a development delivery institution for the tribal communities: experience of the national rural...

Development Policy Review, 2010, 28 (4): 457-479

© The Authors 2010. Journal compilation © 2010 Overseas Development Institute.

Published by Blackwell Publishing, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

A Development Delivery Institution for the Tribal Communities: Experience of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

Pulak Mishra, Bhagirath Behera and Narayan Chandra Nayak∗

This article examines the varied impacts of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) as a development delivery institution for the tribal communities vis-à-vis other social groups across the Indian States, using the framework of new institutional economics. A number of State-specific, socio-economic institutional factors seem to be responsible for these variations. The article therefore suggests institutional reforms and convergence of the development initiatives of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs with the NREGS in order to realise the optimal potential of the scheme, and, in particular, to ensure greater livelihood opportunities for these marginalised groups and their entitlement to productive resources with greater socio-economic and political empowerment. Key words: NREGS, impact, tribal, equity, State, India

1 Introduction The role of institutions in the development delivery system has become an important area of research in recent years. Most social scientists agree that institutions matter tremendously for overall economic development (Dinello and Popov, 2007). Hence, institutions and development are intimately related. While a plethora of institutions has emerged, especially in developing countries like India, to promote inclusive growth by delivering development services to poor and disadvantaged groups of society, most of these institutions have repeatedly failed and become ineffective in bringing the fruits of economic development to the targeted population. Unfortunately, without correcting inefficiencies and learning from previous mistakes, governments, especially in developing countries, have added more such institutions for a variety of reasons, in the hope that the new institutions will deliver the goods. The recent emergence of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) institutions in India is one such attempt tailored to promoting inclusive and pro-poor economic growth in the country.

∗Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur-721302, West Bengal, India (correspondence: [email protected]). The authors are grateful to Shibananda Nayak and Subhechhya Haldar for their excellent research support. An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Seminar on ‘Adivasi/ST Communities in India: Development and Change’ organised by the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India, 27-29 August 2009, and the authors wish to thank the participants for their valuable comments.

458 Pulak Mishra, Bhagirath Behera and Narayan Chandra Nayak


Development Policy Review 28 (4)

The NREGS, introduced by the Government of India in September 2005, is considered to be one of the largest development programmes in terms of scale and volume of resources initiated in India since independence.1 Its objective is to enhance the livelihood security of rural households by providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a financial year to each family whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2005). In addition, the scheme also aims to strengthen the natural resource base of the rural economies. The NREGS came into effect, on a pilot basis, in February 2006 in 200 economically backward districts of the country. In the second phase, it was extended to 130 additional districts, and the remaining districts were covered in the third phase in April 2008.

The NREGS’s primary objective of the eradication of poverty from the rural landscape marks a paradigmatic shift from the earlier measures of wage employment adopted by the government from time to time, in terms of approach and priorities. The scheme is also expected to facilitate insulating the local community from the adverse effects of climate change by encouraging works on water harvesting, soil conservation, irrigation, flood protection, afforestation and plantations, etc.

There are a number of studies dealing with various aspects of the NREGS, including its process, procedures and impacts. A review of the studies suggests that the scheme has the potential to provide a ‘big push’ in India’s regions of distress (Shah, 2007; Ambasta et al., 2008) and thereby has created a sense of hope amongst the rural poor (Bhatia and Drèze, 2006). In addition to creating livelihood opportunities for the rural poor, the NREGS can also play an active role in respect of rapid response to crises and disaster, particularly at the local level (Krishnamurthy, 2006).

Realisation of these potentials, however, depends largely on creating awareness of employment as an entitlement (Drèze, 2007; Roy et al., 2008), increasing lean-season wages in rural areas, arresting forced migration (Mehrotra, 2008) and benefiting the marginalised people belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribal communities (Jha et al., 2008). As Ambasta et al. (2008) point out, realisation of the potential of the NREGS is constrained by the ossified structure of implementation which has deeply institutionalised the corruption, inefficiency and non-accountability that have penetrated into the very fabric of Indian democracy. Furthermore, while much has been said and written about the social audits and their contribution to transparency, empowerment and good governance, the ground these audits have covered is much less than has been advertised, and they have ignored many important aspects of the scheme’s implementation that are critical for achieving efficiency (Gopal, 2009). Even the system of paying wages through bank accounts as a way of preventing the embezzlement of funds is not free from its own problems (Vanaik and Siddhartha, 2008). In order to realise the potential of the NREGS, the role of civil-society organisations is considered to be critical (Shah, 2007).

But the constraints to, and requirements for, successful implementation of the NREGS, as indicated in existing studies, are much more general in nature rather than condition-specific. The requirements at the government level may vary depending on the socio-economic, political and other institutional set-up, coupled with agro-climatic and geophysical conditions, and the performance of the scheme may vary accordingly across

1. See next section for details of the scheme.

Experience of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India 459



the States.2 Furthermore, even within the same State, requirements may differ across social groups because of the variations in their entitlement to productive resources, socio-cultural practices and institutional norms and provisions. In this context, it is necessary to assess the impacts of the NREGS on the tribal communities of India and the role of institutions in this regard, particularly when we consider the NREGS itself as a development institution in a caste-ridden rural society with a tribal fringe. While the institutions with adequate empowerment of the tribal people in activating the NREGS can deliver the desired outcomes, lack of the necessary institutional support can render this marginalised section largely deprived of the development benefits.3 Therefore, an assessment of the impacts of the NREGS on the tribal communities can largely facilitate reforms of the development institutions in their favour.

Existing studies on the NREGS are largely confined to its implementation, employment generation (for example, CAG, 2007; Biswas, 2007), transparency (Drèze, 2007), supply of manpower, administrative procedures and quality of works (Ambasta et al., 2008), etc. Examining the impact of the scheme on the tribal communities across the States and the role of institutions in this regard remains by and large ignored. The present study attempts to fill this gap. The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the scheme compared with other development initiatives. The socio-economic status of the tribal communities vis-à-vis other communities is presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses how the tribal communities have benefited from the scheme in terms of livelihood opportunities. Section 5 analyses the delivery mechanisms of the NREGS to the tribal communities, using the framework of new institutional economics (NIE). Section 6 examines the NREGS institution with a case study from the State of Orissa, and Section 7 makes policy suggestions for better implementation of the scheme that would help in benefiting the tribal communities.

