supportfrom reformists; this effort was helped enormously when Khatami gave him his endorsement shortlybeforethepoll.SomethingofabandwagonofenthusiasmforRouhanididfinallydevelopinthelasthoursofthecampaign.

Whenthevoteswerecounted,itemergedthatRouhanihadbeenelectedwith50.7percentofthevote,narrowlysqueakingpastthefiftypercentthresholdrequiredforacandidatetosucceedwithoutasecondvotinground.Hewaswellaheadofhisnearestrival,MohammadQalibaf,withmorethanthreetimesthenumberofvotes.

Giventhescaleoftheallegedfraudinthe2009election,onemightthinkthatitwouldnothavebeendifficulttoskewthe2013resultbytheoneortwopercentagepointsnecessarytoensurethatthevotingwenttoasecondround—anditwasfarfromclearthatRouhaniwouldhavewonasecondround.ThisindicatedagainthattheconductoftheelectionimpliedadecisionbyKhameneiandhiscircleinfavorofa candidate well placed and well qualified to resolve the nuclear dispute—an impression reinforcedfurther by a story reported in the Iranian press later to the effect that Rouhani’s candidacy had onlynarrowlybeenapprovedby theGuardianCouncilafter thechairman,AyatollahJannati,had intervenedpersonallyinhisfavor.

ButRouhani’selectionseemstohavehadanother,moredomesticsignificancealso.TheAhmadinejadpresidencyhadbeenasignificantlurchtotherightinIranianpolitics.Theoutcomeofthe2009elections,which increased thedependenceof theSupremeLeaderon theRevolutionaryGuardand therestof thesecurityapparatus,wasadangerousfurtherlurchinthesamedirection.Khomeiniinhistimehadalwaystried to keep Left and Right in balance. Despite the fact that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad eventuallyemerged still on top, the huge demonstrations that followed the disputed election of 2009 must havesoundedawarningtoKhamenei.Inthatcontext,andwithoutdetractingfromRouhani’ssuccess,theresultofthe2013electionlookedalsolikeadeliberaterebalancingtowardmorebroad-basedgovernment.

Sincethe1979revolutionHasanRouhanibelongedtothatgroupofclericsassociatedwithRafsanjani(and Beheshti before him)—conservative, but modernizing and above all pragmatic, with significantdirectexperienceof life in theWestandgoodability inWesternlanguages(at theendof the1990s,heearnedaPhDatGlasgowCaledonianUniversity,albeitlargelyonadistancelearningbasis).Formostofhiscareer,RafsanjanihasbeenRouhani’smainpatronandmentor,butRouhanihasbeenwellconnectedwithothermajorfiguresacrossthesystem.In1989hewasappointedsecretaryoftheSupremeNationalSecurityCouncil (SNSC)—a powerful position of trust thatmeant he chaired preparatorymeetings asKhamenei’s representative. In the closing years of the Khatami presidency Rouhani came to newprominence (fromOctober 2003), as the chief negotiator for Iran on the nuclear question—the Iranianpressgavehimthenicknameof“diplomatsheikh”—butheresignedfromthenuclearnegotiatorjob(andfromthepositionassecretaryoftheSNSC)shortlyafterAhmadinejad’selectionin2005.

Afterhiselectionaspresident in2013,Rouhanimadeclearhis intention topushforward towardaresolutionofthenucleardisputeasamatterofurgency.InSeptemberhewenttoNewYorkfortheUNGeneralAssembly (UNGA), and inhis speech thereonSeptember24he said that theeraof zero-sumgames in international relationswasover—coercionand threathad tobe replacedbycompromiseanddialogue to solve tensions and conflicts. Iranwas ready to remove “all reasonable doubts” about hernuclearprogram,but thebestway to resolve thequestion lay throughacceptanceof Iran’s“inalienablerights.”Thespeechwascarefullywrittenfordomesticaswellasinternationalhearing,butperhapsmoreimportant were the responses of interlocutors to private talks with the Iranian team (led by the newforeignminister,MohammadJavadZarif)inthemarginsoftheUNGA.AmericanandBritishdiplomatsimmediatelywelcomedanew,moreconciliatoryandworkmanlikeapproachfromtheIranianside.Andthen, as the politicians and diplomats left New York three days later, Rouhani and Obama spoke bytelephone in what was generally interpreted as a breakthrough—the first such exchange since 1979.Diehard hardliners in Iranmadedissenting noises onRouhani’s return, butmuchmore importantwerecontinuingstatementsfromKhameneiinRouhani’ssupport.WithKhameneibehindhim,Rouhanididnothavetoworrytoomuchaboutthosediscordantnotes.

TalksresumedinOctoberbetweenIranandtheP5+1(thepermanentfiveoftheUNSecurityCouncil—theUSA,Britain,France,RussiaandChina,plusGermany)inamuchmorepositivespirit.WhenthenegotiatorsreconvenedinGenevaattheendofNovember,theywereabletoreachaninterimagreement

(onNovember24).ThecoreofthedealwasthatIranagreedtosuspenduraniumenrichmentabovethefivepercent level inexchangefor relaxationofsomesanctions—arelaxationestimated tobeworth$7billion to Iran (“modest,” according to the United States). In addition, the Iranians agreed to beginconvertinguraniumenrichedtoahigherleveltoputitbeyondweaponuse,toincreasethefrequencyandintrusivenessof inspections, to suspendworkon theArakplutoniumplant, and tohalt developmentofimproved centrifuges that would greatly increase the speed and efficiency of enrichment. Furthernegotiationswouldcontinuetowardafinalagreement,tobecompletedwithinsixmonths.Althoughonlyaninterimsettlement,itwasagreatsuccess—adevelopmentwithhugepotentialimplicationsforbetterrelationsbetweenIranandtheUnitedStates,andtherestoftheworld,andperhapsforanimprovementinconditionsintheMiddleEastmorewidely.

It soon emerged that the Iranian negotiators had full backing for the terms they had agreed—AliKhameneiquicklyissuedastatementwelcomingtheagreement,sayingthat“God’sgraceandthesupportof the Iranian nation were the reasons behind this success.” Netanyahu in Israel had spoken stronglyagainstthetalksinGeneva,andblastedtheiroutcomealso,asbeingtoosoftonIran.SimilaroppositionfromSaudiArabiaseemedalsotofallondeafears.Obamawasabletofacedowntheirobjections,buthehadtopersuadeskepticsintheU.S.Congressandelsewheretogivethisnewprocessachanceandnottoimposenewsanctions.TothisendObamaandhiscolleaguespresentedthedealasafirststepthathaltedor reversed the Iraniannuclearprogram.Thatwasonewayof lookingat it; signedoffbysevenof theworld’smostimportantforeignministers,itnonethelessalsosignifiedinternationalrecognitionofIranasamajornuclearpower.

Partof thesignificanceof the interimagreementwasabout thedirections that theUnitedStatesandIran had not taken. They had both pulled back from positions of intransigence, confrontation andescalation.TheIranianscouldhaveremainedobdurateagainstanykindofconcessionsorlimitsontheirnuclearprogram,hunkeringdownandacceptingthepriceofisolationandthemassiveeconomicdamagefrom sanctions that had been making life miserable for their people. The United States could havecontinuedwiththe“noenrichment,can’t trustIran”line,steadilyincreasingthesanctionspressureuntiltheonlysanctionsleftweremilitaryones.ButObamapulledbackfromthat,andtookachanceontrustingtheIranians.ThatwastherealsignificanceoftheGenevaagreement,andtheprocessthatfollowed.

It emerged after the Geneva deal that there had been direct bilateral talks in secret between theIraniansand theUnitedStates sinceMarch2013—wellbeforeRouhanihadbeenelectedaspresident.Big political figures in Iran and in theUnitedStates hadmade a commitment to a positive process ofdiplomacy.Theinvolvementoftheotherstatepartieswasimportant,butinitsessentialsitwasaU.S.-Irannegotiation.Aswithallinitiativesinvolvingacommitmentofthiskind,momentumandthepoliticalcapitalinvestedintheprocesscountedforasmuchasthetechnicaldetails.

Accordingto the interimdealachievedinGeneva,afinalsettlementwas tobeachievedwithinsixmonths.Butpredictably,thenegotiationsproveddifficult,andthedeadlinewaspostponedtwice,inJuneandNovember2014,beforeaframeworkdealwasagreedupononApril2,2015,onthebasisthat thetechnicaldetailsof a final agreementwouldbe completedby the endof June.Eventually, after furtherextensionofdeadlines,afinalanddefinitiveagreementwasmadeinViennaonJuly14.

Building on theGeneva deal, theVienna settlement—officially known as the Joint ComprehensivePlanofAction,orJCPOA—committedIrantoreduceitsnumberofoperationalcentrifugesfromtwentythousandtofewerthansixthousand,toenrichnouraniumbeyondthelevelof3.67percent,tolimitstocksenrichedtothatleveltoamaximumofthreehundredkilograms(forfifteenyears),torestrictresearchanddevelopmentofmoreefficientcentrifuges(forthirteenyears),toconverttheundergroundFordowplanttomedicalresearchwithamoratoriumonenrichment thereforfifteenyears, toredesigntheArakplant to

prevent production of plutonium, to accept more or less continuous supervision of existing sites, andallowaccesstootherfacilitiesonrequest(subjecttoaconsultationperiodoftwenty-fourdaysatmost),andtoagree that the liftingofsanctionswouldbegradualanddependentonfulfillmentof theIranians’obligations.

AlthoughitwasadoptedbytheUNSecurityCouncilwithinafewdays,theagreementwasmetwithastormofcriticismfromRepublicanswithintheU.S.politicalsystem.MuchofthishostilitywasbasedonanassumptionthatIranwasincorrigiblymalevolentanduntrustworthy;hence,theverificationprovisionswereheldtobeinadequate(becausetherewasapossibilityfor theIranians todisguisesomeweapon-relatedactivity),andtheprovisionsforIrantobefreeofsomerestrictionsafterfifteenorthirteenyearswere thought to imply toomuch faith in Iran’sability toestablishahigher levelof trustwith theothercountriesinvolvedwithinthattimeperiod.FromtheRepublicanside,moreconsideredobjectionswereaugmented by a deep-seated conservativemistrust of arms controlmeasures on principle, the visceraldislike of Iran that had endured since 1979, and a profound unwillingness to allow the Obamaadministrationanykindofpolicysuccess.ButObamamadeclearhewouldusehispresidentialvetotoupholdtheagreement;overweeksofdebateitbecameclearthattheoppositionhadlittletoofferinthewayofseriouspolicyalternatives,andeventuallyoppositiontotheagreementinCongresscollapsed.

Congressional misgivings over the agreement were not the only potential problem. Verificationprovisions designed to develop trust can often give rise to renewed disagreement, accusations of badfaith,andacrimony,especially in theshort term.Theagreementalsostipulated that Iranwouldgiveanaccount of previous weapon-related activity—a provision that was never likely to be conducive togoodwill(thisconditionwassatisfiedbyanIAEAreportattheendoftheyear).ButthedealhadbeenpossibleonlybecausetheleadersoftheUnitedStatesandIran,theprimepartiesinvolved,hadbothmadeahugepolitical investment in it.Given the continuationof that high-level commitment fromboth sidesthroughtheverificationprocess,itseemsatleastlikelythattheinevitableproblemswillbeovercome,asbefore.

Assumingthat theagreementholds, resolutionof thenuclearproblemcouldhave importantsecuritybenefitsacross theMiddleEast region.DespiteNetanyahu’sopposition (hedescribed the JCPOAasa“historic mistake”), Israel would benefit more than any other state from a serious normalization ofrelationswithIran,despitethelossofanelementofIsrael’sregionalnucleardominance.RemovalofthenuclearproblemcouldopenupnewpossibilitiesbetweenIranandtheUnitedStates.HighonanyfurtherlistofU.S.wisheswouldberelaxationofIranianhostilitytowardIsrael.If,alongthelinesofwhatwasenvisagedintheGrandBargainofferof2003,IrancouldbebroughttoadefactoacceptanceofIsrael’sexistence and withdraw support for violence against Israel by Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah, thebenefits would surely outweigh Israel’s lingering concerns over Iran’s nuclear program (there werereportsinthelatterpartof2015thatIranhad,infact,ceasedsupporttoHamas).Suchashiftwouldalsohaveapositiveeffect—perhapsnotdecisivebutnonethelesshelpful—ontheconflictbetweenIsraelandthePalestinians.

TheMiddleEastregioncouldbenefitfromreconciliationwithIraninavarietyofways.ItwouldbeofhugebenefitfortheUnitedStatesandotherWesterncountriestobeabletoworkwiththeIranianstoreducethegrowingandviolenthostilitybetweenSunniandShi‘aacrosstheregion,fromSyriatoIraq,Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—perhaps the most threatening development in the contemporaryMiddleEast.ThisopportunitybecamemoreobviousfollowingthecaptureofthecityofMosulinIraqbytheIslamicState(IS)inMay2014—afterwhichtheUnitedStatesandIranbecamedefactoalliesinthefightagainstISinIraq.Inthemediumterm,ifIrancanbecomemoreofapartnerinstabilizingtheregion,itmaydonoharmintherelationsbetweentheWestandSaudiArabia,forexample,too.ASaudiArabia

thathastocompetewithothersfortheattentionandsympathyofWesternnationsmightbemoremotivatedtotakeeffectiveactionagainstthedomesticfactorsthatbreedterrorismandregionalinstability.

