a dynamic model of top management team effectiveness

The Leadership Quarterly 14 (2003) 297–325

A dynamic model of top management team effectiveness:

managing unstructured task streams

Amy C. Edmondson*, Michael A. Roberto, Michael D. Watkins

Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA

Accepted 28 February 2003

Abstract

Leadership research relating top management team (TMT) demographics to firm performance has

produced mixed empirical results. This article suggests a new explanation for these inconsistencies.

We first note that a given TMT is likely to face a variety of different situations over time. Thus, while

TMT demographic composition is relatively stable, the TMT task is dynamic and variable. In some

situations, team members have similar information and interests (a symmetric distribution); in others,

information or interests diverge (an asymmetric distribution). Based on team effectiveness theory, we

argue that, unless group process is managed accordingly, asymmetric distributions of situation-specific

information and interests will reduce TMT decision-making effectiveness. We then develop leader

process choices to mitigate the potentially harmful effect of these asymmetries. These arguments form

the basis of a theoretical model of TMT effectiveness that integrates insights from research on

leadership, TMTs, small group process, and negotiation, and has practical implications for how leaders

of senior teams can improve team effectiveness through appropriate process choices.

D 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Encouraging the CEO and senior executives to work as a team has been suggested as a

way of enhancing strategic leadership effectiveness in complex organizations. Through

strategic leadership (Boal & Hooijberg, 2000), an organization maneuvers forward into an

1048-9843/03/$ – see front matter D 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/S1048-9843(03)00021-3

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-617-495-6732; fax: +1-617-496-5265.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A.C. Edmondson), [email protected] (M.A. Roberto),

[email protected] (M.D. Watkins).

A.C. Edmondson et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 14 (2003) 297–325298

imperfectly known future, making commitments to some opportunities while turning away

from others. Many practitioners and scholars have argued that teamwork at the top promotes

the generation of creative ideas and multiple alternatives, enables executives to utilize diverse

experience to solve difficult problems, and increases involvement and commitment of key

senior executives (Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Bauman, Jackson, & Lawrence, 1997; Nadler,

1996). A top management team (TMT) provides a way to cope with the turbulence and

complexity in the external environment that has complicated the task of executive leadership

(Hambrick, 1998; Janofsky, 1993; Nadler, 1998). Teamwork allows the CEO to engage in a

participative group process through which diverse members wrestle together with difficult

issues to make decisions and build commitment to implementing them, giving rise to strategic

leadership effectiveness.

At the same time, considerable research and anecdotal evidence suggest that TMTs often

fail to achieve their potential. Some scholars have found that many senior teams do not

engage in real teamwork (Hackman, 1990; Hambrick, 1994; Katzenbach, 1998). Others have

reported that TMTs can find it difficult to resolve conflict (Amason, 1996), build commitment

(Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), or reach closure in a timely fashion (Eisenhardt, 1989;

Harrison, 1996; Hickson, Wilson, Cray, Mallory, & Butler, 1986). Several in-depth case

studies document how dysfunctional group dynamics can lead to errors in judgment and

flawed decisions. Notably, Janis’ (1982) early work on groupthink attributed certain foreign

policy fiascoes to the pressures for conformity that arise within cohesive senior groups, and

Ross and Staw (1986, 1993) conducted case studies examining how groups of senior

executives escalate commitment to failing courses of action.

These leadership failures can be explained by an inability to manage group processes

effectively. Team researchers use the term ‘‘process losses’’ (Steiner, 1972) to describe a gap,

attributable to ineffective communication or coordination, between a group’s potential and

actual performance. Potential performance is the level that could be achieved, from a given

set of inputs, such as sufficient resources, diversity of experience, or other advantages. Well-

documented process losses include pressures for conformity that lead to premature conver-

gence on a solution (Janis, 1982; Taras, 1991), group discussion that fails to surface relevant

information members possess (Stasser, 1999), and other coordination and motivation failures.

Although process losses are likely to occur in TMTs—reducing decision quality and overall

team effectiveness—the question of what factors might make senior teams less vulnerable to

them has not been addressed in the literature.

This article develops implications of research on group interaction process for TMTs.

Instead of using relatively stable team characteristics such as demographic composition to

explain differences in outcomes, we focus on the dynamic relationship between the team and

the different situations it faces over time. We propose that the same team composition will have

a different effect on TMT effectiveness depending on situation-specific distributions of

information and interests. Reflecting Hackman (1987), we define TMTeffectiveness as follows:

(1) the degree to which the team’s decisions enhance organizational performance (e.g,

Hambrick, 1994), (2) members’ commitment to implementing team decisions and willingness

to work together in the future (Amason, 1996; Nadler, 1996; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan,

1986), and (3) the extent to which the team process meets members’ growth and satisfaction

A.C. Edmondson et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 14 (2003) 297–325 299

needs (Hackman, 1987; Hambrick, 1994). Situation-specific distributions refer to the distinct-

ive information or interests held by team members in a given situation.

In the next section, we review two streams of literature that inform our understanding of

TMTs and leadership decision-making. Section 3 builds on this background to discuss

implications of the task variability faced by senior teams. Section 4 develops the core of our

theoretical model, which proposes that situation-specific distributions of information and

interests influence TMT effectiveness, moderated by power centralization and psychological

safety. In Section 5, we develop a set of process choices through which leaders can take

actions that alter the effects of situational factors on team effectiveness to produce better

results (see Table 1 in Section 5 for a summary). Section 6 discusses implications of these

arguments for theory and practice.

2. An integrative approach

Two streams of leadership research can contribute to extending theory on TMTs. The first,

strategic leadership research, employs a macro lens to study effects of TMT demographics on

organizational performance, positing that team process mediates this relationship; the second,

supervisory leadership research, employs a micro lens to examine leader decision-making

behavior within a firm (Boal & Hooijberg, 2000). A central focus of the second stream is the

extent to which leaders seek and use input from others in making critical decisions, clearly, an

important issue for understanding TMTs. We review elements of both streams of research as a

foundation for proposing an integrative approach.

2.1. TMT demographics research

The ‘‘upper echelons’’ literature (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) attempts to link the attributes

of the firm’s leaders with strategic choices and organizational outcomes. Using TMT

demographics as proxies for psychological characteristics, researchers relate variables such

as age, tenure, education, and functional background to organizational outcomes such as sales

growth, innovation, and executive turnover (e.g. Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Eisenhardt &

Schoonhoven, 1990; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Keck & Tushman, 1993; Murmann &

Tushman, 1997). TMT composition also has been used to predict team communication and

conflict (e.g., Knight et al., 1999; Miller, Burke, & Glick, 1998; Papadakis, Lioukas, &

Chambers, 1998; Smith et al., 1994). This stream of research employs an input–process–

output model, focusing predominantly on the relationships among certain inputs and outputs

with less attention to intervening process variables.