2 Genesis of the NREGS: a brief overview The policy of creating guaranteed employment through public works in India dates back to the late 1970s. Table 1 presents in brief various employment-generating programmes introduced since 1979. Most of these (other than the NREGS), by and large failed in creating necessary employment opportunities and durable community assets, mainly due to inadequacies in their structure and lack of the necessary legal support. In addition, implementation of most of these programmes was based on the funds allocated rather than the actual demand of the people. The NREGS may be considered unique from this standpoint, as it came into force with the passing of an act in the parliament. With the stipulation of guaranteed employment of 100 days per household, the scheme is intended to ensure employment to all those demanding work. Furthermore, the scheme aims at facilitating sustainable growth and development of the agriculture

2. For example, poor States like Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan have the

highest number of households completing 100 days of work (Mehrotra, 2008). 3. For example, empowering the Jagrut Adivasi Dalit Sangathan of Madhya Pradesh for grassroots

organisational works in activating the NREGS could result in employment generation of 85 days per household per year with nearly half of the working household getting 100 days of work (Khera, 2008).




Table 1: Employment-generation programmes introduced in India, 1979-2005

Sl. No.

Name of programme Year of introduction

Objective(s)

1. Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS)

1979 Providing gainful employment & creating durable assets

2. National Rural Employment Programme (NREP)

1980 Creation of supplementary employment for agricultural workers

3. Rural Landless Employment Programme (RLEP)

1983 Improving & expanding employment opportunities for rural landless

4. Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) 1989 Generating gainful employment for unemployed & underemployed in rural areas

5. Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS)

1993 Ensuring efficiency in development delivery system & generating greater employment opportunities

6. Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY)

1999 Creating demand-driven rural infrastructure

7. Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGSY)

2002 Integrating EAS & JGSY

8. National Food for Work Programme (NFWP)

2004 Creating supplementary employment & rural community assets in backward districts

9. National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)

2005 Creating rights-based & demand-driven employment opportunities of 100 days per household in rural areas

Source: Compiled from Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) (undated).

sector, empowering the rural poor through rights-based law, and initiating new ways of doing business backed by the principles of transparency and grass-roots democracy.4

What is considered most crucial is the empowerment of the poor through the provision of a rights-based law. The NREGS gives rise to a programme that develops not from its deliberate benevolence, but as a legally binding response by the government to a right to work that is enshrined in law. Thus, the constraint of resources cannot be cited by the government as an excuse for failing to provide work (Ambasta et al., 2008). The other key attributes of the scheme are time-bound guarantees, labour-intensive work, decentralised participatory planning, women’s empowerment, work-site facilities

4. The NREGS is intended to enhance the livelihood security and social safety-net of the rural people by

supplementing wage employment opportunities for the unskilled labour force. The scheme is also expected to regenerate the rural natural resource base for sustainable livelihoods through conservation of soil, water and forest.




and, above all, transparency and accountability through the provision of social audits and the right to information. The unprecedented use of information technology in the programme is seen as bringing about greater transparency through intensive monitoring and faster execution. The payment of wages through bank and post-office accounts is another innovative step that is likely to reduce fudging of the muster rolls on the part of the implementing agencies, since the actual payments are beyond their reach. There is also an effort to separate payment agencies from implementing agencies, thereby preventing embezzlement of wages (Vanaik and Siddhartha, 2008).

Arguments from diverse perspectives support this approach to development. It is firmly believed that mass employment programmes have the ability to enhance demand and free the economy from its shackles. Such programmes can help in enhancing consumption smoothing linked to welfare effects and promoting savings-led investments, both private and public. As the consumption propensity is proved to be higher for the poor than the rich, this mode of redistributing income may bring about improved market demand leading to increased economic activities, enhanced output, higher employment and so on. In addition, mass employment programmes are basically guided by welfare motives, a larger goal of societal importance. In developing countries, there is evidence of impoverishment, malnutrition and death owing to lack of alternative sources of livelihood. Policy-induced rural works programmes can be considered to be programmatic efforts to generate non-farm employment opportunities to sustain consumption and income, especially during times of distress (Sen, 1981).

The legally-binding rights-based structure of the scheme is expected to bring about a turnaround in the rural economy by eradicating social inequality along with ensuring sustainable rural livelihoods. Thus, the NREGS is not simply an employment-generation scheme. Instead, it is a development effort that can take the economic and social structure of the country to a new trajectory with its three distinct goals –protective, preventive and promotional. It protects the rural poor from vulnerabilities by providing them with demand-based employment. It prevents risks associated with agricultural investment and migration of the rural poor. And it introduces buoyancy into the rural economy by means of increased consumption demand.

3 Socio-economic profile of the tribal communities According to Article 366(25) of the Constitution of India, Scheduled Tribes (STs) include the communities that are scheduled in accordance with Article 342. These tribal communities are identified according to their primitive traits, distinctive culture, shyness of contact with the community at large, geographical isolation and socio-economic backwardness. Therefore, the list of tribal communities may vary across the States. This section attempts to discuss the socio-economic profile of these tribal communities vis-à-vis other social groups across the States on the basis of secondary information. This is expected to facilitate a better understanding of the impact of the NREGS on these marginalised communities.

According to the census of 2001, the tribal communities constitute 8.2% (approximately 80.5 million) of the total population of the country, with more than half of them concentrated in the States of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Jharkhand and Gujarat. Interestingly, the tribal communities in India live in




different ecological and agro-climatic conditions ranging from plains and forests to hills and inaccessible areas, and they are at different levels of socio-economic development. While some are in the mainstream way of life, there are also vulnerable groups characterised by a subsistence standard of living with extremely low literacy and a pre-agriculture level of technology. The number of people in such communities is, however, either constant or declining over time.

As shown in Table 2, most of the tribal people in India (more than 90%) live in the rural areas, and this ratio is substantially higher than for other social groups. Furthermore, the proportion of rural people living below the poverty line is also the highest (47.6%) for the tribal communities vis-à-vis other social groups. This may reflect the lack of the necessary livelihood opportunities available to this marginalised section, due to their limited entitlement to productive resources along with a lack of adequate access to development services and social and political empowerment. Successful implementation of the NREGS is therefore crucial, not only in creating greater employment prospects for these tribal communities and bringing them above the poverty line, but also in empowering them socially and politically.