ForIranitself,ifthenuclearsettlementholdsandyieldsthefruitallexpectfromit,Iranianscanhopeforrelief fromsanctions,anopening to internationalcommerce,andarenewalofeconomicprosperity.Giventhepotentialoftheeducated,entrepreneurialIranianpeople(nottomentionthehighlydeveloped,highlycompetentIraniandiaspora),theeconomiceffectscouldbedramatic.TheeffectofreducingIran’sisolationwould be likely also to benefit political freedoms and civil societywithin Iran, because thesecurity threat and therefore the justification for repressionwouldalsodiminish.Between thedatesofRouhani’selectionin2013andthenuclearagreementinthesummerof2015,thegeneralassumptionwasthatothermatters,likegreaterpoliticalandpressfreedoms,andthereleaseofpoliticalprisoners,wouldhavetoawaitaresultinthenuclearnegotiations.ThenucleardealwasplainlyasuccessforRouhani,butthe combination of his enhanced prestige and renewed pressure from reformists for progress on thoseothermattersispotentiallydangerousforhimandrequirescarefulhandling.Regimehardliners,jealousoftheirpositionandperhapsdisgruntledalreadywiththeconcessionsmadeintheJCPOA,mightbeinclinedtoreassertthemselvestodemonstratetheircontinuingholdonpowerandtopreventRouhaniencroachingonit.IntheweeksafterthesigningoftheJCPOA,KhameneimadestatementsthatappearedtoprohibitfurtherbilateralcooperationwiththeUnitedStates,andthesewerewidelyinterpretedasreassurancetoregime hardliners that the traditional positions of hostility toward theUnited Stateswere not going tochange.IrandrewcloseralsotoRussiaovertheSyriancrisisintheautumnof2015.ButUnitedStatesandIraniandiplomatstalkedtoeachotheraboutSyriaatthemultilateraltalksinViennanonetheless,andthereweresomesignsthatanti-westernhardlinersopposedtotheJCPOAwerelosingtractionwithintheIraniansysteminadvanceofthe2016Majleselections.

Thedetailishardtopredict,butthesummerof2015lookslikeaturningpointforIranintheregionand in theworld—anopportunity for reintegration into the international systemand for a relaxationofinternalrestrictions.ForIranandtheworldtotakeadvantageofthoseopportunities,previousdoubters,withinIranandwithout,mustadapttothechangedcircumstancesandrecognizethenewpotential.Forthegoodofall,weallneedthevisiontofollowthroughonthehard-wonnuclearagreement.

Notes

PREFACE—THEREMARKABLERESILIENCEOFTHEIDEAOFIRAN1.Gobineau,theearliesttheoristofAryanracialtheories,servedasadiplomatintheFrenchEmbassyinTehraninthe1850s.

CHAPTER1—ORIGINS:ZOROASTER,THEACHAEMENIDS,ANDTHEGREEKS1. Accessed from the University of Pennsylvania’s Web site,

www.museum.upenn.edu/new/research/Exp_Rese_Disc/NearEast/wines.html.2.A.T.Olmstead,HistoryofthePersianEmpire:AchaemenidPeriod(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1948),22–23.3.ThenatureoftheearlyZoroastrianreligionissubjecttogreatdifficultiesofinterpretation,onthesurfaceofwhichIcanbarelymakea

scratch. Ihave reliedheavilyonAlessandroBausani,Religion in Iran:FromZoroaster toBahu’u’llah (NewYork:BibliothecaPersica,2000); seealsoMaryBoyce,AHistoryofZoroastrianism,VolumeOne:TheEarlyPeriod (Leiden:Brill, 1975), andShahrokhRazmjou,“ReligionandBurialCustoms,”inForgottenEmpire:TheWorldofAncientPersia(London:I.B.Tauris,2005),150–180.

4. Bausani, Religion in Iran, 10–11; see also Mary Boyce, Zoroastrianism: A Shadowy but Powerful Presence in the Judaeo-ChristianWorld(London:Dr.William’sTrust,1987),9.

5.ThoughBausani,ReligioninIran,doubtedthisexplanationastoosimplistic,29–30,itisanattractiveintellectualmodelwithanobviousread-across to the way early Christianity assimilated some previous religious forms, while literally demonizing others as superstition orwitchcraft.

6.ThoughintheearliesttimesAhriman’sdirectopponentwasSpentaMainyu—BounteousSpirit—ratherthanAhuraMazda,whowasrepresentedasbeingabovetheconflict.

7.Boyce,Zoroastrianism,8.8.Bausani,ReligioninIran,53.9.ThelateMaryBoycebelievedthatZoroastrianismbecamebetterknowntotheJewsaftertheendoftheAchaemenidEmpire,through

thesediasporacommunities(Boyce,Zoroastrianism,11).10.SeeRichardC.Foltz,Spirituality in theLand of theNoble:How Iran Shaped theWorld’sReligions (Oxford,UK:Oneworld,

2004),45–53,andEdwinYamauchi,PersiaandtheBible(GrandRapids,MI:BakerBookHouse,1990),463–464,foracountertotheBoycethesis.

11.DanielD.Luckenbill,AncientRecordsofAssyriaandBabylonia(London:HistoriesandMysteriesofMan,1989),115–120.12. JamesPritchard,AncientNearEasternTextsRelating to theOldTestamentwithSupplement, 3rd ed. (Princeton,NJ:Princeton

UniversityPress,1969),316.13.PatriciaCrone,“ZoroastrianCommunism,”inComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory36(July1994):460.14.MariaBrosius,WomeninAncientPersia,559–331BC(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1998),198–200andpassim.15.Olmstead,66–68,quotinglaterGreeksources.16.AlessandroBausani,ThePersians(London:BookClubAssociates,1975),20.17.JosefWiesehöfer,AncientPersia(London:I.B.Tauris,2006),33and82.AnalternativereadingoftheevidencewouldbethatDarius

murdered the real Bardiya (and possibly his brother Cambyses before him) to gain the throne. He then had to crush a series of loyalistrebellionsandconcoctacoverstory.

18.Ibid.,67–69.19.AlexandraVilling,“PersiaandGreece,”inForgottenEmpire:TheWorldofAncientPersia(London:I.B.Tauris,2005),236–249.20.SeeVilling,230–231.21.Olmstead,519–520.22.Boyce,AHistoryofZoroastrianism,78–79.

CHAPTER2—THEIRANIANREVIVAL:PARTHIANSANDSASSANIDS

1.Wiesehöfer,134.2.Ibid.,145.3.HabibLevy,ComprehensiveHistoryoftheJewsofIran,H.Ebrami,ed.(CostaMesa,CA:MazdaPublishers,1999),113–115.4.Ihavetakentheselinesfromaneighteenth-centurytranslationofPlutarch,“byDacierandothers”publishedinEdinburghin1763.In

themodernPenguineditionofTheBacchae(Harmondsworth:1973),PhillipVellacotttranslatedthesamelines:“Iambringinghome fromthemountains/Avine-branchfreshlycut/Forthegodshaveblessedourhunting.”

5.“ArsacidDynasty,”inEncyclopediaIranica(NewYork:Routledge,1982–).6.Ibid.7.Bausani,ReligioninIran,12;Wiesehöfer,149.8.“ArsacidDynasty,”inEncyclopediaIranica.9.Levy,113.10.“Mithraism,”inEncyclopediaIranica.11.TourajDaryaee,SasanianPersia:TheRiseandFallofanEmpire(London:I.B.Tauris,2007);Wiesehöfer,160.12.HomaKatouzian,IranianHistoryandPolitics:TheDialecticofStateandSociety(London:Routledge,2007).13.Daryaee,SasanianPersia.14.Wiesehöfer,161;“ShapurI,”inEncyclopediaIranica.15.AnthologizedinSeamusHeaneyandTedHughes,eds.,TheSchoolBag(London:FaberandFaber,1997),183–186.16.Daryaee,SasanianPersia.17.SeeTourajDaryaee,Sahrestaniha-iEransahr:AMiddlePersianText onLateAntiqueGeography,Epic, andHistory (Costa

Mesa,CA:MazdaPublishers,2002).18.Bausani,ReligioninIran,107.19.Ibid.,83–96.20.Daryaee,SasanianPersia.21.Bausani,ReligioninIran,89.22.Ibid.,89,118,and120;Daryaee,SasanianPersia.23.Bausani,ReligioninIran,87.24. ForPelagius the best book, an important book, isB.R.Rees,Pelagius:Life andLetters (Woodbridge,UK:Boydell andBrewer,

1998).MyaccountofAugustinewouldbedisputedbysome,whostillupholdhistheologicalpositions(reassertedinthesixteenthcenturyandlaterbyCalvinists),butthefactsofhistimeasaManichaeanarenotdisputed.MuchrecentChristiantheologyhasturnedawayfrommanyAugustinianpositions,favoringmorePelagianattitudes.AninterestingaspectofthedisputeisthatPelagiusmaintainedthatmancouldperfecthimself and attain salvation by his own efforts; Augustine insisted that salvation could only come by the aid of God’s grace. There is asimilaritybetweenPelagius’sideasonthispointandthethinkingofsomeIslamicthinkers,notablyIbnArabi(seeChapter3).

25.Bausani,ReligioninIran,86.26.Also Sprach Zarathustra: “wenn ich frohlockend sass, wo alteGötter begraben liegen, weltsegnend, weltliebend neben den

Denkmalen alter Weltverleumder”—“if ever I sat rejoicing where old gods lay buried, world-blessing, world-loving, beside themonumentsofoldworld-slanderers.”

27.“ShapurI,”inEncyclopediaIranica.28.Daryaee,SasanianPersia.29.Bausani,ReligioninIran,11–13.Seepage15forBausani’sexplanationofthelaterredactionoftheZoroastrianPahlavitextsinthe

ninthcentury.30.“TheSassanids,”inEncyclopediaIranica;AmmianusMarcellinus,vol.2,457–503,LoebClassics.31.Ibid.;Daryaee,SasanianPersia.32.Ibid.33. Crone, 448. She considered the religious movement to be a life-affirming reaction to gnosticism rather than an outgrowth of

Manichaeism (461–462), and followed an alternative chronology of events that set the death ofMazdak afterKhosraw’s accession to thethrone.ManyaspectsoftheMazdakepisodearedisputed.

34.MohammadibnJariral-Tabari,TheSasanids,theByzantines,theLakhmids,andYemen,vol.5ofHistoryofal-Tabari,editedandtranslatedbyC.E.Bosworth(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress),135andnote.ThestoryalsoappearsinWesternaccounts,butsomeofthemgivethewomanasKavad’swife.

35.Wiesehöfer,190.36.Bausani,ReligioninIran,101.37.Ibid.,100;Daryaee,SasanianPersia.38.Al-Tabari,149.39.EdwardGibbon,TheHistoryof theDeclineandFallof theRomanEmpire (London:PrintedbyA.StrahanforT.CadellandW.

Davies,1802),vol.7,149–151(thepassagedrawsontheByzantinehistorianAgathias).40.“TheSassanids,”inEncyclopediaIranica.41.StevenRunciman,AHistoryoftheCrusades(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1991),10–11.42.“TheSassanids,”inEncyclopediaIranica.

CHAPTER3—ISLAMANDINVASIONS:THEARABS,TURKS,ANDMONGOLS1.ModerncolloquialPersianisinmanywayssimplifiedfromthewrittenformofclassicalPersian,andthePersianofyoungIraniansnow

ischangingfurther,borrowingmanywordsfromEnglish,viafilms,television,andtheInternet.2.The interpretationof theProphet’sdealingswith the JewsofMedina is a controversial subject.SeeBertoldSpuler,TheAgeof the

Caliphs:AHistoryoftheMuslimWorld(Princeton,NJ:MarkusWienerPublishers,1995),11–12;NormanA.Stillman,TheJewsofArabLands:AHistoryandSourceBook (Philadelphia:JewishPublicationsSociety,1979),11–16.

3.SeeAbdelwahabBouhdiba,SexualityinIslam(NewYork:Routledge,1985),19–20andpassim.4.SeeforexampleIraM.Lapidus,AHistoryofIslamicSocieties(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),30.5.RichardN.Frye,TheGoldenAgeofPersia:TheArabsintheEast(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1975),64–65.6.AptinKhanbaghi,TheFire,theStarandtheCross:MinorityReligionsinMedievalandEarlyModernIran(London:I.B.Tauris,

2006),25.7.Bausani,ReligioninIran,118.8.Ibid.,111–121.9. Ibid., 111; for thechangesafter theconquest seeTheCambridgeHistoryof Iran:From theArab Invasion to theSaljuq, vol. 4

(London:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),40–48.10.Ibid.,63–64.11.HughKennedy,TheCourtoftheCaliphs(London:Phoenix,2005),134–136.12.EhsanYarshater,“ThePersianPresenceintheIslamicWorld,”inThePersianPresenceintheIslamicWorld,RichardHovannasian

andGeorgesSabagh,eds.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),70–71.13.Frye,TheGoldenAgeofPersia,122–123;Bausani,ReligioninIran,143.14.Bausani,ThePersians,84–85.15.MehdiNakosteen,Historyof the IslamicOriginsofWesternEducation,AD800–1350 (Boulder:University ofColoradoPress,

1964),20–27.16.QuotedinFrye,TheGoldenAgeofPersia,150.17.Bausani,ReligioninIran,121–130;seealsoKhanbaghi,20–27.18.QuotedinCrone,450.19.PersiantransliteratedfromRezaSaberi,AThousandYearsofPersianRubaiyat:AnAnthologyofQuatrainsfromtheTenthtothe

TwentiethCenturyAlongwiththeOriginalPersian(Bethesda,MD:IbexPublishers,2000),20;forthetranslationIamgratefultoHashemAhmadzadehandLennyLewisohnfortheirhelp.Theselectionofpoetrythatfollowshereisapersonaloneandincludesadisproportionatenumberofruba‘iyat—largelybecausethequatrainformisshorterthantheothermainverseformsandenabledmetoincorporatemorepoetryfromavarietyofpoetsinashortspace,andtoincludetheoriginalPersian.