Although studies have found relationships between demographic variables and outcomes,

the data have produced conflicting results. For example, Murray (1989) found that tenure

heterogeneity was associated with higher performance among firms in the oil industry;

Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) found that tenure heterogeneity was positively asso-

ciated with revenue growth for semiconductor firms, and Murmann and Tushman (1997)

discovered that tenure heterogeneity was associated with faster responses to environmental


change in the cement industry. At the same time, other research found that tenure

heterogeneity is negatively associated with firm performance (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).

Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996) showed that heterogeneous teams responded more slowly

to competitors’ actions in the airline industry, Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly (1984) reported

that teams with high tenure heterogeneity experienced more turnover, and Smith et al. (1994)

found that tenure heterogeneity was associated with lower returns on investment in a sample

of 53 high-technology firms.

Faced with these inconsistencies, scholars have identified three important limitations of the

TMT literature. First, demographic characteristics are, at best, imperfect proxies for psycho-

logical constructs (Boal &Hooijberg, 2000). Second, TMT research pays ‘‘too little attention to

the actual mechanisms that serve to convert group characteristics into organization outcomes’’

(Hambrick, 1994, p. 185). Research thus has not explained how and why certain demographic

attributes affect outcomes, nor provided definitive conclusions regarding the direction of

causality (Bower, 1998; Hambrick, 1994; Pettigrew, 1992). Most studies assume group process

as a mechanism without measuring it directly. In a rare exception, process was measured and

was a stronger predictor of performance than demographic composition (Smith et al., 1994);

nonetheless, enthusiasm for composition as a proxy for process remains strong because of the

relative ease of obtaining demographic over process data.

Third, most demographic studies fail to account for the impact that situation-specific factors

have on team process and performance (Papadakis et al., 1998). Clearly, TMTeffectiveness can

vary from one situation to another (Janis, 1982; Katzenbach, 1998), yet TMT composition

changes infrequently. Demographic analysis therefore necessarily provides an incomplete

explanation of variation in a team’s performance over time. This suggests a need for additional

theory to explain how situational factors and team attributes work together to shape TMT

processes and outcomes.

2.2. Situational leadership research

Situation-to-situation differences are the focus of a substantial body of research on

leadership behavior (Evans, 1970; Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969; Vroom&Yetton,

1973). This work suggests that leaders need to adjust their style or approach based upon the

circumstances and conditions that they encounter in their organizations and environments.

Normative decision theory (Tannebaum & Schmidt, 1958; Vroom & Jago, 1988; Vroom &

Yetton, 1973) focuses specifically on how leaders make decisions in conjunction with their

management teams, and suggests that leaders ought to interact differently with these

subordinates based upon situational attributes. Vroom and Yetton (1973) argue, in particular,

that leaders should invite more or less subordinate participation during a decision-making

process depending upon situational characteristics such as the importance of the quality of the

decision, the level of time pressure, and the extent to which subordinate commitment is critical

to successful implementation. Leaders’ process choices in this model range from highly

directive (making the decision without input from subordinates) to highly participative

(working with subordinates to develop and evaluate alternatives and then reach consensus

on the final decision).


Empirical studies have found substantial support for normative decision theory’s proposi-

tions (Field, 1982; Vroom & Jago, 1988), suggesting that a situation-contingent approach to

TMT decision-making processes is worth pursuing. Because normative decision theory deals

only with the issue of whether to utilize a team to make a decision—not how to manage a team

process to produce optimal outcomes—its propositions do not help leaders avoid the process

losses that groups encounter on a regular basis (Steiner, 1972). Moreover, normative decision

theory focuses on characteristics of the situation or decision itself, rather than examining how

certain situation-specific attributes of the team might affect a leader’s process choices.

2.3. Summary

Upper echelons research focuses on TMT composition as the critical predictor of

effectiveness. Its empirical studies rely on relatively stable and deterministic causal models

that ignore the ways team processes and outcomes might vary across the multiple situations

faced by senior teams. This work thus assumes a consistency of conditions and team

performance that is unlikely to exist in real TMTs, and it underspecifies the role of process.

Normative decision theory, in contrast, prescribes leader choices contingent on the

situation. However, this work has focused on whether or not a leader should employ a team,

rather than how to employ different kinds of team processes in different situations.

This paper proposes an integrative approach, in which TMT effectiveness depends both on

team composition and on how the team leader manages team process to reflect situational

factors. In the next section, we thus identify critical characteristics of TMTs that vary with the

situation and address implications of this variability for group processes and outcomes.

3. Situation-specific asymmetries

Psychological research on small groups can inform our understanding of TMT process.

Like many decision-making groups (e.g., Hollenbeck, Ilgen, LePine, Colquitt, & Hedlund,

1998; Hollenbeck et al., 1995), TMTs are hierarchical and have distributed expertise. For

example, product development teams often have strong leaders and highly diverse expertise

(Clark & Wheelwright, 1992; Lewis, Welsh, Dehler, & Green, 2002). At the same time,

scholars recognize the unique nature of TMTs and pay special attention to attributes that

distinguish them from work groups lower in the organizational hierarchy (Hambrick, 1994;

Nadler, 1998). We thus highlight salient characteristics of TMTs to build a foundation for

developing theoretical propositions to explain process failures in these groups.

3.1. Unstructured task streams

TMTs face ambiguous and ill-structured problems (Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Hambrick,

1994). Many scholars have observed that senior teams perform tasks that are more complex

and unstructured than the activities carried out by most other organizational work teams

(Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Hambrick, 1994; Nadler, 1998). Senior teams must comprehend


and interpret a great deal of vague, ambiguous, and often conflicting, information from many

sources (Hambrick, 1994). They manage diverse external constituents, from the Board of

Directors, to shareholders, analysts, government officials, and potential alliance partners

(Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Hambrick, 1994; Nadler, 1998). Furthermore, TMTs must decide

which (of many possible options) are the most critical tasks to perform, unlike most work

groups, which are assigned to carry out specific tasks.

We identify an additional dimension of task complexity. Senior teams confront a wider

variety of ‘‘tasks’’ (that is, situations, issues, and challenges) than other teams. The TMT task

is inherently variable. In contrast, most organizational teams, including both self-managed

and hierarchical distributed expertise (HDE) teams, tend to undertake relatively structured,

unitary tasks that exhibit some degree of consistency over time (Hackman, 1987, 1990;

Hollenbeck et al., 1995, 1998). We conceptualize this task variability as follows: senior teams

face unstructured task streams—a continual flow of varying and overlapping situations. In

these streams, some situations may be familiar and routine, while others demand substantial

investments in problem definition or creation of new knowledge. For consistency, we use the

term ‘‘situation’’ to refer to the task, issue, or decision confronting a TMT at a given time.

3.2. Dynamic distributions of information and interests

The dynamic nature of this unstructured task stream implies that the team–situation

relationship—or the match between the team’s stable characteristics and the situation at

hand—will vary across time. We identify two core dimensions of the team–situation

relationship.

