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Brown, Lester R.; And OthersState of the World: 1989. A Worldwatch InstituteReport on Progress toward a Sustainable Society.Worldwatch Inst., Washington, D.C.ISBN-0-393-30567-889271p.; Graphs and charts may not reproduce well.Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave,Washington, DC 20036 ($9.95 papers ISBN-0-393-02638-8hard cover).Viewpoints (120) -- Reports - Descriptive (141)

MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.Air Pollution; Climate; *Conservation (Environment);Ecology; *Energy Conservation; *EnvironmentalEducation; Environmental Influences; *EnvironmentalResearch; Hazardous Materials; *Physical Environment;Pollutions *Science and Society; ScientificResearch

There are more people being affected by environmentalchange than ever before. The deterioration of the earth's physicalcondition appears to be accelerating. This sixth in a series ofannual reports is a collection of 10 essays detailing the majorthreats to global environmental security and possible responses tothem. Included are: (1) "A World at Risk" (Lester R. Brown,Christopher Flavin, and Sandra Postel); (2) "Halting LandDegradation" (Sandra Postel); (3) "Reexamining the World FoodProspect" (Lester R. Brown); (4) "Abandoning Homelands" (Jodi L.Jacobson); (5) "Protecting the Ozone Layer" (Cynthia Pollock Shea);(6) "Rethinking Transportation" (Michael Renner); (7) "Responding toAIDS" (Lori Heise); (8) "Enhancing Global Security" (Michael Renner);(9) "Mobilizing at the Grassroots" (Alan B. Durning); and (10)"Outlining a Global Action Plan" (Lester R. Brown, ChristopherFlavin, and Sandra Postel). The report concludes with a statement ofthe belief that the 1990s needs to be a turn-around decade. (CW)

Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be madefrom the original document.

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ID

STATE OF THEWORLD

1989

t.0

Other Norton/Worldwatch Books

Lester R. Brown et al.

State of the World 1934





STATE OF THEWORLD

1989AWorldwatch Institute Report on

ProgressEward a Sustainable Society

PROJECT DIRECTOR

Lester R. Brown

ASSOCIATE PROJECTDIRECTORS

Christopher FlavinSandia PostelEDITOR

Linda Starke

SENIOR RESEARCHERS

Lester R. BrownAlan D towingChristopher FlavinLori HeiseJodi JacobsonSandia PostelMichael RennerCynthia Pollock Shea

WWNORTON & COMPANYNEW YORK LONDON

Coloright ;E) 1989 In IVorldwattli InstituteAll rights ITNeTVCd.

Published simult.tneoush in Canada by Penguin Books Canada Ltd.. 2801 John Street.Nlarkham. Ontario 13R 104

Primed in the United States of America.

First Edition

ISBN 0-393-02638-8

ISBN 0-393-30567-8 {PBK}w. W. Norton It: Company. Inc.. 300 Filth Avenue. New York, N.Y. 10110

V. W. Norton & Company Ltd_ 37 Great Russell Street. London WCIB 3NU

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

C;

WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Orville L. Freeman. ChairmanUNITED STATES

Andrew E. Rice, Vice ChairmanUNITED STATES

Lester R. Brown (Ex Officio)UNITED STATES

Carlo M. CipollaITALY

Edward S. CornishUNITED S FATES

Lynne GallagherUNITED STATES

Mahbub ul HagPAKISTAN

Hazel HendersonUNITED STATES

Anne-Marie HolensteinSWITZERLAND

Abd-El Rahman KhaneALGERIA

Larry MinearttNrrED STATES

WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE STAFF

Lester R. BrownLinda DohertyStephen DujackAlan DurningLori EatonSusan FineChristopher FlavinHilary FrenchGuy GormanJames GormanBlondecn Gravely

Lester R. BrownPRESIDENT

Felix GorrellTREASURER

OFFICERS

Lori HeiseJodi JacobsonReah Janise KauffmanAnn KipNicholas LenssenMarcia LoweSusan NorrisSandra PostelMichael RennerCynthia Pollock SheaJohn Young

Christopher Fla%inBlondeen GravelySandra PostelVICE PRESIDENTS

Timothy AtkesonGENERAL COUNSEL.

i

Acknowledgments

Nine names are inscribed on the cover ofSlate of the World 1989, but the book is thefruit of countless others' labor. It is atribute to years of strong support andsound advice from Chairman OrvilleFreeman and the entire WorldwatchBoard of Directors. They have neverceased to encourage us to ask the hardquestions of how to sustain humanitywhile sustaining the earth. The Rocke-feller Brothers Fund. Winthrop Rocke-felier Trust, and the George GundFoundation supply the backbone of fi-nancial support for the Stale of the Worldseries.

The Institute receives the bulk of re-search funding from the Geraldine R.Dodge, William and Flora Hewlett, W.Alton Jones. Andrew W. Mellon, EdwardJohn Noble. and Jessie Smith NoyesFoundations, as well as project supportfrom the Public Welfare Foundation andthe United Nations Population Fund.Without them, State of the World wouldstill be a concept on a drawing board.

On short notice, ranks of scholars andpolicy experts outside the institute re-viewed chapters to double-check ourfacts, critique our analysis, and adddepth to our vision. We thank Jeff Alson,Sheldon Annis, Deborah Bleviss, JamesChin, Douglas Cogan. Clarence Ditiow.Harold Dregne. Martin Foreman. LaurieGreenberg, Jeffrey Harris, John Hoff-man, Kevin Healy, Ken Hughes, WilliamLyerly, Michael Oppenheimer, MeadOver, Philip Patterson, Michael Replo-gle, Sherwood Rowland, Jane Sisk, Dan-

id Stiles, Michael Walsh, and EdwardWolf. Any remaining errors fall, ofcourse. to the authors alone.

NVhile the bulk of our research is car-ried out by mail and telephone from ouroffices off Dupont Circle in Washington,D.C., members of our research teamjourneyed to China, Europe, and LatinAmerica during the summer of 1988 tosee firsthand the problems and pros-pects of those regions. We are deeplyindebted to those generous individuals,too numerous to name, who shared withus their wisdom, their experience, andoften their homes.

Nineteen hundred eighty-eight was ayear of growth at Worldwatch Institute.With the launch of our new magazine,World Watch, and production beginningon a Slate of the Work/ television series,extraordinary demands have beenplaced on the staff. The quality of thisvolume testifies to their sheer tenacityand to the sirength of their commitment.N'ice President Blondeen Gravely nursedthe Institute through its growth pains.while Treasurer Felix Correll skillfullymaintained the financial health of the or-ganization.

Reah Janise Kauffman not only borethe full responsibility of assisting thepresident but also managed a fickle andexpanding computer system. Linda Do-herty and Guy Gorman deftly juggledtelephones, incoming orders, and visi-tors without losing their sense ofhumor.The editorial duo of Stephen Du jack andJames Gorman steered the 11'0r/diva/a

(yin) ..iehnowledgments

Papers and World if magazinethrough the rapids of Slate of the Worldproduction. Lori Eaton and Ann Kipboth put in early mornings and latenights to keep our accounts and draftson track. Ted Wolf. newly independentfrom the institute. kept us in close con-tact with the team working from Bostonon the television series.

The research business is characterizedby an enormous volume of paper, coin-ing in and going out. In that department,three part-thners at the institute borethe brunt. Chas Chiodo mailed booksfrom our offices to almost every countryon earth. Meanwhile, most of thesources cited in the notes reach the au-thors after photocopying by either ourresident distance runner George Brownor our resident whitewatet championBrian Brown.

Those who left the institute for otheropportunities since the last State of theWorld include Mary jo Allen, CynthiaBainton, Robin Bell, Bill Chandler, andBruce Goldstein. They are each sorelymissed. We also owe an apology to Amy*Mein. who was unintentionally omittedfrom the acknowledgments in Stale qf theWorld 1988. That is closest to the eye issometimes overlooked.

Talented research assistants Itre thefoundation of Worldwatch's work andthis year. in particular, we have had a

dedicated team. They each contributedto the entire book with their insightfulsuggestions, as well as to the particularchapters on which they worked: SusanFine and Bruce Goldstein (Chapters 5and 7). Hilary French (Chapter 4), NickLenssen (Chapters 1 and 10), MarciaLowe (Chapters 2 and 10). and JohnYoung (Chapters 1, 15, 6, 8, and 10).

The final and greatest debt is owed tothose who do the thankless job of turn-ing 10 disjointed manuscripts into oneunified whole. At W.W. Norton & Com-pany in New York. lva Ashner and AndyMarasia patiently accommodate our last-minute alterations and still produce Slateof 11w World in record time. And here onMassachusetts Avenue, the book itself ismade possible only by the unerring redpen of our editor, Linda Starke, whotirelessly works on draft after draft andthen coordinates the project hroughgalleys to final product. The realfinalethe indexis once again due tothe skills of Bart Brown.

We also all appreciate the ceaselessvigilance of Susan Norris. who managesproduction of the volume and keeps allthe details in mind herself while calmingthe fears of eight authors. We thank herin particular for years of spirited service.

Lester R. Brown, Christopher Flavin,and Sandra Postel

l

Contents

Acknowledgments vii

list of Tables and Figures xi

Foreword s1 A World at Risk, by Lester R. Brown.

Christopher Flavin. and SandraPoste! 3

CROSSING pERcEPTUAL THREsIlomsTHE THREAT 01; CLIMATE CHANGEA LOSS OF FeoD SECURITYWORLD WIT. JUT BORDERS

2 Halting Land Degradation, by SandraPastel 21

LANDS AND PEOPLE AT RISKUNEARTHING DEGRDATION'S TRUE

CAUSESDROUGHT. DESERTIFICATION. AND THE

HYDROLOGICAL. CYCLE

REGAINING. LAND PRODUCTITYJOINING THE BATTLE

3 Reexamining the World Food Pros-pect, by Lester R. Brown 41

PRODUCTION TRENDSTHE CROPLAND BASEWATER FOR IRRIGATIONLAND PRODUCTIVITY POTENTIALFOOD SECURITY TRENDS

4 Abandoning Homelands, by Jodi LJacobson 59

IN SEARCH OF FERTILE SOILSUNNATURAL DISASTERSA TOXIC HOME

THE THREAT OF INVNDTIoNA YARDSTICK OF' HABFLBILFIT

5 Protecting the Ozone Layer, byCynthia Paoli Shm 77

THE, OzONE DEPLETIoN PzzIEEEFF:GTs OF uLTRAvIOLET RDIATIONCHEMICAL WONDERS. ATospIIF.Ric

viLLAINSREDUCING EMISSIONSMOiNG BEIoND MONTREAL

6 Rethinking Transportation, by3hrhael Renner 97

WIIITIIER THE AUTOMOTIVE AGE?SEARCHING FOR LTERNTIEs TO on,ENHANCING FUEL EFFICIENCYIMPROVING AIR QUALITYA NEW AGE OF TRANSPORT

7 Responding to AIDS, by Lori Beim.113

THE PNDEMIC UNFOLDSTHE IMPACT IN THE THIRD WORLDPROGRESS TOWARD PREVENTION IN

INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIESALLIANCE. FOR PREVENTION IN

DEVELOPING COUNTRIESAIDS AS SOCIAL CRUCIBLE

8 Enhancing Global Security, byMichael Renner 132

A WORLD AT WARTHE DRAIN OF A PERMANENT WAR

ECONOMYENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY

.,...

CO Contents

FROM OFFENSE TO DEFENSE ANDPEACEKEEPING

BEATING SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES

9 Mobilizing at the Grassroots, by AlanR. Thawing 154

AN UNNOTICED TIDETHE GENESIS OF LOCAI. ACTION*MEETING HUMAN NEEDSPROTECTING THE EARTHREFORMING DEVELOPMENTFROM THE BOTTCHt AND THE TOP

10 Outlining a Global Action Plan, byLester R. Brown, ChristopherFlavin. and Sandra Poste, 174

A CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ENERGYSTRATEGY

A NEW FUTURE FOR FORESTSAtEETING FUTURE FOOD NEEDSSTABILIZING POPULATIONA TURNAROUND DECADE

Notes 195

Index 245

List of Tables and Figures

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 1. A World at Risk

1-1 Food Insecurity in Selected African Countries. 1986 131-2 World Grain Prices. July 1988, Compared With July 1987 14

Chapter 2. Halting Land Degradation

2-1 Status of Desertification in the World's Dry lands. 1983-84 232-2 Observations of Land Degradation, Selected Countries and Regions 242-3 Annual Sediment Load Transported to the Sea by Major Rivers. Early Eight-

ies 252-4 China: Effects of Land Rehabilitation Strategy in Quanjiagou, Mizhi County.

1979-86 34

Chapter 3. Reexamining the World Food Prospect

3-1 The Changing pattern of World Grain Trade, 1950-88 453-2 United States: Sign-Up for Conservation Reserve Program, March 1986 - .July/

August 1988 483-3 World Grain Production, Use. and Carryover Stocks. 1961-88 563-4 United States: Cropland Idled Under Commodity Programs. 1965-88 573-5 United States: Grain Production. Consumption. and Exportable Surplus by

Crop Year. 1980-88 58

Chapter 4. Abandoning Homelands

4-I Displaced Population in Selected African Countries, September 1985 624-2 Effects of Sea Level Rise on the Bengal and Nile River Deltas Under Two

Scenarios 73

Chapter 5. Protecting the Ozone Layer

5-1 Global CFC Use. by Category. 1985 865-2 Global CFC Use. by Region. 1986 875-3 Use and Emissions Profiles of Commonly Used Chemicals, 1983 88

...

(xii) List of Tables and Figures

Chapter 6. Rethinking Transportation6-1 Automobiles in Use, Worldwide and United States, 1950-87 986-2 Car Density, 1970-86, and Car Fleet in 1986, by Region 101

Chapter 7. Responding to AIDS7-1 Officially Reported AIDS Cases. Selected Countries, December 1,1988 1167-2 Estimated HIV Prevalence, Selected Regions, 1987/88 116

Chapter 8. Enhancing Global Security8-1 Armed Forces and Employment in Military Industry, Selected Countries. Early

to Mid-Eighties 1348-2 Military Share of Gross National Product, Selected Countries, 1984 1378-3 Annual Growth of World Economic Output and Military Expenditures,

1960-85 1388-4 Military ..,,.1 Civilian R&D in Selected Countries, 1971 and 1986 1408-5 International Water Disputes, Mid-Eighties 1438-6 Trade-Offs Between Military and Social or Environmental Priorities 150-51

Chapter 9. Mobilizing at the Grassroots9-1 Grassroots Organizations in Selected Developing Countries, Late Eight-

ies 157

Chapter 10. Outlining a Global Action Plan10-1 Projected Net Reductions in Carbon Emissions from Expanded Forest Protec-

tion and Reforestation Efforts 18310-2 Projected Population Size at Stabilization and Increase Over Current Level,

Selected Countries 189

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1. A World at Risk1-1 Carbon Emissions from Fossil Fuels, 1950-87 91-2 Observed Global Average Temperatures, 1880-1987, With Projections to

2040 101-3 World Grain Production Per Capita, 1950-88 121-4 U.S. Corn Yield Per Hectare, 1950-88 16

Chapter 3. Reexamining the World Food Prospect

3-1 World Grain Production, 1950-88 433-2 World Harvested Area of Grain, 1950-88 463-3 World Irrigated Area, 1900-85 493-4 Irrigated Land in the United States, 1900-84 50

.i S

List of Tables and Figures (xiii)

3-5 World Grain Yield Per Hectare, 1950-88 523.6 World Fertilizer Use and (train Area Per Capita, 1950-88 53

Chapter 5. Protecting the Ozone Layer5.1 Atmospheric Concentration of Chlorine Monoxide and

Southern Hemisphere, 1987 80Ozone by Latitude,

Chapter 6. Rethinking Transportation6.1 World Passenger Car Production, 1950-87 986.2 Car Production in South Korea and Brazil. 1970-87 996.3 World Passenger Car Gasoline Consumption, 1950-86 1026-4 Fuel Consumption of U.S. Automobiles, 1970-88 103

Chapter 8. Enhancing Global Security8-1 World Military Expenditures, 1950415 1338-2 U.S. Military Expenditures and Budget Deficits, 1950-88 141

Chapter 10. Outlining a Global Action Plan10-1 Crude Birth and Death Rates in Japan, 1948-88 18910-2 Crude Birth and Death Rates in China, 1949-87 19010-3 World Birth and Death Rates, 1950-88, With Projected Goal for 2000 190

t .-,-ft

Foreword

This sixth annual State of the World reportis being released at a time when morepeople are being affected by environ-mental change than ever before. The de-struction of the world's forests is ac-celerating and deserts continue toexpand. Soil erosion is sapping not justagricultural production, but the liveli-hoods of millions, while the extinction ofplant and animal species is rapidly di-minishing our biological heritage. Forthe first time in history, we are alteringthe atmosphere itself, destroying theozone layer that protects us from ultravi-olet radiation and raising the level of" greenhouse gases" that are warmingthe earth.

The deterioration of the earth's physi-cal condition that we have documentedin past volumes of this report is now ac-celerating. And there is nothing in pros-pect that will reverse it in the foreseeablefuture. We are now in a race to stop envi-ronmental deterioration before itbecomes unmanageable, before it leadsto economic decline and social disrup-tion.

On the encouraging side, during thepast year environmental stories havemoved onto the front pages of newspa-pers, magazine covers, and televisiontalk shows. At the same time, a new com-mitment to global environmental issuesby Soviet leaders and a new administra-tion in Washington present extraordi-nary opportunities to address environ-mental problems.

In the United States, devastating heat

and drought in 1988 led to the unthink-ablea U.S. grain harvest that fell below.consumption. The precipitous fall in theNorth American grain harvest raisedworld grain prices by half between mid-1987 and mid -I988. If the North Ameri-can drought was exacerbated by globalwarming, which is being driven by thebuildup in greenhouse gases, it wouldmark the first time human-induced envi-ronmental change has caused a majorshift in a basic economic indicator.

Environmental threats came to light innumerous ways. For vacationers goingto many of the beaches along the Balticor Adriatic seas, the "No Swimming"signs were a disappointing reminder ofincreasing oceanic pollution. For mil-lions of Chinese living in the ChangJiang (Yangtze) Valley, it was exposureto the dangerously high July tempera-tures that caused local hospitals to beoverwhelmed with heat-stroke victims.

As the evidence of potentially un-controllable environmental changesmounted, there were scattered signs ofnational governments beginning to re-spond. In late October, President JoseSarney of Brazil announced a 90-daysuspension of the tax breaks and otherincentives that had spurred the clearingand burning of large tracts of Amazonrain forest. In Lagos, the Nigerian gov-ernment asked couples to limit the num-ber of children to four at most, makingit the first African country to call for alimit on family size. The Soviet Unioncalled for a massive international effort

(.1.-pi ) Foreword

to shift resources from military securityto environmental security. And thePrime Ministers of Canada and Norwaypublicly endorsed a goal of cutting car-bon emissions from fossil fuels by 20percent by 2005.

Notwithstanding these and other na-tional initiatives, the gap between whatneeds to be done to protect the planet'shabitability and what is being done isgrowing. That is the bad news. The goodnews is that more people want to getinvolved in the effort to save the planet.The question that now dominates ourmail is, What can I do?

Record advance sales of State of theWorld indicate a growing hunger for in-formation among people concernedabout the fate of their planet and theirchildren's future. This concern is by nomeans limited to the English-speakingworld. State of the World now appears innearly all of the world's major lan-guagesSpanish, Arabic, Chinese, Jap-anese, Javanese, German, Polish, Italian,and Russian. In 1987, the Arabic transla-tion was the first to be published, follow-ing the English edition by only twomonths. In 1988, the Italian version,published by Editore Petrini, was availa-ble just one month after the English edi-tion. Petrini's 1989 goal, using a team oftranslators, is to publish the Italian edi-tion simultaneously with the English one.

Although it is too early to tell for sure,it looks as though U.S. sales of State of theWorld 1989 will pass the 100,000 mark.All segments of the marketpublicpolicymakers, concerned citizens, cor-porate planners, and the academic com-munitycontinue to grow. Last year,State of the World was adopted for use in751 courses in 451 U.S. colleges and uni-versities.

Three years ago, we announced that

we were joining forces with WGBH, theBoston-based producers of "Nova," toproduce a major series for public televi-sion based on State of the World. We arepleased to report that filming began inlate 1988, and the series is scheduled toair in 1990.

We conclude this year's report withthe notion that the nineties needs to bea "turnaround decade." The loomingthreats we now faceincluding climatechange, ozone depletion, and popula-tion growthhave so much momentumthat unless action begins now to reversethem, they will inevitably lead to oaralyz-ingly costly economic consequences andthe collapse of social and political insti-tutions. One of these years, we wouldlike to be able to write an upbeat State ofthe World, one in which we can reportthat the trends under mining the humanprospect have been reversed. It nowseems that if we cannot write such a re-port in the nineties, we may not be ableto write it at all.

In numerous ways each year, we seehow State of the World plants the seeds ofchange. Our goal is to inspire enoughpeople to nourish and spread thoseseeds that meaningful change begins tooccur.

As always, we welcome your com-ments, reactions, and suggestions.

Lester R. BrownProject Director

Christopher FlavinSandra Poste!

Associate Project Directors

Worldwatch Institute1776 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.Washington, D.C. 20036

December 1988

STATE OF THEWORLD

1989

1

AWorld at RiskLester R. Brown, Christopher Flavin,

and Sandra Postel

Historians looking back on 1-988 maywell mark it a watershed year both forthe environment and the public's con-cern about it. The earth's deterioratingcondition moved into the limelight, asweekly news magazines and televisiontalk shows gave prominent play to unset-tling evidence of environ mental stress. Acollage of the year's headlines would cryout to be captioned "a world at risk."Indeed, the year provided a tangibleforetaste of what lies ahead if we con-tinue down the current pathand thisglimpse into the global future was dis-quieting, to say the least.

In June, evidence came from the U.S.National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration (NASA) that the long-predictedglobal warming had apparently becomereality. James E. Hansen, head ofNASA's Goddard Institute for SpaceStudies, released findings from a studyof global temperature records spanningthe last century. Not only had there been

Units of measurement are metric unless commonusage dictates otherwise.

a gradual long-term warming consistentwith models of the greenhouse effect.but the four warmest years had all occur-red in the eighties-1980, 1981, 1983.and 1987. It appeared then that 1988would join them, and would become thehottest year on record.'

As if to lend import to NASA" find-ings, weather conditions in key parts ofthe world seemed to preview what life ina greenhouse world would be like. Tem-peratures in parts of central Chinasoared to between 36 and 40 degreesCelsius (97 and 104 degrees Fahrenheit)on 10 consecutive days in July. For thehundreds of millions of Chinese who livein this densely populated regionwhichembraces Shanghai, Nanjing, andWuhanthe heat wave was nothing lessthan frightful. Hospitals in Nanjing wereoverwhelmed by the number of heatstroke victims; temporary cots had to beset up in corridors and shaded areas.With daily highs climbing well abovenormal body temperature, hundreds ofpeople died.2

Meanwhile, heat waves and drought

t-,./

(4) State of the World 1989

were also striking North America. Tem-perature records were set across thecontinent. Crop yields declined sosharply in the United States that grainproduction fell below domestic con-sumption, probably for the first time inhistory. Fortunately, grain reservescould easily fill this deficit as well as sat-isfy export commitments. But with re-serves largely depleted, a drought in1989 would slow U.S. grain exports to atrickle, send food prices soaring, andlead to a frantic scramble for grainamong scores of importers.

Additional worrisome news camefrom NASA in March: the atmosphericozone layer that protects earthly lifefrom harmful ultraviolet radiation hadbegun to thin globally. Depletion was nolonger confined to the polar vegions.More than 100 scientists from sevencountries had spent 16 months carefullyanalyzing ground-based and satellitemeasurements of atmospheric ozone.They found that from 1969 to 1986,ozone decreased between 1.7 percentand 3 percent in a heavily populatedband of the northern hemisphere en-compassing virtually all of continentalUnited States and Europe. Wintertimeozone losses were even greater, rangingfrom 2.3 percent to 6.2 percent. Failureto adequately control emissions ofozone-depleting chemicals thus virtuallyassures a future of increased skin cancerrates, crop losses. and damage to marinelife. (See Chapter 5.)3

Local and regional signs of environ-mental stress, some verging on the cata-strophic, seemed commonplace in 1988.Early September found two thirds ofBangladesh under water, a direct resultof heavy monsoon rains but also in-directly due to the disruption of thehydrological cycle in the Himalayanwatershed because of progressivedeforestation in recent decades. Flood-ing in Bangladesh has worsened mea-surably during the eighties. The 1988

flood, the worst in living memory, left 25million of the country's 110 million peo-ple homeless, adding to the growingranks of "environmental refugees."(See Chapter 4.)4

Alarming news about deforestationcame from Brazil. Satellite data coveringthe 1987 dry season showed that theAmazon rain forest is being cleared farfaster than previously thought. An as-tonishing 8 million hectaresan areaabout the size of Austriawere burnedin 1987 alone, and burning during the1988 dry season was expected to be evenworse. This accelerated destruction isdriving uncounted numbers of plant andanimal species to extinction, adding tocarbon dioxideinduced climate change,and threatening to disrupt the region'spowerful hydrological cyclewhich inturn could alter hemispheric and possi-bly even global clinriatic patterns. (SeeChapter 2.)3

Perhaps the most distinguishing fea-ture of 1988 was the extent to which en-vironmental threats began to directlytouch the emotions and lives of people.Like the mercury in their outdoor ther-mometers, Americans' concern for theenvironment seemed to rise to unprece-dented heights during the summer.Within the span of a few weeks, they iwere bombarded by news of medicalwaste washing up on East Coast beaches,persistent drought searing cropsthroughout the agricultural heartland,fires raging through popular Yellow-stone National Park, and health-threat-ening pollution levels in the air outsidetheir homes.6

In Europe, concern about the environ-ment escalated with the deaths of thou-sands of seals in north European waters,even though the role of pollution waslater minimized. Pollution of the Adria-tic Sea led to fish kills and an exodus oftourists from long stretches of the Italiancoastline. Soviet officials banned swim-ming in the Baltic, Black, and Aral seas

i

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A World at Risk (5)

because of pollution-related healththreats. West Africans sounded alarmsover the dumping of toxic waste on theirshores. And the human suffering causedby the flood disaster in Bangladesh wentbeyond most people's imaginations. Thenatural world, it seemed, was strikingback.?

But what will become of this groundswell of concern arising from the eventsof 1988? Will it fade like the summerheat? Or will it translate into sufficientpressure to force policymakers to re-spond to the looming threats of whichthis year provided a sampling?

The environmental era now dawningis distinguished by problems truly globalin scale. Even while countries grapplewith the more localized problems of acidrain, toxic waste, and soil erosion, globalthreats of unprecedented proportionsare now overlaid upon them. The imme-diate challenge is to translate a commonvision of a world at risk into the interna-tional alliances and bold actions neededto safeguard the earth.

CROSSING PERCEPTUALTHRESHOLDS

Social change occurs when people alterthe way they perceive some of the ele-ments constituting their world. Spurredby a dramatic event, a charismaticleader, or a gradual awakening througheducation, people cross a "perceptualthreshold" that forces them to see andjudge some aspect of their world in anew light. These perceptual shifts oftenhave a decidedly ethical component.Witness the turning of slavery from animplicit right to a moral abomination, orthe subjugation of women from commonpractice to--at least in some parts of theworlda reprehensible condition.

An effective response to the env;ron-mental threats now unfolding will re-quire that humanity's perception of itsrelationship to the earth's natural sys-tems cross a new threshold. During theeighties, a number of shifts occurred onthe environmental front that led tomajor turnarounds on some importantissues. They give cause for optimism indealing with the larger threats becausethey show that major reversals are possi-ble in a fairly short period of time. Butthey also engender concern because itoften seems to take a crisis before peo-ple's perceptions change sufficiently tosupport an effective political response.With problems such as climate changeand population growth, a continuationof that pattern means that much irre-versible damage will be done before so-cieties respond.

It often seems to take a crisisbefore perceptions change suffi-ciently to support an effective polit-ical response.

The explosion at the Chernobyl nu-clear reactor in the Soviet Ukraine inearly April 1986 did what hundreds ofstudies assessing nuclear technologycould never have done: it made the dan-gers of nuclear power real Fresh vegeta-bles were declared unfit for human con-sumption in northern Italy. Polishauthorities launched an emergency ef-fort to get iodine tablets administered tochildren. The livelihood of the Lapps innorthern Scandinavia was threatenedwhen reindeer upon which they dependbecame too contaminated with radiationto bring to market, In the Soviet Unionitself, 100,000 people in the vicinity ofthe reactor were forced to abandon theirhomes.8

This single event shifted public atti-

..... .,

fi.; t,

(6) State of the World !9S9

Ludes so strongly against nuclear powerthat since then five countries have de-cided not to build more nuclear plantsand two. Italy and Sweden, have decidedto accelerate closings of existing plants.In the Soviet Union, at least five reactorshave been canceled since the accident,and work has been suspended at severalother sifes.9

Rapid advances in recent years towardacid rain control in Europe stem in largepart from the West Germans' suddenawakening to waldsierben, forest death.After a 1982 survey showed that trees inthe fabled Black Forest and elsewherewere dying in large numberswith sus-pected links to air pollution and acidrainwnldsterben rapidly emerged as apotent political and emotional issue. Apoll taken during the summer of 1988showed that West Germans were moreconcerned about the fate of their foreststhan about the Pershing missiles thatwere to be placed on their territory laterthat year."

An environmental awakening hasoccurred in Eastern Europe andthe Soviet Union.

Until that Lime, the nation had beenfirmly against cooperation towardstricter air pollution controls. Faced withsuch strong public concern, however,West German officials dramatically re-versed their position in 1988. At a meet-ing of the U.N. Economic Commissionfor Europe (ECE) to discuss transbound-ary pollution, West Germany brokeranks and supported a Scandinavianproposal calling for each ECE memberto cut sulfur dioxide emissions by 80percent by 1998. Dissent from theUnited States. the United Kingdom, andothers prevented the proposal's adop-tion. But it led to die formation of an

informal "80 percent club" made up ofnations committed to this target, whichin turn paved the way for the Protocol onthe Reduction of Sulfur Emissionssigned by 21 nations in Helsinki in1985.11

By 1986. 10 countries had met or ex-ceeded the 80-percent reduction goalan astonishingly rapid achievementand 4 had committed themselves to a70-percent reduction. IL is impossible toknow how acid rain controls in Europewould have progressed had waldsterbennot become such an emotional issue. es-pecially in West Germany but also inother countries that discovered exten-sive damage to their woodlands. Thespectre of dying forests clearly causedenough Europeans to cross a thresholdof concern that made political action notonly urgent, but unavoidable."

Just since the mid-eighties, an envi-ronmental awakening has occurred inEastern Europe and the Soviet Union.The Chernobyl accident and the spreadof forest damage were precipitating fac-tors, but the rising awareness seems tospring equally from concern about thedeterioration of the region's air, drink-ing wafer, and soils."

With the emergence of glasnosi, thisawakening has spurred much environ-mental activism. One western observerin the Soviet Union has compared themood there with that in the UnitedStates in 1970, the year Earth Day wasproclaimed. In Poland, there are nowsome 2,000 environmental organiza-tions, most of them established since1986. Freedom and Peace. among themost active of them, captures the funda-mental nature of the growing concernwith its statement: "Threatened with theruin of the biosphere, pollution of air,wafer and soil, we realize that freedomshould also be the possibility to live innon-devastated surroundings.'44

Of course, perceptual shifts by them-selves do not resolve problems. Addi-

A World al Risk (7)

Lional pollution control measures arestill needed in Europe, and the environ-mental awakening in Eastern Europeand the Soviet Union has led only to in-cipient action by governments. But suchshifts are often prerequisites to effectiveresponses, the sparks that ignite the pro-cesses of change.

In Western Europe, this evolutionfrom perception to action may be has-tened by the emergence of the so-calledgreen political movement. With roots inWest Germany in the late seventies, thismovement now has official political par-ties in 16 countries and members of par-liament (MPs) in 8. The European Par-liament itself now includes Green Partymembers. In 1988, Sweden's Greens be-came the first new parry to enter the par-liament in 70 years, and Italy's less for-mal green parliamentary group becamean important force in that nation's poli-tics. In some countries, Green MPs areable to direct some public funds towardenvironmental research and into confer-ences and other events that raise thelevel of public awareness.15

Perceptual shifts of profound propor-tions are needed to respond adequatelyto global warming, to unchecked popu-lation growth, and to persistent pov-ertyarguably the greatest threats toenvironmental health and economicprogress during the next decade andbeyond. These problems are especiallydaunting because they involve deeplyrooted patterns of behavior, beliefs, andvalues. And none can be alleviatedthrough a simple action or technologicalfix. Environmental philosopher LynnWhite hinted at the predicament morethan two decades ago: "I personallydoubt that disastrous ecologic backlashcan be avoided simply by applying to ourproblems more science and more Lech-nology."16

Indeed, crossing the perceptualthresholds needed to respond to theseproblems launches humanity toward a

new moral frontier. A growing sense ofthe world's interJ.-pendence and con-nectedness Lakes shapethe recogni-tion, for example. that automobile useanywhere threatens climate stabilityeverywhere, that persistent poverty anddebt cast an economic shadow over in-dustrial countries as well as those in theThird World. The old business of pursu-ing narrow economic and political self-interest falls away, anachronistic andplainly untenable. As historian JeremyBrecher wrote in 1988, this "second eco-logical revolution ... will have to say thatpreserving the conditions for human lifeis simply more important than increas-ing national power or private wealth."17

Without a strong sense that peoplefavor the fundamental changes neededto respond to these problems, govern-ments will not Lake the necessary actions.The immediate task, then, is for in-dividuals everywhere to raise their un-derstanding, concern, and voices to thepoint where political leaders are forcedto respond. Scientists who not only con-vey the relevant facts but also articulatethe consequences of political inactionwill play a crucial role in this process ofeducation and mobilization. So, too, willthe media.

Will societies cross these new percep-tual thresholds soon enough to avoidmajor ecological backlash? Though amajor transformation of attitudes andpriorities is still needed, there are a fewglimmers of hope on the horizon.

Around the world, people concernedabout direct threats to their health andlivelihoods have banded together to Lakegreater control over their destinies.Thousands of grassroots movementshave arisen on virtually every continentin response to a host of injusticesin-cluding toxic contamination, industrialexploitation of forests, militarization'sdrain on resources, landlessness, andlack of access to basic water, sanitation,and health care services. (See Chapters 8

(8) Stale of the World 1989

and 9.) These groups show that tttobili-zation for change is possible; more im-portant, perhaps, they form a criticalpart of the institutional foundationneeded to do the work of sustainable de-velopment.

In Vietnama nation devastated bywar, overpopulation, and povertythere are unexpected signs of the kind ofperceptual shifts that need to take placeamong national leaders. General VoNguyen Giap, the former commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese Armyand current vice president, is among thebackers of a national plan calling for alarge-scale family planning program anda massive reforestation effortmeasuresurgently needed to lift the country out ofecological and economic decline. Gen-eral Giap has said, "The soldier comesto another front now, the environmentalfront. . . . Now I see that without envi-ronmental recovery, Vietnam cannothave economic recovery; the two are in-separable . . . . Today I fight for Viet-nam's environmentand for peace."18

In several industrial countries, the ur-gency of climate change is beginning tohit home. The prime ministers of Can-ada and Norway have each publicly en-dorsed cutting carbon emissions by 20percent by 2005. And in the UnitedStates, in the wake of the summer of1988's record-breaking heat waves,three separate pieces of legislation toslow the pace of global warming wereintroduced in Congress. Few peoplecould have imagined when 1988 beganthat climate change would rise so rapidlyon the political agenda.19

Yet vast chasms separate glimmers ofhope irom effective responses. A com-mitted, active, vocal public is essential tobring about the policy changes neededto safeguard the earth's environment.The difficult choices that lie ahead willchallenge our social institutions and per-sonal values as never before. It will help

46

to remetnber that progress is an illusionif it destroys the conditions needed forlife to thrive on earth.

THE THREAT OF CLIMATECHANGE

When NASA scientist James Hansen an-nounced at a Senate hearing during theintense June 1988 heat wave that "globalwarming has begun," he ignited a whirl-wind of public concern that has yet tosubside. The warming of the earth's cli-mate is an environmental catastrophe ona new scale, with the potential to vio-lently disrupt virtually every natural eco-system and many of the structures andinstitutions that humanity has grown todepend on. Although climates haveshifted only slightly so far, the worldfaces the prospect of vastly acceleratedchange in the decades ahead. Conditionsessential to life as we know it are now atrisk.20

The threat of climate change stemsfrom the increasing concentrations ofcarbon dioxide (CO2) and other "green-house gases" that hold heat in the loweratmosphere, allowing temperatures torise. Thehurning of coal and ofother car-bon-based fuels such as oil and naturalgas releases carbon as the basic productof the combustion, while the large-scaleclearing of tropical forests adds addi-tional carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.Just since 1958, when routine measure-ments began, the CO2 concentration hasgone from 315 parts per million to 352parts per millionsubstantially abovethe highest concentrations experiencedon earth in the past 160,000 years.2'

Concentrations of other, more potentgreenhouse gasesnotably methane, ni-trous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons(CFCs)are increasing even more rap-

A World at Risk (9)

idly. Based on current emission rates,they have as much potential as CO2 towarm the atmosphere. While the carbondioxide level has grown at a rate of 0.4percent a year since 1958, these othergases are increasing at annual rates ashigh as 5 percent.22

Humanity added 5.5 billion tons ofcarbon to the atmosphere in 1988through fossil fuel combustion and an-other 0.4 billion to 2.5 billion tonsthrough deforestation. The UnitedStates is the largest contributor, but itmay be passed soon by the Soviet Unionand later by China. (See Figure 1-1.)While carbon emissions are growingslowly in the industrial countries that ac-count for two thirds of the total, they areskyrocketing in the developing world. Ifrecent worldwide consumption growthrates of about 3 percent per year con-tinue, fossil fuels could contribute 10billion tons of new carbon annually inthe year 2010. Meanwhile, deforestationin the Amazon and perhaps other tropi-cal regions appears to have acceleratedto frighteningly rapid rates.23

Teams of British and American scien-tists have assembled series of global av-erage temperatures going back 1( 0years. While experts still disagree about

Million Tbnsof Carbon

1,500

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 14. Carbon Emissions from Fossil Ards,1954147

- i

some of these numbers, the overall trendis dear. The global average temperaturein the 1890s was 14.5 degrees Celsius,and by the 1980s it had climbed to 15.2degrees. Temperatures leveled off be-tween 1940 and 1970, but the acceler-ated rise during the eighties has morethan offset this lull. As noted earlier, thefive warmest years of the past centuryhave all fallen in this decade.24

These trends appear to confirm theglobal circulation models that scientistsuse to assess the impact of greenhousegases on the climate. NASA's Hansen,for example, is now 99 percent certainthat the observed temperature increasesreflect the impact of the greenhouse ef-fect. Meanwhile, the upper atmosphereis becoming cooler while the lower at-mosphere warms, and temperatures athigher latitudes are increasing fasterthan they are at the equator, just as theglobal warming models predict.25

The five warmest years of the pastcentury have all fallen in thisdecade.

The limited warming that has occur-red so far is important to scientists, butnot threatening to society. Danger lies inthe acceleration of climate change thatappears imminent. Between 2030 and2050, average temperatures could be1.5-4.5 degrees Celsius (3-8 degreesFahrenheit) higher than they have beenin recent decades, or warmer than theearth has been for the past 2 millionyears. (See Figure 1-2.) This implies awarming that is 5 to 10 times as fast asthat experienced during the past cen-tury.26

If the spurt in global temperaturesthat began about 1970 continues,droughts, heat waves, and other unusualweather may increase by the late nineties

(ro)

DegreesCelsius

20

19-

18 -

17 -

16 -

15 -


production would be tragically dis-rupted by a rapid warming.29

Trees are adapted to a narrow rangeof temperature and moisture levels, andcannot cope with rapid climate change.A temperature increase of 1 degree Cel-sius per decade in mid- to upper lati-tudes translates into a shift in vegetationzones of 60-100 miles northward. Ter-restrial ecosystems cannot migrate thatfast. Vast numbers of trees are likely todie, and new trees adapted to warmertemperatures are unlikely to be able toreplace them rapidly. During such a dis-ruption, huge areas of forest could dieand, as they decay or burn, send largequantities of additional CO2 into the at-mosphere, accelerating the warming.29

Biological diversity, already being re-duced by various human activities, maybe one of the chief casualties of globalwarming. Massive destruction of forests,wetlands. and even the polar tundracould irrevocably destroy complex eco-systems that have existed for millennia.Indeed, various biological reserves cre-ated in the past decade to protect speciesdiversity could become virtual deathtraps as wildlife attempt to survive inconditions for which they are poorlysuited. Accelerated species extinction isan inevitable consequence of a rapidwarming.39

Sea level rise is another threat. Asocean water warms, it will expand, andwarming at the poles will melt parts ofglaciers and ice caps. Studies concludethat a temperature rise of 3 degrees Cel-sius by 2050 would raise sea level by 50-100 centimeters. By the end of the nextcentury, sea level may be up by as muchas two meters.31

This would hurt most in the develop-ing world, particularly in densely popu-lated Asia, where rice is produced onlow-lying river deltas and floodplains.Without heavy investments in dikes andseawalls to protect the rice fields fromsaltwater intrusion, such a rise would

1880 1900 1940 1980 2020 2060

Rpm 1- 2. Observed Global MotageTemperatures. isso-ort,With Projecdous to 2040

to the point where even nonscientistswill notice the climate is changing. Al-though there is no proof that theweather of 1988 is attributable to globalwarming, the extreme heat and drynessin areas such as central North Americaand China indicate what. may be in storefor the nineties and beyond. In the fu-ture, higher latitude and mid-continen-tal regions in the United States andChina are likely to experience greatertemperature rises than the world as awhole. In these areas, stifling summerheat waves and devastating droughtsmay soon be commonplace.27

It is still argued by some that climatechange will have positive as well as nega-tive effects. and that it is a problem withwhich societies can readily cope. But thisignores the extraordinary rate of changethat is now projected, and the impossi-bility of adjusting quickly enough. Scien-tists believe that the pace of climatechange will soon overwhelm natural var-iability in the earth's climate. Indeed. itcan be compared with nuclear war for itspotential to disrupt a wide range ofhuman and natural systems, complicat-ing the task of managing economies andcoping with other problems. Irrigationworks, settlement patterns, and food

25

.1 World at Risk (it)markedly reduce harvests. Large areas ofwetlands that nourish the world's fisher-ies would also be destroyed.32

In Bangladesh, sea level rise and sub-sidence caused largely by human activi-ties could flood up to 18 percent of thenation's land area by 2050, displacingmore than 17 million people. In Egypt,where only 4 percent of the laud area canbe cultivated. food production coulddrop and 8.5 million people could beforced from their homes. In these al-ready crowded countries, there is noplace for these people to go and no alter-native land available on which to growcrops. (See Chapter 4.)"

In the United States, a U.S. govern-mentsponsored study has estimated thepotential impacts of climate change onCleveland, Miami, and New York. A fewminor benefits are mentioned, such aslower snow removal budgets and winterheating bills, but the overall picture isbleak. In particular, many billions of dol-lars will likely have to be spent on im-proving already inadequate water supplysystems, since demand will increase andsupplies will be degraded as the climatechanges.34

In New York, for example, salt watercould move up the lower Hudson Riverwhile more-severe droughts limit theamount of water available from upstatewatersheds. In Miami, most of which wasonce below sea level, even extensive dik-ing will not preserve its porous freshwa-ter aquifer. If global warming continues,Miami could one day be reclaimed by thesea. Meanwhile, air-conditioning costsare likely to soar."

Global circulation models and the var-ious studies that flow from them mainlyforecast averages. But in the game of cli-mate change, it is not the averages thatkill, it is the extremes. Unexpecteddroughts, extraordinary heat waves, anddevastating hurricanes are among thedangerous events likely to be more com-

P 6

mon in a wanner world, but their preciselocation and timing ntay never be en-tirely predictable. A handful of extremestortns could kill tnilliotts of people. Inmany developing countries. two or threedroughts in a row could leave millionsstarving.96

When air pollution and solid wastedisposal first commanded attention inthe seventies, analysts were at least ableto point to solutions to the problems andcome up with 5- or 10-year action plans.One of the most disturbing things aboutglobal warming is that even as some ofits implications are being discovered, itappears that substantial and damagingclimate change is inevitable due to theenormous changes forced on the earth'satmosphere over the past century.

In the game of climate change, it isnot the averages that kill, it is theextremes.

Climate change has so much momen-tum behind it now that it can only beslowed, not stopped. (See Chapter 10.)Future generations will have to copewith a warmer and ever-changing world,one in which major investments are re-quired simply to maintain the status quo.Global warming will hurt rich and poor,North and South alike. But those most atrisk are the almost 4 billion people wholive in the Third World, many of whomalready face declining living standardsand who lack the resources to protectthemselves from spreading deserts andrising sea levels.

Indeed, climate change, like no otherissue, calls the whole notion of humanprogress into question. The benefits ofnewer technologies, more efficienteconomies, and improved political sys-tems could be overwhelmed by uncon-trolled global warming. Some warming

(12) Slate of the World 1989

is inevitable. But unless trends are re-versed, tragic changes could occur injust the ncia two decades. The challengeis to act before it is too latewhichmeans before the scientific evidence isconclusive. The longer society waits, themore radical and draconian the neededresponses will be.

A Loss OF FOOD SECURITY

As the eighties draw to a close, climatechange is being added to an already longlist of environmental stresses and re-source scarcities that are underminingglobal food security. Soil erosion, de-sertification, the salting of irrigatedlands, and a scarcity of new cropland andfresh water are combining to lower thegrowth in food output below that of pop-ulation in dozens of developing coun-tries. Partly as a result, the world nowhas far more hungry people than it didwhen the eighties began.37

A dramatic 2.6-fold increase in grainproduction between 1950 and 1984raised per capita consumption by nearly40 percent. But since then growth hasstopped. In each of the past two years,world grain production has fallensharply, marking the first steep back-to-back annual declines on record. A mon-soon failure in India in 1987 anddrought-reduced harvests in NorthAmerica and China in 1988 explain onlypart of the reduction. In several popu-lous countries, including China, India,Indonesia, and Mexico, little or no prog-ress has been made in expanding grainproduction since 1984.38

Continuing rapid growth of worldpopulation during the last few yearscombined with the reduced harvests hasled to a record fall in per capita outputof grain, the food source that accountsfor half of world caloric intake when con-

27

sumed directly and a sizable pan of theremainder when consumed indirectly asmeat, milk, and eggs. Between 1986 and1988, production per person fell 14 per-cent, dropping back to the level of 1970.(See Figure 1-3.) Roughly 11 percentwas offset by using carryover stocks ofgrain; the remaining 3 percent translatesinto reduced food intake, largely be-cause of higher world grain prices.39

This reversal in humanity's agricul-tural fortunes has occurred ratherabruptly. For those accustomed to read-ing as recently as early 1988 of "a worldawash in grain," the latest downturn ingrain output may come as a surprise. Al-though not widely recognized at thetime, the impressive growth in worldproduction following the doubling ofworld grain prices in 1973 was achievedin pan by plowing highly erodible land,and in part by drawing down water ta-bles through overpumping for irriga-tion.

Farmers can overplow and overpumpwith impressive results in the short run,but for many the short run is drawing toa close. The result is a worldwide re-trenchment in cultivated area and a dra-matic slowdown in the spread of irriga-tion. As highly erodible croplandbrought under the plow during the agri-

100

Sour= US. DeptolAgticulture

1950 1960 1970 1980 19r, 2000

Figure 1-3. %rid Qat ProductionPer capita, 195048

4 World at Risk 03)cultural boom years of the seventies istaken out of cultivation, and as fallingwater tables in key food-producingcountries force a reduction in irrigatedarea, the growth in world food output isslowing.'"

In each of the past two years, worldgrain production has fallensharply.

Evidence that environmental degrada-tion in some regions is altering the foodprospect and, in turn, the human pros-pect is unmistakable. In Africa, a deteri-orating agricultural resource base, re-cord population growth, and economicmismanagement lowered grain outputper person throughout the seventies.During the eighties, mounting externaldebt reduced capital available for invest-ment in agriculture, exacerbating the de-cline.'"

The social effects of agricultural ad-versity are now becoming highly visiblethroughout the continent. In mid-1988.the World Bank reported that "both theproportion and the total number of Afri-cans with deficient diets have climbedand will continue to rise unless specialaction is taken." The Bank went on tosay that "barely a quarter of Africans areliving in countries where food consump-tion was increasing in the 1980s, downconsiderably from about two-thirds inthe 1970s."42

In Africa, the number of "food inse-cure" people, defined by the Bank asthose not having enough food for nor-mal health and physical activity, now to-tals over 100 million. Some 14.7 millionEthiopians, one third of the country, areundernourished. Nigeria is close behind,with 13.7 million undernourished peo-ple. The countries with 40 percent ormore of their populations suffering from

28

chronic food insecurity are Chad,Mozambique, Somalia, and Uganda.(See Table 1-1.) The Bank summarizedits findings by noting that "Africa's foodsituation is not only serious, it is deteri-orating."'"

The island of Madagascar, with a pop-ulation of 11 million expanding by 3 per-cent per year, reveals in some detail howpopulation growth and environmentaldeterioration are affecting people. Aswith the rest of Africa, per capita grainproduction peaked in 1967 and declinedgradually until 1983, when the fall accel-erated. Since then average grain con-sumption has fallen by nearly one fifth,pushing food intake below the survivallevel for many. Infant mortality, themost sensitive indicator of nutritionalstress, rose from 75 to 133 per thousandbetween 1975 and 1985. Short of a mira-

Table I-1. Food Insecurity in SelectedAfrican Countries, 1986

Country

EthiopiaNigeriaZaireTanzaniaKenya

UgandaMozambiqueAlgeriaGhanaSudan

ZambiaMaliChadMoroccoSomalia

Numberof People

Share ofPopulation

(million) (percent)

14.7 3413.7 1312.0 386.6 296.2 29

6.1 405.9 424.1 184.1 313.4 15

2.7 392.5 332.4 472.4 11

2.3 42

SOURCE: World Bank, Report of Ike Task Force on FoodSecurity in Africa (Washington. D.C.: 1988): WorldBank. World Development Report 1988 (New York:Oxford University Press. 1988).

(1.) State of the Work! 1989

cle, the future of this country, with abirth rate among the world's highest anda rate of topsoil loss greater even thanthat of Ethiopia, is not bright.44

This deterioration is not limited toAfrica. In Latin America, which exportedmore grain than North America did amere half-century ago, per capita grainproduction has fallen 7 percent sincereaching an all -time high in 1981. In its1988 report "The Global State of Hun-ger and Malnutrition," the U.N.'s WorldFood Council reports that the share ofmalnourished preschoolers in Peru in-creased from 42 percent to 68 percentbetween 1980 and 1983. Infant deathshave risen in Brazil during the eighties.If recent trends in population growth,land degradation, and growth in exter-nal debt continue, Latin America's de-cline in food production per person willalmost certainly continue into the nine-ties, increasing the number of hungry,malnourished people. The Council sum-marized its worldwide findings by notingthat "earlier progress in fighting hunger,malnutrition and poverty has come to ahalt or is being reversed in many parts ofthe workl."46

When domestic food production isinadequate, the ability of countries toimport becomes the key to food suffi-ciency. During the late eighties, low-in.come grain-deficit countries must con-tend not only with an increase in grainprices, but also in many cases with un-manageable external debt, whichseverely limits their expenditures onfood imports. The World Bank nutritionsurvey of Africa just cited was based ondata through 1986; since then, condi.lions have deteriorated further as worldgrain prices have climbed.46

The effect of higher grain prices onconsumers is much greater in develop.ing countries than in industrial ones. Inthe United States, for example, a $1 loafof bread contains roughly 50 worth ofwheat. If the price of wheat doubles, the

29

price of the loaf would increase only to$1.05. In developing countries, how-ever, where wheat is purchased in themarket and ground into flour at home, adoubling of world grain prices translatesinto a doubling of prices to consumers.For those who already spend most oftheir income on food, such a rise candrive consumption below the survivallevel."

For debt-ridden, food-deficit, low-in-come countries, higher world prices ofwheat, rice, and corn mean lower con-sumption and more hunger. (See Table1-2.) Higher corn prices will affect mostdirectly corn-consuming countries inEast Africa and Latin America. The ris-ing price orrice will reduce caloric intakeamong the low-income populations ofAsia, where 90 percent of the world'srice is consumed. The 1988 jump in theprice of wheat, the principal grain usedfor food aid, will reduce the amountavailable from international develop-ment agencies.48

Already faced with a deterioratingfood situation, the world is now con-fronted with climate change, an addi-tional threat to food security. TheTable 1-2. World Grain Prices, July 1988,

Compared With July 1987

_July _July

197 1988Grain Change

(currentdollars) (percent)

Wheat 2.85 4.07 +43(price per bushel)

Rice 212 305 +44(price per ton)

Com 1.94 3.22 +66(price per bushel)

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund. InternationalFinandal Statistics (Washingtor D.C.: variousmonths).

A World at Risk

drought-damaged U.S. grain harvest in1988, which fell below consumption forthe first time in recent history, illustrateshow global warming may affect agricul-ture over the longer term in the UnitedStates and elsewhere. With normalweather, the United States typically har-vests more than 300 million tons ofgrain; Americans consume roughly 200million tons and the rest is exported. Be-cause this year's drought eliminated theshare of harvest normally sold overseas,exports during the 1988-89 trade yearwill come entirely from reserves.49

As noted earlier, climate change willnot affect all countries in the same way.The projected rise of 1.5-4.5 degreesCelsius (3-8 degrees Fahrenheit) is aglobal average, but temperatures are ex-pected to increase much more in themiddle and higher latitudes and moreover land than over the oceans. They areprojected to change little near the equa-tor, while gains in the higher latitudescould easily be twice the anticipatedglobal average. This uneven distributionwill affect world agriculture dispropor-tionately, since most food is produced inthe middle and higher latitudes of thenorthern hemisphere.50

Though they remain sketchy,meteorological models suggest that twoof the world's major food-producing re-gionsthe North American agriculturalheartland and a large area of centralAsiaare likely to experience a declinein soil moisture during the summergrowing season as a result of higher tem-peratures and increased evaporation. Ifthe warming progresses as the modelsindicate, some of the land in the U.S.western Great Plains that now produceswheat would revert to rangeland. Thewestern Corn Belt would become semi-arid, with wheat or other drought-toler-ant grains that yield 40 bushels per acrereplacing corn that yields over 100 bush-els.51

On the plus side, as temperatures in-

(15)

crease the winter wheat belt might mi.grate northward, allowing winter strainsthat yield 40 bushels per acre to replacespring varieties yielding 30 bushels. Alonger growing season would also per-mit a northward extension of springwheat production into areas such asCanada's Alberta province, thus increas-ing that nation's cultivated area. On bal-ance, though, higher temperatures andincreased summer dryness will reducethe North American grain harvest,largely because of their negative impacton the all-important corn crop.

Drought, which afflicted most of theUnited States during the past summer, isessentially defined as dryness. For farm-ers, drought conditions can result fromlower than normal rainfall, higher thannormal temperatures, or both. Whenhigher temperatures accompany below-normal rainfall, as they did during thesummer of 1988, crop yields can fallprecipitously. Extreme heat can also in-terfere with the pollination of crops.Corn pollination can easily be impairedby uncommonly high temperatures dur-ing the 10-day period when fertilizationoccurs, usually in July.st

A study from the National Center forAtmospheric Research in Boulder,Colorado, suggests that a rise in averagetemperatures will also increase the prob-ability of extreme short-term heat waves.If these occur at critical timessuch asthe corn pollination periodthey canhave a much greater effect on crop yieldsthan the relatively modest average tem-perature increase of a few degrees mightindicate.53

This vulnerability of corn, which ac-counts for two thirds of the U.S. grainharvest and one eighth of the world's,can cause wide year-to-year swings in theworld grain crop. An examination ofU.S. corn yields since 1950 shows fivesharply reduced harvests over the last 38years. (See Figure I-4.) The only pro-nounced drops before tilt: eighties came

(1'6) State of the World 1989

I950 t960 1970 t980 1990 2000

figure 1-4. US. Coes Ildd Per Healle.1950401

in 1970, from an outbreak of corn blight,and in 1974, when a wet spring and lateplanting combined with an early frost todestroy a part of the crop before itmatured.54

Three harvests since 1950 have beensharply reduced by drought, all in theeighties. Each drop has been worse thanthe last. Compared with the precedingyear, the 1980 corn yield per hectare wasdown by 17 percent, that in 1983 wasdown by 28 percent, and that in 1988 bya staggering 34 percent.55

These three reduced harvests each oc-curred during one of the five warmestyears globally of the last century. Thereis no way to conclusively link thedrought-depressed U.S. harvests withthe global warming, since annualweather variability is so much greaterthan the rise in average global tempera-tures measured during the eighties.56

Among other things, the prospect ofclimate change increases uncertaintyover future harvests, making decisionsmore complicated for farmers andpolicymakers alike. For example, the1989 U.S. grain crop could be a bin-buster, the largest ever harvested. Witha normal harvest elsewhere in the world,this would permit at least a modest re-building of depleted grain reserves.

31

Judging by the historical record, theodds are against severe back-to-backdroughts, but with the warming now ap-parently under way, hot dry summers willbecome more frequent. In the event ofanother disastrous drought, U.S. grainexports would drop dramatically. Theworld would face a food emergency forwhich there is no precedent in thedecades since North America emerged asits breadbasket. There would be a des-perate effort to corner available suppliesas world grain prices soared to recordlevels. In such a situation, preventingstarvation among the world's poor wouldrequire affluent countries tu reduce theamount ofgrain fed to livestock.

Asian and African countries, in partic-ular, would find it impossible to feedtheir people without North Americangrain. Many of the world's major citiesLeningrad, Cairo, Lagos, Caracas, andTokyo, for exampledepend largely ongrain from the United States and Can-ada- in an integrated world food econ-omy, all countries suffer the conse-quences of poor harvests."

All available evidence indicates thatthe ranks of the hungry are expandingduring the late eighties, reversing thetrend of recent decades. Uncertaintiesand stresses from a changing climate arenow being overlaid upon an alreadytightening food situation. In the absenceof a major commitment by govern-ments to slow population growth andstrengthen agriculture, food insecurityand the social instability associated withit will preoccupy the political leaders ofmany countries during the nineties.

WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS

The global commonsthe oceans, theatmosphere, and tropical forestsarenow at risk. Ozone depletion, climate

A World at Risk (i7)

change, and oceanic pollution simplycannot be solved at the national level.Indeed, a world in which countries gotheir own way may not be worth living in.Whereas the seventies were marked by aseries of national leas to address envi-ronmental problems, the nineties maywell be marked by comparable initiativesat the international level.

One encouraging sign is that theNorth-South tensions that pervaded theUnited Nations and other internationalforums in the seventies have begun toease. Industrial-country leaders recog-nize their interest in and responsibilityfor participating in sustainable develop-ment. And developing countries increas-ingly see (heir stake in environmentalprotection.

East-West differences are also beingbridged. The Soviet Union has proposeda major strengthening of internationalinstitutions to deal with global prob-lems. Addressing the U.N. General As-sembly in September 1988, Soviet For-eign Minister Eduard Shevardnadzestated that "the dividing lines of thebipolar world are receding. The bio-sphere recognizes no division into blocs,alliances or systems. All share the sameclimatic system." Western leaders, stillstartled by the fading of Soviet intransi-gence, are daring to dream of a moreunified world community. Protecting thebiosphere is a new channel for the vastenergies now directed to the cold warrivalry."

Scientific cooperation is one aspect ofenvironmental protection that has ad-vanced in recent years. Most notable isthe International Geosphere-BiosphereProgram, also known as the GlobalChange Program. Established in 1986, itis intended to deepen un6erstanding ofthe physical, chemical, and biologicalforces that affect the biosphere, usingmore extensive national monitoring, sat-ellite reconnaissance, and advanced

computer modeling. Although severalcountries are now actively participatingin this program, funding commitmentshave lagged and need to be increased.Heightened awareness of these prob-lems is likely to give the Global ChangeProgram a boost."

International environmental coopera-tion has come furthest in WesternEurope, where a score of countries aresqueezed into a small area and trade pol-lutants back and forth across their bor-ders via winds and rivers. Much of theregion's environmental regulation isnow done under the auspices of theEuropean Economic Community.

Protecting the biosphere is a newchannel for the vast energies nowdirected to the cold war rivalry.

Production and trade of toxic sub-stances in Western Europe is alreadyregulated by the community. Automo-bile emission limits were also recentlyapproved by the European Parliament,though further negotiations are re-quired before their final shape is clear.Also, the European Commission is con-sidering an environmental freedom-of-information proposal, ensuring publicaccess to key environmental facts. Whenmost of the remaining economic barriersin Western Europe are torn down in1992, environmental cooperation willneed to be strengthened."

The world community as a whole hasalso moved forward in protecting the at-mosphere. During the seventies, it be-came clear that air pollution was cross-ing borders and damaging forests. Whilecountries are reluctant to make majorinvestments to protect their neighbors'environments, all now have an interestin these kinds of agreements. Indeed, forCanadians and Scandinavians, imported

32

,

(z8) State of the World 1989

air pollution has become a major foreignpolicy consideration. (See Chapter 8.)

In 1979, a U.N.-sponsored Conven-tion on Long-Range Transboundary AirPollution was agreed to by 35 countriesin Eastern and Western Europe andNorth America. Its first concrete resultwas the Protocol on the Reduction ofSulfur Emissions, signed in 1985 by 21nations. By 1986, as noted earlier, 10nations had met the 30-percent reduc-tion goal set for 1993, and 4 had com-mitted to 70-percent cuts. A similaragreement to freeze nitrogen oxideemissions at 1987 levels was signed by24 nations in 1988.61

In each of these agreements, scientificevidence sparked the process, but actionwas fueled by nations willing to makeunilateral commitments. Concernedofficials then grasped at the most readilyavailable institution. Already, membersof the Transboundary Air PollutionConvention are monitoring other pollu-tants with an eye to regulating them aswell. However, without stricter enforce-ment and the participation of morecountries, air pollution will continue toworsen.62

The world's oceans are another globalcommons needing international protec-tion. The activities of one country canendanger the open ocean as well as thecoastal ecosystems of other nations.Water pollution, ocean dumping ofwaste materials, and overfishing areamong the threats.

On April 30, 1982, after 10 years ofnegotiations, the Convention on the Lawof the Sea was signed by 119 nations, 35of which have ratified it. Although 22countries, including the Soviet Unionand the United States, refused to sign,the Law of the Sea has already improvedthe way oceans are managed. It is in ef-fect a constitution for the oceans, statingthat the oceans are "the common heri-tage of mankind," ensuring free naviga-tion and limiting actions that despoil the

33

seas. It provides a framework for futureinternational agreements to protect thisglobal resource."

Central to the Law of the Sea are the200-mile exclusive economic zones cre-ated around coastal nations, giving themthe legal authority and international ob-ligation to manage their coastal re-sources effectively. These now encom-pass 40 percent of the world's oceanarea, and have led, for example, to a cutin the Northwest Atlantic cod catch bylong-range fleets of at least 90 percent.The Law of the Sea also calls for nationallaws that reduce ocean dumping. Addi-tional, stricter regulations of pollutionare needed if oceanic resources are to beprotected from the bewildering profu-sion of new toxic chemicals. The nextdecade will likely see a continuation ofthe growing array of oceanic agree-ments, some connected to the Law of theSea, and others independent.64

The international community also hasa critical role to play in protecting theozone layer. (See Chapter 5.) Althoughthe United States and Scandinaviancountries limited some uses of ozone-damaging chlorofluorocarbons as earlyas the mid-seventies, attempts to addressthe problem began in earnest in theeighties. As scientific evidence mounted,the United Nations Environment Pro-gramme led the effort to create theVienna Convention for the Protection ofthe Ozone Layer, adopted M 1985 toprovide a mechanism for CFC con-trols.65

Spurred by a dramatic annual thinningof the ozone over Antarctica, the UnitedStates led the push for CFC controlswhile the British and Japanese held backin favor of "economic caution." A mid-dle position favored by West Germanyand the Netherlands carried the day. In1987, the Montreal Protocol was estab-lished and has now been signed by 35countries. It freezes CFC production at1986 levels and calls fora 50-percent cut

A World at Risk ('9)

by 1998 in industrial countries, but al-lows for some increases in the develop-ing world. It has already become clearthat this is not enough. The conventionpermits negotiations on stricter limits,preparations for which are beingmade.66

Climate change is fast becoming thenext arena for international environ-mental agreement, and solutions to theproblem may have to break new institu-tional ground. Indeed, if climate changeis to be minimized, international actionmay have to precede rather than follownational actions. Already, business andpolitical leaders are arguing againststringent national policies on thegrounds that by themselves such actionswould hardly make a difference. This isparticularly true for small nations thatfeel impotent in the face of globalchanges over which they have only a tinyinfluence.

The first step is scientific cooperation.The International Council of ScientificUnions and the World MeteorologicalOrganization are coordinating interna-tional research on climate change. At aNovember 1987 meeting in Bellagio,Italy, consensus was reached about theneed for action. Policy discussions beganin earnest in June 1988 at a world con-ference on The Changing Atmosphere:Implications for Global Security, held inToronto. Sponsored by the Canadiangovernment, the meeting included theprime ministers of Canada and Norwayand the top environmental officials ofother countries. The final statement saidthat carbon emissions should be reducedby 20 percent by 2005.67

If such goals are to be achieved, aninternational treaty will probably beneeded. The Montreal Protocol and theConvention on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution provide usefulmodels, but for a global warming treatyto be effective it must be far broader inscope and include additional nations.

Some have called for an international"Law of the Atmosphere" parallel to theLaw of the Sea."

Such a treaty must deal both with in-dustrial countries that have caused muchof the problem so far and developingones whose use of energy is growing rap-idly and adding to global warming. De-veloping countries argue convincinglythat if they are going to vastly improveefficiency and reforest millions of hec-tares, they will need funding from richernations.

If climate change is to be mini-mized, international action mayhave to precede rather than follownational actions.

At the U.N. General Assembly in thefall of 1988, a host of ministers and am-bassadors drew attention to globalwarming and the need for the worldcommunity to address it. The MalteseAmbassador called for a major U.N.study on climate and the development ofa global strategy. Cyprus suggested aspecial session on the environment, andthe Soviet Union called for turning theU.N. Environment Programme into anEnvironmental Council that can take ef-fective actions to ensure ecological secu-rity.69

As with other issues, unilateral com-mitments by individual countries may bethe leadership spark needed to ignite in-ternational agreement. The govern-ments of Canada, the Netherlands, andNorway are among those committed tointernational negotiations on globalwarming. The Soviet Union has ex-pressed interest in it, and U.S. resistanceis fading. Some have compared thescope of such negotiations to those ofstrategic arms talks. Indeed, similar ap-proaches may have to be applied. For

(w) Slate of the World 1989

example, it may make sense to set upipermanent negotiating teams in Geneva

as a way to introduce and discuss ap-proaches raised by various govern-ments.70

The next step is to move beyondagreements on CFCs, the oceans, andclimate change to a more comprehensiverescue plan for the global environment.Among the issues now ripe for discus-sion of new international conventions orprotocols are the preservation of bio-diversity, the slowing of deforestation,and perhaps even family planning. Thiswill require a strengthening of interna-tional institutions and a willingness togive up unilateral authority in someareas. Today these institutions are oftenfragmented and ineffective in dealingwith global problems. But just as na-tional governments themselves firstemerged as tentative and weak efforts tounite diverse tribes or city-states, so in-ternational institutions may one daybecome far more robust and central tothe issues of our time.

The year 1988 was marked by a seriesof important steps in what RichardGardner, professor of international lawat Columbia University, has termed"practical internationalism." TheUnited Nations played a central role inresolving major conflicts in the MiddleEast, Afghanistan, and southern Africa.(See Chapter 8.) In each case, the war-ring parties recognized that they hadmore to gain from peace than from fur-ther bloodshed. But the United Nationsmade the peace process work. In justrecognition, U.N. Peacekeeping Forceswere awarded the 1988 Nobel PeacePrize.'n

A strengthening of the U.N. system,providing it with more reliable sourcesof revenue and clearer lines of authority,will be essential. Already, the world ismoving in this direction. During 1988,both the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates began to settle large debts to the

United Nations. And japan has indicateda willingness to fund major new multilat-eral initiatives. At the same time, theUnited Nations has played a critical rolein everything from the fight againstAIDS (see Chapter 7) to the cease-fire inthe Iran-Iraq war.72

Maurice Strong, the first head of theU.N. Environment Programme, haspointed out that the world faces thechallenge of developing effective mech-anisms for governance, or manage-ment, at the international level: "Peo-ple have learned to enlarge the circlesof their allegiance and their loyalty. aswell as the institutions through whichthey are governed, from the family tothe tribe to the village to the town tothe city to the nation state. We are nowcalled upon to make the next and finalstep, at least on this planet, to the glob-al level."73

This does not mean an end to nationalgovernments. just as people did not giveup allegiance to family or town when na-tion-states were created, so national gov-ernments can exist within a strength-ened world community. The solutions tomany problems are close to homeoften within a local government or grass-roots organization. All these levels ofhuman organization can continue andeven thrive as international cooperationis expanded.

The era of superpower dominance ofa bipolar world is rapidly fading, andperhaps with it the notion that one ortwo "great powers" can ever presideover the complex, multifaceted, prob-lem-ridden world in which we now findourselves. Looming threats to theworld's climate and the undermining ofother global commons may soon makethe transition to stronger internationalinstitutions inevitable. As Prime Minis-ter Brundtland of Norway stated at the1988 Toronto Conference, "Now it istime to take a giant leap forward in theupgrading of civilization."74

2

Halting LandDegradation

Sandra Pastel

Major droughts in Africa, China, India,and North America over the last fouryears have spotlighted an immutable re-ality for much of the world: despite amyriad of sophisticated technologiesand scientific advances, humanity's wel-fare remains tightly linked to the land.Millions in these drought-stricken re-gions have watched their economic fu-turesor, in the worst cases, theirchances for survivalfade. For the firsttime in more than a decade, global foodsecurity has come into question. (SeeChapter 3.)

While these headline-making eventsignite concern for a few weeks ormonths, the true tragedy goes unno-ticed. Much of the world's food-produc-ing land is being sapped insidiously of itsproductive potential through overuse,lack of care, or unwise treatmenta pro-cess scientists call "desertification."While the term conjures up images ofthe Sahara spreading beyond its boundsto engulf new territories, its most worri-some aspects are less dramatic. Desert-ification refers broadly to the impover-

-, -

ishment of the land by human activities.Perhaps a more appropriate term is landdegradation, which in this chapter isused interchangeably with desertifica-tion.'

Each year, irreversible desertificationclaims an estimated 6 million hectaresworldwidea land area nearly twice thesize of Belgium lost beyond practicalhope of reclamation. An additional 20million hectares annually become so im-poverished that they are unprofitable tofarm or graze. Most of the affected land,however, lies on the degradation con-tinuum, somewhere between fully pro-ductive and hopelessly degraded. Unfor-tunately, much of it is sliding down thediminishing productivity side of thescale.2

Although the technologies to restoreresilience and fertility to stressed landsexist, so far the political will does not.The majority of people affected are poorfarmers and pastoralists living at soci-ety's margins and lacking a politicalvoice. A lasting victory over land degra-dation will remain a distant dream with-

(22) State of flit World 1989

out social and economic reforms thatgive rural people the security of tenureand access to resources they need to im-prove the land. And with degradationrooted in excessive human pressures,slowing population growth lies at theheart of any effective strategy.

Land degradation may be difficult torally around and adopt as a cause. Yet itsconsequencesworsened droughts andfloods, famine, declining living stan-dards, and swelling numbers of environ-mental refugeescould not be morereal or engender more emotion. A worldof 5.1 billion people, growing by 86 mil-lion each year, cannot afford to be losingthe productivity of its food base. With-out good land, humanity quite literallyhas nothing to grow on.

LANDS AND PEOPLE AT RISK

More than a decade has passedsince government representatives fromaround the world gathered at the UnitedNations Conference on Desertification.Held in 1977 in Nairobi, Kenya, themeeting followed on the heels of a dev-astating drought that struck much ofwestern and north-central Africa from1968 through 1973. It focused theworld's attention for the first time on theproblems and prospects of fragile lands.

Out of Nairobi came a Plan of Actionto Combat Desertification, which recom-mended 28 measures that national, re-gional, and international institutionscould take to halt land deteriorationaround the world. Sadly, the action plannever got off the ground, a victim ofinadequate funding and lack of sus-tained commitment by governments.When severe drought and famine re-peated themselves in Africa in 1983 and1984, again bringing tragedy, Canadian

37

meteorologist F. Kenneth Hare re-marked grimly: 'It is alarming that tenyears later ... the news stories should beso familiar."3

Seven years after the Nairobi confer-ence, the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) took a more carefullook at the overall status and trends ofdesertification worldwide. This includedsending a questionnaire to 91 countrieswith lands at risk. These dataincom-plete, sketchy, and lacking in geographicdetail though they areremain the bestavailable and are more than sufficient tograsp the severity of the problem.

According to UNEP's 1984 assess-ment, 4.5 billion hectares, or 35 percentof the earth's land surface, are threat-ened by desertification. Of this totalonwhich a fifth of humanity makes its liv-ingthree fourths has already been atleast moderately degraded. (See Table2-1.) Fully one third has already lostmore than 25 percent of its productivepotential.

What lies behind these numbers is adeteriorating relationship between peo-ple and the land that supports them (seeTable 2-2), a situation all the moretragic because people themselves arenot only degradation's victims but its un-witting agents. The four principal causesof land degradationovergrazing onrangelands, overcultivation of crop-lands, waterlogging and salinization ofirrigated lands, and deforestationallstem from excessive human pressures orpoor management of the land.

Rangelands and the animals that grazethem play an important role in the globalfood supply. The 3 billion cattle, sheep,goats, and camels that roam the world'spastures can do something humans can-not: they convert lignocellulosea mainproduct of photosynthesis that is indi-gestible to humansinto meat and milkthat provide the human population withhigh-quality protein. Shifts to livestockfed on grain or forage have diminished

Halting Land Degradation (23)

Table 2-1. Status of Desertification in the World's Dry lands, 1983-841

Share of

Area AnnuallyDeterioratingto Level of

Area at Least Category at Least Zero NetLand-Use Category Moderately Degraded Moderately Degraded Economic Return

(million hectares) (percent) (million hectares)

Rangelands 3,100 84 17.7Rain fed Croplands 335 59 2.0Inigated Land 40 31 0.6

All Three Categories 3.475 77 20.3

1Dry lands includes the arid. semiarid. and subhumid climatic zones.SOURCES: United Nations Environment Programme. General Assessment of Progress in the Implementation of thePlan of Action to Combat Desertification (New Yott: United Nations. 1984); annual deterioration from H.E.Dregne. Desertification of kid Lands (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers. 1983).

dependence on grazing animals in someregions. But in much of Africa and theMiddle East, and in parts of India andLatin America, roaming ruminants stillunderpin subsistence economies andsupport millions of pastoralist families.4

Degradation on rangelands mainlytakes the form of a deterioration in thequality and, eventually, the quantity ofvegetation as a result of overgrazing. Asthe size of livestock herds surpasses thecarrying capacity of perennial grasses onthe range, less palatable annual grassesand shrubs move in. If overgrazing andtrampling continue, plant cover of alltypes begins to diminish, leaving theland exposed to the ravages of wind andwater. In the severest stages, the soilforms a crust as animal hooves tramplenearly bare ground, and erosion acceler-ates. The formation of large gullies orsand dunes signals that desertificationcan claim another victory.5

Ironically, years of abundant rain fallseemingly beneficial to pastoral peo-plescan often sow the seeds of furtherdegrad anon and hardship. During wet-ter periods the area suitable for grazingexpands, leading pastoralists to increasethe sizes of their herds as insuranceagainst another drought. When the next

dry spell hits, the number of livestockexceeds what the reduced area of grasscan sustain. The result is overgrazingand accelerated land degradation. a pat-tern most visible in Africa, where morethan half the world's livestock-depen-dent people live.6

Livestock watering holes, a popularfeature of international developmentprojects, have contributed to rangelanddesertification as well. Cattle cannot gomore than three days without water, sodigging water holes to sustain herds dur-ing dry seasons seems logical. But theconcentration of livestock around thewatering points leads to severe localizedovergrazing, which gradually spreadsoutward from this central area. Whendrought strikes again, the animals rarelywill die from thirst, but rather from lackof forage.?

For more than two decades, farmers insouth-central Niger have lamented inHausa to development workers thatkasar mu, la gaji, "the land is tired." Peas-ants in western parts of the countrystrike a more ominous chord in Zarmawith laabu, y bu. "the land is dead." Thephrases aptly depict land suffering fromovercultivation, which now affect: atleast 335 million hectares of rainfed

9 8

0


Table 2-2. Observations of Land Degradation, Selected Countries and Regions

Country/Source Observation

MaliPatricia A. Jacobberger. geologist.Smithsonian Institution, 1986

MauritaniaSidy Goye...lotbio. 1987

TunisiaUNEP, 1987

ChinaBeijing Review, interview with Zhu Zhcnda,Chinese Academy of Sciences. 1988

IndonesiaRonald Greenberg and M.L. Higgins.U.S. AID Jakarta, 1987

ThailandD. Phantumvanit and K.S. Sathirathai,Thailand Development Research Board,1988

BrazilMac Margolis, interview with geologistHelio Penha, II12shington Post, February1988

On the Landsat maps. there is nowandthere wasn't in 1976a bright ring of soilaround villages. Those areas are now 90%devoid of vegetation, the topsoil is gone,and the surface is disrupted and cracked."

"There were only 43 sand-storms in thewhole country between 1960 and 1970.The number increased tenfold in thefollowing decade, and in ... 1983 alone arecord 240 sandstorms darkened thenation's skies."

"Rangelands have been overgrazed withthree heads of cattle where only one couldthrive . . . Two-thirds of the land area ofTunisia is being eaten away bydesertification."

"Unless urgent measures are taken,desertification will erode an additional75,500 square kilometers ... by the year2000, more than twice the area ofTaiwan.""

"Thirty-six watersheds . .. have criticalerosion problems, . .. In Kalimantan, thesilt load in streams has increased 55 foldin some logging areas."

"The pace of deforestation has beenaccelerating since the early 1900s, but ithas moved into a higher gear since the1960s ... 'Between 1961 and 1986,1Thailand lost about 45 percent of itsforests."

"Every year, rains slash deeper into thebared soil, dumping tons of silt inwaterways, causing rivers to overflow intothe city's streets. Now 'people flee thedrought in the Northeast only to die infloods in Rio'."

souttcr Worldwatch institute, based on various sources.

:19


cropland worldwide (excluding thehumid regions), more than a third of theglobal total.'"

Agricultural land left without vegeta-tive cover or situated on steeply slopinghillsides is subject to the erosive powerof wind and rainwater. An inch of soiltakes anywhere from 200 to 1.000 yearsto form; under the most erosive condi-tions, that same soil can be swept off theland in just a few seasons. Erosion sapsthe land's productivity because most ofthe organic matter and nutrients are inthe upper layers of soil. According toone estimate, about half the fertilizer ap-plied to U.S. farmland each year is re-placing soil nutrients lost through ero-sion. In addition, erosion degrades thesoil's structure and diminishes its water-holding capacity. As a result, crops haveless moisture available to them, which,especially in drier regions, is often ero-sion's most damaging effect.9

Only a handful of countries have at-tempted to estimate their rates of soilloss in any detail, so the magnitude ofthe problem worldwide is difficult to

gauge in other than broad terms. (SeeChapter 3.) One useful measure is theload of earth materials carried to the seaby rivers and streams. This figure totalsat least 20.3 billion tons per year, whichincludes 15.3 billion tons of suspendedsediment, 4 billion of dissolved material,and I billion of coarser bed load. Sincethis accounts only for material reachingthe seaand excludes, for instance, sed-iment trapped behind damsit underes-timates the total amount of soil lost fromthe land."'"

A look at the geographic distributionof these sediment loads gives a quicksense of where severe erosion is takingplace. (See Table 2-3.) A 1987 expedi-tion of the internationally sponsoredOcean Drilling Program estimated thatthe Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers onthe Indian subcontinent transport 3 bil-lion tons of sediment to the Bay of Ben-gal each year, far more than any otherriver system. The sediment fan on thefloor of the bay now spans 3 millionsquare kilometers. Much of that sedi-ment originates in the Himalayas, where

Table 2-3. Annual Sediment Load Transported to the Seaby Major Rivers, Early Eighties

River System Country/RegionDrainage

AreaAnnual Suspended

Sediment Load

(thousandsquare kilometers) (million tons)

Ganges-Brahmaputra South Asia 1,480 3,000Huang He (Yellow) China 770 1,080Amazon South America 6,150 900Chang Jiang (Yangtze) China 1,940 478

Irrawaddy Burma 430 265Magdalena Colombia 240 220Mississippi United States 3,270 210Orinoco Venezuela 990 210

SOURCES: D.E. Walling. -Rainfall, Runoff and Erosion of the Land: A Global View." in K.J. Gregory. ed..Encl.:Ma of Physical Environment (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987); Ganges-Brahmaputra sediment loadfigure from Ocean Drilling Program, news release, Texas A&M University. College Station. September 4.1987.

40


deforestation and cultivation of steepslopes in recent decades has added tomillions of years of massive erosion fromnatural geologic activity.11

In China, the Huang He (YellowRiver), with a drainage area half that ofthe Ganges-Brahmaputra system, carriesmore than a billion tons of sediment tothe sea each year. About half of it comesfrom the Loess Plateau, in the HuangHe's middle reaches, among the mostwater-eroded areas on earth. Deeply cutgullies and denuded hillsides span 430,-000 square kilometers, and erosion ratesaverage some 65 tons per hectare annu-ally . it

Today roughly one third of theworld's food is grown on the 18 percentof cropland that is irrigated. Irrigatedfields typically yield two to three timesmore than those watered only by rain,and, because crops are protected fromthe ravages of drought, provide a crucialdegree of food security.is

Unfortunately, poor irrigation prac-tices have degraded much of this valu-able cropland. Over time, seepage fromcanals and overwatering of fields causethe underlying water table to rise. In theabsence of adequate drainage, watereventually enters the root zone, damag-ing crops. Farmers belonging to a largeirrigation project in the Indian state ofMadhya Pradesh have referred to theironce fertile fields as "wet deserts."14

In dry regions, salinization usually ac-companies waterlogging as moisturenear the surface evaporates, leaving be-hind a layer of salt that is toxic to plants.An aerial view of severely salinized fieldscan give the impression they are coveredwith snow. UNEP's assessment placedthe irrigated area damaged by saliniza-tion at 40 million hectares.15

About half of the affected area is inIndia and Pakistan, but other regionssuffering from salinization's effects in-clude the Tigris and Euphrates basins inSyria and Iraq. California's San Joaquin

41

Valley, the Colorado River basin.China's North Plain, and Soviet centralAsia. In the Soviet republic of Turk-men, the government blamed saliniza-tion for a cotton harvest shortfall of onethird in 1985. Meanwhile, anothersalinit) threat has struck Soviet centralAsia: because so much irrigation water isbeing siphoned off from the two majorrivers flowing into the Aral Sea, the sea'ssurface area has shrunk by 40 percentsince 1960 and its volume has droppedby two thirds. Winds picking up driedsalt from the basin are now annuallydumping some 43 million tons of it onmore than 15 million hectares of crop-land and pasture surrounding theshrinking sea.ie

The last major cause of degradationdeforestationcuts across all land usetypes. By accelerating soil erosion andreducing the soil's water-absorbing ca-pacity, deforestation often accentuatesthe effects of overcultivation and over-grazing. Moreover, though forest clear-ing in humid regions was not included inUNEP's desertification assessment, inmany cases it results in a net decline inthe productivity of land. Most of the nu-trients supporting moist tropical forestsare held in the vegetation, so forestclearing removes them as well. Havinglost its inherent fertility, the land cannotlong support intensive agriculture.Large areas of pasture and cropland thatreplaced tropical forest in the BrazilianAmazon, for example, have been aban-doned.

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Orga-nization (FAO) estimates that each year11.3 million hectares of tropical forestare lost through the combined action ofland clearing for crop production, fuel-wood gathering, and cattle ranching. Re-cent satellite data from Brazil, however,indicate that 8 million hectares of forestwere cleared in 1987 in the BrazilianAmazon alonestrongly suggesting thatthe widely cited FAO figure is far too


low. Some portion of deforested landgoes into sustainable land usessuch astraditional shifting cultivation, which in-cludes a fallow period that restores theland's fertilitybut the bulk of it doesnot. In the tropics today, deforestationusually translates into land degrada-tion."

UNEARTHINGDEGRADATION'S TRUE

CAUSES

Desertification's direct causesover-grazing, overcultivation, salinization,and deforestationare easy to enumer-ate, but only by grappling with the com-plex web of conditions leading to theseexcessive pressures is there hope ofstopping desertification's spread.Though they vary greatly from place toplace, these underlying forces generallyare rooted in population densitiesgreater than the land can sustain and,more fundamentally, in social and eco-nomic inequities that push people intomarginal environments and vulnerablelivelihoods.

The number of people a given landarea can supportwhat scientists call itscarrying capacitydepends on climaticfactors, the land's inherent productivity,the products it yields, and the methodsused to increase its productivity.Though carrying capacity is difficult tomeasure accurately, few pieces of dataare more crucial to wise developmentplanning or tell more about the threat ofdesertification.