20. JeromeClinton, “AComparison ofNizami’sLayliandMajnun andShakespeare’sRomeo and Juliet,” inThe Poetry of NizamiGanjavi:Knowledge,LoveandRhetoric,K.TalattofandJ.Clinton,eds.(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2000),xvii.

21.Ibid.,72–73.22.IdriesShah,TheSufis(London:OctagonPress,1964),xiv.23.A.J.Arberry,ClassicalPersianLiterature(London:GeorgeAllen/RuskinHouse,1958),6724.MehdiAminrazavi,TheWine ofWisdom:TheLife,Poetry andPhilosophy ofOmarKhayyam (Oxford:Oneworld Publications,

2007),25–27.25.Ibid.,199–200.26. Saberi, 75; translation by Axworthy, Ahmadzadeh, and Lewisohn. There are examples of quatrains where Fitzgerald took greater

libertieswiththeoriginals.27.Aminrazavi,131–133;EhsanYarshater,ed.,PersianLiterature(NewYork:BibliothecaPersicaPress,1988),148–150.28.Saberi,78;translationbyAxworthy,Ahmadzadeh,andLewisohn.29.A. J.Arberry,TheRuba‘iyat ofOmarKhayyam: Edited from aNewlyDiscoveredManuscriptDated 658 (1259–60) in the

PossessionofA.ChesterBeattyEsq.(London:EmeryWalkerLtd.,1949),14;AhmadSaidi,ed.andtrans.,Ruba‘iyatofOmarKhayyam(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1992),36;translationbyAxworthy,Ahmadzadeh,andLewisohn.

30. For Sufism generally, see especially Leonard Lewisohn, The Heritage of Sufism, Volume I: Classical Persian Sufism from ItsOriginstoRumi(700–1300)(Oxford:Oneworld,1999),andAnnemarieSchimmel,MysticalDimensionsofIslam(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1975).

31.Lewisohn,TheHeritageofSufism,11–43;MarshallHodgson,TheVentureofIslam,vol.2(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1974),203,209,213,217–222,293,304.

32.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,Volume5:TheSaljuqandMongolPeriods(London:CambridgeUniversityPress,1968),299.33.Arberry,ClassicalPersianLiterature,90–91.34.R.Gelpke,Nizami:TheStoryofLaylaandMajnun(Colchester:BrunoCassirer,1966),168.35.Clinton,25.36.LeonardLewisohnandC.Shackle,eds.,Attarand thePersianSufiTradition:TheArtofSpiritualFlight (London: I.B.Tauris,

2006),255;andL.Lewisohn,“Attar,Faridal-Din,”inLindsayJones,ed.,EncyclopediaofReligion,15-VolumeSet(NewYork:MacMillanReferenceBooks,2005),601—cf.Nietzsche:WasausLiebegetanwird,geschiehtimmerjenseitsvonGutundBöse—Thatwhichisdoneoutoflove,alwaystakesplacebeyondGoodandEvil.

37.Faridal-DinAttar,TheConferenceoftheBirds,AfkhamDarbandiandDickDavis,eds.andtrans.(London:PenguinClassics,1984),57–75.

38.DavidMorgan,Medieval Persia 1040–1797:History of theNear East (London: Longman PublishingGroup, 1988), 88–96 andpassim.

39.TheCambridgeHistory of Iran, Volume 5, 313–314; based on JohnAndrewBoyle, ed. and trans.,TheHistory of theWorld-Conqueror(Juvayni)(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1958),159–162.

40.Ibid.,337.41.Levy,245.42.Jalalal-DinRumi,TheMasnavi,BookOne,JawidMojaddedi,ed.andtrans.(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),4–5.43.Saberi,257;translationbyAxworthyandAhmadzadeh.44.WilliamC.ChittickandPeterLambornWilson,eds.andtrans.,FakhruddinIraqi:DivineFlashes(London:PaulistPress,1982),34.45.Ibid.,36.46.BaqerMoin,Khomeini:LifeoftheAyatollah(London:I.B.Tauris,1999),47.Thesearedeepwaters;theideaofthePerfectMan

refersbacktoSohravardi,Neoplatonism,andpossiblytothepersonifications(daena,fravashi)andangels inZoroastrianism;seealsoHenryCorbin,EnIslamIranien:AspectsSpirituelsetPhilosophiques,vol.2(Paris:Gallimard,1971),297–325.

47.HenryCorbin,Spiritual Body andCelestial Earth: FromMazdean Iran to Shi‘ite Iran (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,1977),139;thesimilaritytotheearlierextractsdescribingthedaenaisobvious.

48.ChittickandWilson,60.49.G.M.Wickens,trans.,TheBustanofSa’di(Leiden:1974),150.50.EdwardGranvilleBrowne,ALiteraryHistory of Persia: Volume II, FromFirdawsi to Sa‘di (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity

Press,1969),530.51.Saberi,274;translationbyAxworthyandAhmadzadeh.52.Ibid.,277;translationbyAxworthyandAhmadzadeh.53.Arberry,ClassicalPersianLiterature,331.ThereismorethananechoofthispoeminMatthewArnold’sDoverBeach.54.Arberry,43;IamgratefultoLennyLewisohnforhistranslation.ComparewithThomasHardy’spoem“MomentsofVision”:ThatmirrorWhichmakesofmenatransparencyWhoholdsthatmirrorAndbidsussuchabreast-barespectacleseeOfyouandme?55.Andnot just Iranians—Westerncommentatorshaveagonizedoverwhethersuchpoems,addressed toaBeloved in the thirdperson

singular—whichinPersianisgenderneutral—arehomoeroticorconventionallyheterosexual.Theanswer,giventheabsenceofcleargendermarkers,suchasonefinds inotherpoems, issurely that theambiguity isdeliberate.Onemightmoreprofitably reflecthowappropriate theneutralthirdpersonistothehighermeaningoftheBeloved,i.e.,toGod.

56.P.NatilKhanlari,ed.,Divan-eHafez(Tehran:1980),ghazal197;alsoquotedinJohnW.Limbert,Iran:AtWarwithHistory(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1987),144.

57.Saberi,384;Saberi’stranslation.58.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,Volume5,546–547.59. Jürgen Paul, “L’invasionMongole comme revelateur de la société Iranienne,” inL’Iran face à la dominationMongole (Tehran:

1997),46–47andpassim.60.Cf.MostafaVaziri,Iranas ImaginedNation:TheConstructionofNational Identity (NewYork:MarloweandCompany,1994),

passim.61. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 353–355; E. Gellner,

“TribalismandtheStateintheMiddleEast,”inTribesandStateFormationintheMiddleEast(London:I.B.Tauris,1991),passim.

CHAPTER4—SHI‘ISMANDTHESAFAVIDS1. The following draws largely onMoojanMomen,An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam: TheHistory andDoctrines of Twelver Shi‘ism

(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1987),28–33andpassim.2.SeeforexampleJamesA.BillandJohnAldenWilliams,RomanCatholicsandShi‘iMuslims:Prayer,Passion,andPolitics(Chapel

Hill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2002),1–7.3.KathrynBabayan,Mystics,MonarchsandMessiahs:CulturalLandscapesofEarlyModernIran(Cambridge:HarvardCenterfor

MiddleEasternStudies,2002),xxxviii.4.Ibid.,xxxix.5.EncyclopediaIranica“Esmail”(Savory);seealsoAndrewJ.Newman,SafavidIran:RebirthofaPersianEmpire(London:I.B.

Tauris,2006),9–12.6.“Esmail,”inEncyclopediaIranica(Savory).7.Newman,24–25,passim.8.TheextentofShi‘isminIranbefore1500andthechangesthereafterhavebeenthoroughlyexploredbyRasulJa‘farian,DinvaSiyasat

darDawrah-yeSafavi(Qom:1991).

9.Foltz,134.10.V.Minorsky,ed.andtrans.,Tadhkiratal-Muluk:AManualofSafavidAdministration(London:GibbMemorialTrust,1980),33–35.11.SeeWillemFloor,TheEconomyofSafavidPersia (Wiesbaden,Germany:2000),andRudolphMatthee,ThePursuit ofPleasure:

DrugsandStimulantsinIranianHistory1500–1900(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005).12.C.A.Bayly,ImperialMeridian:TheBritishEmpireandtheWorld1780–1830(London:Longman,1989),30;J.Foran,“TheLong

FalloftheSafavidDynasty:MovingBeyondtheStandardViews,”inTheInternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies,no.24(1992):281–304(passim);MansurSefatgol,“SafavidAdministrationofAvqaf:Structure,ChangesandFunctions,1077–1135/1666–1722,”inSocietyandCultureintheEarlyModernMiddleEast:StudiesonIranintheSafavidPeriod(Leiden:BrillAcademicPublishers,2003),408.

13.SeeWillemFloor,SafavidGovernmentInstitutions(CostaMesa,CA:MazdaPublishers,2001)andMinorsky.14.“MollaSadraShirazi,”inEncyclopaediaIranica(SajjadRizvi).“Molla”and“Mullah”arethesameword,butIrefertoMollaSadra

inthiswayinanattempttodistancehimfrommodernconnotationsthatcouldbemisleading.15.RoyMottahedeh,TheMantleoftheProphet(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1987),179.16.Yarshater,PersianLiterature,249–288,and,notably,thequotationfromBausani,275.17.Levy,293–295;seealsoElizSanasarian,ReligiousMinoritiesinIran(Cambridge/NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),45.18.Togetasenseofthis,albeitinadescriptionfromalaterperiod,therelationshipbetweentheJewishfamilyandtheirvillagemullahin

DoritRabinyan’sPersianBrides(Edinburgh:GeorgeBrazillerPublishers,1998)isvividandmemorable.19.Mottahedeh,203.ThethinkerAliShariati(1933–1977)alsoattackedtheShi‘ismoftheSafavidperiod(BlackShiism)butarguablywas

addressingdeficienciesofreligiouspracticeinhisowntimeratherthanmakingahistoricalpoint.HisprioritywastoencouragearesurgenceoftrueShi‘ism(RedShi‘ism)—arevolutionaryShi‘ismofsocialjustice—seeChapter7.

20. See Rudolph Matthee, “Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran,” in Safavid Persia: TheHistoryandPoliticsofan IslamicSociety (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996), andMichaelAxworthy, “TheArmyofNaderShah,” in IranianStudies(December2007).

21.Matthee,ThePursuitofPleasure,61.22.Ibid.,50–56.23.RogerSavory,IranUndertheSafavids(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),232.24.Matthee,ThePursuitofPleasure,58–60.25.Ibid.,91–92,92n.TheevidencecomesnotjustfromWesternobserversatcourt,butalsofromPersiansources;theShaykhol-Eslam

ofQomhadthetemeritytocriticizetheshah’sdrinkingandwasluckytoescapeexecutionforit.26.Newman,SafavidIran,99;“Partofthisstrugglefortheheartsandmindsofthe‘popular’classes.”27.SeeV.Moreen,“Risala-yiSawa‘iqal-Yahud[ThetreatiseLightningBoltsAgainsttheJews]byMuhammadBaqirb.MuhammadTaqi

al-Majlisi(d.1699),”inDieWeltdesIslams32(1992),passim.28.J.Calmard,“PopularLiteratureUndertheSafavids,”inSocietyandCultureintheEarlyModernMiddleEast:StudiesonIranin

theSafavidPeriod(Leiden:BrillAcademicPublishers,2003),331.

CHAPTER5—THEFALLOFTHESAFAVIDS,NADERSHAH,THEEIGHTEENTH-CENTURYINTERREGNUM,ANDTHEEARLYYEARSOFTHEQAJARDYNASTY

1.ThisversionistakenfromSirJohnMalcolm,HistoryofPersia:ContaininganAccountoftheReligion,Government,Usages,andCharacteroftheInhabitantsofThatKingdom(London:Murray,1829),399–400;butanumberofPersianandothersourcesgivethesamestory—cf.MohammadKazemMarvi,18,andFr.JudaszTadeuszKrusinski,TheHistoryoftheLateRevolutionsofPersia(London:1740;NewYork:ArnoPress,reprint1973),62–64.

2.Matthee,ThePursuitofPleasure,92–94;Babayan,485;Lewisohn,TheHeritageofSufism,VolumeI,132–133.3.BirgittHoffmann, ed. and trans.,PersischeGeschichte 1694–1835 erlebt, erinnert und erfunden—das Rustam at-Tawarikh in

deutscher Bearbeitung (Bamberg, Germany: Aku, 1986), 203–204, 290; Krusinski, 121–122;Michael Axworthy, The Sword of Persia:NaderShah,fromTribalWarriortoConqueringTyrant(London:I.B.Tauris,2006),31–33.