First, the distribution of relevant information within the team is likely to differ across

situations, depending on the relationship of a given issue to members’ current activities and

functional expertise. Situation-specific information consists of facts, data, and ideas that are

pertinent to a particular decision.

Second, TMT members, as representatives of powerful constituencies within the organ-

ization, may have closely aligned interests on some situations and divergent or competing

interests on others. Situation-specific interests comprise goals and objectives that individual

team members wish to achieve, sometimes at the expense of other team members. The nature

and distribution of interests within the TMT thus differs from one situation to another.

Distributions of information and interests are a central focus of negotiation research (Lax

& Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Watkins, 2000). This work is

particularly relevant for TMTs because decision-making in these groups often resembles

multiparty, mixed-motive negotiations rather than collaborative problem-solving processes

(Allison, 1971; Bazerman, 1998; Cyert & March, 1963; Murray, 1978). Negotiation scholars

contend that assessing how information and interests are distributed among parties is critical

to understanding multiparty negotiation processes (e.g., Raiffa, 1982). In some situations,

participants enter a negotiation with common information about each person’s best alternative

to a negotiated agreement or ‘‘BATNA’’ (Fisher & Ury, 1991); hence, each knows others’

walk-away points. Scholars describe this distribution of information as symmetric. In other

situations, each negotiator knows his or her own BATNA but is uncertain of others’—an


asymmetric distribution. Likewise, individuals in a negotiation may have substantially

aligned (symmetric) interests, or they may have substantially opposing (asymmetric) interests

(e.g., Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Watkins, 2000).

The state of a TMT relative to a specific situation can also be characterized along these

dimensions. Each member of a TMTmay have the same situation-specific information, or they

may have access to private or unique information not possessed by others. We define TMT

information asymmetry as the degree to which different team members have distinct, unshared

information about a particular situation. For example, facing a decision about a merger, team

members are likely to have different information about the strategy, organization, and finances

of potential partners. In many cases, the relevant information may be so taken for granted by

individual team members that they are unaware of others’ lack of knowledge or understanding

(Argyris, 1993; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994).

Similarly, interests of teammembers may be strongly aligned, or highly divergent.We define

TMT interest asymmetry as the degree to which team members have divergent interests in a

given situation. For example, facing a decision to downsize the workforce, team members may

wish to preserve their own power and resources and therefore try to minimize layoffs in their

respective areas. In such ‘‘mixed-motive’’ situations, team members may both cooperate to

accomplish joint objectives and compete to advance individual interests (Bazerman,Mannix, &

Thompson, 1988; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

These asymmetries are more dynamic and situation-dependent than demographic variables

in teams (such as tenure heterogeneity), which tend to be relatively stable over time. The same

team thus may have a symmetrical distribution of information and/or interests for one

situation and an asymmetrical distribution for another. For instance, member interests may be

closely aligned in a decision about fending off an unsolicited takeover bid, while interests may

be quite divergent when executives gather to determine the annual budget at a time when

resources are limited. This suggests that models that rely on stable compositional variables

may miss an important source of variance in team effectiveness, as depicted in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Situation variability creates situation-specific asymmetries affecting TMT process and effectiveness.


4. Diagnosing process losses

We draw from research on small groups to suggest that asymmetries in the distribution

of situation-specific information and interests may lead to process losses in TMTs. One

research tradition views groups through a computational lens, focusing on how inputs

(information that individual members possess) are transformed into outputs (group

decisions). Decision outcomes are a function of both the a priori distribution of information

and the efficiency with which a group surfaces and uses its distributed information

(Hollenbeck et al., 1998; Stasser, 1999; Stasser & Davis, 1981). Another tradition stems

from the psychology of social influence processes (e.g., Asch, 1951; Baron, Vandello, &

Brunsman, 1996; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Janis & Mann, 1977; Zimbardo & Leippe,

1991) and employs a socio-emotional lens. In this work, outcomes are a function of

dominance patterns in group discussions (Bales, 1954), suppression of dissent (Janis, 1982),

or whether and how minority viewpoints are considered (Nemeth, 1997; Nemeth &

Wachtler, 1974). Both traditions document process failures, with the former focused on

poor use of information and the latter on failure to consider the full range of ideas held by

group members.

We use both conceptual lenses to analyze implications of distributions of informa-

tion and interests in TMTs for group process and performance. Two relatively stable

TMT attributes—power centralization and psychological safety—are explored as moder-

ators of the relationships between dynamic situation-specific asymmetries and TMT

effectiveness.

4.1. Information asymmetry

One purpose for engaging in a team decision process is to pool expertise from multiple

sources and thereby generate ideas that no individual could develop alone. In this way,

leaders may anticipate capturing synergistic benefits from teamwork. Such benefits often

remain elusive, however. First, teamwork is not automatic (Hackman, 1998). Although

asymmetric information promises synergy from integrating multiple perspectives and

diverse expertise, it also can interfere with team functioning (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).

Compared to having the same information and experience, team members with divergent

information may bring taken-for-granted assumptions and competing mental models that

inhibit mutual understanding (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Dougherty,

1992). Seeing a situation through a lens partly shaped by the information each holds,

group members may misinterpret each other’s comments.

Second, unique information (known by only one member) tends not to be shared in

group discussions (Stasser, 1999). Experimental studies have demonstrated that groups

tend to dwell on common information (that held by all members), such that privately

held information fails to surface; further, when it does surface, its impact is often muted

(Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Stasser, 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985). Note

that this phenomenon is not dependent on interests being asymmetric. Private information

may remain unshared when individuals—deeply engaged in the discussion at hand—fail


to recognize its salience for the issue under consideration. Members also may fail to

share private information because they take it for granted and implicitly assume that

others know what they know, or because they are reluctant to jump into an already active

discussion.

If situation-relevant information fails to surface in a TMT decision-making process, the

quality of outcomes will be reduced. By not discussing all pertinent information, teams

may overlook plausible options, fail to examine the full consequences of each alternative,

or underestimate the risks associated with a proposal. In addition, members’ awareness

that relevant information did not surface is likely to erode commitment to implementing

the group’s decision, especially if they feel they did not contribute fully to it. In contrast,

if members have relatively more situation-relevant information in common at the outset,

the group will more effortlessly consider that information (Stasser, 1999).

Proposition 1: Situation-specific information asymmetry will reduce TMT effectiveness.

This problem is likely to be particularly acute in TMTs characterized by power

centralization. We define power as the capability of an actor to influence others’ behavior

and to get people to do what they otherwise would choose not to do (Finkelstein, 1992;

Kanter, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981, 1992). Scholars have argued that power plays a more central

role in strategic decision-making within top teams than in the tasks performed by other

work groups (Child, 1972; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1994; Mintzberg,

1983; Tushman, 1977). TMTs must make strategic choices even when cause-and-effect

relationships are unclear and when members’ goals are ambiguous and conflicting, while

lower-level groups tend to work on problems characterized by goal agreement and a more

complete understanding of cause–effect relationships (Child, 1972; Tushman, 1977) in

contexts conducive to sharing power and leadership (Avolio, Jung, Murry, & Sivasubra-

maniam, 1996; Seers, 1996).