Table 2: Rural residence and poverty ratio in India

across social groups, 2004-5

Social groups Rural residence (%) Rural poverty ratio

Scheduled Tribes (ST) 91.4 47.6

Scheduled Castes (SC) 79.8 36.8

Other Backward Castes (OBC) 78.0 26.7

General (GEN) 62.3 16.0

All 74.7 28.3 Source: National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) (61st round), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

The share of the STs in the total rural population varies widely across the States,

and the variation is substantially higher as compared with other social groups (Table 3). The proportion is greater in North-eastern States such as Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Sikkim, etc.5 In addition, some of the central and eastern States like Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa, etc., are home to quite a sizable proportion of ST population. On the other hand, there are States like Bihar, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh where the share of the STs is very low. Hence, making the NREGS beneficial to the ST communities appears to be largely State-specific and may depend considerably on how the States with a large proportion of tribal people implement the scheme, given their socio-economic and political set-up.

5. In fact, in States like Manipur and Mizoram more that 90% of the total population belong to the ST

communities.




Table 3: Distribution of rural population across States by social groups (%)

States Rural social groups

ST SC OBC GEN Coefficient of variations

Assam 18.9 9.6 17.5 53.8 0.79 Bihar 0.6 23.0 59.9 16.3 1.01 Chhattisgarh 35.2 14.6 44.8 5.5 0.72 Goa 3.3 3.0 8.5 85.1 1.61 Gujarat 20.5 11.2 44.7 23.6 0.57 Haryana 0.3 28.0 32.2 39.5 0.69 Himachal Pradesh 5.1 27.0 15.5 52.5 0.81 Jammu and Kashmir 0.6 14.6 15.3 69.4 1.22 Jharkhand 29.9 13.0 45.8 11.4 0.65 Karnataka 8.4 20.3 38.8 32.5 0.54 Kerala 1.9 11.2 59.4 27.5 1.01 Madhya Pradesh 25.8 18.2 40.1 15.9 0.44 Maharashtra 13.6 14.8 35.7 35.9 0.50 Manipur 46.3 0.4 48.9 3.9 1.06 Meghalaya 92.8 1.1 1.3 4.8 1.81 Mizoram 98.2 0.1 1.7 0.1 1.95 Orissa 25.6 17.6 39.4 17.3 0.41 Punjab 0.4 40.1 21.4 38.1 0.74 Rajasthan 16.1 21.0 46.6 16.4 0.58 Sikkim 38.5 6.7 50.1 4.7 0.91 Tamil Nadu 0.5 27.1 70.5 1.9 1.31 Tripura 23.7 26.3 20.5 29.2 0.15 Uttar Pradesh 0.5 25.4 54.6 19.4 0.90 Uttaranchal 5.9 22.9 17.7 53.4 0.81 West Bengal 8.2 28.9 7.1 55.8

0.91 All India 10.6 20.9 42.8 25.7 0.54 Coefficient of variation 1.26 0.60 0.59 0.80

Source: ibid.

The extent of rural poverty by social groups varies significantly across the States.

While the differences between groups are quite high in States like Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala Punjab and Rajasthan, indicating large-scale economic inequality across social groups in these States, they are very low in Jharkhand and Uttaranchal. Nevertheless, the extent of rural poverty of the ST people is the highest vis-à-vis other social groups in the majority of States. Furthermore, the poverty incidence varies significantly across the States. While in States like Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal, the tribal communities are in a relatively better position




particularly in comparison with the SC people, the situation is quite alarming in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Orissa, where more than half the rural tribal people live below the poverty line and the ratio is higher than the national average. The STs of Orissa record the highest extent of rural poverty, with around 76% of them living below the poverty line.

The extent of rural poverty among the tribal communities is reflected in their monthly per capita expenditure (MCPE), which is quite low in most of the States when compared with that of other social groups. Furthermore, this statistic varies widely across the States and this variation is quite high when compared with other social groups. Orissa has recorded the lowest MPCE by the tribal people, followed by Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The MCPE by the tribal communities in these States is lower than the national average. However, there is a wide gap between the MPCE of the rural STs and the much higher monthly expenditure of the STs living in urban areas. Furthermore, the MCPEs of urban tribal communities in many of the States are higher than those of other social groups. This means that the urban STs in many Indian States are better placed vis-à-vis not only their rural counterparts but also other social groups.

Thus, the rural tribal communities appear to be economically the most marginalised group among the socio-economic strata of the country. Not only is the extent of their poverty very high as compared with other social groups, their monthly per capita expenditure is also very low. Such backwardness may largely be attributed to their geographical and cultural isolation, coupled with their limited access to information and lapses in the delivery mechanisms of developmental projects. Furthermore, the variations in the extent of their poverty suggest that their socio-economic conditions are largely influenced by State-level factors. In this connection, the NREGS is expected to play an important role in bringing about improvement, largely because it not only recognises the right to work of the rural people, but also follows a demand-driven approach with the necessary statutory support. In addition to providing sustainable livelihood opportunities, it aims to promote social harmony in the country’s development process. The system of localised planning and implementation coupled with a demand-driven approach is also expected to facilitate incorporating State and local-level factors that influence the variations in the socio-economic backwardness of the rural STs.

4 The NREGS and the tribal communities While the objectives of, and basic approaches to, the NREGS are uniform across the States, the socio-economic, political, and institutional differences of the States may cause its impact to vary. This may be so in particular for the STs as the concentration of, and institutional framework for, these marginalised communities differs widely across the States. In this perspective, the present section attempts to examine the impact of the scheme on the livelihood of tribal communities as compared with other social groups. The impact is assessed in terms of job cards issued and average number of days of employment generated. The necessary data used were collected from the official website of the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, New Delhi (www.nrega.nic.in).




It is observed that the proportion of job cards issued is highly skewed towards social groups other than the SCs and STs in most States apart from Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Jharkhand, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Punjab, Sikkim and Tripura (Table 4). But a comparison between STs and SCs shows that proportionately more job cards are issued to the former group in many States like Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Orissa, Sikkim and Tripura. However, at the macro level SC job-seekers have a larger share of the total job cards issued than their ST counterparts.