In response to mounting concernabout environmental deterioration inWest Africa, the World Bank set up aspecial working group led by Jean Eu-gene Gorse to study the problem inmore detail. Gorse's group focused on a

-)4 4

band of seven countries in what areknown as the Sahelian and Sudanianzones: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia,Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Inthese countries, annual rainfall increasesfrom north to southfrom less than 200millimeters (mm) in the northernmostzone to more than 800 mm in the south-ernmostand so, consequently, doesthe carrying capacity of traditional farm-ing and livestock practices. The studyfound that in two out of the five east-west trending zones, the rural popula-tion in 1980 had already exceeded thatfor which the land could sustainably pro-vide sufficient food. Only in the south-ernmost band could the land withstand asubstantial increase in human num-bers. to

Even more important, wood resourcesemerged as the limiting factor in the car-rying capacity of every zone in the re-gion. Indeed, the 1980 population of allseven countries collectively exceededthe number of people the region's woodresources could support by 10.1 million.This finding is critical to developmentstrategies because it means that effortsto raise the carrying capacity of the crop-ping and livestock systems will not in-crease the total population this land cansustain until more trees are planted, theefficiency of wood-burning is increasedgreatly, or some other means is found ofmeeting energy needs.) 9

Not surprisingly, this imbalance be-tween what the land can sustainablyyield and the numbers of people livingon it has led to pervasive desertification.Virtually all the rangeland and an es-timated 82 percent of the rainfed crop-land in those same seven countries is al-ready at least moderately degraded.Moreover, with a projected populationin the year 2000 of 55 milliona 77-percent increase over the 1980 totalpressures on the land will increasemarkedly, and land productivity isbound to fall even further.2°

(a8) State of the World 1989

Similarly, in India, growth in thehuman and animal populations, both ofwhich have doubled since 1950, has out-stripped the sustainable production lev-els of the nation's fuelwood and fodderresources. Estimated fuelwood and fod-der demands in the early eighties ex-ceeded available supplies by 70 and 25percent, respectively. As a result, over-grazing and deforestation have led to ex-tensive degradation. Out of an estimated266 million hectares of potentially pro-ductive land, 94 million (35 percent)suffer varying degrees of degradationfrom water erosion, wind erosion, or sa-linization. Of the 75 million hectares offorestland, 40 million are degraded-30million lacking tree cover and 10 millionhaving only shrubsand satellite datashow that the nation continues to loseforests at the rate of 1.3 million hectaresper year.21

In the Philippines, agrarian policyhas promoted land resettlementrather than redistribution.

Next to population pressures, perhapsno other factors foster more degradationthan the inequitable distribution of landand the absence of secure land tenure.In an agrarian society, keeping a dispro-portionate share of land in the hands ofa few forces the poorer majority to com-pete for the limited area left, severelycompromising their ability to managesustainably what land they do have.

In the Philippines, for example, agrar-ian policy over the last several decadeshas promoted land resettlement ratherthan redistribution. The elite retainedtheir holdings while landless peasantswere encouraged to move to designatedresettlement areas. One such area was inPalawan, the country's largest province.Incoming migrants cleared forest to

43

grow crops, but the land could not longsustain production under the methodsthey used; weeds invaded, farmers aban-doned their fields, and new lands werecleared.22

The government had made no provi-sions to protect the land rights of Pala-wan's indigenous communities, and soas migrant farmers moved in, the localfarmerswho had developed sustaina-ble agricultural practiceswere forcedto retreat to the interior hills. Their plotson the steep slopes yielded only half asmuch as their lowland fields had. As aresult, fallow periods crucial to restoringthe land's fertility were shortened fromeight years to two, thereby exhaustingthe soil and further depressing yields.2s

Similar scenarios have played out innumerous countries where strikinginequities in land holdings compoundpopulation pressures. About 44 percentof South African blacks arc forced to livein the "Bantu homelands," which havean average population density of 79 peo-ple per square kilometer compared with15.5 people per square kilometer in therest of the country. Much of the land setaside for the native people is not evenarable, yet the majority of them are sub-sistence farmers. As John Hanks of theWorld Wide Fund for Nature says, "it ishardly surprising that these areas havesome of the worst cases of overgrazing,deforestation, and soil erosion in thewhole of the African continent."24

The flip side of the unequal distribu-tion of land is lack of secure land tenure.Since land is often needed as collateral,farmers without titles to property havedifficulty getting the loans they need toinvest in their land's p-oductivity, and asa result often abandon worn-out fieldsfor less-degraded new land. Lack of se-cure tenure pervades much of the ThirdWorld. In Thailand, for example, onlyabout 20 percent of all private land hadtitle deeds as of 1985, and an estimated500,000 farm families were landless.ss


In many areas, these problems are ag-gravated by the denial of social and eco-nomic rights to women. In Africa,women grow 80 percent of the food theirfamilies eat, and, with their children'shelp, collect the water and wood theirhouseholds need for cooking and heat-ing. Yet despite their crucial role in theagrarian economy, women rarely haveproperty rights or even access to theirhusbands' incomes. Extension servicesand training programs usually are di-rected toward men, even though it is thewomen who till the fields. Becausewomen lack the resources needed to im-prove their farms' productivity, thelandand the families living on itsuf-fers."

Unless existing land distribution pat-terns change, the number of smallholderand landless families in the developingworld will grow by nearly 30 percent bythe year 2000to a total of 220 millionhouseholds. Without access to secureproperty, credit, and extension services,these rural people will have no choicebut to overuse the land and to farm areasthat should not be cultivated."

Finally, national land use policies fos-ter degradation as well. For example, thegovernments of Brazil and Indonesiasupported by World Bank loanshavesponsored resettlement programs thatencourage people to clear tropical forestto create new cropland, even though thatland will only sustain cropping for a fewyears. During the mid-seventies, U.S.officials encouraged the plowing up ofgrassland to expand crop production inresponse to higher world grain prices,even though much of that land wouldexperience soil erosion reminiscent ofthe Dust Bowl days. And numerous gov-ernments and development institutionshave supported irrigation projects with-out adequate attention to drainage, eventhough the problem of salinization datesback at least to ancient Mesopotamia.Whether they reflect a profound igno-

rance of the land or simply a lack of con-cern for its long-term health, such mis-guided policies produce the sameunfortunate result: more degradedland.28

DROUGHT, DESERTIFICATION,AND THE HYDROLOGICAL

CYCLE

A natural phenomenon, droughts comeand go with unpredictable regularity.They are the bane of a furrier's exis-tence, for without sufficient water, agri-cultural land will bear only a meager har-vest at best no matter how deep andfertile the topsoil, how high-yielding thevariety of seed, or how well-tended thefarmer's field. Human activities are nowaltering the hydrological cycleon glo-bal, regional, and local scalesin waysthat have profound implications for fu-ture food production and the long-termproductivity of the land.

There now seems little doubt thatglobal warming from the long-hypothe-sized "greenhouse effect" has begun.(See Chapter 1.) Since a warmer atmo-sphere will hold more moisture, averageprecipitation worldwide is expected toincrease by 7 to 11 percent from the tem-perature rise associated with a doublingof preindustrial levels of atmosphericcarbon dioxide. But higher evaporationrates and changing circulation patternsmean that some regionsincluding,possibly, the North American grainbeltwill experience a reduction in soilmoisture available for plant growth, ifnot an absolute reduction in rainfall.Models suggest that severe droughts,such as occurred in the North Americanheartland in 1988. could strike more fre-quently. If so, long-term average pro-duction and reliable crop output will de-

44


cline until adjustments in irrigation pat-terns and cropping systemswhich willbe enormously expensive and takedecades to completeare put in place.29

For good reason, climate change nowcommands higher priority in the halls ofgovernments, in research institutes, andon the international environmentalagenda. Far less attention, however, isbeing devoted to a less dramatic butequally serious change in the earth'sphysical condition: alterations in the hy-drological cycle as a result of land degra-dation.

The Sahel had just gone through sixdry years when Massachusetts Instituteof Technology meteorologist J.G. Char-ney put forth the idea in 1975 that theremoval of vegetation in dry regionscould cause rainfall to diminish becauseof an increase in the albedo, the share ofsunlight reflected back from the earth.Desert sands and bare rock, for example,have higher albedos than grassland,which in turn reflects more sunlight thana dense forest does. According to Char-ney's hypothesis, less of the sun's radia-tion is absorbed at the earth's surface asalbedo increases, so surface tempera-tures drop. This in turn fosters greatersubsidence, or sinking motion in the at-mosphere. Since subsiding air is dry,rainfall would decline. The degradedarea would feed on itself, becoming evermore desert-like."

Tests of Charney's hypothesis usingclimate models generally confirmed it:large increases in albedo did indeed re-duce rainfall. Less clear, however, washow smaller changes in reflectivitywould affect rainfall and whether thepatchy pattern of desertification couldproduce albedo changes sufficient to af-fect rainfall levels.

Another worrisome link surfaced fromthe modeling studies ofJ. Shultla and Y.Mintz. They examined the effects onrainfall of changes in evapotranspira-tion, the transfer of water vapor from the

45

land surface to the atmosphere throughevaporation or transpiration by plants.For evapotranspiration to occur, the soilmust be sufficiently moist and vegetationmust be present to bring that moistureinto contact with the air. Presumably ifevapotranspiration is an importantsource of atmospheric water vapor in agiven locale, rainfall levels could declineif it diminishes. Shukla and Mintz foundjust that, although, as with Charney'sstudy, their findings pertained tochanges of a large magnitude and wideextent. Once again, land degrada-tionby diminishing the vegetativecover needed for evapotranspirationwas linked to climatic change."

Meanwhile, meteorologist SharonNicholson was analyzing rainfall datafrom roughly 300 sites in some 20 coun-tries of Africa. She calculated a long-term average from data covering 1901-74, and then calculated the annualpercentage departures from that long-term average for 1901-84. Between1967 and 1984, the region experienced17 consecutive years of below-normalrainfall, by far the longest series of con-secutive sub-par rains in the 84-year re-cord. Annual rainfall in 1983 and 1984fell more than 40 percent short of thelong-term average. Interestingly, Nich-olson also analyzed northern sub-Saha-ran rainfall levels according to threeeast-west trending zones and found thatdrought was most persistent in thenorthern. most arid band. where the al-bedo and low evapotranspiration feed-backs would be greatest."

The global circulation models used inclimate studies are composed of equa-tions that mathematically describe thelaws governing atmospheric motion.Such models allow scientists to examinehow changes in certain parameterssuch as albedo. soil moisture, or thecarbon dioxide concentrationaffectlarge-scale atmospheric circulation. Un-fortunately, they are not sufficiently


fine-tuned to predict changes for specificlocations. Yet as meteorologist F.Kenneth Hare points out, plausible hy-potheses exist "that blame the albedoand soil moisture feedbacks for the in-tensification of drought in Africa."While scientists cannot yet knowwhether dryness will persist, he says,"there are now many more climatolo-gists who are prepared to say that desk-cation will continue than there were atUNCOD [the U.N. Conference onDesertification] in 1977."%

Research in the Amazon basin of Bra-zil suggests that land degradation canalter the hydrological cycle in humid re-gions as well. Eneas Salati has studiedthe water budget of a 25-square-kilome-ter basin located 60 kilometers north ofManaus and found that streams carryaway roughly 25 percent of rainfall,while transpiration by trees and plantsreturns to the atmosphere nearly 50 per-cent and evaporation the remaining 25percent. Thus, fully three quarters of therainwater falling in the basin returns aswater vapor to the atmosphere.%

Salati points out that moisture-ladenair from the Atlantic Ocean carried west-ward by the winds provides about halfthe water vapor leading to rainfall in theAmazon region. Evapotranspirationfrom the forest itself supplies the otherhalf. Thus, water recycling by the Ama-zon vegetation plays a crucial role in sus-taining rainfall levels, a role that in-creases in importance at greaterdistances from the Atlantic .%

Deforestation alters this hydrologicpattern. More rainfall runs off, and lessgets recycled back to the atmosphere togenerate new rainfall. It remains uncer-tain what amount of forest clearingmight initiate significant rainfall de-clines, or if the crossing of some defor-estation threshold could precipitate asudden change. An estimated 12 percentof Amazonian rain forest in Brazil al-ready has been cleared. Salati suspects,

4 6

though he cannot support this, thatchanges in the water budget maybecome noticeable when 20-30 percentof the region has been deforested, espe-cially if most of the clearing occurs in theeastern Amazon, where rainfall recyclingbegins.%

Satellite data show clearly that defor-estation in parts of the Amazon is ac-celerating. In the Brazilian state of Ron-donia, for example, the area deforestedhas grown at an exponential rate be-tween 1975 and 1985; 1 million hectareswere cleared just between 1984 and1985. If the exponential rate continues,half of the state's tropical forests will dis-appear by the early nineties, and all willbe gone sometime around the turn ofthe century.3

As noted earlier, satellite data for thewhole Brazilian Amazon show that 8 mil-lion hectares were cleared in 1987 alone,5 to 6 million more than were thought tohave been cleared annually in the earlyeighties g8 If clearing continues at such apace, Brazilians may face a multiple trag-edy: the replacement of productive rainforest with cropland or grassland thatloses its fertility and must be abandonedafter several years, and reduced rain-fallnot only in the Amazon basin itself,but, because the basin exports watervapor to the south, possibly in the agri-cultural lands of the central plateau.

Regardless of whether desertificationand deforestation cause rainfall to di-minish, hydrologic balance hinges onhow the land and its vegetative cover aremanaged. When rainwater hits the land,it either immediately runs off into riversand streams to head back to the sea,soaks into the subsurface to replenishsoil moisture or groundwater supplies,or is evaporated or transpired back intothe atmosphere. Land degradation shiftsthe proportion of rainfall following eachof these paths. With less vegetative coverand with soils less able to absorb water,degraded land increases runoff and de-


creases infiltration into the subsurface.The resulting reduction in soil moistureand groundwater supplies worsens theeffects of drought, while the increase inrapid runoff exacerbates flooding.

In India, scientists now blame de-forestation and desertification forthe worsening of droughts andfloods.

What appear, then, to be conse-quences and signs of meteorologicaldroughtwithered crops, fallinggroundwater levels, and dry streambedscan actually be caused as much ormore by land degradation. Perhaps nowhere has this case been made moreconvincingly than in India, where agrowing number of scientists now blamedeforestation and desertification for theworsening of droughts and floods.Writes Jayanta Bandyopadhyay of theResearch Foundation for Science, Tech-nology and Natural Resource Policy inDehra Dun, "With an amazing rapidityacute scarcity of water has grabbed thecentre stage of India's national life . . . .

State after state is trapped into an irre-versible and worsening crisis of drought,desertification and consequent waterscarcity, threatening plant, animal andhuman life."39

Water shortages plagued some 17,000villages in the state of Uttar Pradesh inthe sixties; by 1985. that figure had risennearly fourfold, to 70,000. Similarly, inMadya Pradesh, more than 36,400 vil-lages lacked sufficient water in 1980; in1985, the number totaled more than 64,-500. And in Gujarat, the number of vil-lages short of water tripled between1979 and 1986, from roughly 3,840 to12,250.0

Michael Mortimore of Bayero University in Nigeria has studied villagers' re-

4 7

sponses to drought and famine in partsof the northern states of Kano andBorno. He finds that their survivalstrategies lead inevitably to further deg-radation of the land, diminishing theirchances for complete recovery. Whendrought claims large portions of theirlivestock and crops, for example, theymay turn to cutting and selling morefirewood, construction materials, andother wood products, thereby increP lingpressures on local woodlands. To _im-pensate for lower yields, they may alsoshorten fallow periods and cultivate ad-ditional marginal land. Their reducedanimal herds supply less manure, lead-ing to a drop in the fertility of theirfields."

When drought ends, the villagers thusbegin their recovery from a severelycompromised position: more highly de-graded fields and woodlands, not tomention greater poverty. As Monimoresays, "By a set of actionsrational inthemselves--the overall productivity ofthe system deteriorates in a series of ir-reversible steps linked with the occur-rence of droughts. It is only necessaryfor us to add population growthas anindependent variableto complete thisscenario of a structurally unstable sys-tem.""

Drought and degradation reinforceeach other by preventing land fromrecovering from stress. Whereas healthyland will bounce back to its former pro-ductivity after a drought, degraded andabused land frequently will not. Formuch of the Third World, especiallyparts of Africa and India, a return to"normal" rainfall levels may not mean areturn to past levels of productivity. Andif land degradation actually causes rain-fall to diminish, a cycle could be set inmotion that leads to long-term economicand environmental declineand to evengreater hunger and human sufferingthan witnessed in Africa and India dur-ing the eighties.


REGAINING LANDPRODUCTIVITY

A search for solutions to halting desert-ification's spread turns up no quick fixes.With the causes tied to varied mixes ofphysical, social, and economic condi-tions, the remedies must be diverse andtailored to the problems and needs ofparticular locales. But here and therein villages. grassroots organizations,research institutes, experiment stations,development agencies. and governmentbureaustechnologies and policiesgeared to restoring the land are beingdevised. tried. and shown to have prom-ise.

Since much degradation stems fromthe extension of cropping or grazingonto marginal lands that cannot sustainthose activities, changes in the way landis used and managed lie at the heart ofrehabilitation efforts. In some cases, de-grading lands can simply be removedfrom production and allowed I o recover.The U.S. government has done just thisin setting up a Conservation Reserveand calling for 16 million hectares (40million acres) of highly erodible crop-land to be planted in grass or trees by1990. Farmers get compensation fromthe government for their lost produc-tion, and have already placed an es-timated 12 million hectares into the re-serve under 10-year contracts. (SeeChapter 3.) Three fourths of the way toits 1990 goal, the program has slashedthe national annual erosion rate by morethan 800 million tonsnearly one thirdof the excessive soil losses from U.S.cropland before the program began.43

A creative initiative, the ConservationReserve works in large pan because aprice-depressing surplus of crops madethe removal of land from production at-tractive to farmers and the governmentalike. Removing the most erodible. mar-ginal land only makes good sense. But in

most Third World regions threatenedwith desertification, the struggle to keepfood production increasing apace withpopulation growth and the swellingnumbers of land-hungry peasants makesshifting a large portion of cropland outof production almost unthinkable.

In a few pockets of the developingworld, however, land is being restored inways that both conserve the resourcebase and improve people's living stan-dards. These efforts take various forms,but center around measures that con-centrate production on the most fertile,least erodible land. that stabilize soils onsloping and other marginal land, andthat reduce rural people's vulnerabilityto crop failure, often by diversifying in-come-generating options at the villagelevel.

One such effort is under way inChina's Loess Plateau, the highly erodedarea spanning some 60 million hea aresaround the middle reaches of the HuangHe. Because of the constant threat thatthe silt-laden river will flood, the centralgovernment has supported efforts tocontrol erosion on the plateau for sev-eral decades. Planting of trees and grassand the construction of terraces on slop-ing land have helped stabilize soils onsome 10 million hectares, nearly onequarter of the area suffering from ero-sion.44

During the past decade, the Chinesegovernment's erosion control strategyhas turned to sustainable land use sys-tems that improve the livelihoods of theregion's rural inhabitants. In 1979, withsupport from the United Nations Devel-opment Programme, an experiment sta-tion was established in Mizhi County innorthern Shaanxi Province. a drought-prone, highly gullied area, where morethan 60 percent of the land slopes at an-gles of 25 degrees or greater. Scientistsdeveloped a plan aimed at intensifyingcrop production on a smaller croplandarea, planting much of the sloping land


in trees or grass, and developing animalhusbandry as an added source of incomefor the villagers.4S

In 1984, armed with promising resultsfrom pilot experiments, the governmentsought assistance from FAO's WorldFood Programme (WFP) to replicate thestrategy in a portion of Mizhi County en-compassing 105,000 people and 241 vil-lages. WFP provides food as an incentivefor farmers to do the work of land recla-mation and as compensation for thecropland converted to trees or grass.46

Quanjiagou, one of the villages in theproject, gives a visitor who has traversedhundreds of kilometers of the degradedLoess Plateau an overwhelming sense ofa land transformed. Earthen dams builtacross the deep gullies have capturedtopsoil eroding off'the hillsides, creatingflat, fertile fields where farmers haveplanted corn, potatoes, and other v lige-tables. Terraces allow cropping withminimal erosion on a portion of theslopes, while cash crop trees, such asapple, and a leguminous shrub good forfuel and fodder stabilize the remainingsloping land. Between 1979 and 1986,the area planted in crops was halved, buttotal crop production increased 17 per-

centan amazing 134-percent gain inproductivity. (See Table 2-4.) With theadded value from tree products and ani-mal husbandry, per capita income in thevillage has more than doubled.47

Average costs of these efforts, includ-ing the value of grain supplied by WFP,total about $162 per hectare if the villag-ers' labor is valued monetarily, $54 perhectare if it is not. While this sum is largerelative to per capita income, the invest-ment is modest compared with manyother development projects, such as es-tablishing fuelwood plantations or ex-panding irrigation, which often cost up-wards of $1,000 per hectare.44

In the drought-plagued, degradedhighlands of Ethiopia, similar food-for-work projects are under way in some 44catchments. Like efforts on the LoessPlateau, they are aimed at integratingconservation and development to bothrehabilitate the land and boost crop pro-duction. A key feature of the Ethiopianefforts is simple structures called bunds,walls of rock or earth constructed acrosshillsides to catch soil washing down theslope. Soil builds up behind the bund,forming a terrace that both diminisheserosion and enhances water infiltration.

Table 24. China: Effects of Land Rehabilitation Strategy in Quanjiagou,Mizhi County, 1979-86

Effects 1979 1986 Change

Land Use (hectares) (percent)

Cropland 234 117 50

Trees 60 111 + 85Pasture 16 83 +419

(tons) (percent)Crop Production 250 293 + 17

(yuanI) (percent)Per Capita Income 127 313 +146

lAs of midNovember 1988, 1 yuan exchanged for U.S. 27o.SOURCE: Shaanxi Control Institute of the Loess Plateau. "Brief Introduction on the Comprehensive Controlin Qpanjiagou Experimental Watershed," unpublished paper. Shaanxi Province. China. August 1987.

o ...

Halting Land Degradation

Between 1976 and 1985, through pro-jects sponsored by the United Nationsand various foreign aid agencies, Ethi-opian farmers built 600,000 kilometersof bunds and about 470,000 kilometersof terraces for reforestation of steepslopes. Though impressive, these effortsare only a start: just 6 percent of thethreatened highlands are now pro-tected.45

No matter how creative a strategy,land rehabilitation hinges on a set of ef-fective technologies that will be adopted.By working in partnership with villagers,scientists and development workerscome to know their needs, priorities, andcultural practices, and can promote ap-propriate technologies. Soil scientistRattan Lal makes the basic but crucialobservation that "the subsistence farmerwho risks famine would consider a suc-cessful technology to be the one thatproduces some yield in the worst yearrather than the one that produces a highyield in the best."5°

Simple techniques of soil and waterconservation that add nutrients andmoisture to the land form the core ofpromising rehabilitation efforts. Work atthe International Institute of TropicalAgriculture in Ibadan, Nigeria, hasshown, for example, that applying amulch of crop residues at rates of sixtons per hectare can provide nearly com-plete erosion control on slopes of up to15 percent, allowing sustainable crop-ping of such land. The mulch protectsthe soil from the impact of raindrops,increases rainfall infiltration, conservessoil moisture, and improves soil struc-ture, all helping to boost yields. In fieldtrials, a mulch of six tons per hectare hasled to yield increases over non mulchedplots of 83 percent for cow peas, 73 per-cent for cassava, 33 percent for soy-beans, and 23 percent for maize.51

Many subsistence farmers are aware ofthe benefits of mulching, but usually donot have sufficient plant residues to

50

apply to their fields at the needed rates.One strategy that remedies this is alleycroppingan agroforestry design inwhich food crops are planted in alleysbetween hedgerows of trees or shrubs.The hedgerow trimmings provide agood mulch for the crop, besides help-ing meet other needs such as fodder foranimals and fuelwood for heating andcooking. Planting the hedges along thecontours of sloping land reduces rainfallrunoff and soil erosion. Even though thehedgerows take up land, crop yields perhectare suffer little if at all, and some-times even increase.52

Nitrogen-fixing trees, including somespecies of acacia, gliricidia, and leuca-ena, are especially useful for agrofores-try since they help improve soil fertilityand maintain productivity. Sudanesefarmers who leave native Acacia senegaltrees on their cropland can grow milletcontinuously for 15-20 years, comparedwith 3-5 years if they remove the trees.Similarly, research in Senegal has shownthat an integrated crop - livestock -treesystem, using Acacia albida, could sus-tainably support several times more peo-ple per hectare than the average for theregion. This acacia drops its leaves dur-ing the rainy season, adding nitrogenand organic matter to the soil; in the dryseason, it produces pods good for fod-der and leaves that offer shade to live-stock whose dung, in turn, enhances soilfertility.55

Another promising prospect for fight-ing land degradation is a densely tufted,deep-rooted plant called vetiver grass.Native to India and known there as khus,vetiver grass offers a simple, inexpensivealternative to the construction of bundsand earthen walls to slow sheet erosionon sloping cropland. It can be estab-lished for between I and 10 percent ofthe cost of these other measures. and itrequires no maintenance. Vetiver seemsto survive in all climates, and has donewell even during the last four years of


drought in India. Since the most com-monly used species (Vetiveria zizanioides)propogates only by root division, thereis no danger of it spreading out of con-trol."

Vetiver grass forms a vegetativebarrier that slows runoff, allowingrainfall to spread out and seep intothe field.

When planted to form continuoushedges along the contours of a hillside,vetiver grass forms a vegetative barrierthat slows runoff, allowing rainfall tospread out and seep into the field, andtraps sediment behind it, forming a nat-ural terrace. Farmers need only give upa 50-centimeter strip of their croplandfor each. contour hedge of vetiver, andthe resulting soil and water conservationgains far outweigh the small amount ofland lost from production. Yields typi-cally increase at least 50 percent overthose from traditional cultivation meth-ods."

Land restoration also requires incen-tives that motivate rural people to buildterraces, plant trees, or do whateverneeds to be done andequally impor-tantto maintain what they put in place.Without such incentives, governmentsand aid organizations face the prospectof footing the bill for land rehabilitationefforts everywhere they are neededclearly, an impossible task.

Recent economic reforms in China,for example, give farmers the securityin land tenure and fair prices needed toencourage improvements in the land.Under the "responsibility system,"farmers can sell on the free marketwhatever they produce above theirquota to the state. Although the gov-ernment still owns the land, familiescan enter into long-term contracts to

51

use it, and in many cases this right-of-use is inheritable. In Mizhi County,each household's allocation of croplandremains valid for 15 years. Tenure forpasture and wooded land ranges from30 to 50 years, and can often be passedon to children."

In Ethiopia, on the other hand, thegovernment owns the land and givesPeasant Associations the responsibilityof allocating it to farm families for theiruse. Since the Peasant Associations canredistribute the land, farmers using anygiven plot have no guarantee that theywill benefit from any long-term improve-ments they make. As in many countries.a long-standing policy of keeping foodprices low to appease urban dwellers hasfurther discouraged farmers from in-vesting in land productivity. A promis-ing step was taken in mid-1988, how-ever, when plans were announced tobegin raising prices in certain regionsfor the portion of crops that farmersmust sell to the governments'

Unfortunately, successes with range-land rehabilitation form a rather shortand unconvincing list. Restoring the na-turally fluctuating range resourcegiven periodic drought, shifting num-bers of range animals, and the fact thatmobility is central to nomadic pastoral-ists' survivalpresents formidable chat-lenges. Yet a few promising efforts dotthe landscape. In northern Nigeria, re-searchers at the International LivestockCenter for Africa (ILCA) are experi-menting with "fodder banks," reservesof nitrogen-fixing crops that can providenutritious feed for livestock during thedry season. Other efforts focus on redis-tributing livestock to even out pressureson the range. For example, ILCA is help-ing Ethiopian pastoralists to dig moreponds that retain water for severalmonths into the dry season, therebyhoping to reduce localized overgraz-ing."

Perhaps the clearest success in range-


land restoration springs from the revivalof the ancient "Hema" system of coop-erative management in Syria. Coopera-tives are established that each have solegrazing rights to a demarcated area ofrange. Families in the cooperative arethen granted a license to graze a certainnumber of sheep within that area. By re-ducing overgrazing, the system has en-abled the revegetation of 7 million hec-tares of rangeland.59

Much less irrigated cropland thanrainfed land suffers from degradation,but the cost of this degradation is great,both because of irrigated land's highproduction potential and because of thelarge investments that have gone into it.An expensive and daunting task, reha-bilitation of salinized land has not re-ceived the attention it deserves. Paki-stan, among the countries most affected,has perhaps tried hardest to tackle it, buthas achieved only mixed results.

In 1960 the government committed it-self to draining salt-affected lands by in-stalling vertical tube wells, Two decadesand over 12.000 tube wells later, thearea reclaimed still fell far short of thetarget. Although the technology hadproved effective, the public programshad actually reclaimed less land than thecombined effects of private tube wellsand an improved water supply. TheSixth Five Year Plan, 1983 to 1988, al-located an astonishing 43 percent of thetotal water budget to drainage activities,and established credits and subsidies tofurther encourage private developmentof tube wells so

In Egypt, a drainage system coveringonly a small portion of the Nile DeltaValley has been estimated to cost $1 bil-lion. Such high sums partly explain whygovernments tend to ignore the prob-lem, and why preventing salinization inthe first placeby increasing irrigationefficiency and providing for adequatedrainage when irrigation systems arebuiltis crucia1.61

JOINING THE BATTLEWhy, more than a decade after a globalgoal was set to stop desertification by theyear 2000, are we losing more trees,more topsoil, and more grazing landthan ever before? The easy answers arethat governments fail to grasp the sever-ity of the threat, lack the political will togive it priority, and devote insufficientfinancial resources to combat it. But amore fundamental reason may lie in thevery nature of "desertification control"itself. It crosses all traditional discipli-nary and bureaucratic boundaries, in-cluding agriculture, forestry, pastoral-ism, and water management. Lastingsolutions are rooted as much in socialand economic reforms as in effectivetechnologies. Telescoping desertifica-tion control into a single program orplan of action defies the reality that it isinseparable from the broader notion ofsustainable development.

All the elements needed to reverseland degradation exist, but they have notbeen joined effectively in the battle orgiven the resources needed to mount anadequate fight. in the United NationsEnvironment Programme and its Execu-tive Director, Mostafa Tolba, desertifi-cation control has a strategic headquar-ters and a strong, committed leader. Butthe amount of funding mobilized fordesertification control over the lastdecade has fallen far short of needs. Har-old Dregne estimates that an average of$170 million per year was spent bydonor agencies on field-level desertifi-cation control between 1978 and 1983,compared with an estimated $1.8 billionof annual expenditures needed to com-bat desertification adequately. UNEPplaces investment needs at $4.5 billionper year to bring desertification undercontrol within 20 years. Several coun-tries have developed the national plansof action called for by the 1977 Nairobiconference, but only threeBurkina

132


Faso, Mali, and Tunisiahave appar-ently drummed up sufficient support tobegin successfully implementing them.The United Nations Sudano-SahelianOffice intends to push implementationof four existing plans before the end of1989 in this northern part of Africa.62

While this top-down approach pro-ceeds at a glacial pace with few measur-able gains, efforts at the village levelhave produced numerous, albeit smallsuccesses. (See also Chapter 9., On theisland of Cebu in the Philippines, for ex-ample, local farmers have been workingwith U.S.-based World Neighbors since1982 to stem soil erosion on the steepslopes they cultivate. Initially, the WorldNeighbors project director led the semi-nars on contouring and other tech-niques; later, villagers familiar with themethods took over the presentations.Two years into the project, 74 farmerswere participating and 25 kilometers oferosion control structures had beenbuilt. Three new sites were added by theend of 1987, and project workers nowexpect 750 farmers to adopt the conser-vation techniques.6s

Efforts at the village level have pro-duced numerous, albeit small suc-cesses.

In western Kenya, 540 different localorganizationsmostly women's groupsand primary schoolsare working withthe U.S.-based organization CARE topromote reforestation. CARE providesthe materials needed to establish nurser-ies, as well as training and extension ser-vices, but local people do the planting.Each group plants between 5,000 and10,000 seedlings annually, collectivelyamounting to nearly a third of the plant-ings the government estimates areneeded.64

53

The greatest hope of reversing landdegradation lies in marrying stepped-upinternational support and technicalguidance with the commitment and ex-perience of organizations operating atthe local level. Although that presents anonerous set of institutional challenges,there are some promising signs.

Recognizing that community-basedinitiatives have higher success rates andmore lasting impacts than "top-down"projects, UNEP is strengthening its co-operation with nongovernmental orga-nizations (NGOs). The agency currentlysupports several grassroots projectsthrough the Nairobi-based AfricanNGOs Environmental Network, and hasalso helped launch the Deforestationand Desertification Control NGO Net-work in the Asia-Pacific region. A similarnetwork is being established for LatinAmerica. In addition, UNEP has pro-vided $35,000 to bolster tree plantingefforts in southern India through theMillions of Trees Club, a grassrootsgroup that has set up people's nurseriesand training centers for reforestation.During the two years of UNEP's support,the number of nurseries grew from 20 to45, and from them more than 2 milliontrees and shrubs were planted.65

Another promising sign emerged inDecember 1985, when representativesfrom 41 African governments, regionalorganizations, and NGOs gathered inCairo for the first African MinisterialConference on the Environment. Theconference's prime objective was devel-oping a cooperative program aimed atarresting environmental degradation onthe continent and helping Africansachieve food and energy self-sufficiency.Toward that end, a Cairo Plan was setforth that called for two sets of pilot pro-

jects.66The first involves selecting three vil-

lages in different ecological zones ineach of 50 African countries and imple-menting ecologically based develop-


ment schemes in each. The secondfocuses on rehabilitating rangelands,and calls for one pilot project in each of30 countries designed to produce fodderfrom small plots irrigated by animal-powered water pumps. The goal is toproduce enough fodder to carry villageherds through the dry season so that de-graded rangelands have a chance to re-cover. It is hoped that through these 180demonstration projects, which will in-volve working closely with NGOs andvillagers, successful and replicablestrategies will emerge.67

Funding for the Cairo Plan is to comefrom African governments themselves aswell as from international donor agen-cies. UNEP, which is helping coordinatethe effort, is currently working to roundup support. So far, about 5 projects havereceived funding, and up to 20 othersare in the pipeline."

Bilateral donor agencies also have animportant role to play in stimulating ac-tion at the local level. By funneling moremoney through NGOs rather than na-tional government agencies, they canoften ensure more bang for the develop-ment buck. The U.S. Agency for Interna-tional Development (AID), for example,sponsors a $27-million AgroforestryOutreach Project in Haiti, which is ad-ministered through three private volun-tary organizations. Operation DoubleHarvest produces and distributes seed-lings and manages demonstration treefarms. CARE provides agroforestrytraining and extension services to farm-ers in the severely degraded northwest-ern region. And the Pan American De-velopment Foundation works with morethan 120 Haitian voluntary groups,many of them church-related, by train-ing "promoters" to help farmers plantand care for trees on their farms and toreport back on which strategies are prov-ing successful.69

So far, some 130,000 farmers haveplanted more than 35 million trees, not

only conserving soils and boosting cropyields, but helping meet their needs forfuel and fodder. While initially the pro-ject paid farmers to plant and care forthe seedlings, the benefits of agrofores-try soon rendered the payments un-necessary. Indeed, farmers' demand forseedlings currently exceeds what thenurseries can provide. Project officialshope that, having tapped into andstrengthened existing networks at thelocal level, the reforestation effort willcontinue long after the project money isspent."

Building institutional bridges betweenresearch organizations and. farmers'fields is also crucial in the battle againstland degradation. Technologies per-fected on experimental research plotsoften need adapting to suit the needsand conditions of small farmers. TheTropical Agricultural Research andTraining Center (CATIE, from theSpanish), located in Turrialba, CostaRica, serves just such a role for its sixCentral American and Caribbean mem-bers: Costa Rica. the Dominican Repub-lic, Guatemala, Honduras. Nicaragua,and Panama'

CATIE's activities focus on develop-ing integrated crop, livestock, and forestproduction systems suited to subsistencefarming in the tropics. David Joslyn ofAID, which provides 65 percent ofCATIE's $13-million annual budget,knows of no other institution like it: "Inboth training and research, the organiza-tion accomplishes what the small coun-tries of Central America could never ac-complish alone."72

Without adequate incentives for smallfarmers to invest in their land, the tech-nologies developed at research institutesand the land use strategies testedthrough aid projects will not spreadwidely enough to make more than a dentin desertification. As noted earlier, re-forming land ownership and tenure poli-cies and providing access to credit for


smallholders is vital to the reversal ofland degradation. Special emphasisneeds to be placed on the status ofwomenespecially in Africa, where thedisparity between the work women doand the rights they have is greatest.

Of the multilateral development orga-nizations, the International Fund for Ag-ricultural Development (WAD) is headsabove the others in incorporating theseneeds into its projects more thoroughly.This decade-old U.N. agency has nowcarried out about 190 projects, and inthe words of WAD president IdrissJazairy, they are "people-oriented" andbuilt upon the philosophy that develop-ment involves the "liberation of [peo-ple's] creative potential."76

An IFAD project in Kenya, for in-stance, operates through women's sav-ings clubs and other community groupsto enhance women's access to credit,farm supplies, and extension services.Another, in The Gambia, works to up-hold women's traditional cultivationrights under a new land distributionscheme and establishes day-care centersfor children of women whose workloadshave increased with the introduction ofdouble-cropping. While the provision ofchild-care services may seem farremoved from desertification control,freeing women to do the work of raisingland productivity could in fact be an es-sential first step.74

Expanded research into crop varietiesand production systems appropriate forthe lands and people at risk from deser-tification is also crucial. With the high.yielding, Green Revolution package of

E.; ::::I V

technologies having captured the re-search limelight over the last severaldecades, efforts t improve the produc-tivity of subsistence farming are just be-ginning to get the attention they de-serve. Research on cowpeas. foiexample, an important leguminous cropin Africa, has led to varieties harvesta-ble in 50-60 days instead of 90-100.That paves the way for double- or eventriple-cropping in some regions, whichwould reduce pressures to extend culti-vation to marginal lands. A newdrought-tolerant sorghum has yieldeddouble or triple that of traditional vari-eties in the Sudan. By boosting per-hec-tare production, its spread amongsmallholders also would allow someerodible lands that would otherwise becultivated to be planted in soil-stabiliz-ing tree or fodder crops.75

Finally, with much degradation stem-ming from excessive human pressureson the land, reversing it will require adramatic slowing of population growth.If current growth rates persist, Africa'sworn-out lands will need to support anadditional 263 million people by theyear 2000, roughly equivalent to addingtwo more Nigerias. India will grow bynearly 200 million people, or 24 percent,and the Philippineswith the fastestgrowth rate in Southeast Asiaby morethan a third. No matter how much fund-ing comes forth, or how fast effectivetechnologies spread, or how diligentlygovernments implement land reforms, alasting victory over land degradation willremain out of reach until populationpressures ease.76

3

Reexamining the WorldFood Prospect

Lester R. Brown

At the start of the 1987 hat-vest, worldgrain stocks totaled a record 459 milliontons, enough to feed the world for 101days. When the 1989 harvest begins, the"carryover" stocks 0.1 likely drop to 54days of consumption, lower even thanthe 57 days at the beginning of 1973,when grain prices doubled. During abrief two years, world reserves ofgrainwhich account for half of allhuman caloric intake when consumed di-rectly and part of the remainder in theform of meat, milk, cheese, butter, andeggswill have plummeted from thehighest level ever to the lowest since theyears immediately following WorldWar ILI

Stocks have declined precipitously be-cause food demand has continued itspopulation-driven rise while productionhas fallen at a record rate. In 1987, amonsoon failure in India contributed toan 85-million-ton drop in world output.

An expanded version of this chapter appeared asWorldwatch Paper 85, The Changing World FoodProspect: The Nineties and Beyond.

r0n.)

In 1988, drought-reduced hat-vests inthe United States, Canada, and China re-duced world grain output a further 76million tons.2

The drought that afflicted the UnitedStates in 1988 is by many criteria themost severe on recordso severe thatdomestic grain production has fallenbelow consumption for perhaps the firsttime ever. North America, which sup-plies most of the world's wheat and feed-grain exports, is able to maintain exportsduring the 1988/89 trade year only byselling its carryover stocks. A severedrought in 1989 will reduce exports to atrickle, creating a world food emer-gency.3

The central question raised by thisovernight depletion of world grain re-serves is, What are the odds that NorthAmerica will experience another severedrought in 1989? Are the three drought-reduced harvests of 1980, 1983, and1988 simply reruns of the types ofdroughts that occurrcd in the thirties, ordo they foreshadow an agricultural fu-ture in a world where summers in mid-


continental North America will be farhotter? No one knows.

Drought can be caused by below-nor-mal rainfall, by above-normal tempera-tures (which increase evaporation), orboth, as was the case in 1988. Record-high temperatures in key U.S. agricul-tural areas during the summer of 1988contributed to the reduced harvest. Thisunprecedented summer cannot be con-clusively linked to the long-projectedglobal warming, but both the reducedrainfall and the higher temperatures inthe North American agricultural heart-land are consistent with projectedchanges in climate associated with thebuildup of greenhouse gases. Manymeteorologists believe it is likely that thewarming is now under way. If so,droughts and heat waves will occur withincreasing frequency, making it moredifficult to rebuild stocks once they aredepleted. (See Chapter I.)4

The future of agriculture is beingshaped increasingly by environ-mental trends and resource con-straints.

In addition to the drought-reducedharvests, the growth of world food pro-duction appears to be losing momen-tum. Between 1950 and 1984, worldgrain output climbed from 624 milliontons to 1,645 million tons, a prodigious2.6-fold gain that raised per capita grainproduction by 40 percent. Since then,output per person has declined eachyear. falling 14 percent over the last fouryears. In pan, this fall measures the un-sustainable use of soil and water.5

No one knows what share of worldfood output is unsustainable, but someidea of its scale can be gleaned by look-ing at U.S. agriculture. Under the Con-servation Reserve Program, the U.S. De-

panment of Agriculture (USDA) istaking 11 percent of the country's crop-land out of production, converting it tograssland or woodland, because it is tooerodible to sustain continuous cropping.Irrigated area has shrunk 7 percent since1978. Even so, water tables are still fall-ing by six inches to four feet per yearbeneath one fourth of U.S. irrigatedcropland, tggesting that further shrink-age is in prospect.6

If the estimated 57 million tons of U.S.grain outputroughly one sixth of thetotalproduced with this unsustainableuse of soil and water is subtracted fromworld output, the surpluses of the eight-ies disappear. More seriously, subtract-ing unsustainable output for the UnitedStates alone from world food productionputs sustainable world production belowconsumption.?

Depressed farm prices during theeighties have clearly slowed investmentin agriculture, but other forces are shap-ing the world food prospect. For in-stance, the backlog of unused agricul-tural technologies that farmers can drawupon in some countries is dwindling,making it more difficult for them tomaintain the rapid output growth of re-cent decades.

But beyond these economic and tech-nological Influences, the future of agri-culture is being shaped increasingly byenvironmental trends and resource con-straints. Prominent among these are thecontinual loss of topsoil from croplands,the conversion of cropland to nonfarmuses, the waterlogging and salting of irri-gation systems, falling water tables, thediversion of irrigation water to nonfarmuses, and now the possible adverse ef-fects of climate change.

In addition, demographic trends aremaking it ever more difficult to achieve asatisfactory balance between food andpeople. The annual addition to worldpopulation, estimated at 86 million in1988, is projected to exceed 90 million

Reexamining the World Food Prospect

in the early nineties. By the end of thedecade, there will be nearly a billionmore people to feed. In the two regionswith the fastest population growth,Africa and Latin America, per capitagrain production is falling. if action isnot taken soon to reverse these declines,hunger and malnutrition will spread,and eventually food consumption formore people will fall below the survivallevel.°

PRODUCTION TRENDS

The enormous growth in world grainoutput between 1950 and 1984 has noprecedent. Never before had the worldwitnessed such an increase in food pro-duction within one generation. But canthis rapid growth be restored and sus-tained indefinitely?

The last four years may help answerthese questions. After increasing onlyslightly in 1985 and 1986, global grainproduction fell sharply in 1987 andagain in 1988. (See Figure 3-1.) Asnoted earlier, in per capita terms it hasfallen each year since 1984.9

The overall loss of momentum in

Millionlbas

2.000

1.600

1.200 -

Sources: US. Dept ofAgrieuhumnbrldwatch

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Elms 3-1. Wodd Gado Producdoo,Wt

(43)

world grain output. exacerbated by themonsoon failure in India in 1987, theNorth American and Chinese droughtsin 1988, and large areas of croplandidled under U.S. commodity supplymanagement programs in both years,has depressed the world grain harvest bynearly I0 percent in two years. Recordback-to-back declines have interruptednearly four decades of steady growth inworld grain output, one of the most pre-dictable of global economic trends sinceWorld War II.

During the mid-eighties, grain pro-duction plateaued in some of the world'smost populous countries, includingIndia, Indonesia, Mexico, and China.India more than tripled its wheat harvestbetween 1965, when the Green Revolu-tion was launched, and 1983, sharplyboosting total grain output. Since then,grain production has not increased thereat alio

Indonesia doubled its grain harvest,consisting almost entirely of rice, be-tween 1970 and 1984. but output hassince leveled off. Indonesia's resettle-ment program, designed to alleviateland hunger by moving people fromdensely populated Java to the outer is-lands, has been widely judged a failureand has nearly halted. In contrast toJava's rich soils, those of the outer is-lands typically deteriorate, and ratherquickly, once the dense rain forest iscleared for farming.n

Mexico, where the Green Revolutionoriginated, boosted its grain harvestfourfold between 1950 and 1984. There,too, production has stagnated, largelybecause the area in grain has declinedone tenth during the eighties. Thisshrinkage, as degraded cropland is aban-doned and as some areas are convertedto nonfarm uses, is offsetting the gains inyield per hectare.12

China may illustrate the leveling offmost dramatically. The economic re-forms that quickly led to exploitation of


a large backlog of unused technologiesboosted grain production by nearly halfbetween 1976 and 1984, an impressiveachievement by any standard. Sincethen, China's output has actually fallenslightly. Beijing's official goal early in1988 was to regain the record level of1984. Notwithstanding an increase ingrain procurement prices for the 1988crop, China's efforts to regain the 1984harvest level failed for the fourth consec-utive year.is

The food prospect for China is of spe-cial concern, not merely because it is theworld's largest consumer, but becauseits planners may be greatly overestimat-ing future gains in production. Theyproject a 130-million-ton increase ingrain production by the end of the cen-tury, or roughly a third, but is this reallyfeasible? The recent experience of threeother countries in East Asia with similarpopulation/land ratios, and that haveundergone rapid industrial develop-ment comparable to that now under wayin China, calls this goal into question.I4

In Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.grain production has been declining formany years. In each of the three, the his-torical peak came during the 11-yearspan between 1967 and 1978. Fromtheir respective peaks, production hasdeclined more than one fourth in Japan,by one fifth in Taiwan, and by one sixthin South Korea."

The reasons for these common trendsare clear. With a small area of croplandper person, it becomes difficult to boostoutput per worker in agriculture as fastas in industry. The rapid rise in laborproductivity and income in the industrialsetter pulls workers out of agriculture.As a result, the area multiple-croppedgrowing more than one crop per year inone fieldbegins to decline. In additionto siphoning labor out of agriculture, thenonfarm sector also draws land awayfrom farmers. Record rates of industrial-ization lead to rapid growth in land usedfor the construction of factories, ware-

houses, access roads. and, as affluencerises, new housing. In each of these EastAsian countries, the decline in grain areawas followed in a matter of years by adecline in grain production.

For densely populated countries thatare industrializing rapidly, the compara-tive advantage lies in industry, not in ag-riculture. As a result, these three coun-tries have greatly increased their grainimports over the last decade or twoanobviously sensible policy. Although allthree :Ire largely self-sufficient in rice,they import most of their wheat andnearly all of their feedgrains. In 1987,imports accounted for 71 percent ofJapan's grain consumption, 72 percentof Taiwan's, and 59 percent of SouthKorea's.16

Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion are slowly reducing their de-pendence on outside grain.

The experience of these three coun-tries may explain why China is now hav-ing such difficulty boosting grain pro-duction. Like its neighbors, China isdensely populated and has a small areaof cropland per person, a rapid rate ofindustrial development, and a nonfarmsector that is pulling both labor and landaway from agriculture. In addition, inChina's water-scarce north, the nonfarmsector is diverting water from irriga-tion.17

China's grain area peaked in 1976,just 12 years before grain production didthe same. With grain yield per hectarealready four fifths of that in Japan,achieving the yield increases that areneeded to reach the one-third increaseplanned by the year 2000 will not beeasy.18

In 1988, China imported 5 percent ofits grain, roughly 15 million tons. If thenation's efforts to expand output are no

Reexamining the World Food Prospect (45)

more successful than those of its threesmaller neighbors, it might be importinga steadily growing share of its food dur-ing the nineties. If China were to import15 percent of its needs by 1995, theamount would total 45 million tonsmore than the 28 million tons nowbought by Japan and the 24 million tonsby the Soviet Union, the world's leadinggrain importers.'

Perhaps the best indicator of long-term shifts in food production relative todemand can be seen in the changinggeographic pattern of world grain trade.(See Table 3-1.) In 1950, most of thegrain in international trade flowed fromNorth America to grain-deficit WesternEurope. The rest of the world was essen-tially self-sufficient. That has changeddramatically in recent decades. Sincemid-century, North America has in-creased its grain exports more than five-fold, from 23 million to 119 million tons,emerging as the world's breadbasket.

Latin America became a grain-deficitregion in the seventies, with net importsof roughly 11 million tons by 1988. De-spite a vast land area. Brazil now regu-larly imports both wheat and feedgrains.These imports plus those of Mexico,with its growing food deficit, and of sev-eral smaller countries more than offsetexports from Argentina.20

Africa, a largely agrarian continent

beset by environmental deteriorationand a record population increase, hasbecome heavily dependent on importedgrain as it tries to offset a two-decadedecline in per capita production. Thenorthern tier of countriesEgypt,Libya, Tunisia, Algeria. and Morocconow bring in half the grain they con-sume. Even with continental imports ofan estimated 28 million tons in 1988,millions of people in sub-Saharan Africawere left hungry and malnourished,some on the verge of starvation.21

The combination of a small andshrinking cropland area per person andrising prosperity in many countries hasmade Asia the leading food-importingregion. Its purchases surpassed those ofEurope during the mid-sixties, and allindications are that they will continue torise during the nineties and beyond.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.which were importing at record levels inthe late seventies and early eighties, areslowly reducing their dependence onoutside grain. Whether they reach self-sufficiency will depend heavily on thesuccess of Soviet agricultural reforms.

Western Europe is perhaps the mostinteresting regional story. In the earlyeighties, it ended two centuries of de-pendence on imported grain, a depen-dence that began with the industrial rev-olution and the exchange of manu-

Table 3-1. The Changing Pattern of World Grain Trade, 1950-881

Region 1950 1960 1970 1980 19882

(million metric tons)North America +23 +39 +56 +131 + 119Latin America + 1 0 + 4 10 11

Western Europe 22 25 30 16 + 22E. Eur. and Soviet Union 0 0 0 46 27Africa 0 2 5 15 28Asia 6 17 37 63 89Australia and New Zeal. + 3 + 6 +12 + 19 + 14

1Plus sign indicates net exports; minus sign. net imports. 2Preliminary.SOURCES: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook (Rome: various years); U.S. Depart-ment or Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Service. World Rice Reference Tables and World Wheal and CoarseGrains Reference Tables (unpublished printouts) (Washington. D.C.: June 1988).

.0

I


factured goods for food and raw materi-als with the rest of the world. Steadilyadvancing farm technologies, farm sup-port prices well above the world marketlevel, and a population growth rate thatis approaching zero have combined topush the region's net exports abovethose of Australia. Although West Euro-pean farmers could face some reduc-tions in support prices as the costs ofmaintaining current levels soar, they stillmay be able to sell more grain abroadthan Australia, which with its semiaridclimate will find it difficult to increaseexports substantially.

Until recently, expanding food pro-duction was largely an economic con-cern. a matter of formulating agricul-tural price policies that would stimulateinvestment. Today, rises in commoditysupport prices in some countries maysimply result in the plowing of highlyerodible land or the installation of moreirrigation pumps where water tables arealready falling. Given the soil and waterconstraints now facing farmers, theslower growth in food output of recentyears is not surprising.

THE CROPLAND BASE

From the beginning of agriculture untilthe mid-twentieth century, most of thegrowth in world food output came fromexpanding the cultivated area. Since1950, a combination of the diminishingfertility of new land to plow and theavailability of new technologies shiftedthe emphasis from plowing new land toraising land productivity. Roughly fourfifths of the growth in world food outputsince mid-century has come from thissou rce.22

The world grain area increased some24 percent between 1950 and 1981,when it reached an all-time high. (See

6i

MillionHectares

800

700

Source. US. Dept.Agriculture

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Byre 3-2. World1Harvested Area of Grain,9564111

Figure 3-2.) Since then, it has fallensome 7 percent. That the world's crop-land area would expand when the worlddemand for food was growing rapidly isnot surprising. What is surprisingandworrying--is the recent decline. This isdue partly to the abandonment oferoded land, as in the Soviet Union;partly to the systematic retirement ofsuch land under conservation programs,as in the United States; and partly togrowing competition from nonfarmsources, a trend most evident in denselypopulated Asia As

From mid-century until 1981, twomajor surges in the world grain area oc-curred. The first came in the early fifties,when the Soviets embarked on the Vir-gin Lands project. Between 1951 and1956, they added some 40 million hect-ares to their cropland base, accountingfor most of the steep growth in the worldgrain area.24

The second surge began when worldgrain prices doubled between 1972 and1973. Farmers throughout the world re-sponded to record prices by plowingmore land. In the United States, they notonly returned idled cropland to use, theyalso plowed millions of acres of highlyerodible lznd. Between 1972 and 1976,


the U.S. area in grain climbed some 24percent. But soil erosion increased aswell. By 1977, American farmers werelosing an estimated six tons of soil forevery ton of grain they produced."

Meanwhile the Soviet Union, embar-rassed by its 1972 crop failure, expandedits area in grain some 7 percent. By1977, it had reached a record high. Buterosion of soil by both wind and wateralso increased. Although detailed dataon soil loss are not available, paperspublished by the Soil Erosion Labora-tory at the University of Moscow indica-ted severe and worsening erosion.26

In early 1982, Mikhail Gorbachev,then only a Politburo member, urgedplanners to heed the advice of soil scien-tists and adopt measures to limit ero-sion. But in the face of pressures to re-duce food importsthen the world'slargestthe scientists often were ig-nored and responsible managementpractices cast aside."

Soil erosion is making future produc-tion gains more difficult in China as well.The Yellow River Conservancy Commis-sion reported in 1980 that the HuangHe, or Yellow River, was depositing 1.2billion tons of soil in the ocean eachyear. At the Mauna Loa observatory inHawaii, scientists taking air samples cantell when spring plowing starts in Chinaby the surge of dust carried eastward byprevailing winds."

Perhaps the grimmest soil erosion re-port came in a 1978 dispatch from theU.S. embassy in Addis Ababa, statingthat an estimated 1 billion tons of topsoilwere washing down from Ethiopia'shighlands each year. The result for thatcountry has become well known: recur-rent famine, a window on the future ofother developing countries that are fail-ing to control soil loss."

The use of land for building is alsoshrinking the cropland area. In China,one result of the past decade's welcomeprosperity is that literally millions of vil-

lagers are either expanding their existing dwellings or building new ones. Andan industrial sector expanding at morethan 12 percent annually since 1980means the construction of thousands ofnew factories. Since most of China's 1.1billion people are concentrated in itsrich farming regions, new homes andfactories are often built on cropland.This loss of agricultural land combinedwith the shifts to more profitable cropshas reduced the grain-growing area inChina 9 percent since 1976."

Throughout the Third World, mount-ing population pressures continue topush farmers onto lands too steeplysloping to sustain cultivation and semi-arid lands too dry to be protected fromthe winds when plowed. As erosion con-tinues, land gradually loses its inherentproductivity, threatening the livelihoodof those who depend on it.

Continual overuse of biologicalsystems can set in motion changesthat become self-reinforcing.

During the eighties, the results of thisprocess became clear. Researchers nowrealize that continual overuse of biologi-cal systems can set in motion changesthat become self-reinforcing. WorldBank ecologist Kenneth Newcombe hasdescribed how complex systems unravelthrough several stages, each of whichhastens the onset of the next. His model,drawn from the experience of Ethiopia,shows how a decline in biological pro-ductivity can be triggered by a loss oftree cover."

All too often, this starts when thefirewood demands of growing popula-tions begin to exceed the sustainableyield of local forests. As the woodlandsrecede from the towns, firewoodbecomes scarce. At this point, villagers

48) Slate of the World 1989

start using crop residues and animaldung for cooking. This interrupts twoimportant cycles, depriving the land ofnutrients and also of the organic matteressential to maintaining a productivesoil structure. As protective vegetationdisappears and as soils become morecompact, more rainfall runs of soil ero-sion accelerates, less water is absorbedby the soil, and the soil moistureneeded for healthy crops diminishes.Water tables begin to fall. Over time,wells go dry. Eventually, not enoughsoil is left to support even subsistence-level agriculture. At this point, villagersbecome environmental refugees, head-ing for the nearest city or relief camp.(See Chapter 4.)

Official recognition of this cycle ofland degradation and its consequencesis emerging in India. Agronomists thereestimated that their country, with thesame cropland aria as the United States,was losing somc 5 billion tons of topsoileach year as oi. 1975. compared with aU.S. loss of just ever 3 billion tons. In1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi setup a National Wastelat.is DevelopmentBoard; its aim is to transform 5 millionhectares of degraded land every yearinto fuelwood and fodder plantations.32

This grim process of eroding soils isleading the world into a period of agri-cultural retrenchment. Even ignoringthe cropland idled under U.S. commod-ity programs, the world area in grain hasdeclined steadily since reaching the his-torical high in 1981. The United States isin the midst of a five-year program toconvert at least 40 million acres (16 mil-lion hectares) of highly erodible crop-land-11 percent of its total croplandto grassland or woodland before itbecomes wasteland. (See Table 3-2.)33

In contrast, the Soviet Union does nothave a program for converting highlyerodible land to less-intensive, sustain-able uses. As a consequence, each yearsince 1977 it has abandoned roughly amillion hectares of cropland, leading to

F3

a 13-percent shrinkage in grain area.Abandonment on this scale suggests thatinherent fertility may be falling on a farlarger area, helping explain why theSoviets now lead the world in fertilizeruse while still ranking a distant third ingraM production after the United Statesand China.S4

In some developing countries, crop-land degradation from erosion is leadingto the wholesale abandonment not onlyof cropland. but of entire villages.Across the southern fringe of the SaharaDesert. thousands of villages and theirsurrounding farmlands are surrenderingto the sand. Declining rainfall and deser-tification are forcing the agriculturalfrontier to retreat southward across abroad band of Africa, from Mauritania inthe west to the Sudan in the east S3

As the eighties draw to a close, such

Table 3-2. United States: Sign-Up forConservation Reserve Program, March

1986July/August 1988

Sign-upPeriod

AreaSigned Up

AverageAnnual

Rental RacePer Hectare

(millionhectares) (dollars)

March 1986 0.30 104May 1986 1.12 109August 1986 1.90 116February 1987 3.84 126July 1987 2.14 119February 1988 1.38 119July /August 1.05 121

1988

Total 11.73 120

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),Economic Research Service (ERS), Agricultural Re-sources: Cropland, Water, and Conservation Situation andOutlook Report (Washington. D.C.: September1987); "Sixth CRP Signup Adds 3.4 MillionAcres." Agricultural Outlook, August 1988; data forJuly/August 1988 are preliminary Worldwatch es-timates based on Tim Osborn, USDA, ERS, privatecommunication, November I, 1988.


data as are available indicate that soilerosion is slowly reducing the inherentproductivity of up to one third of theworld's cropland, though increased useof chemical fertilizers is temporarilymasking this deterioration. Worldwide,an estimated 25 billion tons of topsoil isbeing lost from cropland each year,roughly the amount that covers Aus-tralia's wheat lands.s6

WATER FOR IRRIGATION

The spread of irrigation from its initia-tion in the Middle East several thou-sand years ago has been dramatic, asdetailed in State of the World 1987. Atthe start of this century, the world totalstood at some 40 million hectares. By1950, it had reached 94 million hec-tares; by 1980, 249 million hectares.After 1980, however, growth sloweddramatically, expanding by an es-timated 8 million hectares since then.(See Figure 3-3.)37

Irrigation often holds the key to crop-ping intensity, especially in monsoonalclimates, where the wet season is fol-lowed by several months with little or norain. Where temperatures permit year-

MillionHectares

300

200 -

100 -

t9C0 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Figure 3.3. World Irrigated Area. 190045

- .-.: . i 64

round cropping, as they often do wheremonsoons prevail, irrigation allows theproduction of two, three, or even morecrops per year.

China and India lead the world in irri-gated land. In China, this agriculturalpractice grew impressively between1950 and 1980, increasing from scarcely20 million hectares in 1950 to some 48million by 1980. The growth facilitatedan increase in multiple cropping, froman average of 1.3 crops per hectare in1950 to 1.5 in 1980."

India's net irrigated area in 1950 wasalmost exactly the same as China's.Though growth has been less rapid, thetotal nonetheless reached some 39 mil-lion hectares as of 1980. The most rapidgrowth has occurred since the mid-six-ties, following the introduction of high-yielding wheat and rice varieties thatwere both more responsive to the use ofwater and more exacting in their de-mands. This enhanced profitabilitystimulated widespread investments bysmall farmers in wells of their own sothey could more fully exploit the yieldpotential of the new varieties.ss

The United States and the SovietUnion rank third and fourth, respec-tively, in irrigated area. Growth in U.S.irrigated area from 1950 to 1980 wasconcentrated in the southern GreatPlains. Soviet irrigated area grew stead-ily during the same period. With some18 million hectares already under irriga-tion in 1983, the government planned toadd over 600,000 hectares a year duringthe mid-eighties. The Soviets look to ir-rigation not only to help boost food pro-duction but also to minimize the wideswings in crop output that result fromhighly variable rainfall."

Unfortunately, not all of the irrigationexpansion during the preceding threedecades is sustainable. Some, as in theU.S. southern Great Plains, is based onthe use of fossil water, which will eventu-ally be depleted. In other parts of the


United States and in other countries,some irrigation growth has resulted inthe drawing down of water tables aspumping exceeds aquifer recharge. Inaddition, the water available for irriga-tion is being reduced in still other areasby the growing water demands of indus-tries and cities."

In recent years, the world's two lead-ing food producersthe United Statesand Chinahave experienced un-planned declines in irrigated area. TheU.S. irrigated area, which peaked in1978, has fallen some 7 percent sincethen, reversing several decades ofgrowth. (See Figure 3-4.) In addition tofalling water tables, depressed commod-ity prices and rising pumping costs havecontributed to the shrinkage."

Further declines are in prospect. In1986, USDA reported that more thanone fourth of the 21 million hectares ofirrigated cropland was being watered bypulling down water tables, with the dropranging from six inches to four feet peryear. They were falling either becausethe pumping exceeded the rate ofaquifer recharge or- because the waterwas from the largely nonrenewableOgallala Aquifer. Although water min-ing is an option in the short run, in the

MillionHectares

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Figure 3-4. Irrigated Land 1st theUnited Sisk* 190044

long run withdrawals cannot exceedaquifer recharge.*

In China, where the expansion alsopeaked in 1978, irrigated area hadshrunk 2 percent by 1987. Under partsof the North China Plain in the regionsurrounding Beijing and Tianjin, thewater table is dropping by one to twometers per year. Industrial, residential,and agricultural users compete for dwin-dling supplies of fresh water. Deteriora-tion in some community irrigation sys-tems is also evident due to neglectarising from the shift to family-centeredfarming.**

Overpumping is evident in India aswell. Although no groundwater studycomparable to the USDA survey hasbeen done, several states have reportedthat water tables are falling and thatwells are going dry. In Tamil Nadu, onIndia's eastern coast, the water table insome areas fell 25-30 meters during theseventies. In Maharashtra, on the westcoast, competition is growing betweenlarge-scale producers of commercialcrops, such as sugarcane, and local vil-lagers who are producing food staplesfor their own consumption. As commer-cial growers invest in deeper wells, theylower the water table, and the shallow,hand-dug wells of the villagers go dry.Thousands of Indian villages now relyon tank trucks for their drinking water.Notwithstanding widespread watershortages in some states, there is still alarge potential for irrigation expansionin parts of India, such as in the water-rich Gangetic Plain.*

In the Soviet Union, the excessive useof water for irrigation takes the form ofdiminished river flows rather than fallingwater tables. A good part of the nation'sirrigated cropland is iit central Asia, andmuch of it is watered by the Syr-Daryaand Amu-Darya, the two great rivers ofthe region. Irrigation diversions fromthese rivers have greatly reduced their

Reexamining the World Food Praspect (5i)flow into the landlocked Aral Sea. As aresult, the sea's water level has fallensome 12 meters since heavy river diver-sions got under way some two decadesago." .

Since 1960, the area covered by theAral Sea has shrunk by 40 percent. Muy-nak, once a port city and major fish-pro-cessing center, is now nearly 50 kilome-ters from the shore. Soviet scientists feara major ecological catastrophe is unfold-ing as the sea slowly disappears. The drybottom is now becoming desert, the siteof sandstorms that may drop on the sur-rounding fields up to half a ton per hec-tare of a sand-salt mixdamaging thevery crops that water once destined forthe sea is used to grow.47

The Soviet Union's prospects for fu-ture irrigation expansion are limited.Two years ago, the government aban-doned its ambitious plan to divert south-ward into central Asia the Siberian riversthat flow into the Arctic Ocean. Al-though investment in irrigation contin-ues, the prospective net gains are mod-est ones.48

Apart from the growing scarcity offresh water, the productivity of perhapsone third of the world's irrigated land isbeing adversely affected by severe water-logging and salting. (See also Chapter2.) Like soil erosion, this process at firstgradually reduces land productivity andeventually leads to abandonment.

If underground drainage of irrigatedland is not adequate, percolation fromriver water diverted onto farmland grad-ually accumulates and over time slowlyraises the water table until it moves towithin a few feet of the surface. As a re-sult, deep-rooted crops begin to suffer.As the water table continues to rise, itbegins evaporating through the remain-ing inches of soil into the atmosphere,leaving salt on the surface and reducingthe Land's productivity.

With all natural water containing a

GG

certain amount of salt, the buildup ofthis natural compound is a commonthreat to the sustainability of irrigatedagriculture. As long as the hydrody-namics of the irrigation system providesufficient flushing, salt does not ac-cumula;.: in the surface soil. But inmany semiarid and arid regions, this isnot the case.

The productivity of one third of ir-rigated land is being adversely af-fected by severe waterlogging andsalting.

Worldwide, the prospects for majorgains in irrigated area are not good. Tobe sure, India's irrigated area is pro-jected to expand steadily in the yearsahead, and the Soviet Union's continu-ing investments will lead to some mod-est increases. In several of the smallercountries of Asia, such as Thailand andthe Philippines, naturally flooded rice-land is being converted to irrigated rice-land, a shift that permits farmers to raiseyields dramatically. At least some devel-oping countries on each continent areplanning new additions to their irrigatedland. As food prices go up, investment inirrigation will also rise. But as noted ear-lier, irrigated area in the United Statesand China has declined in recent yearsand may well drop further.49

On balance, it now seems unlikely thatthe world will be able to reestablish atrend of rapid, sustained gains in irri-gated area of the sort that characterizedthe period from 1950 to 1980. In retro-spect, this three-decade growth era willprobably be seen as unique. To the ex-tent that the irrigated area expands inthe future, it may depend as much ongains in water-use efficiency as on newsupplies.50


LAND PRODUCTIVITYPOTENTIAL

The ancients calculated yield as the ratioof grain harvested to that sown. Forthem, the scarce resource was the seedgrain itself. In the late twentieth century,land is becoming the constraint. The keyto meeting future needs is raising landproductivity.

With little opportunity to add produc-tive land to the world's cultivated area,the food - .prospect in the nineties is di-rectly tied to the potential for raisingland productivity. Between 1950 and1984, farmers more than doubled theoutput of their cropland. World grainyield per hectare increased from 1.1 tonsto 2.3 tons, a remarkable feat. (See Fig-ure 3-5)51

Since 1984, however, grain yields havechanged little. One reason is undoubt-edly the depressed level of farm pricesduring this period, which has dis-couraged both short-term investment ininputs, such as fertilizer, and longer-term investments in land improvement.The monsoon failure in India in 1987and the droughts in North America andChina in 1988 also lowered the globalaverage yield. if grain prices increase,

Kilograms3,000

2,500 -

2,000 - P(r\1,500

1,000 -

500 Soutre: US. Dept.of Agriculture

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 3-5. World Grain Yield Per Haim,19e.,048

117

however, yields should resume theirlong-term rise.52

By far the most important source ofrising grain yields in recent decades hasbeen the growth in fertilizer use. From1950 through 1984. world fertilizer usemoved higher each year, with only occa-sional interruption. It increased duringthis time from 14 million to 125 milliontons, a gain of more than 11 percent peryear. Between 1984 and 1988, however,usage went from 125 million to 135 mil-lion tons, an 'nnual rise of less than 2percent. The trend has become some-what erratic as agricultural commodityprices have weakened, Third World debthas soared, the yield response to fertili-zer use has diminished, and many finan-cially pressed governments have re-duced fertilizer subsidies.53

In per capita terms, world fertilizeruse quintupled between 1950 and 1984,going from 5 kilograms to 26 and offset-ting a one-third decline in grain area perperson. (See Figure 3-6.) As land be-comes scarce, farmers rely more on addi-tional fertilizer to expand output, in ef-fect substituting energy in the form offertilizer for land in the production pro-cess.54

The bulk of this impressive increase inworld fertilizer use during the fifties andmost of the sixties occurred in the indus-trial world. But the practice spread inAsia as Green Revolution varieties ofwheat and rice were widely introduced.In China, chemical fertilizers were notwidely used until 1960, when it becameclear that organic fertilizers were notgoing to be able to produce enough foodfor the country's growing population.Usage more than doubled between 1976and 1981the steepest increase ever ina major food-producing countryal-though organic fertilizer continues to bea major source of plant nutrients inChines

Some sense of the potential for raisingland productivity worldwide can be

Reexamining the World Food Prospect (53)Hectares

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 WOO

Fica34. %liodd Fatlism Use andAm Per Capiii. 19504$

gleaned from looking at yield trends forwheat, rice, and corn in countries withthe highest yield levelsfor example,rice in Japan, corn in the United States,and wheat in the United Kingdom. In1950, crop yields in these countries wereessentially the same, at about 2.25 tonsper hectare. Over time, the Japanese riceyield increased slowly, reaching 4 tonsper hectare in the mid-seventies. Sincethen, it has increased relatively little,even though the government supportprice is far above the world marketprice.ss

A similar trend exists in other high-technology rice-producing countries,such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Italy.In each case, once rice yields pass 4 tonsper hectare, they rise quite slowly oreven level off, suggesting that dramati-cally surpassing this level may await newtechnological advances. Agriculturaleconomists Duane Chapman and RandyBarker of Cornell point out that "thegenetic yield potential of rice has not in.creased significantly since the release ofthe high yielding varieties in 1966." Ineffect, the highest yielding rice varietiesavailable to Asian farmers in 1989 werereleased 23 years ago."

With both corn and wheat, yields have

gone much higher. Corn yields in theUnited States, for example, have exceeded 7 tons per hectare (112 bushelsper acre) in good crop years. Likewise,wheat in the United Kingdom hasranged between 6 and 7 or more tonsper hectare in recent years.ss

At this point, no one knows how faryields can profitably be raised. Eventu-ally, growth in yield per hectare, like thegrowth of any other biological process ina finite environment, will conform to theS-shaped growth curve. What is not clearis how close output in the higher-yieldcountries is to the upper inflection pointon this curve, where the rise will slowmarkedly and begin to level off.

The systematic application of scienceto agriculture and the increasing invest-ment of energy in agricultural inputs andprocesses has permitted a regular yearlyincrease in yields for more than a gener-ation, making it difficult to imagine a sit-uation where yields will not continuetheir steady rise. Nonetheless, some ana-lysts a; ^ becoming concerned about thepotential for indefinitely raising yields, aconcern heightened by the limited po-tential for finding new cropland.

Robert Herdt, senior economist at theRockefeller Foundation, anticipates aslowdown in grain production growth inthe developing countries. He observesthat "in the next five to ten years thereis little potential for further rapid spreadof existing semi-dwarf varieties that pro-vided the breakthrough in developing-country wheat and rice production in themid-1960s. Likewise, it appears thatthere is little scope for increasing therates of fertilizer [application] on thosevarieties much above their mid-1980slevels."ss

In some farming communities cropyields on the best farms now approachthose on experimental plots. It is unreal-istic, however, to expect yields on farmsactually to reach these high levels. Suchplots are used to determine the maxi-


mum physical response to an input, suchas fertilizer. Farmers, on the other hand,are concerned with the maximum profitresponse. Scientists working on experi-mental plots can increase fertilizer useuntil there is no more response. Farmersmust stop when the value of the addi-tional yield no longer covers the cost ofthe extra fertilizer.

Similarly, scientists on experimentalplots can plant during the period thatwill produce maximum yields. Farmers,who must deal with such real-world con-straints as multiple-cropping and the de-mands on their time imposed by othercrops, often cannot plant during thisnarrow time window.

Rising grain yield per hectare musteventually give way to physical con-straints. With cereal yields, the ultimatelimit may be photosynthetic efficiency.Where the best farmers supply all thenutrients and water that advanced varie-ties can use, cereal yields may now beapproaching this limit.

Biotechnology is a timely additionto the scientist's tool kit, but it doesnot promise dramatic productiongains.

Evidence that photosynthetic con-straints may be emerging can be seen inthe diminishing returns on fertilizer use.Whereas 20 years ago the application ofeach additional ton of fertilizer in theU.S. Corn Belt added 15 to 20 tons tothe world graM harvest, today it may addonly 5 to 10 tons. In analyzing recentagricultural trends in Indonesia, Chap-man and Barker note that "while onekilogram of fertilizer nutrients probablyled to a yield increase of 10 kilograms ofunmilled rice in 1972, th:- ratio hasfallen to about one to five at present."This, combined with depressed farm

prices, helps explain why growth inworld fertilizer use Itas slowed in recentyears, and why it has actually declined insome countries, including the UnitedStates."

Hybrid wheats and rites have beenavailable for many years but, except forhybrid rice in China, their widespreaduse awaits far higher grain prices. Andsince yields of the more productivewheat and rice strains now in use aremuch closer to the photosynthetic limitthan were those of corn when hybridswere introduced 50 years ago, the poten-tial for raising output is comparativelymodest.

Other possibilities for boosting yieldlie in breeding cereals more tolerant ofsalt, drought, and heat. In a world grow-ing warmer, gains from this source willloom far larger than they do today.

Contrary to popular belief, biotech-nology is not an agricultural panaceathat will end hunger. For instance, thewidely discussed development of nitro-gen-fixing cereals, which biotechnologi-cal techniques could facilitate, wouldreduce the need for fertilizer but wouldalso likely lower yields, since some ofthe plant's metabolic energy is divertedto fixing nitrogen rather than produc-ing seed. Biotechnology is a timely ad-dition to the scientist's tool kit, one thatwill speed the pace and the potential re.turn on investment in agricultural re-search, but it does not promise dra-matic production gains. The contri-bution of this research tool, like all theothers that scientists use, is ultimatelyconstrained by the limits of photosyn-thetic efficiency.

Unfortunately, no identifiable tech-nologies are waiting in the wings thatwill lead to the quantum jumps in worldfood output such as those associatedwith the spread of hybrid corn, the nine-fold increase in fertilizer use between1950 and 1984, the near-tripling of irri-

0


gated area during the same period, orthe relatively recent spread of the high-yielding dwarf wheats and rites in devel-oping countries. The contribution ofthese technologies is diminishing insome situations and no major new tech-nologies are emerging to take theirplace.

Although countries where yields arealready quite high are finding it difficultto maintain a rapid rise, those whereyields are low can tap existing technolo-gies to boost their output. For example,Japan may not be much more successfulin raising rice yields in the nineties thanit has been in the late eighties, but India,where rice yields are less than half thoseof Japan, still has a large unrealized po-teniia1.61

FOOD SECURITY TRENDS

The two most useful global indicators offood security are per capita grain pro-duction and carryover stocks of grainthe amount in the bin when the new har-vest begins. The trend in per capitaproduction gives a sense of whetheroverall food availability is improving ordeteriorating. Changes in carryoverstocks indicate whether production is ex-ceeding consumption or falling short ofit.

World grain production increasedsubstantially faster than population from1950 through 1984, boosting per capitaoutput from 246 to 345 kilograms. This40-percent increase led to impressiveimprovement in diets in many countries,boosting consumption of livestock prod-ucts. Per capita output declined slightlyin 1985 and 1986 before droppingsharply in 1987 and again in 1988. Be-tween 1984 and 1988, grain productionper person fell from an all-time high of345 kilograms to 296 kilograms.62

The decline in total grain productionin 1988largely the result of thedroughts in North America and Chinacompleted the largest two-year drop onrecord. The accompanying 14-percentfall in per capita production since 1984brought this indicator back to the levelsof the mid-seventies. Record grain re-serves permitted a drawdown of stocksto offset most of the decline, limiting thedrop in -insumption per person to 3percent.65

This look at global changes in percapita production, however, obscureswide differences in regional trends. Theprincipal determinant of whether foodproduction per erson is rising or de-clining in this case is the differential rateof population growth. For example,while per capita production in WesternEurope was climbing rapidly, that inAfrica wked in 1967 and has declinedsome 27 percent since then. These tworegions illustrate the extremes.64

Unfortunately, Latin America hasjoined Africa during the eighties as thesecond region to experience a decline infood production per person. Since 1981,the year before the debt crisis began, theregion's output per person has fallen byroughly one tenth, expanding the re-gion's grain deficit.65

As total grain production has declinedduring the last two years, so too havestocks. World carryover stocks reachedan all-time high at the beginning of 1987of 459 million tons, enough to feed theworld for 101 days. During 1987, stocksdropped to 402 million tons. In 1988,world consumption is likely to exceedproduction by a staggering 152 milliontons. (See Table 3-3.) Unless the mid-year USDA world grain consumption es-timate of 1,673 million tons is reducedby rising prices, year-end stocks are ex-pected to fall to roughly 250 milliontons. This amounts to 54 days of con-sumption, less than the 57-day supply at


Table 3-3. World Grain Production, Use and Carryover Stocks, 1961S8

Carryover Stocks

Year Production Consumption QuantityConsumption

Equivalent

(million metric tons) (days)

1961 813 835 185 81

1965 917 952 159 61

1970 1.096 1,130 198 641971 1.194 1,169 223 701972 1,155 1.192 186 571973 1,271 1.259 198 571974 1,219 1.213 203 611975 1,250 1,229 221 661976 1.363 1.303 281 791977 1,337 1.338 279 761978 1,467 1.418 328 841979 1,428 1.440 315 80

1980 1.447 1,475 286 711981 1.497 1.476 307 761982 1.548 1.500 355 861983 1.485 1,537 303 721984 1.645 1,585 363 841985 1,661 1.594 430 981986 1,682 1,653 459 1011987 1,597 1,653 402 891988 1.521 1.673 250 54

SOURCES: 1961-87.13.S. Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Service. World Grain Situation andOutlook. Washington. D.C.. July 1988: 1988. Worldatch Institute.

the end of 1972. when world grain pricesdoubled 66

At this low level. carryover stocksamount to little more than "pipeline"supplies. Substantial quantities of grainare required to keep the trucks andbarges between producer and consumerfilled. The supply lines from the UnitedStates, which holds a disproportionatelylarge share of global carryover stocks inorder to assure regular supplies to itscustomers, often stretch halfway aroundthe world.

In addition to its carryover stocks, theworld has a second line of defense

against food shortagesthe croplandidled under U.S. commodity programs.In 1988. some 20 million hectares (50million acres) were idled under farmprograms designed to maintain pricestability. (See Table 3-4.) Virtually allthis land can be returned to productionwithin a year if the USDA decides it isneeded.

Amounting to roughly 2 percent ofthe world cropland area, this reserve canhelp boost production now that stocksare depleted. Given the precariously lowlevel of carryover stocks, prudenceargues for bringing this land back into

71

Reexamining the H'odd Food Prospect (57)

Table 3-4. United States: CroplandIdled Under Commodity

Programs, 1965 -88

Year Land Area

(millionhectares)

1965 17.41966 19.31967 10.21968 14.51969 20.3

1970 21.51971 13.71972 23.81973 6.81974 0.0

1975 0.01976 0.01977 0.01978 7.41979 5.3

1980 0.01981 0.01982 4.51983 31.51984 10.9

1985 12.5

1986 17.5

1987 21.71988 20.1

souncE: Brad Karmen. U.S. Department of Agri-culture. private communication. June 24. 1988.

production in 1989. However, the 12million hectares of highly erodible crop-land that has been planted to grass ortrees since early 1986 under the Conser-vation Reserve Program should not bedisturbed."

The overwhelming dependence onNorth America, where agricultural out-put in both the United States and Can-ada is affected by the same climatic cycle,

introduces a special dimension of foodinsecurity. A drought in the UnitedStates is invariably accompanied by onein Canada. In 1988, when the U.S. grainharvest was down 29 percent, that ofCanada was reduced by 33 percent. Withthe United States and Canada control-ling a larger share of grain exports thanthe Middle East does of oil, this is anissue of concern to food-importingcountries everywhere.68

The risk of such overwhelming depen-dence on one region is obvious. Duringthe eighties, North American grain ex-ports have averaged around 110 milliontons per year. Even at this level, someU.S. cropland has been idled duringmost of the decade.

As stocks have dropped, higher pricesand scarce supplies increasingly pose aserious threat to those food-importingcountries with low incomes. When car-ryover stocks hit 57 days at the end of1972, the United States returned itsidled cropland to use. Four years passed,however, before world grain reserveswere rebuilt and food-importing coun-tries could again breathe easily.

Thus, the devastated grain crop inNorth America in 1988 is sobering newsfor the more than 100 countries that de-pend on imports from the North Ameri-can breadbasket. For the poorer food-deficit countries, many with externaldebts that are already unmanageable,maintaining needed imports in the faceof sharp price rises may not be possible.For people living in these countries, theroad to the next harvest could be a longone.

In the drought-stricken year of 1988,the U.S. grain harvest fell below domes-tic consumption, probably for the firsttime in history. (See Table 3-5.) With aharvest of 196 million tons and an es-timated consumption of 206 milliontons, there was no surplus for exportfrom the 1988 crop. Export demandsuntil the 1989 harvest begins are being

(p8) State of the World 1989

Table 3-5. United States; Grain Production, Consumption, and Exportable Surplus byCrop Year, 1980-88

Year Production Consumption

ExportableSurplus fromCurrent Crop°

(million metric tons)1980 268 171 + 971981 328 179 + 1491982 331 194 + 1371983 206 182 + 24

1984 313 197 + 1161985 345 201 + 1441986 311 217 + 971987 277 215 + 621988 196 206 10

1Docs not include carryovcr stocks.souttcx: USDA, Forcign Agricultural Service, World Crain Situation and Outlook, Washington, D.C., Octoberand Novembcr 1988.

met almost entirely by drawing downstocks. If those had not been available,the 10-million-ton shortfall would alsohave forced a reduction in domestic con-sumption, or the importation of grain ifit were available.

What will happen if there is a severedrought in 1989? Historically, the oddsagainst severe back-to-back droughtshave been rather high. But with globalwarming now apparently under way, thefrequency of hot, dry summers is in-creasing. In the event of even a moder-ate drought in North America, worldfood prices would soar, A severedrought would cause a global foodemergency.

In sum, overall food security is beingthreatened by two trends. One is the lossof momentum in the growth in output, aloss that is particularly noticeable inmajor developing countries, such asChina, India, Indonesia, and Mexico.

The second trend is the warming of theplanet. The areas that are likely to expe-rience higher temperatures and lowerrainfall include some of the earth's keyfood-producing regions, such as mid-continental North America. The world'sfarmersalready struggling to keep upwith the record year-to-year growth inpopulationare facing the nineties witha great deal of uncertainty about howquickly the warming will progress andhow it will affect their production.

Meeting adequate food needs duringthe nineties and beyond will require farmore of the attention of political leaders,particularly those in the Third World,than ever before. (See Chapter 10,) Un-less national governments are preparedto wage the war against hunger on amuch broader front, it may not be possi-ble to arrest the decline in per capitafood production that is now undermin-ing the future of so many people.

4

Abandoning HomelandsJodi L. Jacobson

More than two years after an explosionat a nuclear reactor in the Ukrainespewed clouds of radiation from Kiev toKrakow, Soviet officials have announcedplans to demolish the adjacent town ofChernobyl. This death warrant extin-guished any hope of returning home forthe city's 10,000 former residents. Be-cause the world's worst nuclear disasterhas permanently contaminated theirtown, they will be forced to settle else-where.'

These people are refugees, thoughnot by any standard definition. Accord-ing to widely accepted doctrine, refu-gees are people who decide to seek asy-lum out of fear of political, racial, orreligious persecution, or who leave theirhomes because of war or civil strife. Thisconventional notion, however, leavesout a new and growing classenviron-mental refugees.

Throughout the world, vast areas arebecoming unfit for human habitation.These lands are being despoiled eitherthrough long-term environmental deg-radation or by brief but catastrophicevents. Unsustainable land use practices,

An expanded version of this chapter appeared asWorldatch Paper 86, Environmental Refugees: AYareluiek of Habitability.

for example, have reduced the ability ofecosystems to support life throughoutthe Third World. At the same time, high-risk technologies have sometimes re-sulted in accidents, such as the Cherno-byl explosion, that leave whole regionsuninhabitable for extended periods.Moreover, the expected rise in sea levelbecause of global warming threatens toreduce the planet's habitable area on agrand scale.

The growing number of people flee-ing from environmental decline adds anew dimension to an already controver-sial global refugee problem. The num-ber needing protection and assistanceunder traditional refugee classifications,now more than 13 million, mounts dailydue to wars and insurrections, despoticgovernments, and deteriorating eco-nomic conditions, particularly in theThird World. Meanwhile, nations thathave been traditional havens are increas-ingly trying to restrict this form of immi-gration.2

Most governments do not recognizeenvironmental decline as a legitimatecause of refugee movements. Neitherthe U.S. State Department nor the U.N.High Commissioner for Refugees, forexample, collects data on this problem.