Power centralization in a TMT is likely to influence the sharing of private information.

Researchers have shown that some TMTs consist of individuals with roughly equal power,

such that the CEO does not maintain a substantial advantage over other members; in others,

the CEO has a great deal more power than the rest of the team (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,

1988; Finkelstein, 1988, 1992).

We hypothesize that power centralization—that is, when the CEO has a great deal more

power than other members—will inhibit open sharing of private information. Group

members with less power often defer to those with more power (Bales, 1988; Maier,

1961; Pfeffer, 1992; Russo & Schoemaker, 2002), in part because powerful group

members can reject or marginalize those holding minority views (Nemeth, 1997; Nemeth

& Wachtler, 1974; Schachter, 1951). Less powerful members may engage in self-

censorship with respect to dissenting views (Janis, 1982) while more powerful members

withhold private information to protect and increase their power (Pettigrew, 1973).

Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) found that TMTs with a high degree of power

centralization engaged in less candid discussion and less open exchange of ideas than

teams with more balanced power distributions. When power was centralized, team


members worked behind-the-scenes to influence the final outcome, such as withholding

critical data or distributing it selectively to others (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). We

predict that power centralization in a TMT will moderate the relationship between

information asymmetry and effectiveness as follows:

Proposition 2: Power centralization increases the negative effect of situation-specific

information asymmetry on TMT effectiveness.

Next we suggest that the level of psychological safety in a senior team will affect the

relationship between information asymmetry and team effectiveness. Team psychological

safety is defined as the shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking

(Edmondson, 1999). In teams with high psychological safety, a function of interpersonal

trust and mutual respect, members believe that the group will not rebuke, marginalize, or

penalize them for speaking up or for challenging prevailing opinion.

Psychological safety is salient (and often low) in TMTs for several reasons. First, the

CEO has the ability to hire, fire, and set compensation for the other team members. This

can make it difficult for other senior executives to take interpersonal risks, because they

fear the consequences of missteps as evocatively depicted in one qualitative study

(Edmondson, 2002). Second, conflicts and disputes within senior teams often become

public knowledge. This external visibility creates an added pressure that may affect the

climate within a TMT. Moreover, TMT members can find themselves competing with

one another in a highly politicized and public contest for CEO succession. The stakes are

high, not simply because the winner becomes the chief executive, but also because the

losers typically must search for new employment. The nature of these high-stakes

contests can make it difficult to develop a safe environment for open discussion.

Power centralization and psychological safety are not uncorrelated. Teams with greater

power centralization are less likely to perceive the environment as safe for interpersonal

risk. However, teams can exhibit high psychological safety despite substantial differences

in power among members (Edmondson, 2002; Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2000,

2001), or low psychological safety with relatively balanced power structures (Edmondson,

1999, 2002). This is because powerful leaders can take actions that create psychological

safety, such as acknowledging their own mistakes, actively inviting others’ ideas, and

communicating a genuine interest in open discussion and experimentation.

In teams characterized by a low level of psychological safety, individuals may feel

uncomfortable revealing uniquely held information. They may become preoccupied with

concerns about the risk of sharing information and particularly reticent to provide

information that does not confirm existing views within the group. In contrast, individuals

are more likely to share private information if psychological safety is high. Thus, we

propose that psychological safety will moderate the relationship between information

asymmetry and team effectiveness as follows:

Proposition 3: Psychological safety decreases the negative effect of situation-specific

information asymmetry on TMT effectiveness.


4.2. Interest asymmetry

TMTs may experience process losses when discussing issues for which members have

divergent interests. Although senior executives strive to achieve common goals for the firm,

they also represent powerful subunits or constituencies within the organization. This creates

‘‘a tension regarding group identities’’ and enhances the likelihood of goal conflict and self-

interested behavior in some, but not all, situations (Hambrick, 1994, p. 176). For instance,

members can find themselves in direct competition regarding the allocation of resources

(Bower, 1970). Members of lower-level work groups do not represent such large

constituencies and do not have as many organizational resources under their command

and are therefore less likely to experience identity tension (Hambrick, 1994). As noted

above, such tensions may be exacerbated by succession scenarios, in which members

jockey for advantage in the battle to become CEO.

The negotiation literature distinguishes between ‘‘value-creating’’ and ‘‘value-claiming’’

behaviors that arise when interests are not aligned completely (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

Value-creating behavior consists of finding ways to advance compatible interests or to

devise mutually beneficial trades that benefit the organization as a whole. However, when

interests are not completely aligned, individuals are motivated to capture or ‘‘claim’’ as

much value as they can (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). In these situations, competitive value-

claiming behavior often takes place at the expense of cooperative value-creating behavior.

We argue that when interests within a top team differ, value-claiming behavior is likely

to decrease the generation of creative new options, as executives become ardent, even

overcommitted, advocates for their positions. Advocates’ self-serving behavior can under-

mine efforts to advance shared goals, preclude the kind of thorough analysis needed to

arrive at the best solution for the company as a whole, and lead to erosion of team

relationships. For a vivid example of this phenomenon, consider the demise of investment

banking firm, Lehman Brothers, in the aftermath of value-claiming behavior by senior

executives with divergent interests (Bazerman, 1998; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Mannix,

1989). In the 1980s, the firm’s two business units became embroiled in a dispute over the

distribution of profits; each unit advocated a strategy that satisfied its own interests, leading

to the departure of the firm’s respected chairman and to financial distress (Bazerman, 1998;

Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Note that this phenomenon is not dependent on an asymmetric

distribution of information. Differences in interests can lead to self-serving behavior, even

when people know what others know (Bazerman & Neale, 1992).

Excessive value-claiming behavior is likely to undermine TMT effectiveness by inhibiting

the potential for mutual gains, thereby leading to suboptimal solutions for the organization.

When value claiming occurs at the expense of value creation, teams are also likely to lack

commitment to implementing resulting decisions and may be less motivated to work

together in the future, a key aspect of TMT effectiveness. Because individuals perceive

themselves as ‘‘winners’’ or ‘‘losers’’ in these situations, the losers lack commitment to the

final solution, necessarily eroding shared commitment. Finally, interpersonal conflict often

emerges as a result of value-claiming behavior, eroding commitment and group harmony

(Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995).


Proposition 4: Situation-specific interest asymmetry reduces TMT effectiveness.

Power centralization exacerbates value-claiming behavior in mixed-motive situations.

Negotiation research has shown that dyads with different interests and unequal power

balances tend to arrive at inferior outcomes relative to those with equal power balances,

because those with more power stand to gain more than those with less, and they impede the

creative processes that might have yielded greater total gains by imposing their preferences

on others (e.g. Mannix & Neale, 1993; McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986; McClintock,

Messick, Kuhlman, & Campos, 1973). Conversely, scholars have demonstrated that multi-

party negotiations among people with equal power tend to result in more value creation than

negotiations among parties with different levels of power (Mannix, 1993), for several reasons.