4.Bayly,30;Foran.5.Krusinski,196–198.6.Axworthy,TheSwordofPersia,142.7. N. D. Miklukho-Maklai, “Zapiski S Avramova ob Irane kak istoricheskii Istochnik,” in Uchenye Zapiski Leningradskogo

gosudarstvennogouniversiteta.Seriiavostokovedcheskikhnauk,Part3(Leningrad.:1952),97.8.BasileVatatzes(ed.N.Iorga),Persica:HistoiredeChah-Nadir(Bucharest,Romania:1939),131–133.9.Levy,360–362;Axworthy,TheSwordofPersia,169.10.ThefullsignificanceofNader’sreligiouspolicyiscoveredadmirablyinErnestTucker’sNadirShah’sQuestforLegitimacyinPost-

SafavidIran(Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,2006).11. See Axworthy, The Sword of Persia, 249–250; as well as Axworthy, “The Army of Nader Shah.” The size of the army is

corroboratedfromanumberofsources,andisplausiblegivenearliertrends.12.Bayly,23(OttomanandMoghulfigures);Floor,TheEconomyofSafavidPersia,2;CharlesIssawi,TheEconomicHistoryofIran,

1800–1914 (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress, 1971), 20;WillemFloor, “DutchTrade inAfsharid Persia”Studia Iranica, Tome 34,fascicule1,2005.

13.Axworthy,TheSwordofPersia,280–281.14.MirzaMohammadMahdiAstarabadi,Jahangusha-yeNaderi,translatedintoFrenchbySirWilliamJonesastheHistoiredeNader

Chah(London:1770)(originalPersiantexteditedbyAbdollahAnvar,Tehran,1377),187.15.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,63–65.16.Floor,TheEconomyofSafavidPersia,3.17.Ibid.18.Ibid.,2–3;Issawi,20.19.Floor,“DutchTradeinAfsharidPersia,”59.20.NotablybyAnnK.S.Lambton,“TheTribalResurgenceandtheDeclineoftheBureaucracyintheEighteenthCentury,”inStudiesin

Eighteenth-CenturyIslamicHistory(CarbondaleandEdwardsville:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress,1977).ForthisparagraphseealsoTheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,506–541(RichardTapper);RichardTapper,FrontierNomadsofIran:APoliticalandSocialHistoryoftheShahsevan(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),1–33;andGellner.

21.Hasan-eFasa’i,HistoryofPersiaUnderQajarRule(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress1972),4.22.Ibid.,52–54.23.Malcolm,125.24.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,125.25.SeeHamidAlgar,“Shi‘ismandIranintheEighteenthCentury,”inStudiesinEighteenth-CenturyIslamicHistory(Carbondaleand

Edwardsville:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress,1977).26.Mottahedeh,233;asimilarprocesstookplaceinthelaterRomanEmpirewiththetitleofsenatorandotherhonorifics.27.Momen, 238–244; Nikki R. Keddie (Ghaffary),Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796–1925 (Costa Mesa, CA:Mazda

Publishers,1999),94–96.28.Forexample,Hasan-eFasa’i,101–102.29.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,142–143.30.Malcolm,217.31.DenisWright,TheEnglishAmongstthePersians:ImperialLivesinNineteenth-CenturyIran(London:I.B.Tauris,1977),4–5.32.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,331–333;Hasan-eFasa’i,111.33.Ibid.,334;Keddie,QajarIranandtheRiseofRezaKhan1796–1925,22.34.Ibid.,335–338.35.NikkiR.Keddie,ModernIran:RootsandResultsofRevolution(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2006),42–43.36.LaurenceKelly,DiplomacyandMurderinTehran:AlexanderGriboyedovandImperialRussia’sMissiontotheShahofPersia

(London:TaurisParkePaperbacks,2006),190–194.37.NikkiR.Keddie,“TheIranianPowerStructureandSocialChange1800–1969:AnOverview,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEast

Studies2(January1971):3–4;TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,174–181.38.Keddie,QajarIranandtheRiseofRezaKhan1796–1925,17;TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,174.

CHAPTER6—THECRISISOFTHEQAJARMONARCHY,THEREVOLUTIONOF1905–1911,ANDTHEACCESSIONOFTHEPAHLAVIDYNASTY

1. Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896 (Berkeley: University ofCaliforniaPress,1997),252.

2.Levy,427.3.Ibid.,430.4.HaidehSahim,“Jewsof Iran in theQajarPeriod:PersecutionandPerseverence,” inReligionandSociety inQajar Iran (London:

RoutledgeCurzon,2005),293–310.5.Sanasarian,45–46.6.Hasan-eFasa’i,256–260.7.Amanat,44,66.8.ForacasestudyoftheQashqaitribebringingoutthesepoints,seeLoisBeck,“WomenAmongQashqaiNomadicPastoralistsinIran,”

inWomenintheMuslimWorld(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1979).9.Keddie,QajarIranandtheRiseofRezaKhan1796–1925,26–28;Amanat,113–117.10.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,182–183.11.Amanat,428–429;TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,180.12.Ibid.,180.13.Ibid.,401–404(Greaves).14.QuotedinErvandAbrahamian,“TheCausesoftheConstitutionalRevolutioninIran,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies

10(August1979):400.15. Nikki R. Keddie, “Sayyid Jamal Al-DinAl-Afghani,” inPioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 2005), 24 (I drew on

Keddiealsoforthelastpartofthepreviousparagraph).16.Levy,397.

17.TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,vol.7,199–200.18.Abrahamian,“TheCausesoftheConstitutionalRevolutioninIran,”404.19.Ibid.,408–409.20.Levy,490–491.21.Mottahedeh,221–222;VanessaMartin,IslamandModernism:TheIranianRevolutionof1906(London:I.B.Tauris,1989),193–

195.22.Ibid.,223;Moin,22.23.Levy,498–507.24.TheCambridgeHistoryof Iran, vol. 7, 206–207;SaidAmirArjomand,TheTurban for theCrown: IslamicRevolution in Iran

(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),46.25.MorganSchuster,TheStranglingofPersia(London:T.FisherUnwin,1912),219.26.AliAnsari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921:ThePahlavisandAfter(London:Longman,2003),22.27.Accessedathttp://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_1918.htm.28.ForthecontraryviewseeHomaKatouzian,“RizaShah’sLegitimacyandSocialBase,”inTheMakingofModernIran:Stateand

SocietyUnderRizaShah,1921–1941(London:RoutledgeCurzon,2003),16–18.29.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,21–22.30.HomaKatouzian,StateandSocietyinIran:TheEclipseoftheQajarsandtheEmergenceofthePahlavis(London:I.B.Tauris,

2000),165;Arjomand,60;Keddie,QajarIranandtheRiseofRezaKhan1796–1925,74.31.Wright, 181;Katouzian,State and Society in Iran, 233; alsoKeddie,Qajar Iran and the Rise of RezaKhan 1796–1925, 79;

MichaelZirinsky,“ImperialPowerandDictatorship:BritainandtheRiseofRezaShah,1921–1926,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies24(November1992):passim.

32.Arjomand,62–63.

CHAPTER7—THEPAHLAVISANDTHEREVOLUTIONOF19791.VitaSackville-West,Passenger toTeheran (London:Tauris ParkePaperbacks, 1991; 1st ed., 1926), 100–101;Keddie,Qajar Iran

andtheRiseofRezaKhan1796–1925,79.2. StephanieCronin, “Paradoxes ofMilitaryModernisation,” inTheMaking ofModern Iran: State and SocietyUnder Riza Shah,

1921–1941(London:RoutledgeCurzon,2003),44andpassim.3.Issawi,376.4.ErvandAbrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982),143.5.Issawi,375–379.6.RudolphMatthee,“EducationintheRezaShahPeriod,”inTheMakingofModernIran (London:RoutledgeCurzon,2003),140and

passim.7.Kamran Talattof,The Politics ofWriting in Iran: AHistory ofModern Persian Literature (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University

Press,2000),53–62.ThestorythatallHedayat’sworkshadbeenbannedbyAhmadinejadwascarriedintheGuardianinanarticlebyRobertTaitonNovember17,2006,butwhenIvisitedIraninNovember2007,Iwastoldthatonlyoneofhisworkshadbeenbanned.

8.Yarshater,PersianLiterature,336–380.9.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,143;Katouzian,“RizaShah’sLegitimacyandSocialBase,”29–30.10.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,56–59.11.Ibid.,68.12.Katouzian,“RizaShah’sLegitimacyandSocialBase,”26–32.13.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,163(theshooting)and158–161;Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,64.14.Ibid.,164.15.Katouzian,“RizaShah’sLegitimacyandSocialBase,”32–33.16.Levy,544–546.17. Accessed at http://users.sedona.net/~sepa/sardarij.html and www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?

c=fwLYKnN8LzH&b=253162&ct=285846.18.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,110.19.Ibid.,78–85.20.HomaKatouzian,SadeqHedayat:TheLifeandLegendofanIranianWriter(London:RoutledgeCurzon,2003),13–14;Katouzian

ratherdrylysuggeststhatthereorientationwouldhaveshiftedaseasilyintheotherdirectionifAxispowershadoccupiedIran.21.Mottahedeh,98–105;Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,125–126.22.Ibid.,164.23.Moin,105.24.Keddie,ModernIran, 130;DaryiushBayandor’s researches toward a new book on the coup argue plausibly that the role of the

secret services was rather less significant than previously thought and that of the clergy and their bazaari supporters was rather moresignificant.

25.Mottahedeh, 287–323; GeorgeMorrison, ed.,History of Persian Literature from the Beginnings of the Islamic Period to thePresentDay(Leiden,UK:BrillAcademicPublishers,1981),201–202(Kadkani);forSiminDaneshvar’srevelations,seeTalattof,160.

26.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,133.27.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,420.28.Issawi,375–382.29.QuotedinAliAnsari,Iran,IslamandDemocracy:ThePoliticsofManagingChange(London:ChathamHouse,2000),38–39.30.Keddie,ModernIran,145;RobertGraham,Iran:TheIllusionofPower(London:CroomHelm,1978),69.31.Moin,107–108.32.Ibid.,123.33.Ibid.,1–8.34.ThebestaccountofsuchaneducationisMottahedeh’sbrilliantMantleoftheProphet.35.Moin,42–44.36.Ibid.,64.37.Keddie,ModernIran,147.38.Ibid.,152.39.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,535–536.40.Keddie,ModernIran,158.41.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,430–431.42. JamesA.Bill,The Eagle and the Lion: The Tregedy of American-Iranian Relations (NewHaven, CT:YaleUniversity Press,

1988),379–382.43. FarahAzari, “Sexuality andWomen’sOppression in Iran,” inWomenof Iran:TheConflictwithFundamentalist Islam (London:

IthacaPress,1983),130–132andpassim,drewattentiontothesexualaspectoftherevolutioninaninsightfulchapter,andMottahedeh,273,makesasimilarpoint.

44.Mottahedeh,270–272.45.QuotedinAbrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,419.46.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,173.47.Bill,TheEagleandtheLion,183–184.48.Mottahedeh,328.49.ForavividpictureofthelivesoftheJewsofShirazinthisperiod,seeLaurenceD.Loeb,Outcaste:JewishLifeinSouthernIran

(NewYork:Routledge,1977).50.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,500–504.51.Moin,152–156.52.Momen,256–260.53.Keddie,“SayyidJamalAl-DinAl-Afghani”,23654.Ibid.,208–245;Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,464–473.55.Moin,186.56.ThisjudgementisbasedoncontributionstotheGulf2000Internetforuminthespringof2007;particularlyonacontributionfromAli

Sajjadi,whoinvestigatedthecaseforaRadioFardareport.57.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,510–513.58.Ibid.,519.

CHAPTER8—IRANSINCETHEREVOLUTION:ISLAMICREVIVAL,WAR,ANDCONFRONTATION

1.Oralternatively,hichehsasinadaram—“Ihavenofeelings.”2.SeeChapter3.3.Withthepartialexception,inthecontextofghuluwwrhetoric,ofShahEsma‘ilI(seeChapter4).4.IamgratefultoBaqerMoinforthisquotation,andhisthoughtsonthissubject,andtheinsightsinhisbookKhomeini.5.Abrahamian,IranBetweenTwoRevolutions,526–529.6.Moin,207–208.7.Roy 1994, 173, claims that none of themost senior ayatollahs (the grand ayatollahs) supported the velayat-e faqih in 1981—except

Montazeri,Khomeini’spupil.8.Moin,214.9.Momen,294.10.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,233.11.Bill,TheEagleandtheLion,1–2.12.Moin,282–283;ChrisRundle,FromColwynBaytoKabul:AnUnexpectedJourney(Stanhope:2004),146–150.13.QuotedinMoin,275–276.14.Momen,298–299.15.Ansari,AHistoryofModernIranSince1921,244–245.16.ForfurtherexpositionofSoroush’sideasonthispoint,seeAnsari,Iran,IslamandDemocracy,75.

17.SeeKatouzian,SadeqHedayat,5–6,andMottahedeh,383–384.18.SeetheinterviewpublishedintheMideastMirror,January20,2000,15,amongotherstatements.19.Moin,279.20.DavidMenashri,Post-RevolutionaryPoliticsinIran:Religion,SocietyandPower(London:Routledge,2001),35–38.21.SeeAnoushEhteshami,AfterKhomeini:TheIranianSecondRepublic(London:Routledge,1995),passim;andAnsari,Iran,Islam

andDemocracy,52–53.22.Keddie,ModernIran,264.23.Ibid.,264–266.24.SeealsoZibaMir-Hosseini,“Women,MarriageandtheLawinIran,” inWomenin theMiddleEast (Basingstoke,UK:Macmillan,

1992).25.2003figures—Keddie,ModernIran,286.26. Afsaneh Najmabadi,Women with Mustaches andMenWithout Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of IranianModernity

(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2005),givesthought-provokinganalysisonthethemeofgenderinIranianhistory.27.AzadehKian-Thiébaut,“FromMotherhoodtoEqualRightsAdvocates:TheWeakeningofthePatriarchalOrder,”IranianStudies38

(March2005):passim.28. Brought out most clearly in the comparative surveys carried out by Mansour Moaddel, which also back up Kian-Thiébaut—for

example,49percentof Iranians surveyedbelieved lovewasmore important thanparental approvalwhenmarrying (41percent thought thecontrary),whereinIraqthesplitwas71percentforparentalapprovaland26percentforlove.InSaudiArabia,thetallieswere50percentforparentalapprovaland48percentforlove.Surveysareaccessibleatwww.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/tmp/moaddel_values_survey.html.