Table 4: Distribution of job cards issued and employment generated

across social groups, March 2009 (%)

State ST SC Othersa Job

cards Employment Job

cards Employment Job

cards Employment

Assam 15.4 9.2 5.9 6.8 78.7 84 Bihar 1.6 2.7 27.5 33.9 70.9 63.5 Chhattisgarh 37.7 37.9 12.1 11.1 50.3 51.1 Goa 31.2 100 8.4 0 60.4 0 Gujarat 36.3 36.9 9.9 13.4 53.8 49.7 Haryana 0.1 0.1 51 49.4 48.9 50.5 Himachal Pradesh

6.5 6.4 29.3 30.3 64.2 63.4

Jammu and Kashmir

17.1 16.9 12.2 10 70.7 73.1

Jharkhand 36.6 42.3 13.6 12.4 49.8 45.3 Karnataka 10.9 12.6 22.5 21.9 66.6 65.5 Kerala 3.9 7.7 13.9 16.6 82.2 75.7 Madhya Pradesh 19.1 22.8 18.9 28 62 49.2 Maharashtra 13.7 37.1 7.6 7.9 78.6 55 Manipur 52.8 1.5 1 4.2 46.3 94.3 Meghalaya 91.9 96.9 1.1 0.5 7 2.7 Mizoram 99.8 99.9 0 0 0.2 0.1 Orissa 30 35.8 20.1 20.2 49.9 44 Punjab 0.1 0 81.2 77.2 18.7 22.8 Rajasthan 17.4 19.6 16.9 18.9 65.7 61.5 Sikkim 40.1 34.2 4.9 8.2 55 57.7 Tamil Nadu 1.5 4.6 31.6 29.7 66.9 65.8 Tripura 37.9 44.4 18.7 18.3 43.4 37.3 Uttar Pradesh 1.9 1.6 25.2 19.3 72.9 79.1 Uttaranchal 2 2.4 21.9 19.8 76.1 77.9 West Bengal 8 10.4 29.1 39.3 63 50.4 All India 16.2 22.6 20 19.8 63.8 57.6

Note: a) Includes OBC and GEN category. Source: www.nrega.nic.in




Furthermore, if standardised with the population composition by social groups, it appears that the tribal people are better placed in terms of distribution of job cards (Table 6). Not only are proportionately more job cards issued to them in most States apart from a few like Assam, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Punjab, Uttaranchal and West Bengal, but the difference is also substantially high in Goa, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura.

The same can be said in respect of the number of days of employment generated. In many States like Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Manipur, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal the proportional distribution of employment is skewed towards social groups other than the SCs and STs (Table 5). But the STs are better placed vis-à-vis the SCs in a number of States like Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Orissa, Sikkim and Tripura. At the macro level also, the STs have a greater share of total days of employment generated.

Table 5: Difference between social inclusion in NREGS

and composition of rural population

States Issue of job cards Days of employment ST SC Othersa ST SC Othersa

Assam -3.5 -3.7 7.4 -9.7 -2.8 12.7 Bihar 1.0 4.5 -5.3 2.1 10.9 -12.7 Chhattisgarh 2.5 -2.5 0.0 2.7 -3.5 0.8 Goa 27.9 5.4 -33.2 96.7 -3.0 -93.6 Gujarat 15.8 -1.3 -14.5 16.4 2.2 -18.6 Haryana -0.2 23 -22.8 -0.2 21.4 -21.2 Himachal Pradesh 1.4 2.3 -3.8 1.3 3.3 -4.6 Jammu and Kashmir 16.5 -2.4 -14 16.3 -4.6 -11.6 Jharkhand 6.7 0.6 -7.4 12.4 -0.6 -11.9 Karnataka 2.5 2.2 -4.7 4.2 1.6 -5.8 Kerala 2.0 2.7 -4.7 5.8 5.4 -11.2 Madhya Pradesh -6.7 0.7 6.0 -3.0 9.8 -6.8 Maharashtra 0.1 -7.2 7.0 23.5 -6.9 -16.6 Manipur 6.5 0.6 -6.5 -44.8 3.8 41.5 Meghalaya -0.9 0.0 0.9 4.1 -0.6 -3.4 Mizoram 1.6 -0.1 -1.6 1.7 -0.1 -1.7 Orissa 4.4 2.5 -6.8 10.2 2.6 -12.7 Punjab -0.3 41.1 -40.8 -0.4 37.1 -36.7 Rajasthan 1.3 -4.1 2.7 3.5 -2.1 -1.5 Sikkim 1.6 -1.8 0.2 -4.3 1.5 2.9 Tamil Nadu 1.0 4.5 -5.5 4.1 2.6 -6.6 Tripura 14.2 -7.6 -6.3 20.7 -8.0 -12.4 Uttar Pradesh 1.4 -0.2 -1.1 1.1 -6.1 5.1 Uttaranchal -3.9 -1.0 5.0 -3.5 -3.1 6.8 West Bengal -0.2 0.2 0.1 2.2 10.4 -12.5 All India 5.6 -0.9 -4.7 12.0 -1.1 -10.9

Note: a) Includes OBC and GEN category. Source: NSSO, 2004-05 and www.nrega.nic.in




In this aspect also, the tribal people are relatively better placed than other social groups when compared with the population composition across States. In most States, apart from a few like Assam, Haryana, Maharashtra, Manipur Punjab, Sikkim and Uttaranchal, the STs have availed themselves of proportionately more days of employment vis-à-vis their share in the total population (Table 5). The difference is substantial in Goa, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Orissa and Tripura. This has made the difference considerable at the macro level as well, indicating that ST job-seekers have a fairly reasonable position in NREGS employment.

Table 6 presents the average number of days of employment generated per job-card holder by social groups across States. It is observed that there is a wide variation in access to employment per ST job-card holder in particular, and across households in general. States like Bihar and Himachal Pradesh have performed exceedingly well in this respect, as they have been able to provide 47.38 and 54.30 days of employment respectively to each ST job-card holder, more than the State average. Amongst ST-dominated States, Jharkhand has performed badly, providing only 2 days per ST card holder. Other ST-dominated states in eastern India like Manipur and Sikkim also have not done well in this regard. Interestingly, the table also shows that the number of days of employment per ST card holder is more than the overall employment per card holder of their respective States. This is true across all States, suggesting that ST households are better placed in comparison with other caste groups and the overall ratio at the State level.

Thus, the above observations made on the basis of information accessed from government sources seems to suggest that the NREGS is successful in providing greater livelihood opportunities to the tribal people. With employment in agriculture saturated and non-farm employment largely skill- and knowledge-oriented, the NREGS has been able to create the space for employment of the rural illiterate and unskilled workforce largely consisting of the socially backward classes. The scheme seems to have benefitted the ST communities and thereby made the development process inclusive in producing social harmony. However, the important issue is: should the outcome of a development institution be judged solely on the basis of quantitative indicators like the issuance of job cards, employment generation, wage payment, etc? When the NREGS is considered as a development institution, aspects like awareness, processes and procedures, access, entitlement and participation are also quite important, especially for the ST communities that are marginalised in this regard. Furthermore, the observations also indicate a number of variations in the NREGS outcomes for ST communities across the States. This means that the outcomes of the scheme are largely influenced by local-level factors. It is therefore necessary to examine the developmental outcomes of the NREGS at the micro-level, as the following section does using the framework of new institutional economics.