First, a powerful CEO may believe that he or she can impose a preferred outcome quickly

and forcefully. Doing so may suppress creative problem solving that could lead to a better

solution. Second, less powerful members may focus primarily on protecting their own

interests in these situations, because they fear that others will try to claim extra value through

the behind-the-scenes lobbying that often occurs within TMTs with highly centralized power

(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). Third, given these concerns, less powerful members may be

less willing to cooperate with others to discover mutually beneficial alternatives, approaching

the discussion competitively instead of cooperatively (Mannix & Neale, 1993). Thus, we

propose that power centralization moderates the relationship between interest asymmetry and

TMT effectiveness.

Proposition 5: Power centralization increases the negative effect of situation-specific interest

asymmetry on TMT effectiveness.

Greater psychological safety, in contrast, may enhance value creation in mixed-motive

situations. To identify opportunities for mutual gains or creative new alternatives (Fisher &

Ury, 1991), team members must be willing to come forward with novel proposals and to be

open about their own interests and objectives, as well as to engage in a candid discussion of

each proposal’s costs and benefits for all of the parties involved in the decision process. Frank

dialogue requires a climate in which people have few concerns about being embarrassed or

punished for offering unorthodox suggestions; otherwise, they are likely to focus on

defending their own interests rather than on identifying opportunities for mutual gains. Thus,

psychological safety should moderate the relationship between interest asymmetry and team

effectiveness.

Proposition 6: Psychological safety decreases the negative effect of situation-specific interest


4.3. The interaction between interest asymmetry and information asymmetry

When interests and information asymmetries occur simultaneously, the likelihood of

team effectiveness decreases further. In these instances, individuals may withhold unique


information because they wish to utilize it to create a personal advantage during bargaining

with other group members, or because full disclosure may harm their negotiating position.

An individual may hold back information that would enable others to determine his or her

goals or preferences, referred to as the ‘‘strategic’’ use of private information (Bazerman,

1998; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Thus, we argue that these two variables interact to

exacerbate process losses created by each asymmetry individually. Interest asymmetries

mean that team members are motivated to withhold certain information strategically, while

information asymmetries make it more difficult for people with different interests to

recognize creative opportunities to realize mutual gains, increasing the likelihood of flawed

and incomplete debate.

Proposition 7: Situation-specific interest and information asymmetry interact to decrease

TMT effectiveness.

4.4. Summary

The above analysis identifies specific process losses likely to reduce TMT effectiveness.

Situation-specific asymmetries in information and interests are proposed as causes of process

losses, and hence, ineffective decision-making. This is not to suggest that some well-

functioning groups cannot capitalize on the potential benefits of asymmetry, thereby creating

novel and creative solutions to problems; we simply argue that teams are more likely to

encounter process losses when these asymmetries exist. Fig. 1 models the core argument

developed thus far, suggesting that unstructured task streams give rise to situation-specific

asymmetries of information and interests that affect TMT process and, in turn, TMT

effectiveness.

Because power centralization and concerns about psychological safety can be particularly

acute in TMTs, we addressed the potential moderating effects of these variables. In this way,

we relate reasonably stable attributes of top teams to dynamic (situation-specific) factors to

explain TMT effectiveness.

The next section explores leadership process choices that may mitigate effects of

information and interest asymmetries. First, we note that the team leader, as CEO, has

the positional authority to manage team process. Just as scholars of negotiation argue that

bargaining strategies should be contingent upon the distribution of information and interests

(Fisher & Ury, 1991; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Watkins, 2000), we suggest that

leaders can design and lead TMT decision-making processes contingent upon situational

assessments of the distributions of information and interests. We thus develop a prescriptive

contingency model (e.g., Elangovan, 1995; Vroom & Yetton, 1973) for leading TMTs.

5. A prescriptive model of contingent process choices

Drawing from both normative decision theory and negotiation theory, in this section we

propose a prescriptive model for TMT decision-making to minimize the process losses


described above. The purpose of the model is to articulate leadership strategies for realizing

the promise of teamwork despite input asymmetries. By managing process in a contingent

manner, we argue that senior teams can increase their potential for integrating a mix of

perspectives to produce better outcomes than individual leaders could produce alone. Table 1

summarizes our process choice arguments.

Table 1

Matching the potential for situation-specific process losses with leader’s process choice

Team–situation

variable

Process failure Leader’s process

choice

Behavioral attributes

of high level of

process choice

Outcome of process

choice for team

effectiveness

Interest

asymmetry

Value-claiming

behavior reduces

the potential

for group value

creation or joint

gains; affective

conflict

Outcome control

(high vs. low)

Leader decides

final outcome:

. imposes decision

on group after

deliberations are

complete

Decision outcome

likely to create

most value for

organization as a

whole; affective

conflict reduced

Information

asymmetry

Relevant information

fails to surface in

group discussion—

not motivated by

personal gain but

rather by failure to

recognize salience

or reluctance to jump

into discussion process

Process

intervention

(high vs. low)

Leader intervenes

actively and

frequently in the

discussion to

. facilitate sharing

of situation-

specific

information

. clarify others’

contributions;

emphasizes

private

information

. inquire into

views of silent

group members

All situation-specific

information is

revealed and

discussed by the

group in the

deliberation process;

team commitment

to solution is

enhanced

Interaction

effect

Self-serving behavior

can exacerbate

information-surfacing

failures, as people

deliberately withhold

information to enhance

their own power,

further reducing amount

of relevant information

shared and inhibiting

potential for novelty

and synergy that

produce joint gains

Process design

(high vs. low)

Leader imposes a

structured process

to ensure debate

and thorough

consideration of

alternatives, e.g.,

. uses subgroups

to develop

and debate

alternatives

. assigns one or

more devils’

advocates

A healthy debate

between more

than one alternative

takes place, including

a comprehensive

analysis of issues,

improving decision

quality and

increasing team

commitment


We do not simply provide prescriptions for reducing or eliminating information and

interest asymmetries for two reasons. First, part of the rationale for teams is to bring

different knowledge, expertise, and interests together; amidst this heterogeneity lies the

promise of team synergy. Second, these asymmetries are dynamic (or situation-specific),

such that a solution to align interests in one situation may not solve the problem in

another.

The model includes three process choices, each addressing one of the three basic

failures described above. By articulating three distinct process choices for leaders, we

depart from prior decision-making research that treats level of subordinates’ contribution

as a single process choice (e.g., Hollenbeck et al., 1998; Tannebaum & Schmidt, 1958;

Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Much of the leadership and team literature implicitly frames

the decision-making task as the job of the leader, with or without others’ input and

with varying degrees of weight assigned to others’ input. For example, researchers

studying decision-making in HDE teams focus on how much weight a team leader places

on other members’ input when making a decision (Hollenbeck et al., 1998). Similarly,

normative decision theory (Vroom & Jago, 1988; Vroom & Yetton, 1973) postulates that

leaders traverse a single spectrum from less to more participative modes of decision-

making.