(6o) State of the World 1989

Yet the number of environmental refu-geesestimated to be at least 10 mil-lionrivals that of officially recognizedcategories and is sure to overtake them.3

Judging by what people will put upwith before they move away from an en-vironmental hazard, society's standardsconcerning habitability are fairly lax.People are willing to tolerate a broadrange of threats to health and longevity.Witness the fact that, throughout theworld, densely populated cities plaguedby air and water pollution are the rulerather than the exception. And in manycountries, millions have built homes inareas prone to avalanches and floods.

For every environmental refugee,then, there are thousands more whoselives are compromised every day by un-healthy or hazardous conditions. Be-cause migration is a last resortwhenconditions become so poor that life itselfis in imminent dangerthe rising num-ber of environmental refugees should beseen as an important indicator of the ex-tent and severity of worldwide envirc n-mental deterioration.

IN SEARCH OF FERTILESOILS

In his landmark historical novel TheGrapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck chroni-cled the economic and environmentaldisintegration of American farms in theGreat Plains during the thirties. Duringthat period, small farmers caught in thevise of poverty and debt took to plantingcrops from fencerow to fencerow to sur-vive. Failed harvests and subsequentforeclosures rent the fabric of rural soci-ety, sending thousands of families west-ward in search of a livelihood. Most ofthese former landowners and sharecrop-pers became migrant workers.4

Though Steinbeck never used theterm, his "Okies" were environmentalrefugees. To be sure, the depression hada strong impact on U.S. agriculture. Butit. was the severely degraded environ-ment dubbed the Dust Bowl that ulti-mately forced farmers from their land.Unsustainable farming practices had im-poverished soils and made them morevulnerable to erosion by wind and rain.As the drought that became a hallmarkof that decade deepened, rural people'seconomic margin of safety vanishedalong with their topsoil.

Today, this story is repeating itself inmany parts of the world. Agriculturallands are degrading on every continent.This deterioration is most acute and itsimpact is greatest in those developingcountries where the majority of the peo-ple are farmers. Soil erosion may costCanada some $1 billion annually in re-duced yields, but Canadians do notstarve. By contrast, sharply deterioratingland resources in Africa imperil the livesof millions.3

Land degradation is most often as-sociated with poverty. Indeed, the twoform a vicious circle. Throughout theThird World, subsistence farmers ekeout a living on !and depleted of nutri-ents, stripped of topsoil, and no longerable to withstand natural stresses such a°drought or heavy rain.

These cultivators are, in a sense, vic-tims of circumstance. Though the grossdomestic product of most developingcountries is dominated by farm goods,few invest in the agricultural sectorbeyond their support of cash crops forexport. The low, government-regulatedprices, inadequate credit and extensionservices, and inequitable land tenurecharacteristic of many developing coun-tries have kept small landholders fromincreasing productivity in a sustainablemanner. Eventually their land is de-pleted beyond restoration. Once this

Abandoning Homelands (6i)

stage is reached, people are forced tomove.

Pressed by growing families and deep-ening poverty, farmers make decisionsto increase productivity that, in the longrun, prove environmentally andeconomically disastrous. Cultivatingland that should be fallowed, dividingalready small plots among family mem-bers, bearing numerous children to helpwith farm chores, cutting ever-scarcertrees for fuel and fodder are all practicesthat, while they may ensure a meagerharvest for tomorrow, make certain thatfamine is inevitable.

Mass migrations have become the en-during symbol of hunger. In Ethiopia,relief workers watch the movements ofvillagers toward food distribution cen-ters as one indicator of conditions in therural areas. In the country's northern re-gion, "stone deserts" have replacednearly 4 million hectares of once-fertilefarmland. In June 1988, the U.S. em-bassy in Addis Ababa reported thatabout I million people in the highlandswere about to move unexpectedly due tofamine conditions. Soil erosion andrapid loss of productivity ensure that thenext drought will create a new wave ofenvironmental refugees.6

Many fleeing land degradation are notclassified as environmental refugees be-cause they simply move on to cultivateincreasingly marginal lands. In Africa,thousands end up in the relief campsthat are now regular fixtures on that con-tinent. Others move to urban areas: themassive shift to cities that has occurredin the Third World since mid-century isdue in large part to the complex of fac-tors underlying land degradation.

"Throughout the Third World. landdegradation has been the main factor inthe migration of subsistence farmersinto the slums and shantytowns of majorcities, producing desperate populationsvulnerable to disease and natural disas-ters and prone to participate in crime

and civil strife," according to the UnitedNations Environment Programme(UNEP). Such exodus ... exacerbate[s1the already dire urban problems. . . .

And, at the same time, it has delayedefforts to rehabilitate and develop ruralareasthrough the lack of manpowerand the increased negligence of land."

Mass migrations have become theenduring symbol of hunger.

Desertification, the most severe formof land degradation, is most acute in theand and semiarid regions. (See Chapter2.) A UNEP survey estimated that 4.5billion hectares around the worldfully35 percent of the earth's land surfaceare in various stages of desertification.More than 850 million people live inthese areas; many risk having theirhomes and livelihoods foreclosed byland degradation .6

About 135 million people inhabitareas undergoing severe desertification.Soil scientist Harold Dregne of TexasTech University notes that "50 million. . . have already experienced a majorloss in their ability to support them-selves. [Furthermore) an unknown per-centage of that 50 million will have toabandon their agricultural way of lifeand join the overcrowded cities to seekrelief."

Africa, a land where poor soils andvariable rainfall pose a harsh climate foragriculture, has spawned the most envi-ronmental refugees. Most come fromthe Sahel, a belt that spans several agro-ecological zones and stretches west toeast across some nine countries fromMauritania and Senegal on into theSudan. Desertification is accelerating inthe Sahel, the world's largest area to bethreatened by the wholesale loss of ara-ble land. As the region's habitability de-clines, the movement of people in-


creases: in the last 20 years, the area'surban population has quadrupled.'°

Two major droughts have occurred inthe Sahel over the past two decades. Inthe first. from 1968 to 1973. between100,000 and 250,000 people who waitedtoo long to migrate died. To escape thisfate, many Sahelians moved south andwest to coastal African nations. Wholevillages were abandoned as the move-ment across and within borders gotunder way. The flux of environmentalrefugees was the largest ever witnessed:more than 250,000 people in Mauri-tania, 20 percent of its population,joined the already growing ranks of des-titute farmers in the country's towns.Nearly 1 million environmental refugeesin Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), asixth of the country's population, mi-grated to cities."

By 1974 there were 200,000 peoplein Niger completely dependent onfood distribution in towns and camps. InMali, 250,000, or 5 percent of the popu-lation, were totally aid-dependent. Coted'Ivoire, with a relatively stable and de-veloped economy, became the principaldestination for many refugees from thegrowing desert. t2

Years of lower-than-average rainfallpersisted throughout the seventies andeighties, leading up to the seconddrought. By early 1984, more than 150million people in 24 western, eastern,and southern African countries were onthe brink of starvation. By March 1985,the drought had forced an estimated 10million people to abandon their homesin search of food.'3

In just five countriesBurkina Faso,Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Nigermore than 2 million people were dis-placed during this second drought. (SeeTable 4-1.) Some 3 million, half ofNiger's population, were affected bydrought during 1983. There, Fulaniand Tuareg pastoralists became paup-ers as two thirds of their herds died. By

Table 4.1. Displaced Population inSelected African Countries, September

1985

CountryPeople Share of

Displaced Population

(number) (percent)Burkina Faso 222,000 3Chad 500.000 11

Mali 200,000 3Mauritania 190,000 12Niger 1,000,000 16

SOURCES: U.N. Office of Emergency Operations inAfrica. Status Report on Me Emergency Situation inAfrica as of 1 September 1985 (New York: UnitedNations, 1985).

June 1985, some 400,000 nomads hadmoved to the cities. The population ofMauritania's capital, Nouakchott,swelled to four times its original size asdesert swept the countryside. Its an-cient cities of Chinguetti, Tichitt,Oualata, and Ouadane are now underconstant siege from glacier-like wavesof sand. Mauritania's only major road-way, optimistically christened the"Highway of Hope," has become hope-lessly impassable.14

Changes in land use since colonialtimes that have undermined the partner-ship between people and land areamong the causes of the Sahel's decline.Both human and livestock populationshave increased dramatically. One resulthas been a growing competition be-tween farmers and livestock herders forscarce land. In the state of Borno in Ni-geria, a stable agricultural balance hadheld for centuries due to complementaryland use patterns developed by theHausa planters and the itinerant cattle-herders, the Fulani. But a breakdown inland stewardship, combined with the re-gion's droughts, has reduced productiv-ity and heightened tensions between thegroups. In many cases, the herders havehad to migrate.15

Pastoralists, politically less powerful

Abandoning Homelands (63)

than their agrarian counterparts, oftenlose out in the struggle for land and arefaced with the choice of grazing theirherds on smaller patches or becomingsettled farmers themselves. Long accus-tomed to wandering the continent's aridand semiarid lands in an ecologicallybalanced if somewhat tenuous partner-ship with nature, many of the great pas-toral tribes, like the Fulani and the Tua-reg, have been forced by governmentpolicy and land degradation to adopt amore sedentary life-style.

Governments throughout the Sahelencourage the establishment of cash-crop plantations and settled agriculturein rangelands for a host of economic andpolitical reasons. But these types offarming, less ecologically appropriatethan pastoralism in arid lands, reducefallow periods and intensify degradationon land that is far too fragile for sus-tained cultivation. Not only have thesepolicies further diminished the nomads'domain, but their increased conversionto sedentary farming concentrates largenumbers of people and livestock aroundoases that in the past were visited onlyon a seasonal basis. (See Chapter 2.)Refugees from land degradation today,former nomads like the Tuaregs are sureto be on the move again within the nextdecade or so due to the declining habita-bility of the ecosystems they are crowd-ing into.

Land degradation is also undermininghabitability north of the Sahel. Largerhuman and cattle populations have ex-ceeded the carrying capacity of aridlands in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco,and Tunisia. In Algeria, for example,desertification has begun to undercutthe economy. UNEP notes that north ofthe Saharan Atlas mountains "somelarge settlements and cultivated landsare threatened by shifting sand dunesand sand drift." In Morocco, high popu-lation densities on arid lands are leading

to desertification. Irrigation canals,roads, and oases are threatened by drift-ing sand and shifting dunes.is

In the southern part of the continent,deforestation, soil erosion, and the de-pletion of water supplies have driventens of thousands of environmental refu-gees from their farmlands to other ruralareas, into towns and cities, or into reliefcamps. In Botswana, for example, bore-holes have been drilled in many parts ofthe country to supply the water needs ofcattle herds that have multiplied in partdue to government incentives to exportbeef. Water tables are now droppingsteadily as a result, forcing herders tomigrate or give up their stock.i/

What seems to be self-reinforcingdrought conditions have also taken holdin India. Between 1978 and 1988, west-ern Rajasthan and parts of eastern Indiawere gripped by serious drought. Thou-sands of farmers whose crops had failedfor years on end began moving out ofthese areas by mid-1988 to neighboringHaryana and Madhya Pradesh. Manymoved to the huge coastal, city of Ma-dras, where the influx caused lines forsuch basic commodities as water.is

Mauritania's ancient cities of Chin-guetti and Oudane are now undersiege from glacier-like waves ofsand.

In Latin America and the Caribbean,land degradation results from the com-bination of highly inequitable land dis-tribution and rapidly growing popula-tions. Latin America is home to some ofthe world's biggest cities in large partbecause of migration from rural areas.Millions of poverty-stricken farmers fac-ing decades of agricultural neglect andland degradation throughout the moun-


tains and the plains of South America fillthe urban shantytowns of Sic) Paulo, Riode Janeiro, Mexico City, Lima, and LaPaz. In many countries, particularly inCentral America, the response to endur-ing poverty and environmental declinehas been civil war and migration, oftenillegal, to the United States."

Haiti, already the poorest country inthe western hemisphere, also has thefastest-growing population. One third ofthe nation's land, exhausted by decadesof deforestation and poor husbandry, isnow virtually useless, and about 40 per-cent of the population is malnourished.More than half the land is held by lessthan 4 percent of the planters. The aver-age holding for a peasant farmer is lessthan an acre. When food production perperson began to decline in the fifties,farmers started adding to their incomesby selling charcoal. As trees vanished, sodid the topsoil, further reducing foodproduction and increasing reliance oncharcoal for income. A combination ofpolitical repression, economic decline,and environmental devastation haspushed an estimated i million refu-geesone sixth of Haiti's populationout of the country over the pastdecade."

Agriculture is the backbone of devel-oping economies. Yet throughout theThird World, farmers have been forcedby financial and population pressures toadopt shortcut methods that are leadingto long-term land degradation. By inter-fering with important natural cycles andoverusing fragile, barely stable ecosys-tems. they are creating a self-reinforcingcycle of land deterioration. When thecountryside is no longer able to producea crop, the farmers along with the rest ofthe rural populace are forced to moveon. Whether they end up in cities, in re-lief camps, or on other marginal lands,these people constitute a growing classof environmental refugees.

r-',:-.)1 .

UNNATURAL DISASTERS

When an earthquake in Colombia or aflood in India causes hundreds of deathsand leaves thousands homeless, societyaccepts these losses as unfortunate acci-dents of fate. But more people are beingkilled or displaced by avalanches. cy-clones, earthquakes, and floods thanever before, and close examination ofthe environmental backdrop againstwhich these events occur suggests astrong human component. These disas-ters are second only to land degradationas a factor in the growing number of en-vironmental refugees.

"Unnatural disasters"normal eventswhose effects are exacerbated by humanactivitiesare on the rise. Human pres-sures on forests, soils, and land haverendered ecosystems less resilient, lessable to cope with natural fluctuations.Ultimately, they collapse under other-wise normal stresses, creating and mag-nifying disasters such as landslides andfloods.

At the same time, competition for landand natural resources is driving morepeople to live in these marginal, disas-ter-prone areas, leaving them more vul-nerable to natural forces. Hence, mil-lions of Bangladeshis live on chars, barsof silt and sand in the middle of the Ben-gal delta, some of which are washedaway each year by ocean tides and mon-soon floods. Millions of Nepalis live inthe areas most likely to be hit by earth-quakes. And thousands of slum dwellersin the cities of Latin America perch ondeforested hillsides prone to mudslidesin heavy rain.

Human-induced changes in the envi-ronment can turn a normal event into acatastrophe. The deterioration of majorwatersheds in many developing coun-tries, for example, increases the numberof devastating floods. A 1988 flood inBangladesh came on the heels of heavymonsoon rains in the Himalayan water-

Abandoning Homelands Opshed of the Ganges river system. In addi-tion to an astounding 25 million lefthomeless, at least 1,200 people died andhundreds of thousands more contracteddiseases as a result ofcontaminated foodand water supplies.2'

Bangladesh, with its per capita incomeof $160 ranking it among the world'spoorest, is one of the most denselypopulated nations. More than 110 mil-lion peoplealmost half the populationof the United Statesare packed into acountry about the size of Wisconsin. Thenation sits on a vast, low-lying island ofsilt that makes up the world's largestriver delta.22

Bangladeshis are accustomed to hav-ing water overflow the banks of theirmighty rivers. Each year, monsoon rainsquench the thirsty Indian subcontinent.shedding moisture essential for crops.Water accumulated in the Himalayanranges of Bhutan, India, Nepal. andTibet runs through the Ganges and twoother large rivers, the Brahmaputra andthe Meghna, into Bangladesh, supplyingall but 10 percent of the country'swater.26

This water is critical to Bangladesh'sagricultural output: rice farmers, for ex-ample, depend on moderate annualfloods for a successful harvest. And thesilt carried by rivers and streams into thedelta region helps maintain soil fertility.In moderation, these natural commodi-ties are essential to Bangladesh; in ex-cess, they can be disastrous.

But up in the Himalayan watershed,where agrarian people depend on woodfor fuel, a large and rapidly expandingrural population has been outstrippingthe carrying capacity of the environ-ment. Deforestation, overgrazing, andunsustainable farming practices have di-minished the soil's ability to absorbwater. Available data, though not com-prehensive, suggest that from half tothree fourths of the middle mountain

ranges in Nepal and India have been de-forested in the last four decades.24

In the past, truly massive floods hitBangladesh only once every 50 years orso. But since mid-century the number oflarge-scale iloods has markedly in-creased. The country was heavily inun-dated on average once every four yearsthrough the seventies. After a flood in1974, an estimated 300,000 people diedin a famine that led to the overthrow ofthe country's founder, Sheik MujiburRahman. Since 1980, several "50-year"floods have occurred, each worse thanthe last.25

Similarly, degradation of the Nile wa-tershed contributed to flooding in theSudan in 1988. The headwaters of theBlue Nile are in the highlands of Ethio-pia, where a rich and diverse agriculturedeveloped thousands of years ago.Today, the highlands constitute 90 per-cent of the arable land, supporting 88percent of the country's population and60 percent ofits livestock. But deforesta-tion and poor soil husbandry, coupledwith rapid population growth. have un-dermined the nation's agriculturalbase.26

Thousands of slum dwellers inLatin America perch on deforestedhillsides prone to mudslides inheavy rain.

Because land degradation has dis-rupted the hydrological cycle, in whichwater is recycled to and from the atmo-sphere through soil absorption andplant transpiration, the entire region isconsiderably drier than in the past. Ex-tensive floods are not normally a featureof the region downstream of the high-lands. but in 1988 an exceptionallyheavy rainfall, together with the water-shed's reduced holding capacity, al-

, u0


lowed a torrent to wreak havoc on theSudanese plain below. Khartoum wasravaged by the deepest flooding to strikethe Sudan in this century, and some 1.5million people were left homeless.27

Some "natural" tragedies are the re-sult of development strategies that bla-tantly disregard their impact on the envi-ronment. In 1983, a cyclone in thePhilippines that normally might havecaused fewer than 100 fatalities killedthousands. Floods caused by the tropicalstorm were far more numerous and se-vere than in the past. "Villages built inplaces where flooding had not been aproblem before are having to deal withpatterns of water runoff that have beenradically changed by the lumbering andmining operations which have spreadunchecked," writes Debora MacKenziein the Kew Scientist. "Slag heaps frommines have been thrown up in valleys,sometimes completely rerouting rivers,and whole forests have disappeared."28

Deforestation of mountains and hillsthat ring cities in the developing worldhas led to an increasing number of mud-slides in urban shantytowns. In Septem-ber 1987, more than 500 people werekilled in a cascade of mud and rocks inMedellin, Colombia, after torrentialrains had soaked the Andes for a week.Only half the population of Villa Tina,an impoverished suburb of Medellin,survived the catastrophe."

Five months later a similar disaster hitthe shantytowns of Rio deJaneiro. Eigh-teen inches of rain fell un the city overthree weeks, destabilizing the mountain-sides once forested by soil-grabbingtrees but now blanketed with huts ofscrap wood, adobe, and sheet metal.Nearly 300 people died, 1.000 were, in-jured, and more than 18,000 were lefthomeless. Mac Margolis of the Washing-ton Post noted that although this was theworst such storm since 1966, "Lately. . . even modest rains have provendeadly . , render[ing) this sophisticated

81

metropolis a hostage to the elements.""These "unnatural disasters" are

largely a product of the same kind ofland degradation discussed in the previ-ous section, in which financial and popu-lation pressures force both farmers andurban dwellers onto marginal lands thatsoon lose their stability. But in this casethe lend degradationwhile devastatingin itself and also to be feared because itis self-reinforcing--inhibits the ability ofecosystems to roll with nature'spunches. The result has been that therare has become commonplace, the ex-tremes of weather that have been en-dured and survived through the mil-lennia are increasingly turning intofull-fledged catastrophes on an unprece-dented scale.

A TOXIC HOMEAlthough Guy Reynolds and his wifemoved to Springfield, Vermont, in a mo-bile home, they arrived with the inten-tion of staying put. But the Reynoldsfamily and 59 other residents of the mo-bile-home park in which they live havebeen forced to evacuate. In July 1988,the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) ordered their relocationwhen it determined that the park wasatop a landfill containing toxic chemi-cals. The Reynolds family and theirneighbors are among a small but grow-ing number of refugees from land poi-soned by hazardous wastes. Once con-fined to industrial countries, theinherent conflict between disposal oftoxic wastes and human habitation isspreading around the world.3'

Chemical contamination can be sud-denthe result of a rail accident, for in-stance, Or it can result from the insidi-ous penetration of toxics into theatmosphere, the food chain, or water


supplies. Although toxic wastes pose apervasive threat to the environment,until recently few countries had lawsregulating their disposal. As a result,many companies found it easier andcheaper to discard their wastes intolandfills, waterways, or the atmosphere.The disposal of chemical wastes in land-fills over the past several decades hascreated enormous problems for COIMMU-nities throughout the world now facedwith the choice of expensive cleanups orcontamination of their environment byleaking toxics.

In the United States, dumping wastesinto landfills that were later topped offand used for other purposes, such ashousing developments, became com-monplace. Today, thousands of toxicwaste sites are festering sores in townsand cities throughout the country, and abattle continues over the hazards theyrepresent and who should bear the re-sponsibility for cleaning them up. Insome cases. people remain in theirhomes, accepting higher risks to healthbecause they are unable to sell theirproperty and cannot otherwise afford tomove. In other cases, toxic contamina-tion is so bad that whole communitiesbecome ghost towns virtually overnight.

Love Canal was one such community.Beginning in 1920, a partially completedchannel between the upper and lowerNiagara Rivers in upstate New Yorkcame into use as a municipal and chemi-cal waste dump. In 1953, the channelwas filled in, and homes and schoolswere subsequently built on and aroundthe site. Over time, chemicals buried inthe canal began to surface, and residentsoften complained of strange odors andsubstances. In 1976, a consultant discov-ered toxic chemical residues in the airand sump pumps of a good percentageof homes bordering the canal. High lev-els of carcinogenic polychlorinatedbiphenyls (PCBs) were found in thestorm sewer system."

Not until 1978 did the New York StateDepartment of Healthbased on evi-dence of a high incidence of reproduc-tive problems among women and highlevels of chemical contamination inhomes, the soil, and airorder the evac-uation of pregnant women and of chil-dren under the age of two from 239homes. Eventually, all but 86 of the 900families living in Love Canal were evacu-ated. Purchasing the homes of the for-mer residents cost the federal govern-ment $20 million. Another $200 millionis being spent to clean up the area."

In the United States, thousand oftoxic waste sites are festering soresin towns and cities.

Love Canal proved to be just the firstof many. Thousands of other sites acrossthe country are contaminated by bothlegally and illegally dumped wastes.Realizing that both government and in-dustry would have to share the burden ofthe cleanup, the U.S. Congress enactedthe Superfund program in 1980."

Since then, 1,390 families in 42 com-munities across the United States havebeen relocated with Superfund money.In 1983, Times Beach, Missouri, a sub-urb of St. Louis with a population of2,400, was abandoned and disincor-porated as a result of the careless spray-ing on city streets of oil laced with highlytoxic dioxin. A combination of federaland state funds helped relocate familiesfrom Globe, Arizona, and Centralia,Pennsylvania. in the same year."

Because relocation is less costly andsimpler than detoxifying contaminatedsitesnot to. mention a faster way ofprotecting peoplethe U.S. govern-ment has increasingly used this option todeal with the toxic waste problem. Since


1985 this class of environmental refu-gees has more than doubled.%

Some who would flee remain in haz-ardous areas because of financial circum-stances. About a fifth of the petrochemi-cal production in the United States isconcentrated along the 85-mile stretchof the Mississippi River that winds fromBaton Rouge to New Orleans. Louisi-ana. Local economies are primarily de-pendent on the jobs and income offeredby the 135 chemical plants and seven oilrefineries that line this corridor. But theregion absorbs more toxic substancesannually than do most entire states, in-cluding such dangerous substances asvinyl chloride, a carcinogen and sus-pected embryotoxin.37

The Polish government recentlydeclared Bogomice and four othervillages "unfit for human habita-tion."

According to the Washington Pos1, "theair, ground, and water along this corri-dor are so full of carcinogens, mutagens,and embryotoxins that an environmentalhealth specialist defined living [there] as'a massive human experiment,' the stateattorney general called the pollution 'amodern form of barbarism,' anti a chem-ical union leader now refers to it as 'thenational sacrifice zone.' " Several townsin the corridor exhibit uncommonly highrates of cancer and miscarriages.%

Because most of these compoundsrepresent creeping rather than suddendangers to health, and because little re-search has been undertaken to separateout the contribution of toxic chemicalsfrom other health threats, governmentprotection or assistance tor relocationdoes not extend to residents of Louisi-ana's chemical corridor. Indeed, publicpoliciessuch as lax controls on pollut-

ers have encouraged the growth of thisindustry. As a result, hundreds of thou-sands of people remain subject to thedangers of toxic poisoning and diseasein an area that is barely inhabitable.

Urban residents around the worldhave long tacitly accepted the reality ofliving with higher levels of pollution intheir immediate environment, particu-larly in the air they breathe. Automo-biles, power plants, and industrial plantsare the biggest contributors to air pollu-tion. Where pollution control technol-ogy is unavailable or regulations areunenforced, as in Eastern Europe andthe Soviet Union, regions where thepostwar rush to industrialize was givenprecedence over environmental protec-tion, emissions have made atmosphericpollution so bad that whole regions arevirtually uninhabitable.

Pollution poses grave threats to agri-culture and human health throughoutEastern Europe. The Polish govern-ment, for example, recently declaredBogomice and four other villages "unfitfor human habitation" due to the ex-tremely high levels of heavy metals in theair and soil deposited by emissions fromnearby copper-smelting plants. The gov-ernment is encouraging villagers fromthis region to resettle elsewhere by of-fering compensation.39

Likewise, in the Soviet Union the qual-ity of air, soil, water, and forest re-sources is in rapid decline. Fyodor Mor-gun, head of the country's Environ-mental Protection Committee, declaredrecently that degradation from indus-trial waste has reached the proportionsof"a Chernobyl-like catastrophe." Prob-lems are particularly acute in the UralMountains, a region of heavy industry.In December 1987, Pravda stated thatthe industrial city of Ufa, with a popula-tion of nearly 1 million, had become"unfit for human habitation. "4°

Sudden accidents, such as a rail crash,fire, or explosion, can instantaneously


confer upon thousands of people thestatus of environmental refugee. In the19 years leading up to 1978, seven majorchemical accidents worldwide killed 739people, injured 2.647. and forced 18,-230 from their homes. All but one occur-red in industrial countries. Since then,the number and se%erity of toxic diha.-ters has increased, with more of these inthe Third World. In the eight years fol-lowing 1978, there were 13 major chemi-cal accidents. The numbers tell the trag-edy: 3,930 dead; 4,848 injured; andnearly 1 million evacuated. 41

Among the worst examples of an acci-dent in the industrial world was the 1976explosion at a small chemical plant inSeveso, Italy, that sent a cloud of smokeand highly toxic dioxin particles waftingover the countryside. Eight hundredpeople were evacuated from their homesfor more than a year; although manyhave returned, questions about theirhealth linger. Incomplete data suggestan elevated rate of birth defects in thetwo years following the explosion.Whether the accident will result in ahigher incidence of cancers with long la-tency periods will only be known overtime.42

Higher wage costs and tighter con-trols on production and disposal of haz-ardous chemical materials in industrialnations, along with the development of aglobal market for chemical products,have sent some multinational firms scur-rying to build plants in developing na-tions. Experience shows that such invest-ments can be a mixed blessing. Althoughthey gain some jobq and revenue fromthe chemical industry, most developingcountries have neither laws controllingtoxic chemicals nor the technical and in-stitutional capacity to put them intoforce. The general lack of controlsmakes incidems of contamination morelikely.4s

The toxic leak in 1984 at Bhopal,India, was perhaps the worst example of

this trend. A Union Carbide pesticideplant accidentally released a cloud ofdeadly methyl isocyante over the town,killing about 2,500 and sending morethan 200,000 fleeing for their lives. Asmany as 100,000 people are still suffer-ing side effects. such as blurred vision,disabling lung diseases, intestinal bleed-ing, and neurological and psychologicaldisorders. Bhopal, less a case of perma-nently reduced environmental habitabil-ity, is certainly evidence of the dangersinherent in many of the industrial anddevelopment choices being madetoday.44

Nuclear reactor accidents have themost pervasive and long-lasting conse-quences of any industrial catastrophe.The April 1986 explosion and fire atChernobyl in the Soviet Union caused apartial meltdown of the plant's reactorcore. More than seven tons of radioac-tive material were hurled into the atmo-sphere, eventually contaminating land,food, and water throughout much ofEurope. Twenty-eight people died fromacute radiation poisoning wit',,irt 75 daysof the accident, while another 300 weretreated for serious radiation exposure.More than 100,000 peopie were evacu-ated from their homes, and up to 2,500square kilometers became uninhabit-able.45

Chernobyl was the worst react( I. acci-dent in history and will not easily be for-gotten. But the fact remains ti-. ,:: ..at evenmore serious disaster could .accur at anytime at a reactor in a densely populatedarea. A Chernobyl-like accident at theIndian Point plant in the New York met-ropolitan region could require the per-manent evacuation of more than i mil-lion people. Assessing the risks inherentin using nuclear power under the mostoptimistic conditions, nuclear analystshave determined that with 500 nuclearplants in operation, there would be onecore-damaging accident every 20 years,


based on one accident for every 10,000years of reactor operation. But theThree Mile Island accident in the UnitedSlates occurred after only 1,500 years ofworldwide reactor operation, and Cher-nobyl occurred after another 1,900years 46

The rapidly growing volume of haz-ardous waste in industrialized nations,coupled with high disposal costs, has ledsome companies to export their indus.trial residues to the Third World. threat-ening a new wave of chemical illnessesand refugees. It costs from $250 to $350per ton to dispose of hazardous munici-pal and industrial wastes in the UnitedSlates, for example, but some develop-ing countries will accept such wastes foras little as $40 per ton.47

Local conditions and lack of monitor-ing or waste treatment means that alarge proportion of these importedwaves will end up in the local environ-ment. Frequent rains and poor soils intropical areas hasten the migration ofchemical wastes into groundwater sup-plies.

Thousands of tons of U.S. and Euro-pean wastes have already been shippedto Africa and the Middle East. Some3,800 tons of toxic waste from Italydumped in the small Nigerian porttown of Koko in five shipments between1987 and 1988 contained at least 150ions of PCBsihe chemical that putLove Canal on the map. The contami-nation was the result of an illegal dealbetween an Italian waste contractor andseveral corrupt Nigerian governmentofficials. Residents of Koko complainedthat the odors given off by the leakingsack, and containers of waste madethen ill. The government plans to evac-ua..e the 5,000 residents. The Italiangovernment has since accepted respon-si'oility for reclaiming and destroyingthe wastes but, as of early December1988, a ship laden with the toxics from

Koko had yet to find a port that wouldaccept the hazardous chemicals.46

Similarly, waste shipped from Italy toLebanon in May 1988 will be reclaimedby Italy and incinerated aboard a ship inthe middle of the Pacific. More than2,400 tons of toxic chemicals found theirway to Beirut in a transaction involvingboth Lebanese and European mer-chants, without government supervi.sion. Lebanon's health minister recog-nized the threat immediately: thesewastes are "poisonous and harmful toman and the environment," he said.Other countries, such as Benin, theCongo, and Guinea-Bissau, are recon-sidering plans to accept large quantitiesof waste from the United Slates andEurope in the wake of an internationaloutcry against dumping. The Congo, forexample, recently canceled a contract toaccept 20,000-50,000 tons of pesticideresidue and sludge waste a month froma firm in New Jersey."

Growing recognition and control ofhazardous waste disposal may make theworld a safer place to livefor a while.Two international treaties that wouldcurtail trade in hazardous exports arebeing negotiated, and individual coun-tries and regions are beginning to takeaction on their own. In May 1988, theOrganization of African Unity passed aresolution condemning the practice ofaccepting toxic chemicals from the in-dustrial world, and various of its mem-ber slates are taking action to imple-ment the declaration. The same month,the European Parliament urged its gov-ernments to adopt national legislationthat would ensure recipient countriescan handle the wastes. In the UnitedStates, two bills introduced in Congresswould restrict the export of hazardoussubstances. Despite these laudable ef-forts, hide has been done to reduce atthe source the large volumes of toxicsubstances produced by industrial aciiv-ity.60


THE THREAT OFINUNDATION

Around the world, the Dutch are per-haps best known for their achievementsin water engineering. And well theyshould be: without the carefully main-tained stretches of dikes (400 kilome-ters long) and sand dunes (200 kilome-ters) built by Holland's engineers tohold back the sea, more than half thecountry would be uninhabitable. Cur-rently, 8 million people make theirhomes and livelihoods on this re-claimed delta, a region of unquestionedsocial and economic importance. Thestakes in protecting it, however, are cer-tain to mount. Rising sea levels promiseto test even the Dutch capabilities inwater management.s1

Among the various environmentalproblems that cause the displacement ofpeople from their homes, none rivals thepotential effects of sea level rise as a re-sult of human-induced changes in theearth's climate. A one-meter rise inocean levels worldwide, for example,may result in the creation of 50 millionenvironmental refugees from variouscountriesmore than triple the numberin all recognized refugee categoriestoday.

Most scientists agree that a globalwarming is under way, caused by the ac-cumulation of "greenhouse gases" dueprimarily to fossil fuel use in industrialcountries. The uncertainties lie in justhow much higher the earth's averagetemperature will go, and how quickly theincrease will take place. Recent estimatespredict that a global temperature in-crease of 1.5-4.5 degrees Celsius (3-8degrees Fahrenheit) can be expected asearly as 2030, rising to as much as 5 de-grees by 2100. (See Chapter 1.)s2

If correct, this would precipitate a risein sea level of 1.4-2.2 meters by the endof next century. (By comparison, global

sea level rise has probably not exceeded15 centimeters over the past century.)Such an increase will affect people andinfrastructure around the globe, but de-veloping countries stand to suffer themost immediate and dramatic impacts.ss

President Maumoon Abdul Gayoomof the Maldives has put the problembluntly: "The predicted effects of thechange are unnerving: There will be sig-nificant shoreline movement and loss ofland. A higher mean sea level wouldinevitably . . . increase frequency of inun-dation and exacerbate flood damage. Itwould inundate fertile deltas, causingloss of productive agricultural land andvegetation, and increase saline en-croachment into aquifers, rivers and es-tuaries. The increased costs of recon-struction, rehabilitation and strength-ening of coastal defence systems couldturn out to be crippling for most affectedcountries."54

Some climatologists now estimate thatthe rate of sea level rise will accelerateafter 2050, reaching 2-3 centimeters ayear. But actual sea level rise will bemuch higher in some regions than oth-ers because of obvious differences likeland elevation and less obvious differ-ences in geological processes such astectonic uplift (natural shifts in theearth's crust) or subsidence in coastalareas. Subsidence is a key issue in thecase of river dehas.ss

Under natural conditions, deltas are ina state of dynamic equilibrium, formingand breaking down in a continuous pat-tern of accretion and subsidence. TheMississippi River delta in the UnitedStates, for example, was built up by sedi-ments deposited during floods and laiddown by the river on its way to the sea.Over time, these sediments accumulate.But regional and local tectonic effects.along with compaction, cause the landcreated to subside. Local subsidencealone can translate into a water level riseas great as 10 centimeters per year.. Reia-

-. .

i. S 'kJ

(7.2) Slate of the World 1989

live rates of sea level rise, then, dependon the sum of global sea level rise andlocal subsidence.5'

Subsidence is likely to acceleratewhere subterranean stores of water oroil are tapped. In Bangkok, Thailand,local subsidence has reached 13 centi-meters per year due to a drop in thewater table caused by excessive with-drawals of groundwater over the pastthree decades. Moreover, channeling,diverting, or damming rivers can greatlyreduce the amount of sediment thatreaches a delta. When this happens, as ithas on the Mississippi and the Nile, sedi-ment accumulation will not offset subsi-dence, resulting in heavier shorelineerosion and an increase in water levels."

Low-lying delta regions, importantfrom both an ecological and social stand-point, will be among the first land areaslost to inundation under even slight risesin sea level. Fertile deltas are importantsources of food and other products. Ofthe world's major deltas, several, includ-ing the Bengal and Nile, are also denselypopulated. As a result, these regions willbe the single greatest source of refugeesfrom sea level rise. A recent study byresearchers at Woods Hole Oceano-graphic Institute in Massachusettsshowed the combined effects of sea levelrise and subsidence on Bangladesh andEgypt, where the homes and livelihoodsof some 46 million people are poten-tially threatened.58

The researchers developed three pos-sible scenarios under two estimates ofsea level rise: a minimum of 13 centime-ters by 2050 and 28 centimeters by 2100,and a maximum of 79 centimeters by2050 and 217 centimeters by 2100. The"best case" scenario assumes the mini-mum rise in global sea level and a deltaregion in equilibrium. The second sce-'sari°, called the "worst case," assumesthe maximum rate of sea level rise andthe complete damming or diversion ofthe river system draining into the delta.

In this case, the rate of natural subsi-dence must then be added to the abso-lute rise in sea level. The third scenariois accurately referred to as the "reallyworst case." It assumes that excessivegroundwater pumping from irrigationand other uses accelerates natural subsi-dence.

Low-lying delta regions will beamong the first land areas lostto inundation under rises in sealevel.

To calculate the economic implica-tions of these three cases on both Egyptand Bangladesh, the researchers as-sumed present-day conditions, such asthe estimated share of total populationnow living in areas that would be inun-dated and the share of economic activitythat is derived from them. Continuedsettlement and population growth inthese areas will of course translate intoeven more future environmental refu-gees.

The Bengal Delta, resting at the con-fluence of the Ganges, Brahmaputra.and Meghna rivers, is the world's largestsuch coastal plain and constitutes about80 percent of the c .try's total area(the other one fifth is ..er). As a result,the region's inhabitants are subject toannual floods both from the rivers andfrom ocean storm surges.

Just how severely sea level rise will af-fect Bangladesh depends in part on thepace at which damming and channelingof rivers proceeds and the rate ofgroundwater withdrawal. Although an-nual flooding is severe and can damageup to one third of the crops grown onthe flood plains, large areas of the deltaregion suffer rain deficits for the rest ofthe year, thus creating a large incentiveto divert river water for agriculture.

1


Table 4-2. Effects of Sea Level Rise on the Bengal and Nile River Deltas Under TwoScenarios

Sea Level Rise

HabitableLandLost

PopulationDisplaced

GrossNationalProduct

Lost

GlobalSea Level

Rise

LocalLand

Subsidence

LocalSea Level

Rise

Bangladesh in 2050

(centimeters) (percent)

Worst Casel 79 65 144 16 13 10

Really Worst Casey 79 130 239 18 15 13

Bangladesh in 2100Worst Case' 217 115 332 26 27 22Really Worst Case 217 230 447 34 35 31

Egypt in 2050Worst Case' 79 22 101 15 14 14

Really Worst Case 79 65 :44 19 16 16

Egypt in 2100Worst Case' 217 40 257 21 19 19Really Worst Casey 217 115 332 26 24 24

lAssumes complete damming or diversion of river system draining into delta. *Assumes excessivegroundwater pumping accelerates natural subsidence,SOURCE:John D. Milliman et al., "Environmental and Economic Impact of Rising Sea Level and SubsidingDeltas: The Nile and Bengal Examples." Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. Woods Hole, Mass.,unpublished paper, 1988.

Such diversions would have a severe im-pact on the amount of sediment availa-ble to offset natural subsidence.

On the basis of the limited data availa-ble, the Woods Hole researchers haveconcluded the.;. the increasing with-drawal of groundwater in Bangladesh isaffecting subsidence rates. Between1978 and 1985, the number of wellsdrilled in the country increased at leastsixfold; more than 100,000 shallowtubewells and 20,000 deeper ones werecounted. Sediment samples suggest thatgroundwater withdrawal may haveraised subsidence to at least twice thenatural rate.

Half the country lies at elevations ofless than five meters. Loss of land underthe 13-centimeter rise in the best case

scenario would be minimal by 2050less than 1 percent of the country's total.In the 144-centimeter rise assumed inthe worst case, however, 16 percent ofthe nation's land would be lost. And inthe really worst case, local sea level risewould be 209 centimeters and 18 per-cent of the habitable land would beunder water. (See Table 4-2.) As a re-sult, more than 17 million people wouldbecome environmental refugees.

By the year 2100, the really worst casescenario shows that 35 percent of thenation's populationsome 38 millionpeoplewould be forced to felocate.The economic effects would be devastat-ing. Because nearly a third of Ban-gladesh's gross national product is real-ized within the land area that could be


lost, an already poor country would haveto accommodate its people on a farsmaller economic base.59

The combined effects of warmer cli-mates and higher seas will make tropicalstorms more frequent and more destruc-tive, raising the toll in lives and furtherdecreasing the habitability of coastalareas. Cyclones originating in the Bay ofBengal before and after the rainy seasonalready devastate the southern part ofBangladesh on a regular basis. On aver-age, 1.5 severe cyclones now hit thecountry each year. Storm surges as muchas six meters higher than normal canreach as far as 200 kilometers inland.Total property loss from storms in theregion between 1945 and 1975 has beenestimated at $7 billion, and some 300,-000 lives were lost in 1970 when surgewaters covered an estimated 35 percentof Bangladesh. The imp.4ct of strongerand more frequent storms on thisdensely populated country is unthink-able.

Bangladesh as it is known todaymay virtually cease to exist.

Wl.ere will those displaced by risingseas go? Moving farther inland, millionsof environmental refugees will have tocompete with the local populace forscarce f..)od, water, and land, perhapsspurring regional clashes. Moreover, ex-isting tensions between Bangladesh andits large neighbor to the west, India, arelikely to heighten as the certain influx ofenvironmental refugees from the formerrises. Eventually, the combination of ris-ing seas, harsher storms, and degrada-tion of the Bengal delta may wreak somuch damage that Bangladesh as it isknown today may virtually cease to exist.

Egypt's habitable area is even moredensely populated than Bangladesh. Byand large, Egypt is desert; less than 4

percent of the country's land is cul-tivated and settled, supporting a popula-tion of 1,800 people per square kilome-ter. The Nile River and its delta,accounting for nearly all the country'sproductive land, is Egypt's economiclifeline.

Damming has virtually reduced theNile's contribution of sediment andfresh water to the Mediterranean to atrickle. The Woods Hole study pointsout that because the Nile has beendammed, only the "worst" and "reallyworst" cases are relevant for Egypt,since most of the sediment that wouldoffset subsidence of the delta is trappedupstream. Consequently, sea level risewould range between 101 and 144 centi-meters by 2050, rendering up to 19 per-cent of Egypt's already scarce habitableland unlivable.

If the higher increment were realized,more than 8.5 million people would beforced to relinquish their homes to thesea and Egypt would lose 16 percent ofits gross national product. By 2100, sealevel rise would range between 257 and332 centimeters, inundating up to 26percent of habitable land and affectingan equal portion-24 percentof bothpopulation and domestic economic out-put. Several shallow, brackish lakesalong the coast, accounting for half thenation's fish catch, would also be endan-gered."

Although neither Bangladesh norEgypt is likely to markedly influenceglobal emissions of greenhouse gases orsea level rise, they each wield considera-ble control over local sea levels. Devel-opment policies chosen in the near fu-ture will determine the rates ofdegradation and subsidence of these re-spective deltas.

In 2100, cartographers will likely bedrawing maps with new coastlines formany countries as a result of sea levelrise. They may also make an importantdeletion: by that year, if current projec-


tions are borne out, the Maldives mayhave been swallowed up by the sea. Thissmall nation, a series of 1,190 islands inatolls, is nowhere higher in elevationthan two meters. A mean sea level rise ofequal height would submerge the entirecountry. With a one-meter rise, wellwithin the expected increment of thenext century, a storm surge would, in thewords of President Gayoom, be "cata-strophic and possibly fatal." Other suchendangered areas include the Pacific is-lands of Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Mar-shall Islands.6t

Industrial nations, heavily reliant onthe burning of fossil fuels over the pastcentury, must assume the primary re.sponsibility for global warming and itsconsequences. And while they are in afar better financial position than devel-oping countries to undertake the reme-dial technological measures necessary tosave coastal areas and inhabited land(thereby mitigating the problem of envi-ronmental refugees), these actions willcost them dearly. The Dutch spent tensof billions of dollars over the past threedecades building dikes and pumping sys-tems to hold back the sea. They will haveto spend at least $5 billion more by 2040simply maintaining this system to savetheir delta region as sea levels rise.Large though these expenditures are,they are trivial compared with what theUnited States, with more than 19,000kilometers of coastline, will have tospend to protect its territorial integ-rity.62

A YARDSTICK OFHABITABILITY

On every continent, the living patternsof people are at odds with natural sys-tems. In industrial countries, consump-

1a I

1.;

tion patterns and industrial policies thatignore environmental limits have fouledthe planet with everything from toxicwastes to greenhouse gases. In the ThirdWorld, population growth, poverty, andill-conceived development policies arethe root cause of environmental degra-dation. The large and growing numberof refugees worldwide that has resultedfrom these trends is living evidence of acontinuing decline in the earth's habitability.

Environmental refugees have becomethe single largest class of displaced per-sons in the world. They fall into threebroad categories: those displaced tem-porarily because of a local disruptionsuch as an avalanche or earthquake;those who migrate because environmen-tal degradation has undermined theirlivelihood or poses unacceptable risks tohealth; and those who resettle becauseland degradation has resulted in desert-ification or because of other permanentand untenable changes in their habitat.Although precise numbers are hard tofix due to lack of data, it appears that thislast groupthe permanently dis-placedis both the largest and the fast-est growing. Until sea level rise over-takes it, land degradation will remain thesingle most important cause of environ-mental refugees. As it occurs in stages,moving from moderate to severe desert-ification, it produces refugees in boththe second and third categories.

Current trends are likely to worsenover the next few decades unless societyacts to combat the problems under-scored by the creation of environmentalrefugees. More and more land will berendered unproductive or uninhabit-able, whether through desertification,toxic pollution, or unnatural disasters.By the middle of the next century, thecombined number of environmental ref-ugees from all these and the inevitablerise in sea level because of global warm.


ing will probably exceed the number ofrefugees today from all other causes bya factor of six.

The vision of tens of millions of per-sons forced to abandon their homelandsis a frightening prospect, one withoutprecedent and likely to rival most past

and current wars in its impact on human-ity. The growing number of environ-mental refugees today is already a roughindicator of the severity of global envi-ronmental decline. This yardstick maybe imprecise but its message could notbe clearer.

5

Protecting theOzone LayerCynthia Pollock Shea

When British scientists reported in 1985that a hole in the ozone layer over Ant-arctica had been occurring each springsince 1979, the news came as a completesurprise. Although the theory that agroup of widely used chemicals calledchlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) wouldsomeday erode upper atmosphericozone had been advanced in the mid-seventies, none of the models had pre-dicted that the thinning would first beevident over the South Polenor that itwould be so severe. Scientists were baf-fled: What was threatening this key life-support system? And how many othersurprises lay in store?'

Ozone, the three-atom form of oxy-gen,. is the only gas in the atmospherethat prevents harmful solar ultravioletradiation from reaching the surface ofthe earth. Most of it is found at altitudesof between 12 and 25 kilometers, buteven there, at its greatest concentration,

An expanded ver$ion of this chapter appeared asWorldwatch Paper 87. Protecting Life on Earth: sttp.sto Save Me Ozone Layer.

it is present at only a few parts per mil-lion. Sunlight-triggered chemical reac-tions constantly replenish ozone abovethe tropics and global air circulationtransports some of it to the poles.

By the Antarctic spring of 1987, theaverage ozone concentration over theSouth Pole was down 50 percent. In iso-lated spots it had essentially disa0-peared. Although the depletion wasalarming, many were convinced that ..hethinning was seasonal and unique toAntarctica, a phenomenon attributableto altered atmospheric chemistry and toperplexing polar air circulation.2

A scientific report issued in March1988 shattered this view: more than 100international experts reported that theozone layer around the entire globe waseroding much faster than any mode: hadpredicted. Between 1969 and 1986, 'heaverage global concentration of ozone inthe stratosphere had fallen by approi-mately 2 percent. The magnitude of thedecline varied by latitude and by season,with the most heavily populated regionsof Europe, North America, and the So-


viet Union suffering a year-round deple-tion of 3 percent and a winter loss of 4.7percent.5

As ozone diminishes in the upper at-mosphere, the earth receives more ul-traviolet radiation, which promotes skincancers and cataracts and depresseshuman immune systems. Reduced cropyields, depleted marine fisheries, materi-als damage, and increased smog are alsoattributable to higher levels of radiation.The phenomenon is global and will af-fcct the well-being of every person in theworld.

In 1984 the ozone hole was largerthan the United States and tallerthan Mount Everest.

Compounds containing chlorine andbromine, which are released from indus-trial processes and products and thenmove slowly into the upper atmosphere,are considered the primary culprits.Most of the chlorine comes from CCs;the bromine originates from halons usedin fire extinguishers. Spurred to actionby the ozone hole over Antarctica, 35countries have signed an internationalagreementthe Montreal Protocolaimed at halving most CFC emissions by1998 and freezing halon emissions by1992. Although an impressive diplo-matic achievement and an importantfirst step, the agreement is so riddledwith loopholes that its objectives will notbe met. Furthermore, scientific findingssubsequent to the negotiations revealthat even if the treaty's goals were met,significant further deterioration of theozone layer would still occur. The factthat CFCs and halons are also "green-house gases" and that global warmingmay already be under way (see Chapter1) strengthens the need to further con-trol and eliminate emissions.4

The fundamental links between CFCs,halons, and ozone depletion are no long-er in doubt. Currently available controltechnologies and stricter standards gov-erning equipment operation and main-tenance could reduce CFC and halonemissions by some 90 percent. But ef-fective government policies and industrypractices to limit and ultimately phaseout chlorine and bromine emissionshave yet to be formulated. Encouragingsteps have been taken by some coun-tries, particularly in Scandinavia, and bysome corporations. But just as the ef-fects of ozone depletion will be feltworldwide, a lasting remedy to the prob-lem must also be global.

THE OZONE DEPLETIONPUZZLE

In 1985, a team led by Joseph Farman. ofthe British Antarctic Survey, startled theworld by reporting a 40-percent loss inthe springtime ozone layer over Antarc-tica. Using equipment developed in thetwenties, the team discovered the lowestconcentration of ozone ever recorded onearth. Although Sherwood Rowland andMario Molina of the University of Cali-fornia at Irvine had predicted a declinein global ozone back in 1974, the inter-national scientific community was skepti-cal; why hadn't state-of-the-art mor6or-ing devices aboard sophisticatedsatellites detected the drop?5

Closer examination revealed that sat-ellite sensors had in fact recorded thedecline, and even flagged the lowest val-ues, but that scientists had fallen behindin processing the voluminous data. In-deed, computer archives showed that in1984 the previously undetected ozonehole was larger than the United Statesand taller than Mount Everest.6

Protecting the Ozone Layer (79)

Faced with evidence of a phenomenonthat had not been predicted by atmo-spheric models, scientists scurried to ex-plain the cause and to determine if morewidespread depletion, outside of Ant-arctica, was likely. Numerous theoriesbased on both chemical and naturalcauses were put forth. A reassessment ofsatellite and terrestrial data wasplanned, along with ground- and air-based expeditions to the continent.

Scientists on the first Antarctic expedi-tion arrived in late August 1986, hopingto determine quickly whether the ozonehole was caused by natural forces or bymanufactured chemicals. The secret wasnot easily revealed. Several experimentscast doubt on the theories that blamedsolar cycles and the upward movementof tropospheric air, but tests to confirmchemical destruction theories were in-conclusive. Team leader Susan Solomoncarefully summed up the findings,"Based on the existing theories, chlorineis the only one we can't rule out . .. .Webelieve that a chemical mechanism isfundamentally responsible for thehole."'

Another, much larger expedition com-posed of 150 scientists and support per-sonnel representing 19 organizationsand four nations was planned for 1987.Based ir. Punta Arenas, Chile, the NOZEII (National Ozone Expedition) teamconducted satellite, aircraft, balloon,and ground measurements. Satellitedata, available within 24 hours, helpedresearchers direct two specially retrofit-ted planes into the center of the hole.a

Monitoring equipment detected thatthe average ozone concentration in ahole twice as large as the United Statesdropped by nearly half from August 15to October 7. In some areas within thehole, ozone had vanished completely.The scientists attributed the decline to acombination of factors: unique meteoro-logical conditions present in Antarctica,the presence of 1.-..siar stratospheric

clouds, low concentrations of nitrogenoxides, and, most important, high con-centrations of active chlorine.

The pieces of the puzzle started to fallinto place. During the long, sunless Ant-arctic winter (from about March to Au-gust), air over the continent becomesisolated in a swirling polar vortex thatcauses temperatures to drop belowminus 90 degrees Celsius. This is coldenough for the scarce water vapor in thedry upper atmosphere to freeze, formingpolar stratospheric clouds. Chemical re-actions on the ice crystals convert chlo-rine from nonreactive form such as hy-drogen chloride and chlorine nitrateinto molecules that are very sensitive tosunlight. In addition, gaseous nitrogenoxides able to inactivate chlorine aretransformed into frozen, and thereforenonreactive, nitric acid.9

The first spring sunlight releases thechlorine, and the virulent ozone-destroy-ing chain reaction proceeds unimpededfor five or six weeks. The reactions trans-form two molecules of ozone into threemolecules of ordinary oxygen, and thechlorine survives unscathed, ready to attack more ozone. Experiments con-ducted by James Andcrson and his col-leagues at Harvard University found thatchlorine monoxide levels in the most dis-turbed regions of the hole were up to 500times higher than normal Throughoutthe hole, as chlorine monoxide in-creased, ozone concentrations de-creased. (See Figure 5-1.) 10

Diminished ozone in the vortex meansthat less incoming solar radiation is ab-sorbed, thereby perpetuating lower tem-peratures and the vortex itself. In 1987,the vortex did not break down until earlyDecember, a month later than usual. Inaddition, the hole was some 8 degreesCelsius colder at an altitude c.i 15 kilo-meters tnan it was in 1979. Polar strato-spheric clouds were more pervasive andpersistent In essence, the ozone holewas feeding on itself"

(801 Siam of the World 1989

Chlorinemonoxide (ppb) Ozone (ppm)

1.6 2.75

t.4-js----'--N 2.50Ozone

1.2 - 2.25

1.0- 100

0.8. 1.75Source: Anderson,Harvard

0.6 1.50

0.4- 1.25

0.2 - Chlorine monoxide 1.00,--.-----. . , 1

63°S 64° 66° 68' 70°

Latitude. approximate

Flom 54. Atmospheric Concentration ofChlorine Monoxide and Ozone by Latitude,

Southern Hengsphem, 1987

72°S

The phenomenon of global warmingparadoxically encourages the process.Higher concentrations of greenhousegases (including CFCs, which contributeabout 15-20 percent of the total) arethought to be responsible for an in-crease in the earth's surface temperatureand a decrease in the temperature of thestratosphere. Methane, one of the pri-mary greenhouse gases, is a significantsource of stratospheric water vapor.Colder temperatures and increasedmoisture both facti.tate the formation ofstratospheric clouds.12

Since the ozone hole cannot get muchdeeper, some fear it may spread out-ward, encompassing larger areas of Ar-guntina and Chile and expanding aboveportions of Australia, Brazil, New Zea-land, and Uruguay. These areas may alsosuffer when the vortex breaks up and itsozone-depleted air diffuses throughoutthe lower southern hemisphere. In De-cember 1987, three out of five Australianozone-monitoring stations observed asharp drop in ozone. The abnormallylow values persisted for three weeks overMelbourne, resulting in the lowest De-cember mean ozone levels on record.Roger Atkinson of the the Australian Bu-

.1 95

reau of Meteorology wonders if "it'spossible that this is the first sign of de-pletion extending over Australia.'919

While many of the meteorological andchemical conditions conducive to ozonedepletion are unique to Antarctica.ground-based research in Greenland inthe winter of 1988 found elevated chlo-rine concentrations and depressedozone levels over the Arctic as well. Al-though a strong vortex does not developthere and temperatures are not as low,polar stratospheric clouds do form.14

To find out more about the atmo-spheric chemistry of the Arctic, the U.S.National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration (NASA) sent teams to Sta-vanger, Norway, and Ellesmere Island,Canada, in early 1989. Instruments onthe ground analyzed the chemical com-ponents of the atmosphere, while similarinstruments aboard specially equipped

nes sampled the air in the ice clouds,,,,au equipment aboard the Nimbus-7satellite examined reflected sunliOt.Ground-based measurements were to begathered simultaneously by the Danes inGreenland and by the Soviets over theirnorthernmost territories. The SovietUnion also planned to make aircraft ob-servations at about the same time.' s

The importance of cloud surfacechemistry in the destruction of ozonewas not realized until 1986. Now its roleis viewed as fundamental, and some sci-entists postulate that sulfate chemicalsurfaces may host the same catalyticchlorine reactions that occur over Ant-arctica. Sulfate aerosols from volcanoesand biological processes are present inthe atmosphere at all latitudes, atheights of 15 to 22 kilometers. They areespecially prevalent over the mostdensely populated areas of the northernhemisphere, perhaps indicating the in-volvement of sulfur emissions fromhuman activities. If these chemicals arecapable of hosting the same catalytic re-

Protecting the Ozone Layer (8r)

actions, global ozone depletion may ac-celerate even more rapidly than an-ticipated.16

A greater understanding of and con-sensus about ozone depletion was madepossible by the release of the NASAOzone Trends Panel report on March15, 1988. More than 100 scientists from10 countries spent 16 months reviewingthe published literature and performinga critical reanalysis and interpretation ofnearly all ground-based and satellite-derived ozone data. Their purpose: toeliminate any errors caused by improp-erly calibrated instruments.17

Ozone losses were documentedaround the globe, not just at the poles;the blame, particularly for the Antarcticozone hole, was firmly placed on chloro-fluorocarbons. The panel reported thatbetween 30 and 60 degrees north, wheremost of the world's people live, total-column ozone had decreased by 1.7-3.0percent between 1969 and 1986. Fur-ther, "ozone decreases were most pro-nounced in winter , ranging from 2.3-6.2percent (depending on latitude), andthose winter changes were higher thanpredicted by atmospheric models."Is

Because monitoring stations artt notas prevalent in the southern hemisphere,the panel cautioned that data for regionssouth of 30 degrees north were not asreliable, nor could seasonal variations beaccurately determined. The report fur-ther stated that while the problem wasworst over Antarctica during the spring,"ozone appears to have decreased since1979 by 5 percent or more at all latitudessouth of 60 degrees south throughoutthe year." The hole alone covers ap-proximately 10 percent of the southernhemisphere.19

The report's findings startled policy-makers, industry representatives, and re-searchers around the world. Prior toMarch 15, the phenomenon of globalozone depletion and the role of CFCshad been hotly contested. Within a mat-

ter of weeks the report's conclusionswere widely accepted, and public debateon the issue was building to a new feverpitch. Suddenly. ozone depletion wasreal, no longer just a theory, and peoplearound the globe knew just how bad theproblem overhead had become.

Ozone losses were documentedaround the globe, not just at thepoles.

Scientists were alarmed not only bythe documented damage to the ozonelayer, but by the inadequacy of theirmodels to predict it. Ozone depletion isoccurring far more rapidly and in a dif-ferent pattern than had been forecast.Projections of the amount and locationof future ozone depletion are still highlyuncertain. Although the fundamentalmechanisms of ozone depletion are gen-erally understood, the quantitative effectof cloud surface chemistry, the rate ofvarious chemical reactions, and the spe-cific chemical pathways are still in doubt.According to Sherwood Rowland, one ofthe first to sound a warning, policy deci-sions now and for at least anotherdecade must be made without goodquantitative guidelines of what the fu-ture holds.2°

EFFECTS OF ULTRAVIOLETRADIATION

Tanned, wrinkled, and leathered skin,certain eye disorders, and brittle plasticsare all caused by ultravblet (UV) radia-tion that retches the earth's surface. Atpresent, ozone absorbs much of the ul-traviolet radiation that the sun emits in


wavelengths harmful to humans, ani-mals, and plants. (The most biologicallydamaging wavelengths occur within the290-320 nanometer band, referred to asUV-B.) But, according to uncertain pro-jections from computer models, erosionof the protective ozone shield could re-sult in 5 to 20 percent more ultravioletradiation reaching populated areaswithin the next 40 yearsmost of it inthe UV-B band."

In light of the findings of the NASAOzone Trends Panel, the U.S. Environ-mental Protection Agency (EPA) dam-age projections cited in this section areconservative. Although the EPA rangesare based on current control strategics.they assume ozone depletion levels of1.2-6.2 percent. Yet, all areas of theglobe have already suffered depletionbeyond this lower bound. At extremelatitudes, depletion has exceeded EPA'smost realistic upper bound. Althoughthese damage estimates are the best cur-rently available, it is prudent to considerthem on the low side.22

Globally. skin cancer incidence amongCaucasians is already on the rise, largelybecause of more outdoor activity, but itis expected to increase alarmingly in thepresence of more UV-B. Some 600,000new cases of squamous and basal cellcarcinomathe two most common butrarely fatal skin cancer typesare re-ported each year in the United Statesalone. Worldwide. the number of casesis at least three times as high. The inci-dence is closr:ly tied to cumulative expo-sure to ultraviolet radiation."

Each l-percent drop in ozone is pro-jected to result in 4-6 percent morecases of these types of skin cancer.Ozone depletion is expected to cause 3million to 15 million new cases in Ameri-cans born before 2075: some 52,000 to252,000 of those patients are likely to diefrom the disease. Most at risk are thosewith light coloring who live nearest theequator. Also particularly susceptible

are Argentinians, Australians. Chileans,and New Zealanders who live in areasunder the springtime reach of the Ant-arctic hole. Members of the U.S. Na-tional Science Foundation are workingwith colleagues in Argentina and Chileto measure the increased amount of in-coming UV radiation."

Melanoma. a more deadly form of skincancer. already attacks 26,000 Ameri-cans annually and results in 8.000deaths. Melanoma represents only 4 per-cent of all skin cancers, but is responsi-ble for 65 percent of all skin cancerdeaths. Although the tie between mela-noma and increased UV-B levels is lessclear, EPA estimates that ozone deple-tion will lead to an additional 31.000 to126,000 cases among U.S. whites bornbefore 2075, resulting in an additional7,000 to 30,000 fatalities.2s

Melanoma incidence and mortality arealready rising in all Caucasian popula-tions studied. In Australia, melanomadeaths have risen fivefold over the past50 years. In the United States, the num-ber of cases has increased 83 percentover the past seven years. In other coun-tries. the incidence is increasing at 3-7percent annually. Unlike basal and squa-mous cell carcinoma, melanoma appearsto be associated with acute UV radiationexposure. such as severe sunburns.26

Under the same EPA scenarios, from555,000 to 2.8 million Americans bornbefore 2075 will suffer front cataractswho would not have otherwise. Victimswill also be striken earlier in life, makingtreatment more difficult. Cataracts, aclouding of the lens that blurs vision, canhe removed in a relatively simple opera-tion, but if left untreated can result inblindness. The surgical procedure isperformed routinely in industrial coun-tries, but victims in the developing worldare less likely to have access to, or fundsfor, the operation."

Medical researchers also fear thatUV-B depresses the human immune sys-

Proteding the Ozone Layer (83)

tem, lowering the body's resistance toattacking organisms, making it less ableto fight the development of tumors, andrendering it more prone to infectiousdiseases, such as herpes. The responsemay even decrease the effectiveness ofsome inoculation programs, such asthose for diphtheria and tuberculosis.Instead of building an immune responseto the antigen, the patient might developa full-fledged case of the disease. In de-veloping countries, particularly thosenear the equator that are exposed tohigher UV-B levels. parasitic infectionscould become more common.29

Unlike skin cancer, which predomi-nantly affects whites, a lowered immuneresponse is likely to affect everyone. In-dividuals already immtinosuppressed,such as transplant patients or those withAIDS, could be at greater risk due toadditive effects. Although the extent ofimmunosuppression cannot yet be quan-tified. some evidence suggests it couldbe induced with much lower doses of UVradiation than those required to causecancer. This may mean that doses toolow to cause a sunburn could lower thebody's resistance to disease. An Aus-tralian study has already measured im-munological effects in sunbathers.29

Terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems arealso affected. Screenings of more than200 different plant species, most of themcrops, found that 70 percent were sensi-tive to UV-B. Increased exposure to ra-diation may decrease photosynthesis,water use efficiency, yield, and leaf area.Soybeans, a versatile and protein-richcrop, are particularly susceptible. AlanTeramura, at the University of Mary-land, discovered that a simulated ozoneloss of 25 percent reduced the yield ofone important soybean species by asmuch as 25 percent. He also found thatplant sensitivity to UV -B increased as thephosphorus level in the soil increased,iidicating that heavily fertilized agricul-tural areas may be the most vulnerable.30

Botanists are worried because al-though plants can be bred for manytraits, including UV radiation tolerance,rapid ozone depletion could overwhelmthe capacity to evolve protective mech-anisms. As a consequence, those varie-ties most resistant to the radiation wouldbe the ones to thrive, not necessarilythose with the greatest economic valueor nutritive content. So far, only 4 of the10 major terrestrial ecosystem typeshave been examined; tropical forests,rangelands, and wetlands have yet to bestudied.31

Increased exposure to radiationmay decrease photosynthesis.

Aquatic ecosystems may be the mostthreatened of all. Phytoplankton, theone - celled microscopic organisms thatengage in photosynthesis while driftingon the ocean's surface, are the backboneof the marine food web. Because theyrequire sunlight, already the limitinggrowth factor in high-latitude oceanareas, they cannot escape incoming ul-traviolet radiation and continue tothrive. Yet if they remain at the water'ssurface, studies show that a 25-percentreduction in ozone would decrease theirproductivity by about 35 percent.32

Experiments with marine diatoms, aminute algae, show reductions in bio-mass, protein, and chlorophyll at UV-Blevels corresponding to ozone reduc-tions of 5 to 15 percent, A significantdestruction of phytoplankton and itssubsequent decomposition could evenraise carbon dioxide levels, speeding thewarming of the atmosphere.33

Zooplankton and the larvae of severalimportant fish species will be doublystrained: they too live on the water's sur-face and their sole food supply, phyto-plankton, will be scarcer. Preliminarystudies indicate that sunlight is essential

i


to the larval stage of growth, yet there isno adaption or flight mechanism to re-spond to increased UN' radiation. Forsome shellfish species, a 10-percent de-crease in ozone could result in up to an1$- percent increase in the number ofab-normal larvae. A study of anchovies cal-culated that 8 percent of the annual lar-vae population would be killed off by a9-percent decrease in ozone.34

Commercial fish populations alreadythreatened by overfishing may havemore difficulty rebuilding due to effectsof increased UV-B. Most worrisome tomany marine biologists is how the spe-cies composition of ocean environmentswill change. Some species will undoubt-edly be more vulnerable to increased UN'radiation than others and the changesarc likely to be dramatic. Exposure re-sulting from ozone loss of 10 percentcorresponds to moving 30 degreescloser to the equatorlike moving NewYork City to Caracas, Venezuela. Ulti-mately, entire cco3ystems may becomemore unstable and less flexible.

Increased UV-B levels also affect syn-thetic materials. Plastics are especiallyvulnerable. Studies conducted for EPAestimated that %vithout added chemicalstabilizers, the cumulative damage tojust one polymer, polyvinyl chloride,could reach $4.7 billion by 2075 in theUnited States alone.35

Ozone, the same compound that actsas a protective shield in the stratosphere,is a noxious pollutant at ground level.Ironically, destruction of the upperozone could augment the damage doneby the lower. As more UV radiationreaches the earth's surface, the photo-chemical process that creates smog willaccelerate.

Studies show that ground-level ozone,the main component of smog, retardscrop and tree growth, limits visibility.and impairs lung functions. Recent re-search indicates that the biological risksare higher than previously believed.

Most economically valuable plant spe-cies are affected. including cotton. soy-beans. corn. and wheat: the first two areespecially sensitive. A Resources for TheFuture study found that reducing ruralozone levels by 10 percent in the UnitedStates would have resulted in a $700-

gaitt in 1986.36Animal studies suggest that chronic

exposure to ozone causes permanentdamage to and premature aging of thelungs. It also impairs that organ's abilityto fight off bacterial infections and toclear out toxic particles. Doctors nowwarn that everyone, not just people withimpaired respiratory functions, is threat-ened."

More than 60 U.S. cities still do notmeet air quality regulations issued dur-ittg the seventies: air quality is similarlypoor in Western Europe, and oftenworse in the urban areas of developingcountries. The problem is exacerbatedby the fact that ground-level ozone is agreenhouse gas and that the warmertemperatures induced by the green-house effect will result in even greaterformation of ozone-containing smog. Inaddition, stratospheric ozone decline ispredicted to increase troposphericamounts of hydrogen peroxide, an acidrain precursor.38

Most of the research to date on theeffects of increased ultraviolet radiationhas been conducted by U.S. governmentagencies. Annual funding has recentlybeen boosted to some $15-20 million,but there are still many unansweredquestions. Ironically, the most uncer-tainty surrounds the effects of increasedUV-B on the immune system and onaquatic and plant life, where we have thegreatest potential to harm our healthand food supplies. West Germany alsohas an extensive UV-B effects program,financed by the Ministry of Research andTechnology. Joint programs under theauspices of the European Communityare to commence shortly.33

4

Protecting the aane Layer (85)

Despite the many uncertainties re-garding future ozone depletion levels.the incremental amount of UV-11 thatwill reach the earth's surface. and overallbiological effects of these changes. onepoint is certain: the risks to aquatic andterrestial ecosystems and to humanhealth are enormous. The overwhelm-ing conclusion of EPA studies is that"the benefits of limiting future CFC/Ha lon use far outweigh the increasedcosts these regulations would impose onthe economy." In the United Statesalone. the present value of the benefitsof controlling emissions through theyear 2075 is estimated at $6 trillionsome 240 times greater than the costs.40

CHEMICAL WONDERS,ATMOSPHERIC VILLAINS

Chlorofluorocarbons are remarkablechemicals. They are neither toxic norflammable at ground level. as demon-strated by their discoverer ThomasMidgley, Jr., in 1930 when he inhaledvapors from a beaker of clear liquid andthen exhaled to extinguish a candle. Asafe chemical that was inexpensive toproduce was exactly what the refrigera-tion industry was looking for, and CFCssoon became a universal coolant, mar-keted by E.I. du Pont de Nemours &Company under the trademark Freon.(In chemical shorthand, it is referred toas CFC-12.) International productionsoared, rising from 545 tons in 1931 to20,000 tons in 1945.41

Another use for the chemical. as ablowing agent in rigid insulation foams,was discovered in the late forties. In thisapplication, liquid CFC-12 is vaporizedinto a gas that forms lightweight, closedcell bubbles that are poor conductors ofboth heat and cold. Consumers referred

to the product as Styrofoam. the DowChemical Company trademark. From1945 to 1950. total production of CFCsdoubled.42

Over the ensuing years. new chemicalformulations were discovered, and theversatility of the various CFCs seemedalmost endless. CFC-11 and CFC-12were first used as aerosol propellantsduring World War H in the fight againstmalaria. In the postwar economy, theywere employed in aerosol productsranging from hairspray and deodorantto furniture polish. By the late fifties, acombination of the blowing agents CFC-11 and carbon dioxide was used to makesofter furniture cushions, carpet pad-ding. and automobile seats.

Many social and technological devel-opments in recent decades were as-sisted. at least in part, by the availabilityof CFCs. Huge chillers made it possibleto build and cool shopping malls, sportsarenas, and high-rise office buildings.Air conditioning brought comfort, busi-ness. and new residents to regions withwarm climates. Automobile air condi-tioners, now installed in 80 percent ofthe cars sold in the United States, put thenation on wheels for summer vacations.And healthier, more interesting diets arenow available because three fourths ofthe food eaten in the United States isrefrigerated at some point in the produc-tion and distribution chain.43

Even the computer revolution wasaided by CFCs. As microchips and othercomponents of electronic equipment be-came smaller and more sophisticated.the need to remove the smallest con-taminants became critical. CFC-113 isused as a solvent to remove glue, grease,and soldering residues and to leave aclean. dry surface. And, as is the casewith so many of the CFCs, the chemicalis versatile enough to be used on metalsand plastics and to dry-clean clothes,largely replacing more-toxic chlorinatedsolvents. CFC-113 is now the fastest


growing of the CFC family, and world-wide production exceeds 160,000 ionsper year.4 4

Following the energy crises of the sev-enties, industrial, commercial, and resi-dential customers looked for new waysto trim their heating and electric bills.Demand for rigid foam insulation, sonictypes blown with CFC-I1 and otherswith CFC-12, soared. In 1985, rigidfoam accounted for two thirds of the in-sulation put into new U.S. commercialbuildings. half the insulation in new sin-gle-family houses, and one third of thehome re-insulation market. Appliancemanufacturers also set to workand arenow required by U.S. lawto boost theenergy efficiency of their products.Today, the foam walls of a householdrefrigerator contain five tintes as muchCFC (one kilogram) as is used for refrig-erant.'"

An industry-sponsored group, the Al-liance for Responsible CFC Policy, pegsthe market value of CFCs produced inthe United States at $750 million annu-ally, the value of goods and services di-rectly dependent on the chemicals at $28billion, and the end-use value of in-stalled equipment and products at $135billion. Products that currently dependon the chemicals are ubiquitous: theUnited States alone has 85 millionhousehold refrigerators and 60 millionauto air conditioners. in addition, bil-lions of foam packaging containers areproduced each year to keep fast foodshot, eggs cushioned, and meats dis-played.46

Around the world, aero$ ols are stillthe largest user of CFCs, arcounting for25 percent of the total. (See Table 5-1.)Rigid foam and solvent applications, thefastest growing uses for CFCs, are tiedfor second place. In 1987, global CFCproduction (excluding China, the SovietUnion, and the Eastern bloc) surpassedthe peak set in 1974. and came close to1 million tons. Combined production of

10 i .

CFC-11 and CFC-I2 accounts for atleast three quarters of this total. Onlysome two dozen firms produce CFCs,but production data are scarce and nottotally reliable. Companies claint thatsuclt numbers are proprietary and thathaving them publicly available would putthe manufacturers at a competitivedisadvantage. Unfortunately, attemptsto analyze and regulate markets arethwarted by lack of information.47

Total per capita use of the three mostcommon CFCs is highest in the UnitedStatesat 1.2 kilogramsbut Europeand Japan are not far behind. In most ofthe rest of the world, consumption ratesare far lower. Indeed, Americans use sixtimes the global average, Consumptionpatterns also differ by region. Aerosolsaccount for 37 percent of European CFCuse; mobile air-conditioning and otherrefrigeration constitute 39 percent ofuse in the United States; and solvents,primarily for the electronics industry,constitute 39 percent of Japanese CFCuse;t8

From 1931 through 1986, virtually allthe CFC-1 I and CFC-12 produced was

Table 5-1, Global CFC Use, by Category,1985

Use

AerosolsRigid Foam InsulationSolventsAir ConditionirgRefrigerantsFlexible FoamOther

Total

Share ofTotal

(percent)2519191287

10

100

souRct: Daniel F. Kohler et al.. Projections of Con-sumption of Products ('sing Chlorofluorocarbons in Devel-oping Countnes (Santa Monica, Calif.: RandCorporation, 1987).

i


sold to customers in the northern hemi-sphere. Since raw chemicals and prod-ucts made with and containing CFCswere then exported, in part to develop-ing countries, final usage was not quiteas lopsided, and the Third World ac-counted for 16 percent of global CFCconsumption in 1986. (See Table 5-2.)As populations, incomes, and the manu-facturing base grow in developing coun-tries, CFC use there is projected tofise.49

Unlike most chemicals, CFCs are %totbroken down in the troposhere, the layerof air surrounding the earth. Instead,they waft slowly upward and after six toeight years reach the upper layer of theatmosphere, the stratosphere. Oncethere. the chemicals can survive for up to100 years. When they are broken down.each chlorine atom released is capable ofdestroying tens of thousands of ozonemolecules before it eventually getswashed out of the atmosphere.

Halons are also inert at ground level.They contain bromine, a more effectiveozone destroyer than chlorine, and arelong-lived in the atmosphere. Halons

Table 5-2. Global CFC Use, by Region,1986

Region

United States

Other Industrial Countriest

Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc

Other Developing Countries

China and India

Share ofTotal

(percent)

29

41

14

14

2

'European Community accounts for more thanhalf, followed by Japan, Canada. Australia, andothers.soURCE: "The Ozone Treaty: A Triumph for All."Update from State. May/June 1988.

are used for fighting fires: halon 1211 isemployed in handheld extinguishers andhalon 1301 is used in total flooding sys-tems designed for enclosed areas withvaluable contents, such as computerroom!, telephone exchanges, .-nuseums,and bank storage vaults.

The latest ozone measurements re-flect only the response to gasesreleased through the early eight-ies.

Halons were developed by the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers at the end ofWorld War II as a way to fight fires intanks and armored personnel carriers.Because they are nontoxic and can beapplied directly to sensitive equipmentwithout causing damage or leaving a res-idue, they have become the favoredchemical for fighting fires. Demandquadrupled between 1973 and 1984 andis still growing at a rate of 15 percentannually.50

alarming though the latest ozonemeasurements arc. they reflect only theresponse to gases released through theearly eighties; gases now rising throughthe lower atmosphere will take six toeight years to reach the stratosphere. Anadditional 2 million tons of substancescontaining chlorine and bromine aretripped in insulation foams, appliances,and fire-fighting equ,pment."

Chlorine concentrations in the upperatmosphere have grown from 0.6 to 2.7parts per billion in the past 25 years.Under even the most optimistic regula-tory scenarios, they are expected to tri-ple by 2075. Bromine concentrations areprojected to grow considerably fasterexhibiting a tenfold increase from theircurrent 1 part per trillion level despitean anticipated freeze on consumption.52

CFCs and halons are insidiously and

I 0 :

(88) State of the HOW 1989

inexorably destroying the planet's pro-tective ozone shield. Biological systemsaround the globe will soon start to sufferadverse effects, but the real losers will befuture generations who inherit an im-poverished environment and wonder atthe filly of their ancestors.

REDUCING EMISSIONS

Determining the largest sources of po-tential ozone depletion is the first steptoward curbing emissions. To do this re-quires knowing how much of eachozone-depleting chemical is currentlyused, its emissions profile, and the usesto which it is put. (See Table 5-1) Onlythen can individual countries assess the

technical and economic feasibility of lim-iting emissions from specific markets.

Immediate reductions in CFC emis-sions can be achieved by banning CFCpropellants in aerosols and by eliminat-ing rapid evaporation of cleaning sol-vents. Intermediate savings are obtaina-ble by capturing the blowing agents usedto inflate flexible foams, by plugging theleaks in refrigeration and air-condition-ing systems, and by recovering the re-frigerants drained during system re-charging. Long-term reductions involvealternative product disposal methods,use of substitute chemicals, and devel-opment of new process technokgies.

When concern about the ozone layerfirst emerged in the seventies, someindustrial-country governments re-sponded. Since 455,000 tons (56 per-cent) of CFC-1 I and CFC-12 produced

Table 5-3. Use and Emissions Profiles of Commonly Used Chemicals, 1985

ChemicalAtmospheric

Emissions Lifetime! Applications

AnnualGrowth

Rate

Share ofContributionto Depletions

(thousandtons) (years) (percent) (percent)

CFC- l 1 238 76 Foams. Aerosols,Refrigeration

3 26

CFC-12 412 130 Air Conditioning. 5 45Refrigeration. Aerosols.Foams

HCFC-22 72 ;),) Refrigeration. Foams 11 0CFC-113 138 02 Solvents 10 12

Halon 1211 3 12 Fire Extinguishers 23 1

Halon 1301 3 101 Fire Extinguishers n.a. 4

Methyl 474 8 Solvents 7 5ChloroformCarbon 66 67 Solvents 8Tetrachloride

'Time it takes for 63 percent of the chemical to be washed out of thy atmosphere. 2Coltimu doe; nottotal 100 due to rounding.sconces: James K. Hammitt et al.. "Future Emission Scenarios for Chemicals that May Deplete Strato-spheric Ozone. .Vature. December 2-1, 1987: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Regulatory ImpactAnalysis: Protection of Stratosphenc Ozone. Volume H. Part 1 (Washington. D.C.: 1987): Douglas Cogan. Stonesrn a Clots Muse: CFCs and Ozone Depletion (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center.1988).

Protecting the alone Layer (89)

in 1974 were used in aerosols, spray canswere an obvious target. Under strongpublic pressure. Canada. Norway. Swe-den. and the United States banned CFCpropellants in at least 90 percent of theiraerosol products. Because hydrocar-bons. the replacement propellant. areless expensive than CFCs, the net sav-ings to the U.S. economy was $165 mil-lion in 1983 -alone. The European Com-nuinity adopted a different approach. In1980. the member countries agreed notto increase their already excessive capac-ity to produce these two CFCs and calledfor a 30-percent reduction in their use inaerosol propellants by 1982 (based on1976 consumption figures).55

Cumulative reductions in CFC- l 1 andCFC-12 emissions due to lowered use inaerosols in the United States and theEuropean Community amount to 2 mil-lion and 501.000 tons. respectively, theequivalent of six years of current CFC-11 production and one year of CFC-12output. These figures are based on theassumption that CFC use in aerosolswould have'remained at the 1974 peak inthe United States and the 1976 peak inthe European Commtinity.54

Worldwide, aerosol cans are still thelargest source of CFC emissions, con-tributing 224.000 tons annually. some33 percent of combined global emis-sions of CFC-11 and CFC-12. Risingconcern about ozone depletion amongconsumers and governments shouldsoon curtail this use. And because somenations took the lead. economical andoften less e.pensive substitutes are al-ready widely available.55

Denmark banned aerosol propellantsin 1987. and voluntary industry cutbacksof 90 percent by the end of 1989 wereannounced recently in Belgium, theNetherlands, Switzerland. the UnitedKingdom, and West Germany. Britishand Swiss manufacturers will also labeltheir products so consumers will know ifthey are ozone-friendly. The SovietUnion has declared its intention to

switch to non-CFC aerosol propellantsby 1993. France, Japan, and the nationsof Eastern Europe and the Third Worldare the only major users that have notyet announced control measures.56

Worldwide, aerosol cans are stillthe largest source of CFC emis-sions.

Despite rapid growth. CFC-113 emis-sions may be sonic of the easiest andmost economical to control. Since thechemical is only used to clean the finalproduct and is not incorporated in it,emissions are virtually immediate: threequarters result from vapor losses, the re-mainder from waste disposal. A U.S. banon land disposal of chlorinated solventsthat took effect in November 1986. con-sideration of similar regulations else-where, the high cost of incineratingCFC-113 (because it contains toxicfluorine), and accelerating concernabout ozone depletion have all createdstrong incentives for solvent recoveryand recycling.57

Since CFC-113 costs about twice asmuch as other CFCs. investments in re-covery and recyling pay off more quickly.Recycling of CFC-113 is now practicedon-site at many large comptrer compa-nies. An IBM plant outside of Stuttgart,West Germany, has installed a recyclingsystem that recovers 70-90 percent ofthe plant's solvents. Similar rates arebeing achieved by American Telephoneand Telegraph (AT&T) in the UnitedStates. Smaller electronics firms, forwhom in-house recycling is not econom-ical, can sell their used solvents to com-mercial recyclers or the distributors ofsome chemical manufacturers.58

Rapid progress in emissions reduc-tions over the past several years bodeswell for more short-term savings.Hirotoshi Goto. director of the Straw-


spheric Protection Program inlapan, ex-pects industries that use CFC solvents toachieve recycling rates of 95 percent.Such firms account for some 40 percentof total Japanese CFC consumption."

Capturing CFC emissions from flexi-ble foam manufacturing can also be ac-complished fairly quickly, but requiresinvestment in new ventilation systems.Current production processes result inthe complete and immediate release ofthe blowing agent to the atmosphere.(When rigid foams are made, 90 percentof the CFC blowing agent remains in theclosed cells of the product.) New suctionsystems coupled with carbon adsorptiontechnologies are able to recover from 40to 90 percent of the CFCs released."

One technology operating in bothDenmark and Norway traps CFCs at theblowing stage and recovers 40-45 per-cent of total emissions. A more compre-hensive system designed by Hyman De-velopment in the United Kingdom isable to recover almost twice as much.Traditionally, flexible foam is cured inan open room for several days, allowingCFCs to waft from the product. In theHyman process, curing time is reducedto 40 minutes, occurs in an enclosedarea, and the CFCs released are cap-tured by the ventilating system. Uni-foam, a Swiss company, is marketing asimilar system able to recover 85 percentof the blowing agent for future use."

Another area that offers significantsavings, at a low cost, is improved de-sign. operating. and maintenance stan-dards for refrigeration and air condition-ing equipment. These uses account for30 percent of combined CFC-11 andCFC-I2 consumption. Codes of practiceto govern equipment handling are beingdrawn up by many major trade associa-tions. Key among the recommendationsare to require worker training, to limitmaintenance and repair work to author-ized personnel, to install leak detectionsystems, and to use smaller refrigerant

1i

charges. Another recommendation, toprohibit venting of the refrigerant di-rectly to the atmosphere, requires theuse of recovery and recycling technolo-gies.

Careful study of the automobile air-conditioning market in the UnitedStates, the largest user of CFC -12 in thecountry, has found that 34 percent ofemissions can be traced to leakage, 48percent occur during recharge and re-pair servicing, and the remainder hap-pen through accidents, disposal. andmanufacturing, in that order. Equip-ment with better seals and hoses wouldcurb emissions and result in less needfor system maintenance.62

When car air conditioners are ser-viced, it is now standard practice to drainthe coolant and let it evaporate. Severalcompanies have seen the folly of this ap-proach and designed recovery systems,known as "vampires." The refrigerant ispumped out of the compressor, purified,and reinjected into the automobile byequipment costing several thousand dol-lars. Because the coolant contains fewcontaminants, up to 95 percent of it canbe reused. Refrigerant can also be storedand transported to a central recycler,though this option appears to offer lesspromise."