Table 6: Average number of days of employment per job card by social groups

State Average days of employment per job card

SC ST Othersa Total Assam 8.3 9.9 7.3 8.3 Bihar 46.7 47.4 39.2 41.9 Chhattisgarh 14.9 16.3 16.5 16.2 Gujarat 13.4 17.1 13.5 14.8 Haryana 16.8 13.6 9.1 11.4 Himachal Pradesh 45.4 54.3 39.9 46.4 Jammu and Kashmir 5.6 14.6 3.8 5.4 Jharkhand 2.7 2.0 1.8 2.0 Karnataka 4.0 3.9 2.4 3.0 Kerala 8.4 13.8 6.4 7.0 Maharashtra 6.8 8.1 6.9 7.0 Manipur 1.8 2.4 1.3 1.4 Meghalaya 13.9 28.0 13.6 28.0 Mizoram 10.5 13.0 11.2 10.8 Madhya Pradesh 17.6 16.5 16.8 17.0 Orissa 10.8 12.3 15.3 14.1 Punjab 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.3 Rajasthan 3.0 7.7 2.8 7.3 Sikkim 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.4 Tamil Nadu 5.8 3.0 3.6 3.5 Tripura 6.7 3.5 6.2 5.8 Uttar Pradesh 0.8 2.5 0.8 0.8 Uttaranchal 44.0 0.3 20.6 10.1 West Bengal 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.0 All India 11.8 16.6 10.7 11.9 Coefficient of Variation 1.13 1.12 1.06 1.09

Note: a) Includes OBC and GEN category. Source: ibid.

5 NREGS as an economic institution: an analytical framework The NREGS is being implemented uniformly across India’s States and is expected to deliver uniform outcomes to their economies. However, the analysis carried out in Section 4 does not support this perception, revealing wide-scale variations. This raises an important question: what are the factors responsible for such different outcomes? And more importantly, what factors are responsible for making the NREGS institution rigid at the State level? Hence, there is a need to identify and analyse the various factors that are conditioning the NREGS institution across States. This can be done by applying the New Institutional Economics framework. What follows is a brief explanation of Williamson’s (2000) four levels of institutional framework in the light of the NREGS institution.




5.1 Four levels of institutional analysis of NREGS The various influences that an economic institution such as the NREGS can have are subjected to manifold conditions that are complex in nature (Behera and Engel, 2006). To identify them in the context of the NREGS demands an analytical structure such as Williamson (2000) provides. Analysing the evolution and functioning of the NREGS in this framework helps to shed light on the sources of problems it experienced and to gain insights on how to overcome them.

According to Williamson (2000), there are four stages in which an institution functions, and at each stage it takes a different time period to change (Figure 1). The first level, ‘embeddedness’, deals with informal constraints (for example, customs, taboos, traditional norms) in which the institution (here the NREGS) is embedded. Such constraints are usually present in a society for a long period, take centuries or millennia to change and are believed to be spontaneous in origin. The second level refers to the institutional environment that human beings create through formal rules (for example, constitutions, laws, property rights, etc.). Institutions at this level tend to change faster than at the previous one, with a timeframe of decades or centuries. The theoretical framework for this level is given by the economics of property rights, which implicitly assumes costless or easy enforcement of rights. However, this assumption has been disputed and rejected by the supporters of transaction-cost economics (for example, Williamson, 1998). As a consequence, Level 3 deals with how the game is played, i.e. ‘the governance of contractual relations’. Here, institutions of governance are discussed, including issues of contract definition and enforcement, as well as conflict-resolution mechanisms. The idea is that for each specific transaction there is an efficient structure, i.e. a transaction-cost-minimising governance structure. Changes at this level take place within a shorter time than at the previous levels (one to ten years). The fourth level deals with economic activities and is concerned with getting the marginal conditions right. Neoclassical economics (where continuous adjustment of prices and quantities takes place to optimise marginal conditions) as well as theories of asymmetric information (including adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems) are located here. At this level, the incentives are shaped by the combined effects of the other three levels.

The above four stages are interconnected with each other. In particular, higher-level institutions impose constraints on lower levels. There may also be feedback effects from lower to higher levels. Informal institutions such as norms, culture, conventions, and codes of ethics (Level 1) evolve over time in a society and are found to be more pervasive than formal rules. These informal institutions do not change immediately in reaction to changes in formal rules. As a result, they play an important role in structuring interactions among the participants of the NREGS. Tensions between changed formal rules and persisting informal institutions have implications for overall socio-economic outcomes (North, 1990). Such informal institutions are largely present and are of great importance in India. It should be stressed that Level 1 is very important in influencing the evolution of institutions in general and the NREGS in particular. For example, according to Indian tradition, women workers are not encouraged to work outside their homes. Up to now this tradition is being practised by many communities in rural India. This is likely to have serious gender implications both economically and




socially, but is also likely to make the NREGS inefficient because of lack of women’s participation.

Levels 2 and 3 together provide a complete analysis of property rights, the core of the new institutional economics (NIE). In particular, Level 2 relates to absolute property rights, i.e. rights in physical objects that guarantee the owner a power that s/he can exercise against all others (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). Also at this level, according to Williamson, positive political theory plays an important role shaping the property rights in a State. In this regard, it is important to note that the evolution and creation of NREGS institutions are strongly motivated by social, economic and political factors. Pro-poor and vote-bank maximisation politics has played a significant role in providing property rights, in terms of guaranteed employment and market wage rates, to local populations at the grassroots level and in the empowerment of Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs).

The third level is primarily concerned with relative property rights or contractual rights which deal with issues relating to contracts and their enforcement (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). In particular, we shall discuss the actual interactions between local communities/panchayats and local bureaucrats in terms of rule-setting and enforcement or implementation of the NREGS. At this level, the performance of NREGS communities in terms of physical and/or infrastructural and institutional outcomes will be assessed, the basic idea being to assess how the NREG Act has been implemented at the State level and the various outcomes.

Similarly, Level 4 deals with incentives that enable a household to participate in NREGS decision-making processes and activities. Important issues arise here, particularly with respect to (i) who actually participates in community-level decision-making, and (ii) the intra-community distribution of benefits from the NREGS. Here we try to identify the different incentives and disincentives that the job-card holders are facing and examine various enabling factors. Specifically, we examine the various opportunity costs that the locals face in deciding whether or not to participate in NREGS works.