29.TheinterviewisdiscussedindetailinAnsari,Iran,IslamandDemocracy,133–137.30.Sanasarian,ReligiousMinoritiesinIran,47,47n;48,48n.OthershavesuggestedthatthenumberofJewsin1948mayhavebeenas

highas140,000to150,000.31.ShirinEbadisaidsomethingverymuchtothiseffect—thatonerevolutionisenough—inaspeechshegaveattheHay-on-Wyeliterary

festivalinMay2006.32.Fordiscussionofthecrackdownonthefreepressinthesummerof2000,seeAnsari,Iran,IslamandDemocracy,211–217.

CHAPTER9—FROMKHATAMITOAHMADINEJAD,ANDTHEIRANIANPREDICAMENT1.Forexample,27percentofIranianssurveyedbyMansourMoaddeltookpartinreligiousservicesonceaweekormore,comparedwith

33 percent in Iraq, 42 percent in Egypt, 44 percent in Jordan, and 45 percent in theUnited States. Fifty-five percent of Iranians thoughtWesternculturalinvasionwasaveryseriousproblem,comparedwith64percentofEgyptians,68percentofIraqis,70percentofSaudis,and85 percent of Jordanians. Askedwhether they were primarilyMuslim or country nationalists, 61 percent of Iranians saidMuslim and 34percentsaidnationalist.InIraqitwas63percentMuslimand23percentnationalist;inJordan,72percentMuslimand15percentnationalist;inSaudiArabia,75percentMuslimand17percentnationalist;and inEgypt,79percentMuslimand10percentnationalist. InIran60percentthoughtmenmadebetterpoliticalleadersthanwomen,comparedwith72percentinSaudiArabia,84percentinEgypt,86percentinJordan,87 percent in Iraq, and 22 percent in the United States. However, other findings suggested that, perhaps because they have had moreexperiencewith it, Iranianswere lessenthusiasticaboutdemocracyas thebest formofgovernment thanothers in the region.Accessedatwww.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/tmp/moaddel_values_survey.html.

2.FordetailsofIraniansupportagainsttheTaliban,seethereportfromJamesDobbins(leaderoftheU.S.delegationtothetalksinBonnthatsetupthecoalition),WashingtonPost,July22,2007.

3.TranslatedtranscriptfromMideastwire.com.4.PollbyBaztab.com;reportedtoGulf2000(aWebdiscussionforum)byMeirJavedanfar.5. Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics; see also Mansour Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism:

EpisodeandDiscourse(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2004).6. For these, and for a brilliant snapshot of the general attitudes of at least someyoung Iranians, seeNasrinAlavi,WeAre Iran:The

PersianBlogs (London:PortobelloBooks, 2005); alsoR.Varzi,WarringSouls:Youth,MediaandMartyrdom inPost-Revolution Iran(Durham:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2006).

7.OneofthosehistoricalfactsthatmodernBritons,leftbereftoftheirownhistorybytheireducationsystem,oftenforgettoremember.8. One hundred seventy in the United States and seventeen in Britain. Figures taken from BBC,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6351257.stm, and the Daily Telegraph, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/25/wirq225.xml&sSheet=/news/2006/06/25/ixnews.html.

9.On July 15, 2007, theLosAngelesTimes reported, on the strength of comments by (anonymous) seniorU.S.military officers, andothers,thatalthoughthefingerhadbeenpointedatIranandSyria,thelargestnumber(45percent)offoreignsuicidebombersandinsurgentsinIraqwerefromSaudiArabia(plus15percentfromSyriaandLebanon,and10percentfromNorthAfrica—figuresforIranwerenotgiven,presumably because theywere off the bottom end of the scale). Suicide attacks have systematically killed larger numbers of civilians andsoldiersinIraqthanotherkindsofattacks,andtheyhavebeenpredominantly,ifnotentirely,carriedoutbySunniinsurgents.Thesamesourceclaimedthat50percentofallSaudifightersinIraqcamethereassuicidebombers.Thearticlecommented:“Thesituationhasleft theU.S.militaryintheawkwardpositionofbattlinganenemywhosetopsourceofforeignfightersisakeyallythatatbesthasnotbeenabletopreventitscitizensfromundertakingbloodyattacksinIraq,andatworstsharescomplicityinsendingextremiststocommitattacksagainstU.S.forces,IraqiciviliansandtheShiiteledgovernmentinBaghdad.”

10.InApril2007theIranianSupremeCourtoverturnedmurderverdictsagainstagroupofBasijisconvictedofkillingpeopletheyregardedasimmoralinthesoutheasterncityofKerman(in2002).Thevictimsincludedacouplethatwerebetrothed,whohadbeenabductedwhileontheirwaytoviewahousetheyhadbeenhopingtoliveintogetheraftertheirmarriage.TheSupremeCourtacceptedthemen’sdefensethattheybelieved theyhad been justified (on the basis of guidance fromAyatollahMesbahYazdi), after givingwarnings, in killing people theyregardedasimmoral.ItwasthoughtthattherecouldhavebeenasmanyaseighteensuchkillingsinKerman,andsimilarmurdersinMashhadandTehranaswell(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6557679.stm).

11.TheformulahadbeenusedbeforebyKhomeiniandothers,andhadbeentranslatedbyrepresentativesoftheIranianregimeas“wipedoff themap.” Some of the dispute that has arisen over what exactly Ahmadinejadmeant by it has been rather bogus.When the sloganappeared draped overmissiles inmilitary parades themeaningwas pretty clear. Itwas partly to addressAhmadinejad’s remarks, but alsobecauseithasoftenbeenpassedover,thatIhavepaidsomemoderateattentiontothehistoryofIran’sJewsinthisbook.

12.MartinGilbert,Israel:AHistory.(London:BlackSwan,1999),639.

EPILOGUE1.BenRhodes,“OnNowruz,PresidentObamaSpeakstotheIranianPeople,”TheWhiteHouse,http://www.whitehouse.gov/Nowruz/.2. BorzouDaragahi and RaminMostaghim, “Iran Security Forces Retreat as HugeNumbers ofMourners Gather at Cemetery,”Los

AngelesTimes,July31,2009,http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran-protests31-2009jul31,0,7400028.story.3.BorzouDaraghi, “Iran:AyatollahCallsGovernment a ‘MilitaryRegime,’Calls forClericalRevolt,”Babylon andBeyond (blog),Los

AngelesTimes, September 14, 2009, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/09/iran-grand-ayatollah-calls-government-a-military-regime.html.

4. Robert Tait, “Iran Hit by New Clashes as Crowds Protest During Religious Ceremonies,” The Guardian, December 26, 2009,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/27/iran-protests-riot-police-shots.

5. IranWire. “View from Iran:TheGreenMovement,” June 23, 2015, http://en.iranwire.com/features/6576/; see also an interviewwithHosseinGhazian,oneofthepollsters:IranWire,“‘TheWallsHaveEars’:FindingOutWhattheIranianPublicReallyThinks,”June22,2015,http://en.iranwire.com/features/6577/.

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Index

Pagelocatorinboldindicatesmap

AbbasMirza,178,180,181,184AbbastheGreat,134–138,141,142AbbasII,141,142,159Abbasiddynasty,77–85,104

courtrichandlearned,80–82asculturalreconquestofArabsbyPersians,78lookedbackonasagoldenage,80andpowerofgovernors/localdynasties,80,84weakenedbytaxcollectingmeasures,119

Abdal-Wahhab,175Abrahamian,Ervand,229AbuBakr,72AbuMuslim,77,128,133Abu’lAbbas,77Achaemenes,5,12AchaemenidEmpire,11,12–16,22,251

absorbedratherthandestroyedcultureofrivals,14–15,21accessionofDarius,17–20Alexander’sdefeatof,28,29andconquestofEgypt,17andtheGreeks,23–26andPersianwars,23,25,26refoundingofEmpirebyDarius,20–23systemofgovernmentunder,21–23writinglookeduponnegatively,22SeealsoCyrus

Acropolis,Athenian,25,29AdelShah,163,165–166,169Adhurpat,55Adhvenak,9Adultery,stoningfor,264AfghanrevoltagainstSafavids,148–151Al-Afghani,Jamalal-Din,197–198Afghanistan

foundedbyAhmadKhanAbdali,165–166needforIranianhelpin,289

Afshars,136,151,161AghaMohammadKhan(laterShah),169–172,176,298–299.SeealsoQajarPersiaAgriculturalsettlements,earliest,2,3AhmadKhanAbdali(AhmadShahDurrani),165–166,216,217,219Ahmadinejad,Mahmud,285–286,292,296–299,306

anddenialofHolocaust,290Khamenei’spublicdisputewith,303

Khamenei’ssupportforreelectionof,297leverageofinIranlessthanitappears,289

Ahriman,7–8,42,44AhuraMazda,7–8,19,42,44Aisha(wifeofMohammad),71Ajam,79Akhbaris,172–173Akhtar(newspaper),198Al-eAhmad,Jalal,238–239,245Albright,Madeleine,278AlchemyofHappiness,The(al-Ghazali),95AlcoholandSafavids,141–142,143,152.SeealsoWineAlexanderofMacedonia,16,28–30Ali(fourthcaliph),76–77,125,126,133AmericanschoolinTehran,248–249Aminod-Dowleh,199,200AmirKabir,191–192,205Amanpour,Christiane,278AmnestyInternational,250,252Amuzegar,Jasmshid,253Anahita,54Andragoas,32Angels,9Anglo-IranianOilCompany(AIOC),231–232,239Anglo-PersianAgreementof1919,215–216Anglo-PersianOilCompany,212,227,235Anti-Semitism,290Antony,Mark,38–39Aq-Qoyunlu,120–121,130–131,132Arabiclanguage,81–82,83ArabSpringof2011,302Arabs

conquestofSassanids,72–74earlyconquestsof,72,73,75–76

Aramaiclanguage,22,34Arberry,A.J.,93,113Arcadius,RomanEmperor,56Architecture

influenceofPersiansonAbbasids,78–79andIsfahanandSafavid,136,138,148Parthianandivanaudiencehall,34andSoltaniyeh,104

Ardashir,43–46,47,54–55Aristotelianphilosophyandlogic,81–2Armenia,5,54Arsacids,32,43.SeealsoParthiansArshak(Arsaces),32Artabanus(Ardavan)IV,43,44Artaxerxes(Artakhshathra),25ArtaxerxesII&III,26Asabiyya,118–119,131Ashuracommemorations,125,173–174,175,243,268AssemblyofExperts,264Assyrians,2,4Astyages,12Atatürk,Kemal,222,226,227Athens,24,25Attar,Faridal-Din,97–100AugustineofHippo,51–53AugustusCaesar,30

Aurelian,Emperor,54Averroes,82Avesta,5,9,34,40,55,57,58Avicenna(IbnSina),81–82,95,138,270“AxisofEvil”speech,284Azari,Farah,276–277Azerbaijan,205,216,232–233,234,267

BabimovementandBaha’ireligion,187–189,204andMohammadRezaShah,251–252persecutionofunderIslamicRepublic,280andQorratal-Ain,188,189

BabylonandBabylonians,2,10,14,25,33Bacchae,The(Euripides),37Baghdad,78,80,90,104Bahar,MohammadTaqi,139,225–226Baha’uallah,189Bahrain,286BahramChubin,63,84BahramV(BahramGur),57–58Bakhtiar,Shahpur,252,253,261–262Bakhtiaritribe,208,209ElBaradei,Dr.Mohamed,291Bardiya,17,18BattleofMarathon,23Bausani,Alessandro,51,53Bazaarandbazaarimerchants,48,205,227,247,254,274Bazargan,Mehdi,253,257,262,263,265Behbehani,AqaMohammadBaqer,192Behbehani,AyatollahAbdollah,200,201,202,203,204,208Beheshti,Ayatollah,266,272Beytal-Hikma(HouseofWisdom),81Bidel,115Bill,JamesA.,248Bisitun,17,18–19,20,22,86BlackFriday(September8,1978),257Bogomils,52–53Bonyad-eMostazefin(FoundationfortheOppressed),263,265Borujerdi,Ayatollah,240,242,245British

andblockadeofoilexportsin1951,235–236buyingChieftaintanksfrom,247changingalliancesofpriortoWWI,211cynicalpolicyofinnineteenthcentury,195–196anddivisionofPersiainthreepartsin1907,207–208expatriatesinIranin1970s,248failureofpolicy,andRezaKhan,218,219andGulfWarin1991,274imperialismandNaderShah,164andimprovementofrelationsin1998,278liaisonswithulemain1902/3,200andmutualprotectionagreementof1801,178,179andNaserod-Din’sreign,193andoccupationinWWII,227–233oppositionofal-Afghanitowards,197andreplacingMossadeq,236restorationofrelationsin1954,240rivalswithRussiainPersia,187sailorscapturedbyIranin2007,289

andsuccessortoFathAliShah,185–186andTreatyofFriendshipandAlliance,180andWWI,213–214,215SeealsoAnglo-IranianOilCompany;Anglo-PersianOilCompany

BritishPetroleum,239Buf-eKur(TheBlindOwl),225Bulls,7,42Burialpractices,16Bush,GeorgeW.,284Bustan,TheOrchard(Sa‘di),111Buyidsdynasty,84,88Byzantium,63,64