Markets for the on-site equipment in-clude mass transit companies, airplanemanufacturers, government agencies,automobile dealerships, and high-vol-ume service stations. The U.S. automo-bile industry is currently developingquality standards for recovery and recy-cling operations and should have the in-frastructure and perhaps the equipmentin place by the 1989 air-conditioningseason. If the industry is not recycling ata satisfactory level by 1992, EPA willmake the practice mandatory."

To recover CFCs from junked au-tomobiles and other appliances yearsafter they are produced requires either acollection system or a bounty scheme to


encourage reclamation by salvagers.Several towns in West Germany arestarting to collect discarded householdrefrigerators in order to keep the CFCsin the refrigerant and the insulatingfoam from reaching the atmosphere.The refrigerants will be recycled and thefoam will be incinerated in high-temper-ature furnaces. Although a few othercountries are contemplating this ap-proach, most view it as economical onlyfor large commercial and industrialunits, not for the small volumes thatwould be recovered from household ap-pliances.68

Over the longer term, phasing out theuse and emissions of CFCs will requirethe development of chemical substitutesthat do not harm the ozone layer. Thechallenge is to find alternatives that per-form the same function for a reasonablecost, that do not require major equip-ment modifications, that are nontoxic toworkers and consumers, and that are en-vironmentally benign.

Petroferm, a small company in Fer-nandina Beach, Florida, has developed asubstitute solvent called BioAct EC-7.Made with terpenes found in citrus fruitrinds, the chemical is biodegradable,nontoxic. and noncorrosive. BioActEC-7 has been tested by AT&T at threeof its plants and was found to be effectiveand economically competitive, evencounting the cost of replacing cleaningmachinery. AT&T, which used someL400 tons of CFC-113 in 1986, expectsto replace about one quarter of its CFCuse with BioAct EC-7 over the next twoyears. An outside analysis estimates thatthe new compound could substitute for30-55 percent of total projected CFC-113 use in the U.S. electronics indus-try.66

Du Pont and imperial Chemical In-dustries (ICI), the world's two largestCFC producers, appear convinced thatthe replacement chemical for CFC-12 inair conditioners and refrigerators will be

chlorine-free HFC-134a. Du Pont has al-ready announced plans to build a com-mercial plant costing $25 million in Cor-pus Christi, Texas. The company saysannual production will exceed 1,000tons starting in 1990. The plant will bethe fourth Du Pont facility for HFC-134a, and the seventh in the company'soverall program to develop CFC alterna-tives. The substitute will likely sell for $2a kilogram, some seven times the priceof CFC-12.67

Several towns in West Germany arestarting to collect discarded house-hold refrigerators.

Work is also under way to developnew chemical blowing agents for bothflexible and rigid foams. Union Carbiderecently announced that it has found asubstitute chemical for blowing the softpolyurethane foam used in furniturepadding. According to the company, itsnew product. Ultracel, is already com-mercially available and could eliminate70 percent of the CFCs employed in theflexible foam industry. Dow Chemical, aleading manufacturer of rigid foam insu-lation, has announced that it will stopusing regulated CFCs by 1989.68

Many of the major chemical manufac-turers are placing their bets on HCFC-22. -123, -141b, and -142b. The addedhydrogen atom makes the ozone deple-tion potential of these compounds only5 percent that of the chemicals theywould replace. Their cost. on the otherhand, would be three to five timesgreater.69

One major delay associated with thecontmercialization of new chemical com-pounds is the need for extensive toxicitytesting; tests are run for five to sevenyears. To expedite this process, 14 CFCproducers from Europe, Japan, South

1 I s


Korea, and the United States have de-cided to pool their efforts in a multintil-lion-dollar joint testing program.HCFC-123 and HFC-134a are the firsttwo chemicals chosen to undergo long-tem testing. HCFC-22 has alreadypassed. Results will be shared amongmembers and, if promising, ought to bepassed along to regulatory agencies tospeed the approval process."

Some alternative foam-blowing agentsare already available and have been usedfor years. These include methylene chlo-ride, pentane, and carbon dioxide. Al-though still viewed as possible substi-tutes, each has drawbacks. Methylenechloride is a carcinogen and difficult todispose of, pentane is highly flammableand contributes to photochemical smog,and carbon dioxide results in denserflexible foams and has poorer insulatingproperties, meaning that rigid foamsmade with it alone must be 40-50 per-cent thicker to perform the same func-tion.7t

In sonte instances, new product de-signs can eliminate or reduce the needfor CFCs and substitute chemicals whileproviding additional benefits. In au-tomobiles, for instance, side vent win-dows, window glazings that slow solarabsorption, and new solar ventilationsystems can reduce interior heating andcurb or eliminate the need for air-condi-tioning, thereby saving energy. Heliumrefrigerators, long used for space andmilitary applications, have been adaptedfor civilian use in trucks and homes.Cryodynamics, a New Jersey company,will soon produce 9 million helium-cooled refrigerators in Shanghai. Theunits use less than half the energy ofconventional systems. In Japan, ammo-nia refrigerants are used in energy-effi-cient commercial buildings.72

Rigid foam insulation in refrigeratorsand freezers may ultimately be replacedby vacuum insulation, the type used inthermos bottles. Work done at the U.S.

Solar Energy Research Institute indi-cates that vacuum panels take up lessspace than foams and make appliancesmore energy-efficient.73

Halon emissions appear relativelyeasy to curtail, although there are nopromising substitutes on the horizon.Most halons produced are never used,they just need to be available in case ofemergency. At present, halon floodingsystems are tested when first installed byreleasing all the baton in the system. Dis-charge testing now contributes moreentissions than fire fighting does. Usingalternative chemicals or testing proce-dures that are acceptable to the insur-ance industry and eliminating accidentaldischarges would cut annual emissionsby two thirds.74

Another large source of Italon emis-sions is fire fighter training. The U.S.military, with one of the world's largestprograms, has recently introduced theuse of simulators that do not require ac-tual chemical release. ICI is establishinga recycling service for halon 1211 so thatcontaminated supplies, and those thatwould otherwise be disposed of, can berecovered."

The approach taken to reducing CFCand Italon emissions varies greatlyamong nations and industries. Compa-nies in Sweden, for example, view thedevelopment of alternative products andprocesses as an economic opportunity.They are poised to seize new interna-tional markets in a changing globaleconomy. On the other hand, the majorchemical producers in France, apan, theUnited Kingdom, the United States, andWest Germany have traditionally viewedemission controls as a threat to their in-ternational competitiveness. They havebeen loath to go along with unilateralcontrol measures for fear of losing theirmarket share.

The time has come to ask if the func-tions performed by CFCs are really nec-essary and, if they are, whether they can

Protecting the Ozone Layer

be performed in new ways. For example,must all computer chips be cleaned? Forthose that require cleaning, are water- oralcohol-based solvents sufficient? TheU.S. Army and Navy will not allow thequestion to be asked, They require thatelectronic components be cleaned withCFCs, thereby discouraging manufac-turers from exploring alternatives."

If all known technical control mea-sures were used, total CFC and halonemissions could be reduced by approxi-mately 90 percent. Many of these controlstrategies are already cost-effective, andmore will become so as regulations pushup the price of ozone-depleting chemi-cals. The speed with which controls areintroduced will determine the extent ofozone depletion in the years ahead andthe date when stratospheric healing willbegin.

MOVING BEYOND MONTREAL

On September 16, 1987, after years ofarduous and heated negotiation. theMontreal Protocol on Substances thatDeplete the Ozone Layer was signed by24 countries. (As of mid-November1988, that total had increased to 35countries.) Provisions of the agreementinclude a freeze on CFC production (at1986 levels) by 1989, a 20-percent de-crease in production by 1993, and an-other 30-percent cut by 1998. HaIonproduction is subject to a freeze basedon 1986 levels starting in 1992.77

An international document calling fora 50-percent reduction in the productionof a ubiquitous, invisible chemical fearedresponsible for destroying an invisibleshield is unprecedented. The achieve-ment is a tribute to the United NationsEnvironment Programme that spear-headed the effort; to governmentnegotiators from all countries. especially

(93)

those from the so-called Toronto groupwho kept pushing for tougher regula-tions; and to the many nongovernmentalorganizations and scientists who workedto build support among policymakersand the general public.

In order to take effect by the targetdate of January 1989, the protocol musthave been ratified by 11 countries repre-senting at least two thirds of interna-tional CFC consumption. By mid-No-vember 1988, 14 countries had alreadyapproved the treatyCanada, Egypt.Kenya, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico,New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portu-gal, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Uganda,and the United States. But the two-thirdsconsumption requirement will not bemet until the treaty is ratified by the en-tire European Communitya step thegroup has pledged to take. Unfortunat-ley, even this level of support will not beenough to protect the fragile ozonelayer.78

Ozone does not differentiate thesource of chlorine and hromine emis-sions. All nations, including those in theThird World, must rapidly step up theirreduction efforts. Developing countriesare an important part of the controlstrategy because of their large and grow-ing populations and their rapidly in-creasing CFC use. Some of the key de-veloping countries are Brazil, China,India, Indonesia, and South Korea. InChina, for example, only 1 householdout of 10 now owns a refrigerator, butthe government hopes that by 2000every kitchen will have one. South Koreaand Brazil are world-class automobilemanufacturers."

Some of the provisions that enhancethe treaty's appeal to signatories includeextended deadlines, allowances to ac-commodate industry restructuring, andloose definitions of the products that canlegitimately be traded internationally.The Soviet Union and Eastern bloccountries, for example, are permitted to

(91) Slag of the World 1989

carry out the erection or expansion ofany production facilities that are part oftheir current five-year plans beforeadopting restrictions, provided totalconsumption will not exceed 0.5 kilo-grams per capita. Developing countrieshave been given a 10-year grace periodpast the industrial-country deadline,during which CFC use can grow to meet"basic domestic needs," up to a limit of0.3 kilograms per capita (one third thecurrent per capita level in some indus-trial countries). After that, they too mustfreeze and then cut their use of con-trolled chemicals by 50 p...k.c.n.80

The Montreal agreement will notarrest depletion, merely slow its ac-celeration.

The treaty also grants a country thatenacts more than the prescribed mea-sures the right to transfer production ca-pacity to low-volume producers. And al-though imports of chemicals fromnonsignatory countries are to ceasewithin a year after the treaty takes effect,trade in products containing or manu-factured with CFCs is permitted until atleast the mid-nineties. The cumulativeeffect of these loopholes means that,even with widespread participation. theprotocol's goal of halving worldwideCFC use by 1998 will not be metal

Signatories of the Montreal Protocolwere operating under the assumptionthat implementation of the treaty wouldresult in a maximum ozone loss of 2 per-cent by the year 2075. Furthermore, be-cause negotiations preceded results ofthe 1987 Antarctic expedition, delegateswere effectively told not to consider thehole when adopting their positions. Yetless than one year later, there was wide-spread agreement that average globalozone concentrations had already fallen

1

by more than 2 percent, and by consider-ably more close to the poles. A recentEPA report concluded that by 2075,even with 100-percent global participa-tion in the protocol, chlorine concentra-tions in the atmosphere would triple.82The agreement will not a rest depletion,merely slow its acceleration. In light ofthese findings, it is obvious that thetreaty and other regulatory measuresneed to be strengthened.

Curtailing chlorine and bromine emis-sions enough to prevent widespread en-vironmental damage requires a virtualphaseout of CFC and halon emissions byall countries as soon as possible. Re-leases of other compounds containingchlorine and bromine not currently cov-ered under the treaty also need to becontrolled and in some cases halted. Ac-cording to EPA analyses, 45 percent ofprojected chlorine growth in the strato-sphere by 2075 will stem from alloweduse of controlled compounds, 40 per-cent will come from chlorine-containingchemicals that are not covered, and 15percent will be from the emissions ofnonparticipant nations.83

Methyl chloroform and carbon tetra-chloride together contributed 13 per-cent of total ozone-depleting chemicalemissions in 1985. As the use of con-trolled chemicals diminishes, the relativeand absolute contribution of these twouncontrolled compounds will grow.Methyl chloroform is widely used as asolvent, especially for metal cleaning,and carbon tetrachloride (though usedprimarily to manufacture CFCs in west-ern industrial countries) is still used as asolvent in Eastern bloc and developingnations. Although methyl chloroformemissions currently exceed those for anyof the CFCs. its short atmospheric life-time of eight years makes it one of thefew chemicals whose control would pro-vide short-term results.84

As noted, it is technically feasible toreduce CFC and halon emissions by 90


percent by 1995. The challenge is forgovernments to muster the political willto phase out CFC and baton emissions assoon as possible.

Timing is crucial. Analysts at EPA ex-amined the effects of a 100-percent CFCphaseout by 1990 versus a 95-percentphaseout by 1998. Peak chlorine concen-trations would differ by 0.8 parts per bil-lion, some one third of current levels.Under the slower schedule, atmosphericcleansing would be considerablydelayed: chlorine levels would remainhigher than the peak associated with theaccelerated schedule for at least 50years."

Sweden is the first country to movebeyond endorsing a theoretical phase-out. In June 1988 the parliament, afterextensive discussions with industry,passed legislation that includes specificdeadlines for banning the use of CFCs innew products. Consumption is to behalved by 1991 and virtually eliminatedt.y 1995. Sterilization uses and the smallquantity remaining in aerosols were tobe phased out by the end of 1988. Use inpackaging materials is to cease a yearlater. CFCs used as an engineering sol-vent and for blowing flexible and ex-truded polystyrene foams are to be dis-continued by the end of 1990.Blow-molding of rigid foams. dry-clean-ing, and coolant uses are to cease by theend of 1994 at the latest. Under no cir-cumstance may CFCs be replaced withchemicals that pose environmental orhealth hazards.86

If it becomes possible to phase any ofthese uses out earlier than planned, in-dustry will be required to do so. In theinterim, the Swedish government plansto offer incentives and provide financialsupport for the research and develop-ment of recovery and recycling tech-nologies, of alternative products, and ofmeans to keep discarded CFCs fromreaching the atmosphere. The latter in-cludes collection systems for coolants

and incineration technologies for rigidfoams. Sweden is currently responsiblefor less than 1 percent of global CFCuse, however, so its approach will haveto be adopted by many more countriesbefore a significant dent is made in glob-al emissions."

Priming the research and develop-ment pump is a role for governmentsaround the world. Although chemicalmanufacturers are spending some $100million annually to develop safe chemi-cal substitutes, they have no interest inalternative product designs that wouldcut into their markets.88

Research on new refrigeration, air-conditioning, and insulation processes isthe most worthy of government support.Phasing out the use of CFCs in theseapplications would protect the ozonelayer and delay the greenhouse effectdirectly by reducing the emissions ofCFCs that absorb infrared radiation, andindirectly by promoting more energy-efficient processes that would trim car-bon dioxide emissions. Cooling cars,offices, and factories with equipment de-pendent on chemicals and powered byfuels that warm the earth is ludicrous.Unfortunately. international funding todevelop new approaches is probably lessthan $5 million."

As mentioned in the text of the Mon-treal Protocol, results of this research, aswell as new technologies and processes,need to be shared with developing coun-tries. Ozone depletion and climatewarming are undeniably global in scope.Not sharing information on the most re-cent developments is like refusing to tellthe driver of a car that is about to hit youwhere the brakes are. And it ensures thatenvironmentally damaging and out-dated equipment will continue to beused for years to come, further erodingthe technology base in the Third World.Developing countries are also the mostvulnerable to the effects of ozone deple-tion because they rely primarily on fish

110


for their protein and have inadequatehealth care facilities.

Under the existing treaty, a scientificassessment of current ozone depletionis scheduled to occur from April to Au-gust of 1989. This is to be followed inApril 1990 by a meeting of treatynegotiators to consider the evidenceand decide what further actions arecalled for. Given recent developments,Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director ofthe United Nations Environment Pro-gramme, has been petitioned by manyto expedite the process and is in favorof doing so. The United Kingdom. theUnited States, West Germany, and pos-sibly Japan and the Soviet Union ap-pear amenable to taking faster action.France is the only major producercountry still dragging its feet."

As with so many of the major environ-mental problems now facing policymak-ers, the timing and fortitude of their re-

sponse is crucial. The ultimate goal ofnegotiators has always been the eventualphaseout of all ozone-depleting chemi-cals. The question is, How quickly arecountries willing to act in order to pro-tect human health, food supplies, andthe global climate?

The scientific fundamentals of ozonedepletion are known. Although currentmodels of future change vary in theirpredictions, the evidence is clear enoughto warrant an immediate response. Be-cause valuable time was lost when gov-ernments and industries relaxed theirregulatory and research efforts duringthe early eighties, a crash program isnow essential. Given the relatively highdegree of understanding and consensussurrounding ozone depletion, the sup-port that can be garnered for putting anend to chlorine and bromine emissionsmay be indicative of the political will toprotect the earth's habitability.

6

RethinkingTransportation

Michael Renner

The individual mobility, convenience,and status bestowed by the private pas-senger car hold a seemingly unbeatableallure. In 1987, a record 126,000 carsrolled off assembly lines each workingday, and close to 400 million vehiclesclog the world's streets today.1

But the car's utility to the individualstands in sharp contrast to the costs andburdens that society must shoulder toprovide an automobile-centered trans-portation system. Since the days ofHenry Ford, societies have enacted asteady stream of laws to protect driversfrom each other and themselves. as wellas to protect the general public front theunintended effects of massive automo-bile use. Legislators have struggled overthe competing goals of unlimited mobil-ity and the individual's right to be free ofthe noise, pollution. and physical dan-gers that the automobile often brings.

Prior to the seventies, the auto's utility

An expanded version of this chapter appeared asWorldwatch Paper 84. Re:hulking the Role of the Auto-mobile.

and assured role in society were hardlyquestioned. Even worries about escalat-ing gas prices and future fuel availabilitysubsided in the eighties almost asquickly as they had emerged. Car salesrecovered, driving is up, and affluentcustomers are once more shopping forhigh-performance cars.

The motor vehicle industry's apparentsuccess in dealing with the challenges ofthe seventies has obscured the adverselong-term trends of automobile-cen-tered transportation. Rising gasolineconsumption will before long put in-creased pressure on oil production ca-pacities. In addition, as more and morepeople can afford their own cars and asmass motorization takes hold, cor.ges-don becomes an intractable problem.And motor vehicles are important con-tributors to urban air pollution, acidrain, and global warming.

Society's interest in fuel supply secu-rity, the integrity of its cities, and protec-tion of the environment calls for a funda-mental rethinking of the automobile'srole. Stricter fuel economy and pollution

1 i 2


standards are the most obvious and im-mediate measures that can be adopted.But they can only be part of the answer.In the years ahead, the challenge will beto develop innovative transportationpolicies.

WHITHER THE AUTOMOTIVEAGE?

During the postwar period, the automo-bile industry experienced its most dra-matic and sustained expansion, but-tressed by massive highway constructionprojects, fueled by cheap and abundantoil, and riding a wave of unprecedentedaffluence in industrial countries. Produc-tion grew a rapid 6 percent annually.from under 10 million vehicles a year inthe fifties to almost 30 million in 1973.2

The first oil crisis, however, broughton an era of unprecedented volatility.(See Figure 6-1.) Global production didreach a new peak of 32.9 million vehiclesin 1987. Yet had the pace recorded be-tween 1950 and 1973 continued, annualoutput would now be twice as highs

The world's car fleet has grown from

MillionVehicles

36

32-

28 -

24 -

20-

16 -1

12 -

8

4-

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Fitton 6-1. World Passenger Car Production,1950417

about 50 million vehicles in the immedi-ate postwar period to 386 million in1986 (see Table 6-1), with still no sign ofa real leveling-off. But if the pre-1973pace of additions to the car fleetnotjust replacementshad held, total pas-senger cars would now number close to600 million.

The United States dominated theearly stages of the automotive age. Onlyduring the sixties and seventies didWestern Europe andjapan, respectively,begin to catch up. The lure of owning aprivate passenger car has since provedirresistible everywhere.

Until the seventies, the Soviet Unionand Eastern Europe gave production of

Table 6-1. Automobiles in Use,Worldwide and United States, 1950-87

Year World linked States U.S. Share

(millionpassenger cars) (percent)

1950 53 40 75

1955 73 52 71

1960 98 62 63

1965 140 75 54

1970 195 89 46

1975 260 107 41

1980 321 122 381981 331 123 371982 340 124 361983 352 127 361984 365 128 35

1985 375 132 351986 386 135 351987 139

soma.: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-tion, World Motor rehielt Data. 1988 Edition andFarts and Figures '88 (Detroit, Mich.: t988).

Rethinking Transportation (99)

trains, trucks, and buses priority over au-tomobiles. But in response to growingconsumer pressure, passenger car pro-duction more than tripled in the seven-ties. Between 1970 and 1985, the Sovietand East European car fleets grew five-foldto 27 million vehicles. Long wait-ing lists indicate there is still enormousunmet demand. Access to car ownershipremains regulated by bureaucratic allo-cation and heavy taxation.4

General Secretary Gorbachev's at-tempts at perestroika, the restructuring ofthe Soviet economy, may well lead to astronger emphasis on consumer goods,with the automobile near the top of thelist. The Soviet Union is currently study-ing plans to double its car production of1.4 million vehicles per year. In EasternEurope, on the other hand, an un-resolved debt crisis may keep a lid onexpansion of car ownerships

The governments of many developingcountries are also anxious to encouragethe development of auto-centered trans-portation systems because they considerthem an indispensable cornerstone ofindustrial development. Car ownershipin the Third World has risen sharply,averaging an annual growth rate of I Ipercent in the first half of the seventiesand 8 percent in the second half, butonly 5 percent in the eighties.6

With only a few exceptions, car owner-ship in the Third World is unlikely toreach the levels in industrial countries.Low per capita incomes mean buyingand maintaining a car is simply beyondthe reach of most people, The highlyskewed wealth distribution patterns inmost countries may foster a small, privi-leged class with ample purchasingpower, but they effectively limit thenumber of potential car owners,

Third World car ownership is concen-trated mainly in the newly industrializingcountries of Latin America and South-east Asia and in the major oil-exporting

countries where appetites for cars werewhetted by soaring oil revenues in theseventies and low gasoline retail prices.Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico togetheraccount for almost half the cars in thedeveloping world.'

Yet the emergence of the debt crisis in1982, coming on the heels of surging oilprices in the seventies, shattered theauto industry's expectations that thebulk of future growth would occur inLatin America. The debt crunch com-pelled these nations to marshall their fi-nancial resources for debt servicing,precipitating major recessions. Soaringinterest rates and falling real wageseroded buying power. Car purchases inArgentina, Brazil, and Mexico fell by halfin the eighties, and the once dynamicBrazilian auto industry stumbled fromboom to bust and back. (See Figure

Brazil and Mexico embraced automo-bile exports as an avenue to escape thedebt morass. First encouraged in 1972by generous government incentives topav for ballooning oil imports, exportstook a rising share of Brazil's car produc-tion and soared to 40 percent in 1987,when domestic demand collapsed. InMexico, the share of production sold

ThousandVehicles

1,000

goo 4 Brazil

Sourm MVMA

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000

Figure 62. Car Production in South Koreaand Brazil, 1970-87

(zoo) State of the World 1989

abroad has grown from less than 5 per-cent in 1982 to 48 percent in 1987.These two countries are joined by India,Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thai-land in growing competition in theworld export market.9

South Korea, by contrast, has alwaysdepended on sales overseas, which cur-rently claim two thirds of domestic pro-duction. With close to 800,000 unitsproduced in 1987, South Korea isemerging as a serious challenger toJapan in the small-car market segment.But car ownership at homecurrentlyone auto for every 65 peoplehas beenhobbled through high taxes on pur-chases, registration, and gasoline andthrough low wages.'°

China and India together account for38 percent of the world's population,but they own scarcely half of 1 percent ofits automobiles. Until the late seventies,these governments assigned cars one ofthe lowest development priorities. Both,however, have since embarked on poli-cies that seek to emulate the motorizedtransport systems of the industrial Westand to increase domestic car productiondramatically."

Cars now account for a larger por-tion of oil demand than they did atthe time of the first oil crisis.

Production and ownership are thusstill ovevhelmingly concentrated in ad-vanced industrial societies. They ac-count for only 16 percent of the world'spopulation but 88 percent of the car pro-duction and 81 percent of the globalfleet. (See Table 6-2.) Put differently, by1986 only a little more than 1 percent ofthe population in developing countriesowned a car, compared with 40 percentin the western industrial countries, andwith a world average of about 8 percent.

Between 1970 and 1986, the UnitedStates alone added as many cars to itsroads as the entire Third World nowpossesses. 12

SEARCHING FORALTERNATIVES TO OIL

Because cars run almost exclusively onpetroleum-based fuels, the auto industryis understandably sensitive to changes inthe price and availability of oil. As ameans of transportation, the automobileis, after all, only as reliable as its fuelsupplies. Since the first oil crisis, othersectors of the economy have reducedtheir reliance on petroleum. But no easysubstitutes are available for automotivefuels. Thus, cars now account for alarger portion of oil demand than theydid at the time of the first oil crisis. Since1976, the United States has used morepetroleum each year for transportationthan it has produced. In 1985, the trans-port sector consumed 63 percent of theoil used in the United States (up from 50percent in 1973), 44 percent of that usedin Western Europe, 35 percent in Japan,and 49 percent in developing coun-tries."

The oil crises of the past 15 years rein-forced the notion that a transport systemcentered on the private passenger carcan impose tremendous costs on society,whether in the form of escalating fuelimport bills or huge expenditures of cap-ital and resources to tap domestic fuelsources. Higher prices made oil accountfor a rapidly growing share of total im-ports of most countries. The averagefraction of Third World export earningsused to pay for oil imports tripled duringthe seventies. By 1981, Brazil spent overhalf such earnings to pay for imported

Rethinking Transportation

Table 6.2. Car Density, 1970-86, and Car Fleet in 1986, by Region

(JO!)

Region or Country

Density1986Fleet1970 1980 1986

(people per car)(millionvehicles)

United States 2.0 1.9 1.8 1:15

Western Europe 5.2 3,3 2.8 125Oceania 4.0 3.:i 2.8 8Canada 3,0 2.ti ,).,) I1Japan 12.0 4.9 4.2 99

South Africa 12 12 1l 3Eastern Europe 36 12 11 17

Latin America 38 18 15 06Soviet Union 147 3° 24 1"

Asial 196 95 02 12

Africa? 191 111 110 5India 902 718 554 1.4

China 27.707 18.673 1.374 0.8

World 18 14 1`? 3863

lExcluding japan. China. India. t'Excluding South Africa. 3COlOttiii dues Ito 3Itti to toial due torounding.sovitc.E: Worldwatch Institute. based on Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association. Feu% and FigutrA (De-troit. Mich.: various editions).

oil. Kenya, South Korea, and Thailandspent close to one third and Bangladesh,two thirds.14

Brazil, by far the Third World's larg-est car market and oil importer, saw itsoil bill skyrocket from $280 million in1970 to $10.3 billion in 1980. Higherdomestic oil production and a contro-versial program to generate ethanol fuelfrom sugar crops allowed the country tocut its reliance on imported oil by 60percent between 1979 and 1986. Yet,providing the fuel from domesticsources carried a hefty price tag, requir-ing large-scale investment and govern-ment subsidies. The Brazilian govern-ment has spent an estimated $8 billion toprop up the country's ethanol industryalone. When international oil prices col-lapsed in 1986, annual subsidies grew to

$2 billion from $630 million in thepreceding year.'

The dark clouds cast over the auto'sfuture by the two oil shocks in the seven-ties seemed to recede in the eighties. Carsales quickly resumed growth as concernover oil prices and supplies faded frommemory. Cheaper gasoline served as acatalyst for increased and faster driving.Global gasoline consumption resumedits upward climb in 1983. (See Figure6-3.) Unless car fuel efficiency is boostedfurther to offset these trends, gasolineconsumption will continue to rise.Growing demand will eventually put in-creased pressure on production capaci-ties.16

Warnings of a renewed oil crisis andconcerns about the environmental ef-fects of gasoline use have revived inter-

1 ; i..).-

(102)

BillionGallons

240

200

160

120

80

40

Stale of the World 1989

fuels in large quantities would still re-quire large inputs of agricultural land.Thus, transportation fuel needs couldcome in conflict with food requirements,particular!), if both keep growing. Thedrought that befell different parts of theworld during the summer of 1988 dem-onstrates how quickly surpluses can betransformed into shortages. (See Chap-ter 3.)

Coal and natural gas reserves areplentiful enough to produce methanolon a large scale in resource-rich coun-tries. Abundant as these sources may be,however, ultimately they are as finite aspetroleum. And their use on a large scalehas serious implications for the trend to-ward global warming, as discussed laterin this chapter.

A major drawback of all alcohol fuelsis that some 30-40 percent of the origi-nal energy content of their potentialfeedstocks (biomass, coal, and naturalgas) is lost in the conversion process.Numerous studies suggest that the totalamount of energy inputs to obtainethanolincluding energy required tofuel farmers' vehicles, to produce fertili-zer and pesticides, and to ferment andpurify the alcoholmay be close to oreven surpass the eventual energy out-put's

Using natural gas directly as an auto-motive fuel, either in compressed (CNG)or in liquefied form (LPG), appearsmore practical than tapping it as a feed-stock for alcohol fuels because less of theoriginal energy is lost in the conversionprocess. Today, more than 680.000CNG vehicles are on the road world-wide, with a similar number expectedover the next 10-15 years.t9

In the more distant future, hydro-genthe most common element in theuniversemay become a widely usedfuel in either liquid or compressed gase-ous form. For environmental and supplyreasons, hydrogen is best derived fromwater. Cost is still a major impediment to

Source: United Notions

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 6.3. World Passenger CarGasoline Consunipdon, 1950-86

est in alternative fuels. Attention cur-rently centers on alcohol fuels (ethanoland methanol), natural gas, and, to alesser degree, electricity. Alcohol fuelscan be derived from agricultural wasteand other biomass sources; methanolcan also be produced from natural gasand coal.

Brazil's Proalcool program is widely re-garded the "success story" of theethanol industry, despite the hefty gov-ernment support required. Sugarcane-derived ethanol provided roughly halfthe country's automotive fuel in 1986.The scope of Brazil's program, however,may not be readily replicable elsewhere,because of either insufficient crop sur-pluses, or a lack of government commit-ment, or an automotive fleet that is sim-ply too large. If corn were used as afeedstock, for example, almost 40 per-cent of the entire U.S. annual harvestwould have to be earmarked for ethanolproduction in order to meet 10 percentof the nation's automotive fuel demand.Sugar beets and, where it can be cul-tivated, sugarcane are more efficient inconverting sunlight into stored energy,and therefore promise greater fuelyields than corn or other grains.17

But in most heavily auto-dependentcountries, the production of alcohol

Rethinking Transportation 003)

commercialization. and vehicle technol-ogy has not yet advanced beyond theprototype stage. Canada, Japan, andWest Germany have made major com-mitments to promote hydrogen researchand development. In the United States,however, hydrogen has yet to attractR&D funding commensurate with itsenormous potentia1.20

Electric vehicles promise higher en-ergy aficiency and quieter operationthan conventional internal combustionengines. Barring major breakthroughsin battery technology and cost, however,electric vehicles will likely be confined tomarket niches where performance andrange criteria are less important than inthe overall passenger car market. More-over, such vehicles can only be a viablealternative if the fuels used in electricitygeneration are renewable. Solar power,through the use of photovoltaic cells, isone main candidate. Fuel cellswhichconvert the chemical energy in hydro-gen, methanol. and natural gas directlyinto electrical energy without mechani-cal lossescould some day hold the keyto making electric vehicles more accept-able.21

Alternative fuels have to overcomeconsiderable odds if they are to makemore than just a dent in the motor fuelmarket. The most daunting obstacle is a"chicken and egg" dilemma: an infra-structurefuels. vehicles, service sta-tionswill not spring up unless there isadequate demand, while such demand isunlikely to materialize in the absence ofan appropriate infrastructure.

ENHANCING FUELEFFICIENCY

After the first oil crisis, car companiesaround the world took dramatic steps toboost fuel efficiency. New passenger cars

in the United States today are almosttwice as efficient as the gas-guzzlingbehemoths of the early seventies; as aresult, the average fleet fuel usage rosefrom 13 miles per gallon (MPG) in 1973to 18 MPG in 1986. (See Figure 6-4.)22

New U.S. cars travel an average of 26miles per gallon, but continue to trailtheir European and Japanese competi-tors, whose models achieve 30 MPG ormore. Due to lower efficiency and moredriving, the average North American carstill burns up more than twice as muchgas each year as its counterpart in Japanor Western Europe. Annual gasolineconsumption per car in countries be-longing to the Organisation for Eco-nomic Co-operation and Develoment(OECD) fell by one quarter between1973 and 1985. Thus, while the OECDfleet expanded by 45 percent, its totalfuel consumption grew by only 4 per-cent.23

Fuel economy in the Soviet Union andEast Germany is roughly on a par withthat in Western Europe. Information onfuel efficiency in developing countries isspotty; most cars there are either im-ported or engineered and designed bywestern car manufacturers. However.because on average they rely on olderdesigns and because maintenance isoften poor, autos in the Third World are

Miles PerGallon30

n

Source DOE MVMA

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000

Rowe 64. Fuel Cosithoptiou of U.S.Automobiles. 197048

(104) Slate of 11w World 1989

likely to be less efficient than those inindustrial countries,"

Once the world passed the peak of thesecond oil crisis, fuel economy goalsswiftly lost their urgency. Since 1983.gains in the United States and mostother OECD member countries havefallen short of the impressive achieve-ments between 1974 and 1982. More-over, the growing popularity of lighttrucks in the United Stateswhich areone-third less fuel-efficient than newU.S. passenger carslimits the potentialfor future efficiency gains. Improve-ments in Europe and Japan have beenpartly offset by consumers' growingpreference for larger and more powerfulvehicles.25

But the world could make muchgreater strides toward fuel efficiency. Al-though technical solutions seem almostinvariably to generate the greatest ex-citement and attention, simple humanadjustments could double efficiency vir-tually overnight. For example. even ahighly fuel-efficient car is inefficientlyused when it carries only the driver, as isthe case for over half the auto trips madein the United States; 87 percent of alltrips have at most Iwo passengers. In1084, American cars used just as muchenergy for every passenger-mile of travelas in 1971.26

Still, technical opportunities to im-prove efficiency are far from exhausted.Weight reduction and improvements inengine and transmission efficiency holdthe greatest promise. In addition, aero-dynamics, tire rolling resistance, the en-ergy dissipation of the brakes, and theenergy consumption of accessories meritfurther improvement."

On average, a 10-percent weight re-duction will yield a 6-percent fuel econ-omy gain. Past fuel-economy improve-ments in the United States haveprimarily been accomplished throughlowered weights and shifts to front-

wheel drive. Further gains will likely re-sult from greater substitution of lighter-weight materials for steel and cast-ironcomponents. These materials, in orderof their potential contribution to lightercars, include magnesium, plastics, alumi-num, and high-strength low-alloy steel;they offer strength, heat and stress re-sistance, and design flexibility compara-ble to conventional materials."

Even a highly fuel-efficient car isinefficiently used when it carriesonly the driver.

Due to low cost, plastics have exhib-ited the most dramatic growth of all newautomotive materials. In 1985, some8-11 percent of the vehicle weight ofcars manufactured in Japan, the UnitedStates, and West Germany was ac-counted for by plastics; that share couldgrow to 18-20 percent by early next cen-tury.29

Reducing the weight of a car allowsthe use of smaller engines without hav-ing to sacrifice performance. Engine ef-ficiency can also be improved by runningthe motor at more optimal loads, mini-mizing energy loss through exhaustgases, and improving fuel combustion.Reducing engine warm-up time is an-other important goal since fuel efficiencyam drop by half when an engine iscold.99

Advanced engine designs such as theadiabatic diesel (which minimizes heatloss) and the stratified charge engine(which features a "rich" air-to-fuel mix-ture surrounding the spark plug whilemaintaining an efficient and cleaner-burning overall lean mixture) promisefuel economy improvements of 25-40percent.31

Increases in the number of gears allowa motor to run at its most efficient speed.

Rethinking TranSporlalion 005)Continuously variable transtnissions(CVTs) essentially give a car an unlim-ited number of gears; they offer fuel sav-ings of 20-24 percent, particularly inurban, stop-and-go, driving. Japan'sSubaru. in its Justy subcompact model,was the first to introduce CVT technol-ogy commercially, to be followed by theFiat Uno and Ford Fiesta."

Energy losses due to braking andidlingwhich occur frequently duringurban drivingcan amount to as muchas one third of a vehicle's original kineticenergy. Energy storage systems, such asa flywheel device, together with a CVTcan alleviate this problem by capturingan engine's excess power whenever thedriving requirements are less than itsoutput. This power can then be tappedat some other time, thereby enablingsmaller engines than in today's models.Researchers at the University of Wiscon-sin hope to double fuel economy withsuch a system."

The most efficient cars currently avail-able are about twice as efficient as theaverage new car on the road. At the topof the list is a Japanese model, the SuzukiSprint, which gets 57 MPG. More ad-vanced prototypes, such as the PeugeotECO 2000, Toyota AXV, VolkswagenE80, and Volvo LCP 2000, achieve any-where from 70 to over 100 MPG; Re-nault's VESTA scored a stunning 124MPG in test runs.34

The prospects that innovations cur-rently tested in prototypes will be com-mercialized in a timely fashion are notencouraging, however. Car companiesaround the world have responded tolower oil prices by slowing down theirefforts to incorporate advanced fuel-economy technologies in mass-pro-duced cars. Instead, consumers are of-fered styling changes and gadgetry. Infact. "muscle cars"featuring eight cyl-inders and high horsepowerare backin style.

In the seventies, the United States

held a research lead in advanced fuelefficiency projects such as energy stor-age systems and the lean-burn engine.But with the advent of the oil glut. theAmerican car companies abandoned fueleconomy as a strategic goal. At the sametime, U.S. government support for vari-ous fuel economy R&D projects was ter-minated or reduced by the Reagan ad-ministration. This shortsighted attitudewas compounded by the administra-tion's rollback and proposed repeal offederally mandated standards for newcarsan idea bound to decrease na-tional security. contrary to governmentpredictions."

Today, the Japanese and Europeansare the pacesetters in the quest forhigher fuel efficiency. Japanese firmslead in developing lean-burn motors andceramic engines, and European firms arestrong contenders in energy storage sys-tems. Fven in aerodynamics. whereAmerican companies are still ahead, aresearch lead has not translated intopractical advances.

In keeping with Henry Ford II's 1971dictum that "mini-cars mean mini-prof-its," General Motors and Ford prefer toconcentrate on big cars. In the small-carsegment. all three U.S. companies in-creasingly rely on "sponsored" im-portsmarketing cars often designed,engineered, and manufactured abroad.As a result, they could find themselveswithout a sufficient manufacturing baseto meet the demand for smaller carswhen it develops again."

One reason auto companies lag incommercializing highly fuel-efficienttechnologies is the current lack of con-sumer interest. In 1986, gasoline andmotor oil accounted for only 15 percentof total car operating costs per mile inthe United States, down from 26 percentin 1975. In addition, each fuel economyincrement yields proportionally smallersavings. For someone driving 10,000miles a year, an improvement from 10 to

120

(ro6) State of the World 1989

20 MPG will save 500 gallons of fuel an-nually; but doubling that to 40 MPGpromises "only" an additional savings of250 gallons, and doubling again, a com-paratively meager 125 gallons.32

Fuel taxes, collected per unit of con-sumption, have had some success in re-straining gasoline consumption. Butthey have done so more by affectingdriving patterns than by steering con-sumers toward the most efficient cars. Atax levied on the sale of a new vehiclecould shape consumers' purchasing de-cisions if it were tailored to the car's fueleconomy.33

Left to their own devices, both indus-try and consumers will enjoy the freeride currently afforded by low fuel pricesand will neglect fuel economy. Govern-ments need to adopt a strong frame-worka set of new standards andtaxesto boost fuel efficiency. Given therange of advanced technologies now in-stalled in prototypes, on the shelf, or ona drawing board, striving for 50 MPG innew cars by the end of the century is areasonable goal.

IMPROVING AIR QUALITY

The most alarming effect of mass motor-ization may not be the depletion of fossilfuels but the large-scale damage tohuman health and the natural environ-ment. Researchers at the University ofCalifornia estimate that the use of gaso-line and diesel fuel in the United Statesalone may cause up to 30,000 deathsevery year. And the American Lung As-sociation estimates that air pollutionfrom motor vehicles, power plants, andindustrial fuel combustion costs theUnited States $40 billion annually inhealth care and lost productivity s9

Cars, trucks, and buses play a promi-nent role in generating virtually all the

major air pollutants, especially in cities.In OECD member countries, they con-tribute 75 percent of carbon monoxideemissions, 48 percent of nitrogen ox-ides, 40 percent of hydrocarbons, 13percent of particulates, and 3 percent ofsulfur oxides. Worldwide, the produc-tion and use of automotive fuels ac-counts for an estimated 17 percent of allcarbon dioxide (CO2) released from fos-sil fuels. Transportation is also the pri-mary source of lead pollution. The ad-verse health effects of all thesepollutants are fairly well established,though the threshold of effects remainsuncertain.49

Perhaps more significant are the syn-ergistic effects. The best known andmost pervasive of these is photochemicalsmogthe brown haze that causeshealth disorders, restricts visibility,erodes buildings and monuments,reduces crop yields, and is at least partlyresponsible for the massive forest dam-age afflicting central Europe. Ozone, themost important component of smog, isthe product of complex reactions be-tween nitrogen oxides and hydrocar-bons in the presence of sunlight.41

In 1986, between 40 million and 75million Americans were living in areasthat failed to attain National AmbientAir Quality Standards for ozone, carbonmonoxide, and particulates. If thesestandards were in force elsewhere, theywould routinely be exceeded in manycities: Athens, Budapest, Cairo, MexicoCity, New Delhi, and Sao Paulo areamong those with the world's most pol-luted air.42

Nitrogen and sulfur oxides, togetherwith unburnt hydrocarbons, are theprincipal components of the phenome-non commonly known as acid rain. Acidprecipitation is destroying freshwateraquatic life and forests throughout cen-tral Europe and North America and de-grading marine life in Atlantic coastalwaters.4 3

12:

Rethinking Transportation (107)

The most serious long-term conse-quence of automotive emissions, how-ever, is the atmospheric buildup of CO2and other "greenhouse gases"nitrousoxide, methane, and ozone. There isnow virtual consensus among scientiststhat if the concentration of CO2 in theatmosphere doubles from preindustriallevels, a substantial increase in averageglobal temperature will occur. Indeed,such a rise is already under way. Theimpending climate change could shiftglobal precipitation patterns, disruptcrop-growing regions, raise sea levels,and threaten coastal cities worldwidewith inundation. (See Chapter 1.)44

Among all the auto-generated air pol-lutants, lead has been most successfullyfought. Since it was purposely added togasoline as an octane enhancer, it couldjust as well be eliminated from it. Reduc-ing emissions of nitrogen and sulfur ox-ides, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons,and particulates has proved more dif-ficult because they are products of thecombustion process. The most sophis-ticated exhaust control device at the mo-ment is the three-way catalyst, whichreduces emissions of hydrocarbons, car-bon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides.Over the life of a vehicle, today's cata-lysts cut emissions of hydrocarbons byan average of 87 percent, of carbonmonoxide by 85 percent, and of nitro-gen oxides by 62 percent, But withoutproper maintenance, their effectivenessis likely to decrease rapidly. And cata-lysts are least effective when an engine iscolda frequent situation given theprevalence of short trips in OECD mem-ber courstries.43

Since the early sixties, the UnitedStates has set the pace in establishingand tightening emission limits and pio-neering control devices. Japan's stan-dards, implemented in 1975 and 1978,are roughly comparable. Australia, Can-ada, and South Korea recently estab-

fished emission standards equivalent tothose in force in the United Slates. Brazilinitiated a 10-year phase-in of regula-tins that, by 1997, will allow it to matchcurrent U.S. standards. Emissions in Ar-gentina. India, and Mexico, on the otherhand, still go virtually uncoun oiled.Controls in the Soviet Union and East-ern Europe are limited to enginemodifications 46

The most serious long-term conse-quence of automotive emissions isthe atmospheric buildup of "green-house gases."

Within Western Europe, there is awidening gulf between the so-calledStockholm group and the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC). Austria,Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland re-quire installation of catalytic convertersand compliance with emission levelscomparable to those prevalent in theUnited States, EEC standards establishseparate categories for large, medium,and small vehicles, and those for smallcars in particular remain very lenient,due to the opposition of the French andItalian car industries. Because some 60percent of all cars on the road in Europeare in that category, little reduction inemissions can be expected.47

Europe has also been slow to controldiesel pollutants, which pose evengreater health risks than gasoline emis-sions. Unlike in Japan and the UnitedStates, diesels are enjoying rising popu-larity among European motorists, cap-turing 18 percent of the new-car marketin 1986. EEC diesel emissions standardsare still considerably less stringent thanthose in the United States, which ironi-cally many European-produced vehiclesare already capable of meeting.48

Emission controls have been most

A 4

3


successful in reducing carbon monoxideand hydrocarbons. During the seventies,carbon monoxide emissions from mo-bile sources fell by more than 50 percentin Japan and by one third in the UnitedStates. But during the eighties progresshas come to a virtual standstill, althoughemission levels remain unacceptablyhigh; in most of Europe emissions arerising along with increasing traffic vol-ume. A similar trend can be observed forhydrocarbons. Nitrogen oxides emis-sions stabilized or decreased modestly inthe seventies and early eighties in theUnited States. Japan, and some Euro-pean countries. But in many nations,these earlier gains are in danger of beingwiped out by growing traffic and highertravel speeds.4°

Athens, Budapest, and Sao Paulohave imposed restraints on motor-ized traffic in their inner cities.

The goal of clean air remains elusive.Even though U.S. emission standardsare as strict as any in the world, the na-tion's enormous traffic volume simplyoverwhelms pollution control efforts.The average new gasoline-powered carcould already meet considerably morestringent norms than those in forcetoday. Yet there are no in-use standardsfor older cars, even though these oftenpollute far more than permitted by new-car standards. Some 62 American citiesstill fail to meet federal ozone and car-bon monoxide standards, and one thirdof them have no prospect of ever meet-ing them.50

The U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) has been lax in enforcingClean Air Act provisions that call forbans on federal funds for new highwayand industrial construction in noncom-pliance areas. Since 1975, Congress has

repeatedly rolled back the deadline formeeting ozone standards. An effort toreauthorize a stricter Clean Air Act be-came deadlocked in the fall of 1988 dueto the opposition of the car, coal, andutilities industries.5'

Tougher measures seem called for.EPA Administrator Lee Thomas hassuggested that "the smog problem maywell need to be dealt with by reducingthe number of cars on the street, by tell-ing people they can't drive nearly to theextent they have in the past." Indeed, inan effort to combat urban air pollution,Athens, Budapest, Florence, Milan,Rome, and Sao Paulo have recently im-posed restraints of varying strictness onmotorized traffic in their inner cities.52

Fuel efficiency has been largely ne-glected as a means of combating pollu-tion. Doubling fuel economy willroughly halve CO2 emissions. Efficiencycould be of further help if' legislatedemission limits were expressed in unitsof fuel consumed rather than in units ofdistance traveled. One technology underdevelopment is a membrane that, byseparating nitrogen from the air beforeit is drawn into the combustion chamber,would not only eliminate nitrogen ox-ides but also boost combustion effi-ciency.53

Pollution abatement efforts every-where have focused almost entirely ontailpipe devices that seek to reduce ex-haust emissions rather than on develop-ing solutions that might prevent theirformation in the first place. Some alter-native engine designs described earlieras fuel saversthe stratified charge andadiabatic diesel enginescould fit thatbill. Ceramic engines or engine compo-nents could also cut emissions. Unfortu-nately, government R&D support forthese technologies in the United Stateswas terminated or sharply curtailedunder the Reagan administration.54

The use of nonpetroleum fuels to re-duce emissions is garnering growing

Rethinking Transportation (rost)

support among both public officials andauto industry managers. A bill passed bythe U.S. Congress in the fall of 1988strives to encourage automakers tomass-produce either "dedicated" alter-native-fuel vehicles (designed to use afuel mixture containing at least 85 per-cent ethanol or methanol) or fuel-flexi-ble vehicles (capable of running on vari-ous blends of gasoline and alcohol fuelsor of operating on natural gas and gaso-line). But the legislation may end uperoding fuel economy standards whilefailing to induce the use of alcoholfuels.5s

Colorado and several other states areor will be mandating alcohol blends(gasoline containing up to 10 percentethanol or methanol) to meet Clean AirAct standards. California has taken thelead on pure methanol. The mecca ofthe automotive culture originally em-braced methanol in 1979 in response tothe oil crisis; the program has sincegained fresh impetus as a way to meet airquality standards. In little more than adecade, California hopes to replace asmuch as 30 percent of gasoline con-sumption with methanol in areas violat-ing federal air pollution standards.56

Tests for alcohol fuel vehicles show awide range of air quality results, andthere is considerable controversy, par-ticularly over the merits of methanol use.Pure methanol yields only negligibleamounts of highly reactive, ozone-pro-ducing hydrocarbons. but does not no-ticeably reduce carbon monoxide emis-sions; methanol blends decrease carbonmonoxide emissions, but do not provideany tangible ozone benefit."

A neglected aspect of turning to meth-anol is its impact on the greenhouse ef-fect. Operating a vehicle on methanolemits less CO2 than using gasolinewould. But producing the fuel from coalwould worsen the threat of climatechange because converting coal intomethanol could double CO2-equivalent

emissions. Even ethanol combustionproduces compoundsaldehydes andperoxyacetyl nitratethat may contrib-ute to global warming.55

The search for less polluting alterna-tives to petroleum extends beyond alco-hol fuels. Outside the United States, nat-ural gas vehicles are receiving growingattention, because they promise lowercarbon monoxide and particulate emis-sions (but perhaps higher discharges ofnitrogen oxides) than conventional vehi-cles. But emissions of greenhouse gaseswould hardly be lower.s5

Electric vehicles essentially emit nopollutants. Their environmental accept-ability, however, depends on how theelectricity that powers them is gener-ated. Unless nonfossil feedstocks areused, the CO2 problem would remainuntackled or could even be ag-gravated.65

Hydrogen may well be the most desir-able fuel of the future. Unless it is basedon fossil fuels, the production of hydro-gen does not lead to CO2 emissions. Itsuse does not generate carbon monoxideor unburnt hydrocarbons, and nitrogenoxides emissions are low.61

A NEW AGE OF TRANSPORTThe auto culture is so deeply ingrainedin western society that alternatives to itseem virtually unthinkable. But exces-sive reliance on cars can actually stiflerather than advance societies. The verysuccess of mass motorization has createdconditions that cannot be amelioratedsimply by making cars more efficient andless polluting.

The automobile exacts an enormoustoll in human life. Despite safety im-provements, an estimated quarter-mil-lion people die in traffic accidentsaround the world every year, with mil-

(1 la) Stale of the World 1989

lions more suffering injuries of varyingseverity.62

Large stretches of land have beengiven over to the automobile and its in-frastructure. Worldwide, at least a thirdof an average city's land is devoted toroads, parking lots, and other elementsof a car infrastructure. In American cit-ies, close to half the urban space goes toaccommodate the automobile; in LosAngeles, the figure is two thirds."

Cars confer on their owners virtuallyboundless freedom as long as their num-bers remain limited. But instead of facili-tating individual mobility, the prolifera-tion of automobiles has bred a crisis ofits owncongestion. The conventionalapproach to this problem has led to avicious circle: building more roads sim-ply attracts more cars, thus increasingthe pressure for still more roads. Insouthern California, with probably moremiles of freeways than anywhere in theworld, the average travel speed is nohigher than 33 miles per hour and is ex-pected to drop to 15 miles per hour by2000. The Commission on CaliforniaState Government Organization andEconomy. a panel of business and politi-cal leaders, recently warned that mount-ing congestion had placed California onthe brink of "a transportation crisiswhich will affect the economic prosperityof the state."64

Those cities most reliant on automo-biles face virtual paralysis, an "urbanthrombosis," as Kirkpatrick Sale has putit, "that slowly deprives the city of itslifeblood." In U.S. cities like Denver,Houston, and Los Angeles, roughly 90percent of people get to work by car; inthe less auto-dependent cities like NewYork, cars still account for two thirds ofall work-related trips. By comparison, inEurope, where communities are less ex-tensively suburbanized and averagecommuting distances are half those inNorth America, only about 40 percent ofurban residents use their cars. Some 37

percent use public transportation, andthe remainder walk or bike. In Tokyo,just 15 percent of the population drivesto work. The result is that residents ofthe highly car-oriented American citiesuse twice as much gasoline per capita asAustralians, four times as much as Euro-peans, and 10 times as much as Asians.66

Congestion is no longer an exclusivelyurban phenomenon. In the UnitedStates. residential settlements and jobsare increasingly dispersed in sprawlingsuburbs. As a consequence, the numberof commutes within central city areas hasremained fairly stable since 1960, whilethe number of trips between central citiesand suburbs and from suburb to suburbhas doubled. When suburban communi-ties are too scattered, public mass transit,biking, and walking are not feasible.66

The United States boasts of the high-est degree of individual mobility in theworld. But Americans' heavy reliance onthe automobile is a peculiar blend ofpreference and necessity, a cross be-tween an abiding love affair with the pas-senger car and a profound lack of alter-natives to autos. Fewer than 20 percentof the miles traveled by car are for vaca-tioning, "pleasure" driving, or visitingfamily or friends. The overwhelmingmajority of driving goes for such dailynecessities as commuting to work andshopping.6'

A full accounting of the manifold sub-sidies the automobile receives, plus theenvironmental and health costs it en-tails, might cool the passion felt for cars.In most if not all countries, car ownersdo not bear the full costs of road build-ing and maintenance, municipal services(such as traffic regulation and costsborne by police and fire departments),accidents and related health care, andtax losses from land paved over for auto-motive purposes.

In the United States, total subsidiesmay surpass $300 billion each yearanamount equal to all personal auto-re-

Rethinhing Transportation (iii)lated expenditures. If these expenseswere reflected in retail fuel prices, a gal-lon of gasoline might cost as much as$4.50. An environment tax, assessed ei-ther on automobiles or the fuels theyburn, would help internalize the lessquantifiable environmental costs. Nodoubt political opposition to such mea-sures would be enormous. But societiescannot continue to ignore the true costsof cars."

With a short reprieve from higher oilprices, it is time to build a bridge from anauto-centered society into an alternativetransportation future characterized bygreater diversity of transport modes, inwhich cars, buses, rail systems, bicycles,and walking all complement each other.Mass transit systems offer a host of ad-vantages over automobiles. When fullyused, they are considerably more en-ergy-efficient and less polluting. In addi-tion, they reduce congestion: a car re-quires roughly nine times more roadspace per passenger than a bus.69

Ifproperly planned, public transit net-works can approximate the flexibilityprovided by private passenger cars. Bysynchronizing schedules, ;twltidestirm-tional or grid systems allow convenienttransfers between different transit line ,.They enhance access throughout a met-ropolitan area and create a dense net-work of mass transit corridors that at-tracts more riders. Multidestinationalsystems are operating successfully inmany European and some North Ameri-can cities."

The viability of public transit sys-temsparticularly in suburban areascan be enhanced by making them moreaccessible. Bike-and-ride stations andfacilities to carry bicycles on buses andrail systems have proved enormouslypopular in Denmark, Japan, the Nether-lands, and West Germany, but remainlittle used in the United Stairs."

R:orienting transport priorities canbe successful only if the symbiotic rela-

tionship between land use patterns andtransportation networks is recognized.Public transit systems can facilitate andreinforce more compact land use, whileland use patterns frequently determinetransportation needs. Zoning ordi-nances can encourage a higher densityof urban activity while slowing develop-ment at the urban perimeter. The moreconcentrated both population and jobsare, the shorter are travel distances, themore mass transit becomes viable, andthe more walking and biking occurs. Inshort, more compact cities foster less in-dividual motorized transport."

Societies cannot continue to ignorethe true costs of cars.

Third World cities stand at a cross-roads as they swell in size and as urbantransportation needs rapidly multiply. Inthe view of Michael Replogle of the Insti-tute for Transportation and Develop-ment Policy in Washington, D.C., "thereis a growing transportation crisis inmany lesser developed countries. Thiscrisis is the product of . . . a mismatchbetween the supply of transportation in-frastructure, services, and technologiesand the mobility needs of the majority ofThird World people.""

Governments frequently assign prior-ity to motorized travel in traffic plan-ning, budget decisions, and allocation ofstreet space, marginalizing pedestriansand traditional modes of transportation.Similarly, the World Bank has helped toslant transportation projects toward mo-torized solutions. Between 1972 and1985, rail and bus systems received lessthan one third of the funding for WorldBank urban transportation projects.Nonmotorized modes have been virtu-ally ignored.14

Alas. government policies favoringprivate car ownership by a tiny but af-


fluent elite are squandering scarce re-sources and distorting development pri-orities. Bringing in fuel, car compo-nents, or already assembled autosstretches import budgets thin. Likewise,building and maintaining an elaboratesystem of roads. highways, bridges, andtunnels devours enormous resources.

The overwhelming majority of peoplein the Third World will never be able toown a car. The promotion of auto own-ership thus entails sharp inequities: tomake it happen, the resources of poorand wealthy alike need to be devoted,though only a small share of the popula-tion enjoys the benefits. Existing publictransportation often is in poor repairand has failed to keep up with urbanpopulation growth. In India and Ban-gladesh, for example. the urban publictransit sector may meet as little as 15percent of transportation needs."

To meet the mobility needs of thepoor majority in the Third World, sub-stantial improvements and expansion ofpublic transport are required. But oftenthe poor cannot even afford public trans-portation. They frequently spend a dis-proportionate share of their incomes ongetting around the city. In New Delhi,the lowest income groups devote 20-25percent of their household incomes totransport, while the wealthiest groupspends only 8 percent. Walking accountsfor two thirds of all trips in large Africancities like Kinshasa, and for almost halfthe trips in Bangalore, India."

Nonmotorized modes of transporta-tionrickshaws, bicycles, push-carts,and animal-drawn cartsthat require lit-tle input of capital and energy can be animportant complement to public transit.They are more affordable, mostly do notpollute, do not strain investment and im-port budgets, and also generate a signif-icant amount of employment."

Bicyclesconsidered mainly a recrea-tional device in the industrial Westarethe predominant means of short-dis-

I n

Lance urban vehicular transportation inAsia. although they are far less commonin parts of the western hemisphere andAfrica. There are 800 million bicycles inthe world today, twice the number ofcars. In China, there are 540 bikes forevery car, with one bicycle for every fourpeople."

French philosopher Andre Gorz onceremarked that "the automobile is theparadoxical example of a luxury objectthat has been devalued by its ownspread. But this practical devaluationhas not yet been followed by an ideologi-cal devaluation." The proliferation ofautomobiles has led to the multiplecrises of oil depletion, air pollution,looming climate change, and conges-tion. The magnitude of these problemssuggests the need for a fundamental re-thinking of the automobile's role."

The scope of the modern, auto-cen-tered transportation systemfrom pro-duction and distribution to operationand repairis so tremendous that fun-damental change cannot occur quickly.A successful policy therefore needs toencompass various layers, ranging fromthose that can Lake effect more immedi-ately, such as making cars more efficientand less polluting and discouraging autouse where possible, to others that willneed more time to make their impactfelt, such as identifying and developingrenewable, environmentally acceptablefuels. and establishing efficient, flexiblepublic mass transit systems.

A more comprehensive policy mustrecognize that transportation needs arenot abstract. What people need is accessto jobs, homes, and services. More com-pact and integrated communities canprovide such access without long com-mutes. Making urban design an integralcomponent of future transportationpolicies could reconcile the contrastinginterests of individuals in mobility and ofsociety in fuel supply security, urban in-tegrity, and environmental protection.

7

Responding to AIDSLori Heise

Few tragedies in human history havecaptured the world's attention as hasAIDS. No disease, past or present, hasinspired an international responseequal to the current AIDS mobilizationof the World Health Organization(WHO). None in recent memory hasprovoked more anxiety, aroLsed suchprejudice against the afflicted, or stimu-lated so many moral, ethical. and legaldebates. And no disease has morepointedly forced societies to confrontissues otherwise conveniently ignored:drug abuse, sexuality, and the plight ofthe poor.

This global response is all the moreremarkable given the relatively smallnumber of people affected by acquiredimmunodeficiency syndrome so far.WHO estimates that by the end of 1988.at least 350,000 cases of the disease hadoccurred worldwide. The U.N. agencyexpects 1 million more cases by 1992,but even then, other killers will dwarfAIDS' toll. Each year, 2.5 million peopledie of smoking-related illnesses and 5million children succumb to chronic di-arrhea. Tuberculosis alone claims 3 mil-lion lives annually, 10 times the numberof AIDS cases to date.'

This incongruity of numbers morelikely reflects gross underattention to di-arrhea and tuberculosis than overreac-tion to AIDS. The world is rightlyalarmed at AIDS' potential to surpassother killers if it continues to spread un-checked. Moreover, body counts alonedo not reflect what sets AIDS apart. Un-like most diseases. AIDS is almost alwaysfatal; there is no cure and no vaccine.Carriers may go for years without symp-toms, evoking the paranoia and fear thataccompany uncertainty. And AIDS dealswith the most intimate of human activi-ties, the most powerful of human emo-tions.

Together these factors give AIDS apsychological charge unmatched by anyother illness. Significantly, though,AIDS is one of the few diseases thatposes a substantial threat to both indus-trial and developing nations. This con-vergence of interests provides oppor-tunities to forge new alliances and newmodels for international cooperation. AsJonathan Mann, Director of WHO'sGlobal Programme on AIDS, observes:"AIDS has the potential to bring us to-gether, if we can thwart those who woulduse it to drive us apart."2

I. =/ ,...)


THE PANDEMIC UNFOLDS

In 1981, astute physicians in Californiaand New York began to recognize astrange clustering of symptoms amongsome of their male homosexual patients.Something was destroying the immunesystems of these individuals, renderingthem susceptible to an odd assortmentof opportunistic infections and cancers.Almost simultaneously, doctors in Cen-tral Africa, Europe, and Haiti began tonote patients with similar conditions. By1982, the new disease had a name: AIDS.And one year later, it had a cause: thehuman immunodeficiency virus, orHIV.'

AIDS on average takes eight ornine years to develop.

HIV exhibits a unique combination ofcharacteristics that makes it intrinsicallyhard to control. Like genital herpes.once caught, the virus stays with its car-rier for life. Once disease develops,AIDS is almost always fatalusuallywithin two years. But instead of mani-festing within a few days or weeks, likemost viral diseases, AIDS on averagetakes eight or nine years to develop.During this interval, carriers look andfeel healthy but can pass the virus to oth-ers. Researchers now believe that most ifnot all individuals infected with HIV willeventually develop AIDS.4

The good news, however, is that com-pared with other virusessuch as polioand the common coldH1V is fragileand relatively difficult to transmit. AIDSis overwhelmingly a sexually transmitteddisease, communicated through bodyfluids and blood during vaginal or analintercourse. To a significant but lesserextent, the virus is also transmittedthrough blood transfusions, through thesharing or reusing of contaminated nee-

dies, and from mother to child duringpregnancy or birth. Contrary to wide-spread fears, AIDS cannot be caughtthrough casual contact, sneezes, kissing,toilet seats, or insects.

Although the virus is transmitted thesame way everywherethrough blood,through sexual intercourse, or frommother to childthe pattern of trans-mission and infection varies among re-gions. Indeed, the international AIDSpicture can best be understood in termsof three broadly defined subepidemics,each with its own dynamic.

In North America, Western Europe,and certain Latin American countries,AIDS is mainly transmitted through ho-mosexual intercourse and the sharing ofneedles among drug addicts. As a result,those infected are overwhelmingly male,and transmission from mother to child islimited. Less than 1 percent of the popu-lation is thought to be infected, but theinfection rate among intravenous (IV)drug users and homosexual men ex-ceeds 50 percent in some cities. Hetero-sexual sex is responsible for a small butincreasing proportion of cases. Interest-ingly, despite its potential, sex with pros-titutes is not a major mode of transmis-sion.5

By contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa andparts of the Caribbean, AIDS is primarilya heterosexually transmitted disease,with women infected as often as men.Because so many women are infected,transmission from mother to child is dis-turbingly common. Blood transfu-sionsa route largely eliminated in theindustrial worldremain a source of in-fection in many countries where bloodsupplies still are not screened. Since in-travenous drug use and homosexualityare rare, these modes of transmissionare not significant, although reuse ofcontaminated needles by health workersremains a likely source of infection. Insome countries, infection in the totalpopulation exceeds 1 percent, with 5-33

Responding to AIDS (115)

percent of sexually active adults in selecturban areas infected. Male contact withprostitutes is thought to play a majorrole in the epidemic's spread.6

In the third set of countries, HIV hasbeen introduced only recently. Infectionrates remain extremely low even amongpeople with multiple sex partners, suchas prostitutes. Most cases have origi-nated outside of the country eitherthrough sex with a foreigner or throughimported blood products contaminatedwith HIV. Although there is increasingevidence of in-country spread, no strongpattern of heterosexual or homosexualtransmission has emerged. Asia, EasternEurope, northern Africa, the MiddleEast, and most of the Pacific all fall inthis category::

These variations evolve from a combi-nation of factors, including when andwhere the virus first entered the popula-tion and the different social practicesand behaviors that exist among cultures.In Africa, for example, the epidemic in-volved the heterosexually active popula-tion first, whereas in the United Statesthe epidemic was initially introducedand amplified in predominately malepopulations.. homosexuals, people withhemophilia, and IV drug users. Re-searchers also believe that the greaterprevalence of untreated sexually trans-mitted diseases (STDs) in Africa hasfacilitated the spread of AIDS there andmay largely explain the greater efficiencyof heterosexual sex in transmitting thevirus among Africans .°

It is becoming increasingly clear, forexample, that chlamydia and STDs thatcause genital sores (such as syphilis,herpes, and chancroid) make it easier forHIV to pass between sexual partners.Sadly, in developing countries wheretreatment is less accessible, STDs are farmore endemic than in the industrialworld. Laboratory evidence also sug-gests that an individual whose immunesystem has been activated by chronic in-

fections might be more susceptible toHIV infection. This factor may operateto increase heterosexual transmission inthe Third World, where viral and para-sitic diseases are endemic. There is noconvincing evidence that genetic differ-ences or variations in viral strains ac-count for the African pattern of trans-mission .°

Although scientists have mapped thevirus's surface chemistry in minute de-tail, the world has only the vaguest no-tion of where HIV is and where it isgoing. As of December 1, 1988, 142countries had reported a total of129,385 AIDS cases to the World HealthOrganization. (See Table 7-1.) Due togross underreporting and underrecog-ration, however, WHO suspects that thetrue global caseload is more than twicethat figure. Moreover, AIDS cases repre-sent only the tip of the iceberg: for everyAIDS case, anywhere from 20 to 100people may carry the virus but not yetshow symptoms. All told, WHO esti-mates that 5 million to 10 million peopleworldwide may be infected with HIV.'°

Lacking any better measure, manypeople have used WHO data on re-ported AIDS cases to compare the sever-ity of the epidemic in different parts ofthe world. Such comparisons can be mis-leading, however, because countriesvary greatly in the accuracy and com-pleteness of their reporting. Also, be-cause of the virus's long latency period,a country's current number of AIDScases is actually a snapshot of the epi-demic five to eight years ago, when thosewho now have AIDS first got infected.The severity of today's epidemic is bestrepresented by studies that measure howmany people are currently infected withHIV by testing individuals' blood for an-tibodies to the virus.

Because antibody testing is expensiveand difficult to conduct on a large scale,only a handful of countriesincluding

131)

(rr6) State of the World 1989

Table 7-1. Officially Reported AIDSCases, Selected Countries,

December 1, 1988

Country Prevalence Rate

(cases permillion

(cases) population)

United States 78.985 321Uganda 5.508 336Brazil 4.436 31

France 4.211 75Tanzania 3.055 126

Kenya 2.732 117Malawi 2,586 336West Germany 2,580 42Italy 2,556 45Canada 2.156 83

Mexico 1.502 18

Haiti 1,455 231Burundi 1,408 271Congo 1.250 568Zambia 1,056 141

Rwanda 987 139

Switzerland 605 92French Guiana 113 1,228Japan 90 0.7Bermuda 81 1,396China 3 0.003

souxcEs: World Health Organization data base:Population Reference Bureau. 1988 World Popula-tion Data UM (Washington. D.C.: 1988).

Uganda and Rwanda have attemptedto design and implement surveys thatwould yield national estimates of HIVprevalence. Even in these small coun-tries, the logistical and design problemsof testing "representative" cross sec-tions of society have proved immense,making it unlikely that many countrieswill undertake similar ventures. Withoutsystematic testing, epidemiologists willhave to rely on small-scale blood surveysof select groups for estimating the scopeof infection.'"

By testing enough people with differ-ent backgrounds and risk factorsfac-tory workers, prostitutes in cities, ruralblood donorsepidemiologists canpiece together a fairly accurate picture ofthe epidemic's extent. Researchers atWHO are now using such surveys to de-rive country-specific estimates of infec-tion within different age-groups. Al-though estimates of infection by countryare not yet available, the sum total ofdata lead WHO to believe that Africa isthe most affected continent and Asia theleast. (See Table 7-2.) Infection in Africaappears largely concentrated in the cen-ter, extending west from Tanzania to theCongo, and dipping south to includeZambia and Malawi. The United States isalso severely affected, with an estimated1-1.5 million infected individuals.'2

Antibody surveys likewise reveal thatthroughout the world AIDS is primarilyan urban disease, although it is graduallyspreading from major urban centers tosmaller cities and towns. In parts ofZambia, northwestern Tanzania, andsouthwestern Uganda, however, thereare major rural outbreaks, emanatingfrom the movement of people and dis-ease along the Trans-African Highwayand in areas of military conflict.13

Table 7-2. Estimated HIV Prevalence,Selected Regions, 1987/88

Region Prevalence

AfricaUnited StatesLatin AmericaEuropeAsia

World

(number infected)

2-3 million1-1.5 million

500,000-750,000280,000-800,000

fewer than 100,000

5-10 million(probably closer to

5 million)

SOURCE: Worldwatch Institute. compiled from vari-ous World Health Organization sources.


Even more difficult than determiningthe world's current AIDS picture is pre-dicting how the epidemic will evolve. Al-ready there have been important shiftsin the persons most at risk in variouscountries and in the relative significanceof different transmission routes. Suchshifts are meaningful because they indi-cate where new prevention activitiesshould be focused and have importantimplications for the spread of infectionbeyond those presently affected.

The United States and WesternEurope, for example, are now experienc-ing a second wave of epidemic amongintravenous drug users. Whereas mostAIDS cases used to involve homosexualmen, evidence indicates that rates of newinfection are declining among gay menbut accelerating among drug addicts. Infact, in certain parts of Europeinclud-ing Italy, Spain, and ScotlandIV drugusers now account for the majority of allcases. Overall, the proportion of totalEuropean AIDS cases involving drug in-jection rose from 2 percent in Septem-ber 1984 to 24 percent in mid-1988.14

This new pattern is important becauseof both its impact on the drug-usingcommunity and its potential to facilitatethe spread of AIDS into the general pop-ulation. Although it is too early to pre-dict whether AIDS will move into theheterosexual mainstream in these areas,addicts could facilitate this process bycommunicating the virus to their sexualpartners who in turn could infect peopleoutside the drug community. Seventypercent of heterosexually transmittedcases in native-born U.S. citizens cur-rently occur in partners of IV drugusers."

Indeed, it is difficult to overemphasizethe role that drug abuse could play in thefuture of the American and EuropeanAIDS epidemic. Already, more than 70percent of cases in American childrenare due to IV drug use by their motheror her sexual partner. Half of all AIDS

cases in American women are related todrug use, with even higher proportionsamong black and Hispanic women (70and 8$ percent, respectively). Evenamong female prostitutes, the likelihoodof infection is more closely linked to IVdrug use than to prostitution itself 16

Half of all AIDS cases in Americanwomen are related to drug use.

Cenain Central American and Carib-bean nations have also experiencedshifts in AIDS epidemiology, withheterosexual sex gradually replacing ho-mosexual activity as the dominant routeof transmission. This change is best ex-emplified in Haiti, where the percentageof cases involving men who contractedAIDS through homosexual activity de-clined from 50 percent in 198$ to 1 per-cent in 1987, while the share transmittedheterosexually increased from 26 to over80 percent. As a result, the proportion ofcases among women has doubled since1979, and the number of babies bornwith AIDS has increased greatly."

Latin American health officials suspectthat the high prevalence of bisexualityamong some Latin men has contributedto this shifting epidemiology. Becausehomosexuality is less acceptable in Latinculture and the pressure to have chil-dren is acute. many men who engage inhomosexual activity marry or havesteady female lovers. This sets the stagefor increasing AIDS incidence amongwomen and children, a pattern alreadydocumented in Trinidad and Tobago,the Dominican Republic, and Honduras,among others. Health officials fear thatother Latin American countries couldfollow Haiti's lead. In Brazil and Mexico,for example, bisexuals account for 2$percent of reported AIDS cases; in Ecua-dor, for 40 percent."

(i18) Stale of the World 1989

THE IMPACT IN THE THIRDWORLD

Estimating the social and economic im-pact of AIDS in the Third World is anendeavor fraught with uncertainty. Sci-entists have too few data on the preva-lence of HIV infection or on the condi-tionsboth behavioral and socialthatdetermine its spread to project with anyconfidence the future course of the epi-demic. Even less information is availablefor translating rising death rates into po-tential impacts on overtaxed health caresystems, economic output, or futurepopulation growth. Yet one thing is cer-tain: AIDS will have a profound impactin the Third World, and one that ex-ceeds the impact in the West, where re-sources are more plentiful and basic in-frastructure better developed.

A look at existing health care systemsin the Third World provides a glimpse ofthe disadvantage that developing coun-tries face in responding to AIDS. In1984. Haiti had $3.25 to spend on healthcare per citizen; Mexico had $11.50.Rwanda's pitiful annual budget of $1.60per person would not even buy a bottleof aspirin in the industrial world. By con-trast, Sweden annually spends over$1,100 on health care per person andthe United States invests more than$760. Yet meager Third World healthbudgets must contend with existing epi-demics of frightening proportion. Threemillion Third World children die eachyear from preventable diseases such asmeasles, tetanus, and whooping cough.In Africa alone, malaria annually claims1 million lives.19

Data from countries already respond-ing to AIDS confirm that the costs ofprevention will be high. In 1988, for ex-ample, Brazil's prevention program wasestimated to cost $28 million, $8 millionof which went to screen blood at state-run blood banks. Health officials in Peru

_I'

put the start-up costs of screening theirnational blood supply at $20 million in1987, a sum that could otherwise coverthe total annual health care bill for 1.5million Peruvians. If borne aione by de-veloping countries, these costs could de-rail already fragile and inadequatehealth care systems.201

Developing countries also have feweroptions for treating AIDS patients thancountries in the West do. Physicians inindustrial countries largely respond bytreating the secondary diseases, such asPneumocyslis carinii pneumonia, that ac-company AIDS. It is an expensive ordealthat often involves frequent hospitalstays. The only drug currently known toattack HIV directlyzidovudine, com-monly known as AZTcosts roughly$8,000 per patient annually, and causesanemia so severe that over a quarter ofrecipients require blood transfusions. Inthe Third World, where per capita in-comes are measured in hundreds of dol-lars and blood is in short supply, a life-prolonging drug like AZT might as wellnot exist.21

Indeed, preliminary cost data fromaround thy world suggest that theamount spent per AIDS patient roughlycorrelates with a country's gross nationalproduct (GNP). As with health care ingeneral, poor countries are forced tospend less on each patient. If Zaire spentat a level comparable to the UnitedStates, the cost of treating 10 AIDS pa-tients would exceed the entire budget ofMama Yemo, the nation's largest publichospital. Although costs in industrialcountries are inflated by higher salaries,more expensive equipment, and addedmalpractice insurance, AIDS treatmentundoubtedly suffers in countries whereeven antibiotics and syringes are in shortsupply.22

Given such constraints, AIDS natur-ally raises the question of triage. Wherehospital space and medical supplies arescarce and where people regularly die of

Responding to AIDS (zz9)

treatable illnesses, diverting resourcesto AIDS treatment may actually cost livesby crowding out patients who can becured. From a quarter to half of precioushospital beds in some central Africanhospitals are occupied by patients whoare infected with HIV; Costa Rican offi-cials predict a similar situation by themid-1990s. Already, AIDS patients arebeing discharged from some healthfacilities in Africa, Haiti, and Brazil togive preference to patients with curableillnesses.25

In terms of overall health investment.however, AIDS prevention activities mayactually deserve high priority, even incountries heavily burdened by other dis-eases. A World Bank/WHO researchteam of western and African researchershas estimated that preventing one caseof HIV infection in Africa would savemore years of life than would preventinga case of malaria, measles, tuberculosis(TB), or pneumonia. To determine therelative merits of investing in AIDS pre-vention versus other disease controlprograms, decision makers need to con-sider how many people are affected byeach disease and the comparative costsof each prevention program. Signifi-cantly, preventing a case of AIDS stopssecondary and tertiary transmission ofthe virus, whereas preventing a case ofmeasles or malaria would affect trans-mission little if at all, because such dis-eases are already so pervasive inA frica.24

Not only does AIDS compete withother diseases for limited health 'aud-gets. HIV actually magnifies existing epi-demics. By weakening the immune sys-tem of its host, the virus makes carriersmore susceptible to renewed attack fromother microbes lying dormant. For ex-ample, some 30-60 percent of adults inmany developing countries are carriersof the tuberculosis bacteria, even thoughtheir bodies have conquered outwardsigns of the disease. By suppressing the

immune system, HIV allows dormantTB bacteria to become active, leading tothe contagious form of tuberculosis.25

Although it is too early to measureworldwide increases in TB prevalence,some evidence suggests that HIV mayalready be having a multiplier effect onthis deadly disease. New York Cityhome to almost half of all U.S. AIDS pa-tientsreported a 35-percent jump inTB cases between 1984 and 1986. Stud-ies also document a close association be-tween TB and HIV: in Kinshasa, Zaire,38 percent of TB patients tested wereHIV-positive, compared with only 2.5-8percent of healthy adults. An HIV-TBlink is especially worrisome in the ThirdWorld, where poverty, overcrowding,and lack of access to treatment make tu-berculosis more lethal than in theWest.26

From a quarter to half of precioushospital beds in some central Afri-can hospitals are occupied by pa-tients infected with HIV.

It is in the area of child health, how-ever, that AIDS has the greatest poten-tial to erode hard-won health gains inthe Third World. Over the last threedecades, developing regions haveinaugurated a "child survival revolu-tion" through encouraging oral rehydra-tion therapy for diarrhe.., immunization,breast-feeding, and birth spacing. To-gether with economic growth and in-creased female literacy, these simple in-terventions have cut Third World childdeaths by slightly more than half since1955, with Southeast Asia making thegreatest progress and Africa the least.27

Left unchecked. AIDS will underminethese gains as more and more pregnantwomen become infected and transmitthe virus to their children in utero. Al-

s.


ready 9-24 percent of pregnant womenin some African citiessuch as Kinshasaand Kampalaare infected. Up to halfthe children born to these women willcontract the virus and die. Preliminarymodels of the most affected regions inAfrica suggest that infant mortalitycould increase by more than 25 percent,eroding three decades of progress in in-fant and child health.29

These models also show that althoughadult death rates in Africa could rise dra-matically, AIDS will likely have onlymodest impacts on population growth.The notionadvanced by somethatparts of Africa are already "lost" toAIDS or that the disease eliminates theneed for family planning funds is notsupported by the evidence. A model byJohn Bongaarts of the Population Coun-cil in New York, for example, predictsthat a typical African growth rate of 3percent could fall to 2 percent over 25years if, 20 percent of the total popula-tion became infected. Even if death rateswere to doublewith AIDS adding asmany deaths as all other causes com-binedpopulation growth would notcease.29

AIDS eliminates the most produc-tive segment of a population.

The demographic effects of AIDS maybe small, but the economic impact of afatal epidemic focused on sexually activeadults could be immense. Unlike otherdiseases that cull the weakest membersof societythe sick, the old, and the veryyoungAIDS eliminates the most pro-ductive segment of a population. InAfrica, HIV infection in women peaksduring their third decadethe primechildbearing yearsand for males dur-ing their fourth decade, the most pro-ductive years at work and in the commu-nity. Where the ranks of people with

certain specialized skills and trainingmay be small, the loss of even a handfulof engineers, health planners, oragronomists can be debilitating.30

Although predicting AIDS' impact onspecific economic sectors will requiredetailed country-by-country analysis,hints of what may be in store havestarted to emerge. Zambian researchersfear that labor losses due to AIDS couldcripple their nation's copper mining in-dustry, which accounts for one fifth ofZambia's GNP. One study in the nation'sCopper Belt found that 68 percent ofmen testing positive were the skilledprofessionals upon whom the mining in-dustry depends. Since the companiesprovide both retirement benefits andcomprehensive medical and social ser-vices for miners and their families, Zam-bian researchers fear that the financialdrain of AIDS could jeopardize the en-tire mining sector.91

These economic disruptions come at atime when developing nationsespe-cially in Africaare already laboringunder severe economic hardship. Percapita income is declining and foreigndebt is mounting. Against this backdrop,AIDS threatens to further complicatebalance-of-payment problems. Foreignexchange will be lost as governmentsseek to import items necessary to com-bat the epidemic, tourist dollars may de-cline in response to travelers' fears. andeconomic growth will slow as people andgovernments divert savings from invest-ment to treatment. Indeed, in industrialand developing countries alike, the indi-rect economic costs of AIDS will far ex-ceed any direct costs related to preven-tion or treatment.32

Researchers at the Harvard Instituteof International Development are at-tempting to quantify these indirect costsby modeling the impact of AIDS on cer-tain central African economies. Accord-ing to their projections, by 1995 the an-

Responding to AIDS (I 21 )

nual loss to Zaire's economy due to pre-mature deaths and reduced savings willbe between $350 million and $670 mil-lionequal to 8 to 16 percent of the na-tion's GNP in 1984. Even without in-cluding direct treatment costs or lossesdue to illness, these figures exceed the$3 1 4 million that Zaire received from allsources of development assistance in1984."

In human terms, this economic slow-ing will mean that by 1995. the averageZairian will have roughly $18 less in-come per year than he or she would havehad in an economy without AIDS (mea-sured in constant 1984 dollars). A merepittance in industrial societies. $18represents a 10-percent loss in incomefor Zairians, who average only $170 peryear. Tragically, this decline comes ontop of an already seriously eroded in-come base: per capita income in Zairedeclined roughly 42 percent between1965 and 1985. AIDS is an added bur-den these people cannot afford.34

Even more devastating are the costs ofcaring for family members stricken withAIDS. Athough employers or the statepay health care costs in many developingcountries. not all citizens have access tosuch assistance, either because they areunemployed or because they live in re-mote areas. In one study of children withAIDS in Kinshasa, over half the parentswere either unemployed or dead, mean-ing that treatment costs fell to family andfriends. Children's hospital expensestypically were three times their parents'average monthly wages. and funeralsand burial cost almost a year's salary.n

Yet the true costs of AIDS are botheconomic and personal. Economists cancount up the direct costs and calculatethe indirect cost of lost wages from dis-ability and death. But what of the psy-chological toil on those left behind? Eco-nomic tally sheets cannot capture thepain of a child left without parents or of

a generation whose future is short-changed by AIDS.

PROGRESS TOWARDPREVENTION IN INDUSTRIAL

COUNTRIES

For a world used to solving problemswith a technical fix, AIDS is frustrating.Today, prospects for a vaccine or cureseem even more distant than they didtwo years ago, when scientists were reel-ing from the thrill of rapid discovery.The AIDS virus has proved a wily oppo-nent: It hides within the very immunecells that the body normally uses to wardoff invaders, making vaccines and treat-ments exceedingly difficult to devise.And it mutates at a furious paceper-haps even faster than the influenza virusthat requires researchers to alter the fluvaccine every year. Prevention will likelyremain the world's primary weaponagainst AIDS for at least the nextdecade.96

In the industrial world, where trans-mission through blood transfusions hasessentially ceased. stopping AIDS meansgetting people to change high-risk be-havior. Risky behavior includes un-protected sex, especially with multiplepartners. and the sharing of con-taminated needles among drug addicts.The best way to avoid AIDS is to have amutually monogamous sexual relation-ship with a partner known to be unin-fected. Short of that. condoms providegood, although not foolproof protectionagainst HIV transmission. The spermi-cide nonoxyl -9 has also been shown tokill the virus in laboratory tests, but itsability to prevent HIV transmission be-tween sexual partners has yet to beproved."