We extend this work by drawing on Nadler’s (1996) view of executive team leadership

and Elangovan’s (1995) model of managerial dispute resolution. These models both

suggest that leaders can be more or less directive about more than one aspect of a

situation, independently. Nadler argued for a distinction between being directive about

content (what decision is made) and being directive about process (how the decision is

made). Elangovan similarly distinguished between outcome control and process control—

both exercised by a third party engaged in dispute resolution.

We articulate three process choices that a leader of a TMT faces: (1) how to reach

closure on a decision (outcome control), (2) how to facilitate group discussion (a relatively

unobtrusive form of process control), and (3) how to structure debate (a heavy-handed form

of process control, which we call process design). Outcome control provides a way to

reduce process losses caused by interest asymmetry; process control mitigates information

asymmetry, and process design reduces problems caused by the interaction effect of both

asymmetries. This way of modeling the leader’s decision space resembles but does not go

as far as models of shared leadership, in which the leadership function is dynamically

transferred from the leader to other members (Avolio et al., 1996). Compared to leaders of

most work teams, CEOs have far greater positional power and legal and fiduciary

accountability, making truly shared leadership difficult to achieve in these teams; however,

this does not preclude CEOs from influencing team processes to generate better discussion

and better results.

5.1. Outcome control

When trying to reach closure in a decision-making process, the TMT leader faces a choice

about whether to exercise more or less control over the outcome. Exercising outcome control


as a leader involves asking one’s team to generate and discuss alternatives and then making

the final decision alone. Low outcome control means inviting the team to reach a consensus

decision. High outcome control suggests the leader acts as an arbitrator—listening to

competing arguments and selecting the course of action that he or she believes is best for

the organization. With low outcome control, the leader acts as a mediator—trying to bring

team members with different views together to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution (Lax

& Sebenius, 1986).

We propose that low outcome control works best when a team has symmetric interests.

Low outcome control encourages creative problem solving, in part by communicating an

implicit message that everyone’s views matter. Conversely, if a team has symmetrical

interests but knows the leader will make the decision alone anyway, motivation to participate

in the team discussion may be diminished, potentially eroding the quality of the outcome.

Further, if people have not contributed to a decision, they may lack commitment to its

implementation (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995;

Shapiro, 1993; Spreitzer, 1995). Finally, participating in a decision leads members to view

the process as fair, increasing commitment (Shapiro, 1993). Thus, when interests are

symmetrical and problem solving is unlikely to be impeded by value claiming, leaders can

reach closure through consensus building without excess risk of group process losses.

In contrast, when substantial interest asymmetry exists for a given situation, the leader can

mitigate the harmful effects of value-claiming behavior through increased outcome control.

Knowing that team members may push for decisions that meet their own interests at the

expense of organization-wide interests, the leader can communicate that he or she will make a

final decision. Through outcome control, the leader diminishes the likelihood that a struggle

to reach consensus will result in a compromise that is not best for the firm. The leader also

prevents group members from engaging in a competitive battle that results in one subset of

the TMT imposing its will on others. Through outcome control, the leader also can preclude

problem avoidance (Elangovan, 1995, 1998).

Self-serving behaviors in a team have been shown to promote affective conflict (Amason,

1996; Jehn, 1995; Roberto, 2000) and reduce commitment to implementation (Amason,

1996; Garvin & Roberto, 2001). Outcome control allows the leader to ‘‘call the question,’’

bringing deliberations to a close before affective conflict builds up. Team members are

likely to view the leader making the decision as more fair and appropriate than a process

characterized by self-serving or political behavior on the part of group members in a

difficult consensus building session. Dispute resolution research shows that an orderly

process among parties with conflicting interests enhances perceptions of fairness and

commitment (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Karambayya & Brett, 1989). Thus, by formulating

a decision outcome after hearing others’ views, the leader can promote the decision quality

and implementation commitment integral to team effectiveness. In sum, leader process

control is likely to moderate the negative effect of situation-specific interest asymmetry on

team effectiveness.

Proposition 8: Outcome control by the leader reduces the negative effect of situation-specific

interest asymmetry on TMT effectiveness.


5.2. Process control

We define process control as leader intervention in the discussion to encourage certain

people to share information before or more often than others, to inquire into the views of

silent members, or to emphasize particular remarks made by members. This may include

managing participation (‘‘air time’’), asking people where they stand on particular issues, or

encouraging alternative views. High process control entails reiterating or paraphrasing points

that surfaced quickly but failed to receive sufficient attention (Larson et al., 1996; Larson,

Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998), as well as questioning and testing for understanding

(Nadler, 1998). These leadership behaviors constitute a more directive approach to facilitating

group process (Nadler, 1998; Schwartz, 1994; Webne-Behrman, 1998) relative to low process

control—which involves encouraging a discussion in which members participate as they

wish, refraining from calling on particular individuals and not emphasizing or paraphrasing

others’ comments.

When leaders choose low process control, they allow people to speak freely, rather

than choosing to steer the discussion and select who participates at what time. This

distinction draws from two streams of work: research on groups as information systems

(Larson et al., 1998) and models of process consultation (Schwartz, 1994; Webne-

Behrman, 1998) that provide helpful detail about how to facilitate group discussion for

effectiveness.

We propose that team distribution of information should determine the leaders’ degree of

process control. For a symmetric distribution, high process control by the team leader is

unnecessary and may even be counterproductive. First, it may create discomfort for those

who do not like to speak without having thought through their comments carefully. Second, it

may create a perception that the leader is trying to slant the discussion in a particular

direction, leading a group to abandon potentially superior options they believe the leader

disfavors. Indeed, research has shown that group members may show excessive deference if a

leader reveals his views in the early stages of a team discussion (Levine, 1989). If the

rationale for selecting people to speak is unclear, leader intervention may decrease

perceptions of procedural fairness. Finally, if everyone in the team has the same information

at the outset, encouraging people to reveal what they know is superfluous, such that a less

directive approach is intrinsically preferable.

When the distribution of situation-specific information in a TMT is asymmetric, the risk of

private information failing to surface is high (Stasser, 1999) but can be reduced if the leader

takes an active role in encouraging people to share information. The status of leaders gives them

the ability to encourage others to reveal private information (Larson et al., 1996; Stasser, 1999).

Consistent with this proposition, laboratory studies show that groups with unshared (asym-

metric) information make better quality decisions when leaders intervene actively in the

discussion to emphasize and repeat previously unshared information (Larson et al., 1998).