Since our aim is to identify and analyse factors that are likely to be responsible for differential implementation of the NREGS across the States, based on our field experience and literature, we feel that Levels 3 and 4 can explain this to a large extent. However, Levels 1 and 2 may also have contributed, because of inherent problems in the design of the law and other political factors such as different political parties dominating the State and federal governments, setting wage rates and other rules that may not be amenable to some States, etc. For instance, a State like Punjab depends largely on people from Bihar and other eastern States for its labour, but because of the NREGS many people from Bihar have returned home, creating a huge shortage of labour in the State. This may discourage the Punjab government from implementing the scheme. Similarly, there could be different factors which might be hindering different State governments in implementing the programme effectively. This needs thorough and lengthy research on the dynamics of each State, which is beyond the scope of the present study and must be left to future analysis.




Figure 1: Economics of institutions

Level Frequency Purpose

(Time)

L1 102 to 103

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

L2 10 to 102

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

L3 1 to 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

L4 Continuous

L1: Social theory; L2: Economics of property rights/positive political theory; L3: Transaction cost economics; L4: Neoclassical economics/agency theory. Source: Adapted from Williamson (2000).

In this section, we analyse the governance of contractual relations (contracts and

their enforcement). We take a closer look at ‘playing the game’ in terms of the performance of the NREGS and the interactions between individual beneficiaries and the implementing agency. Ideally, since the NREGS is backed by an act of Parliament and is therefore a formal right, there should not be any room for variation in actual contractual relations across the States and hence its outcomes. But in reality there are considerable variations in respect of the tribal communities across the States. It is therefore necessary to understand how the NREGS rules are translated or enforced and

Embeddedness: Informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, religion

Institutional environment: formal rules of the game, especially property rights, polity, judiciary, and bureaucracy

Governance: play of the game, especially contract (aligning governance structures with transactions)

Resource allocation and employment (prices and quantities: incentive alignment)

Often non-calculative; spontaneous

Get the institutional environment right, 1st order economising

Get the governance structures right, 2nd order economising

Get the marginal conditions right, 3rd order economising




implemented, particularly since the need for a good governance structure arises when there are unforeseen problems in the contractual obligations in which the stakeholders are involved (Williamson, 2000). Such problems arise mainly for two reasons: lack of foresight, and asymmetric information (Furubotn and Richter, 2000).

Lack of foresight refers to a situation where the parties are unable to foresee precisely the future consequences of the contract. This problem can be tackled effectively if the contractual obligations are adaptable to new and unexpected situations. It is certainly an issue in the NREGS, but unfortunately there was no specific information available. The problem of asymmetric information arises when one party knows more than the other in regard to information related to the state of the contract. This may lead to opportunism for the party which has the informational advantage and may create serious contractual problems (Behera and Engel, 2006).

5.2 Enforcement of rules The basic purpose of institutions is to structure human behaviour in order to achieve desired objectives. If the objectives are set and rules are framed accordingly, an effective mechanism must be used to ensure that the rules are enforced and observed in the letter and the spirit (Behera and Engel, 2006). Effective enforcement also requires a mechanism to detect violations of the rules and proper sanctions to deter such violations.

NREGS beneficiaries and implementing agencies are, through various contractual relations, bound to certain rules concerning the provision of works within a stipulated period, disbursing wages and provision of other facilities to NREGS workers. Violation of such rules is, however, common across India. The local implementing agencies violate rules when they do not adhere to the above-mentioned rules and indulge in illegal activities in terms of rent-seeking behaviour. Many such instances of violation committed by the local implementing agencies were reported in Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and many other States (Nayak et al., 2009). Although there are some provisions for detection and sanctions in the NREGS guidelines to deter the local officials from violating the rules, they are not being implemented properly.

5.3 Problems of asymmetric information and rent-seeking Problems of asymmetric information and rent-seeking are widespread under the NREGS. The relationship between implementing agency and beneficiaries can be analysed with the help of agency theory as a principal-agent problem. The core of agency theory is that there is a hierarchical system, in which a principal delegates responsibilities to an agent who, due to asymmetries of information and the cost of monitoring, has a significant margin of discretion in decision-making. In a democratic society like India, the people (citizens) can be considered as principals electing representatives (to the central and State governments) to rule on their behalf (Bardhan, 2002). Furthermore, the agents’ (governments’) wishes are implemented by civil servants (here, local bureaucrats), who are sub-agents and have their own interests. The bureaucrats are not elected representatives, and therefore are not accountable to the people. Instead, they are accountable to their seniors in the civil service and enjoy




security of tenure and protection by the Constitution (Vyasulu, 2004). Thus, local bureaucrats tend to have their own interests in implementing the NREGS programme in a way that suits the political and local needs of the government and their own interests of rent-seeking. Because of a lack of accountability, often combined with an ignorance of local communities’ knowledge, customs, and habits and the uplifting feeling of being educated in a largely illiterate society, these bureaucrats often think themselves more knowledgeable than the local communities. The source of the asymmetric-information problem is that local bureaucrats usually have better information than communities about the details of the NREGS as well as its potential loopholes. As a consequence, local officials often considerably limit access to information for local communities regarding the allocation of funds and other related matters, yielding opportunities for rent-seeking.

Several types of rent-seeking by local officials were observed during our fieldwork. It should be noted that these results are likely to underestimate the true extent of rent-seeking as many communities were reluctant to discuss the issues. Furthermore, as stated earlier, the lower cadres of the staff who are in charge of implementing the NREGS have an incentive to undermine monitoring and enforcement of the rules in return for bribes.

Finally, rent-seeking by local officials is often facilitated by the lack of accountability of local leaders such as Sarpanchs and Ward Members to the local people. It is important to note that most job-seekers are marginalised members of society who live in abject poverty and are vulnerable to the exploitation of local and national elites, and this lowers their ability to enforce any contract. The role of local leaders in these circumstances is crucial in defending the rights of their own people. Although local leaders are directly elected by the people, because of their rent-seeking attitude they tend to work in line with the local officials. Having such a close relationship with local officials, they often fail to protect the contractual rights of the marginalised groups they represent.

6 NREGS institutions and tribal communities: a case study Given the set rules, the varied outcomes are largely caused by differential implementation of the same as mentioned above, and this can also be observed even within a region. In this context, it may be interesting to analyse the differential outcomes of the NREGS in terms of perceptions, awareness, physical and financial performance across different caste groups and especially between the tribal and non-tribal communities in a particular region. Assuming that the tribal communities have limited access to information and less awareness of institutional provisions owing to their low literacy and geographical and cultural isolation, it may be expected that such marginalised people are not treated uniformly vis-à-vis other social groups with regard to an economic institution like the NREGS. This can be examined with the help of a case study conducted recently in Orissa, in eastern India. The empirical support in this regard is based on information gathered through in-depth fieldwork in Orissa during the period 1 February to 15 March 2009.