It is important to recognize that it is

.L.,'-..1 o


what people do, not who they are, thatputs them at risk. As the Panos Institutehas pointed out in its groundbreakingwork Blaming Others, talk of "high-riskgroups," such as Haitians. gay men, orprostitutes. tends to invite finger-point-ing and erroneously suggests that any-one not in these groups is safe. More-over. categorization fails to acknowledgethat not all group members practicehigh-risk behavior. AIDS is not a "gaydisease" or an "African disease" or a"disease of drug addicts." Anyone whoengages in high-risk behavior can con-tract H1V.38

Given these risks, industrial countrieshave responded in a variety of ways.some constructive, others less so. Ingeneral, European governments werequicker than the United States to launchbroad-based AIDS education programs,even though their epidemics were notyet as severe. Seven European countriessent information booklets to their citi-zens more than a year before the UnitedStates did so in June 1988. Across theboard, these public information cam-paigns have achieved roughly the sameresult: people now know that sex, blood,and needles can transmit AIDS, but theystill cling to many misperceptions. In1987, 40 percent of Canadians polled,for instance, believed that AIDS couldbe transmitted through insects, as did 38percent of Americans.39

Regrettably, some nations have alsoespoused superficially attractive but in-effective responses, such as screeningand deportation of infected foreigners,premarital testing, and mandatory test-ing of those perceived to be at risk. Forexample, 29 countriesincluding vari-ous developing onesnow impose someform of travel restriction or mandatoryscreening of foreigners even thoughWHO has determined that such mea-sures are costly. repressive, and will notstem the epidemic's tide. Entry restric-tions are born of a desire to erect a bar-

tier between the virus and the unin-fected, to label the afflicted as "foreign,""different," "not me." In reality, by pro-viding a false sense of security, theyallow the disease to spread unchecked.40

In the United States, bills for premari-tal screening for HIV have been intro-duced in 35 states and become law inIllinois, Louisiana, and Texas. (The lawin Texas will not go into effect unlessHIV prevalence exceeds a certainthreshold.) Like travel restrictions, suchbills are politically attractive becausethey are highly visible; yet they are dan-gerous because they deflect attentionand resources from those truly at risk.Even premarital syphilis testing hasnever efficiently identified new syphiliscases: in 1978, premarital screening ac-counted for only 1.27 percent of all testsfound positive, but the program cost $80million annually. Not surprisingly, Loui-siana has already repealed its AIDS lawafter realizing that it uncovered fewcases and pushed couples to neighbor-ing states to get married. Illinois likewiseis having second thoughts.c

Other countries and constituencieshave responded with calls for mandatorytesting, compulsory reporting of HIV-positive individuals, or required partnertracing. The Soviet Union, Hungary,and Bavaria in West Germany, for exam-ple. all require testing of high-risk in-dividuals, including prostitutes, drug ad-dicts, andwith the exception ofBavariahomosexuals. Yet health offi-cials are unanimous in the view thatmandatory measures merely drive un-derground those most in need of testing.In Charleston, South Carolina, the num-ber of homosexual men seeking testingdropped by 51 percent after the statebegan requiring all those who testedpositive to be reported to the publichealth department. When anonymousand voluntary, however, testing, coun-seling, and partner tracing have proved


to be useful and effective tools for AIDSprevention .42

Despite these false starts, many coun-tries now have innovative preventionprograms in place, including school-based education, information campaignsaimed at the general public, condompromotion, and specialized outreachprograms designed to reach those athighest risk. Many of the most impres-sive initiatives come from outside gov-ernment and draw on the skills and en-ergy of the homosexual community,which rallied early to protect its mem-bers. The Gay Men's Health Crisis inNew York (founded in 1982) and theTerrence Higgins Trust in London(founded in 1983) probably still havemore experience in AIDS education thanany other groups in the world.4s

So far it appears that among hetero-sexuals, prevention campaigns have in-creased knowledge but have changedsexual behavior only marginally. Changeamong gay men, however, has been dra-matic and may well constitute the mostrapid and profound behavioral responseever documented in public health. Stud-ies throughout the United States andWestern Europe have found that gaymen have reduced their number of sex-ual partners, increased their use of con-doms, and decreased their participationin unprotected anal intercourse. One re-view of 24 American and European stud-ies concluded that, on average. gay menhave 63 percent fewer sexual partnerssince AIDS. The incidence of receptiveanal intercourse has similarly declined.by 59 percent.44

Because of HIV's long latency period.these behavior changes have not yettranslated into fewer new AIDS cases,but in parts of the United States rates ofnew HIV infection among gay men havedeclined. Less than 1 percent of nonin-fected homosexual men in San Fran-cisco, for example, were being infectedannually by 1988, down from 18 percent

in 1983. AIDS-induced behavior changeis also probably responsible for recentdeclines in the number of new gonor-rhea and syphilis cases among gay menin Denmark. Finland, the Netherlands,Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Be-cause these STDs have shorter incuba-tion periods than HIV, reductions inhigh-risk behavior register more quicklywith syphilis and gonorrhea than withAIDS.*

Mandatory measures merely driveunderground those most in need oftesting.

Unfortunately, studies on both conti-nents confirm that a minority of gay menstill engage in dangerous behavior de-spite understanding the risks involved.Risky behavior is most often associatedwith the use of uninhibiting drugs dur-ing sex, suggesting that programs aimedat alcohol and recreational drugs may beimportant for AIDS control. Moreover,gays living in lower risk areas do notseem to have modified their behavior asmuch. perhaps because they do not feelas personally at risk. It is unsafe to as-sume, therefore, that the entire gay malepopulation in the United States andEurope has been educated and that at-tention is better placed elsewhere.Promising progress has been made, butmuch remains to be done.44

Intravenous drug users have alsoproved capable of change, althoughcurbing HIV infection among drug ad-dicts has received far too little attention.especially in the United States. Responsehas been hampered by debate over themoral and legal appropriateness of cer-tain interventions, such as needle ex-change programs, and the pervasiveview that addicts somehow "deserve"AIDS. Inaction, however, is both inhu-

(7). ...0


mane to drug users and shortsighted,given that IV drug users are the mostlikely bridge between HIV and the gen-eral population.

Without a doubt, helping addicts kicktheir habit is the favored approach tostopping AIDS transmission amongdrug users, but in many countries treat-ment capacity is sorely lacking. TheUnited States, for example, can treatonly 15-20 percent of its more than 1.2million needle addicts, and waiting listsof up to six months for treatment are notuncommon. During this time, addictscontinue to shoot drugs, increasing theirchances of contracting and spreadingHIV and diminishing their resolve tofight their addiction. When treatment isaffordable and accessible, IV drug usershave shown that they will seek it out toreduce their risk of AIDS. In New Jersey,addicts redeemed 84 percent of 970 cou-pons for free treatment that AIDS out-reach workers distributed. More thanhalf said they were largely motivated byfear of AIDS.47

For those unable or unwilling to breaktheir addiction, programs aimed at saferinjection are important for AIDS con-trol. Needle-sharing is deeply ingrainedin the drug culture, both as a form ofsocial bonding and because new syringesare expensive, hard to obtain, and illegalto possess in many areas. But studiesconfirm that addicts will reduce their useof contaminated needles, especially ifgiven the means to do so, either throughneedle/syringe exchange programs orthrough the provision of bleach forcleaning syringes between uses. Indeed,several studies suggest that supplyingthe means to change behavior is critical;programs that provide informationalone have tended to fail.48

Despite the importance of providingthe hardware of behavior change, needleexchange programs have been ex-tremely controversial, especially in theUnited States, where only two small pilot

programs have been approved. On bothsides of the Atlantic, people argue thatto supply syringes is to condone druguse. To refuse addicts access to cleanneedles in the age of AIDS, however, isto deny them the opportunity to protectthemselvesand eventually othersfrom a deadly infection.49

While still controversial, other coun-tries have been more willing than theUnited States to experiment with needleexchange programs. So far, Switzerland,Denmark, the Netherlands, the UnitedKingdom, and Australia have initiatedprograms and all report significantly lessneedle-sharing among addicts. Francehas also liberalized its policy by makingneedles available for sale at pharmacieswithout prescription or identification.Despite widespread concern that in-creased availability of needles would en-courage drug use, there is no evidencethat this is occurring. Indeed, in theNetherlands the number of addicts actu-ally decreased from roughly 8,500 in1984 to 6,800 in 1988 after the govern-ment implemented a comprehensiveAIDS prevention campaign aimed at ad-dicts, including needle exchange, meth-adone treatment, and outreach.5°

Prevention programs have beensingularly ineffective at reachingU.S. minority communities.

Disturbing evidence indicates, how-ever, that changes in sexual behavioramong American and European drugaddicts lag considerably behind changesin drug-use behavior. Even more dis-tressing, the least amount of change hasoccurred within committed, heterosex-ual relationships, where HIV transmis-sion is most likely to occur (because offrequency of intercourse) and wherechildren are most likely to be conceived.


Given that three fourths of American IVdrug users are male and have a primarypartner who does not use drugs, there isclearly need for more education on safersex among addicts as part of an effort toprevent the spread of HIV 5'

AIDS prevention programs to datehave also been singularly ineffective atreaching U.S. minority communities.Studies show that blacks and Hispanicsare less well informed than whites aboutAIDS and that they have not modifiedtheir behavior as much. This is particu-larly worrisome because blacks and His-panics are at extremely high risk. Al-ready they account for 41 percent ofAIDS cases, even though they constituteonly 19 percent of the U.S. population.Eighty-five percent of children who ac-quired AIDS from their mother and 71percent of all women with AIDS areblack or Hispanic.52

This pattern of infection is partly dueto the fact that a disproportionate num-ber of IV drug users are black or His-panic. But even among drug addicts,minorities are more likely to be infectedthan whites. The reasons for this are un-clear, although for cultural and eco-nomic reasons, blacks and Hispanicsmay have less access to clean needles,drug treatment, and AIDS information.Particularly disturbing is evidence thatblacks also account for a disproportion-ate share of new HIV infection occurringoutside of big cities, where IV drug usewould be less common.53

These trends emphasize the need formore culturally relevant AIDS informa-tion aimed at minorities. Recently, theCenters for Disease Control of the U.S.Public Health Service has attempted tofill this gap by ear= -king almost $45million for minority outreach projects in1989, up from only $14 million in 1987.Experience suggests that initiatives aris-ing from the minority communitiesthemselves have the greatest chance ofsuccess S4

ALLIANCE FOR PREVENTIONIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Stopping AIDS in developing countrieswill take a worldwide alliance of profes-sional skills, resources, and experience.Left unaided, the Third World wouldhave to divert scarce resources fromother essential development initiativesor be forced to accept ever-rising deathtolls. Even industrial countries cannotfight this scourge alone. Barring a vac-cine or a cure, no country can indepen-dently protect itself from HIV, for thedisease respects no national boundaries.Like several of today's most pressingproblemsglobal warming, ozone de-pletion, Third World debtunless allnations work together against AIDS,there is little hope in acting separately.

Although nations have collaboratedbefore on action aimed at disease con-trol, there is no precedent for the level ofcooperation that will be required to bat-tle AIDS. Even WHO's successful effortto eradicate smallpox during the seven-ties is not fully analogous: Smallpoxcould be prevented with a single vaccinethat was already available and relativelyeasy to deliver. Industrial nations hadalready conquered the disease, and car-riers were easily identified by a charac-teristic rash. By contrast, HIV infectionis invisible and insidious. And there is novaccine. Stopping AIDS means gettingpeople to change their behavior, a taskthat governments and internationalagencies are ill prepared to do.

With a threat this great and requiringso much coordination, central leader-ship is essential. WHO accepted this rolein February 1987 when it formed theSpecial Programme on AIDS, later re-named the Global Programme on AIDS(GPA). Since then, the program hasgrown rapidly, largely due to the deter-mined leadership of its director, Dr. Jon-athan Mann. Starting with one secretary


and a $580,000 budget. Mann has builtthe AIDS program into one of theagency's largest and most active, with aproposed budget of $95 million for 1989and a year-end staffing target of222 pro-fessionals.55

GPA acts primarily as a coordinatingbody for AIDS surveillance, prevention.and research and as a resource to gov-ernments trying to develop nationalAIDS control plans. With WHO's en-couragement and assistance, more than150 nations now have national AIDScommittees, and 119 have developedshort-term plans for combatting the dis-ease (including every country in sub-Saharan Africa). Forty-eight countries,mostly in the Third World, have gone onto develop three- to five-year plans.WHO also serves as an intermediary be-tween donors and developing countrieshoping to arrange funding for their na-tional AIDS programs. As of December1988, $99 million had been raised tosupport 30 medium-term plans, mostlyin Africa and the Caribbean.56

That so many nations have mobilizedis a testament to WHO's effectiveness,given that two years ago most govern-ments still denied the presence or extentof AIDS. The challenge now is to trans-late these paper plans into functioningprograms, a task that will be particularlyhard in developing countries. Most ex-perts agree that it is preferable to inte-grate AIDS prevention activities into ex-isting health and educational systemsrather than develop "vertical" AIDSprograms that would compete for re-sources and attention. But it is impossi-ble to graft AIDS control programs ontononexistent or rudimentary rural healthcare systems or to introduce bloodscreening in countries without adequatelabs, trained technicians, or functioningblood banks. Indeed, to be successful insome poorer countries, the whole healthinfrastructure will have to be expandedand fortified.

41,

WHO's leadership has clearly inspiredsome countries to act. but many nationshad nascent education campaigns evenbefore WHO entered the scene. As inindustrial countries, many of the earliestefforts were implemented by nongov-ernmental groups, the vanguard of AIDSeducation, In Kenya, for example, theRed Cross distributed over a millionleaflets counseling "Help Crush AIDS"and "Spread facts . . . not fear." TheRwandan Red Cross launched an im-pressive campaign using radio an-nouncements, posters, and leaflets. Andin the Dominican Republic, the govern-ment distributed free condoms, printedhundreds of thousands of brochures,posters, and bumper stickers, andpassed legislation requiring all motels toprovide complimentary condoms.57

Indeed, the picture that emerges fromthe Third World is one of many smallacts that combine to form a growing tideof prevention activities. hi Guatemala,the Association for Sexual Education hasproduced two pamphlets and a series ofwallet-sized cards that describe how toprotect oneself from AIDS. In Mexico, adynamic woman named Gloria OrnelasHall runs an AIDS hotline that handlesover 70 calls a day. And in Uganda, aphysiotherapist and a doctor whose liveswere personally touched by AIDS haveformed a counseling service for sufferersand their families. With few resourcesbut much foresight, these individuals arereaching out into their communities toeducate others about AIDS.sg

As WHO has helped mobilize outsidefunds, Third World governments havebecome more involved in prevention.Often one of their first priorities hasbeen to secure the nation's blood sup-ply, primarily because it is one route thatcan be eliminated with a technical fix. In1985, when a blood test for HIV firstbecame available, from 8 to 18 percentof blood donors in the capitals ofUganda, Rwanda, and Zaire were in


fected. With screening units costing upto $10,000 apiece and each test costingon average $1-4, developing countriescould not afford screening and hospitalsbecame part of the chain of infection. InCentral Africa, transfusions probably ac-count for 5-10 percent of HIV transmis-sion among adults and up to a quarter ofall AIDS cases in children.69

The majority of developing countriesnow have at least some screening capac-ity, mostly in major urban areas. By theend of 1988, limited testing equipmentwas available in most capital cities inAfrica and Latin America and somecountriessuch as Zimbabwe, Zambia,and Mexicohad nearly universalscreening. Blood screening shouldbecome considerably more common inthe near future as a new generation ofsimple, rapid blood tests for HIVbecome available. Field tests are nearingcompletion on several that yield resultsin 2-4 minutes, and that use only a slideand medicine dropper instead of expen-sive equipment and reagents. The abilityto screen quickly is especially importantin developing countries where blood isoften not banked but donated as neededwhen an emergency arises.60

Although worth doing, screeningblood will have a relatively small impacton the spread of AIDS because at least80 percent of transmission in the ThirdWorld is through heterosexual sex.Thus the bulk of prevention must cumefrom encouraging fidelity and greateruse of condoms. Also important is ex-panding access to treatment for othersexually transmitted diseases that maybe facilitating the spread of HIV.

The best strategy for curtailing sexualtransmission depends in part on whetherHIV has infiltrated the general popula-tion or not. In countries where the virusis already widely dispersed, preventionactivities must be broad in scope. Butwhere HIV prevalence is still low, as inWest Africa and Asia, countries have an

opportunity to target interventions andthereby save vital resources. Experiencehas shown that HIV generally spreadsoutward from pockets of infectionamong individuals whose behavior in-creases their risk of contracting andtransmitting the virus, such as prosti-tutes, men in the military, and IV drugusers. By helping such groups to protectthemselves, governments can preventHIV from gaining a foothold in theircountry.61

Programs that use peers as AIDSeducators seem the most promis-ing.

The speed at which the virus can infil-trate unsuspecting populations arguespersuasively for acting before HIV is anobvious problem. Studies in Bangkok,Thailand, for example, show that amongthe city's estimated 60,000 IV drugusers, HIV prevalence rose from 1 per-cent in 1987 to over 30 percent by mid-1988. Had prevention programs been inplace, this precipitous rise might havebeen avoided. These individuals nowrepresent a large pool for spread of HIVboth within the drug community and,through sexual contact, outside of it.62

Even where HIV is already wide-spread, there is urgent need for morecommunity-based programs designed toreach populations at highest risk: clientsof STD clinics, long-distance truck driv-ers, and bisexual men in Latin America,among others. The message must bedelivered in their own language and bya source they can trust. So far, programsthat use peers as AIDS educators seemthe most promising. In Accra, Ghana,for example, prostitutes trained as AIDSeducators increased condom use sig-nificantly within their community: 67percent of prostitutes now use condoms


all the time and another 24 percent re-port frequent or occasional use. (Only13 percent used condoms before theprogram.) Similar pins have beenachieved by peer educators working withprostitutes in Nairobi, Kenya, and inSanto Domingo, Dominican Republic.63

Encouraging though this may bethese results are but small victories inwhat is destined to be a protracted andexpensive war. Consider the challengeof expanding condom use alone. Pro-grams to supply condoms vary greatly incost depending on how the condoms willbe distributed and how actively they willbe promoted. Even the least expensiveoptionsubsidizing their sale throughexisting commercial outletscostsroughly $12 per couple annually, half ofwhich is the cost of the condoms them-selves. Just to ensure that commercialchannels supply enough condoms forone third of all couples in the nine hard-est-hit countries of Africa would cost$110 million annually, more thanWHO's total AIDS budget for 1989.64

Yet the bigger challengeboth interms of difficulty and expenseis get-ting couples to use condoms in cultureswhere birth control itself is not readilyaccepted and where condoms are espe-cially disdained. In most African coun-tries. less than 5 percent of marriedwomen practice any form of moderncontraception and only 0.3 percent usecondoms. Efforts to promote condomsthroughout the Third World will have toovercome strong cultural and religiousprohibitions as well as daunting logisti-cal problems.65

Such observations capture the magni-tude of the prevention task at hand andraise the question, Are we doingenough? The answer is most certainly noif the number of lives at risk is consid-ered. Yet world priorities have seldombowed to the exigencies of body counts.In 1988, industrial countries probably

143

spent in the neighborhood of $100-150million on AIDS control in the ThirdWorld, a reasonable amount when com-pared with other health, nutrition, andpopulation assistance. But the worldspent more than $100 million each houron the global military apparatus. It is notthat AIDS deserves a bigger share of thehealth and development pie, but thathealth and development themselveshave been vastly underattended.66

Admittedly, money alone will notsolve the AIDS dilemma. But money isan important catalyst for action. Thechallenge ahead is to find new interna-tional funds for AIDS control with an eyetoward helping the Third World developthe infrastructure and indigenoushuman talent necessary to sustain theeffort over the long haul. So far donorshave been forthcoming with develop-ment assistance to fight AIDS, but thismoney appears largely to have been sub-tracted from other development ac-counts. If AIDS control comes at the ex-pense of other life-promoting initiatives,we will have won the battle, but lost thewar.

AIDS AS SOCIAL CRUCIBLEAIDS is both a product of social changeand its instrument. Rapid urbanizationin Africa, the rise of gay liberation in theWest, and the advent of modern airtravel have all fueled this pandemic. Inturn, AIDS has already triggered pro-found changes in every aspect of humanendeavor, from how we care for thedying to how we relate to the living. Per-haps most significant, AIDS compels so-cieties to confront issues and aspects ofthe human condition that are otherwiseeasily ignored. While heighteningawareness, the disease does not dictateour response. How societies choose to

i


act on the issues raised by AIDS maystand as a key measure of our time.67

Like all crises, AIDS has brought outthe best and the worst of human nature.The pulling together of the Americangay community to respond to a crisiswithin its ranks, the generous and oftencourageous actions of thousands of pro-fessional and voluntary caregivers, andthe outpouring of global resources andtalent to fight the disease are all expres-sions of human compassion at its best.But if compassion has been at work, sotoo have fear and denial ea

AIDS has aroused mean-spirited andirrational responses, often provoked bygross misperceptions about how the dis-ease can be transmitted. American chil-dren with AIDS have been barred fromschool, despite repeated assurances byhealth professionals that they pose norisk to other students. In Colombia, oneman with AIDS was forced to guard hishouse with a shotgun to keep villagersfrom burning it down to avoid "contami-nation." And in the United States, gayrights groups note that physical attacksagainst homosexuals have risen sharplysince the epidemic began.69

AIDS has thrown into sharp reliefinadequacies and inequities in theexisting social order.

These panic responses have beenmade worse by the fact that AIDS firststruck already stigmatized popula-tionsgay men, IV drug users, and for-eigners in the West; prostitutes andthose with multiple sex partners in de-veloping countries. This has reinforcedthinly veiled prejudices and encouragedscapegoating. Regrettably, the globalmobilization against AIDS has beenhampered by the human tendency toblame others for a problem rather than

tackle the problem itself. AIDS has beenblamed on everything from Westerndecadence to sexual promiscuity amongAfricans. Such accusations have merelybred resentment, encouraged denial,and thwarted the global cooperation sodesperately needed to fight this dis-ease."

The potential for discrimination andpersecution is so great, in fact, that Jona-than Mann recently made an unprece-dented call for an international humanrights network to monitor discrimina-tion and abuse against HIV-infected in-dividuals. Without a supportive and tol-erant social environment, fear andretribution will undermine communica-tion, reinforce prejudice, and make in-fected people unwilling to come for-ward. Indeed, health officials considertolerance so important to AIDS controlthat the London World Summit ofHealth Ministers and the U.S. Presiden-tial Commission on the Human Im-munodeficiency Virus Epidemic bothendorsed antidiscrimination policies as atop AIDS priority."

In addition to exposing human vul-nerabilities, AIDS has thrown into sharprelief certain inadequacies and inequi-ties in the existing social order. The cri-sis has underscored the dismal state ofhealth infrastructure in the developingworld, where even syringes are in shortsupply. It has highlighted the structuralflaws in economic systems that fail toprovide gainful alternatives to prostitu-tion and drug dealing. And in the UnitedStates, it has made painfully obviousshortcomings in the nation's health caresystem: the underfunding of preventivehealth measures, the lack of care optionsfor the chronically ill, and the plight ofthe poor and uninsured.

By highlighting these flaws and addinga sense of urgency, AIDS may galvanizesocieties to tackle the underlying prob-lems that allow HIV to flourish. Stop-ping AIDS among drug users, for exam-

(130 Slate of the World 1989

pie, may have more to do in the longterm with fighting unemployment, pov-erty, and welfare dependence than withneedle exchange or more treatment. AsHarvey Fineberg, Dean of Harvard'sSchool of Public Health, observes:"Jobs, schools and housing .. . would goa long way toward creating the individ-ual self-respect, dignity and hope for thefuture that can forestall the turning todrugs in the first place." Similarly, socie-ties may come to realize that prostitutionis seldom a profession of choice, but oneof economic necessity. Already, a familyplanning association in Ghana is fightingAIDS by retraining prostitutes in othertypes of work.72

AIDS has also forced societies to lookagain and with new eyes at issues such assex education in schools, drug addiction,and the standards of public discourse.The urgency of AIDS has encouragedreappraisal of the appropriateness ofcertain interventions and has tabled de-bates over offending "public sensibili-ties." Formerly taboo subjects such ascondoms are now topics of conversationin settings as diverse as western dinnerparties and village tea stalls. In the So-viet Union, Vadim Pokrovskiy, directorof the Moscow AIDS Clinic, appeared ontelevision in August 1987, strongly urg-ing the use of condoms. Such franknessin Soviet broadcasting would have beenunthinkable in a world without AIDS"

Indeed, AIDS has forged is own spe-cial form of glasnost in the Eastern bloc.For the first time, governments are re-sponding with candor about the exis-tence of drug abuse, prostitution, andhomosexuality within their societies.Bulgaria, for example, now acknowl-edges some 600 addicts in a populationof 9 million. The Soviet Union has gonefrom denying that drug addiction existsto implementing a program to registeraddicts. And the Polish weekly Politykanow reports that Poland has approxi-mately 270,000 homosexual men

i 4 3

about 1.5 percent of the male popula-tionand twice as many bisexuals.74

It is in the area of health care, how-ever, that AIDS will likely catalyze thegreatest changes. In both industrial anddeveloping countries, for example,AIDS is already encouraging a shift fromhospital to community- or home-basedcart to limit cost and preserve vital hos-pital beds. Interestingly, AIDS' influ-ence to date appears to be operatingthrough its ability to overwhelm localhealth care services rather than throughits impact on national health care expen-ditures. In the United States, the cost ofAIDS treatment and prevention ac-counted for only 0.4 percent of totalmedical spending in 1986. Even by1991, AIDS will likely account for only1.5 per( ent of U.S. health expenditures,largely because deaths from other dis-eases will still overwhelm those fromAIDS.7s

In the world's hardest-hit cities, how-ever, the financial and health impacts ofAIDS are already substantial. By 1991,AIDS patients will occupy one out ofevery four hospital beds in New YorkCity, a proportion already exceeded insome central African cities. In fiscal year1988, San Francisco spent $17 million ofcity funds on AIDS; New York plans tospend $170 million in 1989. Medicalcare alone for San Francisco's AIDS pa-tients in 1991 is expected to cost some$350 per city resident. Of course, citytaxpayers will share these costs with pri-vate insurers, the federal government,and the patients themselves, but thelocal burden will still be great.76

Faced with such burdens, citiesaround the world are experimentingwith new models of community-basedcare that may forever change how socie-ties cope with chronic illness. San Fran-cisco, which pioneered this approach,now has expanded hospice care, im-proved home nursing, residential radii-


ties for patients who are homeless, andoutpatient clinics for AIDS treatment.Cost per patient has declined, as has thepercentage of patients requiring hospi-talization and the average hospital stay.Likewise, in southern Zambia, Chikan-kata Hospital has cooperated with theSalvation Army to establish rovinghealth teams that care for and counselAIDS patients in their homes. In 1987,the program avoided an estimated 35hospital admissions. more than payingfor itself."

Ultimately, the power of AIDS lies inits ability to reveal ourselves to our-selves. AIDS raises the questions, andthe quality of our response may define

our humanity. What if scientists developa solution to AIDS that works in indus-trial nations but is either impractical ortoo costly for the developing world? Willwestern nations consider further AIDSresearch a priority? Or will AIDSbecome like schistosomiasis and otherThird World diseases that can be ig-nored because Americans and Euro-peans are not dying? What if AIDSbecomes largely a disease of minoritiesand drug users? Will money for treat-ment and prevention still be forthcom-ing? As Jonathan Mann observes, "AIDSwill . .. put our global conscience to thetest." Let us hope that compassion andtolerance prevail.

8

Enhancing GlobalSecurity

Michael Renner

National security has traditionally beendefined almost exclusively in militaryterms. As a concept, it is invoked to jus-tify the expenditure of enormous sumsof money, the maintenance of largearmed forces, the deployment of ever-newer weapons systems, the interven-tion by stronger powers in the affairs ofweaker nations, or even the violation ofhuman rights at home. After 1945, thecold war elevated such considerations tonew heights.

But perceived in these terms, nationalsecurity is an outmoded concept. In-deed, we are now witnessing an era inwhich the old bipolar, superpower-dom-inated system seems to be evolving intoa multipolar and more interdependentworld, undermining the foundations ofthe cold war; in which there are morestirrings than cohesion within the mili-tary blocs; in which "geo-economics"seems to rival geopolitics as a focus ofconcern; and in which ecological threatsare ascending to the top of the interna-tional agenda. There are still! no widelyaccepted ways to measure what consti-

I

tutes security. But the debate is in flux:the essence of security, the threats to it,and the means to achieve and preserve itneed to be reappraised.

Military means are no longer adequateto provide tangible security benefits. Al-though they may at times in the pasthave been too weak to repel an attacker,ironically now they are often too strong.In the age of weapons of mass destruc-tion, the world faces a fundamental secu-rity dilemma. The accumulation ofweapons and the growth of militarypower tends to diminish the security ofan opponent more than it adds to a na-tion's own security. National securitypolicies have yielded international in-security.'

No doubt nuclear weapons are themost extreme example. Gene Sharp, di-rector of the Program on NonviolentSanctions in Conflict and Defense atHarvard University, has perceptivelysaid that "the capacity to defend in orderto deter [an attacker] has been replacedby the capability to destroy massivelywithout the ability to defend." Warfare is

Enhancing Global Security

no longer limited to a delineated battle-field, and the distinction between corn-batams and civilians has becomeblurred. Modem technology has giveneven so-called conventional weapons adegree of range, accuracy, and destruc-tive power that renders a viable defensedifficult if not impossible. In the Iran-Iraq war, for example, both belligerents'cities were vulnerable to escalating mis-sile attacics.2

But military prowess has not lost itsusefulness in the eyes of those who wieldit. By using it, or threatening to, govern-ments still hope to coerce other nations,to influence their economic policies andpolitical systems, or to secure desired re-sources on their own terms. The worldcommunity has accepted a definition ofsecurity that focuses almost exclusivelyon this attitude.

Yet the security of nations depends atleast Is much on economic well-being,social justice, and ecological stabil-ity. Environmental problemsclimatechange, ozone depletion, Iran s boundaryair pollution, land degradation, defor-estation, and soil erosionthreaten todestroy the human habitat and under-mine economies everywhere. Pursuingmilitary security at the cost of social, eco-nomic, and environmental well-being isakin to dismantling a house to salvagematerials to erect a fence around it.

In an age in which civilian and militarytechnology has given governments andcorporations a global reach, purely na-tional means are fast becoming obsolete,while real security is increasingly to befound in global cooperation. If theworld's nations want true security, theyneed to devote greater energies to de-veloping reliable mechanisms for nonvi-olent dispute settlement. If security poli-cies are to be relevant to society's futuresecurity needs, they need to be reori-ented to meet looming environmentaldangers.

(133)

A WORLD AT WARThrough the course of human history,the ability to wage war, in either defen-sive or offensive fashion, has becomemore organized and institutionalized."Progressing" from standing armies tolaunch-on-warning, war preparation hasbecome a permanent endeavor, often nolonger related to any particular. identi-fiable threat. The notion that countriesshould be able to defend themselvesfrom any conceivable threat at all timeshas found near-universal acceptance. Asa result. the war-making institutionsthe armed forces, the national securitybureaucracy, the military intelligenceagencieshave become fixtures of na-tional life, supported by a permanentwar economy.

The world has spent an estimated $16trillion for military purposes sinceWorld War II; annual expendituresreached $825 billion in 1986 (both in1984 dollars). (See Figure 8 -1.) Adjustedfor inflation, industrial countries havedoubled their outlays since 1960. whilethe Third World has increased its expen-ditures more than sixfold. Developingcountries' share of world military spend-

101 ionDollars

800984 dollars)

Source SIPRI

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 8-1, World Military Expenditures,195045

14.4 a

('34) State of Me World 1989

ing rose from 6 percent of the worldtotal in 1965 to 18 percent by the mid-eighties.3

The world's armed forces are some 29million strong, equivalent to the popula-tion of Argentina; a further 11 millionpeople at least are employed in theworld's arms industries. (See Table 8-1.)These numbers understate the real ex-tent of militarization because they do notinclude militias and other paramilitaryforces and because there are no esti-mates for employment in arms indus-

tries of such important producers asChina.

Although the superpowers and theirEuropean allies are responsible for threequarters of global military spending,militarization is spreading worldwidealong numerous avenues: military al-liances, bases on foreign territories (witha, least 1.8 million military personnelstationed in some 68 countries), andmilitary training programs and joint ma-neuvers. Perhaps most important,though, is the burgeoning arms trade.

Table 8-1. Armed Forces and Employment in Military Industry, Selected Countries,Early to Mid-Eighties

Country Workerst Soldiers* Country Workerst Soldiers*

(thousands) (thousands)

Soviet Union 4.800 4,500 Israel 90 195United States 3,350 2,289 Thailand 5 270India 280 1,515 South Africa 100 95United Kingdom 700 335 Argentina 60 129France 435 563 Philippines 5 157

North Korea 55 784 Peru 5 128West Germany 290 495 Chile 3 124Italy 160 531 Malaysia 3 124Pakistan 40 644 Netherlands 18 103South Korea 30 600 Sweden 28 69

Brazil 75 496 Singapore 11 59Egypt 75 466 Austria 16 4.0Taiwan 50 4.10 Norway 15 41Spain 66 411Indonesia 26 281

Total

World

10,791 15,884

n.a. 29,260

'Employed in arms-producing industries. 2Military and civil service personnel employed by nationaldefense ministries.souacz.s: P. Wilke and H. Wulf. "Manpower Conversion in Defence-Related Industry." Disarmament andEmployment Programme. Working Paper No. 4 (Geneva: International Labour Organisation. June 1986):Peter Southwood. "The UK Defence Industry." Peace Research Reports No. 8. University of Bradford.September 1985: U.S. Department of Defense. Rational Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1988/1989 (Washing.ton. D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 1987); Michael Brzoska and ThomasOhlson. "Trade in Major Conventional Weapons: The Changing Pattern."Bulletin of Peace Proposals. VoI.I7. No. 3-4, 1986: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and ArmTransfers 1987 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. March 1988): Vicenc Fisas Armengol.Les Armes * la Dernocrocia (Barcelona, Spain: Fundacien Jaume BobIl. 1988).

140


Deals worth an estimated $635 billion,On 1984 dollars) were concluded be-tween 1967 and 1986. Since 1984 themonetary value of weapons transfers hasdeclined somewhat, no doubt as a resultof worsening economic conditions inmany Third World countries. A growingnumber of countries, however, are ac-quiring the capacity to produce sophis-ticated weaponry domestically.4

Throughout history, governmentshave sought to develop and acquiremore numerous and more effectivearms. Every major scientific discoveryhas been checked for possible militaryapplication. Possession of the "perfect"weapon, it was (and still is) believed,would mean absolute security, unques-tioned superiority, and thus leverageover other nations. But ultimately, uni-lateral advantages prove short-lived,fueling destabilizing arms races anddegenerating into warfare.

Ironically, the nation that pioneerednuclear weapons development is nowmore vulnerable than ever. A countryseparated from most of the world's othernations by oceans, for more than 165years the United States has had no rea-son to fear an invasion of its territory.But its possession of the atomic bombspurred the Soviets and other powers toacquire such weapons as well. Later in-novations like the intercontinentalbomber, the ballistic missile, the multi-ple warhead delivery vehicle, and thecruise missile resulted in only transitoryadvantages.

Particularly since 1945, modern mili-tary technology has dramatically in-creased the destructive power of weap-ons, the range and speed of deliveryvehicles, and the sophistication of tar-geting technologies. In less than 30 min-utes, a single MX missile or its Sovietcounterpart can deliver a destructiveforce equivalent to more than 200 Hiro-shima bombs to within 90 meters of atarget 11,000 kilometers away.s

035)The quest for the ultimate weapon has

delivered the global community to anall-encompassing state of insecurity. Anarsenal of 55,000 nuclear warheadsworldwide possesses the explosivepower of 160 million Chernobyls. AsRuth Sivard writes in World Military andSocial apenditures 1987-88: "Every ham-let has been brought within the orbit ofconflict, every inhabitant made a poten-tial victim of random annihilation. Mili-tarization presumably designed to insu-late and protect the nation state has infact united the world's population in aprecarious mutual vulnerability."6

National military power is at unprece-dented levels, yetor perhaps as a re-sultthe number of wars and war deathshas steadily increased over the centuries.Some 22 wars have been raging in theeighties, more than in any previousdecade in recorded military history.Some 120 armed conflicts in the ThirdWorld since 1945in terms of death,collectively the equivalent of World WarIIhave killed at least 20 million peo-ple. Many of these conflicts are farremoved from the minds of westerners,but some may be the tinderboxe. fromwhich a future conflict might rapidlyspread to global conflagration.?

Civilians constitute a rapidly grow-ing share of war victims.

Interestingly, military aggression hasbecome less successful. In the twentiethcentury, aggressors have won only 4 outof 10 wars; in the eighties, that ratio isdown to 1 out of 10. Irrespective of theoutcome of wars, the prime losers havebeen the civilians whom the military sup-posedly is protecting. Whether throughdirect war actions or war-induced starva-tion, civilians constitute a rapidly grow-ing share of war victims: they accountedfor 52 percent of all deaths in the fifties,

150


but for 85 percent in the eighties. It iswithout exaggeration that economistKenneth Boulding says: "National de-fense is now the greatest enemy of na-tional security. "8

The conventional view of armedforces guarding against external ene-mies is becoming increasingly irrelevant.By far the most conflicts (and approxi-mately half of all war deaths) sinceWorld War H have been in the form of"civil wars," pitching armies controlledby unrepresentative elites against theirdomestic opponents. These conflictsarise from a host of social (ethnic, class.religious), political, economic, and eco-logical disputes and are fueled by sharpinequalities. But while resort to militarymeans may succeed in suppressing thoseexpressing grievances, it is unlikely toeliminate the causes of conflict.9

When Third World governments ac-tually do engage in warfare against an-other state, the combat is usually ofshort duration because their stayingpower is severely circumscribed by lim-ited financial resources, weak civic insti-tutions, and a lack of regime legitimacy.Wars of attrition risk major political andeconomic breakdown. As MohammedAyoob of the National University of Sin-gapore explains: "These constraintssoon outweigh the perceived political ormilitary benefits for which the wars werelaunched." The exceptions are foundwhere outside powers stoke the fires oras in the Iran-Iraq war, where large oilrevenues foot the bill.")

Countries lack a reliable internationalframework and mechanism on which todepend for security. Robert Johansen,former president of the World Policy In-stitute, points out that "the very natureof the system of sovereign states encour-ages armed rivalry between govern-ments. Because the system provides noimpartial, dependable way to preventone government from violently coercing

151

another, governments seek arms as ameans of self-help."

Governments frequently comprehendmilitary prowess as the ultimate expres-sion of national sovereignty. But reasonsfor the continuing arms race can also befound at home. Keeping a nation in astate of constant war preparation givespoliticians, bureaucrats, and generalscommand over an enormous share of asociety's resources and lets arms mer-chants derive a steady stream of profits.

THE DRAIN OF A PERMANENTWAR ECONOMY

Even in the absence of armed conflict,preoccupation with building militarypower can drain the vitality of nationsand lead to social neglect. On average,the world's nations spend some 6 per-cent of their gross national product(GNP) on defense, although countries atwar allocate a considerably higher por-tion. (See Table 8-2.) Such a share isroutinely considered too small by manyeconomists to elicit concern. In fact,some observers even argue that "mili-tary Keynesianism"a steady stream oflarge government contracts for weap-onsis a perfect tool for stimulating theeconomy.

But GNP is a poor yardstick againstwhich to measure the impact of militaryspending on the civilian economy. A sta-tistical aggregate of monetary values,GNP tells little about the productive ca-pacities of an economy and nothingabout Itow they are being used. The mili-tary sector saps productive capacities farbeyond the effect suggested by a simplecomparison with GNP. is

In fact, as a new cold war chilled rela-tions between the world's nations durigthe eighties, global military expendi-tures rose rapidly, while GNP growth

Enhancing Global Security (137)

Table 8-2. Military Share of GrossNational Product, Selected Countries,

1984

Country Share

(percent)

Iraq 50.0Israel 27.1Saudi Arabia 21.7Syria 16.6Angola 14.2Iran 13.3Libya 12.9Nicaragua 12.4

Soviet Union 11.5Chad 10.4North Korea 10.2Ethiopia 9.3Egypt 8.5China 7.0Afghanistan 7.0United States 6.4South Korea 5.4United Kingdom 5.4East Gemtany 4.9France 4.1

South Africa 4.0West Germany 3.3India 3.2Japan 1.0Brazil 0.8

World Average 5.6

SOURCE: Ruth Leger Sivard. World Military and So-cial Expenditures 1987-88 (Washington, D.C.:World Priorities. 1988).

continued its downward trend. For thefirst time since 1960, the growth in glo-bal military outlays exceeded that ofworld economic output. (See Table8-3.)

Although the military expenditures ofmost Third World countries are minutecompared with those of the superpow-erseither one of which spends morethan developing countries combinedthey nonetheless entail a heavy burdenfor their economies and populations.

When improving people's living stan-dards requires all available resources forproductive investment, every dollar,rupee, peso, or naira spent for the mili-tary is money forgone for human devel-opment.

When arms take precedence overneeds basic to human development,people are not secure. The present pri-orities of the international system de-plete scarce resources required formeeting basic human needs: they leavesome 770 million persons malnourished,14 million children dying of hunger-re-lated causes each year, some 1.3 billionpeople without access to safe drinkingwater, 100 million individuals withoutadequate shelter, and 880 million adultsunable to read and write. PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower put it eloquently36 years ago: "Every gun that is made,every warship launched, every rocketfired represents, in the final analysis, atheft from those who hunger and are notfed, who are cold and are not clothed." is

Soaring arms imports have contri-buted to bloated foreign debt: had non-oil-exporting developing countriesmade no foreign arms purchases during1972-82, their accumulated debts by theend of that period would have been atleast 15 percentsmalier, and perhaps asmuch as 25 percent. Cumulative ThirdWorld military expenditures between1977 and 1982 alone were greater thantheir total debt outstanding in 1982the year the debt crisis first erupted.Lloyd Dumas, Professor of PoliticalEconomy at the University of Texas, haspointed out that "if the Third World'sshare of world military spending hadbeen the same in those years as it was inthe early sixties, the less developed na-tions as a group would have savedenough money from this one source tofinance repayment of nearly two-thirdsof their outstanding debt. "14

Huge foreign debts, no matter whattheir origin, are serious threats to the

152

(r38) State of the World 1989

Table 8.3. Annual Growth of World Economic Output and Military Expenditures,1960-851

Region 1960-70 1970-80 1980-85 1960-85

Western Industrial Countries(percent)

Gross National Product 4.9 3.1 2.2 3.6Military Spending 2.9 -0.8 5.7 2.0

Third World?Gross National Product 7.6 6.2 3.1 6.1Military Spending 11.7 2.7 2.1 6.1

Centrally Planned EconomiessGross National Product 4.4 3.3 1.7 3.4Military Spending 3.2 3.9 1.3 3.1

World AverageGross National Product 5.0 3.5 2.2 3.9Military Spending 4.1 1.6 3.2 2.9

'Military spending figures are for 1961: annual growth rates calculated from data expressed in constant1986 dollars. tlncludes China. sEstimates for centrally planned economies are likely to have a widemargin of error.sounces: Worldwalch Institute, based on U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic Statistics1987, (Springfield, Va: National Technical Information Service. 1987), and U.S. Arms Control and Disar-mament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Prim-ing Office, various editions).

economic security of many Third Worldcountries. By siphoning off financial re-sources needed for investment and so-cial spending, debt servicing impairseconomic development and sacrificeseconomic well-being.

For wealthy, industrialized countries,the negative consequences of maintain-ing a permanent war economy are lessdramatic, but no less pervasive. Both theUnited States and the Soviet Union, forexample, have spent enough on the mili-tary to cause a deterioration of vital in-frastructure, a retardation of civilian re-search and development, and a loss ofcompetitiveness. Soviet leader MikhailGorbachev is well aware that the armsrace with the United States needs to bebrought under control if the ailing So-viet economy is to be invigorated. Thenation's chronic shortages of consumergoods and their low quality are widely

s-," tio

_.

recognized. Civilian R&D and capitaland consumer goods production havesuffered enormously as the prerogativesof the arms race assigned top priority inresource allocation and high-quality in-puts to military projects.

The tremendous demands of militaryspending share a good deal of the blamefor transforming the Soviet and EastEuropean economies into economicbackwaters. In the late fifties, accordingto Seymour Melman, Professor Emeritusof Industrial Engineering at ColumbiaUniversity, the Soviet Union was on theverge of becoming an efficient mass pro-ducer of machine tools, with the pros-pect of assuming a world leadership rolein the field. That promise never materi-alized, however, because the money andtalent to develop a competitive industrywere redirected to a massive militaryspace program. Today, the Soviets find


they are unable to compete in world in-dustrial markets, having been bypassedin high-tech development by newly in-dustrialized countries such as Brazil andSouth Korea.15

The United States, too, faces troubleacross its economic landscape. While themilitary has enjoyed a cornucopia. civil-ian infrasclicture has been starved offunds. The amount of capital devoted bythe United States to building militarypower of colossal proportions ($8.4 tril-lion between 1948 and 1988, in 1984prices) exceeds the cumulatiie moneyvalue of all human-made wealth in theUnited States. An estimated two thirdsof the products of this civilian "fixed re-producible tangible wealth "industrialplants and machinery, communicationsand transport systems, buildings,bridges, water and sewage systems, andso onare now in dire need of recon-struction.16

The most critical impact of militaryspending is perhaps in the area of re-search and development. The researchintensity of military prodtc;-: has beenestimated to be about 20 times that ofcivilian products. A heavy emphasis ondefense-related R&D impairs a country'sinnovative capacity by pointing scientifictalent toward the military. A large poolof a nation's talents are then unavailableto keep industry at the competitive edge.or to develop less polluting productiontechnologies, improve energy efficiency.and advance renewable sources of en-ergy."

World military R&Destimated tototal at least $80 billion in 1985ac-counts for roughly a quarter of all R&Dfunds and for a comparable portion of allthe scientists and engineers engaged inresearch. The share of public R&D out-lays that goes to the military is as high as70 percent in the United States, 60 per-cent in the Soviet Union, and 50 percentin the United Kingdom. It demandsmuch It.wer shares. however, in mostother countries, such as 19 percent in

(139)

India. 13 percent in West Germany andAustralia, and below 5 percent in Switz-erland, Norway. and japan.")

The military share is lower when pri-vate R&D funds are taken into consider-ation, but the discrepancy in prioritiesbetween different countries remains.(See Table 8-4.) Overall, some 25-30percent of U.S scientists and engineersare engaged in military-related work.This is a much higher proportion than,for example, in either West Germany orjapan.12

Heavy emphasis on defense-relatedR&D impairs a country's innova-tive capacity.

Proponents of large-scale militaryspending contend that while resourcesare diverted from the civilian economy,scientific breakthroughs from defense-related research more than offset thatdisadvantage. But relative to the lavishresources devoted to military R&D. the"spinoffs" have been minimal. Gener-ally, the results of applied research,which constitutes the bulk of military re-search, are less transferable than thoseof basic R&D. In the military realm,product specifications are geared tomaximum performance, with little atten-tion devoted to cost. These criteria areincreasingly divergent from those of ci-vilian products, for which durability aridlow cost, not the extreme demands ofcombat conditions, are key.20

Simon Ramo, a cofounder of TRWInc., one of the leading U.S. militarycontractors, admitted in 1980 that "inthe past thirty years. had the total dollarswe spent on military R&D been ex-pended instead in those areas of scienceand technology promising the most eco-nomic progress, we probably would betoday where we are going to find our-selves arriving in the year 2000."21


Table 84. Military and Civilian R&Di in Selected Countries, 1971 and 1986

Country

1971 Expenditures 1986 Expenditures

Military CivilianMilitaryShare Military Civilian

MilitaryShare

(billion dollars) (percent) (billion dollars) (percent)

United States 8.50 18.2 31.82 37.3 79.4 32.03United Kingdoms 0.80 2.3 26.1 3.5 8.5 29.3France 0.604 3.04 16.8 3.5 14.6 19.5West Germany 0.40 4.7 7.3 1.4 26.1 5.1Japan 0.03 4-8 0.5 0.33 44.05 0.7

lIncludes government and privately funded R&D, 2Understates the total military share becausemili-tary-relatedR &D of the federal space program is not included: including space. the military share may beas high as 40 percent in 1986. 'British data are for 1972 and 1985. 41972. 51989.SOURCE: Worldwatch institute, calculated from international Monetary Fund. lnlernalional Financial Slalislicsl'earbook 1987 (Washington. D.C.: 1987). and from National ScienceBoard. Science and Engineering Indicators1987 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1987).

To the extent that spinoffs areachieved, they could be accomplishedmore directly and at considerably lowercost through civilian scientific studies.Research by Professor David Noble ofDrexel University in Philadelphia, for ex-ample, demonstrates that the U.S. AirForce's sponsorship of computer-con-trolled machine tools resulted in anoverly complex and expensive technol-ogy that failed to keep American indus-try competitive with Japan 29

Large-scale military spending pre-empts capital from civilian investments.In the United States, according to Pro-fessor Dumas of the University of Texas,the physical capital controlled by thePentagon in 1983-valued conserva-tively at $475 billion-was equivalent toalmost half that owned by all U.S. manu-facturers, including the 20,000 primemilitary contractors and over 100,000subcontractors. The military's net in-vestment in plant and equipment in1982 equaled nearly 38 percent of theinvestments in plant equipment under-taken by all U.S. manufacturers."

The effects of long years of militarypriorities are also apparent in the areasof unemployment and inflation. A 1988study by Michael Dee Oden of Employ-

-1- ,....-

ment Research Associates in Michiganfound that military outlays generate lessemployment per dollar spent than civil-ian expenditures do. There is alsostrong evidence that large-scale militaryspending "accelerates inflation in peri-ods of full employment and limits the fallin the inflation rate in deflationary peri-ods."24

Military largesse cannot alone beblamed for all the troubles of the U.S.economy. But it has strongly contri-buted. A combination of record peace-time military spending and tax policiesthat reduced federal revenues triggereda dramatic rise in federal budget defi-cits in the eighties. These deficits haveprimarily been financed by an enor-mous inflow f foreign capital. If thiscapital inf!aw were to stop, the FederalReserve would be confronted with a di-lemma, Dumas points out: either "tofinance the huge deficits and risk infla-tion, or refuse to finance them and riskdepression."25

Decades of heavy military spendinghave strongly contributed to a deteriora-tion in civilian productivity growth,which in turn has undermined the abilityof U.S. industry to remain cost-competi-tive. Compounded by a strong dollar in


the early eighties, this led to a loss ofdomestic and overseas markets andhence to a growing trade gap. (See Fig-ure 8-2.) Between 1981 and 1984. 42percent of the growth of U.S. domesticconsumer spending went to imports. Butthe bloated dollar masked the erosion ofthe country's fundamental competitive-ness. Its value against other western cur-rencies fell by 30 percent between 1985and 1987, but did virtually nothing toshrink the trade deficit Y6

Until 1980. the United States neverregistered a trade deficit in manufac-tured goods. Today, imports are no lon-ger restricted to low-tech, labor-inten-sive industries, but are booming in areasof traditional U.S. strengthsuch as au-iomobiles, consumer electronics, metal-cutting machine tools, steel, and semi-conductors. In 1984, the United Statesexperienced its first-ever trade deficit inelectronics."

It is no surprise that the dispropor-tionate amount of resources and talentdevoted to military purposes in theUnited States has adversely affected itscompetitiveness in the world market.Countries such as Japan, which haskept its military spending within tight

3001950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 8-2. US. Miters &podiumsod Budget Whits, 1950-88

bounds, are the only winners of thesuperpower arms race.

ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY

Countries are prepared to make consid-erable sacrifices in order to defend theirnational sovereignty and territory. Envi-ronmental degradation is a more funda-mental, if sometimes subtler, threat tothe security of virtually all nations. It un-dermines the very support systems onwhich human activity depends and even-tually manifests itself as a threat to eco-nomic well-being. But most countriesare doing precious little to preserve theirenvironmental security. The UnitedStates, for example. spent some $273billion in 1986 to defend against poorlydefined foreign military threats. but only$78 billion (of which $60 billion wereprivate funds) to deal with very concreteenvironmental pollution threats.28

It may be that ecological threats gener-ate less attention because often they arehomespun. As Wendell Berry. notedAmerican writer and farmer, has asked:"To what point . . . do we defend fromforeign enemies a country that we aredestroying ourselves? In spite of all ourpropagandists can do, the foreign threatinevitably seems diminished when our airis unsafe to breathe, when our drinkingwater is unsafe to drink, when our riverscarry tonnages of topsoil that make lightof the freight they carry in boats, whenour forests are dying from air pollutionand acid rain, and when we ourselves aresick from poisons in the air. Who are theenemies of this country?"29

But pollution respects no human-drawn borders: it jeopardizes not onlythe security of the country from which itemanates, but also that of its neighbors.There is thus a fundamental contradic-tion between the illusion of national sov-


ereignty and the reality of transbound-ary environmental degradation. OurCommon Future, the report of the WorldCommission on Environment and De-velopment (the Brundtland Commis-sion), put the dilemma succinctly: "TheEarth is one but the world is not. We alldepend on one biosphere for sustainingour lives. Yet each community, eachcountry, strives for survival and prosper-ity with little regard for its impact onothers."so

Throughout human history, strugglesover access to and control over naturalresourcesland, water, energy, andmineralshave been a root cause of ten-sion and armed conflict. But disputesover the allocation of resources are in-creasingly aggravated by the rapiddeterioration of resource quality. Insome cases, environmental degradationis i .pidly becoming a prominent sourceof it.; ernational tension.

Border-transcending environmentaldegradation most immediately affectsneighboring countries, as illustrated bydisputes over water resources. An es-timated 40 percent of the world's popu-lation depends on the 214 major riversystems shared by two or more countriesfor drinking water, irrigation, or hydro-power 12 of these basins are snared byfive or more countries. Disputes revolvearound water diversion or reduced waterflow, industrial pollution, the salinationor siltation of streams, and floods ag-gravated by soil erosion."

For example, control over the Nile wa-ters is a matter that casts a long shadowover relations between Egypt, theSudan, and Ethiopia. Butros Ghali,Egypt's Foreign Minister, warned inearly 1985: "The next war in our regionwill be over the waters of the Nile, notpolitics." Similar disputes simmer in vir-tually all parts of the world. (See Table8-5.)32

Soil erosion might seem less directlyimplicated as a source of tension be-

tween nations, yet silt accumulation canlead to more frequent and devastatingfloods. This has happened in Ban-gladesh, for instance, where years of de-forestation in the Himalayas have led toincreased soil erosion and, as a conse-quence, to siltation of the rivers enteringthat country. The latest flood, in Sep-tember 1988, is now considered to bethe worst ever. Such catastrophes canonly be effectively counteracted if Ban-gladesh, India, Nepal, and China allagree to cooperate in reforestation andreduction of soil erosiona task thatseems daunting indeed."

Environmental degradation is rap-idly becoming a source of interna-tional tension.

The rapid evaporation of the Aral Seain the central Asian region of the SovietUnion (due to excessive draining for irri-gation purposes of rivers feeding thesea) is having detrimental effects on re-gional agriculture, fisheries, vegetation,and climate patterns. The climatic im-pact might well be felt as far away asAfghanistan and Iran, for the Aral Seaabsorbs solar energy, thus moderatingwinters and making possible a longergrowing season."

Trans boundary air pollution providesanother example, with perhaps evenmore worrisome consequences. Acidrain is destroying aquatic life and foreststhroughout central Europe and NorthAmerica. Massive damage from aciddeposition in Canada (more than 50 per-cent of which comes from U.S. sources)has caused considerable diplomatic fric-tions between Canada and the UnitedStates, because the latter has doggedlyrefused to consider additional measuresto reduce emissions of sulfur and nitro-gen oxides.35

/5 7

Body of Water


Table 8-5. International Water Disputes, Mid-Eighties

Countries Involved in Dispute Subject of Dispute

Nile Egypt. Ethiopia, Sudan

Euphrates, Tigris Iraq, Syria, Turkey

Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, SyriaJordan. Litani,Yarmuk

Indus, Sutlei

Ganges

Mekong

Parana

Lauca

Rio Grande,Colorado

India. Pakistan

Bangladesh. India

Kampuchea, Laos, Thailand,Vietnam

Argentina, Brazil

Bolivia, Chile

Mexico, United States

Great Lakes Canada, United States

Rhine France, Netherlands, Switzerland.West Germany

Elbe Czechoslovakia, East Germany.West Germany

Szamos Hungary, Romania

Level of water flow

Dams, water flow

Water flow

Irrigation

Siltation, flooding

Water flow

Dam, land inundation

Dam, salinization

Salinization, water flow,agrochemical pollutioa

Water diversion

Industrial pollution



souacc: Worldwatch institute. based on various sources.

"Toxic clouds" carrying hazardoussubstances can traverse the entire globebefore dispersing or falling down toearth. A case in point is the pesticideDDT. Though its use has been prohib-ited in the United States since 1972, it isnevertheless still produced and ex-ported to many developing countries,where no laws govern its use. DDTsprayed in Central America is known tohave contaminated the upper GreatLakes, and the pesticide even returns inimported agricultural produce. Simi-

larly, insecticides from Asia and south-ern Europe are found in Arctic and Ant-arctic waters.36

Increasingly, environmental degrada-tion is having ., truly all-encompassing,global effect, in the sense that no singlenation can hope to escape the danger.The growing hole in the ozone layerposes grave threats to human health, ag-ricultural productivity, and marine fish-eries. (See Chapter 5,) Similarly, thebuildup of carbon dioxide and othertrace gases is leading to rising global

.1 ."-1 'e. L.).7)

(IV) Stale of the World 1989

temperatures and potentially cata-strophic climate shifts. (See Chapters 1and 10.) The security of entire nations iscompromised by the impending dangersof shifting precipitation patterns, risingsea levels, and disrupted crop-growingregions. While all of humanity will sufferfrom the repercussions, ozone depletionand global warming are caused primarilyby industrial countries, which accountfor 84 percent of chlorofluorocarbon(CFC) production and 69 percent of car-bon dioxide emissions.97

Nuclear power provides an importantexample of both the global effects of en-vironmental destruction and the trans-boundary political problems it cancause. The powerful explosion at Cher-nobyl on April 26, 1986, hurled radioac-tive debris far into the atmosphere andacross large areas of the planet's north-ern hemisphere. The recriminationsagainst the Soviet Union for failing toprovide an adequate and timely warningof the accident have demonstrated thepotential of such incidents for raising in-ternational tensions.

Military means cannot reverse re-source depletion or restore lostecological balance.

As popular awareness of the dangersof nuclear power has grown, so havestrains between nations over the con-struction and siting of reactors, enrich-ment and reprocessing facilities, and ra-dioactive waste dumps. In Europe, 119nuclear power plants are located within100 kilometers of a national border. TheDanish parliament decided to ask Swe-den to close a plant 30 kilometers fromCopenhagen. The French governmentrejected a similar plea by local West Ger-man authorities to cancel constructionof four reactors at Cattenom. Tensions

1 'i f*tj

on similar issues run high between Ire-land and the United Kingdom, betweenAustria (whose nuclear program wasabandoned in 1978) and both West Ger-many and Czechoslovakia, betweenHong Kong and China. and between Ar-gentina and Chile."

The contradiction between nationalsovereignty and the international impactof environmental degradation is exacer-bated by the wide discrepancies in thestage of industrial development and thecapacity for effective action that differentcountries find themselves in. For exam-ple, strict regulations, increased publicopposition to landfills and incinerators,and consequently rising costs for haz-ardous waste disposal in industrial coun-tries have led to a proliferation of legaland illegal shipments to developing na-tionsparticularly those on the Africancontinentwith little or no environmen-tal legislation. The dumping of Italiantoxic wastes in Nigeria in 1988 cast aspotlight on such shadowy deals.39

Conflicts over the allocation of naturalresources have lent themselves, at leastin the view of competing governments,to military solutions. But in the face oftransnational pollution, a zero-sumgame is transformed into a no-win situa-tion. National defense establishmentsare powerless against environmentalthreats. As technologically sophisticatedas they may be, military means cannotreverse resource depletion or restorelost ecological balance. In fact, an em-phasis on military strength compoundsthe problem. As described in the previ-ous section, the ability to deal effectivelywith the challenges arising from envi-ronmental degradation is compromisedby the continued global arms race.

Predictably, national governments arereluctant to relinquish any of their hard-won sovereign rights. At a conference ofEuropean environmental ministers con-vened to work out a cleanup program forthe Rhine, for example, France, Switzer-


land, and West Germany objected to aDutch recommendation for interna-tional inspection of suspected pollutionsites, arguing that such action would vio-late national sovereignty.40

But absolute sovereignty is no longera workable concept. Exclusively nationalpolicies are ill suited for a world thatfaces border-transcending environmen-tal destruction of an unprecedentedscope. Without effective "environmentaldiplomacy" that yields multinationalagreements to limit or ban the produc-tion of substances inimical to the envi-ronment, each country is left at themercy of others' actions. Environmentalsecurity depends critically on interna-tional coordination and cooperation.

FROM OFFENSE TO DEFENSEAND PEACEKEEPING

After a decade of runaway militaryspending, the nineties may provide anopportunity for redirecting security poli-cies. More-stringent U.S. federal spend-ing limits, Gorbachev's disarmamentovertures, the onerous debt burden inthe Third World, and, perhaps most im-portant, the popular yearning for a lessheavily armed world could set the stagefor far-reaching arms reductions. Re-versing the global arms race not onlypromises greater security, but also al-lows governments to free the resourcesneeded to address pressing social, eco-nomic, and environmental problemsacross the globe.

The record of traditional arms controlis not reassuring. Instead of putting abrake on military competition, super-power agreements have served as asmokescreen for relentless war prepara-tion: tailored to establish weak limits foraging weapons systems, they stimulated

the development and deployment ofmore-sophisticated technology. Since1972, the Strategic Arms LimitationTalks treaties allowed the superpowersto add almost 13,000 warheads to theirstrateg.c nuclear stockpiles.41

A Strategic Arms Reductions Talks(START) accord, if it becomes reality,would cut strategic nuclear weapons by30-35 percent, returning warhead num-bers to the level prevalent in the lateseventies. But fixation on numerical lim-its alonehowever "deep" a cut may beenvisionedwill fail to arrest the mostdynamic aspects of the arms race. Scien-tists never stop conceiving of new tech-nologies, and military strategists alwaysseem to discover new security threatsand new weapons "gaps" to justify theirdeployment. As currently envisioned, aSTART accord would in no way slow thetide of new weapons planned or on thedrawing board. Terminating the armsrace and releasing substantial resourcesfor productive use requires a curb onfurther development, production, anddeployment of new warheads and deliv-ery systems.42

Cloaked in secrecy, arms negotiations. tend to get bogged down because there

is little pressure to compromise. "Inde-pendent initiatives" may prove morefruitful. Taken outside the realm of for-mal bargaining sessions, they seek tobring the weight of world public opinionto bear on the process. Either the U.S. orthe Soviet government, for example,might publicly announce it will refrainfrom testing and deploying any new nu-clear weapons for a specified period. Ifreciprocawd by the other government,that constraint could be extended for anindefinite period, and at a later point becodified in a formal accord.43

General Secretary Gorbachev has infact taken this approach in an effort tobreak the arms control stalemate. Unfor-tunately, his initiatives have beenbrushed aside by western leaders as


mere propaganda ploys. A constructiveAmerican responsetesting the sincer-ity of these proposalsmight create apositive dynamic in the superpower rela-tionship. If such initial steps proved suc-cessful, they could build the trust neces-sary to move toward disarmament.44

As frightening as a world wired withexplosives is, many people find it hard toconceive of a practical alternative to it.This is a profound obstacle to disarma-ment. Governments and ordinary citi-zens alike need a roadmap that givesthem a measure of confidence that theycan navigate this largely uncharted terri-tory. Although most governments em-ploy not a single person for such pur-poses, nongovernmental groups haveput their imaginations to work.

The debate over alternative defensehas simmered for many years within aca-demic and peace movement circles. Butit has gathered momentum in Europe, asdenuclearization and a reduction of con-ventional forces have suddenly becomeserious options in the wake of the Inter-mediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. A"nonprovocative defense" would in-volve a fundamental restructuring of thearmed forcesweapons, personnel, andstrategiesso that they can defend butlack the ability to attack. It may be dif-ficult to determine whether a particularweapon has defensive or offensive prop-erties, but the litmus test is whether adefensive system increases a nation's se-curity without threatening the security ofothers.45

In' the eighties, alternative defensehas, in the words of Hal Harvey, directorof the security program at the RockyMountain Institute, "graduated fromtheory to politic:,." The Danish parlia-ment has established a research centerto study nonoffensive defense, and theSocial Democratic Party in West Ger-many and the Labour Party in the UnitedKingdom are advocating such policies.Similar concepts have entered the vo-

/6JI. J..

cabulary of Soviet generals and partyleaders. Gorbachev has coined the term"reasonable sufficiency" to guide thetransition of Soviet military doctrinefrom offense to defense. In July 1988 theWarsaw Pact nations formally proposeda three-step conventional arms reducetions process in Europe.46

A defensive footing not only promisesgreater military stability, it also is an im-portant way station on the path towarddisarmament. A sober reassessment ofmutual intentions, interests, and securityneeds would likely show that the. as.sumptions that have guided securitypolicies in the postWorld War II era areseriously outdated. If so, reduced reli-ance on weapons may become more pal-atable.

It may seem unrealistic to envision aworld without war. But it is perhaps lessreasonable to expect humanity to sur-vive with a nuclear sword of Damocleshanging over it indefinitely. A world inwhich the use of force becomes increas-ingly delegitimized does not abolish na-tion- states; rather, it would enable statesto resolve internal and external disputesmore safely, without resort to armedconflict and the prospect of mutual anni-hilation.

It has been a quarter-century since thesuperpowers seriously contemplatedgeneral and complete disarmament. In1961, they agreed on the McCloy-Zorin

Joint Statement of Agreed Principles forDisarmament Negotiations, the terms ofwhich were unanimously adopted by theU.N. General Assembly that September.The statement contained guidelines formultilateral negotiations to design andimplement an internationally acceptabledisarmament program. In 1962, theKennedy administration presented atreaty outline to an international confer-ence and distributed its provisions in adocument entitled Blueprint for the PeaceRace. By late 1963, however, that ap-

,

,


proach had been shunted aside in favorof arms contro1.47

Almost three decades and an incon-clusive arms race later, the merits of dis-armament are worth reconsidering.Recognizing the dire military and eco-nomic implications of the arms race, inJanuary 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev pre-sented a plan to rid I:le world of all nu-clear weapons by the end of the century.It remains to be seen whether the newadministration under George Bush isprepared to take up the Gorbachev chal-lenge and bring the cold war to an end.

Meanwhile, Marcus Raskin, a seniorfellow at the Institute for Policy Studiesin Washington, D.C., and former mem-ber of President Kennedy's National Se-curity Council, has launched an effort torevive the McCloy-Zorin Principles. Hehas formulated, and submitted to Ameri-can and Soviet analysts for comment, adetailed and careful draft treaty thatspells out a 15-year process for disband-ing the world's armed forces, eliminat-ing all stockpiles of weapons and theirdelivery vehicles, and converting armsindustries to civilian use.4B

One reason governments resist disar-mament is that they distrust each other'sintentions. An international satellitemonitoring agencyproposed in 1962and 1978, and currently revived as anideacould help build greater trust. Un-dertaking modest tasks at first, it mighteventually provide impartial informationto verify arms treaties, confirm or denyalleged border violations, deter surpriseattacks, monitor cease-fires, discourageclandestine missile tests, and assist U.N.peacekeeping missions. According to aU.N. General Assembly study, start-upand operating costs would be well under1 percent of world military expendituresannually.49

The General Assembly is currentlyconsidering the establishment of a moni-toring center of limited scope that, forthe time being, would not involve satel-

lite monitoring. In the United States,Representative Robert Mrazek has intro-duced a bill to investigate how satellitemonitoring can increase internationalsecurity and stability.50

The greatest hope for reining in thearms race lies with the vocal and insis-tent pressure that has emerged from thegrassroots, paralleling the movement inthe environment and development field.(See Chapter 9.) People everywhere areless and less inclined to leave the re-sponsibility for defining security to gov-ernments. Their agenda ranges fromtraditional peace movement actions toinnovative acts of citizen diplomacy. TheNztural Resources Defense Council, bypersuading Soviet authorities to let it es-tablish seismic monitoring stations nearthe nuclear testing grounds at Semipala-tinsk, helped compel the Reagan admin-istration to reopen talks with Moscowabout nuclear test ban verification. TheCampaign for Peace and Democracy/East and West and the European Nu-clear Disarmament Campaign seek tocounter the arms race by building agrassroots alliance of peace and humanrights groups straddling the militaryblocs in Europe.

An international satellite monitor-ing agency could help build greatertrust.

While Third World conflicts arisefrom a multitude of causes, they oftenare exacerbated by the involvement ofoutside powers. In the absence of for-eign intervention, such disputes may beeasier to resolve. For the superpowers,the lessons of Vietnam and Afghanistansuggest that military intervention hasreached a point of diminishing returns.Either the United States or the SovietUnion could offer to refrain from send-

1 6 2


ing armed forces or weapons into anynonaligned country, in return for similarself - restraint from the other super-power. Such a nonintervention policywas in effect endorsed by a panel of for-mer and current American and Sovietofficials in a report on "The Require-ments for Stable Coexistence in UnitedStates-Soviet Relations." In a similarvein, Gorbachev proposed removing So-viet naval forces from Cam Ranh Bay inVietnam, if the United States in returnagreed to closedown its military bases inthe Philippines.51

The best hope for impartially resolv-ing Third World conflicts rests with theUnited Nations. The history of U.N.peacekeeping efforts shows that the or-ganization has been an effective concilia-tor of conflicts that did not directly in-volve any of the major powers. Eventhough those who had high hopes in-vested in the United Nations havelargely been disappointed during thefirst four decades of its existence, theorganization's reputation has lately im-proved.s2

The changing Soviet attitude towardthe United Nations is a particularly en-couraging development. as reflected inSoviet payment of past membershipdues, Moscow's proposals for a U.N.flotilla in the Persian Gulf, and its ac-ceptance of U.N.-mediated talks that ini-tiated the withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom Afghanistan. if the incoming ad-ministration in Washington can reversethe hostile U.S. stance toward this worldbody, both superpowers could jointlymake the United Nations what its found-ers envisioned: an organization at thecenter of a collective security system.

Meanwhile, the United Nations is re-ceiving a boost from an unexpected cor-ner. This decade has seen numerousconflicts around the globe that seem tohave no victors but only vanquishedthe Iran-Iraq war, Soviet forces pitchedagainst the Afghan mujahedeen, the Viet-

namese occupation of Kampuchea, andthe struggle between the Sahrawi peopleand Morocco over control of the West-ern Sahara. Sheer exhaustion and warweariness have driven these combatantsto see the United Nations as a peace-maker of last resort. Cease-fire negotia-tions sponsored by the United Nationsoffer a face-saving way out of a stale-mated conflict. And in southern Africa,the world body may soon rtly a crucialrole in overseeing Namibia's transitionto independence.

If the world body's current peacekeep-ing efforts continue to be successful, itcan capitalize on its new prestige, repu-tation, and trust to cope with an evenmore daunting challenge: to move fromorganizing cease-fires and creatingbuffer zones to preventing the outbreakof hostilities in the first place. The an-nouncement that U.N. PeacekeepingForces received the 1988 Nobel PeacePrize may be just the boost the organiza-tion needed to take on this new role.

In the future, armed conflict may wellbe prevented by having either unarmedobservers or peacekeeping forces al-ready in place. Indeed, as part of a pro-posal for a comprehensive security sys-tem, the Soviet Union recently urged theUnited Nations to set up "observationposts in explosive areas of the world."Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Pe-trovsky suggested that any country seek.ing to protect itself from outside inter-ference should be able to call on theUnited Nations to send observer teamsto patrol borders.53

In 1983, Nicaragua proposed that aneight-nation Latin American contingentpatrol its border with Honduras to deterContra mercenary incursions. In 1988,Honduran Foreign Minister LopezContreras called for a similar force. If aU.R. team or another international forcehad been available, it might have pre-vented much of the bloodshed in the re-gion. It would also have been much


cheaper. A Pentagon estimate con-cluded that a force of 1,300 observerscould monitor the borders separatingNicaragua from Honduras, El Salvador,and Costa Rica for less than $40 milliona year. By contrast, the United Statesspends some $3 billion to project mili-tary force into the region, and the Cen-tral American countries together spendanother $1 billion on their armies.54

The world may therefore want to con-sider creating a more permanent peace-keeping force. To solidify the impartial-ity of such a forceand therefore itsacceptabilityit should ideally consist ofindividually recruited persons, trained inthe unique skills of peacekeeping, whoseloyalty to the United Nations is beyondquestion.55

Annual outlays for seven U.N. peace-keeping operations come to about $380million currently. A stepped-up role forthe United Nations would requiregreater expenditures. The organizationmay soon be spending $2 billion a yearif it assumes an active role in Kampu-chea, the Western Sahara, and southernAfrica. That would still be less than whatthe world spends on the arms race on asingle day.56

BEATING SWORDS INTOPLOWSHARES

As far back as in the Bible, people havebeen urged to cast down their arms, tobe done with war and to labor insteadwith plows and pruning hooks. The ad-vice is even more appropriate today,when threats to natural life-support sys-tems are the whole world's enemy.

To rechannel resources from the mili-tary to the civilian economy and to pro-vide sufficient resources for reversingenvironmental degradation, a planned

(1.19)

conversion process must be set in mo-tion in parallel to a disarmament pro-cess. Conversion seeks to protect de-fense-dependent workers and communi-ties from the social and economic dislo-cation that otherwise would arise duringdisarmament. Worldwide, perhaps asmany as 50 million peopleeither assoldiers or as workers in military indus-tryare on the military payro11.57

A planned conversion processmust be set in motion in parallel toa disarmament process.

Conversion is a critical component inreordering the priorities of a nation's se-curity policy. First of all, it helps identifyexisting innovative and productivecapabilitiesthe capital, raw materials.machinery, and hum -n skills and exper-tise now tied up in military-relatedproduction. Second, it provides theframework and mechanism for rechan-neling these capabilities into civilian use.Legislation proposed by Represent-ative Ted Weiss, for example, wouldmandate the formation of local alterna-tive-use committees in every militaryplant, base, or laboratory, and entrustthem with the responsibility for develop-ing a blueprint for civilian productdevelopment and marketing; the billfurther provides for occupationalretraining of managers, engineers, andworkers to help them adapt to the re-quirements of the civilian market.58

Third, as a deliberate planning pro-cess, conversion enables societies to an-ticipate the availability of capital andother resources for alternative civilianuses. Their reclamation from the mili-tary sector is badly needed to assist inrepairing deteriorating public infra-structure, revitalizing the economy, andimproving living standards. But conver-


Table 8-6. Trade-Offs Between Military and Social or Environmental Priorities

Military Priority Cost Social/Environmental Priority

Trident II submarine and F-18 jetfighter programs

Stealth bomber program

Requested SDI funding fiscalyears 1988-92

2 weeks of world militaryexpenditure

German outlays for militaryprocurement and R&D. fiscalyear 1985

3 days of global military spending

Development cost for MidgetmanICBM

2 days of global military spending

5100.000,000.000

$68,000,000.000

$58.000.00.000

$50,000.000.000

$10.750,000.000

$6,500.000,000

$6.000.000.000

$4.800.000,000

Estimated cost of cleaning up the10.000 worst hazardous wastedumps in the United States

Two thirds of estimated costs tomeet U.S. clean water goals bythe year 2000

Disposal of highly radioactivewaste in the United States

Annual cost of the proposedU.N. Water and SanitationDecade

Estimated costs to dean up WestGerman sector of the NorthSea

To fund Tropical Forest ActionPlan over 5 years

Annual cost to cut sulfur dioxideemissions by 8-12 milliontons/year in the United Statesto combat acid rain

Annual cost of proposed U.N.Action Plan to halt ThirdWorld desertification, over 20years

sion also frees up the money and brainsrequired for reversing environmentaldegradation. Table 8-6 provides a sam-ple of the trade-offs between militaryand sfNcial and environmental priorities.

In 1978, for example, the University ofCalifornia Nuclear Weapons Labs Con-version Project studied the possibilitiesof switching the Lawrence LivermoreLaboratory to work on alternative pro-ducticn in the energy field. Another suchproposal envisioned transforming theFort Detrick biological warfare facility

1. 3

into a center for cancer and related bio-medical research. Or a chemical weap-ons factory could become a laboratoryworking on toxic waste treatment.59

Conversion is more than just a theory.At the close of World War II, 30 percentof U.S. GNP was transferred from thewar industry into civilian uses. Today,China stands as an example. The post-Mao leadership assigned the militarysector the lowest priority of the "fourmodernizations" (the others being agri-culture, industry, and science and tech-

Military Priority


Cost Social/Environmental Priority

6 months of U.S. outlays fornuclear warheads. fiscal year1986

SDI research. fiscal year 1987

10 days of European EconomicCommunity military spending

1 Trident submarine

3 B-1B bombers

2 months of Ethiopian militaryspending

1 nucicar weapon test

1-hour operating cost. B-15bomber

S4.000.000.000

S:1.700.000.000

S2.000.000.000

$1.400.000.000

$680,000.000

S50.000.000

S12.000.000

521.000

U.S. government spending onenergy efficiency. fiscal yearsi980 -87

Enough funds to build a solarpower system serving a city of200.000

Annual cost to clean uphazardous waste sites in 10European EconomicCommunity countries by theyear 2000

Clobal 5-year child immunizationprogram against 6 deadlydiseases, preventing I milliondeaths a year

U.S. government spending onrenewable energy. fiscal years1983-85

Annual cost of proposed U.A.Anti-Desertification Plan forEthiopia

Installation of 80.000 handpumps to give Third Worldvillages access to safe watet

Community-based maternalhealth cart: in 10 Africanvillages to reduce maternaldeaths by half in one decade

souttet:: Worldtva Itca Institute.tute. based on various sources.

nology). In 1985, the country decided toslice its 4-million-strong armed forces byone quarter and to utilize part of themilitary-industrial capacity to manufac-ture civilian goods. Civilian productionnow accounts for 20 percent of the out-put of China's 30,000 military factories;that share is projected to reach 50 per-cent by the year 2000.60

It is important fer nations to devote

greater resources to environmental pro-tection. But in the face of transnationalenvironmental problems, national ef-forts are likely to prove fruitless withoutthe cooperation ofneighbors. Indeed, asawareness of the transnational characterof environmental degradation hasgrown and as remedies became more ur-gent, an increasing number of interna-tional conventions have been concluded.


with varying degrees ofnational commit-ment and success. (See Chapter 1.)

The linked Nations EnvironmentProgramme (MEP) has served a usefulfunction in laying the groundwork foradditional treaties. Its most celebratedachievement to date is the Montreal Pro-tocol that calls for a 50-percent cut inCFC production by 1999. But UNEP'smandate remains limited, and there areno firmly established internationalmechanisms to address ecological prob-lems. For example, several of UNEP'sattempts to draft rules on internationalresponsibility for transboundary envi-ronmental damage have failed.61

Ironically, transnational coordinationof environmental policies can occasion-ally even be a two-edged sword. Theconsensus-building process within theEuropean Economic Community, for ex-ample, has at times inhibited individualmember countries from taking strirternational action. This was the case withautomotive emissions. (See Chapter 6.)

As in the field of disarmament, the in-ertia of formal international conferencesmay be overcome by the independentactions of one or more like-mindedcountries. They could commit them-selves to reduce their fossil hie! con-sumption, cut their CFC production, orstop ocean dumping, and then inviteother nations to adopt similar policies.Such environmental alliancesformedto act against a common threatcouldtie together nations that share ecosys-tems, countries that are geographicallydistant but bear primary responsibilityfor global environmental threats, or po-litical, ideological, or military rivals thatmay have little else in common than aninterest in avoiding environmental catas-trophes.

These alliances are already becominga reality. In 1984, nine European coun-tries and Canada formed a "30 percentclub." Aware that vast amounts of air-borne pollutants drift across national

167

borders, these nations committed them-selves to reduce their 1980 levels of sul-fur dioxide emissions, a chief culprit inthe formation of acid rain, by at least 30percent by 1993. A total of 19 countries{including the Soviet Union but not theUnited States) have joined the club sofar. A similar pledge to cut nitrogen ox-ides by 30 percent by 1998 was made by12 European nations in 1988.62

Environmental alliances that runacross adversaria. military alliances canfulfill a valuable role by strengtheningthe common interests of opposingcamps. Europe has been divided intoEast and West for four decades now, butjoint policies to cope with environmentalthreats may help in breaking down ideo-logical barriers. Tanks and planes mightfend off a military attack, but no technol-ogy exists to repel the air- and water-borne pollutants that cross borders withimpunity. East-West environmental co-operation first became manifest in the1979 Convention on Long-RangeTransboundary Air Pollution, whichgave rise to the "30 percent club." Bothsides are now showing considerablygreater interest in enhanced coopera-tion.63

One specific alliance might evolveamong the countries that share the Elbe.This riverseverely polluted with cad-mium, mercury, lead, phosphates, andnitratesflows through heavily industri-alized parts of Czechoslovakia and EastGermany before streaming throughHamburg, West Germany, and emptyinginto the North Sea. Because West Ger-many has an obvious interest in seeingthe river cleaned up, it is consideringfunding a water treatment plant in EastGermany. By similar logic, the countryearlier agreed to pay for some sulfur di-oxide scrubbers on Czechoslovakianpower plants in an effort to reduce theair pollution wafting across the border.64

The newfound urgency to counteractglobal problems like the greenhouse ef-

I

Enhancing Global Security 033)fect and ozone depletion may also bringchange in U.S.-Soviet relations. As earlyas 1972, the superpowers signed anAgreement on Cooperation in the Fieldof Environmental Protection. But activi-ties carried out under the accord havebeen starved for funds. Now, withoutgovernmental sponsorship, scientistsfrom the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates are beginning to collaborate moreclosely on measures to cope with thegreenhouse effect, in an effort dubbedgreenhouse glasnost .65

A unique environmental alliance isshaping up in war-torn Central America.Governments agreed in 1988 to estab-lish a series of "peace parks"designedto preserve the region's fast-disappear-ing rain forests and to help promote sus-tainable developmentstraddling theborders ofCosta Rica, El Salvador, Hon-duras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Pan-ama. Nicaraguan official Lorenzo Carde-nal hopes these biosphere reserves willbecome "a worldwide model of sustaina-ble tropical forest development."66

In the final analysis, all countries mustbecome part of an earth-spanning envi-ronmental coalition. In June 1988, theprime ministers of Norway and Canadacalled for a global "law of the air" analo-gous to the Law of the Seaa treaty toprotect the earth's atmosphere fromozone depletion and the buildup ofgreenhouse gases. A world atmospherefund, financed by a tax on fossil fuel con-sumption in the industrial countries,could provide the financial support forimproving energy efficiency, switchingto more benign fuels, and taking otherremedial actions. (See Chapter 10.)67

As with war and peace issues, citizen

diplomacy is playing an increasingly im-portant role in pushing governments tostem environmental degradation. Inwidely divergent ways, environmentalgroups have sought to link up with over-seas counterparts or influence nationalpolicies affecting the global environ-ment. The Rainforest Action Network,for instance, is pressuring developmentbanks not to fund projects that destroythe remaining rain forests. The Environ-mental Project on Central America is or-ganizing American support for the Cen-tral American "peace parks."

Conservation International and theWorld Wildlife Fund have pioneered in-novative financial arrangements knownas debt-for-nature swaps (though theirimpact is too min uzrule to solve the debtcrisis). Survival International is con-cerned with preserving the habitat onwhich endangered peoples depend.Greenpeace has developed a truly globe-spanning network of activists mobilizedon a wide range of issues. Environmentallinks across the East-West divide on thegrassroots level are still in their infancy.But Friends of the Earth, among others,is busy budding contacts with a buddingEast European environmental move-ment.

Today's threats to environmental se-unity may supplant concerns about in-tractable issues of military security, evenas the world takes halting steps towarddisarmament and economic conversion.Growing environmental awareness isspawning a new willingness to collabo-rate on a global basis. If nations canwork together to solve common ecologi-cal problems, if multilateralism works,then we stand a chance of overcomingthe many other issues that divide us.

168

,

9

Mobilizing atthe Grassroots

Alan B. Darning

Villagers in the parched hinterlands ofSenegal may never have heard the worddesertification, yet they know better thanany agronomist that their soil is ex-hausted and that hunger is on theirheels. Women on the banks of theGanges may not know what an infantmortality rate is, but they know all toowell the helpless agony of holding achild as it dies of diarrhea. Forest dwell-ers in the heart of the Amazon may neverhave been told about the mass extinctionof species now occurring around them,but they know far better than any re-search biologist what it is to watch theirprimeval homeland go up in smokebefore advancing waves of migrants anddevelopers.

The men and women of Senegal, Ban-gladesh, and Brazil understand globaldeterioration in its rawest forms. Tothem, creeping degradation of ecosys-tems has meant declining health, failing

An expanded version of this chapter appeared asWorldwatch Paper 88. Alobihzing at she Gras000ts:Lora' Action on Poverty and the Environment.

i6 ?

livelihoods, and lengthening workdays.But they are not standing idle. In vil-lages, neighborhoods, and shantytownsaround the world, people are coming to-gether to discuss and respond to thetightening ecological and economic con-ditions that confront them. Viewed inisolation, these initiatives are modest-10 women plant trees on a roadside, adozen youths dig a well, an old manteaches neighborhood children toreadbut from a global perspectivetheir scale and impact are monumental.Indeed, local organizations form a sortof ragtag front line in the worldwidestruggle to end poverty and environ-mental destruction.

Although most individual groups arelittle known outside their own locality,the overall movements they form can bestudied by piecing together insightsfrom scores of interviews, field visits,grassroots newsletters, official docu-ments, press reports, and academic pa-pers. The resulting picture reveals anexpanding latticework of human orga-nizations that, while varying from place

Mobilizing at the Grassroots

to place in many of the particulars, sharebasic charac teristics. I

The particulars include cooperatives,mothers' clubs, peasant unions, reli-gious groups, savings and credit associa-tions, neighborhood federations, collec-tive work arrangements, tribal networks,and innumerable others. The universalsinclude the capacities to tap local knowl-edge and resources, to respond to prob-lems rapidly and creatively, and to main-tain the institutional flexibility necessaryin changing circumstances. In addition,although few groups use the words sus-tainable development, their agendas inmany cases embody its ideal. They wanteconomic prosperity without sacrificingtheir health or the prospects for theirchildren.

At the grassroots, and particularlyamong the close to 4 billion humans indeveloping lands, it appears that theworld's people are better organized in1989 than they have been since Euro-pean colonialism disrupted traditionalsocieties centuries ago. Alone, however,this new class of organizations is far frompowerful enough to single-handedly setthe world on a sustainable course. Thetasks requiredfrom putting the brakeson population growth to reforesting theplanet's denuded watershedswill ne-cessitate an unprecedented outpouringof human energy. (See Chapter 10.)Community groups, whose membershipnow numbers perhaps into the hundredsof millions, can show the world how totap that energy. But national govern-ments and international agencies, whichhave all too often excluded or sought tocontrol popular organizations, mustlearn to work with them. Developmentinstitutions in particular will need funda-mental reorientation if they are to fulfilltheir potential as supporters of and com-plements to local efforts.2

The difficulty of forging an alliancebetween powerful, often rigid institu-tions and the world's millions of fledg-

(155)

ling community groups can scarcely beunderestimated, yet neither can its im-portance. To succeed, sustainable devel-opment will have to come from both thebottom and the top.