Encouraging people to share private information also builds commitment, because

individuals feel they have had ample opportunity to influence the final outcome (Shapiro,

1993; Thibault & Walker, 1975). This contention is supported by experimental research

showing that when leaders ask clarifying questions, probe for further explanation, and


rephrase comments to insure that they have understood people correctly, they foster higher

levels of commitment (Korsgaard et al., 1995); we add that this is particularly relevant when

information asymmetries exist. In this way, process control can moderate the negative effect

of information asymmetry on team effectiveness.

Proposition 9: Process control reduces the negative effect of situation-specific information


5.3. Process design

Finally, the leader faces a choice about how to design a decision-making process to

ensure healthy debate. The exercise of process design may involve dividing the team into

two subgroups to develop alternatives before coming together to debate the merits of each,

a process choice called the ‘‘Dialectical Inquiry’’ method (Priem, Harrison, & Muir, 1995;

Schweiger et al., 1986). Or, a leader can assign an individual to observe and critique

alternatives being discussed—the ‘‘Devil’s Advocacy’’ Method (e.g., Priem et al., 1995;

Schweiger et al., 1986). These process designs have been proposed as a way to insure that

team members have an opportunity to develop and express their views free from the

pressures to conform to a dominant position within a larger group (Janis, 1982; Schweiger

et al., 1986). A low level of process design means that the leader does not design or

structure the process, but rather allows the group to determine both the mode of dialogue

among members and how to evaluate alternatives.

We suggest that TMT leaders can use process design to counteract the risk of failing to

generate or evaluate alternatives that arises in situations characterized by asymmetric

interests and information. Deliberate process design can help a TMT conduct a more

thorough analysis than would happen spontaneously when facing these asymmetries. For

example, creating subgroups forces the team to develop and consider different viewpoints,

and provides a forum where minority views are more accepted. By asking members to

explain and defend various alternatives in a structured debate, the leader enhances the

likelihood that private information will be shared. In addition, the leader can minimize

value-claiming behavior by dismantling natural coalitions in composing the subgroups, or

by forcing powerful advocates to consider and argue for options they may not have

endorsed initially. This may enhance the development of creative new options, as well as

the recognition and pursuit of value-creating opportunities.

This prescription is consistent with Janis’ (1982) observation that decision-making

practices employed during the Cuban Missile Crisis helped Kennedy’s team avoid

premature convergence. Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Kennedy administration

developed techniques for employing subgroups and devil’s advocates. Reflecting on the

former decision, Kennedy and his advisers realized they had discouraged dissenting

opinions, marginalized those with minority views, and thereby converged prematurely on

a flawed plan of action. Janis thus advocated the use of subgroups to discuss and debate

alternatives, and he suggested assigning one or more team members to play devil’s

advocate.


These structured decision-making procedures have been evaluated in a series of experi-

mental studies that suggest that formal, structured decision-making procedures are superior to

less structured techniques in certain situations (Priem et al., 1995; Schweiger et al., 1986).

Schweiger et al. (1986) demonstrated that both Dialectical Inquiry and Devil’s Advocacy

encouraged higher levels of critical evaluation, generated more alternatives, and led to higher

quality decisions than the less structured Consensus Method. Priem et al. (1995) demonstrated

that these structured methods promoted higher levels of team member satisfaction and

commitment, because individuals felt that they had a fair and legitimate opportunity to express

their views and disagree openly with one another. This research does not suggest that structured

techniques are uniformly superior to a consensus approach; conflicting findings have led

scholars to suggest that the effectiveness of each type of process depends on the nature of the

task (Murrell, Stewart, & Engel, 1993; Priem et al., 1995; Priem & Price, 1991). Consistent

with this, we propose that process design moderates the interaction effect of interest and

information asymmetries on TMT effectiveness.

Proposition 10: Process design reduces the negative effect on TMT effectiveness of the

interaction between situation-specific information and interest asymmetries.

Table 1 provides an overview of the process choices for each of the salient conditions we

identified above.

In summary, by examining the relationship between the stable team attributes studied in

TMT demographic research and the dynamic situation characteristics studied in supervisory

Fig. 2. Moderators of the relationship between situation-specific asymmetries and team effectiveness.


leadership research, we suggest a new model of TMT effectiveness. The full model, shown

in Fig. 2, has the potential to explain conflicting findings from research that includes only

team-level variables. Fig. 2 summarizes our theoretical arguments by showing how both

team-level (stable) and situation-level (dynamic) variables moderate the relationship

between situation-specific (dynamic) asymmetries and team effectiveness. Thus, TMT

effectiveness is likely to vary across situations unless team process is carefully managed

by the leader.

6. Implications of the dynamic model of TMT effectiveness

Two essential leadership functions—behavioral style and interaction with subordinates

(supervisory leadership) and top executives’ influence on strategic choice and firm

performance (strategic leadership)—have been investigated in separate streams of research

(Boal & Hooijberg, 2000). The dynamic model presented in this paper suggests a need to

study these leadership functions together, and thus takes seriously the complementarity of

hierarchical and collaborative forms of leadership decision-making (Barnes & Kriger,

1986).

Our analysis thus contributes to building a cumulative field in leadership research (Hunt &

Dodge, 2001) by linking the leader’s process choices with TMT effectiveness—a key aspect

of strategic leadership effectiveness, which in turn is a key driver of organizational

effectiveness (Boal & Hooijberg, 2000). Fig. 3 depicts these relationships to place our model

in context. Because TMTs wrestle with strategic issues, effective teamwork can lead to better

strategic decisions and firm performance (Hambrick, 1994; Nadler, 1998). Consistent with

much leadership theory, our model (shown in Fig. 2) presents cross-level propositions

(Waldman & Yammarino, 1999), relating individual leaders’ process choices to group

effectiveness and organizational outcomes.

6.1. Implications for strategic leadership research

First, the construct of unstructured task streams and the resulting situation-specific

asymmetries they create suggest that group-level variables can only provide a limited

explanation of variation in TMT effectiveness. Static team characteristics, such as demo-

graphic composition, cannot lead uniformly to better or worse performance across all

situations. Our analysis suggests that the same team may perform more or less effectively in

Fig. 3. TMT effectiveness as an input to strategic leadership.


different situations, such that findings related to demographic effects are likely to be

confounded by variability in distributions of information and interests within the team.

Second, if team effectiveness depends upon process choices that leaders make in each

situation, future research should include situational factors to explain TMT performance. This

work may help explain contradictory findings in the TMT literature.

Third, recognition of the effect of situational factors on team outcomes does not imply

that stable team characteristics are not important. Notably, we argue that psychological

safety and power centralization in TMTs moderate the relationship between situational

asymmetries and team effectiveness. Further theory development may consider effects of

stable TMT attributes on the likelihood that information or interest asymmetries will arise.

For example, team-level variables such as incentive structures or demographic heterogen-

eity are likely to influence the chances of situation-specific asymmetries occurring,

although they will not eliminate them completely. A compensation system that rewards

team members for the performance of individual business units rather than overall corporate

performance increases the chances of interest asymmetries. And, team longevity or tenure

may affect the chances of information asymmetry, because over time, teams can build

transactive memory (Moreland, 1999) in which they are more aware of what each member

knows.