Caesar,Julius,36,38Calendar,7,90,251Cambyses(Kambojiya),17,19,23Caracalla,43Carlyle,Thomas,164Carrhae,battleof,36–38Carter,President,256,258,266Cathars,52,53Caucasus,171,177,228

Russian/Persianwarin1804–1828,178–179,180,181–182CentralIntelligenceAgencyofUnitedStates,237Chemicalweapons,268,273,274China,33ChioniteHuns,56ChristiansandChristianity,50,55,57,125

andManichaeismandAugustine,51–53andMithraism,41andMohammad,70toleranceandIslam,74

Churchill,Winston,283Cinema,Iranian,293–294Clinton,Bill,278Communistpoliticalmovements,229.SeealsoTudehConscription,military,223Constantine,Emperor,55Constitution.SeeMashrutehConstitutionalRevolutionof1905–1911,202–211,212

centralizingeffectof,213Curzonmissingimpactof,215idealsofresurfaceagainandagain,212–213reinstatedafterShah’scoupandforeigninterventions,208RezaKhanasnemesisandchildof,220Westerninfluenceupon,205,206,210andWWI,213

Constitutionalists,206,225Continuityfrompre-IslamictoIslamicera,67–68Corbulo,GnaeusDomitius,40CossackBrigade,195,207,208,213,217,218,222CouncilofGuardians,264,286Crassus,MarcusLicinius,36–38CroesusofLydia,King,1,12Crone,Patricia,15Ctesiphon,33,44,72Culture

andconqueringofMongols,104,105anddehqansafterIslamicconquest,60

influenceofPersianonAbbasids,78–79,83influenceoutsidePersiainSafavidperiod,138–139influentialinworldhistory,293–294andIranasempireofmind,120,294ofParthians,34pervasivenatureofPersianattimeofNaderShah,159andresilienceofPersianscholar-bureaucrats,120andShu‘ubiyyamovement,79spreadbySufisineleventh/twelfthcenturieson,95andsuppressionofwritersunderRezaShah,225underSassanids,48–49,62–63SeealsoArchitecture;Literature;Poetry

Curzon,Lord,215–216,217CustomspoliciesunderMozaffarod-Din,200Cyaxares,4Cyrus(Kurosh)andAchaemenidEmpire,12–16,20,21,23,26,251.SeealsoAchaemenidEmpireCyruscylinder,13–14,15

Daena,8–9,75Daghestan,159–160Dahaetribe,32Damascus,76Daneshvar,Simin,239DaqiqiTusi,86Daral-Fununpolytechnicschool,191,196Daryaee,Touraj,58D’Arcy,WilliamKnox,oilconcession,200,212Darius(Daryavaush),17–20,21,23DariusIII,26,28Darwinism,116Darya-yeNurjewel,158,171Dawkins,Richard,116Dehqans,47–48,60,87Deioces,4Delhi,massacrebyNaderShah,158Demonstrations

afterarrestofKhomeiniin1963,242–243andBlackFriday,257brokenup,289–290andeconomic/religiouselementsin1905,201–202andGolhakin1906,202–203againstgovernmentandlandreform,242andMontazeri’sfuneral,301forPalestiniancause,299andsocialmedia,298–299,301bystudentsin1999,280after2009election,296,298–299,301andWriters’Associationin1977,253

DietrichofNieheim,259Divan(Hafez),115DivineFlashes(Iraqi),109DivorceIranianStyle(film),276Dualism

andManichaeism,49–50,52andZoroastrianism,7

Dunsterville,Lionel,214

EastIndiaCompany(EIC),135,177–178

EasternOrthodoxChurch,53Ebadi,Shirin,287,294Ebtehaj,Abol-Hassan,240Economy

Ahmadinejad’sfailuretodeliveron,286andconquestsofNaderShah,157,160,162,163difficultiesunderMozaffarod-Din,200–201growthfrom1963tolater1970s,246–247andgrowthin1950sand1960s,240–241andindustryunderRezaKhan,224inflation/outofcontrolin1970s,247–248andlateSafavid,148inmid-1800sandforeigners,194andRafsanjani’smarketfreedom,275revitalizationunderAbbasids,80andsanctionsbyU.S.,275,304,311andSchusterandRussiandesiretokeepIranpoor,209whenRezaShahcametopowerin1926,222inWWIanditsaftermath,214

Education,199,224,242,247underIslamicRepublic,276–277

Egypt,17,23,30,54ElamandElamites,2,21Election,Iranian,Presidentialof2009

demonstrationsafter,296,298–299,301fraudsuspicionswith,295–297governmentallegitimacyharmedby,302andGreenMovement,300–302andinternalregimeproblems,300,303andprobablefraudcausingcrisis,299–300publicopinionpollson,301–302RevolutionaryGuardCorpsstrengthenedby,300–301rumorsexplainingresultsof,297U.S.policydecisionsand,300votermotivationsin,297–298

Election,Iranian,Presidentialof2013,304–305EmamRezashrine,212,227Emami,Saeed,278Emams,Shia,127,128Esma‘il,131–134,141–142Esma‘ilIII,166,168Ettela‘atnewspaper,265EumenesofCardia,29Ezra,25

FamilyProtectionLaw,252Famines,194,214Al-Farabi,81Farazdaq,261Farrokhzad,Forugh,226Fascistpoliticalmovements,229FathAliShah,176–177,182,184,185Fatima(daughterofMohammad),71,76–77,124,133Fedai,250,267Ferdowsi,Abolqasem,37,60–61,86,105,117Ferguson,Niall,286Fiqh,253Fisher,H.A.L.,123

Fitzgerald,Edward,91Formsonlyshadowofrealworld,108,109Foruhar,DariushandParvaneh,252,253,278FourJourneys(MollaSadra),244France,178,179,180,231Fravashi,9,34Freewill,92FreedomMovement,253,257,265,267Frye,RichardN.,125Fususal-Kikam,SealsofWisdom(IbnArabi),108,244

Ganji,Akbar,287Gardane,Count(ClaudeMatthieu),179,180GardenofTruth,The(Sana’i),95Gaumata,17GenghisKhan,100,118Georgia,178GerardofCremona,82Germany,213–214,228Al-Ghazali,95Ghaznavids,84,86–87,88,89,90,104Ghuluww(extreme),130,131,141Gibbon,Edward,51,62Gnostics,49,53,94Golestan,GardenofRoses(Sa‘di),110,111Golhakprotestof1906,202–203Gorbachev,Mikhail,270Gordian,Emperor,46Gotarzes,33Governmentalsystem

andAbbastheGreat,135,137–138andAbbasids,78,80,84changesmadebySassanids,47–48,59–60Iranianelectionof2009harminglegitimacyof,302MohammadRezaShah’sfailuretoestablishrepresentative,252morerepresentativethanmostMiddleEasterncountries,287andNaderShah,161inQajarstate,183–184andreligioncontrolledbystatein1990s,271–272andresiliencyofPersianscholar-bureaucrats,120ofSeljukTurksaccordingtoPersianateAbbasidmodel,90andSiyasat-NamehorTheBookofGovernment,90andvelayat-efaqihestablishedbyKhomeini,253–254,263–264

GrandBargain,284,289,293GreatGame,The,187Greeks,23–24,32,48,81GreenMovement,300–302Griboyedov,Alexander,182,184GuardianCouncil,264,286,297,304,306GulfWarin1991,274Gunpowder,135,141

Hadiqatal-haqiqa,TheGardenofTruth(Sana’i),95–96Hadith,82,83,172Hadrian,42Haeri,ShaykhAbdolkarim,244Hafez(Shamsal-DinMohammadShirazi),87,112–115,116,118HajjiFirozTepe,2

HajjiMirzaAqasi,187Al-Hallaj,94Hamas,286,290Harunal-Rashid,84Hebrewscript,10Hecht,Anthony,46–47Hedayat,Sadeq,225,255HephtaliteHuns,58,59,63Heraclius,Emperor,64–65Herat,120,192Herodotus,1,4,9,15,18,19,27,251Hezbollah,263,265,266,272,286,290Hezekiah,13HiddenEmam,188,204,253,261Hijra,70Hokumat-eEslami:Velayat-eFaqih(Khomeini),253Holocaust,230,290Hormuz,straitsof,135Hormuzd,55,56HormuzdIV,63,66Hosein(sonofAli,grandsonofMohammad),77,123–124,126–127,173–175HouseofJustice(adalatkhaneh),202Hoveyda,AmirAbbas,253,263Hulagu,104Humanrightsissues,250,252,279HunaynibnIshaq,81

IAEA.SeeInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)IbnArabi,108–109,138,244,260,270IbnKhaldun,72,83,118–120Ibsen,Henrik,111–112Ijtihad,172ImperialBankofPersia,194–195India

conquestsinbyNaderShah,157–158invasionofandestablishmentofDelhiSultanate,104–105andIran’simportancetoBritain,212MoghulEmpire,139,157–158andTimur,118

Indo-Europeanfamilyofpeoples,1Infantmortalityrate,247InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),291,304,310IranandIranians

firstinscriptionsreferringto,45formaluseofnamein1935,226ideaof,aboutculture/languagenotrace/territory,3identityof,45,117mapofmodern,260Medianstatetobecomeempireof,5specialsenseofstatusamongMiddleEasternnations,285

Iran/Contraaffair,269,273Iran/Iraqwar,267–269,274,275Iraniansettlers/migrations,1,2–3,4,6Iraq

andIran/Iraqwar,267–269,274,275shrinecitiesofsouthern,132,268

Al-Iraqi,Fakhroddin,107–110IraqWar(SecondGulfWar),288–289Ironside,General,216–218,219

Isfahan,118,135,136,150,152,153,167,169,249Islam,69–71

andal-Afghani,198conversionofIraniansto,75andcorruptauthorityvs.piousausterity,126andearliestrelationswithJews,70andManichaeism,51andMu‘tazilisvs.traditionalistSunniulema,82–83andstrictrulesunderMaljesi,147

IslamicRepublicofIranestablishmentof,263andreconstruction,274–276andreformplatformofKatami,277–281andrepressionofimmoralityinpublic,289andsovereigntyofitsborders,289stillspacefordissentandchange,287andwomen,276–277

IslamicRepublicParty(IRP),264,266IslamicState(IS),311Ismailior“Sevener”branchofShi‘ism/Assassins,103–104,128Israel

andAhmadinejad,290–291earlyconquestofanddeportationstoIran,9emigrationto,279Iran’shostilerelationshiptowards,278,280,284andnuclear-armedIran,286–287,292,310–311SeealsoJewsandJudaism

Ja‘faral-Sadiq,128Jalalal-Din,103Jami,115Jangalimovement,212,213,214,218JCPOA.SeeJointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA)Jerusalem,14–15,25,65Jesuits,128JesusofNazareth,5,50,52,110JewsandJudaism,9–10

attacksandpersecutionof,103,140,186–187,208attitudestowardsinlatenineteenthcentury,198–199andconstitutionof1906andMajles,204emigrationtoIsraelandUS,279in1930s,229Mazdaeninfluenceon,9–10andMohammad,69,70andMohammadRezaShah,251–252andorphanedchildrenhelpedtoPalestine,230andParthians,34,40andsackingofChristianJerusalemin614,65savingofbySardariinFrance,231andShapur,50tolerancetowards,14–15,57,74,157underIslamicRepublic,279–280SeealsoIsrael

Jizyatax,74JointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA),309–310,312Jordan,288Julian,RomanEmperor,55–56Justice,21,57

Justinian,ByzantineEmperor,62

Ka‘baofMecca,71Kadivar,Mohsen,274Karbala,77,124–125,126–127,173–175,268,287KarimKhanZand,166,168,169,184,253Kashani,AyatollahAbol-Ghasem,237,240,245Kasravi,Ahmad,233–234,238Katouzian,Homa,45,287KavadI,58–61KavadII,65Kayhannewspaper,265Kermani,MirzaReza,198Khadija(wifeofMohammad),71Khamenei,AyatollahAli,269,273,284,295,300,302,306–308

Ahmadinejad’spublicdisputewith,303Ahmadinejad’sreelectionsupportedby,297

Khanaqas,Sufi,94Kharijites,76,126Khatami,Mohammad,277–281,284,296–297,300Khomeini,AyatollahRuhollah,243–244,245,303,306

arrestin1963,242articleattackingin1978,256attacksuponU.S.governmentin1963–4,242,243,245andBazarganasprimeminster,262becomesleadingopponenttoshahin1963–4,245andconstitution,245,264criticismofclosed-mindedmullahs,271deathofin1989,269–270anddenunciationofPersepolisevent,251exileofin1964,243,245andfatwavs.TheSatanicVerses,270,273andgovernmentbyulema,253–254andIbnArabiandPerfectMan,108,244,260–261andlettertoGorbachev,270–271andprotectionofJews,279returntoIraninFebruary1979,258,259–260andRevolutionaryCouncil,262andsilencingofopposingShi‘aleaders,264andviolence/repression,262,263,265,266

Khorasan,77,80,95,103,151Khorasani,MohammadKazem,206–207Khorramites,15,83,130KhosrawAnushirvan,31,59–60,61–63KhosrawParvez,64–66KhosrawvaShirin(NizamiGanjavi),96Khwarezm,100Kiarostami,Abbas,293Kimiya-yesa‘a-dat,TheAlchemyofHappiness(al-Ghazali),95Al-Kindi,81Kingship,Sassanidconceptof,57Komitehs(revolutionarycommittees),262Konya,105KuchekKhan,212,218Kuh-eNurdiamond,158,165KurdishDemocraticParty(KDP),267KurdsandKurdistan,161,262–263