AN UNNOTICED TIDEIn an anthropological sense, social orga-nization is always present. Kinship, peerrelations, division of labor, social hierar-chies, and religious structures form thescaffoi ding of human community in tra-ditional societies. Yet traditional mgani-zations. first disturbed by Europeancolonialism, have been stretched andoften dismantled by the great culturalupheavals of the twentieth century: pop-ulation growth, urbanization, the adventof modem technology, and the spread ofwestern commercialism.°

In the resulting organizational vac-uum, a new generation of communityand grassroots groups has been steadily,albeit unevenly, developing, particularlyover the past two decades. This emer-gen°e is driven by a shifting constella-tion of forces, including stagnant ordeteriorating economic and ecologicalconditions for the poor, the failure ofmany governments to respond ade-quately, and the spread in some regionsof new social ideologies and new inter-pretations of religious doctrines. In con-trast to traditional organizations andmass political movements, this risingtide of community groups is generallypragmatic, self-consciously focused ondevelopment. nonaligned in party poli-tics, and concerned primarily with self-help.

At the same time, in much of the worlda second layer of institutions has jelledatop the first. This diverse class of inter-mediary organizations serves the groupsat the base by facilitating the flow of in-

!in


formation, materials. and funds betweenthe grassroots and broader institutionssuch as church. state. and developmentdonors. The groups go by many names:in Europe they are called nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs), in theUnited States private voluntary organi-zations (PVOs). and in Asia voluntaryagencies or "Volags." Here they will becalled "independent development orga-nizations" or simply "independentgroups."4

Numbers only crudely capture the vi-tality of the world's grassroots move-ments since data are sketchy and groupsfluid, yet the explosive growth is unmis-takable. Although at mid-century com-munity development projects existedmainly where traditional self-help cus-toms remained intact, today dynamiclocal organizations are found through-out the world. (See Table 9-1.)s

Asia has by many accounts the mostactive community movement. India'sself-help movement has a prized place insociety, tracing its roots LO MahatmaGandhi's pioneering village develop-ment work 60 years ago. Gandhi aimedto build a just and humane society fromthe bottom up, starting with self-reliantvillazes based on renewable resources.After independence in 1948, Gandhi'sdisciple Vinoba Bhave sparked the in-fluential Village Awakening movementand, when that peaked in 1964, a newwave of community organizing com-menced, spurred by a generation ofcommitted middle-class youths. Tens ifnot hundreds of thousands of localgroups in India now wage the day-by-daystruggle for development.6

Across the subcontinent. communityactivism runs high. Self-help in Ban-gladesh has risen sharply since indepen-dence in 1971, and 3 million Sri Lankansparticipate in Sarvodaya Shramadana, acommunity development movement thatcombines Gandhian teachings with so-cial action tenets of Theravada Bud-

171

dhism. Sarvodaya mobilizes massivework teams to do everything from build-ing road networks to draining malarialponds, and their achievements have gar-nered international praise.?

After Asia. Latin American communi-ties are perhaps the most active. There,the bulk of the continent's experiencedates to the 1968 conference of CatholicBishops in Medellin, Colombia, wherethe church fundamentally reoriented itssocial mission toward improving the lotof the poor. Since that time, millions ofpriests. nuns, and laypeople have fannedout into the back streets and hinterlandsfrom Tierra del Fuego to the RioGrande. dedicating themselves to creat-ing a people's church embodied inneighborhood worship and actiongroups called Christian Base Communi-ties. Brazil alone has 100,000 base com-munities, with at least 3 million mem-bers. and an equal number are spreadacross the rest of the continent. In Cen-tral America. they play an important rolein movements for peace and humanrights.6

In Latin America. past political move-ments also lay the groundwork for cur-rent community self-help efforts. In Co-lombia, the rise and subsequent violentrepression of the National Association ofSmall Farmers in the seventies gavepeasants experiences with organizingthat led to the abundance of communityefforts today, including everything fromcooperative stores LO environmental"green councils." In Nicaragua, the na-tional uprising that overthrew theSomoza dictatorship in 1979 created afount of grassroots energy that flowedinto thousands of local groups.°

Community self-help organizationsare relative newcomers to Africa, thoughtraditional village institutions arestronger than in other regions. Never-theless. in pans of Africa where politicalstruggles have led to dramatic changesin political structures. local initiatives

Mobilizing at the Grassroots (057)

Table 9.1. Grassroots Organizations in Selected Developing Countries, Late Eighties

Country Description

India Strong Gandhian self-help tradition promotes social welfare, appropriatetechnology, and tree planting; local groups number in at least the tens ofthousands; independent development organizations estimated at 12,000.

Indonesia 600 independent development groups work in environmental protectionalone.

Bangladesh 1,200 independent development organizations formed since 1971,particularly active with large landless population.

Philippines 3,000-5,000 Christian Base Communities form focal points for local action.

Sri Lanka

Kenya

Zimbab,,e

Rapidly growing Sarvodaya Shratnadana village awakening movementincludes over 8,000 villages, one third of total in country; 3 millionpeople involved in range of efforts, particularly work parties, education,preventive health care, and cooperative crafts projects.

16,232 women's groups with 637,000 members registered in 1984,quadruple the 1980 number; 1988 estimates range up to 25,000; manystart as savings clubs.

Informal small-farmer groups throughout country have estimatedmembership of 276,500 families (2.3 million people); active women'scommunity gardens multiplying.

Burkina Faso Naam grassroots peasant movement has 2,500 groups participating indry-season self-help; similar movements forming in Senegal, Mauritania,Mali, Niger, and Togo.

Brazil

Mexico

Peru

Enormous growth in community action since democratization in earlyeighties: 100,000 Christian Base Communities with 3 million members;1.300 neighborhood associations in SSo Paulo; landless peasant groupsproliferating; 1,041 independent development organizations.

Massive urban grassroots movement active in squatter settlements of majorcities; at least 250 independent development organizations.

Vital women's self-help movement in Lima's impoverished shantytowns with1.500 community kitchens; 300 independent development organizations.

souace: Worldwatch Institute, based on various sources.

172


have sprung up in abundance. In Kenya,the harambee ("let's pull together")movement began with independence in1963 and, with encouragement from thenational government, by the early eight-ies was contributing nearly one third ofall labor, materials, and finances in-vested in rural development. With Zim-babwe's transfer to black rule in 1980, asimilar explosion in community organiz-ing began, as thousands of women'scommunity gardens and informal smallfarmer associations formed. Senegal andBurkina Faso are well organized at thegrassroots level as a result of traditionsof joint action.°

With Zimbabwe's transfer to blackrule in 1980, thousands of women'scommunity gardens and smallfarmer associations formed.

For lack of space, this chapter concen-trates on Third World self-help move-ments, yet local action seems to be onthe rise everywhere. In the Soviet Union,Eastern Europe, and China, officiallysanctioned local organizations are nu-merous but largely controlled by stateand party hierarchies, and as such can-not be equated with the nonaligned self-help movements of other countries.Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and East-ern Europe have witnessed over thisdecade the emergence, often at consid-erable risk to the founders, of indepen-dent community groups battling nuclearpower reactors and industrial pollu-tion."

In western industrial nations, grass-roots action for sustainability is a formi-dable force, setting its sights on every-thing from local waste recycling tointernational trade and debt issues. TheU.S. environmental movement took adecidedly grassroots turn in the early

173

eighties, as momentum switched fromnational to local campaigns on toxicwaste and groundwater protection. Esti-mates of nationwide participation rangeup to 25 million. In West Germany,meanwhile, the ascent of the GreenParty, whose roots go back to the "citi-zen initiative" movement of the sixtiesand seventies, fostered broad public en-vironmental awareness and pushed na-tional leaders toward institutionalizingconcern for the environment.°

A final noteworthy characteristic ofcommunity movements is the centralrole that women play. As the majority ofparticipants in many regions, they formthe backbones of the movements. InAfrica the sheer enormity of women'sburden unites them: women bear exclu-sive responsibility for child care, cook-ing, cleaning, processing food, carryingwater, and gathering fuel; they grow 80percent of the food, raise half the live-stock, and have 27 million babies a year.Worldwide, women's traditional nurtur-ing role may give them increased con-cern for the generations of their child -enand grandchildren, while their subordi-nate social status gives them more togain from organizing.°

THE GENESIS OF LOCALACTION

Poverty is an economic condition, but itseffects ripple deep into the human psy-che, devastating self-confidence andself-respect. One consequence, accord-ing to sociologists, is that organizingcomes more naturally to the fortunatethan to the dispossessed. Despite activistpriests and Gandhian workers, the poorremain the least organized of the world'speople. The multiple causes of this iner-tia are critical obstacles to progress

Alobiking al the Grassroots

against hunger, poverty, and environ-mental decline.

For those who live on the brink of star-vation, generations of misfortune andinjustice have bred an often overwhelm-ing fatalism, As Zimbabwean organizerSithembiso Nyoni has pointed out.Third World people are not at the dawnof their history. Life experience counselsthem that change is impossible and thatthose who offer to help have ulterior mo-tivesproselytization, political patron-age, or simple greed. Further, livinghand-to-mouth. the poor have little mar-gin for risky experiments and new un-dertakings. Change must go inch byinch."

If fatalism and risk-aversion accountfor some of the world's grassroots iner-tia, social structures account for the rest.The poor of the world are not, as FirstWorld myth has it, an undifferentiated"peasant mass" or a "sea of need." So-cial and economic roles are as intricatelystratified in Bontbay slums as they are inNew York or Berlin. Research on a Ban-gladeshi village of 150 households, forexample, revealed 10 distinct socialclasses. Many communities are furthertorn apart by personality conflicts, fac-tional frictions, and turbulent squab-bles .15

Springing the trap of fatalism and divi-sion usually requires a catalyzing influ-ence from outside the community"some experience," in the words ofdevelopment theorist Albert Hirschman."dispelling isolation and mutual dis-trust."16 Sometimes broad-based politi-cal upheaval has this effect, as in Zim-babwe or Nicaragua, but morefrequently an organizer is involved.

Experience from India suggests thatwith training and support from indepen-dent groups, the most effective organiz-ers are natural leaders from the area it-self. These individuals, who often holdno official position, know communitymembers and their strengths, quirks,

(059)

and failings well. Indian independent or-ganizations find that the most reliableorganizers are middle-aged mothers..they have good rapport with villagers,especially other women, but are likely tostay put while younger people often mi-grate to cities after completing organizertraining.17

Another lesson from India is that so-cial stratification often makes all-inclu-sive community organizations counter-productive. Lumping male farmers withlandless women almost guarantees thatthe men will reap the bulk of rewards.Many government community develop-ment programs have treated all villagersas essentially equal in interests and sta-tus, allowing the more powerful to co-opt projects for their own benefit.18

The two basic paths out of fatalismand divisiveness are, in essence, forms ofeducation. but education need not meanschooling. The first path is typified byBrazilian educator Paulo Freire's learn-ing process, now practiced by indepen-dent groups worldwide. It uses informalteachers who guide illiterate adultsthrough discussions of basic conceptsfrom everyday lifesuch as food,school, and landlordto foster a criticalawareness of the predicament of pov-erty. Similar techniques include streettheater, revitalization of traditionaldance and music, and oral history. Bypromoting a sense of identity and self-worth, these methods of "popular edu-cation" all aim to break what Freiretermed the "culture of silence" thattraps large classes in powerlessness andvulnerability.19

In 1975, the Catholic diocese of Ma-chakos, Kenya, initiated a Freirian liter-acy program that, by 1984, invokedsome 60,000 participants. Program co-ordinator Francis Mulwa reports. "Liter-acy-class discussions became the spring-board to other development," gener-ating ventures in handicrafts. tree plant-ing, primary health care, cooperative

1 74

(i6o) State of the World 1989

farming. soil conservation, savings andcredit, and water supply. Albert Hirsch-man calls this pervasive springboard ef-fect "social energy": once a group getsstarted, projects proliferate and momen-tum builds.20

Because actions speak louder thanwords, many organizers prefer the sec-ond path out of fatalism: they organizeto produce something tangible early on.be it a school building, a well, or a paintjob for the church. Again, momentumbuilds once people see what joint actioncan achieve. A variation is the method ofsuch appropriate technology groups asIndia's Centre of Science for Villagesand the Philippine Palawan Center forAppropriate Rural Technology. Deven-dra Kumar of Science for Villages de-scribes the philosophy well: "Technol-ogy can be a tool of rural change,because by introducing one simple de-vice, such as a pulley with ball bearingsfor hauling water out of a well, rural peo-ple begin to see possibilities that theydid not see before." People rarely seekrelief from hardships they consider inev-itable.21

Many organize to produce some-thing tangible early on, be it aschool building or a paint job forthe church.

In Sri Lanka, Sarvodaya Shramadanacombines the two paths in massive workparties and communal feasts. where vil-lages come together to speak, listen, andlearn. The philosophy is all in the name.Shramadana means "gift of labor." andSarvodaya means "village awakening."By giving their labor, people awaken thetalents within their village and set it ona course of self - development."

Even in he best of circumstances,popular action is difficult; the odds

175

weigh heavily against the poor. In aver-age conditions, failure to achieve goals isa normal pan of the process. Workingtogether, however, has its own rewards.Indeed, the intangible benefits of grass-roots action are as important as the la-trines dug and trees planted, for as .,

Chilean dissident Ariel Dorfman so elo-quently put it, "How do you measure theamount of dignity that people accumu-late? How do you quantify the disap-pearance of apathy?"23

MEETING HUMAN NEEDS

In September 1988, World Bank presi-deal Barber Conable flew to Berlin toreport to the governors of the Bank andthe International Monetary Fund. Pov-erty. he announced, "prevents a billionpeople from having even minimally ac-ceptable standards of living." The ranksof the dispossessed, moreover, appear tobe growing.24

Thus, the world's self -help move-ments are arising amidst increasing des-peration; the poor take action as bestthey can on many fronts and all too oftenthey lose. Although the cultural, eco-nomic, and political factors that deter-mine the effectiveness of community ac-tion are too complex to be condensedinto a universal "recipe for success," ex-periences from around the world revealthe strengths and weaknesses of grass-roots groups.

The most essential lesson is that com-munity groups organize to respond, onthe one hand, to a felt need or threatand, on the other hand. to perceived op-portunities. There is, in other words,both a "push" and a "pull" to commu-nity action, and neither is sufficient initself. Depending on local needs and theawareness of opportunities to meetthose needs, communities focus on a va-

Mobilizing at the Grassroots (z61)

riety of areas, most commonly securingrights to their land, providing education,improving health, generating income,and protecting their resource base."

In the mushrooming shantytowns ofthe southern hemisphere, neighborhoodmovements have grown dramatically;San Paulo alone has 1,300 organizations.A typical sequence of development forsuch a squatter community begins wheninnviduals or an organized group in-vadet a vacant areathe push is the ob-vious need for shelter and the pull is see-ing empty land. Once settled, thecommunity's top priority is to protect it-self from expulsion, a difficult and dan-gerous job. In Manila's Tondo slum, oneof Asia's largest, residents formed mas-sive "human barricades" in the ' -ate six-ties to halt government bulldozers benton demolishing homes. The land tenurestruggle can also be protracted: the40,000 inhabitants of Klong Toey inBangkok, for example, prevailed onlyafter a three-decade campaign.26

Natural disasters and similar crises canthrow open the floodgates to old griev-ances between popular groups and pow-erful institutions. The Mexican govern-ment seized on the opportunity of the1985 Mexico City earthquake to relocatethousands of squatters from the primereal estate they occupied, but the city'sneighborhood organizations unleashedwhat writer Octavio Paz called "a socialtide" to halt the relocations and demandreconstruction assistance. Later, withthe symbolic leadership of wrestling starSuperbarrio, hero of society's under-dogs, the unprecedented movementpressured government to extend hous-ing programs.27

As often as not the poor are evicted,but where they are able to establish landtenure, they generally move on to otherpriorities. They pressure authorities tosupply services including water, wastedisposal, and schools, or they provide

them for themselves. In Rio de Janeiro,tenure is largely secure and half of Rio's

favelas, where at least 2 mill:-In live, areat some stage of organizatirs-.i, accordingto lawyer-organizer Eliana Athaydc. Oneof the most successful is Santa Maria,where 11,500 live in precarious struc-tures clinging to a steep slope aboveRio's city council offices. The local orga-nization, which started with an informalday care program, evolved into a vocaland effective neighborhood association.As of June 1988, the accumulated socialenergy had brought water, paved stair-ways (in lieu of roads), and health clinicsinto ihefavela, along with drainage sys-tems against mud slides, which hadwiped out two dozen homes in February1988. The people of Santa Marta builtsome of it themselves; the rest theypressed the city to construct."

Perhaps the world's greatest successstory in self-help community building isLima's Villa El Salvador, where citizenshave planted a half-million trees; built26 schools, 150 day care centers, and300 community kitchens; and trainedhundreds of door-to-door health work-ers. Despite the extreme poverty of thetown's inhabitants and a population thathas shot up to 300,000, illiteracy hasfallen to 3 percentone of the lowestrates in Latin Americaand infant mor-tality is 40 percent below the nationalaverage. The major contributors to suc-cess have been a vast network ofwomen's groups and the neighborhoodassociation's democratic administrativestructure, which extends down to repre-sentatives on each block. Together, theymatch a high degree of base-level orga-nization with a responsive system of gov-ernance to yield maximum participationin designing and implementing commu-nity efforts.29

In Recife, the metropolis of Brazil'spoor northeast region, 2.5 million peo-ple live in shantytowns where barely half

176

(162) Stale of the ll'orld 1989

the population can read. The state gov-ernment, under leadership first from theright and then from the left, has beenunwilling or unable to respond to thecrisis in education, leaving the publicschool system with a 70-percent dropoutrate in the elementary grades alone.Sixty of Recife's favelas have completedthe mammoth organizational task ofopenii ig their own elementary schools,with teachers and lesson plans drawnfrom local life. By 1988, the popular ed-ucation movement was spreading likewildfire across Brazil. Rio de Janeiro,Belem. and Salvador each had over adozen community schools, and thefave-las of Ski Luis had already opened 40.90

In Peru, international debt and theeconomic crisis it drives can bemeasured in the height of the chil-dren.

At least 1.5 billion people worldwidestill lack clean water, although hundredsof communities are bucking the odds ofgovernment complacence and interna-tional neglect to confront this need. InDhandhuka, on the barren coastal planeof India's Gujarat state, a generation ofexcessive fuelwood gathering and over-grazing led to desertification, which inturn triggered social and economicdisintegration. Conflicts erupted overwater that seeped into brackish wells,and in the worst years, four fifths of thepopulation had to migrate to survive.3 1

As in much of the world, fetchingwater in Dhandhuka is women's work,and it was the women who decided,upon talking with community organizersin 1981, to construct a permanent reser-voir to trap the seasonal rains, In thiscase, an idea from migrant laborers pro-vided the pull that complemented thepush of water scarcity. They had seen

177

irrigation channels lined with plasticsheets and reasoned that a reservoircould be similarly sealed. After lengthydiscussion and debate, the communityagreed to the plan, and in 1986, all buta few stayed home during the dry seasonto get the job done. Moving thousandsof tons of earth by hand, they finishedthe pool before the rains and were soonthe envy of their neighbors, whopromptly made plans to build theirown.s2

Food scarcity may be similarly tackledby community groups. In Peru, interna-tional debt and the economic crisis itdrives can be measured in the height ofthe children: malnutrition now stuntsthe growth of one in four. The mothersof the shantytowns that encircle Limahave found an innovative way to combathunger. In more than 1,500 communitykitchens, they buy in bulk to cut costsand rotate cooking duties to save time.The kitchens improve nutrition for allwhile building solidarity among women,long subdued in the machismo of Latinculture.ss

As these examples show, communitygroups are good at attacking sources ofdisease with an identifiable cause, suchas contaminated water or malnutrition.On their own, however, they are un-aware of, and therefore cannot promote,other low-cost preventive techniquesthat public health experts believe couldsave millions of lives in the Third Worldeach year, such as oral rehydration fordiarrhea, extended breast-feeding, andmother and child immunization. Thepush of illness is there, but there is nopull of perceived opportunities. Mostcampaigns that promote these measures,therefore, are initi?ied by independenthealth groups or governments.34

Nevertheless, such large-scale pro-grams usually make use of communityhealth workers, who need the support oflocal groups to be effective. Millions of


community health workers have beentrained since 1980; China alone had 1million "barefoot doctors" and 4 millionhealth aides in 1981. In Bangladesh,where 250,000 children die each yearfrom diarrhea, the nongovernmentalBangladesh Rural Advancement Com-mittee has gone door-to-doer to teach 9million mothers the use of diarrhea rehy-dration fluids made from sugar, water,and salt.35

Most grassroots groups around theworld also neglect family planning,again because they lack knowledge of theopportunities. Spreading the wordabout the benefits of contraception,therefore, generally falls to a class ofspecialized government bodies and in-dependent family planning agencies.Where family planning has effectivelyturned the tide on excessive populationgrowth, however, it has done so throughcollaboration between local and centralinstitutions. Thousands of mothers'clubs in Indonesia and South Korea arethe foot soldiers of those countries'highly effective family planning cam-paigns. In Thailand, the Population andCommunity Development Associationhas trained representatives in 16,000 ofthe country's estimated 48,000 vil-lages.38

Community groups' indirect contribu-tion to family planning, moreover, issubstantial. Data from around the worldshow that as female education, health,employment, and le ;al rights improve,birth rates decline. Large families arefrequently a sign of the subordination ofwomen. Thus, although communitygroups have had a small role in distribut-ing contraceptives and family planninginformation, they play what is in manyways a more fundamental role: liberat-ing women.3'

Through the weekly meetings ofmothers' clubs, church groups, healthcommittees, and cooperatives, womenemerge from the isolation of home and

field to try their voices. Graduallydemystifying age-old taboos against dis-cussing sexuality and mistreatment atthe hands of men, women gain perspec-tive on the hardships of their lives. Thegrowing women's movements of Kenyaand Nigeriawhere birth rates have re-mained high since the sixtiesmay pres-age falling fertility in the nineties. Sincethe eighties began, rural Brazil has alsoseen explosive growth in women'sgroups, many of them anxious to betterinform themselves of their legal, eco-nomic, and reproductive rights.98

In the area of economic development,grassroots efforts fail perhaps morecommonly than those in the social devel-opment areas of health and education.The basic unit of community economicdevelopment is often the cooperative, anassociation of worker-owners who forma business together and manage itjointly. Unfortunately, the majority ofworker cooperatives survive only a kwyears; their members are generally inex-perienced in managing capital andequipment, and they often face volatilemarkets, skyrocketing inflation, andpolicies unsupportive of small produc-ers.39

Success is more common in groupsthat join forces to accomplish well-de-fined, mutually beneficial tasks, withoutcollectivizing production. A striking ex-ample of this comes from the extremenorth of Pakistan, where 800,000 peas-ants five in one of the earth's most rug-ged terrains. In 1982, the nongovern-mental Aga Khan Rural SupportProgram began resuscitating the tradi-tion of local self-help through a partner-ship arrangement.48

At thousands of mass meetings, AgaKhan organizers offered support and as-sistance if the village would form an or-ganization, begin a sating scheme, andselect priority projects. By the end of1987, 764 of the 1,280 villages had bat-tled their way through day-long meet-

179


ings to qualify. Villagers have clearednew farmland, bored irrigation linesthrough mountains, and suspendedpipes across gaping chasms. They havesaved 34 million Rupees ($1.9 million),enough to start a regional village bank.and have sharpened their skills in every-thing from poultry production to ac-counting. Meanwhile, dozens ofwomen's groups have sprung up parallelto the male-dominated village organiza-tions. Community organizing for eco-nomic progress works in Pakistan, solong as no attempt is made to collectivizeproduction.41

Simi lat. wisdom has arisen around theworld. In Taiwan and South Korea,small farmers' associations that facilitatethe flow of information and improvedseed have been the foundation of agri-cultural productivity for over a genera-tion. In Zimbabwe, corn production onblack farmers' land increased from 5percent of the national harvest in 1980to 45 percent in 1985, thanks in parr tothe services provided by small farmers'groups, which grew dramatically duringthat period. Case studies from Sri Lanka,India, and the Philippines demonstratethe critical role of peasant associations inmanaging irrigation systems.42

Since most of the Third World's urbanpoor are involved in what developmentspecialists call the "informal sector"buying, trading, and selling the litter ofgoods that flow through the world's cit-iesthat is where most urban grassrootseconomic development efforts are con-centrated. Judith Tendler performed anin-depth review of indepene.ent organi-zations' economic development initia-tives, and found that those groups bestable to provide large numbers of peoplewith substantial economic gains werenot the common "integrated" small pro-jects that include credit, managementtraining, equipment. and advice. Rather,the successful groups tended to behighly specialized ones that began by de-

-179

veloping a profound understanding ofexisting conditions in a particular sectorof the economy. Although grassroots-oriented, they were centralized enoughto bring their force to bear on specificlegal and institutional obstacles that hin-der progress for the poor:"

Many of them work primarily withwomen. The 22.000-strong Self-Em-ployed Women's Association (SEWA)based in Ahntadabad. India, was formedin 1971 as a trade union to battle forcontinued access to sidewalk space forstreet vendors and to stop police harass-ment. After each success. they have con-sciously worked to widen their impact,now extending to trash collectors, ciga-rette rollers. and farm laborers. SEWAprovides a heartening contrast to mostgrassroots economic projects forwomen, which establish crafts. sewing,and weaving cooperatives, activitieswhere markets are usually flooded andprofit margins slim.14

Community organizing for eco-nomic progress works, so long asno attempt is made to collectivizeproduction,

Many of the most effective grass: ,otseconomic programs revolve aroundcredit. The Grameen Bank of Ban-gladesh, for example, has attractedworldwide attention for its distributionof over 400,000 tiny loans, averaging$60 apiece. The funds go largely towomen for investment in micro-enter-prises that involve the purchase of agoat, for example, or a rice-huller, or-ools for wood cutting. On first enteringa village, Grameen's "bicycle bankers"simply tell landless peasants about thebank's credit offer. Those interestedmust find four others and form a "soli-


darity group" to apply. The neediest twoare given loans first, and if they maketheir weekly payments on time, the oth-ers get theirs: peer pressure takes theplace of loan collatera1.45

Grameen is not in the busines: ofcommunity organizing, but it has hadthat effect nonetheless: dozens of loangroups have begun community schools,gardens, and sanitary latrines. With overIN new branches added each year, Gra-meen's track record is truly extraordi-nary and has inspired a bevy of imitatorson other continents. As Grameen presi-dent Muhammad I'unus points out,however, short-term credit is no sttbsti-tute for necessary reforms in nationaltax, investment, and tenure policies. Itwould be unfortunate if effective creditprograms such as Grameen's becameviewed as a panaceathe latest fad tosweep development institutions.°

In particular, for those who are ex-cluded from access to productive re-sources, self-help of necessity takes ona more confrontational style. TheBhoomi Sena land movetnent of adivasis(tribal people) in Maharashtra, India,for instance, has struggled for 15 yearsto regain the tribal land base that wasappropriated by moneylenders and tim-ber barons early this century. In thePhilippines and El Salvador, maldistri-bution of farmland fuels grassroots ac-tion in its most violent form civil war.And in Brazil, gross inequality in tenurehamstrings agricultural production.Brazil's 10 million landless and mar-ginal peasants began mass occupationsof unused private estates in the earlyeighties and have, in turn, sufferedfierce reprisals from landowners. Am-nesty International rei.orts th;:t 1,000Brazilian peasants have been killedsince 1980. mostly by hired guns:" Alltoo often, grassroots initiatives run intothe brick wall of oppressive politicaland economic power.

PROTECTING THE EARTH

In November 1987, 2,000 low-caste la-borers and farmers from Karnataka.India, performed one of the most pecu-liar acts of civil disobedience in that na-tion's long Gandhian history: theyuprooted 100 trees planted as part of amassive govertunent reforestation cam-paign. That villagers should destroytrees in such a fuelwood-starved landappears little less than self-destructive;in fact, it was perfectly reasonable. Thetrees, eucalyptus to be used in produc-tion of rayon, were planted by a privatecompany on what had been commonland where the poor gathered wood.The poor were defending what wastheirs.°

As officials itt northern and southerncapitals alike grow increasingly awarethat a sound resource base is crucial forreal social and economic progress. astream of self-described "sustainable de-velopment" projects has t zgun to flowfrom the pens of development planners.Notwithstanding their good intentions,this round of ventures could fail as badlyas earlier ones if they disregard the les-son of Karnataka. The fitndatnertialquestions of sustainable developmentarc, by whom and for whom? Sustainabledeveloptnent imposed from on high israrely sustainable; it may not even bedevelopment.

Environmental quality is not a luxury.Those who live beyond the borders ofthe world's industrial economy subsiston nature's surpluson organic soil fer-tility for food, on stable hydrological cy-cles for water, and on forests for fuel.Environntental degradation, conse-quently, has a direct, tangible meaning:hunger, thirst, and fuel scarcity. No linecan be drawn between economic devel-opment and environmental protection.

Many communities have traditionalresource management systems that ef-fectively husband natural systems, but

iso

(1661 Slale of the World 1989

when authority over ranges, forests. orfisheries is vested in distant institutions,the tragedy of the commons all too oftensets in. Nepal nationalized its forests in1957, ostensibly "to protect. manage.and improve" them. The result, how-ever, was disastrous, as villagers' time-honored management systems brokedown and the welter of unchecked indi-vidual interests overwhelmed govern-ment forest institutions. Twenty yearslater, the Nepalese government reverseditself, slowly handing over woodlands tointervillage councils. The reform has notdecentralized control far enough. yetlocal mechanisms of restraint seem to berecuperating, with dramatic forest resto-ration in several cases.49

Traditional resource managementmechanisms can also be overrun byforces internal to the community. suchas population growth, or external to it.such as commercial interests. Communi-ties are most apt to protect their envi-ronment against the latter, which pro-vide a visible adversary against which tomobilize. For example, traditional fish-ers of northeastern Brazil, the Philip-pines, and the Indian states of Goa andKerala have built vocal movements forsafeguarding ocean fisheries againstcommercial trollers and industrial pol-luter0°

In tne world's disappearing tropicalforests. community action is also ac-celerating. Every tropical forest, fromthe Congo to Kalimantan, has humanresidents who live from its natural sur-plus. The traditional inhabitants of theworld's largest rain forest, in the Ama-zon Basin, include cozens of tribes ofIndians and perhaps a half-million rub-ber tappers, a guild of workers who tracetheir roots and the'.r residence in the for-ests to the cyclica'. rubber booms of thelate nineteenth and early twentieth cen-turies. They earn their keep by tappingthe rubber trees spread liberally through

181

the forests. Since the sixties. a series ofpowerful economic and political forceshave thrown waves of landless peasantsand wealthy land speculators into thejungles, where they have driven the rub-ber tappers outsometimes at gunpoint,51

In the remote Brazilian state of Acreon the Bolivian border, by contrast, 30,-000 nibber tappers took a stand in thelate seventies, using improvised nonvio-lent methods. Where clear-cutting hadbegun, men, women, and childrenpeacefully occupied the forest, puttingtheir bodies in the path of destruction.More recently they have taken their pro-tests into the courthouse, the legislativechamber, and the governor's mansion.They have helped reshape World Bankand Inter-American Development Banklending policy by showing that, over thelong run, natural rubber production ismore profitable per hectare than cattleranching or fanning,52

Bolstered by an unprecedented alli-ance with indigenous tribes and the scat-tered beginnings of a nationwide rubbertappers movement. Acre's union haspushed hard for an end to the destruc-tion of their land baseand to violenceagainst their members, (In _June 1988, alandlord's hired assassins killed IvairHigino de Almeida. a local peasant run-ning for county council with rubber tap-per support.) With help from interna-tional environmental groups, the unionhas called on the Brazilian governmentto set off large "extractive reserves"where rubber tappers can carry on theirway of life in perpetuity. It has also giventhe tappers the strength to open a dozencommunity schools, a health program.and a marketing cooperative.53

Across the Pacific, Borneo's densewoodlands have become a foundation ofMalays;a's foreign-exchange strategy,providing the country with most of the$1.6 billion worth of tropical hardwoods


it exported in 1986. The forest is hometo the Dayak tribes, however, who wantit cut only on a sustainable basis andhave battled state-supported timbercompanies by constructing roadblocksand appealing to European consumersto boycott Malaysian hardwoods. Todate. unfortunately, they have had lesssuccess than the rubber tappers, due togreater government intransigence, Theofficial attitude is summed up by stateminister of the environment DatukJames Wong, himself a timber tycoon:"There is too much sympathy for theDayaks. Their swidden lifestyle must bestamped out."54

The world's most famous communitymovement for forest protection. Chipko,was born in the Garhal hills of UttarPradesh, India. One movement story hasnow virtually ascended into mythology.In March 1973, as a timber companyprepared to fell trees above impover-ished Gopeshwar village, local men,women. and children rushed to thewoods and hugged the trees. daring theloggers to let the axes fall on theirbacks.55

Less well known is that Chipko isnow far more than a rearguard action.The movement has deepened its eco-logical understanding and, in the wordsof movement-follower Vandana Shiva,"widened from embracing trees to em-bracing mountains and waters." In1987. for example, activists erected aseven-month blockade at a limestonequarry that was destroying the DoonValley ecosystem. Expanding geograph-ically to all points of the compass.Chipko has gone beyond resource pro-tection to ecological managerr cent, res-toration, and what members call "eco-development," The women who firstguarded trees from loggers now planttrees, build soil retainer walls, and pre-pare village forest plans.56

Groups organize most readily to de-

fend their resource base against the in-cursion of others, but they may also or-ganize to reverse deterioration driven byforces internal to the community. AsKenya's forests shrink, for instance,thousands of women's groups, youthclubs, and harambee societies havemounted local tree planting drives. TheNational Council of Women of Kenyainaugurated its Greenbelt Movement in1977, calling on omen's groups acrossthe country to turn open spaces, schoolgrounds, and road sides into forests.Over a million trees in 1,000 greenbeltsare now straining skyward, 20,000 mini-greenbelts have taken root, and upwardsof 670 community tree nurseries are inplace. Meanwhile, Kenya's largestwomen's development network, Maen-deleo Va Wanawake, with its 10,000member groups. initiated a campaign in1985 to construct ood-saving im-proved cookstoves.57

Chipko has gone beyond resourceprotection to restoration and "eco-development."

Kenya takes soil conservation as seri-ously as tree planting. and again womenare the mainstay of the crusade. WriterPaul Harrison relates a tale representa-tive of the achievements of Kenyanwomen's groups. Kimakimu hill, winchtowers over the town of Machakos, wasso badly eroded from forest clearing andplowing that gaping chasms had openedon its face. "In 1981, the Kaluodiwomen's group began an ambitious se-ries of conservation works on the hill-side. By 1985 all but a handful of farmswere terraced, and the whole hillside wasnotched with zigzagging cut-olidrains tochannel rainwater away from thefields,"56

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(1'68) State of the World 1989

The Nam* movement of Burkina Faso,which now spills over under differentnames into Mauritania, Senegal, Mali,Niger, and Togo, is remarkable in anumber of ways. Reviving pre-colonialself-help traditions, the movement un-leashes vast stores of peasant knowl-edge, creativity, and energy to loosenthe grip of poverty and ecological deteri-oration in the drought-prone Sahel. (SeeChapter 2.) Each year during the dry sea-son. thousands of villages undertakeprojects that they choose and designwith minimal assistance from outsiders.Along with five neighboring communi-ties, for example, Somiaga built a largedam and a series of check dams to trapdrinking and irrigation water and to slowsoil erosion. Villagers piled caged rocksby hand to form a dam 180 meters longand 4 meters high. Meanwhile, hundredsof Naar** farmers have adopted a simpletechnique of soil and water conservationdeveloped by Oxfam-UK, in whichstones are piled in low rows along thecontour to hold back the runoff from tor-rential rains. While halting soil loss,these diveetes increase crop yields dra-matically."

As deterioration of the resource basepushes environmental issues to the foreof many communities' concerns, thefoundations of a new international envi-ronmental movement are in place. Localand national groups are extending tenta-tive feelers out around the world, form-ing effective communication channelsaround issues of common interest. Justin the last year, international environ-mental networks have been formed inAfrica and L7tin America, adding to thatalready exis;ing in Asia. Environmental-ism in Brazil has taken off in the eighties,and Sri Lanka has an environmental con-gress with 100 member groups. New re-gional, continental, and global alliancesform each year, adding strands to thethickening web."

In

REFORMING DEVELOPMENT

Despite the heartening rise of grassrootsaction, humanity is losing the struggle tohalt ecological decline. For every peas-ant league that staunches the hemor-rhage of topsoil from a watershed, doz-ens more fail. Hundreds of conimuctitiesremain mired in fatalism for each onethat rallies to the common cause.

Deep reforms in broader institutionsare the key to unleashing a wider grass-roots mobilization, because no populareffort exists in an institutional vacuum.An intricate matrix of human structuresshapes the local space where grassrootsgroups work. a matrix that includeschurches, political parties, and socialclubs, as well as international develop-ment agencies and governments.Whether intentionally or not. these insti-tutions create many of the opportunitiesand incentives for organized action; theyalso create many of the obstacles. In al-most every case cited in the chapter thusfar, larger institutions played au impor-tant role at different points in the pro -cess.6t

Local groups eventually collide withforces they cannot control. Peasant asso-ciations cannot enact supportive agricul-tural policies or build roads to distantmarkets. Women's groups cannot de-velop and test modern contraceptivetechnologies or rewrite bank lendingrules. Forest people cannot give them-selves a seat at the table in national for-est planning. Thus, perhaps the greatestirony of community action for sustaina-bility is that communities cannot do italone. Small may be beautiful, but it canalso be insignificant."

The prospects for grassroots self-helpare further limited in a world economy inwhich vested interests are deeply en-trenched and power is concentrated in afew nations. Federal budget deficits inWashington drive up interest ratesworldwide, and protectionism in Europe

...


and Japan reduces markets for manyThird World exports. The combinationof international debt payments and in-dustrial-country trade barriers costs de-veloping nations about three times whatthey receive in development assistanceeach year. Thus reforms at the interna-tional level are as important as those atthe village level.63

The paradox of the relationship be-tween community movements and inter-national development institutions is thatboth subscribe to the same goals andboth need what the other has, yet onlyrarely have they worked effectively to-gether. Many community organizationshave deep misgivings about what theyperceive as heavy-handed intervention-ism on the part of multilateral and bilat-eral bodies such as the World Bank andU.S. Agency for International Develop-ment (AID). Development agencies, fortheir part, generally view community or-ganizations as unstable amateurs, juniorpartners in the serious business ofdevel-opment.

A simple distinct;on untangles the is-sues that hog-tie foreign assistancethedistinction between aid and develop-ment. Much that passes as aid does notfoster development, while much devel-opment has nothing to do with aid. Realdevelopment is the process whe-eby in-dividuals and societies build the ,apacityto meet their own needs and improve thequality of their own lives. Physically, itmeans finding solutions to the basicnecessities of nutritious food, cleanwater, adequate clothing and shelter,and access to basic health care. Socially,it means developing the institutions thatcan promote the public good and re-strain individual excess. Individually, itmeans self-respect, for without personaldignity economic progress is a charade.

On a rhetorical level, international de-velopment institutions began singingthe praises of community developmentand popular participation in the fifties,

but practice has been another matter.For most governments and developmentagencies, **grassroots participation"means getting peasants and stunt dwell-ers to build their own roads andschoolsthings they would never dreamof demanding of the rich. The criticalelement. control over the goals and pro-cess of development. has never gone tothe communities themselves. SonicEuropean agencies and many charitabledonors go further toward putting partic-ipation into practice, but still. develop-ment assistance that is truly responsiveto the initiatives of the poor is rare.64

Small may be beautiful, but it canalso be insignificant.

This cautionary note notwithstanding,many development assistance institu-tions do seem to be in the midst of aperiod of re-evaluation. A track recordover decades that can at best be termeddisappointing has prompted them tolook for more people-centered ap-proaches. A growing fraction of bilateralassistance is already channeled throughnorthern charities such as CARE. seenby development agencies as a cost-ef-fective alternative to weak or corruptgovernment minis tries.65

Indeed, grassroots developmentseems to have proved its effectiveness tosuch an extent that large aid donorswant to jump on the bandwagon. Theproblem is, they want to jump on with alltheir weightwithout first undergoingthe necessary restructuring and reorien-tation. Within assistance agencies, ad-ministrators are rewarded for the num-ber of dollars they move across theirdesks rather than their sensitive supportof the local process of change. It is nosurprise that they choose large, capital-intensive endeavors. Most developmentprojects are, in this sense, "funding-

1R4


red"; development, by contrast, is people-led.66

Those closest to the process of grass-roots development rightfully warn thatindiscriminately pumping money intocommunity organizations and indepen-dent groups would be as bad as not sup-porting them at all. Overfunding cansubvert local control, distort communitypriorities, promote capital-intensivetechnologies over effective local ones,and fuel jealousy between organizationsthat should be allies.67

Most development projects are"funding-led"; development, bycontrast, is people-led.

The central lesson of Naam, Sar-vodaya, harambee, and Chipko is thatwhile money is necessary, it is far fromthe most important ingredient. Whatcounts is organization, and tine local mo-mentum, initiative, and cont-ol it gener-ates; although the organizing processcannot be forced from the outside, it canbe nurtured and catalyzed. Fundingshould match and grow with a group'scapacity to employ those funds effec-tively.

Another problem created by money-centered development programs is aparalyzing burden of paperwork. An in-stitutionalized fear of misappropriationand graft creates what one AID em-ployee terms an "ambience of pre-emp-tive cowardice." Required to account forevery cent distributed and tabulate everybenefit delivered, aid agencies demandreams of accounts and reports, prior ap-proval for all decisions, and elaborateplanning that extends to minutiae. ABritish researcher reports that the quar-terly accounts a German agency re-quired of a tiny Bengali independentgroup "weighed over two kilograms and

1S5

included . .. a line item and supportingvouchers for the food supplied to thedog that guards the stores."68

If bureaucracy is the organizationalculture of aid agencies, the culture ofcommunity groups and the independentgroups that support them could becalled "visionary ad hoc-racy." Operat-ing in the context of marginalized vil-lages and slums, they confront constantchange, unstable priorities, and short-lived opportunities. Working relationsare founded not on contractual obliga-tions but on mutual trust. The logicalbut unfortunate result of combining bu-reaucracy with community groups is aclash of organizational cultures thatleaves both sides resentful and discon-tent. The creative energy and commit-ment of community workers is wastedfiling reports and stifled by arbitraryplanning periods. Aid administrators'technical training, meanwhile, is frus-trated by attempting to manage such anunpredictable process.

The "project"nearly universal inthe fidd of aidis another source ofproblems. For development agencies, aproject is a discrete, defined entity: anelaborately planned and budgeted un-dertaking in a limited time frame with along list of prescribed procedural supsand stages. For community groups, bycontrast, development is a process thatat various points may involve particularefforts such as digging wells or plantingtrees, but that has neither a beginningnor an end, nor a final evaluation or pro-ject document.69

With leadership from the independentsector, the outlines of a new assistancecompact between grassroots groups andnorthern donors are beginning to takeshape. Third World independent andgrassroots groups will shoulder moreand more of the responsibility for directwork, as their northern partners gradu-ally retreat to a funding and supportrole. Simultaneously, northern groups


will work harder to educate the public ofindustrial nations about the reality oflifein the Third World and to pressure in-dustrial-country governments to pursuepolicies that further the prospects of thepoor majority, not only in assistance butmore significantly in international debt,finance, trade, and military policy. Theirmost important role will be as a voice forthe world's poor in the nations of theworld's wealthy.70

As this transition evolves, action isalso called for to overcome "project-kis," Specifically, funding should beprocess-oriented, given to an organiza-tion on the basis of its past record and anagreement on goals and principles of op-eration. Initial funding would be smallsometimes less than $10,000andwould increase steadily as the localgroup developed a capacity to use largersums. The relationship would involvemore than funding, however, moving to-ward a long-term goal of equal partner-ship through information sharing, train-ing, and building of an internationalnetwork."

The U.S.-funded Inter-AmericanFoundation, which grants sums gener-ally under $100,1100 to grassrootsgroups and independent developmentorganizations through a highly qualifiedfield staff, is protected by institutionalautonomy from foreign policy priorities.In 1980, Congress created a parallelbody called the African DevelopmentFoundation, which is now getting off theground after surviving several attemptsat political sabotage from the Reagan ad-ministration. Oxfam-UK and its name-sakes in Belgium, Canada, and theUnited States have been committed topromoting local initiatives for perhapslonger than any other major charitabledonor. Ashoka, an American founda-tion, has seen the importance of processfunding. It provides no-strings-attachedgrants to rising community organizers

('7')and creative advocates in the world'smost populous developing nations."

If aid is to support development, insti-tutions need nothing less than to beturned on their heads: they must learn totake their lead from the village watercommittees, health workers, and treeplanting brigades. For particular institu-tions this will mean different things. Bi-lateral agencies should be isolated fromthe yearly shifts of foreign policy, as arcthe Inter-American Foundation and theSwedish International Development Au-thority. In addition to drastically cuttingpaperwork, they can progressively de-centralize operations so that their staff ison the ground with the developmentprocess itself.7s

Multilateral development hanks,which increasingly lend to governmentsnot for projects but to implement certainpolicies, such as "structural adjustment"austerity measures, could use that sameleverage on governments to create aninstitutional environment supportive ofgrassroots actiona critical conditionfor local success. They can also opentheir planning process and policy dia-logue to grassroots participation. De-signing major development programsand policies without consulting localpeople is like prescribing medicine with-out asking what Iturts.74

Northern charities can accelerate theirprogress along the spectrum from givingout groceries to supporting the efforts ofthe poor to help themselves. Equally im-portant, they can educate policymakersand the public in industrial nationsabout the true conditions and prioritiesof the poor. Charities can also pioneerinternational forms of participation indevelopment assistance policy, by put-ting grassroots representatives on theirboards of directors, and by refining flex-ible funding relations.

Deep down, working with the grass-roots is a philosophical attitude, an alle-giance. "Grassroots development is a

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(172) Stale of the II'odd 1989

way of traveling, more than a goal."writes Pierre Prades !and. a French col-laborator with Naam. "It means beingready to travel in a manunie wagon withpeoplewith all the delays, punctures.breakdowns, and sweat that impliesrather than driving along in one's air-conditioned Range Rover with two sparewheels. cool Coke in the icebox, and afixed timetabie."75

FROM THE BOTTOM AND THETOP

Reforming the world's development as-sistance agencies, official and unofficial.will be a monumental task. But the largerchallenge in reversing global deteriora-tion will be to forge an alliance betweenlocal groups and national governments.Only governntents have the resourcesand authority to create the conditionsfor full-scale grassroots mobilizationand nothing less will now suffice if sus -tainability is to be achieved. As grass-roots development theorist SheldonAvails writes: "It may well be that wild-flowers grow by themselves. But grass-roots organizations do not. They are cul-tivated, in large measure, by just policiesand competent government agenciesthat do their job."76

In the rare cases where a national-local alliance has been forged. extraordi-nary gains have followed. South Koreaand China have used village-level orga-nizations to plant enormous expanses oftrees, implement national populationpolicies, and boost agricultural produc-tion. Zimbabwe has trained over 500community-selected family planners toimprove maternal and child health andcontrol population growth.. In the yearafter the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution, amassive literacy campaign sent 90.000

1R7

volunteers into the countryside; in oneyear, they raised literacy from 50 to 87percent. In 1984, Burkina Faso initnu-nized three quarters of its childrenagainst measles. meningitis, and yellowfever in the space of three months.Kenya is waging war on soil erosion. asthousands of wonten's groups terracemountainsides with crude shovels andhoes.77

During World War II, millions of So-viet. American. Asian, and Europeancivilians recycled materials, conservedenergy, and planted victory gardens toboost food production. Today, thethreat to global security from ecologicaldegradation merits a similar mobiliza-tion. (See Chapter 8.) Although un-precedented in scope. the actions neces-sary are far from mysterious; in fact,millions have been engaged in them foryears. What is required is an enormousnumber of simple acts: organizing localgroups, teaching literacy and preventivehealth care, spreading family planning,and planting trees.

Many things can be accomplished. ofcourse, short of a wholesale govern-ment-grassroots mobilization. No stateis monolithic: even in Marcos's Philip-pines. the National Irrigation Adminis-tration transformed itself into a people-centered institution, cooperating withpeasant associations. Such changes arealready promoted by grassroots groupsand could be supported by multilateralinstitutions like the International Mone-tary Fund, which currently uses its lever-age to impose austerity plans on ThirdWorld governments.78

In many cases, the mobilization re-quired is not one of performing a certaintask but of enacting a policy. Grassrootsenergy spent collecting bottles for recy-cling, for example. might be better spentcampaigning for citywide recycling col-lection. Because western industrialcountries have such disproportionatepower in the international economic sys-


tern, their citizens have a special respon-sibility in applying pressure on lawmak-ers to establish farsighted policie° on in-ternational debt and trade. They canalso use the power of their pocketbooksto support socially conscious and envi-ronmentally sustainable enterprises.

Full-scale grass roots-governmentpart-nership can only come about when a mo-tivated and organized populace joinsforces with high-caliber leadership, aprospect that is unlikely in many coun-tries without political change. Unre-presentative elites rule many nations andall too often they crush popular move-ments rather than yield their preroga-tives; elsewhere, powerful interestsvehemently defend the status quo. In theend, self-help will clash with theseforces. Like all development, self-helpmerges into politics: it is the struggle tocontrol the future. Particularly wheregovernments are nondemocratic, thatstruggle holds the potential to erupt inconflict, confrontation, and violence.

In the final analysis, the most lastingcontribution of community groups maynot be the direct benefits they providetheir members but the fundamentalchanges they bring to the world's politi-cal landscape. Self-help organizationsformed in Philippine slums in the seven-ties, for example, played an importantrole in the "people's power" revolutionthat toppled the Marcos dictatorship in1986.78

The time has comeindeed it may beslipping awayfor grassroots mobiliza-tion worldwide to put our civilization on

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a sustainable base. Until governmentsand international institutions join thestruggle, it cannot succeed, but in themeantime hope lies with individual citi-zens. Our most gifted, young and old.have a critical role to play in the commu-nities where they live. To be seeds ofchange, these men and women will needa dear personal vision and deep deter-mination mixed with patience. humility,pragmatism, and insight.

They will join a grassroots campaignalready being waged in the villages andshantytowns of the Third World: In thewar-ravaged south of Zimbabwe, villag-ers gather at dusk to plan the wells andditches they will dig to combat drought.In a Brazilian favela called People ofGod, two young doctors work with ateam of neighborhood women to teachpreventive health care. In a remoteBolivian jungle, a band of Indians de-mands an end to clear-cutting by timberexporters in favor of sustainable forestryby local people.88

Whether these heartening beginningsbecome a global ground swell dependsonly on how many more individualscommit their creativity and energy to thechallenge. One truth becomes clearerwith each passing year: we humans arethe only force in the world powerfulenough to end global poverty and envi-ronmental degradation. 1 i.e inescap-able lesson for each of us is best distilledin the words of Angeles Serrano, agrandmother and community activist inManila's Leveriza slum"Act, act, act.You can't just watch."81

1 8

10

Outlining a GlobalAction Plan

Lester R. Brown, Christopher Flavin,

and Sandra Postel

Many societies have been severely testedover the several thousand years sincecivilization began. Some successfullymet the challenges confronting themand thrived; others did not. But theworld as a whole has never been so chal-lenged as it is today. The questions hu-manity now faces are profound ones:Can we protect this and future genera-tions from harmful doses of ultravioletradiation? Can we avoid the biologicalimpoverishment of the earth projectedfor the next two decades? Can we headoff runaway climate change? Can webring population and food supplies intobalance so that famine does not persis-tently stalk the land?

An affirmative answer to these ques-tions depends on restoring and preserv-ing the conditions that make the earthhabitable, a place capable of supportinga diversity of life and modern civiliza-

169

Lion. Human activities have pushed theplanet's natural support systems danger-ously out of kilter. Continuing on a busi-ness-as-usual path thus virtually assuressevere economic disruption, social insta-bility, and human suffering.

In these last few years of the twentiethcentury, difficult questions are emergingof social equity, national sovereignty,and individual rights and responsibili-ties. A person may be able to afford alarge, energy-consumptive automobile,but can the planet afford it? Indeed, howmany carbon-emitting automobiles canthe atmosphere tolerate without theplanet's habitability being threatened?Similarly. a couple may desire and beable to support several children, but canthe planet afford several children perfamily?

Issues of equity also span the genera-tions. Does our generation have the

Outlining a Global Action Plan

right to extinguish plant and animal spe-des that have evolved over millions ofyears? Do we not have an obligation topreserve our biological heritage for fu-ture generations?

Like it or not, we find ourselves in aworld where we are responsible for eachother's well-being. Inefficient use of fos-sil fuels in the Soviet Union and theUnited States contributes to globalwarming and thus to the eventual inun-dation of rich cropland in the Nile Riverdelta of Egypt. Uncontrolled air pollu-tion by any country in central Europethreatens forests throughout the region.The use of chlorofluorocarbons any-where puts the ozone layer at risk every-where.

In the end, it is we as individualswho are being tested.

Never have national governments andinternational institutions faced prob-lems more difficult than those nowbefore them. Our agenda for actionfocuses on four areas: developing en-ergy strategies that have climate protec-tion as their cornerstone; expanding theearth's forest cover so as to meet basiceconomic and environmental needs inthe Third World and to slow globalwarming; redoubling efforts to meetfood needs in light of an ominous trendof declining per capita grain production;and braking the tremendous momentumof population growth that already is un-dermining living standards in large partsof the world.

Obviously, a comprehensive global ac-tion plan would include many other is-suesinfant mortality, inequitablewealth distribution, and industrial pollu-tion, to name a few. But failure to meetthe challenges outlined in this chapterwill make dealing with other pressingproblems virtually impossible. While re-

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during Third World debt and demilita-rizing the global economy are not ad-dressed in this agenda, they areprerequisites for successful implementa-tion of the specific measures we are sug-gesting.

The capacity of national leaders and ofinternational institutions will be severelytested in the effort to put the world on afirm ecological and economic footing.Vet in the end, it is we as individuals whoare being tested. Our values collectivelyshape social prioritieswhat policies areformulated, how resources are used, andwhen change begins to occur.

A CLIMATE-SENSITIVEENERGY STRATEGY

There can l'e little doubt that energyproduction is now changing he earth'sclimateand with it many of the naturalsystems on which humanity depends.(See Chapter 1.) Food production, watersupplies, forest products industries, andfisheries will all be at risk if global warm-ing continues to accelerate during thenext several decades. The huge quanti-ties of oil, coal, and natural gas thatfueled the modern age may well lead toits decline.

There arc no quick fixes to this prob-lem. Avoiding destructive climatechange will require a fundamental reor-dering of national energy prioritieswithin the next decade. Carbon dioxide(CO2) accounts for about half of Ilic glo-bal warming now occurring. Producingless CO2 requires using less fossil fuels,which means that other energy sourcesmust be found to run the global econ-omy.

What would a serious effort at slowingclimate change look like? There are es-sentially three ways to displace fossil

190

(176) Slate of lhe World 1989

fuels: improving energy efficiency,thereby accomplishing the same tasksusing less oil and coal; developing re-newable sources of energy; and expand-ing the use of nuclear power. Our con-chision is that the simultaneous pursuitof renewables and efficiencyand theabandonment of die nuclear power "op-tion"is the only safe and cost-effectiveway to slow global warming. Meanwhile.natural gas has an important role to playas a transition fuel since it produces lesscarbon per unit of energy than do theother fossil fixls.

The problem with nuclear power isthat over the past 40 ye yes it has ab-sorbed the preponderance of govern-ment energy investments and divertedattention from other attractive options.Nuclear power does provide about 15percent of the world's electricity. andcould in theory be used to replace coal-fired power plants and reduce carbonemissions. But this is not a practical re-sponse. Since its troubled start. nuclearpower has been a problem-ridden tech-nology; unlike renewable energy. itsproblems are growing. It has become in-creasingly expensive and accident-pronein the past decade. And the critical prob-lem of disposing of radioactive wasteshas yet to be solved.'

To replace all coal-fired power plantswith nuclear ones by 2025 would requirebuilding a minimum of one plant everytwo and a half days for 38 years. Theworld would have 18 times as many nu-clear plants as it does today at a mini-mum cost of $144 hillion annually, andcarbon emissions would still be higherthan they are now. Nuclear power couldof course be pursued as one of a long listof options, but for this it is poorly suited.Even on a limited scale. this energysource requires vast financial resourcesand technical skills, curtailing the devel-opment of other options. As construc-tion, operating, and decommissioningcosts have grown, nuclear power has

become a prohibitively expensive way ofproviding electricity or displacing car-bon emissions. Throughout most ofNorth America. Western Europe. andeven the Soviet Union, people are reject-ing the expansion of nuclear power. Un-less the technology is completely re-vamped and there is a sea change inpublic attitudes. both of which are stillremote, that scale of expansion is impos-sible.2

Improved energy efficiency can have amuch larger and more immediate impacton carbon emissions and global warm-ing. For example, the efficiency of U.S.buildings, industry, atid transportationimproved 26 percent between 1973 and1987; this kept carbon emissions at 1.2billion tons per year instead of reaching1.6 billion tons annually. An additionaloutput of 300 pillion tons of carbonemissions was 'ded by efficiency im-provements in other countries. Similargains in efficiency are possible in the fu-ture using already available technolo-gies.3

No other approach offers as cost-effective an opportunity for lim-iting carbon emissions as energyefficiency does.

Shifting to more fuel-efficient trans-portation can sharply reduce carbonemissions. The world's nearly 400 mil-lion cars currently spew 547 million tonsof carbon into the at mosphere each year.10 percent of the total from fossil fuels.Projections based on recent trendswould have these emissions nearly dou-bling by 2010. However, if a combina-tion of improved mass transit, greateruse of bicycles for short trips, and a car-bon tax kept the world fleet to 500 mil-lion cars by the year 2010, and if thesevehicles averaged 50 miles to the gallon

Outlining a Global Anion Plan (1771

rather than the current 20. autoniobilecarbon emissions would fall to 274 mil-lion tons, half of what they are today.(Prototype cars have already been devel-oped that get over 70 miles per gallon,)4

Carbon emissions can also be loweredby improving the efficiency ofelectricity-using devices. Currently, 64 percent ofthe world's electricity is produced usingfossil fuels (chiefly coal). accounting for27 percent of global carbon emissionsfrom fossil fuels (1.5 billion tons annu-ally). Electricity is used in many differentways, all of which can become far moreefficient. Based on current technologies,for example. electric motors can bemade at least 40 percent more efficientthan they art today. and refrigerators 75percent.9

More-efficient lighting systems have aparticularly large potential. Worldwide,lighting accounts for about 17 percent ofelectricity use or 250 million tons of an-nual carbon emissions. These emissionscontinue to grow rapidly as electric light-ing is used more widely in developingcountries. If the world were to doublethe elf- iency of these systems by theyear 2010, it could cut a projected 450million tons of carbon emissions fromlighting in half, to 225 million tons. Forcommon household use, compact fluo-rescent bulbs using 18 watts of electric-ity can already provide the same illumi-nation as incandescent bulbs that use 75watts. Improved bulbs and ballasts cancut the electricity use of commercialbuildings' lighting by 75 percent usingexisting technology.6

Cogeneration (the combined produc-tion of heat and power) also has enor-mous potential to improve the efficiencywith which electricity is generated. Thistechnology, already extensively used insome count:-:es, allows the inevitablewaste heat from electricity generation tobe used directly by buildings or industryor for further electricity generation in acombined cycle system.?

Switching from a conventional 1,000 -megawatt coal-fired power station to acombined cycle system allows a 30-per-cent improvement in efficiency and acommensurate cut in carbon emissionsof 568,000 tons per year. However,switching to a natural-gas-fired, steam-injected turbine permits a 70-percent cutin carbon emissions. For the world as awhole, improving the average efficiencyof today's 1 million megawatts of coal-fired capacity by 30 percent could cutcarbon emissions by 312 million tons.s

About 5.5 billion tons of carbon wereemitted through fossil fuel use in 1988;this will go as high as 10 billion tons in2010 if it grows at just 3 percent annu-ally. Overall, energy efficiency improve-ments worldwide between 1990 and2010 could make a 3-billion-ton differ-ence in the annual amount beingreleased to the atmosphere. A study byIrving Mintzer of the World ResourcesInstitute suggests that a continuing re-duction in emissions of this magnitudecould make a difference of 0.5-1.5 de-grees Celsius in the global average tem-perature by 2075. There is simply noother approach that offers as cost-effec-tive an opportunity for limiting carbonemissions as energy efficiency does.9

Renewable sources of energy do nothave nearly as large a potential to dis-place fossil fuels in the years immedi-ately ahead as energy efficiency improve-ments do. However, that potential willgrow as the technologies are improved.The outlines of a successful strategy al-ready exist. Solar, hydro, wind, and geo-thermal power have been pursued withnotable successes by governments andprivate companies since the mid-seven-ties. Across a broad spectrum of tech-nologies, costs have fallen steadily andperformance has improved. If renewablesources are to supply a large share of theworld's energy by mid-century, thenthey must be vig, zously developedtoday.19

1f 2

(178) State of the World

Hydropower supplies about 21 per-cent of the electricity produced world-wide, displacing 539 million tons of car-bon that ivotild otherwise be entittedeach year. Solar collectors are a majorsource of hot water in Israel, wind powerhas taken hold in California. and geo-thermal energy is a major electricitysource in the Philippines.11

Solar photovoltaic cells, the cost ofwhich has fall ?n 90 percent in the pastdecade, are already being widely used onremote communications systems andportable electronic devices. Photovolta-ics are already an economical electricitysource for Third World villages, and ascosts fall further in the next decade theywill become economical for large powergrids everywhere. The world now hasapproximately 2.000 megawatts of windpower in place. which produces about 2billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, dis-placing 540.000 tons of carbon annually.If wind power and photovoltaic electric-ity development were accelerated,reaching 150,000 megawatts in the year20 W. they could displace 71 million tonsof carbon emissions a year."

If policymakers do not grasp the linkbetween energy efficiency, renewableenergy, and global warming, climate sta-bilization will not be possible. Althoughgovernments have supported these tech-nologies for over a decade, their com-mitment has been inconstant. This isparticularly true in the United States,where research and development bud-gets for renewables and efficiency soaredin the late seventies and then were eachcut by four fifths between 1981 and1988. The U.S. Department of Trans-portation's recent decision to lower fueleconomy standards for automobiles andlight trucks will exacerbate global warm-ing, as will the choice of Chinese officialsto emphasize extensive coal miningrather than efficiency."

A serious and lasting government

IR

1989

commitment to the development anduse of energy-efficient and renewabletechnologies is a prerequisite to stabiliz-ing world climate. So too are individualdecisions about the kind of refrigeratorto buy, the amount of hotne insulation toinstall, and how much to drive a car.

For policymaka-s, the essential chal-lenge today is to improve energy effi-ciency in a period of low energy prices.The costs of climate change and otherenvironmental effects of fossil fuels canbe reflected in prices that consumers payby raising taxes on gasoline and othercarbon-based fuels. The United States,for example, could raise $100 billion an-nually by hiking its gasoline taxes by $1per gallon to the European average taxof about $1.50 per gallon. In addition,governments could levy a "carbon tax"on fossil fuels, with the tax correspond-ing to :he amount of carbon in each fuel.This would hit coal appropriately hard,since it produces more carbon per unitof energy used than do either oil or natu-ral gas. Energy prices would rise and ef-ficiency would improve. Renewable en-ergy sources would become morecompetitive. 14

Ideally, such taxes should be agreedon globally so that the additional costswould not affect the international com-petitiveness of national economies. Therevenues could be used in part to offsetother taxes and in part to develop per-manent and stable funding for energyefficiency and renewable energy pro-grams. If industrial-country govern-ments devoted 10 percent of the reve-nues of such a tax to energy efficiency,renewable energy development, andreforestation in the Third World, itwould encourage a broad-based assaulton the problem of climate change.

Large-scale investments in energy-efficient buildings can also help stabilizeclimate. Governments can providebuilding owners with technical assist-ance and utility companies can invest in

Outlining a Global Aaiun Plan (179)

improved building efficiency rather thannew plants. These investments can beessentially self-financing via a revolvingfund since they pay for themselves inlowered fuel bills.15

Efficiency standards for automobiles,appliances, and other energy-using de-vices are another proven way to reducefossil fuel use. U.S. appliance efficiencystandards already enacted will cumula-tively displace over 300 million tons ofcarbon emissions by the year 2000. Thebroad international market for technolo-gies and the common interest in climatestabilization argue for international ef-ficiency standards for automobiles,trucks, lighting systems, appliances, andelectric motors. For example, reaching aminimum new-car fuel efficiency of 50miles per gallon by the year 2000 and 60miles per gallon by 2010 would be animportant step toward restoring climatestability .16

To slow global warming significantly,hundreds of billions of dollars of invest-ments in improved energy efficiency willultimately be required. Although itmight seem that in a debt-swampedworld such levels are impossible, manyenergy efficiency options are inherentlycost-effective. Companies and individu-als save money via reduced fuel bills. Ul-timately, the more energy-efficienteconomies tend to be more competitivein world markets. Government's role isto set the framework that allows thesekinds of cost-effective investments toproliferate.

In other areas, government has a moredirect role to play. It would, for example,make sense for the international com-munity to dev:se a program to usephotovoltaics rather than coal to elec-trify all Third World villages by 2010.The United Nations and the World Bankcould thereby spur sustainable develop-ment and help slow global warming.

The challenge of raising sufficientfunds to invest in efficiency in the Third

1Vorld is particularly severe. Carbonemissions there are growing at annualrates as high as 5 percent, driven byrapid population growth and expandingeconomies. China, for example, hasplans to more than double its use of coalby sometime after the turn of the cen-tury, an "achievement" that could wellpush it past the United States and theSoviet Union as the world's number onecarbon emitter. Already deeply in debt,most developing countries P .. chroni-cally short of capital. One answer is toredirect a portion of the enormous flowof international lending currently de-voted to building power plants and elec-tric lines. The World Bank has justbegun to consider major loans for im-proved efficiency.17

Global warming has already opened anew chapter in the debates over energypolicy in many national capitals. Old bat-tle lines, first established when high oilprices commanded attention, have inmany cases been redrawn. Many politi-cians still seem to be hoping for techni-cal fixes that will allow them to avoidmaking hard choices. This resistance willhave to be overcome if effective energypolicy is to be forged out of the globalwarming threat.

Global warming has opened a newchapter in the debates over energypolicy in many national capitals.

Unfortunately, the challenge of mak-ing global warming a central concern ofnational energy planners is far frombeing realized. Energy policymaking isoften driven by self-interested industriesand unions, and some, such as the oiland coal lobbies, push for policies thataccelerate global warming. Key legisla-tive committees are dominated by prov-inces or states that produce fossil fuels;

1°4

Y

4

(18o) State of 1hr World 1989

many of the laws and tax breaks thatemerge are intended to propel theirgrowth. In Eastern Europe, ossified en-ergy ministries continue to emphasizemeeting their five-year plans, regardlessof the ecological costs.

The tendency is simply to add globalwarming to a long list of considerationsthat go into making energy policy. Thisis not enough. If energy policymakingcontinues to be the domain of short-term thinking and narrow political con-siderations, there can be little hope. Ifthe climate is to be stabilized, it mustbecome the cornerstone of national en-ergy policies.

Encouragingly, three global warmingbills were introduced in the U.S. Con-gress in 1988, and two included "least -cost" energy plans designed to ensurethat the most cost-effective means to dis-place carbon emissions (chiefly energyefficiency) are pursued first. Govern-ment programs to improve the efficiencyof automobiles, to step up research onefficient technologies, and to acceleratethe development of renewable energytechnologies are good first steps.38

To redirect world energy trends in theabsence of direct market pressures is anunprecedented challenge. Politicianswill have to rise above the parochial in-terests that often motivate them, andcompanies and individuals will have tofocus on the real bottom line. whichshows that improved efficiency is bothcost-effective and can slow global warm-ing. Action will be facilitated if govern-ments adopt short- and long-term car-bon reduction goals along the lines ofthe 20-percent reduction by 2005 sug-gested at the 1988 Toronto climate con-ference. Perhaps more productive wouldb.t energy efficiency targets either by sec-tor or for the economy as a whole, In anycase, there is a clear need both for earlynational initiatives and eventual interna-tional agreements to reduce carbonemissions from fossil fuels.ig

195

A NEW FUTURE FORFORESTS

The grim state of much of the world'sforests and the consequences of their de-struction came to light in numerous, un-settling ways in 1988. Hills stripped oftrees in the Himalayan waterThed contri-buted to the worst flooding on record inBangladesh. New satellite data showedthat 8 million hectares of Brazilian rainforest were burned in 1987 alone, whichmeans that the widely cited figure of 11.3million hectares for annual forest clear-ing in all of the tropics is probably atleast 50 percent too low. In industrialcountries, forests continued to deterio-rate under the stresses of air pollutionand acid rain.20

Evidence that global warming hasbegun underscores the importance offorests worldwide. The earth's vegeta-tion and soils store roughly triple theamount of carbon held in the atmo-sphere. When cleared or burned, forestsrelease much of their carbon, adding tocarbon dioxide buildup and hasteningglobal warming. Though estimatesare uncertain, deforestation probablyreleased a fifth to half as much carbon in1988 as the burning of fossil fuels did.21

Only vigorous efforts to protect theremaining forests and to plant billionsmore trees each year can reverse theseworrisome trends. Yet many tropicalcountriesplagued by debt, weakeconomies, and burgeoning popula-tionssee few alternatives to clearingforests as ways to earn quick foreign ex-change, to spur regional development,or to open up new areas for settlement.They continue to promote wasteful anddestructive logging and the clearing ofprimary forest for cropping and grazing.even though such activities are noteconomically or ecologically sustainable.Much forest has been cleared in Brazil,for example, because of government

Outlining a Global :Salon Plan (ISI)

subsidies that encourage cattle ranching,even though depletion of the pasture-land's fertility causes the ventures to beabandoned in a matter of years.22

Developing alternatives is thus crucialto a broad-based strategy of expandingglobal forest cover. One approach is theexchange of some debt relief for moreconservation-oriented resource policies.Tropical countries would benefiteconomically from the easing of theirdebt burdens as well as from the moresustainable use of their resources. Com-mercial banks and industrial-countrygovernments, which are beginning to re-alize that some debt will never be repaid,have little to lose from the cancellationof "bad debt" from their books. Thus,the time could be ripe for such a linkage.Among the ternis of these debt-reliefpackages would be the elimination ofpolicies that promote destructive log-ging and the clearing of forests For un-sustainable uses.23

Another important step is for develop-ment institutions. especially the WorldBank, to exercise their leverage in pro-moting sounder strategies. The Bankneeds not only to stop funding projectsthat promote senseless forest destruc-tion. but to more actively support sus-tainable agriculture and forestry effortsthat can relieve pressures on primaryforests. The current pace of deforesta-tion warrants more drastic action thanhas ye( been consideredincluding.perhaps, making certain developmentaid contingent on the elimination ofpolicies and programs leading to forestdestruction. Pressure from aid institu-tions seems to have played a role, forexample, in Brazilian President Jose Sar-ney's October 1988 decision to tempo-r-.,ily suspend government incentivesthat have promoted forest clearing.24

Stepped-up support for the interna-tional Tropical Timber Organization(1TIO) could also help slow deforesta-tion. The agreement setting up the

I1i'O, ratified in 1985, calls for nationalpolicies that "encourage sustainable uti-lization and conservation of tropical for-ests and their genetic resources." Atgroup's meeting in Rio de Janeiro inJune 1988, funding was approved for amajor projec«o study the feasibility ofsustainable forest management in theBrazilian state of Acre. By demonstrat-ing economic alternatives to wastefullogging and forest conversion practices,such projects can help pave the way forforest protection.25

Reforesting 130 million hectareswould cut the release of carbonfrom all human activities by 8 to 11percent.

A major global reforestation effort isthe other key component of a strategy topreserve and expand the world's forestcover. In 1988 we estimated that treesneed to be planted on the equivalent of130 million hectaresan area slightlylarger than Ethiopiain order to meetgrowing demands for fueiwood and in-dustrial wood products ann to stabilizesoil and water resources in the ThirdWorld. Accomplishing this goal over thenext 15 years would require plantingsome 15 billion trees annually.26

Besides helping meet basic economicand environmental needs, such an un-precedented reforestation effort is criti-cal to a global strategy of slowing thepace of climate change. As trees grow.they remove carbon dioxide from the at-mosphere through photosynthesis,thereby slowing the CO2 buildup. Suc-cessfully reforesting 130 million hect-ares would reduce net carbon emissionsfrom tropical forests by some 660 mil-lion tons annually until the trees reachmaturity (after subtracting 10 millionhectares of trees that would be burned

196


quickly for fuel). cutting the current re-lease of carbon from all human activitiesby 8 to i 1 percent:27

Although forest cover in much of theindustrial world is fairly stable. the ur-gency of climate change warrantsgreater efforts to capture more carbonby increasing forest productivity andplanting more trees there as (veil. Curb-ing acid rain and air pollutants is crucialto safeguarding forest health and assur-ing that trees can obtain their maximumcarbon-fixing potential. Beyond that,governments can design tree-plantinginitiatives to turn their national land-scapesurban and ruralinto greatersinks for atmospheric carbon.

If industrial countries collectivelyplanted trees on an additional 40 millionhectaresan area roughly the size ofjapan. or two-and-a-half times the areaslated to be planted in grass or trees be-tween 1986 and 1990 under the U.S.Conservation Reserve Programthey

mild remove some 200 million tons ofcarbon from the atmosphere arnuafkwhile the trees were growing. Thatwould offset the carbon released annu-ally by 211 average-sized coal-burningpower plants.28

Once the newly planted standsmatured, carbon released by the decom-position or dead trees over time wouldbalance carbon fixed by replacementgrowth. At this point, mature trees couldbe harvested on a sustainable yield basisto replace coal in electrical generation.Using half that harvest to generate elec-tricity, for example. could reduce coal-horning by some 100 million tons annu-ally. In contrast to energy producedfrom fossil fuels, a wood-energy systemmanaged in this way helps fix carbon inthe short term and makes a continuouscontribution to stabilizing the earth's cli-mate.

COIICeliVely, a global strategy of halv-ing tropical deforestation and of plant-ing the equivalent of 130 million hec-

197

tares of trees in developing countriesand 40 million hectares in industrialones mould reduce worldwide carbonemissit,ns from all human activities byabout .t fourth of current levels. (SeeTable 10-1.) This would slow the paceof warming for several decades. buyingprecious time to adapt and respond toclimate change in other ways. And thisexpansion of forest cover is vital forother reasons in any caseincludingpreserving biological diversity. meetingfitelwood needs, and rehabilitating de-graded environments. (Sec Chapter

In Kenya, the Greenbelt Movementhas mobilized farmers and school-children in planting more than 2million trees.

Successlitlly reforesting such largeareas will require sustained and securesources of finding. One possibility is forgovernments to levy a reforestation taxon some forest- or energy-related activ-ity they desire to discourage. Some trop-ical countries, for example, might taxtimber harvested for export by privatecontractors, generating funds for refor-estation while simultaneously discourag-ing damaging "timber booms- of thesort that have ravaged forests in Coted'Ivoire, Ghana. the Philippines, andelsewhere.

Industrial-country governments mightlevy the tax on gasoline consumption,fossil-fuel generated electricity, or someother carbon-emitting activity and, assuggested earlier in this chapter, usepart of the revenues to support refor-estation either domestically or abroad.In the United States. such an initiativecould be linked with the ConservationReserve Program, under which highlyerodible land is being removed from

Outlining a Global rtion Plan r831

Table 10-1, Projected Net Reductions in Carbon Emissions from Expanded ForestProtection and Reforestation Efforts

Target

Net CarbonEmission

Reductions

Share of Total CarbonEmissions from Fossil Fuels

and Deforestation]

(million tons) (percent)

Halving tropical deforestation rates 8302 12

Planting equivalent of 130 million hectares oftrees in Third World

6603 9

Planting equivalent of 40 million hectares oftrees in industrial countries

2004 3

Total 1.690 24

'Total estimated at 7.1 billion tons per year. 5.5 billion from fossil fuels and 1.6 billion from deforesta-tion. ?Midpoint of estimated range. 'Assumes average annual carbon-fixing rate of 5.5 tons per hectare.and that 10 million hectares would lield no carbon-fixing benefits because trees would be burned quicklyfor fuel. 4Assuntes average annual carbon-fixing rate of 5 tons per hectare.SOttRCES: Worldwatch Institute. based on R.A. Houghton et al., "The Flux of Carbon from TerrestrialEcosystems to the Atmosphere in 1980 Due to Changes in Land Use: Geographic Diu ribution of the GlobalFlux," Tent's. February /April 1987: Sandra Postel and I.ori Heise, Reforesting the Earth. Worldwatch Paper83 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch lnstintb... April 1988): Sandra Brown et al.. "Biomass of Tropical TreePlantations and its implications for the Global Carbon Budget." Canadian Journal of Forest Research. Vol.16, No. 2. 1986.

crop production under 10-year contractsand planted in trees or grass, DanielDudek of the Environmental DefenseFund has suggested such a linkage foroffsetting future carbon emissions fromplanned fossil fuel power plants. He esti-mates that a decade's worth of new emis-sions could be balanced by planting onequarter of the Conservation Reserve intrees. The utilities budding the powerplants would foot the bill, possibly withsonic assistance from the governmentthrough the reserve program.30

Orchestrating large-scale reforesta-tion worldwide presents major chal-lenges. It will require the support andenergy of national leaders, developmentagencie.,, corporations, nongovernmen-tal organizations, community groups.andmost importantlyindividual citi-zens.

Examples of the diverse kinds of ac-tions needed already exist. In Kenya, the

Greenbelt Movement, sponsored by theNational Council of Women. has mobil-ized more than 15,000 Farmers and a

schoolchildren in plantingmore than 2 million trees. Virginia-based Applied Energy Services, an inde-pendent U.S. power company, is volun-tarily helping fund a reforestationproject in Guatemala with the explicitintent of offsetting the carbon emissionsresulting from a new cogenerationrower plant to be built in Connecticut.And the American Forestry Associationhas proposed an urban reforestationprogram with a target of planting some100 million trees in cities and suburbsaround the country by 1992.31

Finally, a strategy aimed at expandingthe earth's forest cover and stabilizingclimate needs as a foundation much bet-ter data on the status of forests than nowexist. While worldwide carbon emissionsfrom fossil fuels can be plotted with a

193

(184) Slate of the ll'orld 1989

good degree of confidence each year,those from deforestation cannot. Hugeuncertainties remain about how fasttropical forests are being cleared, howmuch regrowth is taking place on landsformerly cleared, and how much bio-mass (and therefore carbon) is containedin forested areas. Increased and sus-rained funding to resolve these issues iscrucial. A promising step forward is theundertaking of a new forest assessmentusing retnote sensing technologies byscientists from the National Aeronauticsand Space Adminstration's Goddard In-stitute for Space Studies, the WoodsHole Research Center in Massachusetts.the U.N. Environment Programme'sGlobal Environmental Monitoring Sys-tem, and the U.N. Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO). The first stage, ex-pected to have begun in late 1988, willpinpoint deforestation "hot spots"areas of rapid forest clearing, such asthose documented in parts of the Brazil-ian Amazonwhich will help focus for-est protection elforts.32

National governments, with the helpof international development organiza-tims, also need to engage in morelong-term forest planning. Tropical for-ests rarely are managed as the mul-tipurpose, renewable resources theyare, even though such management isthe key to maximizing their benefits tosociety over the long term. With thelate 1985 launch of the Tropical For-estry Action Plan, jointly sponsored byFAO, the U.N. Development Pro-gramme, the World Resources Insti-tute, and the World Bank, a frameworkwas estahlished for improved planningand management. and for stepped-upforest protection and tree planting ef-forts. The action plan's ultimate impact,however, will depend on individualgovernments making the hard choicesto restructure forest policies and investin reforestation.

IRS.

MEETING FUTURE FOODNEEDS

In many ways, the nineties will be un-like any decade that the world's farmershave ever faced. There will be little op-portunity for expanding cultivated area;irrigated area, while growing slowlyworldwide, is declining in sotne keycountries. For the world's more ad-vanced farmers. there are few new tech-nologies to draw upon. In many coun-tries, returns on the use of additionalfertilizerwhich has been the drivingforce behind the worldwide expansionof food on _put over the past fourdecadesare diminishing. And, finally,the prospect of global warming nowhangs over the future of agriculture.33

On the demand side. the annual incre-ment in world population is projected toclimh to record highs in the years imme-diately ahead. The 86 million added in1988 are expected to joined by at least90 million annually during the earlynineties. And most oldie added millionswill lire in countries where nutrition isalready inadequate and, in many cases,deteriorating.34

Meeting future food needs is a farmore complex undertaking today than itwas 20 years ago. During the sixties, out-lining a strategy for expanding food out-put was relatively simple in most coun-tries. The key was assuring farmers aprice for their harvest that would makeinvestments in fertilizer, irrigation, andimproved varieties profitable. In manydeveloping countries this required re-versing food price policies that had tra-ditionally catered to urban interests,substituting food price supports for foodprice ceilings. When governments adop-ted these price support policies and en-sured that yield-raising inputs wereavailable, farmers could often double ortriple the productivity of their land.

Restoring the rapid growth in world

Outlining a elobal :talon Plan ( 185 1

food output that existed from 1950 to1984 will not be easy. In some countriesand regions, massive gains in output arestill possible. In others, the potential forlarge jumps in the near future is limited.Achieving a satisfactory balance betweenfood and people is becoming more dif-ficult and may not be possible withoutraising the efficiency of feedgrain useand dramatically lowering birth rates incountries where population is still grow-ing rapidly.

Among the areas where massive in-creases in output are unlikely, becauseyields are already high and response tothe use of additional fertilizer is low. areJapan, China, Western Europe. andNorth America. Some regions, such asthe semiarid West African Sahel, have notechnologies available that will sharplyboost output."

India, Argentina, Brazil, and the :,;o-viet Union, on the other hand. all have alarge potential to raise yields. In India,where grain yield per hectare is less thanhalf that in China, a combination of in-centive prices, investment in irrigation,and the use of more fertilizer shouldgreatly boost output in the years ahead.At present, India's farmers use less thanhalf as much fertilizer per hectare as dotheir Chinese and U.S. counterparts.36

Policy adjustments could also spuroutput in Argentina, which still taxesfood exports. thus discouraging farmersby reducing the prices they receive tolevels well below those of the world mar-ket.37

Brazil, too, has a large unrealized po-tential, one that may reside as much inland reform as in expanding the cul-tivated area. In few countries is landown-ership as concentrated as in Brazil,where 70 percent of rural householdsare essentially landless. World Bankstudies in several countries demonstratethat farmers with small holdings pro-duce more per hectare than those withlarge holdings. In part this is because

small farmers, using family labor, canboost output by continuing to use morelabor per hectare even though the valueof the resultant additional output is lessthan the prevailing wage, Large land-owners who rely on hired labor cannotafrrird to do this."

In the Soviet Union. reforms thatstrengthen the link between effort andreward for those working the land couldsubstantially increase the productivity ofagriculture. A plan to lease land to indi-vidual farmers for up to 50 years, an-nounced in Moscow in August 1988,could measurably lift farm output, per-haps reducing the aced to importgrain.39

For some countries, many of which arein Africa, local rainfall is too low andirrigation water too scarce to permit theextensive use of fertilizer. Fortunately,alternatives exist for many of these coun-tries. which may never develop a fossil-fuel-based agriculture. While these willnot lead to the dramatic gains in yield ofthe Green Revolution technologies, theycan boost production markedly amongsubsistence farmers. where the need isgreatest. In many tropical and subtropi-cal regions. agroforestry (the incorpora-tion of trees and field crops into a singlefarming system) is proving to be highlyproductive. (See Cltapter 2.) The treescan provide food. forage, fuel, organicmatter in the form of leaf drop, and, ifthey are nitrogen-fixing, nitrogen for thecrops grown in the immediate vicinity.40

One type of agroforestry involves atechnique known as alley cropping. inwhich strips of fast-growing leguminoustrees are alternated with rows of foodcrops, making it possible to stastainablycultivate sonte soils that otherwise wouldquickly deteriorate once plowed. Theleguminous trees provide nitrogen and,through their leaf drop, organic materialto nourish the soil; the alternate stripsalso control soil erosion.41

%There labor is abundant relative to

200

(186) Mate of the ll'orld 1989

land, labor-intensive agricultural tech-niques such as multiple cropping (grow-ing more than one crop per year) andintercropping (simultaneously plantingmore than one crop on a piece of land)can make a big difference, So can thecomposting of organic wastes, includingstraw, livestock manure, and leaves. Indensely populated parts of Africa andAsia, the stall feeding of livestock, alsolabor-intensive, both helps control landdegradation from random grazing andconcentrates livestock manure, makingcomposting easier.42

As population pressures build, landcan be larmed more intensively usingsuch techniques as biointensive garden-ing. This has figured prominently in el-forts to expand production of vegetablesto supplement cereals and tubers on thePhilippine island of Negros. The tech-nique, involving hand-tillage of theseedbed to one foot or more in depth.relies on local materials to improve andmaintain soil fertility. Among the localinputs used in these highly productiveplots are compost manure, wood ash,bonemeal. leucaena leaves (from a flea-growing nitrogen-fixing tree). andcrushed eggshells. Like the high-yield-ing ricer that originated in the Philip-pines, this technology has a potentiallybroad application in other countries.'"

With cropland becoming scarce,future food security depends onsafeguarding it from conversion tononfarm uses and from erosion.