6.2. Implications for supervisory leadership research

First, the propositions in this paper contribute to a long stream of research on

participative leadership (Avolio et al., 1996; Hunt, 1991; Schweiger & Leana, 1986; Yukl,

1989). Many authors have noted the limitations of advocating executive teamwork (e.g.,

Hambrick, 1994, 1995; Katzenbach, 1998). This paper suggests a new explanation for TMT

effectiveness and describes conditions under which process losses in TMTs are more likely,

as well as strategies for minimizing them, as summarized above in Table 1. In this way, we

have articulated process choices that can help achieve the ideal of shared (or distributed)

leadership (Gronn, 2002; Yukl, 1999). In contrast to the notion of a single heroic leader, the

construct of TMTs recognizes the potential value of shared leadership. Better process

choices constitute a step toward implementing that ideal.

Second, we specify process and outcome choices to help mitigate process losses in TMTs.

In so doing, we have disaggregated the notion of directive leadership (Tannebaum &

Schmidt, 1958; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Normative decision theory presents a single

spectrum of directive versus participative leadership; we argue instead that ‘‘directive’’

leadership behavior may be found along three dimensions—outcome control, process

control, and process design. A highly directive approach involves high control on all three

dimensions; a nondirective approach, in contrast, engages a team in an unstructured process

without active leader intervention in the discussion, where closure is reached through

consensus.

We propose that these choices are independent. That is, a leader may choose to exert more

control with regard to structuring the debate but less control with regard to reaching closure,

and so on. However, we recognize that successful diagnosis requires a level of social


intelligence that not all leaders will have (Boal & Hooijberg, 2000), and successful execution

of the process choices similarly requires some behavioral complexity (Boal & Hooijberg,

2000; Hart & Quinn, 1993; Hunt, 1991). Our normative propositions thus require revisiting a

longstanding debate about whether leaders can exhibit genuine flexibility in adjusting their

styles contingent on the nature of the task (Fiedler, 1967; Hunt, 1991; Quinn, 1988; Yukl,

1989).

Past research provides preliminary evidence that leaders are indeed able to be

behaviorally flexible. Vroom and Yetton (1973) asked leaders to consider hypothetical

decision scenarios and to indicate how they would approach the situation; they found that

leaders believed they could exhibit flexibility without confirming that they actually do vary

their style across real situations. Frederickson and Mitchell (1984) examined hypothetical

decision scenarios with chief executives and found evidence that organizations employ

different types of decision-making process in different situations. Polley, Hare, and Stone

(1988) observed that senior members of small groups change behavior based on the group

process or issue. Katzenbach (1998) argued that leaders rely on teamwork at the top in

some situations but not in others, and Hart and Quinn (1993) provided empirical evidence

that CEOs employing a broad repertoire of behaviors enhanced organizational performance.

Finally, recent work in product development (Lewis et al., 2002) showed clearly that high

performing project leaders display a ‘‘flexible and complicated repertoire of activi-

ties. . .[and] go back and forth between styles as changes in project uncertainty occur’’

(p. 562).

Moving forward, a promising avenue for future empirical research is to examine whether

TMT leaders can change their degree of process and outcome control as the situation changes.

6.3. Model boundaries and future directions

This article examined leadership choices for shaping team process after a ‘‘task’’ has

been selected for attention. These choices necessarily take place within a larger context.

Before situation-specific process choices can be made, leaders (or, in some cases, members

of senior teams) must make choices about what tasks to address and who should be

involved in addressing them. This means that even team composition may vary across

different situations. In short, the leader is in a position to make structural choices in

addition to the process choices we have described. For example, the leader can decide

when and with whom ‘‘to team’’ at the top. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper

to suggest conditions for which a leader should use a team, future theoretical work should

develop a broader model, into which the model developed in this paper fits, to specify

these variables.

Unlike most work groups lower in the hierarchy, senior teams endogenously define the

specific task they will pursue next and, often, the membership of the group that will pursue a

given task. Membership choices affect when information and interest asymmetries arise and

thus indirectly contribute to process losses. The possibility of dynamic team composition has

been largely unexplored in the TMT literature, although recent empirical research indicates

that different teams may form at the top to address different types of strategic decisions


(Roberto, in press). Further theory development and empirical research are needed to develop

our understanding of how teams select and prioritize tasks, as well as how they vary the

composition of the decision-making group based upon the nature of the task at hand. This

paper is thus a starting point in building a richer concept of TMT effectiveness.

Finally, we do not intend to imply that the leader of a TMT necessarily must make one

set of process choices and remain wedded to those throughout a group decision process. It

is possible that leaders can continually update their assessments of the state of the team

and, over time, shift their approach to managing the team process. Suppose, for example,

the leader’s initial diagnosis for a situation is that there are significant information

asymmetries. As a result, the leader decides to intervene actively in the discussion to

surface and legitimize privately held information. Once the leader believes that the group

has surfaced all relevant information, it may make sense to shift approaches and intervene

less frequently in the discussion. Clearly, some shifts are easy to make, and others are more

difficult: for example, stepping back from high outcome control may be easier than

reversing the decision to exert low outcome control. Thus, research may wish to explore

the effect of real-time changes in the level of directive leadership in process design, process

control, and outcome control.

Our model ascribes the process leadership function to the CEO because the special

positional power and accountability of CEOs both motivates and gives them permission to

exercise process choices in TMTs. Future research, however, may explore the possibility

that multiple members of the TMT can share this leadership role, such that the process

design and facilitation responsibilities we have described in this paper can be distributed

within a team. This work could shed light on the specific circumstances in which shared

leadership of team process is more likely and more effective than process leadership by an

individual team leader.

This article provides a starting point for further theory development and empirical

research on TMT effectiveness emphasizing situational contingencies. We do not purport to

offer a complete explanation of variations in team performance. Instead, we offer new

insights and potential explanations for why senior teams often fail to fulfill expectations

and why they often experience certain modes of failure. Empirical research is needed to test

both the descriptive (related to failure modes) and normative (related to process choices)

propositions in this paper. In sum, the model described above invites investigation of the

‘‘black box’’ of senior teams, to examine the dynamic internal processes that are generally

ignored in the study of effects of TMT attributes on organizational outcomes.

Acknowledgements

The authors contributed equally to this article. We are grateful to Max Bazerman, Nancy

Beaulieu, Ralph Biggadike, Joe Bower, David Garvin, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Hannah

Riley, and Mike Tushman for feedback on an earlier version of this article, and to members

of the Senior Teams Workshop and the Negotiations, Organizations, and Markets Seminar at

the Harvard Business School for ideas and inspiration. The final article benefited greatly


from helpful comments provided by three anonymous reviewers and Jerry Hunt at The

Leadership Quarterly.

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a dynamic model of top management team effectiveness

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