A four-stage sampling method was employed to select NREGS beneficiaries. In the first stage, two Districts, namely Mayurbhanj and Balasore, were selected for the study. While Mayurbhanj was covered under the NREGS in the first phase, Balasore was included in the second. Furthermore, Mayurbhanj is one of the most backward districts of the State, with a large proportion of the people belonging to tribal and other socially and economically disadvantaged communities and their primary occupations being agriculture, daily labour and collection of forest produce. Balasore, on the other hand, is a part of coastal Orissa that has a mixed population with diversified livelihood opportunities.

In the second stage, two blocks from each district were selected on the basis of their performance in terms of expenditure incurred, number of jobs created, number of job-card holders, etc. On the basis of demographic characteristics, utilisation of funds, nature of activities undertaken, etc. and in consultation with the district-level NREGS project director, Basta and Nilgiri blocks from Balasore District, and Rasgobindapur and Samakhunta blocks from Mayaurbhanj District were selected. In the third stage, the same exercises were repeated at block level to select sample Gram Panchayats (GPs), four from each block being selected. Finally, at GP level a sample of 10 job-card holders was selected randomly and information was elicited by using a structured questionnaire. In total, 162 job-card holders were interviewed.

Table 7 shows the basic characteristics of sampled respondents in the two Districts. As regards the distribution of respondents across gender, it is shown that in the case of ST households respondents are almost equally divided between males and females. About 50% of respondents are sampled from ST communities and the remaining 50% distributed among other caste groups.

Table 7: Characteristics of respondents across social groups (%)

Caste SC ST OBC General Gender

Male 23.7 49.3 16.4 10.6 Female 25.9 52.9 11.8 9.4 Total 24.7 50.9 14.3 10.1

Education Illiterates 28.4 57.4 11.3 2.9 Primary 20.4 46.6 17.5 15.5 Secondary 17.0 36.2 17.0 29.8 Higher secondary 21.1 42.1 26.3 10.5 Graduates & above 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 Total 24.7 50.9 14.3 10.1

Age group < 30 18.9 56.7 15.6 8.9 30-50 25.1 51.1 13.7 10.1 >50 30.9 42.7 14.7 11.8 Total 24.7 50.9 14.3 10.1

Source: Field survey.




Table 8 presents various indicators of NREGS performance and the perceptions of respondents about the NREGS in the two districts. With regard to average days of work across caste groups, it can be seen that people in the SC communities are availing themselves of more (44%) than the ST job-card holders (34%), and the OBC and general category job-card holders marginally less than the STs. In terms of average wages paid, there is not much difference between SC and ST job-card holders (Rs. 96 each). As regards perceptions about registration of job cards, about 79% of the ST sample reported having availed themselves of free and easy registration as compared with 89.2 % amongst SC and 86.2% amongst OBC card holders. This suggests that job-card holders in ST communities are at a disadvantage in terms of the registration process as compared with their other counterparts. This raises concern about the ST population availing themselves of NREGS employment as that may not be fair and easy.

Table 8: Performance of NREGS in Orissa across social groups

Parameter Social group SC ST OBC General Total

Average days of work 44 34 31 27 35

Average wage paid (Rs) 96 96 87 73 92

% of respondents with free and easy registration of job cards

89.2 79 86.2 100 85.2

Custody of job card Self/head of family 83.8 80.3 89.7 75 82.1 Ward Member/Sarpanch/others 16.2 19.7 10.3 25 17.9

% of respondents applied for employment 51.4 38.2 31 30 38.9

% of respondents issued with receipts of applications

42.1 75 22.2 50 54.8

Average time gap between submission of application and getting works (days)

38 40 17 13 33

% of respondents aware of 100 days of employment

46.2 35.9 35.2 47.4 39.5

% of respondents aware of minimum wage per worker

23.7 42.2 64.8 76.3 44.3

% of respondents aware of unemployment allowances

Neg. 4.7 Neg. Neg. 2.4

% of respondents perceiving NREGA led to more employment generation

73.0 63.2 72.4 80.0 69.1

% of respondents perceiving that NREGA has stopped migration

54.1 52.6 55.2 55.0 53.7

Note: Neg. = Negligible (<0.5). Source: Field survey.




With regard to the custody of job cards, again more job cards from the ST communities are under the custody of ward members and sarpanchs as compared with other caste groups, though the difference is not significant, particularly when compared with the SC comunnity. The percentage of job-card holders applying for employment varies widely across caste groups; more than 50% of job-card holders in SC communities have applied for jobs as compared with only 38% in ST communities. This is a matter of serious concern, as the NREGS programme is supposed to be demand-driven. SC and ST job-card holders also spend more time getting jobs compared with other caste groups. OBC and general category households have to wait far fewer days (17 and 13 respectively) to get jobs as compared with 40 and 38 days for ST and SC job-card holders, respectively.

The success of any development scheme depends largely on the awareness of targeted beneficiaries about various aspects of the scheme, and this is crucial especially for a marginalised group like the tribal communities. Surprisingly, only 36% of the tribal respondents in our sample were aware of the provision for a minimum number of days of employment, a lower percentage than from the SC and general communities. Similarly, only 42% of tribal respondents were aware of the provision for a minimum wage rate in the scheme; this was a larger percentage than their SC counterparts but lagged far behind those from the OBC and general communities. Furthermore, awareness of the provision for unemployment allowance was almost non-existent amongst respondents across all social groups. However, the tribal respondents were relatively ahead of the others with a meagre 4% aware.

The perception of the tribal respondents on the role of the NREGS in generating more employment opportunities was not particularly satisfactory: 63.2% which is reasonable but low when compared with the other social groups. This may to some extent induce the tribal people to keep away from the scheme and look for alternative livelihood opportunities. However, it is encouraging to note that more than 50% of respondents across the social groups felt that the NREGS had helped in stopping migration, and the tribal respondents had a more or less similar perception to that of other social groups. This is very important as internal migration has become a severe social problem, especially for the marginalised groups of rural India.

7 Conclusion and policy implications The present study has made an attempt to assess the impact of the NREGS on the tribal communities in comparison with the other social groups in India. It finds that, at the macro level across the States, the tribal people are better placed in terms of distribution of job cards and number of days of employment generated. The same can be said when the average number of days of employment per ST job-card holder is compared with that for other social groups. However, the performance of the scheme in the States where tribal communities are concentrated is not so satisfactory, as the average number of days of employment per ST job card in many of these States is less than the national average. Furthermore, the extent of benefits to the tribal communities from the scheme also differs widely across the States.