One oldie keys to raising output on asustainable basis is protecting the re-source base. With cropland becomingscarce, future food security depends onsafeguarding it both from conversion tononfarm uses ancl from the erosion thatreduces its inherent productivity. Nearly

201

a decade ago, U.S. Assistant Secretary ofAgriculture Rupert Cutler observed that''asphalt is the land's last crop." Onceproductive cropland is lost to suburbandevelopment, shopping malls, or roads,it is difficult to restore it to food produc-tion.44

A few countries, such as Japan, havecarefully crafted programs designed toprotect cropland. In 1968, Japan adop-ted a comprehensive zoning plan thatput all land in one of three categoriesindustrial, :agricultural, or otherandmade it illegal to build on cropland.Paced with acute land pressures, Japanconfronted the issue early and in doingso established an approach to croplandpreservation that is simple. effective, andeasily adapted to conditions in othercountries.45

National success stories in the effort toconserve topsoil, are few. Among themajor food-producing countries, theUnited States is the only one systemati-cally reducing excessive soil erosion. ItsConservation Reserve Program both en-courages conversion of highly erodiblecropland to grassland or woodland andpenalizes larmers who do not managetheir soil responsibly by denying themthe benefits from farm programs. In1987. the program's second year, U.S.soil losses were reduced by 460 millionions, the greatest year-to-year reductionon record for any country.46

In a world where fresh water is becom-ing more scarce. future growth in irriga-tion may depend on greater investmentsin the efficiency a water Use. Stoppingleakage from irrigation canals andditches and abandoning the use ofavastelid irrigation technologies presentobvious opportunities. Israel. with itsunderground drip system and other ad-vanced irrigation technologies, has ex-panded its irrigated area by using availa-ble water supplies more carefully. Inmany countries, the key to such gains isthe elimination of water subsidies, which

Oullining a Global Aclims Ha(' (187)

actually encourage the inefficient use ofirrigation water.47

Early international agricultural re-search efforts concentrated heavily onraising yields of wheat and rice. theworld's principal staple foods. In recentyears, the Consultative Group on Inter-national Agricultural Research --a net-work of 13 ably staffed agricultural re-search centers, all but one in the ThirdWorldhas shifted its attention to rais-ing output of such minor staples as mil-let, chickpeas, and cassava, crops pro-duced by low-income, subsistencefarmers. Although a far more den tand-ing undertaking, this research eflbrt isresponsive to the needs of a large groupof farmers, many of whom do not haveaccess to lertilizer.48

In a warmer world. where fresh wateris becoming scarce, scientists can helppush back the physical frontiers of crop-ping by developing varieties that arcmore drought-resistant, salt-tolerant,and early-maturing. The payoff on thefirst two could be particularly high. It isin this area that biotechnology may behelpful in speeding up the plant breed-ing process.

Events of the last two years suggestthat the time also has come to rethinkinternational grain reserve policies. Twoor more consecutive drought-reducedharvests could easily wipe out a normallevel of reserves. Had there not been arecord amount of grain in storage at thebeginning of the 1987 crop year. back-to-back declines in the world grain har-vests since then would by now have cre-ated a world food etnergency. As it is,world grain prices in late 1988 had risenby hall since late 1987.49

Ensuring an adequate level of grainstocks requires taking into account notonly year-to-year variations in theweather but the uncertain effects of ris-ing temperatures as well. Global warm-ing will deepen the uncertainty sur-rounding each year's crop and probably

increase the frequency of reduced har-vests. (See Chapter 1.) For example, thethree drought-reduced U.S. harvests inthe eighties could increase to four or fivein the nineties and even more thereafter.With much of the 20 million hectares ofcropland idled under US. supply' man-agement programs scheduled to returnto production in 1989, the need to estab-lish a more formal set of guidelines formanaging world grain reserves willbecome increasingly urgent.

If world food supplies tighten in theyears ahead, the distribution of availablesupplies will bec :ne even more impor-tant than when the world was plaguedwith surpluses. High on the list of ques-tions will be how much of the world'sgrain supply can be fed to livestock. Atpresent. roughly 500 million tons of anannual harvest of usually 1.6 billion tonsis consumed this way."

If the U.S. cropland now set asideunder the supply management programswere returned to production. the (nth-remaining major food reserve to failback on if carrvover stocks of grain aredepleted would be the grain consumedby livestock. When grain prices risesharply, as they did in 1973, higher meatprices and the resulting drop in con-sumer demand force a reduction in theamount of grain fed to livestock. Tragi-cally, by the time grain prices actuallyaffect affluent consumers' consumptionof meat. milk, and eggs. the world'spoorest may not be getting enough grainto survive.1

The relative efficiency of convertinggrain to various types of animal proteinalso affects the world grain supply-and-demand balance. The least efficient live-stock product is beef produced in feed-lots, where it takes roughly sevenpounds of grain to produce a pound ofmeat. The grain used in producing aquarter-pound hamburger could feed aperson in a low-income country for twodays. The production of broilers. much

202


more efficient than beef', requiresroughly two pounds of grain per poundof meat. Thus, shifts from beef to poul-try, already under way in some societiesfor health reasons, help stretch theworld supply of grain,52

Shifts from beef to poultry, underway in some societies for healthreasons, help stretch the world sup.ply of grain.

Perhaps the principal conclusion inthis year's analysis of the world lbodprospect is that future food security maylie more in the hands of family plannersthan farmers. Agricultural policymakersand farmers acting alone may not be ableto ensure adequate food supplies in theyears ahead. That is needed is a majorassist of the sort that China's familyplanning ministry has provided thatcountry's farmers over the last twodecades, a lift that, when combined witheconomic reforms in agriculture, helpedraise food output per person by nearlyhalf between 1976 and 1984.53

STABILIZING POPULATION

M the annual meeting in Berlin in Sep-tember 1988, World Bank PresidentBarber Conable urged developing coun-tries to "renew and expand efforts tolimit population growth," saying thatrapid population increase was contribut-ing to persistent and widespread pov-erty, which he described as a "moral out-rage." Conable's comments reflectedgrowing frustration within the Bank overthe inability of many of its member coun-tries to raise living standards. In mostcountries in Africa. and several in Latin

21)3

America, average food consumption isfalling and living conditions are deteri-orating. In many of these countries, therestoration of economic and social prog-ress now depends on quickly reducingpopulation growth,54

Population stabilization is the only ac-ceptable goal in a world where growth inhuman numbers is leading to a life-threatening deterioration of environ-mental systems. In 13 countries, hometo some 266 million people, birth rateshave already fallen to the point wherebirths and deaths are in balance. Exceptfor Czechoslovakia, East Germany, andHungary, all are in Western Europe.They range from tiny Luxembourg tothree of the four largest countries inWestern EuropeItaly, the UnitedKingdom, and West Germany.55

Balancing birth and death rates wasnot an explicit goal in any of these coun-tries. Fertility declined as economic andsocial conditions improved. As incomesrose and employment opportunities forwomen expanded, couples chose to havefewer children. The wide availability offamily planning services and liberalabortion laws provided the means forthan to do so.

The contrasting prospects of thesecountries and those where populationsare projected to double, triple, or quad-ruple (see Table 10-2) is alarming. Theexperience of recent years indicates thatrapid population growth and socialprogress are not compatible over thelong term. Countries either make theshift to smaller families, as China hasdone, or their life-support systems beginto break down. as is occurring in manyAfrican countries. Given the conditionsof these systems and the trends in percapita kod production and income,many countries may have delayed toolong in implementing effective familyplanning policies. They may now face achoice: adopt a one-child family goal oraccept a decline in living standards. It is

Outlining a Global Action Plan (189)

Table 10.2. Projected Population Size atStabilization and Increase Over Current

Level, Selected Countries

Country1988

Population

ProjectedPopt.lation

Woo*Stationary

Stateis Reached Ratio

(million) (million)

Kenya 23 121 5.3Uganda 16 89 5.1Tanzania 24 123 5.1Nigeria 112 599 4.7Ethiopia 48 205 4.3

Zaire 33 142 4.3Sudan 24 101 .1.2

Ghana 14 58 4.1Pakistan 107 423 4.0Syria 11 42 3.8

Algeria 24 81 3.4Bolivia 7 24 3.4Iran 52 169 3.2Bangladesh 109 342 3.1South Africa 35 90 2.6

Egypt 53 132 2.5Peru 21 48 9.3

Philippines 63 137 2.2Mexico 83 187 9.2India 817 1,698 2.1

SOURCE: World Bank, It Development Report1988 (Ne York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

hard to imagine anything more dillicultfor a society than striving for acceptanceof a one-child family goal except suffer-ing the consequences of failing to do so.

At this point, the only socially respon-sible step for the United Nations, theWorld Bank, and the international de-velopmem community is to call for asharp reduction in the world growthrate, one patterned after the rapid de-clines in fertility that occurred in both

RA: PerThousand

aoSources. PopulationReference Bureau.United Nations

.

1948 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure UM, Crude Birth and Death Ratesin Japan, t948.88

Japan and China. (Sec Figures 10-1 and19-2,) In effect. each of these countrieshalved its rate of population growthwithin a matter of years.56

Following the loss of its wartime em-pire. Japan was faced with the reality ofliving largely on the resources within itsown national borders. Living conditionsdeteriorated, leading many Japanesecouples to want smaller families, This inturn prompted public discussion aboutpopulation control, 'Fire Japanese gov-ernment responded by legalizing abor-tion in 1948 and creating a national fam-ily planning program to providecontraceptive information and counsel-ing, The result was a drop in fertility"unprecedented in the annals of worlddemography." Between 1949 and 1956,Japan cut its population growth ratefrom just under 2.2 percent to scarcely 1percent. Remarkably. Japan made thisdemographic advance before the adventof modern contraceptives, such as thepill and the intrauterine device.57

Two decades later, the Chinese gov-ernment also concluded that its fast-fall-ing population/land ratio was threaten-ing its future economic progress. Thisled to a decision to lower its birth rate.Between 1970 and 1976, China's popu-

2 0 4

Slate of the World 1989

thousand, this would cut the rate ofworld population growth in half, drop-ping it below 1 percent per year. (SeeFigure 10-1)59

Much of this decline would have tooccur. of course, where populationgrowth is most rapidAfrica, LatinAmerica, and the Indian subcontinent.Industrial countries, such as the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, and Japan,where population growth is now wellbelow 1 percent per year, can easily fol-low the industrial societies of WesternEurope to zero population growth 69

Countries that have made the shift tosmall families typically have four thingsin common: an active national popula-tion education program, widely availablefamily planning services, incentives forsmall families (and in some cases, disin-centives for large ones), and widespreadimprovements in economic and socialconditions.61

The starting point for an effective na-tional population education program is acareful look into the future, a set of alter-native projections that relate populationgrowth to environmental support sys-tems and economic trends. The modelfor this continues to be the projectionsundertaken in China in the mid-seven-

' 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Figure 10.2. Crude Birth and Death Ratesin Chios, 194947

lation growth rate dropped from 2.6 per-cent per year to 1.3 percent. Althoughstarting from a slightly higher point thanJapan. it nonetheless cut its growth ratein h al f.55

These family planning breakthroughsin Japan and China are indicative of whatnations can do if they are serious aboutslowing population growth. Countriesthat now want to reduce their birth ratecan draw upon the experience of thesetwo pioneers. And they have the advan-tage of a wider range of modern contra-ceptive technologies.

Given the experience of Japan andChina, a global effort to cut world popu-lation growth in half by the year 2000does not seem out of the question. Thebirth rate for the world of 28 per thou-sand population in 1988 is lower thanthe 33 per thousand that prevailed inJapan and China when they launchedtheir fertility reduction campaigns. The1988 world death rate is 10, midway be-tween the 12 in Japan and the 8 in Chinawhen their efforts began. If national gov-ernments become serious, it is possibleto lower the global birth rate of 28 to 19by the end of the century, a decline ofone third. Assuming that the death ratefor the world remains at roughly 10 per

205

Rate PerThousand

Sources: United Nations,Woridwatth

10- ... ......

1

19901950 1960 1970 1980 19 2000

Figure 10-3. World Binh and Death Room195048, With Projected Goal for 2000

Outlining a Global .lotion Plan (191)

ties as part of the post-Mao reassess-ment. One of the questions asked was.What will the future be like if each cou-ple has two children? Under this as-sumption, the country would have addedsome 700 million people, roughly an-other India, to its population. When re-lated to the future availability of soil,water, forest, energy resources, andjobs, it became clear that a two-childfamily would lead to a decline in livingstandards. China's leaders realized thatonly a one-child family was compatiblewith the goals and aspirations of the Chi-nese people,62

This information was then used inpublic discussions and debates, all theway down to the village level. Peoplewere involved in considering whether toaccept two or more children per familyand a decline in living conditions or tomove quickly to a one-child family pro-gram and a more promising future.However difficult the choice, Chinaopted for the latter, enabling it toachieve levels of infant mortality and lifeexpectancy that approach those of af-fluent industrial societies.63

Undertaking these studies is an area inwhich international development agen-cies can be of major assistance. The keyto meaningful projections is the integra-tion of national demographic, economic,and ecological trends. Only when thethree are combined can a useful view ofthe future be achieved. Only then do thechoices become clear.

Another step with a potentially highpayoffis the provision of family planningservices to those not yet reached by ex-isting service networks. Recent surveysin developing countries indicate thatmany women who wish to limit familysize do not have access to family plan-ning services. Few efforts to improve thehuman condition will pay a higher returnon investment than filling this familyplanning gap.64

Societies that have quickly reducedfamily size have often relied heavily ona combination of incentives for smallfamilies or disincentives for large ones.Countries such as China, Singapore,and South Korea have typically offeredfree health rare and in sonic cases freeeducation through secondary school ifcouples agree to have only the onechild or two children that circumstancescall for. This approach is appealing be-cause the free health care helps assurechildren's survival and the free educa-tion helps enhance their earning power,thus increasing the long-term financialsecurity of parents in societies wherepeople depend on their children in oldage."

In developing countries, manywomen who wish to limit familysize do not have access to familyplanning services.

Any meaningful effort to slow popula-tion growth quickly will thus depend onheavy additional investments in the pro-vision of family planning services, im-provements in education and health, andfinancial incentives that encourage cou-ples to have smaller families. Althoughsuch a broad-based effort could easilyinvolve additional expenditures of $30billion per year, it can be viewed by in-dustrial societies, who would help pro-vide financing, as a down payment on asustainable future, an effort to protectthe habitability of the planet.66

The formulation of population poll-des and the design of family planningprograms are both handicapped by alack of information, Although changes inbirth rates may have a far greater effecton future economic and social trends indeveloping countries than any other

216


economic trends will, few such countriesregularly collect and publish these data.The U.N. Monthly Bulletin ofStatistics nor-inally includes data on birth and death_rates for only 34 countries. nearly all in-dustrial ones.

If the United Nations could launch amonthly report on population and popu-lation-related issues and indicators, itwould help fill an information gap thathandicaps many family planners. Such areport could include information on na-tional goals to reduce family size andprogress in extending family planningservices. A monthly population reportcould also provide national analyses ofthe characteristics of successful familyplanning efforts, material on the kinds ofcontraceptives that work best under vari-ous conditions, and country-by-countryprogress in restoring a balance betweenbirths and deaths.

At the national level, it now seems rea-sonable to expect governments to setfamily planning goals that will lead toimproved living conditions. Some coun-tries may find it necessary to press forone child per couple until the momen-tum of their population growth ischecked. But for the world as a whole,two children may now be a more realisticgoal. Accumulating evidence suggeststhat this is the only population policythat is consistent with restoring a world-wide improvement in living conditions.It is time for international leaders, suchas the Secretary General of the UnitedNations and the President of the WorldBank, to urge adoption of such a goal byall governments.

A TURNAROUND DECADE

In an address before the American Insti-tute of Biological Sciences in August

20 7

1988, biologist Thomas Lovejoy, Assist-ant Secretary for External Affairs of theSmithsonian Institution. stated: "I amutterly convinced that most of the greatenvironmental struggles will be eitherwon or lost in the 1990s. And that by thenext century it will be too late." Lovejoyis not alone. Thousands of other scien-tists around the world who are trackingchanges in the planet's health share hissense of urgency.67

Viewing the world from a very differ-ent vantage point. but reaching a similarconclusion, was Eduard Shevardnadze.foreign minister of the Soviet Union. Heobserved in an address to the U.N. Gen-eral Assembly in September. that allthe environmental disasters of the cur-rent year have placed in the forefront thetask of pooling and coordinating effortsin developing a global strategy for therational management of the environ-ment." He then went on to emphasizethe lack of time, saying that "we have toolittle of it, and problems are piling upfaster than they are solved."68

The 1989 annual report of the UnitedNations Children's Fund gets to theheart of what is at stake: "For almostnine hundred million people. approxi-mately one sixth of mankind, the marchof human progress has now become aretreat."69

By many measures, time is runningout. Circumstances call for major shiftson several fronts simultaneously to re-store the equilibria that make the planethabitable: a global balance betweenbirths and deaths, carbon emissions andcarbon fixation, soil erosion and soil for-mation, tree cutting and tree planting.

It is now clear that we are moving intoa new age, for the current situation sim-ply will not prevail for much longer. Theoutlines of this new age will be definedby choices made in the years immedi-ately ahead. We will either mobilize toreestablish a stable relationship with theearth's natural support systems or con-

Outlining a Global Action Plan (193)

tinue down the path of environmentaldeterioration.

If societies successfully mobilize forchange, the new age will be one in whichforest. cover is expanding, hunger is di-minishing, and life expectancy is every-where increasing. This age will see theevolution of transportation systems thatrely heavily on bicycles and mass transit,as well as on more fuel-efficient automo-biles. It will be an age in which mostresidential hot water comes from roof-top solar collectors, more windmills andfewer polluting power plants dot thelandscape, and Third World villages areelectrified by photovoltaic solar cells. Itwill be an age in which populationgrowth slows because birth rates fall, notbecause death rates rise. It will, by neces-sity, be a more equitable world, and, byconsequence, a more peaceful world.

If instead societies persist with busi-ness as usual, letting current trends con-tinue, the new age will look very differ-ent. Climate change will accelerate,causing untold economic disruption.Summertime heat waves will bring morewater shortages, power blackouts, andcrop failures. The hunger and malnutri-tion that has engulfed much of Africaand parts of Latin America during theeighties will spread. In more countries,infant mortality will rise and life expect-ancy will fall, as is already happening inGhana, Madagascar, and Peru. As foodriots and famine become more common-place, and as the chasm between thehaves and have-nots widens, social andpolitical institutions will begin to un-ravel. At some point, a mounting preoc-cupation with the unstable present willbegin to obliterate hopes for reclaimingthe future.70

There is little precedent for the scaleof action needed over the next decade.In recent history, the only time whenchange even remotely approached thatneeded now was in the early forties,when countries mobilized for war. There

are, however, important differences. De-spite its name, World War II scarcelytouched parts of the world. The dangerswere clear and immediate for those in-volved, and they knew the military effortwas temporary. This made the sacrificesand adjustments easier to bear.

We are moving into a new age, forthe current situation simply willnot prevail for much longer.

By contrast, the battle to protect theearth's life-support systems lacks defini-tion in the minds of many. The danger isnot so clear and present. Climatechange, ozone depletion, populationgrowth, and soil erosion are gradualprocesses, and therefore difficult to mo-bilize against. And the adjustmentsneeded are permanent, for they are theprerequisites for long-term progress.Given these characteristics, a timely re-sponse to environmental threats de-pends less on emotion and more on rea-son--which may explain the growinggap between what needs to be done tosecure the future and what is beingdone.

Social change on the scale needed willtake society into uncharted territory. Itwill require converting a global economynow using 6 percent of its resources formeans of destruction into one devotedto the reconstruction of the planet. Inessence, the task is to organize and sus-tain a survival economy much the waycountries today maintain permanentstanding armies and strategic weaponsin the hope of deterring war. Ratherthan sitting idle, however. the invest-ments in our planet's future will be usedproductivelyfor planting trees, devel-oping renewable energy sources, and ex-panding food production, among othervital tasks.71

2(1g

(194) Stare of the World 1989

Launching and carrying through onthe initiatives needed to safeguard theplanet will place extraordinary demandson political leaders and a high premiumon imaginative leadership. As shown bythe progress of air pollution control inEurope or protection of the ozone layerglobally, action by just a few countriescan inspire many others to join in. Whenthe prime ministers of Canada and Nor-way publicly embraced the goal of reduc-ing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per-cent by 2005. they helped moveconcerns about climate change from re-search institutes into legislatures, wherethey now need to bc.72

Whether the nineties becomes a turn-around decade will also depend heavilyon the response of scientists and thecommunications media, for both playkey roles in broad-based public educa-tion. As important as scientists' findingsin their laboratories will be their abilityand willingness to translate these find-ings into terms understandable by non-scientists. Similarly. the media will betterserve the public's need for informationwhen it begins reporting, for example,that deforestation rates are as importantan indicator of societal health as infla-tion rates arc.

Up until now, environmental organi-sations. both national and local. haveprovided the impetus for efforts to re-store and protect the planet. Numerouscitizen& groups have organized to rem-

2n9

cdy problems directly touching theirlives. whether it be planting trees in aThird World village or oppnsing the sit-ing of a toxic waste dump in a U.S. com-munity. The challenge now is for othergroups to get involved. Collectively,churches, civic groups, and professionalsncietics represent an enormous poten-tial for planetary reclamation. Rotary In-ternational, Girl Scouts, the Interna-tional Association of AgriculturalEconomists, the Lutheran Church, theInternational Society of Tropical Forest-ers, the American Medical Association,and the International Jaycees are but afew of the thousands of groups thatcould play a part.

Ultimately, responsibility for the fu-ture rests with individuals. Our values,choices, and behaviors shape social andpolitical change. Unless more of us jointhe effort, there is little hope of haltingthe planet's deterioration.

By the end of the next decade, the diewill pretty well be cast. As the world en-ters the twenty-first century, the commu-nity of nations either will have ralliedand turned back the threatening trends,or environmental deterioration and so-cial disintegration will be feeding oneach other.

The ultimate rationale for a massivesocial mobilization to safeguard theearth is summed up in a bit of graffitipainted on a bridge in Rock Creek Parkin Washington. D.C. It says. "Goodplanets are hard to find."

Notes

Chapter 1. A World at Risk

1. James E. Hansen, Director. NASA God-dard Institute for Space Studies. "TheGreenhouse Effect: Impacts on CurrentGlobal Temperature and Regional HeatWaves," Testimony before the Committeeon Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Sen-ate, June 23, 1988.

2. Edward A. Gargan, "Flash Floods andDrought Ravage China," New York Times, Au-gust 3, 1988: Noel Fletcher, "China'sDrought Boosting Food-Import Needs,"Journal of Commerce, July 25, 1988; "KillingHeat Wave Hits South China," Beijing Review.July 25-31, 1988; numerous articles on thedrought in China Daily, Summer 1988.

3. National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration, "Executive Summary of theOzone Trends Panel," Washington, D.C.,March 15, 1988.

4. Richard M. Weintraub, "FloodingWorsens in Bangladesh," 1Vashingion Post,September 5, 1988.

S. Alberto W. Setzer et al., "Relathrio deAtividades do Projeto IBDF-INPE 'SEQE'Ano 1987," Institute de Pesquisas Espaciais,Sio Jose dos Campos, Brazil, May 1988: Rob-erti. McNeal, Testimony before the Commit-tee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S.Senate, September 20, 1988.

6. David C. Anderson, "The MedicalTrash That's on the Beach Is Only the Start,"Washington Post, August 7, 1988: KeithSchneider, "Rain Revives Crops but Expertssay Drought Persists," New York Times, July

26. 1988; David S. Wilson, "U.S. Forest FiresWorst Since 1919," New York Times. Septem-ber 1. 1988: Sam Howe Verhovek, **TheLong Heat Also Polluted the Air," New YorkTimes. August 26. 1988.

7. Karen DeYoung. "European Seal HerdPerishing," Washington Post, August 7, 1988:"Italy Promises Remedial Steps Against Eu-trophication in Adriatic," International Envi-ronment Reporter, September 14, 1988; DavidRemnick, "Foul Air, Water Problems WakeSoviets to Ecology," Washington Post. July 31,1988; James Brooke, "African Nations Bar-ring Toxic Waste," New York Times, Septem-ber 25, 1988; Arshad Mahmud, "In Ban-gladesh, Too Much Water and Not Enough,"New York Times, September 18, 1988.

8. Christopher Flavin, Reassessing NuclearPower: The Fallout From Chernobyl. WorldwatchPaper 75 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch In-stitute, March 1987).

9. Christopher Flavin, "The Case AgainstReviving Nuclear Power," World Watch

(Washington, D.C.), July/August 1988; BillKeller, "Public Mistrust Curbs Soviet Nu-clear Power Efforts," New York Times, Octo-ber 13, 1988.

10. Sandra Postel, Air Pollution. Acid Rain,and the Future of Forests, Worldwatch Paper 58(Washington. D.C.: Worldwatch Institute,March 1984).

11. Sandra Postel, "Protecting Forestsfrom Air Pollution and Acid Rain," in LesterR. Brown et al., State of the World 1985 (NewYork: W.W. Norton & Co., 1985); Peter H.

210

(196) ,Votes (Chapter I)

Sand, "Air Pollution in Europe: InternationalPolicy Responses," Environment, December1987.

12. Sand, "Air Pollution in Europe."

13. Catherine Fitzpatrick and JanetFleischman. From Below: independent Peace andEnvironmental Movements in Eastern Europe andthe ISSR (New York: Helsinki Watch Com-ntince, 1987).

14. Remnick, "Foul Air. Water ProblemsWake Soviets to Ecology"; Barbara Jancar,"The Politics of Pollution in the Soviet Unionand Eastern Europe: Two Years after Cher-nobyl," Testimony before Commission onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, U.S.Congress, April 26, 1988; Fitzpatrick andFleischman, From Below.

15. Green Party, "The Green Party ofSweden," Stockholm, 1988.

I6. Lynn White. r., "The Historical Rootsof Our Ecologic Crisis." Science. March 10,1067.

17. Jeremy Bucher, "lite Opening Shotof the Second Ecological Revolution." Chi-cago Tribune, August 16, 1988.

18. Elizabeth kenif, "The Re-greening ofVietnam," .Vew Scientist. June 23, 1988.

i9. "Conference Statement," The Chang-ing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Se-curity, Toronto, June 27-30, 1988; "GlobalEnvironmental Protection Act of 1988," S.2666, U.S. Senate, introduced by SenatorRobert Stafford, uly 28, 1988; "National En-ergy Policy Act of 1988," S. 2667, U.S. Sen-ate, introduced by Senator Timothy Wirth.July 28, 1988; "Global Warming PreventionAct of 1988," H.R. 5460, U.S. House of Rep-resentatives, introduced by RepresentativeClaudine Schneider, October 5, 1988.

20. Hansen, "The Greenhouse Effect."

21. World Resources institute/Interna-tional institute for Environment and Devel-opment, World Resources Report 1988/1989(New York: Basic Books, 1988); Pieter Tans.

2 1

Group Chief. Carbon Cycle Group, NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration,Boulder, Colo., private communication, Oc-tober 28, 1988; Eric T. Sundquist, "Ice CoreLinks CO2 to Climate," Nature. October 1,1987.

22. V. Ramanathan ct al., "Trace GasTrends and Their Potential Role in ClimateChange,"Jountal of Geophysical Research, June20. 1985; F. Sherwood Rowland. "Chloro-fluorocarbons, Stratospheric Ozone, and theAntarctic 'Ozone Hole'," Enitironinenta/ Con-s..rvation. Summer 1988; Irving R. Mintzer,Senior Associate, World Resources Institute,Testimony before Subcommittee on Energyand Power, Committee on Energy and Com-merce. U.S. House of Representatives. Sep-tember 22, 1988.

23. Worldwatch estimate from GreggMarland, Environmental Science 1Y. _sion,Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 0.4 Ridge,Tenn unpublished printout and privatecommunication, September 9, 1988; thelower estimated range for carbon additionfrom deforestation is from R.P. Detwiler andCharles AS Hall, "Tropical Forests and theGlobal Carbon Cycle," &Imre. January I,1988; the higher one is from R.A. Houghtonet al., "The Flux of Carbon from TerrestrialEcosystems to the Atmosphere in 1980 Dueto Changes in Land Use Geographic Distri-bution of the Global Flux," Telha, February/April 1987; George M. Woodwell, "HowDoes the World Work?" presented to WorldWildlife Fund (WWF) Conference on Conse-quences of the Greenhouse Effect for Biolog-ical Diversity, Washington, D.C., October4-6, 1988 (hereinafter cited as WWF Confer-ence); fossil fuel projections are WorldwatchInstitute estimates.

24. Philip D. Jones et al "Evidence forGlobal Warming in the Past Decade," Nature.April 28, 1988; James E. Hansen et al "Glo-bal Climate Changes as Forecast by the GISS3-D Model," Journal of Geophysical Research,August 20, 1988: data for 1988 are prelimi-nary, based on recordings for the first nine

1

Notes (chapter 1) (197)

months of the year. according to James E.Hansen, private communication. October 26,1988.

25. Hansen. "The Greenhouse Effect."

26. U.S. National Academy of Sciences,Changing Climate, Report of the Carbon Diox-ide Assessment Committee (Washington,D.C.: National Academy Press. 1983); JamesE. Hansen. "Prediction of Near-Term Cli-mate Evolution: What Can We Tell Decision-Makers Now?" Testimony before Committeeon Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Sen-ate. November 9, 1987; John W. Firor, Direc-tor. Advanced Study Program. National Cen-ter for Atmospheric Research, Boulder,Colo., Testimony before Subcommittee onEnergy and Power. Committee on Energyand Commerce. U.S. House of Representa-tives. July 7, 1988.

27. Hansen, "The Greenhouse Effect":Syukuro Manabe, Geophysical Fluid Dynam-ics Laboratory. National Oceanic and Atmo-spheric Administration, Princeton, NJ-Testi-mony before Co mmittee on Energyand Natur-al Resources. U.S. Senate, November 9. 1987.

28. World Climate Programme. DevelopingPolicies for Responding to Climate Change (Ge-neva: World Meteorological Organization,1988): Firor, Testimony.

29. Woodwell, "How Does the WorldWork?": Margaret B. Davis and CatherineZabinski, University of Minnesota, "Rates ofDispersal of North American Trees: Implica-tions for Response to Climatic Warming,"presented to WWF Conference.

30. W.D. Billings. Duke University, "Ef-fects of Predicted Climatic Warming on Arc-tic Tundra Ecosystems on the Alaskan NorthSlope," and Daniel B. Botkin and Robert A.Nisbet, University of California. Santa Bar-bara, "Projecting the Effects of ClimateChange on Biological Diversity in Forests."both presented to WWF Conference.

31, James G. Titus, U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency. "Causes and Effects of

Sea Level Rise." presented to the First NorthAmerican Conference on Preparing for Cli-mate Change: A Coiperative Approach,Washington. D.C., October 27-29. 1987.

32. Tom Goemans and Pier Vellinga."Low Countries and High Seas," presentedto the First North American Conference onPreparing for Climate Change: A Coopera-tive Approach, Washington. D.C., October27-29, 1987.

33. John D. Milliman et al.. "Environmen-tal and Economic Impact of Rising Sea Leveland Subsiding Deltas: The Nile and BengalExamples." Woods Hole Oceanographic In-stitution. Woods Hole. Mass., unpublished,1988.

34. J. Christopher Walker et al.. "Impactof Global Climate Change on Urban Infra-structure" (draft), The Urban Institute,Washington, D.C., July 1988.

35. Ibid.

36. Debora MacKenzie, "Winds ofChange May Be Harbingers of Drought."New Scientist. August 27, 1987: DennisWamsted. "Hyper-HurricanesA NewThreat from the Greenhouse Effect?" EnergyDaily, September 15. 1988.

37. U.N. World Food Council (WFC)."The Global State of Hunger and Malnutri-tion: 1988 Report." 14th Ministerial Session.Nicosia. Cyprus. March 24, 1988.

38. U.S. Department of Agriculture(USDA). Economic Research Service (ERS).World Groin Harvested Area, Production, andYield 1950-87 (unpublished printout)(Wash-ington. D.G.: 1988): USDA. Foreign Agricul-tural Service (FAS), World Grain Situation andOutlook. Washington. D.C.. October 1988.

30, USDA, ERS, Work/ Grain 1950-87:1988 per capita grain production estimatederived from production estimates in USDA,FAS, World Grain Situation, and from popula-tion projections in Francis Urban and PhilipRose, World Population by Country and Region.

2.12

(198) .Voles (Chapter 14-

1950-86, and Projections to 2050 (Washington,D.C.: USDA. ERS. 1988).

40. USDA. ERS. World Grain 1950 -87:"Farmers Turn Down the Irrigation Tap."Farm line. August 1988: Frederick W. Crook,Agricultural Statistics of the People's Republic ofChina, 1949-86 (Washington. D.C.: USDA.ERS, 1988).

41. USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

42. World Bank, Report of the Thsk Force onFood Security in .Africa (Washington, D.C.:1988).

43. Ibid.

44. Population Reference Bureau,World Population Data Sheet (Washington,D.C.: 1988): USDA. ERS, World Grain; Mi-chael Griffin, "Harsh Times for Madagascar'sGrowing Numbers," People (London), Vol.15, No. 2, 1988.

45. U.N. Food and Agriculture Organiza-tion, FAO Production Yearbook (Rome: variousyears); USDA, ERS. World Grain 1950-87;WFC. "Global State of Hunger and Malnutri-tion."

1988

46. International Monetary Fund. hiterna-tional Financial Statistics. Washington. D.C..various issues: World Bank, Task Force on FoodSecurity in Africa.

47. Cost of the wheat in a loaf of breadcalculated using a wheat price of U.S.S3 perbushel.

48. USDA, FAS, World Rice Reference Tables(unpublished printout)(Washington, D.C.:July 1988).

49. USDA. FAS. World Grain Situation.

50. Hansen. "The Greenhouse Effect":Syukuro Manabe. "Climate Warming Due toGreenhouse Gases." Testimony before theSubcommittee on Toxic Substances and En-vironmental Oversight, Committee on Envi-ronment and Public Works, U.S. Senate. De-cember 10. 1985; Hansen et al.. "GlobalClimate Changes."

2 : 3

51. S. Manabe ar3 R.T. Wetherald, "Re-duction in &mime,. Soil Wetness Induced byan Increase in htinospheric Carbon Diox-ide." Science. May 2. 1986; Hansen et al.,"Global Climatv Changes."

52. USDA, FAS. World Grain Situation:R.H. Shaw, "Estimates of Yield Reductionsin Corn Caused by Water and TemperatureStress." in C. D. Raper and P.J. Kramer, eds..Crop Reactions to Water and Temperature Stressesin Humid. Temperate Climates (Boulder Colo.:Westview Press. 1983); R. F. Dale. "Temper-ature Perturbations in the Midwestern andSoutheastern United States Important forCorn Production." in ibid.

53. Linda 0. Mcarns et al.. "ExtremeHighTemperature Events: Changes in TheirProbabilities with Changes in Mean Temper-ature," Journal of Climate and AppliedMeteorology. December 1984.

54. USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87;USDA, FAS, World Grain Situation.

55. USDA, ERS. World Grain 1950 -87:USDA. FAS, World Grain Situation.

56. Hansen. "The Greenhouse Effect."

57. USDA, FAS. World Wheat and CoarseGrains Reference Tables (unpublished printout)(Washington. D.C.: August 1988); USDA.FAS, World Rice; USDA. FAS. World Grain Sit-'ration.

58. Eduard A. Shevardnadze. Minister forForeign Affairs of the USSR. Statement be-fore theForty-third Session oftheU.N. Gener-al Assembly. New York, September 27. 1988.

59. William Hively, "Global Change,"American Scientist, March/April 1988; June S.Ewing, Staff Officer, National ResearchCouncil. Washington, D.C., private commu-nication...June 22. 1988: "The InternationalGeosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP):Towards a Plan for Action," Earth Quest. Uni-versity Corporation for Atmospheric Re-search, Boulder. Colo.. Summer 1988.

60. Denise Claveloux. "Tighter Control ofWaste Management. Disposal ofToxic Waste

Notes (chapter 1)

Envisioned in Proposals Made by EuropeanCommunity Commission," International Envi-ronment Reporter. August 10, 1988: "TougherSmall-Car Emissions Limits Being Sought ByEuropean Parliament," International Environ-ment Reporter, October 12, 1988; "EuropeanCommission Considers Directive on Free-dom of Information on Environment." Inter-national Environment Reporter, October 12.1988: Steven Greenhouse, "Making Europe aMighty Market," New York Times. May 22,1988.

61. U.N. Economic Commission forEurope. ECE 1947-1987 (New York: UnitedNations, 1987); Sand, "Air Pollution inEurope"; "12 Nations Agree to Cut Pollu-tion," Washington Post. November 1, 1988.

62. Richard Mott. "An Acid Rain Sum-mons from Europe." The EnvironmentalForum. March/April 1988.

63. Information on signatories from U.N.Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of theSea, New York, private communication, Oc-tober 11, 1988; Elisabeth Mann Borgese."The Law of the Sea," Scientific American,March 1983; Department of Public Informa-tion, A Quiet Revolution: The ['Wird Nations Con-vention on the Law of the Sea (New York: UnitedNations. 1984).

64. Clyde Sanger, Ordering the Oceans: TheMaking of the Law of the Sea (London: ZedBooks Ltd.. 1986); Ann L. Hollick. "Manag-ing the Oceans," The Wilson Quarterly, Sum-mer 1984: Karl Sullivan. "Overfishing andthe New Law of the Sea." OECD Observer. July1984: "United States Acceptance of MAR-POL Annex Will Lead to Ban on DumpingPlastics at Sea." International Environment Re-porter. February 10, 1988; "Global Stop toAt-Sea Incineration Approved," 3IuftilateralEnvironmental Outlook. October 13, 1988.

65. Douglas G. Cogan, Stones in a GlassHouse: CFCs and Ozone Depletion (Washington,D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Cen-ter, 1988): Mostafa K. Tolba, "The Ozone

(r991

Agreementand Beyond." EnvironmentalConsemation. Winter 1987.

66. Cogan. Stones in a Glass !louse; darkCrawford. "Landmark Ozone Treaty Nego-tiated," Science. September 25, 1987; U.N.Treaty Office, New York, various privatecommunications; Philip Shabecoff. "E.P.A.Chief Asks Total Ban on Ozone-HarmingChemicals." New York Times, September 27,1988.

67. World Climate Programme. DevelopingPolicies; "Conference Statement," TheChanging Atmosphere.

68. Toufiq A. Siddiqi, East-West Center,Honolulu, Hawaii. "A Comprehensive Lawof the Atmosphere as a Framework for Ad-dressing Carbon Dioxide and ClimateChange Issues," presented to the Workshopon Global Climate Change. Woods Hole,Mass.. September 23. 1988: Brian Mulroney,Prime Minister of Canada, Speech at TheChanging Atmosphere: Implications forGlobal Security. Toronto. Canada, June 27-30, 1988: Kilaparti Ramakrishna. "Steps To-ward an International Convention for Stabil-izing the Greenhouse Gas Composition of:he Atmosphere" (draft), Woods Hole Re-search Center, Woods Hole, Mass., Septem-ber 2. 1988.

69. Jane Rosen. "Suddenly. Everyone'sTalking About the Weather." The Interdepen-dent. Fall 1988; Shevardnadze, Statement atU.N. General Assembly.

70. Mulroney. Speech at The ChangingAtmosphere; Ed H.T.NI. Nijpels, Minister ofHousing. Physical Planning and Environ-ment, the Netherlands, Speech at 'I beChanging Atmosphere: Implications forGlobal Security. Toronto, Canada, une 27-30, 1988: Gro Harlem Brundtland. PrimeMinister of Norway, "Our Common Future-- -A Climate for Change," Speech at TheChanging Atmosphere: Implications for Glo-bal Security, Toronto, Canada. June 27-30,1988: Shevardnadze, Statement at U.N. Gen-eral Assembly: Draft Summary of Workshop

2 4

(200) Notes (Chapters 1 and 2)

on Global Climatic Change, Woods Hole Re-search Center, Woods Hole, Mass.. Septem-ber 23. 1988.

71. Richard N. Gardner. "The Case forPractical Internationalism." Foreign Affairs.Spring 1988; John M. Goshko, "United Na-tions Finds Itself *Back in Fashion'," Washing-ton Post, September 25. 1988; George D.Moffett III, "Peacekeepers Win Peace Prize,"Christian Science Monitor, September 30, 1988.

72. Paul Lewis, "Soviet Announces Shifton U.N. Staff Demand by U.S.." New YorkTimes, June 4. 1988; Elaine Sciolino, **Rea-gan. in Switch. Says U.S. Will Pay Some OldU.N. Dues." New York Times, September 14,1988; Steven Greenhouse, "Japan is SeekingLarger Role in World's Financial System andDebt Crisis," New York Times, September 27,1988; Hilary F. French, "Restoring theU.N.,'* I l'orld !laid' (Washington, D.C.),July/August 1988.

73. Maurice F. Strong. "Beyond ForeignAid-Towards a New World System," pre-sented to the International DevelopmentConference, Washington, D.C., March 19,1987.

74. Brundtland. "Our Common Future-A Climate for Change."

Chapter 2. Halting Land Degradation

1. Michel M. rerstraete, "Defining Deser-tification: A Review," Climatic Change, No. 9,1986; H.E. Dregne, Desertification of Arid Lands(New York: Harwood Academic Puhlishers,1983).

2. U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP),General Assessment of Progress in the Implementa-

tion of the Plan of eh-lion to Combat Desertification1978-1984 (Nairobi: 1984).

3. F. Kenneth Hare, "Recent Climatic Ex-perience in the Arid and Semi-arid Lands,"Desertification Control Bakal, No. 10, 1984,

4. Edward C. Wolf, "Managing Range-lands." in Lester R. Brown et al., State of the

2 .1 5

World 1986 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,1986).

5. Dregne, Desertification of Arid Lands.

6. Peter H. Freeman and J.K. Rennie,Desertification in the Sahel: Diagnosis and Propos-als for 11.:CN's Response (Gland, Switzerland:International Union for Conservation of Na-ture and Natural Resources, 1985).

7. Dregne, Desertification of And Lands;Wolf, "Managing Rangelands"; Jack A. Mab-butt. "A New Global Assessment of the Sta-tus and Trends of Desertification." Environ-mental Conservation, Summer 1984.

8. Thomas M. Painter, "Bringing LandBack In: Changing Strategies to Improve Ag-ricultural Production in West African Sahel,"in Peter D. Little et al., eds., Lands at Risk inthe Third World: Local Level Perspectives (Boul-der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987); UNEP,General Assessment of Progress.

9. D. Pimentel et al., "World Agricultureand Soil Erosion," BioScience, April 1987.

10. The total is a modification of the esti-mate made by D.E. Walling, "Rainfall, Run-off and Erosion of the Land: A Global View."in K.J. Gregory, ed., Energetics of Physical Envi-ronment (New York: John Wiley & Sons,1987). using a new figure for the Ganges-Brahmaputra system (as referenced in thenext note). which increased the total from 19billion tons to 203 billion.

11. Sediment load and area of sedimentfan from Ocean Drilling Program, news re-lease, Texas A&M University, College Sta-tion. September 4, 1987.

12. Degraded area of Loess Plateau fromMen Qnmei, Vice Chief of Bureau of MiddleReach of Huang He, Xian, Shaanxi Province,private comr..-unication, June 9, 1988; aver-age erosion rate from U.N. Food and Agri-culture Organization (FAO)/World FoodProgramme (WFP) project report, "Im-proved Land Use of the Loess Plateau, MizhiCounty, Shaanxi Province," Rome, July 11,1984.

J

Notes (Chapter 2) (2011

13. Sandra Postel. Conserving Water: 'Therntapped Alternative, Worldwatch Paper 67(Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute.September 1985).

14. Anupam Mishra. An Irrigation Proj-ect That Has Reduced Farm Production,"Centre for Science and Environment, NewDelhi. 1981.

15. UNEP, Central .Assessment of Progress.

16. Ibid.; areas affected from Sandra Pos-tel, IS Rethinking ,Management in an Age ofScatrity. Worldwatch Paper 62 (Washington.D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, December1984); Celestine Bohlen, "Cotton MeasuresFortunes in Soviet Turkmenistan.' Washing-ton Post, May 13, 1986; Philip P. Mick lin,"Desiccation of the Aral Sea: A Water Man-agement Disaster in the Soviet Union," Sci-ence, September 2, 1988.

17. For an overview of deforestationtrends and consequences, see Sandra Posteland Lori Heise. Reforesting Me Earth. World-watch Paper 83 (Washington. D.C.: World-watch Institute, April 1988); Brazil figurefrom Alberto W. Scuff et al.. "Relatorio deAtividades do Projeto, IBDF-INPE 'SEQE'-Ano 1987," Institute de Pcsquisas Espaciais,SSo Jose dos Campos, Brazil, May 1988.

18. Jean Eugene Gorse and David R.Steeds, Desertification in the Sahelian andSudanian Zones of West .Africa (Washington,D.C.: World Bank, 1987),

19. Ibid.

20. Population projections from Popula-tion Reference Bureau (PRB), 1988 WorldPopulation Data Sheet (Washington, D.C.:1988).

21. Area of potentially productive landfrom B.B. Vohra, "Neglect of Natural Re-source Management," Alainstreoni, January16, 1988; National Land Use and WastelandsDevelopment Council, "Strategies, Struc-tures, Policies-. National Wastelands Devel-opment Boa: d," New Delhi, February 6,1986; D.R. Bhumbla and Arvind Khare, "Es-

timate of Wastelands in India." Society forPromotion of Wastelands Development. NewDelhi, India. undated.

22. Maria Elena Lopez. "The Politics ofLands at Risk in a Philippine Frontier," inLittle et al., Lanett at Risk in the Third World.

23. ibid.

24. John Hanks, "Southern Africa'sAbused Environment," Earthwairli, No. 31.in People (London). Vol. 15, No. 2, 1988.

25. Dhira Phantumvanit and KhunyingSuthawan Sathirathai. "Thailand: Degrada-tion and Development in a Resource-RichLand." Environment, January/February 1988.

26. Annar Cassam, "Prospects for AfricanDevelopment," journal fiir Enhoicklungspobtik,Special Issue 1. 1987; Leopold P. Mureithi,"Crisis and Recovery in African Agriailture:Priorities for Dialogue and Action," Develop-ment: Seeds of Change. No. 2/3, 1987; see alsoJodi L. Jacobson, "The Forgotten Re-source," World Iratch (Washington. D.C.),May/June 1988.

27. World Commission on Environmentand Development, Our Common Future (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1987); secalso Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield,"Retrospect and Prospect," in Piers Blaikieand Harold Brookfield, eds., Land Degrada-tion and Society (New York: Methuen & Co.,1987).

28. Postel and Heise, Reforesting the Earth;Lester R. Brown, "Sustaining World Agricul-ture," in Lester R. Brown et al.. State of theWorld 1987 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,1987).

29. S. Manabe and R.T. Wetherald. "Re-duction in Summer Soil Wetness Induced byan Increase in Atmospheric Carbon Diox-ide," Science, May 2. 1986: for a general dis-cussion of the impacts of climate change onagriculture, see Sandra Postel, Altering theEank's Chemistry: .Assessing the Risks, World-watch Paper 71 (Washington. D.C.: World-watch Institute. July 1986).

2.i 6

(202) Notes (Chapter 21

:30. Piers J. Sellers. "Modeling Effects ofVegetation on Climate." in Robert E. Dick-enson. ed., The Geophysiology of Ammonia (NewYork; John Wiley 8.: Sons, 1987); Hare, "Re-cent Climatic Experience in the Arid andSemi-arid Lands."

31. J. Shukla and Y. ,Mina. "Influence ofLind-Surface Evapotranspiration on theEarth's Climate." Scienle, March 19. 1982.

32. Sharon Nicholson. Florida State Uni-versity. Tallahassee. private communication.June 13. 1985. as cited in Lester R. Brownand Edward C. Wolf. Reverting Africa's Decline.Worldwatch Paper 65 (Washington. DX.:Worldwatch Institute. une 1985): Sharon E.Nicholson, "Sub-Saharan Rainfall in theYears 1976-80: Evidence of ContinuedDrought," Monthly IPather Review, August1983.

33. Ann Henderson-Sellers. "Effects ofChange in Land Use on Climate in theHumid Tropics." in Dickenson. Geophysiologyof Aina.zonia; Hare. "Recent Climatic Experi-ence in the Arid and Semi-arid Lands."

34. Eneas Salad. "The Forest and the Hy-drologic Cycle." in Dickenson. Geophysiologyof Ammonia; see also Eneas Salad and Peter B.%Pose. "Amazon Basin: A System in Equilib-rium," Silence, July 13. 1984.

35. Salati, "The Forest and the Hy-drologic Cycle"; Salati and Yost:, "AmazonBasin."

36. Eneas Salad. Inter-American Develop-ment Bank. Washington, D.C., private com-munications. August 4 and 11. 1988; 12 per-cent figure from Dennis Mahar, GovernmentPoliciet and Deforestation in Bra:il's Ammon Re-gion (Washington. D.C.: World Bank. 1988):fora discussion of modeling studies on tro;n-cal deforestation's links to rainfall. see Hen-derson-Sellers. "Effects of Change in LandUse on Climate."

37. Jean-Paul Malingreau and Compton J.Tucker, "Large-Scale Deforestation in theSoutheastern Amazon Basin of Brazil"Ambio. Vol. 17. No. 1, 1988.

2. 7

38. Setzer et al.. "Matt-it) de Atividadesclo Projeto. 1111)F-INPE 'SEQ.r."

39. G.P. Shrivastava, APS. University.RFAVA, Madya Pradesh. India. private com-munication. July I, 1988; Jayanta Ban-dyopadhyay, "Political Ecology of Droughtand Water Scarcity: Need for an EcologicalWater Resources Policy." &month. and Politi-cal Weekly, December 12, 1987; see also J.Bandyopadhyay and Vandana Shiva."Drought, Development and Desertifica-tion," Economic and Political Weekly. August16, 1986.

40. Bandyopadhyay. "Political Ecology ofDrought and Water Scarcity."

41. Michael Mortimore. "Shifting Sandsand Human Sorrow: Social Response toDrought and Desertification." DesertifilationControl Bulletin. No. 14. 1987.

42. Ibid.

43. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Eco-nomic Research Service. Cropland, Water, andConsmation Situation and Outlook Report,Washington, D.C., September 1988; "SixthCRP Signup Adds 3.4 Million Acres.".4gricul-turd Outlook. August 1988; for historicalbackground to the program. see also LesterR. Brown. "Breakthrough on Soil Erosion."World Watch (Washington. D.C.). May/June1988.

44. Author's visit to China's loess Pla-teau, June 1988; Men. private communica-tion; FAO/WFP, "Improved Land Use of theLoess Plateau"; Qi Ying. "Erosion Controlsarc a Success," China Daily. March 10,

1987.

45. FAO/WFP, "Improved Land Use ofthe Loess Plateau"; author's visit to MizhiCounty Experiment Station, Shaanxi Prov-ince, June 14, 1988.

46. FAO/WFP, "Improved Lind Use ofthe Loess Plateau"; author's visit to MizhiCounty Experiment Station.

Notes (Chapter 2) (203)

47. Author's visit to two experimental vil-lages and discussions with the Governor ofMizhi County and scientists at the Miz hi Ex-periment Station; Shaanxi Province, China.June 14 and 15, 1988.

48. Cost cited is upper end of range forprojects of this type in Loess Plateau, accord-ing to Men, private communication; also,similar efforts in a nearby village cost $60 perhectare, according to Governer of MizhiCounty, private communication, June 15,1988.

49. Lengths of builds and terraces fromHans Hurni. "Degradation and Conservationof the Resources in the Ethiopian High-lands." Mountain Research and Development.Vol. 8. Nos. 2/3. 1988: number of food-for-work projects from Paul Harrison, The Green-ing of Africa (New York: Viking/Penguin,1987): Debora MacKenzie, "Can Ethiopia beSaved?" New Scientist, September 24, 1987;share of land protected from Debora Mac-Kenzie, "Ethiopia's Hand to the Plough,"New Scientist, October 1. 1987.

50. Rattan Lal. "Managing the Soils ofSub-Saharan Africa... Science. May 29. 1987.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.; for more information onagroforestr. see Poste] and Heise. Reforestingthe Earth.

53. Michael J. Dover and Lee M. Talbot."Feeding the Earth: An Agroecological Solu-tion," Technology Review. Februar /March1988.

54. World Bank. Vetiver Grass (relives-in:kailioides 1 :. Method of I 'wrathy Soil and Mois-ture Conservation (New Delhi: 1987): John C.Greenfield, seminar on the vetiver systempresented at the World Bank. Washington.D.C., August 4, 1988.

55. World Bank, retailer Grass.

56. Author's discussion with officials at theState Land Administration. Beijing, China.June 7, 1988: Mizhi County figures fromFAO /WEP, "Review of Project 2744," un-published paper. Rome, August 1987.

57. Harrison, Greening of Africa; LindseyElilsunt. "Aggravating Ethiopia's Environ-mental Disaster," Panoscope (London), Au-gust 1987; Robert M. Press, "Dash of Capi-talism Brightens Ethiopia Food Picture."Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1988.

58. Harrison, Greening of Africa; see alsoWolf, "Managing Rangelands."

59. Secretariat of the Independent Com-mission on International Humanitarian Is-sues, The Encroaching Desert: The Consequences of

Human Failure (London: Zed Books Ltd..1986); Wolf. "Managing Rangelands."

60. Sant H. Johnson III. "Large Scale Irri-gation and Drainage Schemes in Pakistan."in Gerald T. O'Mara, ed., Efficiency in hTiga-lion: The Conjunctive ("se of Sulfate and Ground-water Resources (Washington. D.C.: WorldBank, 1988).

Gl. Asit K. Bias. "Environmental Con-cerns in Pakistan, with Special Reference toWater and Fe csts," Environmental Conserva-tion, Winter 1987: Egypt figure from JanetRaloff. "Salt of the Earth," Science News. No-vember 10. 1984.

62. Mostafa K. Tolba. "A Harvest ofDust?" Environmental Conservation. Spring1984: Mostafa K. Tolba, "The Tenth Anni-versary of UNCOD," Desertification ControlBulletin. No. 15. 1987: Harold E. Dregne."Combating Desertification: Evaluation ofProgress," Environi»einal Conservation. Sum-mer 1984: Daniel Stiles, U.N. Sndano-Sahelian Office, private communication. NewYork. October 6. 1988.

63. Judith Gradwohl and Russell Green-berg. Saving the Tropical Forests (London:Earthscatt Publications Ltd.. 1988).

64. Tim Magee. "Trees for Farmers."PIA News, October 1987.

65. "India's 'Peoples Forestry Pro -gramme'--A Decentralized Approach toReafforestation." in "News from UNEP,"Desertification Control Bulletin. No. 14. 1987;

2.1 S


"Project Evaluation Mission in SouthernIndia," in "News from UNEP." DesertcationControl Bulletin, No. 16, 1988.

66. UNEP/African Ministerial Conferenceon the Environment (AMCEN), "Compen-dium of Project Fact Sheets Prepared in Con-nection with the AMCEN Donors Meeting."Nairobi, Kenya,January 1988; Tolba. "TenthAnniversary of UNCOD."

67. Tolba. "Tenth Anniversary ofUNCOD."

68. Ibid.; William Mansfield. UNEP's Dep-uty Executive Director, private communica-tion. Washington, D.C., August 17, 1988;UNEP/AMCEN, "Compendium of ProjectFact Sheets"; number of projects fundedfrom Stiles. private communication.

69. Richard R. Pelleck, Senior Agrofores-try Advisor. U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID)/Haiti, private communi-cation. March 1988: AID. The Environment:Managing Natural Resources for Sustainable De-velopment (Washington. D.C.: 1987).

70. Pelleck, private communication: AID,The Environment

71. Laura Tangley. "Fighting CentralAmerica's Other War." BioScience, December1987.

72. Ibid.

73. ldriss Jazairy, "How to Make AfricaSelf-Sufficient in Food." Development: Seeds ofChange, No. 2/3. 1987; number of projectsfrom Most Efficient and Successful." WorldDevelopment Fonim. December 15. 1987.

74. Jazairy. "How to Make Africa Self-Sufficient in Food."

75. Cowpea and sorghum figures fromN.C. Brady, "Science and Technology forDevelopment," Global Development Report. Fall1987.

76. Population projections from PRB.1988 World Population Data Sheet

2 4 s

Chapter 3. Reexamining the WorldFood Prospect

1. World grain stocks from U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture (USDA). Foreign Agri-cultural Service (FAS), World Grain Sinrationand Outlook. Washington, D.C. July 1988.

2. Grain output in 1987 from USDA. Eco-nomic Research Service (ERS), World GrainHarvested Area. Production, and Yield 1950-87(unpublished printout) (Washington. D.C.:1988); output in 1988 is a Worldwatch esti-mate.

3. U.S. grain production from USIA,FAS, World Grain Situation and Outlook, Wash-ington. D.C., November 1988.

4. USDA. National Agricultural StatisticsService (NASS). Crop Production. Washington.D.C., August 1988; James E. Hansen, Direc-tor. NASA Goddard Institute for Space Stud-ies. "The Greenhouse Effect: Impacts on Cur-rent Global Temperature and Regional HeatWaves," Testimony before the Committee onEnergy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate.June 23, 1988; Syukuro Manabe, "ClimateWarming Due to Greenhouse Gases," Testi-mony before the Subcommittee on ToxicSubstances and Environmental Oversight,Committee on Environment and PublicWorks, U.S. Senate, December 10, 1985.

5. USDA. ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

6. Gary A. Margheim, implementing Conser-vation Compliance (Washington. D.C.: USDA.Soil Conservation Service (SCS). 1986);"Farmers Turn Down the Irrigation Tap."Farmline. August 1988; Gordon Sloggett andClifford Dickason, Ground-Water Mining in theUnited Slates (Washington, D.C.: USDA, ERS,1986).

7. Worldwatch Institute estimate based onirrigation data from Sloggett and Dickason.Ground - Plater Mint* on :..oil erosion datafrom USDA, ERS, An Economic Analysis ofUSDA Erosion Control Programs (Washington,D.C.: 1986), and on grain production datafrom USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

Notes (Chapter 3) (205 )

8. Francis Urban and Philip Rose, WorldPopulation by Country and Region, 1950-86. andProjections to 2050 (Washington, D.C.: USDA.ERS, 1988); USDA. ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

9. Per capita data through 1987 fromUSDA. ERS, World Grain 1950-87: per capitafigure for 1988 derived from USDA, FAS,World Grain Situation, August 1988. and fromUrban and Rose. World Population.


11. Ibid.; Bruce E. Goldstein, "IndonesiaReconsiders Resettlement," World Watch

(Washington. D.C.), March/April 1988.


13. Ibid.; USDA, ERS, China: Agricultureand Trade Report. Washington, D.C.. June1988; "China Grain Yield Likely to DropBelow Target," Journal of Commerce, June 15,1988.

14. Projected output from USDA, ERS,China: Situation and Outlook Report, Washing-ton. D.C., July 1986.


16. USDA, FAS. World Rice Reference Tables(unpublished printout) (Washington, D.C.:July 1988); USDA, FAS, World Wheat andCoarse Grains Reference Tables (unpublishedprintout) (Washington, D.C.: August 1988).

17. USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87;World Bank, World Development Report 1988(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988);USDA, ERS, China: Situation and Outlook Re-port; USDA. ERS, China: .4griculture and Trade;"Midsummer Heat Brings Problems," ChinaDaily. August 4, 1988.

18. USDA. ERS. China: Situation and Out-look; USDA. ERS. World Grain 1950-87.

19. USDA, FAS, World Rice; USDA, FAS,World Wheat and Coarse Grains.

20. USDA, FAS, World Rice: USDA, FAS,World Wheat and Coarse Grains.

21. USDA. FAS. World Rice: USDA, FAS,ll'orld Wheat and Coarse Grains; United NationsWorld Food Council (WFC), "The GlobalState of Hunger and Malnutrition; 1988 Re-port," 14th Ministerial Session, Nicosia, Cy-prus. March 24, 1988.

22. Calculations based on data in USDA,ERS. World Grain 1950-87.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.; USDA. ERS, An Economic Analy-sis.

26. USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950 -87; Ye.F. Zorina et al., "The Role of the HumanFactor in the Development of the Gullying inthe Steppe and Wooded Steppe of the Euro-pean USSR," Soviet Geography, January 1977.

27. Gorbachev quoted in Vera Rich, "SoilFirst," Nature, February 12, 1982.

28. Jiang Deqi et al., Soil Erosion and Conser-vation in the Wuding River Valley (Beijing: Yel-low River Conservancy Commission. 1980),cited in S.A. El-Swaify and E.W. Dangler,"Rainfall Erosion in the Tropics: A State-of-the Art," in American Society of Agronomy,Soil Erosion and Conservation in the Tropics, Spe-cial Publication No. 43 (Madison. Wis.:1982); Josef R. Farrington et al., "Asian Dust:Seasonal Transport to the Hawaiian Is-lands." Science, April 8, 1983.

29. U.S. Agency for International Devel-opment, "Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Proposalfor Ethiopia," Washington. D.C., 1978.

30. USDA, ERS. China: Agriculture andTrade; USDA, ERS, Chine: Situation and Out-look; World Bank. World Development Report1988; USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

31. Kenneth Newcombe. An Economic Justi-fication for Rural Afforestation: The Case of Ethio-pia. Energy Department Paper No. 16 (Wash-ington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984); KennethNewcombe. "Household Energy Supply:The Energy Crisis That Is Here To Stay!"presented to the World Bank Senior Policy

22 0

(206) Notes (Chapter 3)

Seminar-Energy, Gabarone, Botswana.March 18-22. 1985.

32. K. G. Tejwani, Land Use ConsultantsInternational. private communication. July 3.1983; USDA, ERS, An Economic Analysis; Cen-tre for Science and Environment, The State ofIndia's Environment 1982 (New Delhi: 1982).

33. Margheim, Implementing ConservationCompliance.

34. USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87;U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), Current World Fertilizer Situation andOutlook 1985/86-1991/92 (Rome: 1987).

35. Sidy Gaye, "Glaciers of the Desert,"Ambio, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1987; Asim I. El Mogh-raby et al., "Desertification in Western Sudanand Strategies for Rehabilitation," Environ-mental Conservation. Autumn 1987; DjibrilDiallo, "Saving Timbuktu," Africa Recovery.December 1987.

36. Lester R. Brown and ChristopherFlavin, "The Earth's Vital Signs," in LesterR. Brown et al., State of the World 1988 (NewYork: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988); USDA,ERS, Cropland, Water. and Conservation: Situa-tion and Outlook Report. September 1988.

37. W.R. Rangeley, "Irrigation andDrainage in the World." paper presented atInternational Conference on Food andWater, Texas A&M University, College Sta-tion, May 26-30, 1936; irrigated area 1980to present is Worldwatch Institute estimatebased on ibid.

38. Frederick W. Crook. Agricultural Statis-tics of the People's Republic of China. 1949-86(Washington. D.C.: USDA, ERS, 1988).

39. Centre for Monitoring the IndianEconomy. Economic Intelligence Service,Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy,I'd. I: All India (Bombay: 1984).

40. FAO, Production rearbooks (Rome: vari-ous years); Sloggett and Dickason. Ground-Water Mining; USDA, ERS, IISSR: Agricultureand Trade Report. Washington, D.C.. May1988.

224_

41. David Fraser, "Water Crisis Threatensto Dry Up China's Future," New Straits Times,May 8, 1986; Sandra Postel. Water: RethinkingManagement in an Age of Scarcity. WorldwatchPaper 62 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch In-stitute. December 1984); Sloggett and Dicka-son. Ground-Water Mining.

42. USDA. ERS, Cropland. Water. and Con-servation.

43. Sloggett and Dickason, Ground-WaterMining.

44. Chinese irrigated area fell from nearly45 million hectares in 1978 to an estimated44 million hectares in 1987, according todata in USDA, ERS. China Situation and Out-look Report. Washington, D.C., July 1987:Fraser. "Water Crisis Threatens to Dry UpChina's Future"; Postel. Water: RethinkingManagement; Li Rongxia, "Irrigation Systemin Central Shaanxi," Beijing Review. Decem-ber 14-20, 1987; Nie Lisheng, "State Orga-nizes Farmers to Work on Irrigation," ChinaDaily, January 16. 1988.

45. Salamat Ali, "Adrift in Flood andDrought," Far Eastern Economic Review. Au-gust 27. 1987; Navin C. Joshi, "GroundWater Crisis Swells Up," Business Standard.April 26, 1988; B. B. Vohra, When MinorBecomes Major: Some Problems of Ground WaterManagement (New Delhi: Advisory Board onEnergy, 1986).

46. Martin Walker, "Sea Turning IntoDesert," Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 24,1988.

47. Philip P. Micklin. "Desiccation of theAral Sea: A Water Management Disaster inthe Soviet Union," Science. September 2,1988; Walker. "Sea Turning Into Desert."

48. Walker, "Sea Turning Into Desert."

49. U.S. trend from "Farmers Turn Downthe Irrigation Tap"; Chinese trend fromCrook. Agricultural Statistics.

50. Rangeley, "Irrigation and Drainage."


Notes (Chapters 3 mid 4) (207)

52. Yields 1984-88 from USDA, FAS,World Grain Situation. August 1988.

53. FAO. Fertilizer Yearbooks (Rome: vari-ous years): Elliot Berg. "Fertilizer Subsidies"(draft), World Bank, Wasbiroon. D.C., De-cember 1985.

54. World fertilizer use from FAO. Fertili-zer Yearbooks: world grain area per personfrom USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

55. FAO. Fertilizer Yearbooks: Anthony M.Tang and Bruce Stone. Food Production in thePeople's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.:International Food Policy Research Insiitute,1980).


57. Ibid.; Duane Chapman and RandyBarker. Resource Depletion, .1picultural Re-search. and Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity. 1987).


59. Robert W. Herds, "Technological Po-tential for Increasing Crop Productivity inDeveloping Countries." paper presented tothe meeting of the International Trade Re-search Consortium, December 14-18, 1986.

60. Fertilizer returns 20 years ago andprojections from Lester R. Brown with ErikP. Eckholm, By Bread Alone (New York: Prae-ger Publishers. 1974); Chapman and Barker,Resource Depletion: FAO, Current World FertilizerSituation and Outlook


62. Ibid.: 1988 per capita production is aWorldwatch estimate.

63. USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87:1988 Worldwatch estimate: human caloric in-take derived from data in FAO, ProductionYearbook, 1986 (Rome: 1986). from USDA.ERS. World Grain 1950-87, and from USDA.FAS. World Grain Situation, August 1988.


65. Ibid.

66. Data on the carryover stocks of grainin Table 3-3 differ from those in earlier Statesof the World because USDA recently recal-culated the historical data on this item usingbetter information on China.

67. World cropland area figure frontUSDA. ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

68. USDA, FAS, World Grain Situation. No-vember 1988; data on oil exports from Brit-ish Petroleum Company, HP Statistical Reviewof World Energy (London: 1987).

Chapter 4. Abandoning Homelands

I. "Plan to Raze Chernobyl Reported,"New York Times, October 9, 1988.

2. U.S. Committee For Refugees. WorldRefugee Sarver, 1987 in Review (Washington,D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Ser-vice, I988).

3. Worldwatch Institute estimate of thecurrent number of environmental refugeesworldwide assumes at least 8 million refu-gees from land degradation throughoutAfrica, Asia, and Latin America, includingconservative estimates of migrants to citiesdue to declining land productivity; about 2million displaced over the long term by natu-ral disasters whose effects are exacerbated byhuman activity; and several thousand dis-placed by toxic poisoning of land, includingthe aftereffects of Chernobyl. Based on infor-mation obtained from the U.S. Slate Depart-ment. the United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees, and various othersources listed elsewhere in notes.

4. John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath(New York: Viking Press, 1939).

5. Standing Committee on Agriculture,Fisheries and Forestry, Soil .11 Risk Canada'sEroding Future. A Report on Soil Conserva-tion to the Senate of Canada (Ottawa: 1984).

6. Paul Harrison, The Greening of Africa(New York; Viking/Penguin. 1987); RobertM. Press, "Ethiopia Appears to Stay One

222


Small Step Ahead of Famine," Christian Sci-ence Monitor, June 15, 1988.

7. Essam El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refu-gees (Nairobi: United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP). 1985).

8. UNEP, General Assessment of Progress in theImpknientation of the Plan of Action to CombatDesedficalion 1978-1984 (Nairobi: 1984);figure on earth's total land surface fromJames H. Brown. Biogeography (St. Louis; C.V.Mosby Company. 1983): UNEP. "Sands ofChange: Why Land Becomes Desert andWhat Can be Done About It," MEP Environ-ment Brief No. 2, Nairobi, 1988; H.E. Dregneand C.J. Tucker, "Desert Encroachment,"Desedificalion Control Bulletin, No. 16, 1988.

9. UNEP, "Sands of Change": H.E.Dregne, Desertification of .-hid Lanes (NewYork: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1983).

10. UNEP, "Sands of Change ": for infor-mation on the ecology of the Sahelian region,see Harrison. Greening of Africa; JamesBrooke, "Some Gains in West Africa's Waron the Desert." New York Times. September13. 1987.

11. UNEP, "Sands of Change"; Brooke."Some Gains in West Africa's Ware': CarolynM. Somerville, Drought and Aid in the Sahel(Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1986):Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake. Nat-ural Disasters: Acts of God or Ads of Man (Lon-don: International Institute for Environmentand Development. 1984)-

12. El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees;

Wijkman and Timberlake, Natural Disasters.

13. El-H in nawi, Environmental Refugees:

Harrison, Greening of Africa.

14. Harrison, Greening of Africa; Wijkmanand Timberlake, Natural Disasters; UNEP,"Sands of Change"; William S. Ellis,"Africa's Sahel: The Stricken Land," NationalGeographic, August 1987; Sidy Gaye, "Gla-ciers of the Desert," Ambio, Vol, 16. No. 6.1987.

15. Oakland Ross, "Where the WaterWas." Globe and Mail, April 23, 1988.

2P3

16. UNEP, Desertcation Control in Africa:Actions and Directory of Institutions (Nairobi:1985)-

17. Harrison. Greening of Africa; AnneCharnock. "An African Survivor," New Scien-tist, July 3. 1986; Susan Ringrose and WilmaMatheson, "Desertification in Botswana:Progress Toward a Viable Monitoring Sys-tem." Desertification Control Bulletin. No. 13,1986.

18. Mary Anne Weaver, "India: The'Greening' of a Bad Drought," Christian Sci-ence Monitor. May 25, 1983; UNEP, "Sands ofChange"; J. Bandyopadhyay and VandanaShiva, "Drought, Development. and Deser-tification." Economic and Political Weekly. Au-gust 16, 1986; Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, "Po-litical Ecology of Drought and WaterScarcity: Need for an Ecological Water Re-sources Policy," Economic and Political Weekly.December 12, 1987: Steven R. Weisman,"India's Drought Is Worst in Decades," NewYork Times, August 16. 1987; AnthonySpaeth, "Harshest Drought in DecadesDevastates India's Crops, Slows EconomicGrowth," Wall Street Journal, August 19,

1987.

19. Lester R. Brown and Jodi L. Jacobson.The Future of Lirbani,tation: Facing the Ecologicaland Economic Constraints, Worldwatch Paper77 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute,May 1987).

20. Mark Kurlansky, "Haiti's EnvironmentTeeters On the Edge," International Wildlife,March/April 1988; refugee figure from U.S.Committee For Refugees. World Refugee Sur-vey.

21. Richard M. Weintraub, ''FloodingWorsens in Bangladesh," Washington Post,September 5, 1988: "Bangladesh IntensifiesAppeal for Flood Aid." New York Times, Sep-tember 4, 1988.

22. Per capita income figure from WorldBank, World Development Report 1988 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1988); Popu-


lation Reference Bureau (PRB). 1988 WorldPopulation Data Sheet (Washington. D.C.:1988); "Life in Bangladesh Delta: A RaceBred By Disaster," New York nines, June 21,1987.

23. Nam! Huda. "Bangladesh BlamesNeighbors for its Floods," Panoscope (Lon-don). December 1987.

24. International Task Force, Tropical For-ests: A Call to Action, Part 2: Case Studies (Wash-ington. D.C.: World Resources Institute,1985).

25. Huda, "Bangladesh Blames Neigh-bors": "Misery Rising in the Floods in Ban-gladesh." New York nines. September 5.1987: S. Kamaluddin. "Flood of Woes," FarEastern Economic Review. November 8, 1984.

26. Hans Hurni, "Degradation and Con-servation of the Resources in the EthiopianHighlands." .Mountain Research and Develop-ment. Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3. 1988.

27. Blaine Harden, "Nile Floods in SudanTermed Record. Could Deepen.** WashingtonPost. August 10. 1988.

28. Debora MacKenzie, "Man-made Di-saster in the Philippines," New Scientist, Sep-tember 13, 1983.

29. "12J Die in Avalanche of Mud inColombian Slum." New York Times, Septem-ber 29, 1987.

30. Mac Margolis, "Rio's Mudslides PartlySelf-inflicted," If Post, February 28,1988.

31. Sally Johnson, "Toxic Waste Uproot-ing Elderly From Trailer Park," New YorkTimes. July 17, 1988: for information on haz-ardous waste problems in the developingworld, see H. Jeffrey Leonard. "HazardousWastes: The Crisis Spreads," National Devel-opment, April 1986.

32. Love Canal Homeowners Association,Love Canal: A Chronology of Events That Shapeda Movement (Arlington, Va.: Citizen's Clear-inghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Inc., 1984).

33. ibid.; Michael Weisskopf. "EPA toComplete Love Canal Cleanup but Habita-bility Remains Uncertain." Washington Post,October 27, 1987.

34. Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA). "Superfund Reiocation As-sistance," Washington. D.C., 1985; CharlesRobinson, FEMA, Washington. D.C.. privatecommunication, February 22. 1988.

35. "Summary of Superfund Activity." un-published memorandum, FEMA, Washing-ton, D.C., 1988; "8 From ContaminatedTown Lose Illness Suit." New York Times,June 9, 1988; Michael Weisskopf, "BuyoutsReplacing Cleanups as Remedy for PollutedCommunities," Washivon Post, September3, 1987.

S6. Weisskopf, "Buyouts ReplacingCleanups."

37. David Maraniss and Michael Weiss-kopf, "Jobs and Illness in Petrochemical Cor-ridor." Washington Post. December 22, 1987.

38. Ibid.

39. Mike Leary, "Poisoned EnvironmentWorries Eastern Europe." Philadelphia In-quirer, October 4, 1987; Hilary F. French,"Industrial Wasteland," World Watch (Wash-ington. D.C.). November/December 1988.

40. "Soviet Environmental Official UrgesPunishment for Polluters." Journal of Com-merce. July 6, 1988.

41. UNEP, "Hazardous Chemicals."UNEP Environment Brief No. 4, Nairobi, 1988.

42. Jon Nordheimer, "Dioxin's Effects inItaly Less Severe Than Had Been Feared,"New York Times, January 31, 1983; Michael H.Brown, The Toxic Cloud (New York: Harper &Row, 1987); Thomas W. Netter, "Dioxin of'76 Italian Accident Reported Destroyed.**New York Times. July 14, 1986.

43. Jane H. Ives. ed.. The Export of Hazard(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Patti. 1985);Sandra Postel, Defusing the Toxics Threat: Con-trolling Pesticides and Industrial Waste, World-

2.24

(21o) :Votes (Chapters 4 and 5)

watch Paper 79 (Washington, D.C.: World-watch Institute. September 1987).

44. UNEP, "Hazardous Chemicals"; Mi-chael Isikoff, "Twice Poisoned," The Washing-ton Monthly, December 1987.

45. Christopher Flavin. Reassessing :Vueltas.Power: The Fallout From Chernobyl, WorldwatchPaper 75 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch In-stitute, March 1987); George M. Woodwell,"Chernobyl: A Technology That Failed," Is-sues in Scienet and Technology. Fall 1986.

46. Flavin, Reassessing .Viteltar Power.

47. Wendy Grieder, U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA), quoted in Nathan-iel Sheppard Jr., "U.S. Companies LookingAbroad for Waste Disposal," Journal of Com-merce, July 20, 1988.

48. Blaine Harden. "Outcry Grows inAfrica Over West's Waste-dumping," !rash-ingion Post, June 22. 1988; Steven Green-house, "Toxic Waste Boomerang: CiaoItaly!" Yew York Times, September 1, 1988.

49. "Waste Imports Alarm Lebanese,"Journal of Commerce. June 27, 1988; Harden."Outcry Grows."

50. Hilary F. French. "Combating Toxic'Terrorism," Irorld March (Washington.D.C.), September/October 1988.

51. Tom Gocmans and Pier Vellinga,"Low Countries and High Seas." presentedto the First North American Conference onPreparing (or Climate Change: A Coopera-tive Approach. Washington, D.C., October27-29, 1987; J.E. Prins, impact of Sea Level Riseon Society (Delft, Netherlands: Delft Hydrau-lics Laboratory, 1986).

52. Robert C. Cowen, "Man-made GasesIncrease the Chance of Major WeatherChange." Christian Science Monitor. June 30,1988; warming projections from U.S. Na-tional Academy of Sciences, Changing Climate.Report of the Carbon Dioxide AssessmentCommittee (Washington. D.C.; NationalAcademy Press. 1983).

53. James G. Titus, EPA. "Causes and Ef-fects of Sea Level Rise." presented to theFirst North American Conference on Prepar-ing for Climate Change; A Cooperative Ap-proach, Washington, D.C., October 27-29,1987.

54. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, speechbefore the Forty-second Session of the U.N.General Assembly, New York. October 19,1987.

55, John D. Milliman et al.. "Environmen-tal and Economic Impact of Rising Sea Leveland Subsiding Deltas; The Nile and BengalExamples." Woods Hole Oceanographic In-stitution, Woods Hole, Mass., unpublished.1988.

56, Ibid.; Daniel Jean Stanley, "Subsi-dence in the Northeastern Nile Delta: RapidRates, Possible Causes, and Consequences,"Science, April 22, 1988.

57. Milliman et al., "Environmental andEconomic Impact"; for further information.see Clyde Haberman, "A Steamy, CrowdedBangkok is Sinking Slowly Into the Sea." NewYork Times, May 1, 1983.

58. Information on Bangladesh and Egyptin this section from Milliman et al., "Environ-mental and Economic Impact," unless indi-cated otherwise.

59. Year 2100 population from PRB, 1988World Population Data Ant

60. Number of people affected in 2050from PRB, 1988 World Population Data Shttt.

61. Prins, Impact of Sea Level Rise: Gayoom,speech before U.N. General Assembly.

62. Gocmans and Vellinga, "Low Coun-tries and High Seas"; U.S. coastline figurefrom The 1988 Information Pleast Almanac(New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987).

Chapter 5. Protecting the Ozone Layer

1. Joseph C. Farman et al., "Large Lossesof Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal

Notes (Chapter 5)

CIOINOx Interaction," Nature, May 16.1985; Paul Brodeur, "Annals of Chemistry:In the Face of Doubt," New Yorker, June 9,1986.

2. Subcommittees on Environmental Pro-tection and on Hazardous Wastes and ToxicSubstances, Implications of the Findings of theExpedition to Investigate the Ozone Hole Over theAntarctic, Committee on Environment andPublic Works. U.S. Senate. October 27, 1987.

3. National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration (NASA), "Executive Summaryof the Ozone Trends Panel," Washington,D.C., March 15, 1988,

4, United Nations Environment Pro-gramme (UNEP), "Montreal Protocol onSubstances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,"1987; country updates from U.N. Treaty Of-fice, New York, various private communica-tions: Office of Technology Assessment(OTA). U.S. Congress, "An Analysis of theMontreal Protocol on Substances that De-plete the Ozone Layer," Washington, D.C.,December 10, 1987 (rev, February 1. 1988):James E. Hansen. Director, NASA GoddardInstitute for Space Studies, "The Green-house Effect: Impacts on Current GlobalTemperature and Regional Heat Waves,"Testimony before the Committee on Energyand Natural Resources, U,S. Senate, June 23.1988; Linda J. Fisher. U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA), Testimony beforethe Subcommittee on Energy and Power.Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S.House of Representatives, September 22,1988; T.M.L. Wigley. "Future CFC Concen-trations Under the Montreal Protocol andTheir Greenhouse-Effect Implications," Na-tuff, September, 22, 1988.

5. Farman et al.. "Large Losses"; MarioMolina and F. Sherwood Rowland, "Strato-spheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes:Chlorine Atom Catalysed Destruction ofOzone," .nature, June 28, 1974.

6. Douglas G. Cogan, Stones in a GlassHouse; CFCs and Ozone Depletion (Washington,

(211)

D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Cen-ter, 1988); Richard S. Stolarski, "The Ant-arctic Ozone Hole." Scientific ..linnican. Janu-ary 1988.

7. Susan Solomon, National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA), inter-view on "The Hole M the Sky," N01'4,WGBH-Boston. February 24, 1987.

8. Stolarski, "The Antarctic Ozone Hole";"Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment,"NASA, Washington, D.C., uly 1987; ShirleyChristian, "Pilots Fly Over the Pole into theHeart of Ozone Mystery." New York Times,September 22. 1987.

9, Mario J. Molina et al.. "Antarctic Strato-spheric Chemistry of Chlorine Nitrate, Hy-drogen Chloride, and Ice: Release of ActiveChlorine," Science, November 27, 1987;Mario Molina, "The Antarctic Ozone Hole,"Oceania, Summer 1988; F. Sherwood Row-land. University of California at Irvine, Testi-mony before the Committee on Environmentand Public Works, U.S. Senate, September14, 1988.

10. James G. Anderson, Harvard Univer-sity, Testimony before the EnvironmentalProtection and the Hazardous Wastes andToxic Substances Subcommittees, Commit-tee on Environment and Public Works. U.S.Senate, October 27. 1987.

1 1. Molina, "The Antarctic Ozone Hole";NASA. "Ozone Trends."

12. Fisher. Testimony: Wigley, "FutureCFC Concentrations"; Michael McElroy."The Challenge of Global Change," New Sci-

entist, July 28. 1988; Donald R. Blake and F.Sherwood Rowland. "Continuing World-wide Increase in Tropospheric Methane.1978 to 1987." Nainte, March 4. 1988.

13. Pamela S. Zurer, "Studies on OzoneDestruction Expand Beyond Antarctic,"Chemical and Engineering News. May 30, 1988.

14. Ibid.; Malcolm W. Browne. "NewOzone Threat: Scientists Fear Layer is Erod-

226


ing at North Pole,- New York Tunes. October11. 1988.

15 Zurer, "Studies on Ozone DestructionExpand Beyond Antarctic": Molina. "TheAntarctic Ozone Hole: John Gribben. "Sat-ellite Failure Threatens Ozone Probe." NewScientist. July 14, 1988.

16. Rowland, Testimony: R. Monastersky.**Arctic Ozone: Signs of Chemical Destruc-tion," Science News. June 11, 1988: Robert T.Watson. NASA, Testimony before the Envi-ronmental Protection and the HazardousWastes and Toxic Substances Subcommit-tees. Committee on Environment and PublicWorks, U.S. Senate, October 27, 1987.

17. NASA. "Ozone Trends."

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.: McElroy. "Challenge of GlobalChange."

20. Robert T. Watson, '*Present State ofKnowledge of the Ozone Layer," presentedto The Changing Atmosphere.. Implicationsfor Global Security, Toronto. June 27-30.1988; Rowland, Testimony.

21. James Gleik, "Even With ActionToday, Ozone Loss Will Increase," New York71nres, March 20. 1988.

22. NASA. "Ozone Trends"; EPA, Regula-tory Impact .-analysis: Protection of StratosphericOzone, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: 1987),

23. J.C. van der Leun, "Health Effects ofUltraviolet Radiation," draft report to theUNEP Coordinating Committee on theOzone Layer, Effects of Stratospheric Modifi-cationandaimateChange.Bilthoven,Nether-lands, November 19-21. 1986 (hereinaftercited as UNEP Coordinating Committee).

24. Ibid.: Paul Strickland et al.. "Sunlight,Ozone, and Skin Cancer." Health & Environ-ment Digest, May 1988. "Effects of OzoneLayer Modification," UNEP CoordinatingCommittee: EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis:Polly Penhale, National Science Foundation,Washington. D.C., private communication,

2 7

September 28. 1988; Peter Wilkness. Na-tional Science Foundation. Testimony beforethe Environmental Protection and the Haz-ardous Wastes and Toxic Substances Sub-committees. Committee on Environment andPublic Works. U.S. Senate, October 27.1987.

25 National Cancer Institute, 1987 annualCancer Statistics Review. Including Cancer Trends:1950-1985 (Bethesda, Md: National Insti-tutes of Health, 1987); Arjun Makhijani et al.,Saving Our Skins: Technical Potential and Policiesfor the Elimination of Ozone-Depleting ChlorineCompounds (Washington. D.C.: Environmen-tal Policy Institute/Institute for Energy andEnvironmental Research. 1988); EPA,Regulatory Impact Analysis.

26. Robin Russell Jones, "Ozone Deple-tion and Cancer Risk," Lancet, August 22,1987: Janice Longstreth. "Health Effects As-sociated with Stratospheric Ozone Deple-tion." in Dr. Karola Taschner. ed.. The Sky isthe Limit (Brussels: European EnvironmentalBureau, 1987); Darrel Rigel, New York Uni-versity Medical Center, Testimony before theSubcommittee on Health and the Environ-ment. Committee on Energy and Commerce,U.S. House of Representatives, March 9.1987.

27. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis.

28. Margaret Kripke. M.D., AndersonHospital and Tumor Institute, Testimonybefore the Environmental Protection and theHazardous Wastes and Toxic SubstancesSubcommittees. Committee on Environmentand Public Works, U.S. Senate. May 12,1987: EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis:JaniceLongstreth, 1CF Inc.. Fairfax. Va.. privatecommunication. September 28. 1988.

29. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis; Long-streth, private communication; **Chloro-fluorocarbons: A Valuable Chemical Threat-ens the Atmosphere." Health & EnvironmentDigest, May 1988.

30. "Risks to Crops and Terrestrial Eco-systems From Enhanced UV-B Radiation."


draft report to the UNEP Coordinating Com-mittee; Alan Teramura, "The Potential Con-sequences of Ozone Depletion Upon GlobalAgriculture," in J. Titus, ed., Mitts of Changesin Stmlopheric Ozone and Global Climate (Wash-ington, D.C.: EPA, 1986); Alan H. Teramuraand N.S. Murali, "Intraspecific Differences inGrowth and Yield of Soybean Exposed toill-traviolet-B Radiation Under Greenhouse andField Conditions," Environmental and Experi-mental Botany, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1986.