Landreform,242,246

LaylaandMajnoun(NizamiGanjavi),96–97Leonidas,25LezgesofDaghestan,159–160,181Lifeexpectancy,276Literature

banningofworksbyHedayat,225greatbodyhadbeencreatedbyfifteenthcentury,115andshu‘biyyamovement,79underRezaKhan,225–226SeealsoPoetry

LotfAliKhanZand,170–171Love,85,96,97,98,113,116

MacedonandMacedonians,25,26–30Machiavelli,Niccolo,90,148Macrinus,43Madresehtradition,138,140Magi,9,15,17–20,50,53Magianwine(mey-emoghaneh),93MahmudGhilzai,150Majlesornationalassembly,203–204,206,208,211,212,231

andAnglo-Persianagreementof1919,216attackuponbyMohammadAliShah,207blockedbyhardlinerelementsduringKhatamipresidency,281andpartiestosupportMohammadReza,240,250andRezaKhan,219–220,222,224–225Schuster’scommentson,210andseatsforminorities,279underKhomeiniconstitution,264

Makhmalbaf,MoshenandSamira,293Malcolm,John,171,177,178,196Maleki,Khalil,238MalkomKhan,195,196Al-Ma‘mun,80–81Mandaeans,50Mani,49–51Manichaeism,49–53,59Al-Mansur,79,81Mantiqal-tayr,TheConferenceoftheBirds(Attar),97–100Marduk,14,25Marja,173,207Marlowe,Christopher,221Martyrdom,267–268MaryamBegum,146,147,149Mashdadshrine,137MashhadUniversity,255Mashruteh(constitution),202–205,264.SeealsoConstitutionalRevolutionof1905–1911MasnaviofRumi,106Massagetae,15Maurice,Emperor,63,64Mazdaism,7,8,9,10,15

andaccessionofDarius,19–20andArdashir,44andArsacidsandSassanids,34becomesZoroastrianism,55andbrotherhoodsoffifteenthcentury,130codificationofunderSassanids,54–55andfirealtarsbySassanids,49influenceonJudaism,10

andManichaeism,49,50–51massacresatRayandIstakhrbyinvadingArabs,75andMithraism,41–42andShahnameh,86andshu‘ubiyyamovement,79systematicrecordingoftextsof,40SeealsoAvesta;ZoroasterandZoroastrianism

Mazdak,59,60–61Mazdakism,15,59,61,83Mecca,69,70,71,123,125–126MedesandMedianEmpire,4–5,12Medina,69–70“Mentalreservation,”128Mervmassacre,100,102Mesopotamia,2,42Messiah,8,51,129Migration,internal,246Militarymatters

andcavalryanddehqans,60andcavalryexercisesofNader,153duringAchaemenidempire,26andexpansionofarmyunderRezaShah,222–223ofFathAliShahnomatchforEuropeanpowers,182–183andfeminineapproach,28–29andfinancialoverextension,184andmilitaryrevolutionbyNaderShah,161–162andMithraism,41andoilrevenueandU.S.aid,239–240andParthianarrows,34,36Romantortoise/armor,39,40andSafavids,135,141andtestingofShahabIIImissile,281anduseofhorsesbytimeofDariusIII,26

Millspaugh,Arthur,223,232Mind,empiresoffutureare,283Mind,IranianEmpireof,120,294MinistryofIntelligenceandSecurity(MOIS),265,278,279,289.SeealsoSAVAKsecurityagencyMirVeis,148–149MirzaAghaNuri,192MirzaHasanShirazi,197MirzaHoseinKhan,194MirzaMahdiAstarabadi,164–165Mithra,7MithradatesI,Arsacid,33,34MithradatesII(MithradatestheGreat),33,34Mithraism,40–43Mithras,41Modarres,SeyyedHasan,224,225,264MoghulEmpireofIndia,139,157–158Mohammad,5,68–71,93–94,126MohammadAliShah,206,207,208MohammadBaqerMajlesi,144,146,147MohammadGhuri,104MohammadMizra,181MohammadRezaPahlavi

alienationofpeopletowards,by1977,254–255appealtoU.S.andpublicopinionduringWWII,232assassinationattemptagainst,1949,234–235assumptionofthrone,230andautocraticruleandrepression,243,250–251,252

backgroundof,230demandsfromU.S.toliberalize,242eventsof1951–1953alienatedmanyIranians,237,238incidentswherehelookedfoolish,255–256isolationof,251leavescountryinJanuary1979,258andMossadeqcoup,240andpardoningofSardari,231andWhiteRevolutionreforms,242

MohammadShah(Moghulemperor),157,158MohammadShah(Persianruler),185–186,187,188MOIS.SeeMinistryofIntelligenceandSecurity(MOIS)Mojahedin-eKhalqOrganization(MKO),250,266–267,272Mojtaheds,172,206–207,254,271MollaSadra,138Mongolperiod,100–104,101,116–117

culturalconqueringofbyPersians,104,105Montazeri,Ayatollah,254,272–273,301Montazh,250Moses,5Moslehi,Heydar,303Mossadeq,Mohammad,224–225,231,235,236–237,245Motahhari,Morteza,263Mottahedeh,Roy,234,250Mousavi,Mir-Hosein,296–301Mozzafferod-Din,199–200,201,203Mu‘awiya(fifthcaliph),76,126Mullahs,83,140–141,186,196–197

andattacksagainstGriboyedov,182,184Khomeinicriticismofclosed-minded,271

Mu‘tazilis,82,83,95

Nabonidus,14NaderShah,151–165,156,169,219–220

andattempttoconquerDaghestan,160andconquestofIndia,157–158conquestsofandcentralityofPersia,158–159coronationof,155anddefeatofAfghans,153–154,157anddefeatofOttomans,154–155andmilitaryexercises,152–153andmovementagainstOttomanEmpire,160,162,163overstretchingofresourcesof,157,160,162,163asparvenu,161periodbeforebecomingShah,151–155personalbreakdownof,160,163andreligioustolerance,157reorientationtowardsSunnism,155,157,161styleofrulingbackwardorforwardlooking,160–161whynotmorewell-known?,163–164

Najaf,206–207,287Napoleon,178,179,180,183Naqsh-eRostamrockrelief,44,45,46,54Narseh,54Naser-eKhosraw,88Naserod-DinShah,185,188,191–192,197,199,243

assassinationof,198andbreakingofftalkswithBritishin1870s,195

andBritishandRussianinfluenceinPersia,192–193andMalkomKhan,196rulingasownfirstminister,192andtobaccoconcession,197travelingof,194

Naserod-DinTusi,104Al-Nasser,JamalAbd(Nasser),238Nassiri,General,262NationalFront,235,236,240,242,254,257

reformingandcriticismsof1977,252,253NationalIntelligenceEstimateofNovember2007,293,304Nationalism,117,272Naus,Joseph,200,202Nebuchadnezzar,9Nehemiah,25Neo-Platonists,61–62,94,108,138Nero,39NestorianChurch,57Netanyahu,Benjamin,308,310NewJulfa,136NewYearcelebration,20Newspapers,204,232,265Nietzsche,Friedrich,10,53NimaYushij,226Nizamol-Mulk,HasanTusi,90NizamiGanjavi,96–97Nomadicinvaders,IbnKhaldun’stheoryof,118–120Nomadicpeoples,3–4Non-Iran(Aniran)territories,45Nonviolenceprinciple,303NuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT),291Nuclearweaponsdevelopment

declarationsbyreligiousleadersagainst,273,292anddiplomaticdealwithU.S.of2015,307–312disputeregardingIranian,291–293,304,307fearsregardingandAhmadinejadthreats,286–287andGenevainterimagreement,307–309andintelligencethatIranstoppedin2003,293,304andIraniandiplomaticofferof2003,284andJointComprehensivePlanofAction,309–310,312

NuqtaviSufis,137Nuri,ShaykhFazollah,206,208

Obama,Barack,295,300,308,310Odenathus,Septimius,53–54Oil,210

andBritish,226–227,228,235–236andconcessionof1901toD’Arcy(British),200,201demandsfornationalizationofbyMajles,235–236discoveredinKhuzestan,212increasedincomeunderMohammadRezaPahlavi,239,247protectionoffieldsinWWI,213revenueoftomilitary,223U.S.withstakeinafterMossadeqcoup,239SeealsoAnglo-IranianOilCompany;Anglo-PersianOilCompany

OldStoneAgeinhabitants,2Omar(caliph),111OmarKhayyam,90–93,115,116,145OPEC,247

Originalsin,52Ormuzd(AhuraMazda),44Orodes,37,38Osroes(Khosraw),42OttomanEmpire,130,137,151,203

NaderShah’smovementagainst,154–155,160,162,163Persianculturalinfluencein,138–139andwarwiththeSafavids,133,136andWWI,213,215

Pacorus,38Pahlavidynasty

anddevelopmentofmilitary,222–223executionofseniorfiguresbyKomitehs,262andexploitationofoilbyBritishuntil1993,227formalbeginningofin1926,219inventedhistoricalheritagefor,239,251oilboomandexpansionof1960s–1970s,246–250andpoliticalrepressionandremoteness,229,243,250–251,252–253powerslimitedduringWWII,231andtransportinfrastructure,223–224andWesternizingbyRezaShah,226SeealsoMohammadRezaPahlavi;RezaKhan/RezaShah

PahlaviFoundation,263Pahlavilanguage,48,68Palestine,230,299Panahi,Ja‘far,293Paradise,16Parker,Geoffrey,161Parthiankings,asfriendstotheGreeks,32Parthians,4,32–33,34,39

andbattleswithRome,34–40,42–43andIndo-ParthianempireinPunjab,39underSassanids,47

ParthiansandSassanids,35Pasargadae,251PeaceofParis,192PelagiusandPelagianism,52,53PerfectMan,108,260–261Peroz(Feruz),58Persecutionofminorities

in1830s,186–187andKerdir,54andMohammadRezaShah,251–252andriotsof1903,200underIslamicRepublic,279–280underSafavids,133–134,139–140,144andYazdegerdII,68

Persepolis,20,25,29,251Persia,formaluseofname,226PersiaandthePersianQuestion(Curzon),215Persianlanguage

andlanguagereformbyRezaShah,226,229relationshiptootherlanguages,1–2andShahnameh,88survivedIslamicconquest,68

Persian/Russianwarsof1804–1828,175,177Persianwars,23,25,26PhilipofMacedon,27–28

PhiliptheArab,46Phocas,64Phraates,33,34Pilgrim’sProgress(Bunyan),8PlatoandPlatonism,9,24,108Plotinus,50Plutarch,37PoetryofPersia

al-Iraqi,Fakhroddin,107–110andAttar,97–100andcourtsofAbbasiddynasty,84–85culminationofafterArabconquest,105–116andearlierArabictraditions,85eighteenthcenturyrejectionofSafavidstyle,225–226grandthemeislove,85,96,97,98,113Hafez,87,112–115homoeroticstrainin,107–108Kasravi’sdisapprovalofcultof,233–234andNizamiGanjavi,96–97andOmarKhayyam,91–93andRumi,105–107andSa‘di,110–112andSafavidorIndianperiod,139andSana’i,95–96andShahnameh,86–88andSufism,97–100underRezaKhan,225–226verseformsof,92

Politicalsocieties(anjoman),203–204Polygamy,136–137,276Populationlevels,167,222,240,275–276Pourandarzjani,Ramin,299Pressfreedom,265,281ProtectorofthePoor,60

QajarPersia,136,204,219andAghaMohammadKhan,169–172,176andcivilwarwithZands,169–171,184andFathAliShah,176–177,182,184,185mapofPersia,183andMohammadShah,185–186,187,188

Qalandar,97,107Qalibaf,Mohammad,304–305Qanun(newspaper),196,198Qara-Qoyunlu,120–121Qezelbash,131,132,133,134,141

andAbbastheGreat,135,136,137andNaderQoli,151

Qom,202,287Qor’an,69,70,80,82,87,115

andmysticalelement,93andshu‘ub,79similaritiestoZoroastrianism,74–75andveil,190andwomen,71

Qorratal-Ain,188,189Qumran(DeadSea)scrolls,10

Radioownership,increaseofin1940s,232

Rafsanjani,AkbarHashemi,269,274,281,300,304,306andreconstruction,274–276

Railways,192–193,195,223–224Rashidal-Din,117Rashidun,132Rastakhiz(Resurgence)party,250,257Razmobazm,141–142Razmara,Ali,235Reconstructionera,274–276ReformattemptbyKhatami,277–281,284Refugees,afterrecentwars,274Religiousrevolution,18,210

andAbuMuslim,77–78duringAbbasidperiod,83patternofandArdashir,45Revolutionof1979,126,256–258,261Shi‘abeliefsthatarerecipefor,173talkofexportingfadedbyendofIran/Iraqwar,267

Reuter,Baronde,andReuterconcession,194–195Revolutionof1979,126,256–258,261RevolutionaryGuardCorps(Sepah-ePasdaran),263,268,300–302RexCinemafire,257RezaKhan/RezaShah,208,221,230,244

assumesnamePahlaviin1925,219becomesprimeminister/shah,219–220ascommanderofCossackBrigade,217desireforWesternlookindress/attitudes,226fewfriendsasWWIIbegan,227andNazis/fascism,222,228,229purposetomakeIranstrong,222strengthenedhisownposition,224–225takingover/reformingcentralgovernment,218visittoAtatürkin1934,226

RezaPahlavi(sonoflastShah),287RezaQoliMirza,159,160,164,165Rome

andMithraism,41–42andParthians,33,34–40,42–43andpeaceduringtimeofYazdegerdI/Arcadius,56–57andSassanidEmpire,45–46,53,55–56SeealsoByzantium