The institutional set-up seems to have considerably influenced the impact of the scheme on the tribal communities. The enforcement rules and the problem of




asymmetric information and hence rent-seeking on the part of the implementing agents have a significant influence on the benefits of the scheme to the tribal people. The case studies from two districts largely support this view. It is observed that the average days of work allocated to the ST job-card holders is less than that for the SC communities, but the former group have less easy access to the registration of job cards and spend more time getting the jobs than other social groups. Furthermore, more ST respondents have their job cards under the custody of ward members and sarpanchs. In addition, the fact that a much smaller proportion of job-card holders in ST communities have applied for jobs is also a matter of serious concern, as the NREGS programme is supposed to be demand-driven.

The above findings suggest that the NREGS has immense potential for the socio-economic development of the tribal communities. As the case study shows, a reasonable number of ST respondents perceived that the NREGS had led to more employment generation in the local areas and hence halted the migration of community people to other villages, towns or States in search of jobs. But, at the same time, the success of the scheme is constrained by lack of awareness about the number of days of employment, the minimum wage per worker, the provision of unemployment allowance, etc. Therefore, delivering the potential benefits to the target groups requires significant institutional reforms at all levels. While continuous efforts by the executives and people’s representatives at the community level are necessary for creating adequate awareness of the different provisions of the scheme amongst the tribal people, it is equally important to encourage these marginalised people to participate in the planning and implementation process with equal opportunity for the expression of views and suggestions. This will help to bring in the transparency and accountability that are important for efficient utilisation of the resources for the maximum benefit of the tribal people. Provision for social audit and the display of progress on a regular basis by the implementing agencies at the panchayat level can play a significant role in this regard.

While the aforesaid measures can largely reduce the problem of asymmetric information and rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the implementing agents, it is also necessary to make the enforcement rules more stringent. This is very important as the tribal people have less bargaining power than other social groups. Strict enforcement rules coupled with an attractive incentive structure can not only prevent holding job cards by the agents, irregularities in respect of the issue of job cards and the provision of employment, delay in payment of wages, and regular maintenance of reporting documents with consistency, but also bring in proactive leadership in the implementation of the scheme.

Finally, realising the vastness of the NREGS and the largely underutilised funds in many other development schemes, a process of inter-sectoral convergence has already been initiated by bringing together four different ministries, namely, the Ministries of Rural Development, Agriculture, Environment and Forest, and Water Resources, and the Department of Land Resources. This convergence initiative under the NREGS is expected to create sufficient livelihood opportunities through the optimal utilisation of the available resources along with increasing both physical and social capital, facilitating ecological synergies and sustainable development, mitigating the effects of climate change and strengthening democratic processes. Hence, in view of the fact that socio-economic development of the tribal communities requires a holistic approach not




only in introducing schemes and sanctioning funds, but also in creating sustainable livelihood opportunities with equity and justice vis-à-vis other social groups, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs should be included in the convergence process. This can significantly facilitate concerted and coordinated application of efforts and resources by the various agencies involved in the development process. In addition, such intervention of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs combined with that of other ministries can also ensure much more firmly the rights of these marginalised groups over natural resources like land, forest and water.

first submitted September 2009 final revision accepted January 2010

References Ambasta, P., Shankar, P. S. V. and Shah, M. (2008) ‘Two Years of NREGA: The Road

Ahead’, Economic and Political Weekly 43 (08): 41-50. Bardhan, P. (2002) ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’, Journal of

Economic Perspectives 16 (4): 185-205. Behera, B. and Engel, S. (2006) ‘Institutional Analysis of Evolution of Joint Forest

Management (JFM) in India: A New Institutional Economics (NIE) Approach’, Forest Policy and Economics 8 (4): 350-62.

Bhatia, B. and Drèze, J. (2006) ‘Employment Guarantee in Jharkhand: Ground Realities’, Economic and Political Weekly 41 (29): 3198-202.

Biswas, S. (2007) ‘India Job Scheme: Disappointing’, BBC News, 10 November. Controller and Auditor General (CAG) (2007) ‘Performance Audit of Implementation

of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (NREGA)’. Draft Report, New Delhi.

Dinello, N. and Popov, V. (eds) (2007) Political Institutions and Development: Failed Expectations and Renewed Hopes. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Drèze, J. (2007) ‘NREGA: Dismantling the Contractor Raj’, The Hindu, 20 November. Furubotn, E. G. and Richter, R. (2000) Institutions and Economic Theory. Ann Arbor,

MI: University of Michigan Press. Gopal, K. S. (2009) ‘NREGA Social Audit: Myths and Realities’, Economic and

Political Weekly 44 (03): 70-4. Jha, R., Gaiha, R. and Shankar, S. (2008) ‘Reviewing the National Rural Employment

Guarantee Programme’, Economic and Political Weekly 43 (10): 44-8. Khera, R. (2008) ‘Empowerment Guarantee Act’, Economic and Political Weekly 43

(35): 8-10. Krishnamurthy, J. (2006) ‘Employment Guarantee and Crisis Response’, Economic and

Political Weekly 41 (09): 789-90. Mehrotra, S. (2008) ‘NREGA Two Years On: Where Do We Go from Here?’ Economic

and Political Weekly 43 (31): 27-35. Ministry of Law and Justice (2005) National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005,

The Gazette of India, 7 September. New Delhi: Government of India Press. Nayak, N. C., Behera, B. and Mishra, P. (2009) Appraisal of Processes and Procedures

of NREGS in Orissa: A Study of Mayurbhanj and Balasore District. New Delhi: Ministry of Rural Development.




North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roy, A., Drèze, J. and Dey, N. (2008) ‘Finish the Job’, Hindustan Times, 31 January. Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. New

York: Oxford University Press. Shah, M. (2007) ‘Employment Guarantee, Civil Society and Indian Democracy’,

Economic and Political Weekly 42 (45 and 46): 43-51. Vanaik, A. Siddhartha (2008) ‘Bank Payments: End of Corruption in NREGA’,

Economic and Political Weekly 43 (17): 33-9. Vyasulu, V, (2004) ‘Transformation in Governance since 1990s: Some Reflection’,

Economic and Political Weekly 39 (23): 2377-85. Williamson, O. (2000) ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking

Ahead’, Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3): 595-613. Williamson, O. E. (1998) ‘Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works, Where it is

Headed’, De Economist 146 (1): 23-58.

a development delivery institution for the tribal communities: experience of the national rural...

Documents