Rostam,37,38Roxana,29Rouhani,Hassan,304

electionof,305–306andnucleardealsuccess,311–312pragmatismincareerof,306–307UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyspeechof,307

Rudaki,85–86Ruholamini,Mohsen,299Rumi,Jalalal-DinMolavi,105–107,116,238–239Ruralpopulationimprovements,276Rushdie,Salman,270,273Russia

asalliesofNader,155andattemptedreturnofcaptivesin1829,182endingofinfluenceafter1953coup,237andfiringonshrineofEmamReza,212andinterferenceduringNaser-od-Din’sreign,193–194andloanstoPersiaunderMozaffarod-Din,199–200,201

andmilitaryforcedremovalofSchuster,209andoccupationofIraninWWII,227–234andPersian/Russianwarsof1804–1828,175,177representedtraditionalEuropeanorderinnineteenthcentury,193revolutiondestroyedtradewithPersia,214rivalswithBritishinPersia,187andsecessionistmovementsinAzerbaijanduringWWII,232–233andsuccessortoFathAliShah,185–186andtreatyof1907,207–208withdrawalfromIran,234andWWI,213–214SeealsoCaucasus

SaddamHossein,266,267,274,289Sa‘di,110–112Sadr,Abol-HasanBani,265Al-Sadr,Moqtada,287Sadral-Din,130Safavi,Navvab,233Safavids,121,130–144

andAbbastheGreat,134–141Afghaninvasionof,148–151andalcohol,141–142,143andbattleswithSunniOttomans,133,136Esma‘ilandestablishmentofempire,132–134extremismandpersecutionofreligiousgroups,133–134,139–140,144,147functioningwithoutstrongmonarchs,143–144governmentalsystemof,130,137–138andmilitaryandgunpowder,135,141andreligiousrulesandShahHosein,146–147andShahSoleiman,142–143,144,145–146andShahSultanHosein,146–148andShi‘a,131,132andSufis,130,131,140,147

SaffaridsofSistan,84Sakaetribe,32,33,38Salisbury,Lord,185,195SamanidsofBokhara,84,85–86,117Sana’i,95–96San‘an,Shaykh,98–100Sanctuary(bast),202Sanei,GrandAyatollahYousef,273Sanjabi,Karim,252,253,257Saoshyant,8,129Sarbedarimovement,117,130SardariQajar,Abdol-Hosein,230–231SassanidEmpire,43–62

changesingovernmentmadeby,47–48andcreationofnobilityordehqans,48andIranianidentity,117Khosraw’sruleaspinnacleof,62–63andkingasprotectorofjusticeforallsubjects,57andnobilityandclergyduringreignsofKavadandKhosraw,59–60andnon-Iranianterritories,45prefiguringofpoliciesofwithVologasesI,40andRome,45–46,53,55–57underArdashirandShapur,43–49anduseofnameIran,45

SatanicVerses,The(Rushdie),270,273

Satraps,21SattarKhan,208Al-SaudfamilyofArabia,175–176SaudiArabia,288,311SAVAKsecurityagency,240,242,243,255,265

executionofheadofbyKomitehs,262andpursuitofdissidents/radicalmovements,246,250andRexCinemafire,257SeealsoMinistryofIntelligenceandSecurity(MOIS)

Schuster,Morgan,209–210,223Science,Islamic,198Scythiantribes,5SecretIntelligenceService(SIS),British,237Security,148Seleucidkings,30–33Seleucus,30SeleucusNicator,31–32SeljukTurksempire,89,90,96,100,104Sennacherib,KingofAssyria,12–13,14,15September11,2001,284SevenYears’War,158,160Sexuality,15,50,51,52,249–250Seyyed,202,243–244SeyyedAliMohammad,188Shabestari,MohammadMojtahed,274Shabestari(poet),109ShahAbdol-Azim,shrineof,193,198,201–202,206ShahSoleiman,142–143,144,145–146,148ShahSultanHosein,146–148,149,150,151ShahabIIImissile,281Shahabadi,MirzaMohammadAli,244ShahidBalkhi,67,86Shahnameh(Ferdowsi),37–38,85,251

contentandgreatinfluenceof,86–88andPersiancontinuity,68

Shahrokh(grandsonofNader),161,166,171Shahrokh(sonofTimur),120,161Shahrvaraz,65,66ShalmaneserIII,KingofAssyria,4Shams-eTabrizi,105,107ShapurI,46,47–49,50,54,55ShapurII,55–56,134Shari‘alaw,204,253,264Shariati,Ali,255Shari‘atmadari,Ayatollah,256,257,263–264ShaykhJunayd,130ShaykhSafi,130Shaykhism,188,198Shi‘ismandShi‘atradition

andAkhbari/Usulidebate,172–173,175andAliasMohammad’ssuccessor,125,126criticismbyKasraviandothers,233anddeathofeleventhEmam,129andEmamsaslegitimateleaders/PerfectMan,127,260–261establishmentinIranwithEsma‘ilandSafavids,132globally,andIranian-styleIslamicrule,287andillegitimacyofsecularauthority,172–173andindependenceofIraqi/worldwideShi‘atraditions,287andindignationatarroganceofpower,285Iraniansasprotectorsforelsewhere,287

andIsmailisect,128largerthancurrentIranianreligiousleadership,273–274andMu‘tazilithinking,83and“objectofemulation”(marja-etaqlid),173originsof,77,123–129andpoliticalloyaltyrequiredin1990s,271andquietism,128andreligiousrevolution,173andrepressionofwomenandfemalesexuality,277restorationofbyKarimKhanZand,168andsarbedari,117andschismwithSunniIslam,125,127–128self-imageasbetrayedandhumiliated,127andShariati,255andSufism,95andsympathyforoppressed,127,173andtaqiyehordissimulation,128TwelverShi‘ism,129,132SeealsoAshura;Hosein;Karbala

Shu‘ubiyyamovement,79–80,117Silktrade,33,119,135Al-Sistani,GrandAyatollahAli,287Siyasat-Nameh,90Socialmedia,demonstrationsand,298–299,301Sogdians,4,32Sohravardi,94,138,270Solomon,Templeof,9Soltaniyeh,104Soroush,Abdolkarim,271–272SouthPersiaRifles,213Sparta,25,27StranglingofPersia,The(Schuster),210Succession,difficultiesregarding,136–137Sufism,83,93–95

andalcohol,141complexityofandSafavids,131andconflictwithulema,94,95eleventh/twelfthcenturiesandspreadingIslam,94–95andMajnoun,97andMohammadShah,187andmysticalexperience,93–94andobediencetoMaster(pir),131poetryof,95–100Safavideclipsing/persecuting,134,140,147andsarbedari,117andSunnismandShi‘ism,95

Suicidebombing,273Sulla,33SultanMohammad,100Sumerians,2Sunnism

andNaderShah,155,157,168persecutionofinlateSafavidtime,147andschismwithShi‘a,125,127–128andSufism,95andTimur,118

SupremeNationalSecurityCouncil,289,306Suren,37,39Susa,20Swedishgendarmerie,208,213

Syncretism,ofPersianregime,21

Al-Tabari,59,81Tabataba‘i,SeyyedMohammad,201,202,203,206,207,231Tabataba‘i,SeyyedZia,218Tabriz,103,132,205,207–208TaheridsofKhorasan,84,85Tahmasp,134,142,151–152,153,154,159Taj-eMahjewel,158,171Takht-eSoleiman,65Taleqani,Ayatollah,254Taliban,284,289TankerWar,268–269Taqiyehordissimulation,128Taqizadeh,SeyyedHasan,205,207,208,225TaylorPrism,12–13Ta‘zieh,173,174Tbilisi,171Tehran,169,230,246,248,276TehranUniversity,243,254TepeSialk,2Teymurtash,Minister,227Thaïs,29Timur(Tamerlane),112–113,161TimuridEmpire,116–121TobaccoconcessiontoBritishin1890,196–197Tolerance

andAbbasids,80byArabsafterconquest,74andcivilrightsand1906constitution,204andConstantineasprotectorofChristianseverywhere,55andCyrus,14–15andDarius,21inlaterSassanidperiod,56andParthians,33–34shownbyShapur,47,50underNaderShah,157andYazdegerdI,57

Tomyris,Queen,15TowersofSilence,16Trajan,42Transoxiana,80,100,102,118Transportinfrastructure,223–224,274Treatyof1801,178,179TreatyofFinckensteinof1807,179TreatyofFriendshipandAlliance,180TreatyofTurkmanchai,181–182,186,226TreatyofZohab,141Tribes

andconscription,223RezaKhanovercoming,218androleofwomenbefore1900,189–190situationofineighteencentury,167–168stillactiveinQajarstate,183,214andtribute,168

Troubadourtradition,88Tsitsianov(Russiangeneral),178–179Tudeh,pro-Communistparty,229,232,233,234,238

arrestedbySAVAK,246,254

banningofin1983,267andoilnationalizationmovement,236

TurkeyandTurkish,90,159,222.SeealsoOttomanEmpireTuyullands,135TwelverShi‘as,129,132

UlemaAbbassupportof,137Al-eAhmad’scriticismof,239asauthoritativearbitratorsincrisis,120andBabimovement,188andconflictwithSufis,94,95andconstitutionalrevolution,204,205–207,208andfourschoolsofSunnism,82–83asjudgesunderKhomeini,264andKhomeiniandvelayat-efaqih,253–254,263–264,273andlandreform,242andMohammadRezaShah,254andMohammadShahandSufism,187andmojtaheds,172parallelculturetoAbbasidcourtculture,82–83andrecentdissentfromregimepartyline,274andreformsofRezaShah,227relationshiptogovernmentinSafavidperiod,140–1,144andstatusofwomeninIslamicRepublic,277

Umayyaddynasty,76–77,124,127Unemployment,285,286UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,307UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,291,307,309UnitedStates

andBush’s“AxisofEvil”speech,284buyingF–14fightersfrom,247coupof1953andallyofPahlaviregimeafter,236,237–238,240andeconomicsanctionsagainstIran,275,304,311electionof2008andIranianpolicy,295andGulfWarin1991,274andhelptoIranofearly1900s,209hostageofEmbassydiplomatsand1979Revolution,258,261,265–266immunitytoU.S.militaryandloanin1964,243andIran/Contraaffair,269,273andIraniandiplomaticofferof2003,284Iranianelectionof2009andpolicyof,300andIranianreactionafter9/11,284–285Iranianresistancetovaluesof,249,283Iranianlikingandrespectfor,285Jewishemigrationto,279andmilitaryaidfrom1953–63,240andmoreadvisorsin1946,234andoccupationofIraninWWII,230,233andoilboycottofearly1950s,236aspossiblehopetoIranafterWWI,215andpossibletalkswithIranaboutIraq,288–289resumptionofdiplomaticrelationsandKhatami,278self-aggrandizingpresenceofin1970sIran,248–249andsharingstakeinoilafterMossadeqcoup,239andshootingdownofIranianairlinerin1988,268–269

Uraniumenrichment,291–292Urdulanguage,105,139USSVincennes,268–269

Usulis,172–173,253UzunHasan,131

Valerian,Emperor,46–47,53Vatatzes,Basile,152–153Veil,71,190–191,226,265,276Velayat-efaqih,253–254,264,271,273,277,287Ventidius,Publius,38VologasesI(Valkash),40

Wahhabis,95Wahhabism,175–176Warfare.SeeMilitarymattersWassmuss,Wilhelm,213–214Westerninfluence

andconstitutionalrevolution,205,206,210andEuropeans’visitsduringreignofFathAliShah,176,177Iranianresistancetovaluesofsince1979,283

WesternizingofIran,226,241Westoxication(gharbzadegi),238WhatIstheReligionoftheHajiiswithWarehouses?(Kasravi),233WhiteRevolution,242,254,271WildDuck (Ibsen),112Wilson,Woodrow,215Wine,96,107,113–114,142Wolfowitz,Paul,287Women

arrestsofin2007,289expandedimportanceinworkplaceinIslamicRepublic,277andKhorramites,83andMohammadandQor’an,71andNaderShah,157politicalsocietiesfor,204andQorratal-Ain,188,189restrictedroleofisatwentieth-centuryinnovation,189,190,191schoolsforandbanningofveilbyRezaShah,226andsuffrageaspartofWhiteRevolution,242underAchaemenids,15–16withinIslamicRepublic,189,276–277SeealsoVeil

WorldWarI,213–214,215WorldWarII,227–234Writer’sAssociation,253WuTi,33

Xerxes(Khashayarsha),25

YazdegerdI,56–57YazdegerdII,58YazdegerdIII,66,72Yazdi,Ebrahim,253,267Yazdi,Masbah,298Yazdi,MohammadKazem,207Yazid(caliph),124,126,133Yermolov(Russiangeneral),181YoungOttomans,203

Zahedi,General,236,237,240Zands,169–171,184

SeealsoKarimKhanZand;LotfAliKhanZarathustra.SeeZoroasterZenobia,53–54ZoroasterandZoroastrianism,5–10,16,59–60,61

andheavenlybeingsorentities(angels),8–9andIslamicconquest,67,74andnegativeaccountsofAlexander,30andsimilaritiestoQor’an,74–75transitiontofromMazdaismwithcodificationofAvesta,55SeealsoAvesta;Mazdaism

ZurvanandZurvanism,8,49

MichaelAxworthyteachesattheInstituteofArabandIslamicStudiesattheUniversityofExeter,UnitedKingdom.TheauthorofTheSwordofPersia,AxworthypublisheswidelyinthefieldofIranianhistory.