31. James Falco, Director, Office of Envi-ronmental Processes and Effects Research.EPA, Testimony before the Subcommitteeon Natural Resources, Agriculture Researchand Environment, Committee on Science.Space and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-sentatives, March 10, 1987.

32. Robert C. Worrest, "What Are the Ef-fects of UV-B Radiation on Marine Orga-nisms?" Testimony before the West GermanBundestag Commission on Preventive Mea-sures to Protect the Earth's Atmosphere,April 27, 1988,

33. Robert C. Worrest, "Solar Ultravio-let-B Radiation Effects on Aquatic Orga-nisms," draft report to the UNEP Coordinat-ing Committee: "Dinosaurs Doomed by aDearth of Plankton," New Scientist. March 17,1988.

34. Worrest. "Solar Ultraviolet-B Radia-tion Effects on Aquatic Organisms."

35. Office of Air and Radiation, Assessingthe Risks of Trace Gases that Can Modify the Strato-

sphere (Washington, D.C.: EPA, 1987).

36. Raymond J. Kopp and Alan J. Krup-nick, "Agricultural Policy and the Benefits ofOzone Control," American Journal of Agricul-tural Economics, December 1987.

37. Philip Shabecoff, "Ozone Pollution isFound at Peak in Summer Heat." New YorkTimes, July 31, 1988; Marjorie Sun, 'TighterOzone Standard Urged by Scientists," Sci-ence, June 24, 1988.

38. Shabecoff, "Ozone Pollution"; HaroldDovland, "Monitoring European Trans-boundary Air Pollution," Environment, De-cember 1987.

39. Private communications with officialsat EPA, National Science Foundation, U.S.Department of Agriculture, and National In-stitutes of Health; Hartmut Kenne, Ecologi-cal Research Division, West German :inistryfor Research and Technology. Bonn. privatecommunication, June 28. 1988.

40. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis.

41. Cogan, Stones in a Glass House.

42. Chemical Manufacturers Association(CNA), "Production, Sales, and CalculatedRelease of CFC-11 and CFC -12 Through1986," Washin gton.D.C.,November 18 .1987.

43. Michael Weisskopf, "CFCs: Rise andFall of Chemical 'Miracle'," Washington Post.April 10, 1988; EPA, Addenda to RegulatoryImpact Analysis; Alliance for Responsible CH:Policy, The Montreal Protocol: A Briefing Book(Rosslyn, Va.: 1987).

44. Steve Risotto, Halogenated SolventsIndustry Alliance. Washington. D.C., privatecommunication, August 31, 1988.

45. Cogan. Stones in a Glass House.

46. Ron Wolf, "Ozone Layer NegotiationsTarget Chlorofluorocarbons. " Jounial of Com-merce, August 13, 1987; Alliance for Respon-sible CFC Policy, Briefing Book.

47. Cogan, Stones in a Glass House; P.H.Gamlen et al., "The Production and Releaseto the Atmosphere of CC13F and CCI2F2(Chlorofluorocarbons CFC 11 and CFC12)." Atmospheric Environment, Vol. 20, No. 6,1986: Elizabeth Festa Gormley, CMA. Wash-ington, D.C., private communication, August31, 1988; Christopher F.P. Bevington, MetroConsulting Group Limited, London, privatecommunication, May 23. 1988; Risotto, pri-vate communication.

48. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis; Rich-ard Monastersky, "Decline of the CFC Em-

228

(214) Notts (Chapter 5)

pire," Science News, April 9, 1988; House ofCommons Environment Committee, Air Pol-lution (London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice, 1988); Cogan, Stones in a Glass Howe;"White Paper on the Environment in Japan1988," Japanese Environment Agency,Tokyo, May 1988,

49, CMA, "Production, Sales, and Cal-culated Release."

50. Cogan. Stones in a Glass Howe.

51, CMA, "Production, Sales. and Cal-culated Release"; Risotto, private communi-cation.

52. Michael Weisskopf, "EPA Urges Hattin Use of CFCs," Washington Post. September27, 1988; John S. Hoffman and Michael J.Gibbs, Future Concentrations of StratosphericChlorine and Bromine (Washington, D.C.: EPA.1988).

53, Cogan, Stones in a Glass House; CMA."Production, Sales, and Calculated Release";Michael Kavanaugh et al., "An Analysis of theEconomic Effects of Regulatory and Non-Regulatory Events Related to the Abandon-ment of Chlorofluorocarbons as AerosolPropellants in the United States From 1970to 1980, with a Discussion of Applicability ofthe Analysis to Other Nations," ICF Inc..Washington, D.C., February 1986 (rev.);Nigel Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy & Brit-ain (Hallow, Essex: Longman Group UK Ltd,1987).

54, Cumulative emissions reductions fromEPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis; CMA, "Pro-duction, Sales, and Calculated Release."

55. CMA, "Production, Sales. and Cal-culated Release,"

56. "The Aerosol Industry and CFCs: AParting of the Ways," ENDS Report, January1988; Mark Vandenreeck, Belgian embassy,Washington, D.C.. private communication.April 14. 1988; Wolf Dieter Garber, Umwelt-bundesamt, Berlin, West Germany, privatecommunication, June 24. 1988; "AerosolMakers to Offer Voluntary Labeling for Prod-

2P 9

ucts Without CFCs, Association Says," Inter-national Environment Reporter. June 8, 1988;Vera Rich, "Growing Reaction to OzoneHole in Soviet Union," Nature. August 25,1988.

57. F. Camm et al. "The Social Cost ofTechnical Control Options to Reduce Emis-sions of Potential Ozone Depicters in theUnited States: An Update," The Rand Cor-poration, Santa Monica. Calif., May 1986;Alan S. Miller and Irving M. Miutzer, "TheSky Is the Limit: Strategies for Protecting theOzone Layer." World Resources Institute,Washington, D.C., November 1986.

58. M. Drechsler, Umweltbundesamt, Ber-lin, West Germany, private communication,June 24, 1988; L.R. Wallace. AT&T. Prince-ton, NJ., private communication. March 9.1988; Maurice Verhille. Atochem, Paris, pri-vate communication, June 17. 1988: KevinFay, Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy,Rosslyn, Va.. private communication. Octo-ber 14, 1988; J. Rodgers. Allied-Signal. "Re-cycling and Recovery of Solvents in the Elec-tronics Industry," in "Proceedings ofConference and Traue Fair: Substitutes andAlternatives to CFCs and Halons," EPA,Washington, D.C.. January 13-15, 1988(hereinafter cited as Substitutes and Alterna-tives Conference).

59. "Takeshita Cabinet Approves OzoneBill Including Tax Incentives for CFC Recy-cling." International Environment Reporter.April 13, 1988.

60. C.H. Mueller, "Report on Realisationand ResLits with a Full Scale CFC 11 Recov-ery Unit in the Flexible Foam Slabstock Pro-duction at Recticel in Kesteren Holland."Escher Hoogezand. Netherlands, March 11,1987; Dr, H. Creyf, Recticel. Testimonybefore the West German Bundestag Com-mission on Preventive Measures to Protectthe Earth's Atmosphere, April 13. 1988; Na-tional Swedish Environmental ProtectionBoard, CFCs/Freons; Proposals to Protect theOzone Layer (Solna, Sweden: 1987); "FoamPlastics: Next in Line for the CFCs Cam-

Notes (Chapler 5) (215)

paign." ENDS Report, March 1988; N.C.Vreenegoor. "Environmental Considera-tions in the Production of Flexible Slab-stock," Substitutes and Alternatives Confer-ence.

61. Mueller. "Report on Realisation andResults with a Full Scale CFC 11 RecoveryUnit"; Creyf, Testimony; National SwedishEnvironmental Protection Board, CFCs/ Fre-ons; "Foam Plastics: Next in Line," ENDS Re-port; Vreenegoor, "Environmental Consider-ations in the Production of FlexibleSlabstock."

62. EPA, Addenda to Regulatory ImpactAnalysis.

63. Sarah L. Clark, "Protecting the OzoneLayer: What You Can Do," EnvironmentalDefense Fund, New York, 1988; Jean Lupi-nacci, EPA, Washington, D.C., private com-munication. October 14. 1988; KennethManz, Robinair, Montpelier, Ohio, privatecommunication, August 11, 1988.

64. Clark, "Protecting the Ozone Layer ";Lupinacci, private communication.

65. Mr. Pautz, Umweltbundesamt, Berlin,West Germany, private communication, June24, 1988.

66. John R. Fisher, "A New Rosin Deflux-nig Alternative," AT&T, Princeton, NJ.,1988; Philip Shabecoff, "New Compound IsHailed as Boon to Ozone Shield," Nero l'orkTimes. January 14, 1988; Pamela S. Zurcr,"Search intensifies for Alternatives toOzone-Depleting Halocarbons," Chemical andEngineering News. February 8, 1988; SudhakarKesavan, "Overview of CFC.I13 Use in theElectronics Industry and Control OptionsAvailable." Substitutes and AlternativesConference.

67. Laurie Hays, "Du Pont Plans Plant toProduce Refrigerant Harmless to Ozone,"Wall Street Journal. September 30. 1988; "DuPont Plans Commercial-Scale Plant for Pro-duction of CFC -12 Substitute," Journal ofCommerce, September 30, 1988; Malcolm

Gladwell, "Du Pont Mans to Make CFC Al-ternative." Washington Post. September 30,1988.

68. "Carhidc Easing an Ozone Peril,"Washington Post, August 6, 1988; "Dow toCurtail CFCs." Washington Post. May 14,1988.

69. Thomas P. Nelson. "Findings of theChlorofluorocarbon Chemical SubstitutesInternational Committee," EPA. Washing-ton, D.C., 1988; Mcirion Jones. In Search ofSafe CFCs," New Scientist. May 26, 1988; U.Bohr, Du Pont, Testimony before the WestGerman Bundestag Commission on Preven-tive Measures to Protect the Earth's Atmo-sphere, April 25, 1988; Imperial ChemicalIndustries (1C1), Testimony before the WestGerman Bundestag Commission on Preven-tive Measures to Protect the Earth's Atmo-sphere. April 29, 1988.

70. "Du Pont Secs Progress in ReplacingFluorocarbons." Chemical Marketing Reporter,January II, 1988; "Korean Firm Joins in In-ternational Effort to Pool Knowledge on CFCToxicity Testing Studies," hiternational Envi-ronment Reporter, April 13, 1988; Greg Frei-herr, Can Chemists Save the World fromChemists?" The Scientist. May 16. 1988.

71. Camm et al., "Social Cost of TechnicalControl Options"; National Swedish Envi-ronmental Protection Board. CFCs/Freons.

72. Makhijani et al, Saving Our Skins; NickSundt, OTA, Washington. D.C.. private com-munication, July 28. 1988.

73. Tom Potter, "Potential for OffsettingCFCs with Advanced Insulation." Substitutesand Alternatives Conference.

74. John W. Mossel "Uses of Halons andOpportunities for Emission Reductions: Sizeand Structure of the Market," Substitutesand Alternatives Conference.

75, Ibid.; Tom Moorehousc, "1 tic AirForce Halon/Ozone Research Program,"Substitutes and Alternatives Conference.

230


76. Gregory C. Munie, AT&T BellLaboratories. "Experience with the Use ofAqueous Cleaning in the Electronics Indus-try," Substitutes and Alternatives Confer-ence; Leo Lambert, "Digital Equipment Cor-poration Experience with AqueousCleaning," Substitutes and Alternatives Con-ference; Eileen B. Claussen, "Moving For-ward Together," The Environmental Forum,July/Atigust 1988; Kathi Johnson, U.S. Navy,"Alternative Cleaning Materials: ResearchTopics for the Military," Substitutes and Al-ternatives Conference.

77. UNEP, "Montreal Protocol"; U.N.Treaty Office, private communication.

78. U.N. Treaty Office, private communi-cation.

79. Refrigerator use in China from Na-tional Swedish Environmental ProtectionBoard, CFCs /Freon,

80, UNEP, "Montreal Protocol."

81, Ibid.; OTA,''An Analysis of the Mon-treal Protocol."

82, Hoffman and Gibbs, Future Concentra-tions.

83. Ibid.

84. James K. Hammitt et al "FutureEmission Scenarios for Chemicals that MayDeplete Stratospheric Ozone," Nature, De-cember 24, 1987; Arjun Makhijani, Institutefor Energy and Environmental Research,Takoma Park, Md private communication,October 26, 1988,

85. Hoffman and Gibbs, Future Concentra-tions.

86. Government of Sweden, "Environ-mental Policy for the 1990s," EnvironmentalBill, March 4, 1988; Makhijani et al., SavingOur Shim.

87. National Swedish Environmental Pro-tection Board, CFCs/Freons; Government ofSweden, "Environmental Policy for the1990s."

231

88. $100-million figure from Fay, privatecommunication.

89. Mark Ledbetter. American Council foran Energy Efficient Economy, Washington,D.C., private communication, October 12,1988; Terry Statt, U.S. Department of En-ergy, Washington, D.C., private communica-tion, October 12, 1988.

90. Suzanne Butcher, U.S. Department ofState, Washington, D.C., private communica-tion, September 1988; Joan Martin-Brown,UNEP, Washington, D.C.. private communi-cation, November 1, 1988.

Chapter 6. Rethinking Transportation

I. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-tion (MVMA), Facts and Figures '88 (Detroit,Mich.: 1988).

2. Production and ownership data fromMVMA, Ilrorld Motor Vehicle Data, 1987 Edition(Detroit, Mich.: 1987) and MVMA, Fads andFigures '87 (Detroit, Mich.: 1987),

3. MVMA, World Motor Vehicle Data, 1987.

4, Toli Welihozkiy,''Automobiles and theSoviet Consumer," in Soviet Economy in a Timeof Change, Vol. 1, Compendium of PapersSubmitted to the U.S. Congress, Joint Eco-nomic Committee, October 10, 1979; "Rus-sian Cars: French Accent," The Economist, De-cember 3, 1983; MVMA, World Motor VehicleData (Detroit, Mich.; various editions).

5. Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Rise in Allies'Lending to Soviets Divides U.S.," New YorkTimes, October 21, 1988.

6, Worldwatch Institute, based on MVMA,Fads and Figures (Detroit, Mich.: various edi-tions).

7. MVMA, Fads and Figures '87.

8. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, "The Outlookfor Latin American Debt," Foreign Affairs, Fall1987; William A. Orme, "End of Mexico's OilBoom Era Has Meant Hardships for Citi-zens," Washington Post, August 16, 1987;

Notes (Chapter 6) (2:7)

James Bruce, "Atitolatina Braces For FurtherClash," Journal of Commerce, October 15,1987; MVMA, World Motor Vehicle Data, 1987.

9. "The Giants Ship Out to Shape Up,"Gazeta Mercantil, July 13, 1987Jarnes V. Hig-gins, "Mexico Pins Economic Recovery onAuto Exports," Detroit News, June 10, 1988.

10, Alan Altshuler et al., The Future of theAutomobile: The Report of .MT's InternationalMao Program (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1984); export and car density data based onMVMA, World Motor Vehicle Data, 1987 andFads and Figures 37.

1 I. Population data from United Nations,World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projec-tions as Assessed in 1984 (New York: 1986);MVMA, Facts and Figures '37; "A Great DriveForward," Asiaweek, December 11, 1987;"How China Boosts Her Car Industry,"China Daily, July 3, 1987; "China Plans toBuild More Cars," China Daily. June 25,1987: John Elliott, "A 1950s Comeback," Fi-nancial Times Motor Industry Survey, October14. 1986.

12. United Nations. World Population Pros-pects; additions to U.S. car fleet calculatedfrom MVMA, World Motor Vehicle Data, 1987.

13. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),Assessment of Costs and Benefits of Flexible andAlternative Fuel Use in the U.S. TransportationSectorProgress Report One: Context and Analyt-ical Framework (Washington, D.C.: 1988);transport sector consumption based onPhilip Patterson, "Periodic Energy Report.No. 2/1987." DOE, Washington, D.C., De-cember 1987, and on Mary C. Holcomb etal., Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 9(Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory, 1987). Comparative interna-tional data for passenger cars only are notavailable.

14, International Monetary Fund (IMF),International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1987(Washington, D.C.: 1987); Jos* Goldemberget al., Energy for Development .(Washington,MC.; World Resources Institute, 1987).

15. On Brazilian oil import bills, see "Bra-zil Survey," The Economist, April 25, 1987;IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1987. Abarrel of alcohol fuel costs about $45 to pro-vide (compared with oil prices currentlybarely above $10), but its retail price is keptto no more than 65 percent of gasolineprices. Moreover, a reduced fuel import billis at least partially offset by the need to im-port some $3 billion worth of foodstuffs thatfarmers stopped planting in order to growsugarcane as an ethanol feedstock; MarkKosmo, Money to Burn? The High Costs of EnergySubsidies (Washington, D.C.: World Re-sources Institute, 1987).

16. United Nations, 1985 Energy StatisticsYearbook (New York: 1987).

17. Cynthia Pollock Shea, Renewable En-ergy: Today's Contribution, Tomorrow's Promise,Worldwatch Paper 81 (Washington, D.C.:Worldwatch Institute, January 1988). Even inBrazil, demand is growing for gasoline-pow-ered cars, particularly since the governmentdecided to reduce the subsidy for ethanol:"Gasoline-Powered Cars: Output on the Up-swing," Gaeta Mercantil, July 25, 1988. Cornas feedstock discussed in "PMAA Makes aCase for Methanol," Energy Daily, July 30,1987; Barry Commoner, "Economic Growthand Environmental Quality; How to HaveBoth," Social Polity, Summer 1985.

18. J.R. Kenworthy and P.W.G. Newman,"The Potential of Ethanol as a Transporta-tion Fuel: A Review Based on Technological,Economic, and Environmental Criteria," Dis-cussion Paper No. 6/86, Murdoch University,Australia, August 1986: "Energy: AnotherDeficit," The Economist. November 14, 1987.

19. DOE, Costs and Benefits of Flexible andAlternative Fuel Use.

20. Peter Hoffmann, "Hydrogen: Powerto Burn?" Not Man Apart. November/Decem-ber 1987; "Hydrogen Drives PrototypeVan," New Scientist, February 27, 1986.

21. Mark A, DeLuchi et al., "A Compara-tive Analysis of Future Transportation

23 2

(218) Moles (Chapter 6)

Fuels," Institute of Transportation Studies,University of California, Berkeley. October1987; Paul J. Werbos, Oil Dependency and thePotential for Fuel Cell Vehicles, Technical PaperSeries (Warrendale. Pa.: Society of Automo-tive Engineers (SAE). 1987).

22. Average fleet fuel economy fromDOE, Energy Information Administration,Monthly Energy Review, October 1987; new-car fuel economy from MVMA. Fads and Fig-ures '87.

23. Fuel efficiency has been responsiblefor an estimated two thirds of the reducedgasoline consumption per car in countriesthat are members of the Organisation for Ec-onomic Co-operation and Development(OECD), with the remainder due to reduceddriving; International Energy Agency (IEA).Energy Conservation in 1 EA Countries and EnergyPolicies and Programmes of 1E:1 Countries, 1986Review (Paris: OECD, 1987).

24. Soviet and East German fuel economyfrom William U. Chandler, Energy Productivity:Key to Environmental Protection and EconomicProgress, Worldwatch Paper 63 (Washington.D.C.: Worldwatch Institute. January 1985).

25. MVMA, Facts and Figures '87: WA. En-ergy Conservation in !EA Countries; R.M. Hea-venric h et al., Light Dtily Autosnotive TrendsThrough 1986, Technical Paper Series (War-rendale, Pa.: SAE. 1986). On light trucks. seePhilip Patterson. "Analysis of Future Trans-portation Petroleum Demand and EfficiencyImprovements." presented at IEA EnergyDemand Analysis Symposium, Paris, Octo-ber 12-14. 1987; Patterson. "Periodic En-ergy Report." The trend toward larger carsin Europe is particularly strong in West Ger-many; Bundesministerium fur Verkehr, l'er-kehr in Zahlen 1987 (Bonn: 1987).

26. Holcomb et al.. Transportation EnergyData Book.

27. Deborah Lynn Bleviss, The New Oil Cri-sis and Fuel Economy Technologies: Preparing theLight Transportation Industry for the 1990's(New York: Quorum Press. 1988).

28. Ibid.

29. Klaus NItiller. "The Increasing Use ofPlastics and its Impacts on the Recyclabilityof Automobiles and on Waste Disposal inWest Germany. the United States andJapan," presented at the Second RecyclingConference. Washington. D.C. June 18-19.1987; Bleviss, The New Oil Crisis.

30. Bleviss. The New Oil Crisis.

31. OECD, Environmental Effects of Automo-tive Transport (The Compass Project) (Paris:1986).

32. Bleviss, The Neu, Oil Crisis.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.; Dan McCosh. "AutomotiveNewsfront." Popular Science. December 1987.

35. "Burnley Pushes Repeal of Fuel Econ-omy Rules." Journal of Commerce, October 24.1988.

36. Ford quote is from Roberti. Golten etal., eds., The End of the Road. 4 Citizen's Guideto Transportation Problemsolving (Washington,D.C.; National Wildlife Federation/Environ-mental Action Foundation, Inc., 1977).

37. Worldwatch estimates. based onNiVMA. Facts and Figures '87.

38. The U.S. "gas guzzler" tax is assessedon the 'basis of a particular vehicle's fueleconomy. However, it fails to encourage carbuyers to purchase the most fuel-efficientmodels available; A 1986 car achieving a rat-ing of more than 22.5 miles per gallon (MPG)was not subject to any levy, even while thegovernment's own standards dictated a mini-mum corporate average fuel efficiency stan-dard of 26 MPG. See Holcomb et al.. Trans-portation Energy Data Book; Gary Klott, "Risein 'Gas Guzzler' Tax Approved by SenatePanel." New York Times, March 22, 1988.

39. DeLuchi et al., "Comparative Analysisof Future Transportation Fuels"; "AutoOveruse -- Dirty Air," National Association ofRailroad Passengers News, February 1988.

Notes (Chapter 6)

40. And Alexandre and Christian Aver-ous, "Transport's Toll on the Environment,"OECD Observer, February /March 1988; car-bon dioxide (CO2) estimate from DeLuchi etal.. ''Comparative Analysis of Future Trans-portation Fuels." In the United States, high-way transportation accounts for about 27percent of all fossil-fuel-released CO,.

41. Rose Marie Audette. "It Only HurtsWhen You Breathe," Environmental Action,March/April 1988; U.S. Environmental Pro-tection Agency (EPA), The Economic Ejects ofOzone on Agriculture (Corvallis, Ore.: 1984).Recent studies indicate that several hours ofexposure at lower levels may be dangerous tohuman health; see Michael Weisskopf."Ozone Dangers Upgraded," WashingtonPost, July 8. 1988.

42. EPA, National Air Quality and EmissionsTrends Report, 1986 (Research Triangle Park.N.C.: 1988); "Central Budapest Car BanSeeks to Curb Air Pollution," Reuters, March30. 1988; Alan Cowell, "War on Smog isRude Awakening for Athens," New YorkTimes, February 14. 1988.

43. Sandra Postel, Air Pollution. Acid Rain.and the Future of Forests, Worldwatch Paper 58(Washington. D.C.: Worldwatch Institute.March 1984); Diane Fisher et al.. "PollutedCoastal Waters: The Role of Acid Rain," En-vironmental Defense Fund. New York, April1988.

44. Laura Tangley. "Preparing for Cli-mate Change." BioScience, January 1988;Philip Shabecoff, "Temperature for WorldRises Sharply in the 1980's," New York Times,March 29, 1988.

45. OECD. Energy and Cleaner Air (Paris:1987); EPA. Compilation of Air Pollutant Emis-sion FactorsVolume 11: Mobile Sources, 4th ed.(Ann Arbor, Mich.: 1985); Jeff Alson, EPA.Emission Control Technology Division, AnnArbor. Mich., private communications. Feb-: uary 24 and April 14. 1988: Michael P.Walsh. technical consultant on automotive

(219)

emissions, private communications, March15 and April 7. 1988.

46. On U.S. standards, see Holcomb et al.,Transportation Energy Data Book: OECD, Energyand Cleaner Air; Japanese standards from T.Karasudani, Japan External Trade Organiza-tion, New York. N.Y., private communica-tion, February 24. 1988; Michael P. Walsh."Worldwide Developments in Motor VehiclePollution ControlA 1987 Overview." andAlfred Szwarc and Gabriel Murgel Branco."Automotive EmissionsThe Brazilian Con-trol Program," in SAE. Motor Vehicle PollutionControlA Global Perspective (Warrendale, Pa.:1987). Different driving cycles and types ofinstrumentation used make precise compari-sons of national standards difficult.

47. Merrill Korth, EPA, Ann Arbor, Mich..private communication, February 24. 1988;H. Henssler and S. Gospage. "The ExhaustEmission Standards of the European Com-munity." in in SAE, Motor Vehicle Pollution Con-

48. Walsh, "Worldwide Developments";Alson, private communication.

49. OECD, OECD Environmental DataCompendium 1987 (Paris: 1987); World Re-sources Institute/International Institute forEnvironment and Development. World Re-sources 1987 (New York: Basic Books. 1987);Commission of the European Communities,The State of the Environment in the European Com-munity 1986 (Brussels: 1987); EPA. NationalAir Pollutant Estimates, 1940-1986 (ResearchTriangle Park, N.C.: 1987).

50. EPA, Air Pollutant Estimates, 1940-1986; Alson. private communication.

51. Audette. "It Only Hurts When YouBreathe"; "EPA Punts on Construction Sanc-tions for City Ozone Violators," Not ManApart, November/December 1987; MichaelWeisskopf, "Hill Group Seeks to Clear theAir With Compromise on Smog Control."Washington Post, March 18, 1988; DennisWamsted. "Au Revoir to an Acid Rain Bill,"Energy Daily, October 5, 1988.

23 4


52. Thomas quoted in "EPA Chief SeesAuto Use Curbs, " Journal of Commerce, March9, 1988; Cowell, "War on Smog"; "CentralBudapest Car Ban," Reuters; "Air Pollutionin Brazil," Multinational Environmental Outlook.July 21. 1988; Clyde Haberman, "Is It OverThen? The City Closes Its Heart to the Car."New York Times, October 10. 1988.

53. DeLuchi et al., "Comparative Analysisof Future Transportation Fuels ": Bleviss. TheNrw Oil Crisis.

54. Barry Commoner. "A Reporter atLarge: The Environment," The New Yorker,June 15, 1987; OECD, Environmental Effects ofAutomotive Transport. On ceramics, see RobertP. Larsen and Anant D. Vyas, "The Outlookfor Ceramics in Heat Engines, 1990-2000:Results of a Worldwide Delphi Survey," Cen-ter for Transportation Research, Energy andEatvironmental Systems Division. ArgonneNational Laboratory. Argonne, III., March1988.

55. U.S. Senate, Committee on Com-merce, Science and Transportation, Report onMethanol and Alternative Fuels Promotion Act of1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1987); John Young, "Metha-nol Moonshine," World Watch (Washington,D.C.), July/August 1988.

56. "Colorado Alternative Fuels Programto be Watched Carefully by Other States:Herman," International Solar Energy IntelligenceReport, July 28, 1987; "Air Quality ConcernsBuoy Hopes for U.S. Makers of AlcoholFuels," Oil & Gas Journal,February 9, 1987;Philip Shabecoff, "California Acts to Pro-mote Switch From Gasoline to MethanolFuel," New York Times, May 23, 1987; Califor-nia Energy Commission, Air ResourceBoard, South Coast Air Quality ManagementDistrict, "Report of the Three-Agency Meth-anol Task Force," Sacramento, Calif., May15, 1986.

57. De Luchi et al., "Comparative Analysisof Future Transportation Fuels"; CaliforniaCouncil for Environmental and Economic

21"n-.1,_

Balance, dlteniative Fuels as an Air Quality Im-provement StrategyProspects, Options, and Impli-cations for California (Sacramento, Calif.: No-vember 1987): California EnergyCommission. "Report of the Methanol TaskForce." EPA and California state officials dis-agree ai.out whether pure methanol helps re-duce nitrogen oxide: Alson, private commu-nication.

58. Coal contains 1.4 times as much car-bon per unit of stored energy as oil; JimMacKenzie, "Relative Releases of Carbon Di-oxide from Several Fuels," World ResourcesInstitute, Washington, D.C., mimeographed,June 10, 1987. For detailed calculations ofCO2 emissions from methanol production,transmission, and use. see Mark DeLuchi etal., "Transportation Fuels and the Green-house Effect," University of California.Davis. December 1987. On ethanol, see "US-Brazilian Study Says Gasohol Creates'Greenhouse Gases'," Christian Science Moni-tor, November 21, 1988.

59. OECD, Environmental Effects of Automo-tive Transport; DeLuchi et al., "ComparativeAnalysis of Future Transportation Fuels."On greenhouse gases. see DeLuchi et al.,"Transportation Fuels and the GreenhouseEffect"; MacKenzie, "Relative Releases ofCarbon Dioxide."

60. DeLuchi et al., "Comparative Analysisof Future Transportation Fuels"; DeLuchi etal., "Transportation Fuels and the Green-house Effect."

61. Peter Hoffmann, "Fueling the FutureWith Hydrogen," Washington Post, Septem-ber 6, 1987; Hoffmann, "Hydrogen: Powerto Burn?" Producing hydrogen from coal,however, would produce significant nitrogenand sulfur oxide emissions, and more thandouble the CO, emissions, compared withgasoline vehicles; DeLuchi et al., "Transpor-tation Fuels and the Greenhouse Effect."

62. Worldwide fatality figure based on In-ternational Road Federation, World Road Sta-

Holes (Chapter 6) (221)

links 1981-1985 (Washington, D.C.: 1986).and on MVMA. Farts and Figures 87.

63. Global average of land devoted to carsfrom Lester R. Brown and Jodi L. Jacobson.The Future of Urbanization: Facing the Ecologicaland Economic Constraints, Worldwatch Paper77 (Washington. D.C.: Worldwatch Institute.May 1987): U.S. urban figure from Kirkpa-trick Sale. Human Scale (New York: Coward.McCann, & Geoghegan, 1980), and fromRichard Register, "What is an Ecocity ?"Earth island Journal, Fall 1987.

64. Peter W.G. Newman and Jeffrey R.Kenworthy. "The Use and Abuse of DrivingCycle Research; Clarifying the RelationshipBetween Traffic Congestion. Energy andEmissions," Transportation Quarterly. October1984; Charles Lockwood and Christopher B.Leinberger, "Los Angeles Comes of Age,"Atlantic Monthly, January 1988; CaliforniaCommission quoted in Robert Lindsay, "Cal-ifornia Now Sees Cars as a Threat." New YorkTimes. April 5, 1988.

65. Sale. Human Scale; Peter Newman andJeffrey Kenworthy. "Gasoline Consumptionand CitiesA Comparison of U.S. CitiesWith a Global Survey and Some Implica-tions," Transport Research Paper 8/87,School of Environmental and Life Sciences,Murdoch University. Australia; Peter New-man and Jeffrey Kenworthy, "Transport andUrban Form in Thirty-Two of the World'sPrincipal Cities," Paper for InternationalSymposium on Transport, Communicationand Urban Form. Monash University, Aus-tralia, August 24-26, 1987.

66. lam Sessions," U.S. News and WorldReport, September 7, 1987; Christopher B.Leinberger and Charles Lockwood, "HowBusiness is Reshaping America," AtlanticMonthly, October 1986.

67, Worldwatch Institute. based onMVMA, Facts and Figures 87.

68. In the United States. some $17 billionin contributions to 1986 highway construc-tion and maintenance funds. or almost one

third, was subsidized; subsidies in the form ofmunicipal services could be as high as $60billion annually, Furthermore, auto commut-ers are frequently reimbursed by employersfor travel expenses and enjoy free parking attheir workplace. "14..ge Highway Subsidies

.." National Association of Railroad PassengersNews, June 1985; Federzu Highway Adminis-tration. Highway Statistics 1986 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.1987); Stanley Hart, "Huge City Subsidiesfor Autos, Trucks," California Transit, July/September 1986. Per-car and per-gallon sub-sidy estimates are from Stanley Hart. SierraClub, San Francisco. Calif., private commu-nication, April 12, 1988.

69. In the United Statcs in 1984, urban railand bus transit systems used 20 percent lessenergy per passenger mile than the averagecar on the road, Amtrak used 40 percent lessenergy, and intercity buses used less thanone third as much energy. If public transitsystems were used to fuller capacity. the ad-vantages would increase further. Holcomb etal.. Transportation Energy Data Book. On roadspace requirements, see Frederick C. Dunbarand Richard T. Rapp, "Urban TransportEconomics; Analysis for DevelopmentBanks." presented at First Annual Meeting.International Mass Transit Association,Washington, D.C., February 16-17, 1986.

70. Citizens for Better Transit, "Multi-Destinational Transit." Portland, Ore..mimeographed, 1977.

71. Michael A. Replogle, Bicycles and PublicTransportation: New Links to Suburban TransitMarkets, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Bi-cycle Federation, 1988).

72. Juri Pill, "Land Development: TheLatest Panacea for Transit?" .Vlass Transit,January/February 1988.

73. Michael Replogle, "SustainableTransportation Strategies for Third WorldDevelopment," prepared for session onHuman-Powered Transportation and Trans-portation Planning for Developing Coun-tries, Transport Research Board 1988 An-

?6 6

(222) Notes (Chalmers 6 and 7)

nual Meeting, National Research Council,Washington. D.C.

74. The World Bank accounts for by farthe largest share of international develop-ment banks' spending on transportation pro-jects; Dunbar and Rapp, "Urban TransportEconomics: Analysis for DevelopmentBanks." Replogle, "Sustainable Transporta-tion Strategies."

75. Brown and Jacobson, The Future of Cr-ban/union,

76. V. Sett Pendakur, "Formal and Infor-mal Urban Transport in Asia," CI'S° Journal.December 1987; Replogle. "SustainableTransportation Strategies."

77. Replogle, "Sustainable Transporta-tion Strategies"; Pendakur, "Urban Trans-port in Asia."

78. Replogle. "Sustainable Transporta-tion Strategies"; Neal R. Peirce, "China'sBike Boom Backward?" a:Ha DOS, March 9,1988; Marcia D. Lowe, "Pedaling Into theFuture," World Watch (Washington. D.C.).July /August 1988.

79. Andre Got a, Ecology as Politics (Boston:South End Press. 1980).

Chapter 7. Responding to AIDS

1. Smoking-related deaths from WilliamU. Chandler. Banishing Tobago. WorldwatchPaper 68 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch In-stitute. January 1986); diarrhea figure fromKatrina Galway et al., Child Survival: Risks andThe Road to Health (Columbia, Md.: Institutefor Resource Development/Westinghouse,1987): tuberculosis figure from G. Siutkin etal., "Effect of AIDS on the Tuberculosis Prob-lem and Programmes and Priorities for Con-trol and Research," abstract of paper pre-sented at the IV International Conference onAIDS, Stockholm, Sweden,June 12-16, 1988(hereinafter cited as Stockholm Conference).

2. Quote from "Interview: JonathanMann." AIDS Patient Care (New York), June1988.

2;:i 7

3. Renee Sabatier, Blaming Others: Prejudice.Race and Worldwide AIDS (Philadelphia: NewSociety Publishers, for Panos Institute in as-sociation with Norwegian Red Cross, 1988).

4. Observations about control from Dr.Malcolm Potts, "Preparing for the Battle,"People (London), Vol 14, No. 4, 1987; incu-bation period from Roy M. Anderson andRobert M. May, "Epidemiological Parame-ters of HIV Transmission." Nature, June 9,1988; observation about progression toAIDS from Institute of Medicine, NationalAcademy of Sciences, Confronting AIM Up-dale 1988 (Washington. D.C.: National Acad-emy Press, 1988).

5. World Health Organization (WHO),"Global Programme On AIDS: Progress Re-port Number 3," Geneva, May 1988; role ofprostitutes from Don C. Des Jarlais et al,"HIV Infection and Intravenous Drug Use..Critical Issues in Transmission Dynamics,Infection Outcomes, and Prevention," Re-views of Infectious Diseases, Vol. 10, No. 1,1988, and from Bruce Lambert, "AIDSAmong Prostitutes Not as Prevalent as Be-lieved, Studies Show," New York Times, Sep-tember 20, 1988.

6. Until recently, researchers commonlycited 5-20 percent of sexually active adultsinfected in major urban areas of East andCentral Africa; see Jonathan M. Mann et al.,"The International Epidemiology of AIDS,"Scientific American, October 1988. New datafrom urban centers in the Kagera region ofTanzania reveal 32.8 percent of adults (aged15-54) infected; see J. Killewo et al., "TheEpidemiology of HIV-1 Infection in the Kag-era Region of Tanzania," abstract of paperpresented at the Third International Confer-ence on AIDS and Associated Cancers inAfrica, Arusha, Tanzania, September 14-16,1988 (hereinafter cited as Arusha Confer-ence). Prostitute observation from Peter Piotand Michel Carat', ''Epidemiological andSociological Aspects of HIV-infection in De-veloping Countries," British Medical Bulletin,Vol. 44, No. 1, 1988.

Moe (Chapter 7) ( 223 )

7. Dr. Jonathan Mann, "Global AIDS; AStatus Report," Testimony before the Presi-dential Commission on the Human Im-munodeficiency Virus Epidemic (hereinaftercited as Presidential Commission), April 18,1988.

8. Nancy S. Padian, "Heterosexual Trans-mission of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-drome: International Perspectives and Na-tional Projections," Reviews of InfectiousDiseases. September/October 1987; Sabatier,Blaming Others.

9.10. Ndinya-Achola et al., "Co-Factorsin Male-Female Transmission of HIV," ab-stract of paper presented at Arusha Confer-ence; Mann et al.. "International Epidemi-ology of AIDS": Michael Specter. "HerpesFound to Increase Susceptibility to AIDSVirus Infection," Washington Post. June 16.1988; D. Zagury et al., "Long Term Culturesof HTLV-III-infected T-cells: A Model of Cy-topathology of T-cell Depletion in AIDS."Science. February 21. 1986.

10. WHO computer printout and Mann etal., "International Epidemiology of AIDS."

11. Dr. James Chin. Chief. AIDS Surveil-lance Unit, WHO, Geneva, private communi-cations, September 27 and October 21, 1988.

12, U.S. estimate from William L. Hey-ward and James W. Curran, "The Epidemi-ology of AIDS in the U.S.." Scientific American,October 1988; European estimate from J.B.Brunet, "Aids and HIV Infection in Europe."abstract of paper presented at StockholmConference; Latin American estimate fromPan American Health Organization (PAHO),"The Epidemiology of AIDS in the Ameri-cas," Testimony before Presidential Com-mission, April 18, 1988; Asian estimate fromChin, private communication.

13. Rural outbreaks from Dr. Samuel lk-waras Okware. "Towards a National AIDS-Control Program in Uganda," The WesternJournal of Medicine, December 1987, and fromWilliam Lyerly, Jr.. AIDS Coordinator, Bu-

reau for Africa, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID). Washington, D.C., O-vate communication. October 10. 1988.

14. The percentage of European cases in-volving drug injection has leveled of in 1988and includes cases where there are riskbehaviors in addition to IV drug use; see DonC. Des Jarlais, "HIV Infection Among Per-sons Who Inject Illicit Drugs: Problems andProspects." paper presented at StockholmConference.

15. Report ofthe Presidential Commission on theHuman Immunodeficiency rims Epidemic (Wash-ington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-fice, 1988).

16. Gases in American children fromJames W. Curran et al.. "Epidemiology ofHIV Infection and AIDS in the UnitedStates" Science. February 5, 1988: IV druglink to cases in American women from Don-ald R. Hopkins. "Aids in Minority Popula-tions in the United States," Public Health Re-ports, November/December 1987; prosti-tutes' IV drug link from Dr. June E. Osborn."Aids: Politics and Science." New England

Journal of Medicine. February 18, 1988.

17. J.W. Pape et al., "Epidemiology ofAIDS in Haiti (1979-1987)." Testimonybefore Presidential Commission, April 18,1988.

18. PAHO, "Epidemiology of AIDS in theAmericas"; C. Bartholomew et al., "Transi-tion From Homosexual to HeterosexualAIDS in Trinidad and Tobago," abstract ofpaper presented at Arusha Conference; ob-servations about Dominican Republic, Hon-duras, Equador. Brazil. and Mexico fromRenee Sabatier. AIDS and the Third World.Panos Dossier 1 (Philadephia: New SocietyPublishers, for Panos Institute. 1988).

19. Figures on Haiti, Mexico, and Rwandafrom Ruth Leger Sivard. World Military andSocial expenditures 1987-88 (Washington,D.C.: World Priorities, 1987): Swedish figurerefers to per capita health spending in 1984,


as cited in ibid.; U.S. number refers to 1986spending. from National Center for HealthStatistics, U.S. Department of Health andHuman Services. Health, United States 1987(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-ing Office, 1988); United Nations Children'sFund (UNICEF), State of the World's Children1988 (New York: Oxford University Press forUNICEF, 1988).

20. Hesio Cordeiro et al., "Medical Costsof HIV and AIDS in Brazil." paper presentedat the First International Conference on theGlobal Impact of AIDS. London, March8-10, 1988 (hereinafter cited as LondonConference); Ren6e Sabatier, "The GlobalCosts of AIDS." The Futurist. November/De-cember 1987.

21. AZT costs from Fred J. Hettinger,"Forecasting the Personal Medical CareCosts of AIDS from 1988 Through 1991,"Public Health Reports. May/June 1988; anemiaobservation from Sabatier. AIDS and the ThirdWorld.

22. Relationship between GNP and cost oftreatment from Mead Over et al., "The Di-rect and Indirect Cost of HIV Infection inDeveloping Countries: The Cases of Zaireand Tanzania," paper presented at Stock-holm Conference; Mama Yemo hospital ex-ample from Thomas C. Quinn, "AIDS inAfrica: An Epidemiologic Paradigm," Science,November 21, 1986; observation about qual-ity of care from Sabatier, AIDS and the ThirdIll'orld

23. Hospital bed rates from Mann et al.."International Epidemiology of AIDS," andfrom Sabatier, AIDS and the Third World; pa-tient discharge from j, Wilson Carswell, "Im-pact of AIDS in the Developing World," Brit-ish Medical Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. I, 1988, andfrom Raisa Scriabine-Smith, unpublishedmanuscript prepared for the Hudson Insti-tute, Indianapolis. Ind., 1988.

24. Over et al., "Direct and Indirect Costof HIV Infection."

229

25. Slutkin et al., "Effect of AIDS on theTuberculosis Problem and Programmes."

26. Sabatier, AIDS and the Third World; R.Colebunders et al, "HIV Infection in Pa-tients with Tuberculosis in Kinshasa, Zaire,"abstract of paper presented at Arusha Con-ference.

27. United Nations. Mortality s ChildrenUnder Age 5: World Estimates and . rojections.1950-2025 (New York: 1988).

28. Figures on pregnant women from Car-swell, "Impact of AIDS in the DevelopingWorld"; mother-to-child infection rate fromT. Manzila et al., "Perinatal HIV Transmis-sion in Two African Hospitals: One Year Fol-low-Up," abstract of paper presented at Aru-sha Conference; impact on child survivalfrom Mann et at., "International Epidemi-ology of AIDS," and from Rodolfo A. Bula-tao, "Initial Investigation of the Demo-graphic Impact of AIDS in One AfricanCountry" (draft), World Bank, Washington,D.C., unpublished, June 15, 1987.

29. John Botigaarts, "Modeling the De-mographic Impact of AIDS in Africa," paperpresented at the Annual Meeting of theAmerican Association for the Advancementof Science. Boston, February 11-15. 1988;Philip J. Hilts, "Aids Impact on Population."Washington Post. May 24, 1988.

30. Carswell, "Impact of AIDS in the De-veloping World."

3I. "Mining Companies Face IncreasingBurden," New Scientist, March 17, 1988; Cop-per Belt study from Renke Sabatier, .ADS andthe Third World, 2nd ed. (London; Panos Insti-tute, 1987).

32. Indirect costs from Over, "Direct andIndirect Cost of HIV Infection," and fromDavid E. Bloom and Geoffrey Carliner, "TheEconomic Impact of AIDS in the UnitedStates," Science, February 5, 1988.

33. Over. "Direct and Indirect Cost ofHIV Infection,"

34. Ibid.

s.-


35. F. Davachi et al., "Economic Impacton Families of Children with AIDS in Kin-shasa, Zaire," paper presented at LondonConference.

36. Sharon Kingman and Steve Conner."The Answer is Still a Condom," New Scien-tist. June 23, 1988; Marilyn Chase, "AIDSVirus in Infected People Mutates At a Dizzy-ing Rate. Two Studies Show," Wall Street Jour-nal, August 4. 1988.

37. Dr. Jeffrey Harris, AIDS Coordinator.AID, Washington. D.C., private communica-tion, October 8. 1988.

38. Sabatier, AIDS and the Third World(1988).

39. European booklet mailings from Scria-bine-Smith. unpublished manuscript; Cana-dian poll from a study conducted by the Al-berta provincial government, as cited inSabatier. AIDS and the Third World (1988);American data from the National Health In-terview Survey of August 1987. as cited inInstitute of Medicine, Confronting AIDS, Up-date 1988.

40. Steve Conner and Sharon Kingman,"The Trouble with Testing," New Scientist,January 28, 1988: number of countries withtravel restrictions from the Panos Institute.as cited in "AIDS Said to Claim a Victim aMinute," Washington Post, September 28,1988.

41. Alan M. Brandt, "AIDS in HistoricalPerspective: Four Lessons from the Historyof STDs." American Journal of Public Health,April 1988; Sandra G. Boodman, "PremaritalAIDS Testing Annoying Many in Illinois,"Washington Post, July 30, 1988.

42. Hungarian testing information fromRadio Free Europe, February 23, 1987, ascited in Scriabine-Smith. unpublished manu-script; Bill Keller. "New Soviet Law MakesAIDS Testing Mandatory," New York Times,August 27, 1987; "Mandatory AIDS Test onBasis 'of Slight Suspicion' in Bavaria," Na-ture, June 10, 1988; Wayne D. Johnson. "The

Impact of Mandatory Reporting of HIVSeropositive Persons in South Carolina," ab-stract of paper presented at the StockholmConference; for evidence that voluntary andanonymous testing and partner tracing aresuccessful, see Nancy Padian et al., "PartnerNotification as a Means to Prevent FurtherHIV Transmission." M.L. Rekart, "A Modi-fied System of Contact Tracing for HIVSeropositivesA Year's Results," and J.E.Kristoffersen. "Case Contact Tracing andTesting in HIV Infection," all abstracts ofpapers presented at Stockholm Conference;see also Institute of Medicine, ConfrontingABA Update 1988.

43. Sabatier. AIDS and the Third World(1988).

44. Marshall H. Becker and Jill G. Joseph."Aids and Behavioral Change to ReduceRisk; A Review." American Journal of PublicHealth, April 1988; Office of Technology As-sessment (OTA), U.S. Congress, How Effectiveis 41DS Education? Staff Paper, Washington.D.C.. May 1988; Robert R. Stempel and An-drew R. Moss. "Changes in Sexual BehaviorBy Gay Men in Response to AIDS," abstractof paper presented at Stockholm Confer-ence.

45. Rates in San Francisco from Dr. War-ren Winklestein. School of Public Health,University of California. Berkeley. privatecommunication, September 13. 1988: M.Paalman et al., "Condom Promotion in theNetherlands: Evaluation," abstract of paperpresented at Stockholm Conference; Finlandinformation from S. Valle. "The Occurrenceof STD's in a Cohort of Homosexual MenPrior To and After Repeated Personal Coun-selling," abstract of paper presented atStockholm Conference; C.A. Came et al.,"Prevalence of Antibodies to Human Im-munodeficiency Virus. Gonorrhoea Rates,and Changed Sexual Behavior in Homosex-ual Men in London," The Lancet, March 21.1987; G. von Krogh et al.. "Declining Inci-dence of Syphilis Among Homosexual Menin Stockholm." The Lancet. October 18, 1986.

240


as cited in the Scriabine-Smith, unpublishedmanuscript; Asmus Poulsen and Susanne Ull-man, "AIDS-Induced Decline of Incidence ofSyphilis in Denmark." Aaa Dermata rer-nereologica. Vol. 65, No. 6. 1985. as cited inibid.

46. R.R. Stempel et al.. "Changes in Sex-ual Behavior by Gay Men in Response toAIDS," R. Stall et al., "Intravenous DrugUse, the Combination of Drugs and SexualActivity and HIV Infection Among Gay andBisexual Men: The San Francisco Men'sHealth Study." and M. Miller et al., "Rela-tionships Between Knowledge About AIDSRisk and Actual Risk Behaviour in a Sampleof I-lomosexual Men." all abstracts of paperspresented at Stockholm Conference; Valle."The Occurrence of STD's in a Cohort ofHomosexual Men Prior To and After Re-peated Personal Counselling." :..ee alsoOTA, How Effective is AIDS Education? and C.Becker et al., "Gay Male Sexual BehaviorChange in a Low-Incidence Area for AIDS."abstract of paper presented at StockholmConference.

47. Treatment capacity for addicts fromDr. Roy Pickens. Associate Director forAIDS. National Institute on Drug Abuse.Rockville, Md., private communication. Au-gust 23, 1988; coupon data from Joyce F.Jackson. AIDS Community Support Unit,New Jersey Department of Health, Testi-mony before Presidential Commission. De-cember 18. 1987.

48. OTA, How Effective is AIDS Education?

49. Pilot programs have been approved inNew York City and Portland. Oregon, ac-cording to Don C. Des Jarlais. New YorkState Division of Substance Abuse Services,private communication. August 18, 1988.

50. Doug Lefton, "Nations Report onNeedle Distribution," American Medical News,March 4, 1988; "European Countries De-velop Programs to Fight AIDS." AIDS PatientCare (New York). June 1988; E.C. Buning."The Evaluation of the Needle/Syringe Ex-

241

change in Amsterdam." abstract of paperpresented at Stockholm Conference; declinein Dutch drug users from Lefton, "NationsReport."

51. OTA. How Effective is AIDS Education?;three fourths figure from Des Jarlais et al.,"HIV Infection and Intravenous Drug Use."

52. Centers for Disease Control (CDC),"Weekly Surveillance Report." Atlanta. Ga..August 1. 1988; 19 percent figure from Mar-tha F. Rogers and Walter W. Williams. "Aidsin Blacks and Hispanics: Implications for Pre-vention," Issues in Science and Technology.Spring 1987: rates for children and womenfrom Dr. James Mason. Opening Address ofthe National Conference on the Preventionof HIV Infcction and AIDS Among Racialand Ethnic Minorities in the United States.Washington. D.C., August 15, 1988.

53. "Needle Sharing and AIDS in Minori-ties, "Journal of the American Aledical Association.September 18, 1987: Rogers and Williams,"Aids in Blacks and Hispanics"; black HIVinfection outside cities from Lytt I. Gardneret al., "Race Specific Trend Anaysis of HIVAntibody Prevalence in the United States,"abstract of paper presented at StockholmConference.

54. "CDC Spends Over $30 Million toPrevent HIV Infection Among Minorities atRisk," press release from CDC. Atlanta. Ga.,September 6. 1988; fiscal year 1989 fundinginformation from Debbie Mathis, BudgetOffice. CDC, Atlanta. Ga., private communi-cation. October 21. 1988.

55. WHO, "Global Programme on AIDS:Proposed Programme & Budget for 1989,"Geneva. September 1988.

56. Tom Natter. Public Information Of-ficer, WHO, Geneva. December 12, 1988:sub-Saharan countries from William Lyerly,Jr. et al., 'Impact of Epidemiology and De-mographic Patterns on Regional HIV/AIDSControl Strategies in Africa," abstract ofpaper presented at Arusha Conference.

I


57. "Kenyans Respond to Red CrossAlert," People (London), Vol. 14, No. 4, 1987;Susan Allen et al., "AIDS Education in UrbanRwanda: Change In Knowledge and Atti-tudes From 1986 to 1987," abstract of paperpresented at Stockholm Conference; EdwardC. Green, "AIDS and Condoms in the Do-minican Republic: Evaluation of an AIDS Ed-ucation Program," paper prestted at theAnnual Meeting of the American Associationfor the Advancement of Science. Boston,February 11, 1988.

58. Guatemala and Mexico examples fromKathryn Carovano, AIDSCOM project.Washington, D.C., private communication,August 30, 1988; Uganda example fromRobin Le Mare. Ugandan desk officer, ActionAID, London, U.K., private communication.September 16, 1988.

59. Infection rates from Quinn, "AIDS inAfrica''; percentage of cases attributable toAIDS from Piot and C,aratl, "Epidemiologi-cal and Sociological Aspects of HIV-infec-tion."

60. "HIV Screening in the Americas."PAHO, Washington, D.C.. unpublishedmimeograph, January 19. 1988; "Strategyfor Countrywide Screening of Blood Donorsin Zambia," abstract of paper presented atStockholm Conference; Zimbabwe from "ASpecially Prepared Update of the Panos Dos-sier 'AIDS in the Third World'," London,unpublished mimeograph. October 1987;Mexico from Dr. Gonzales Pacheco, PAHO.Washington, D.C., private communication.August 15. 1988; new blood tests from T. C.Quinn et al., "A Rapid Enzyme Immunoassayfor the Detection of Antibodies to HIV-1 andHIV-2," and from J. P. Galvin et al., "HIV-CHEKA Sensitive. Rapid, Manual Test forthe Detection of HIV Antibodies." abstractsof papers presented at Arusha Conference.

61. Malcolm Potts, "The imperative Inter-vention: Targeting AIDS Control ActivitiesToward High-Risk Populations," unpub-lished discussion paper from Family HealthInternational (FHI), Research Triangle Park,

N.C., undated; B. Auvert et al., "Character-istics of the HIV Infection in Kinshasa as De-termined By Compute.. Simulation," abstractof paper presented at London Conference.

62. Chin. private communication.

63. Ghana data from Sharon Weir, Pro-gram Coordinator of AIDSTECH, FIII. Re-search Triangle Park. N.C., private commu-nication, August 29, 1988 (based on a pilotproject conducted by PHI among 72 prosti-tutes between June 1987 and January 1988);Francis Plummer et al., "Durability ofChanged Sexual Behavior in Nairobi Prosti-tutes: Increasing Use of Condoms," and E.Antonio De Moya and Ernesto Guerrero,"The Breaking of the Condom Use Taboo inthe Dominican Republic," abstracts of pa-pers presented at Stockholm Conference.

64. In mid-1988 the total population inBurundi, Central African Republic, Congo,Kenya. Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire,and Zambia was an estimated 122.1 million.according to the Population Reference Bu-reau, Washington, D.C. In these nine coun-tries, women of childbearing age (15-49)constitute on average 22.5 percent of thetotal population, according to age distribu-tions available in United Nations, it Demo-graphic Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025(New York: 1988). Thus the total number ofpeople needing condoms is 27.5 million.Condoms cost about 4.40 apiece and an aver-age couple uses 100-144 per year, accordingto Carl Hemmer, Chief of Commodity andProgram Support Division, AID, Washing-ton. D.C.. private communication. October12. 1988. Shipping adds 20 percent to costand subsidizing their sale through commer-cial channels adds another 70 percent. mak-ing total costs roughly 812 per couple, ac-cording to Jerald Bailey, Deputy DivisionChief of Research, Office of Population, AID,Washington. D.C., private communication,October 12, 1988. Community-based distri-bution or programs that actively promotedcondom use through education, advertising,and so on would cost considerably more.

24 2


65. W. Parker Mauldin and Sheldon J.Segal, Prevalence of Contraceptive Use in Develop-ing Countries.. A Chart Book (New York: Rocke-feller Foundation. 1986); condom use in Africaapplies to married women of reproductiveage, from John W. Townsend and Luis Varela,The Population Council, Testimony beforePresidential Commission. April 18, 1988.

66. Estimate of funding available for AIDScontrol in developing countries from Harris.private communication. No one has yet com-piled data on funds available for AIDS con-trol in the Third World so this number isnecessarily a ballpark estimate. WHO's bud-get for AIDS control in 1988 was $66 millionand AID gave an additional $15 million inbilateral aid. World military expenditure in1987 from Sivard, World Alifitary and SocialExpenditures, 1987-88.

67. Harvey V. Fineberg, "The Social Di-mensions of AIDS," Scientific American, Octo-ber 1988.

68. Kenneth Presitt, "AIDS in Africa: TheTriple Disaster," in Norman Miller and Rich-ard C. Rockwell, eds., AIDS In Africa: The So-cial and Policy Impact (Lewiston, N.Y.: TheEdwin Mellen Press. 1988).

69. Clare Ansberry, "AIDS, Stirring Panicand Prejudice, Tests the Nation's Charac-ter," Wall Street Journal, Noveni:der. 13, 1987;Colombian example from Sarita Kendall."Latin American Conference increases AIDSAwareness." AIDS Watch No. 1, 1988, sup-plement to People (London).

70. For an excellent discussion of these is-sues. see Sabatier, Blaming Others.

71. DrJonathanMann,"WorldwideEpide-miology of AIDS." Address to London Confer-ence; "London Declaration on AIDS Preven-tion," World Summit of Ministers of Healthon Programmes for AIDS Prevention. Jan-uary 28, 1988; Report of Presidential Commission.

72. Fineberg. "Social Dimensions ofAIDS"; Ghana example from "Family Plan-ners Define Their Role in Preventing ViralSpread," New Scientist, July 21, 1988.

243

73. Bill Keller. "New Soviet Law MakesAIDS Testing Mandatory." New York Times,August 27, 1987.

74. Bulgaria from Sophia Miskiewicz,"AIDS in Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion," Radio Free Europe Research ReportNo. 24. February 23. 1987; registration ofaddicts from United Press International. BWire, Moscow Bureau, "Soviet Scientist Says'Positive Results' in AIDS Research," Febru-ary 11. 1987; Poland from Radio FreeEurope Research Report. Poland No. 3. Feb-ruary 19, 1986; all broadcasts cited in Scria-bine-Smith, unpublished manuscript.

75. Bloom and Carliner, "Economic Im-pact of AIDS in the United States."

76. New York hospital bed data from PaulS. Jellinek. "Case-Managing AIDS." Issues inScience and Technology, Summer 1988; SanFrancisco funds for AIDS from Mona J. Roweand Caitlin C. Ryan, "Comparing State-OnlyExpenditure for AIDS," American Journal ofPublic Health, April 1988; New York datafrom Robert Blake, Budget Officer, NewYork City Budget Office, private communica-tion, September 13. 1988; cost per residentfrom Bloom and Carlin er, "Economic Impactof AIDS in the United States."

77. Bloom and Carliner. "Economic Im-pact of AIDS in the United States"; P.S. Arnoand R.G. Hughes. "Local Policy Response tothe AIDS Epidemic: New York and San Fran-cisco," New York Stam Journal of Medicine, May1987; Robert T. Chen et al. "Hospital Utili-zation by Persons with AIDS in San Fran-cisco, January 1984-June 1987," abstract ofpaper presented at Stockholm Conference;Ian Douglas Campbell, ''AIDS Care and Pre-vention in a Zambian Rural Community,"paper presented at London Conference.

Chapter 8. Enhancing Global Security

1. Carolyn Stephenson, "Alternative In-ternational Security Systems: An Introduc-


tion," in Carolyn Stephenson, ed., AlternativeMethods for International Security (Lanham,Md.: University Press of America, 1982),

2. Gene Sharp. Making Europe Unconquer-able: The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrenceand Defense (Cambridge, Mass.; Ballinger,1985),

3. Rita Tullberg, "World Military Expen-ditures," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 17,No. 3-4. 1986; Ruth Leger Sivard, World Mili-tary and Social Expenditures 1987-88 (Washing-ton, D.C: World Priorities, 1988).

4, Sivard. World Military and Social Expendi-tures 1987-88. On arms production capabili-ties, see U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency. World Military Expenditures and ArmsTransfers 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, 1988).

5, Sivard. World Military and Social Expendi-tures 1987-88.

6, Ibid.

7. Ibid,; Miroslav Nincic, How War MightSpread to Europe (Philadelphia: Taylor andFrancis, 1985).

8. More than half the civilian deaths incurrent hostilities, as in Afghanistan, Ethio-pia, Mozambique, and the Sudan, resultedfrom war-related famine; Sivard, World Mili-tary and Social Expenditures 1987-88. Boul dingquote in Greg Mitchell, "Real Security. WhatIs It? How Can We Get It?" Nuclear Times,May/June 1986.

9, Soedjatmoko. "Patterns of Armed Con-flict in the Third World,' Alternatives, Vol. 10,No. 4, 1985; Center for Defense Information,"A World At War-1983," The Defense Moni-tor, Vol. 12, No. 1. 1983.

10. Mohammed Ayoob, "The Iran-IraqWar and Regional Security in the PersianGulf," Alternatives, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1985.

11. Robert C. Johansen, "Toward a De-pendable Peace: A Proposal for an Appropri-ate Security System," World Policy Paper No.8 (New York: World Policy Institute, 1983).

12. Lloyd Jeffry Dumas, Thr OverburdenedEconomy (Berkeley, Calif,: University of Cali-fornia Press, 1986).

13. Sivard, World Military and Social Expen-ditures 1987-88; Eisenhower quote is fromhis address to the American Society of News-paper Editors, Washington, D.C., April1953,

14. Rita Tullberg, "Military-Related Debtin Non-Oil Developing Countries, 1972-82,"Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 17, No. 3-4,1986; Michael Brzoska and Thomas ()Filson,"The Future of Arms Transfers: The Chang-ing Pattern," Bulletin of Peace Proposals. Vol.16, No. 2, 1985; Lloyd.). Dumas, "EconomicConversion: The Critical Link," Bulletin ofPeace Proposals, VW. 19. No. 1, 1988.

15. Private communication, February 3,1988.

16. Cumulative military spending fromU.S. Department of Defense, National DefenseBudget Estimates for FY 1988/1989 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Comptroller), 1987); Seymour Mel-man. "An Economic Alternative to the ArmsRace: Conversion from Military to CivilianEconomy," Presentation at Rayburn HouseOffice Building, Washington. D.C.. Novem-ber 1986.

17. Mary Acland-Hood. "Military Re-search and Development," Bulletin of PeaceProposals. Vol. 17, No. 3-4, 1986; Dumas, TheOverburdened Economy.

18. Acland-Hood, "Military Research andDevelopment"; Dumas, The Overburdened

Economy; Ulrich Albrecht, "Riistungsfor-schung und Dritte Welt," InforrnationsdiensiWissensehaft und Frieclen, December 1984/Jan-uary 1985.

19. Dumas, The Overburdened Economy.

20. Ibid.

21. Simon Ramo, America's Technology Slip(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980).

244

t


22. David Noble, Forces of Production: A So.no! History of Automation (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1986).

23. Dumas, Tort Overburdened Economy.

24. Michael Dee Odell, .4 411rlitary DollarReally Is Different The Economic Impacts of Mili-tary Spending Reconsidered (Lansing, Mich.:Employment Research Associate... 1988).

25. Dumas, The Overburdened Economy.

26. Lloyd J. Dumas, "University Research,Industrial Innovation, and the Pentagon," inJohn Tirman, ed., Alilitarization of High Tech-nology (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984);Economic Report of the President (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1988); Mario Pianta, New Technologies Acrossthe Atlantic: U.S. Leadership or European Auton-omy? (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988).

27. Dumas, The Overburdened Economy;

Pianta, Sew Technologies Across the .4dantic.

28. Military expenditure from ExecutiveOffice of the President, Office of Manage-ment and Budget, Historical Tabks: Budget ofthe U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1989 (Wash-ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-fice, 1988); U.S. pollution abatement figuresfrom Survey of Current Business, May 1988.

29. Wendell Berry, Home Economics (SanFrancisco: North Point Press, 1987).

30. World Commission on Environmentand Development, Our Common Future (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1987).

31. "Environment and Conflict," Earth-scan Briefing Document 40, International In-stitute for Environment and Development,London, November 1984.

32. Ghali quote from Lloyd Timberlake,Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environ-mental Bankruptcy (London: International In-stitute for Environment and Development,1985). For description of internationa waterdisputes, see "Environment and Conflict,"Earthscan; Norman Myers, Not Far Afield: U.S.Interests and the Global Environment (Washing-

245

ton, D.C. : World Resources Institute, 1988);"Where Dams Can Cause Wars," Economist,July 18, 1987; "Canadian Ban Covers WaterDiversions to US," Journal of Commerce, No-vember 6, 1987; John Tagliabue, "The RhineStruggles to Survive," New York Times, Febru-ary 15, 1987; Fernando Ortiz Monasterio,"Confronting Environmental Degradation;A Problem Without Borders," Ceres, Septem-ber 1987; "West Germans Look For Ways toClean Elbe River, Seek Cooperation WithEast Germany, Czechoslovakia," Multina-tional Environmental Outlook, September 15,1988.

33. Narul Huda, "Bangladesh BlamesNeighbors for its Floods," Panoscope (Lon-don), December 1987.

34. Philip P. Micklin, "Desiccation of theArai Sea: A Water Management Disaster inthe Soviet Union," Science, September 2,1988; James Critchlow, "Aral Sea Vanishesas Cotton Fields Expand" (letter to the edi-tor), New Thrk Times, September 25, 1988,

35. Emanuel Somers, "TransboundaryPollution and Environmental Health," Envi-ronment, June 1987.

36. Michael Weisskopf, "'Toxic Clouds'Can Carry Pollutants Far and Wide," Wash-ington Post, March ld, 1988; Monasterio,"Confronting Environmental Degradation."

37, Worldwatch Institute, calculated fromU.S. Environmental Protection Agency,Regulatory Impact Analysis, Vol. 1 (Washing-ton, D.C.: 1987), and from Matthew Wald,"Fighting the Greenhouse Effect," New YorkTimes, August 28, 1988.

38. Christopher Flavin, Reassessing Nut earPower: The Fallout From Chernobyl, WorldwatchPaper No. 75 (Washington, D.C.: World-watch Institute, March 1987): "Czech/Aus-trian Nuclear Disagreement," Financial TimesEuropean Energy Economist, July 1, 1988; "Chi-lean Group Opposes Argentine NuclearWaste Dump," Ecoforum, June 1988.

39. Patrick Smith with Alan George, "TheDumping Grounds," South, August 1988.

Notes (Chapter 8) (23!)

40. Tagliabue, "The Rhine Struggles toSurvive."

41. Robert C. Johansen, "The Failure ofArms Control," Sojourners, March 1981: Jo-hansen, "Toward a Dependable Peace."

42. Robert S. Norris et al., "START andStrategic Modernization," Nuclear WeaponsDatabook Working Papers 87-2 (Washington,D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council,1987).

43. For a more detailed discussion of inde-pendent initiatives, see Robert C. Johanscn,Toward an Alternative Security System. WorldPolicy Paper No. 24 (New York: World PolicyInstitute. 1983); Mark Sommer and GordonFeller. " Independent Initiatives': BetterThan Arms Control?" New Options, October27, 1986.

44. Michael G. Renner. "Disarming Impli-cations of the INF Treaty," World Watch(Washington, D.C.), March/April 1988;Philip Taubman, "Soviet Proposes ArcticPeace Zone," New York Times, October 2.1987.

45. For a detailed presentation of theseproposals, see the set of articles on "Nonof-fensive Defense" in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.September 1988.

46. Hal Harvey, "Defense Without Ag-gression," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Septem-ber 1988; Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet ArmsDoctrine in Flux: An Emphasis on the De-fense," New York Times, March 7, 1988: Dmi-tri Yazoy. "The Soviet Proposal for Euro-pean Security." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.September 1988; "Der Warschauer Pakt Bie-tet Gleichgewicht der KonventionellenStreitkrafte in Europa an," Siiddeutsche 2ei-turig, July 18, 1988; Paul Lewis. "Soviet Of-fers to Adjust Imbalance of ConventionalForces in Europe." New York Times, June 24,1988.

47. For a brief account of these events andthe text of the Joint Statement and the treatyoutline, see Robert Krinsky, "An Introduc-

tion to Disarmament," Briefing Paper No. 2,National Commission for Economic Conver-sion and Disarmament, Washington, D.C..May 1988, and Lawrence D. Weiler, "Gen-eral Disarmament Proposals." Amu ControlToday. July/August 1986.

48. Marcus Raskin, "Draft Treaty for aComprehensive Prop am for Common Secu-rity and General Disarmament," Institute forPolicy Studies, Washington, D.C., July 1986.

49. Cost estimate is reported in Robert C.Johansen, "The Reagan Administration andthe U.N.; The Costs of Unilateralism," WorldPolicy Journal, Fall 1986.

50. John Tirman, "International Monitor-ing for Peace," Issues in Science and Technology,Summer 1988; Owen Thomas, "NationsKeep an Extra Eye on Each Other," ChristianScience Monitor, September 28, 1988. For textof Rep. Mrazek's bill, see H.R. 4036, "TheInternational Security and Satellite Monitor-ing Act of 1988," introduced on February 29.1988. The bill will be reintroduced in thenext Congress, and hearings are planned for1989; personal communication with RobertKatula, Special Assistant to Robert Mrazek,October 3, 1988.

51. Johansen. "The Reagan Administra-tion and the U.N."; "The Requirements forStable Coexistence in United States-SovietRelations," Congressional Record, May 9, 1988:Jonathan Steele. "Superpowers: BeyondArms Control," END. Journal of European Nu-clear Disarmament, Summer 1988. PhilipTaubman, "Gorbachev Offers DisputedRadar for Peaceful Exploration of Space,"New York Times, September 17. 1988.

52. Hilary F. French, "Restoring the UN,"World Watch (Washington, D.C.). July/Au-gust 1988.

53. The United Nations has had previoussuccess in such cases; sec Johansen, "TheReagan Administration and the U.N." PaulLewis, "Soviets Say U.N. Peacekeeping EffortShould Emphasize Prevention," New YorkTimes, October 18, 1988.

226


54. Nicaragua's proposal from Johansen."The Reagan Administration and the U.N.";Honduras* proposal from Wilson Ring."Honduras Holding U.S. Responsible forContras," Washington Poo, October 25.1988; Pentagon estimate from JoanneOman& "Policing a Latin Peace Projectedto Cost Millions." Washington Post. May 11,1985; U.S. spending from Joshua Cohenand Joel Rogers. "Central America Policy:The True Cost of Intervention," The Nation,April 12. 1986; Central American spendingfrom Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, World Military Expenditures and AmuTransfers 1987.

55. Robert C.Johansen, "Fora PermanentUN Police Force." Christian Science Monitor.October 13. 1982; Paul Lewis. "Soviets UrgeNations to Provide a U.N. Army," New YorkTimes, October 3, 1988.

56. For 1988, expenditures totaled about$250 million; the sum of $380 million is ar-rived at by annualizing the initial three-month cost of keeping U.N. observers in Iranand Iraq ($37.5 million), based on George D.Moffett III, "Peacekeepers Win Peace Prize."Christian Science Al °triton September 30, 1988.

57. "Questions and Answers About Eco-nomic Conversion." Corliss Lamont Pro-gram in Economic Conversion, ColumbiaUniversity, New York. May 1987: militarypayroll figure is a Woridwatch estimate.

58. H.R. 813, "The Defense EconomicAdjustment Act," by Rep. Ted Weiss; for abrief characterization of the bill's main provi-sions, see Seymour Melman. "Law for Eco-nomic Conversion: Necessity and Character-istics," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 19. No.1, 1988.

59. Jonathan Feldman. "An Introductionto Economic Conversion," Briefing PaperNo. 1, National Commission for EconomicConversion and Disarmament. Washington.D.C.. May 1988: Herbert York, "Some Possi-ble Measures for Slowing the QualitativeArms Race," Proceedings of the 22nd Pugwash

247

Conference on Science and World Affairs, Oxford,U.K., September 7-12, 1972 (Oxford: 1973).

60. William E. Saxe. review of Ellis Joffe.The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1987), inFriday Review of Defense Literature, September16. 1988. "China Invents the Entre-preneurial Army." Economist, May 14. 1988.

61. Samuel S. Kim. **The United Nations.Lawmaking, and World Order," Alternatives,Vol. 10. No. 4. 1985.

62. Sandra Postel, "Protecting Forestsfrog, Air Pollution and Acid Rain." in LesterR. Brown et al.. State of the World 1985 (NewYork: W.W. Norton & Co.. 1985); "EuropeanNations Ratify Sulfur Reduction Pact," WorldEnvironment Report. September 17. 1987;Warren E. Leary, "Reagan. In Switch. Agreesto a Plan on Acid Rain." New York Times, Au-gust 7, 1988: "12 Nations Agree to Cut Pollu-tion." Washington Past, November 1, 1988.

63. Hilary F. French. "Industrial Waste-land," World Watch (Washington. D.C.), No-vember/December 1988; "Ostblock SchlagtEuropKische Umweltkonferenz Vor." Sid-deutsche Zeitung, July 18. 1988.

64. "West Germans Look For Ways toClean Elbe River. Seek Cooperation WithEast Germany, Czechoslovakia," Multina-tional Environmental Outlook, September 15,1988; "East, West German Officials StruggleWith Environmental Cooperation on ElbeMultinational Environmental Outlook, August 4,1988; "U.S. and Soviets Spur Scientific Col-laboration," Conservation Foundation Letter.1988:1.

65. "U.S. and Soviets Spur Scientific Col-laboration"; Cass Peterson, "U.S.. Soviet Sci-entists Open Dialogue on 'Greenhouse Ef-fect'." Washington Post, May 12, 1988.

66. John B. Oakes, "Greening CentralAmerica," New York Times. April 20, 1988;"Peace Through Parks: A Proposal for Bio-logical Reserves for the Protection of UniqueNatural Areas on the Border Between Nica-

Notes (Chapters 8 and 9) (23 3 )

ragua and Costa Rica," Nicaraguan Instituteof Natural Resources. National Park Serviceof Nicaragua, Managua, mimeographed.Spring 1986.

67. Philip Shabecoff, "Parley Urges QuickAction to Protect Atmosphere," New YorkTimes. July 1, 1988.

Chapter 9, Mobilizing at the Grassroots

1, In addition to the particular sourcesgiven in these notes, this chapter is based onvisits to dozens of grassroots developmentprojects in Bolivia and Brazil in the summerof 1988. as well as previous trips lo otherparts of Latin America.

2. Estimates of global participation ingrassroots movements for sustainable devel-opment are of necessity highly speculative.One attempt to calculate a rough figure forrural Third World grassroots initiatives cameto 100 million; Bertrand Schneider, The Bare-foot Revolution: A Report to the Club of Rome(London: Intermediate Technologies Publi-cations. 1988).

3, Sheldon Annis, "Re-organization at theGrassroots," Grassroots Development, Vol. 11,No. 2, 1987: cult:Aral transformation dis-cussed in Richard Critchfield. "Science andthe Villager: The Last Sleeper Wakes," For-eign Affairs, Fall 1982, and Villages (GardenCity, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday. 1981).

4, Independent groups discussed in WorldDevelopment (supplement), Fall 1987;Schneider, Barefoot Revolution.

5. Table based on James Tarrant et al.,"Natural Resources and Environmental Man-agement in Indonesia: An Overview," U.S.Agency for International Development(AID), Washington, D.C.. October 1987;Philippines from Jason DeParle, "The SlumBehind the Sheraton," Washington Monthly,December 1987; all other countries dis-cussed elsewhere in text with citations given,

6. Terry Alliband. Catalysts of Development:Voluntary Agencies in India (West Hartford,

Conn.: Kumarian, 1983); Mathew Zachariah,Revolution Through Reform: A Comparison of Sar-vodaya and Conscientization (New York; Prae-ger, 1986); Aloysius P. Fernandez, "NGOs inSouth Asia: People's Participation and Part-nership," World Development (supplement),Fall 1987; D.L, Sheth, "Grass Roots Initia-tives in India." Development: Seeds 4. Change.No. 2, 1984; Centre for Science and Environ-ment. The Slate of India 's Environment 1984-85,The Second Citizen's Report (New Delhi: 1985).

7. ADAB News (Dhaka, Bangladesh), May/June 1987; Joanna Macy. Dharma and Develop-ment: Religion as Resource in the Sarvodaya Self-Help Movement, rev. cd. (West Hartford,Conn.; Kumarian, 1985); "Mosquito Controlwithout Pesticides," Panoscope (London), Oc-tober 1987; Denis Goulet, "DevelopmentStrategy in Sri Lanka and a People's Alterna-tive," in Donald Attwood et al., eds.. Powerand Poverty: Development and Development Pro-jects in the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: West-view Press, 1988).

8. Annis, "Re-organization at the Grass-roots": Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (NewYork: Penguin, 1980): Rubem C6sar Fer-nandes and Leilah Landim. "Um Perfil dasONGs no Brasil," Comunicerfoloes do FSER(Rio de Janeiro). November 1986: JaneKramer, "Letter from the Elysian Fields,"New Yorker. March 2, 1987; Sheldon Annisand Peter Hakim, eds., Direct to the Poor: Grass-roots Development in Latin America (Boulder,Colo.; Lynne Rienner, 1988).

9. Robert Wasserstrom, Grassroots Develop-ment in Latin America & the Caribbean: Oral His-tories of Social Change (New York: Praeger.1985); Albert Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collec-tively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America(New York: Pergamon, 1984): Leon Zamosc,The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movementin Colombia: Struggles of the National Peasant As-sociation. 1967-1981 (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1986); David Fran-cis, "Colombian Official Develops InnovativePlan to Protect Environment," Christian Sci-ence Monitor. June 27. 1986; Peter Rosset and

248


John Vandermeer, eds,. Nicaragua: The Unfin-ished Revolution (New York: Grove, 1986).

10. Lloyd Timberlake. Only One Earth: Liv-ing for the Future (New York: Sterling, 1987);Paul Harrison, The Greening of Africa (NewYork: Viking/Penguin, 1987); BarbaraThomas, Politics. Participation, and Poverty: De-velopment Through Self-Help in Kenya (Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1985): Simon Mu-chiro, "The Role of African NGOs as a Toolfor Change," Development: Seeds of Change. No.4. 1987; Pierre Pradervand, "Self-Reliancefor Survival in Africa: Peasant Groups Key toContinent's Future," Christian Science Monitor.March 9. 1988.

11. Hilary F. French, "Industrial Waste-land," World Watch (Washington, D.C.), No-vember/December 1988; Helsinki Watch,From Below: independent Peace and EnvironmentalMovements in Eastern Europe & The USSR (NewYork: 1987).

12. U.S. environmental movement fromPeter Borrelli, "Environmentalism at a

Crossroads," .4micus fournal, Summer 1987,and from Will Collette, "Citizen's Clearing-house on Hazardous Wastes," Environment.November 1987: Horst Mewes, "The GreenParty Comes of Age," Environment, June1985; Saral Sarkar, "The Green Movement inWest Germany," Alien:wives. April 1986.

13. Role of African women from Harrison.Greening of Africa: Population Reference Bu-reau, World Population Data Sheet 1988 (Wash-ington, D.C.: 1988); Peter Wanyande."Women's Groups in Participatory Develop-ment: Kenya's Development ExperienceThrough the Use of Harambee," Development:Seeds of Change. No. 2/3, 1987; Kathryn Marchand Rochelle Taqqu, If Informal Associa-tions in Developing Countries: Catalysis forChange? (Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press,1986): Sally Yudelman, Hopeful Openings: AStudy of Five Women's Development Organizationsin Latin America and the Caribbean (West Hart-ford, Conn.: Kumarian, 1987); Zubeida M.Ahmad, "Women's Work and Their Struggle

249

to Organize." Development: Seeds of Change,No. 4, 1984.

14. Sithembiso Nyoni, "IndigenousNGOs: Liberation, Self-Reliance. and Devel-opment." World Development (supplement),Fall 1987.

15. Bangladesh Rural Advancement Com-mittee, "Household Strategies in BonkuraVillage." in David Konen, ed., CommunityManagement: Asian Experience and Perspectives(West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian, 1986).

16, Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collectively.

17. Lori Heise, Senior Researcher, World-watch Institute, private communications withorganizers in various regions of India duringvisit in Fall 1986.

18. Indian community development expe-rience from Gerrit Huizer. "Harmony vs.Confrontation," Development: Seeds of Change.No. 2, 1984; AID community developmentexperience from Erik Eckholm, The Dispos-sessed of the Earth: Land Reform and SustainableDevelopment. Worldwatch Paper 30 (Washing-ton. D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, June 1979).

19. Paulo Freire. Pedagogy of the Oppressed(New York: Continuum, 1970): popular edu-cation from Patrick Breslin, Development andDignity (Washington, D.C.: Inter-AmericanFoundation (IAF), I987): Ariel Dorfman."Bread and Burnt Rice: Culture and Eco-nomic Survival in Latin America," GrassrootsDevelopment, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1984.

20. Francis Mulwa, "Participation of theGrassroots in Rural Development: The Caseof the Development Education Programmeof the Catholic Diocese of Machakos,Kenya," Development: Seeds of Change. No. 2/3,1987; Albert Hirschman, "The Principle ofConservation and Mutation of Social En-ergy," in Annis and Hakim, Direct to the Poor.

2 I. Eileen Belamide, "Building Self-HelpGroups: The Philippine Experience," ideasand Action (U.N. Food and Agriculture Orga-nization, Rome), November 1986: DevendraKumar, Centre of Science for Villages.


Wardha, India, private communication, May23, 1988.

22, Macy, Dharma and Development.

23. Dorfman, "Bread and Burnt Rice."

24, Barber B. Conable, "Address to theBoard of Governors," Berlin, September 27.1988; World Bank, The World Batik's Support

for the Alkviation of Poverty (Washington, D.C.:1988).

25. Incentives to organize discussed inSheldon Annis, "Can Small-Scale Develop-ment be a Large-Scale Policy? The Case ofLatin America," World Development (supple-ment), Fall 1987.

26. Celine Sachs, "Mutir5o in Brazil,Initiatives for Self-Reliance," Development:Seeds of Change, No, 4, 1986; Julie Fischer,"Creating Communities; Squatter Neighbor-hood Associations in Latin America," Grass-roots Development, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1982; Manilafrom Walden Bello, "The ZOTO Experi-ence," Christianity and Crisis, November 9,1987; Bangkok from Bertha Turner, ed.,Building Community: A Third World Case Book(London: Building Community Books, 1988).

27. Paz quoted in Turner, Building Commu-nity: Sheldon Annis. "What is Not the Sameabout the Urban Poor: The Case of MexicoCity," in John Lewis, ed., Strengthening thePoor: What Have We Learned? (New Brunswick.New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988).

28. Fischer, "Creating Communities";Eliana Athayde, Centro de Defesa Rubino,Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, private communica-tion. June 14, 1988; Gilson Cardoso, presi-dent, Associacfio de Moradores de SantaMarta, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, private commu-nication, June 15, 1988; author's visit toSanta Marta. June 15, 1988.

29, Timberlake, Only One Earth; Turner.Building Community: Pino Cirri& "ManagingLocal Food Supplies: Activism in Peru."Ceres. September 1987,

30. Alan Riding, "Brazil's Northeast, Mis-ery Molded by Man and Nature," New York

Times, May 3, 1988; Valdemar de OliveiraNeto, Director-President, Centro Luiz Freire,Olinda, Brazil, private communication, une21, 1988; Suzana Cavalcanti, Co-Director,Centro Luiz Freire, Olinda, Brazil. privatecommunication, une 22, 1988; Maria LuciaPrazeres Farias, Director, Escola Maria Con-ceic5o, Recife, Brazil, private communica-tion. June 22, 1988; author's visit to commu-nity schools, June 22, 1988.

31. John Briscoe and David de Ferranti.Il'aier for Rural Communities: Helping People HelpThemselves (Washington, D.C.; World Bank,1988); "We Can Solve It: An Alternative bythe Community," video by UTTHAN-Mahiti.Development Action Planning Team, Ah-madabad, India, 1987,

32. "We Can Solve It."

33. Sandra Huffman et al., "CommunityDesigned Interventions to Prevent Malnutri-tion in Peru: Community Kitchens andNeighborhood Childcare" (draft), Center toPrevent Childhood Malnutrition. Bethesda.Md., May 20. 1988; Alan Riding, "HungerSpreading in Peru Inflation," New York Times,October 30, 1988.

34, United Nations Children's Fund (UNI-CEF), The State of the World's Children 1988(New York: Oxford University Press, forUNICEF. 1988).

35, Marilynn M. Rosenthal, Health Care inthe People's Republic of China: ;%loving TowardModernisation (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress. 1987); Golam Samdani Fakir, "TheRole of NGOs in Health and Family Planningin Bangladesh," A DAB News (Dhaka, Ban-gladesh). May/June 1987.

36. South Korea and Indonesia fromBruce Stokes, Helping Ourselves: Local Solutionsto Global Problems (New York: W.W. Norton &Co,. 1981); Thailand from Norman Uphoff,Local Institutional Development: An AnalyticalSourcebook with Cases (West Hartford, Conn.:Kumarian, 1986).

250


37. Jodi L. Jacobson. Planning the GlobalFamily. Worldwatch Paper 80 (Washington.D.C.: Worldwatch Institute. December1987).

38. Harrison, Greening of Africa; Sonia Cor-rea. SOS Corpo Mulher, Recife. Brazil. pri-vate communication, June 21. 1988.

39. Judith Tendler et al., "What to ThinkAbout Cooperatives: A Guide from Bolivia,"in Annis and Hakim. Direct to the Poor; Shel-don Annis, "The Next World Bank? Financ-ing Development from the Bottom Up."Grassroots Development, Vol. 11, No. I, 1987.

40. Shoaib Sultan Khan, General Man-ager. Aga Khan Rural Support Program,"Successful Rural Development in the Moun-tains of Pakistan." presentation at Interna-tional Forestry Seminar, AID, Washington,D.C., February 2, 1988; Operations Evalua-tion Department. The Aga Khan Rural SupportProgram in Pakistan: An Interim Evaluation(Washington. D.C.: World Bank, 1987).

41. Khan, "Successful Rural Developmentin the Mountains of Pakistan"; OperationsEvaluation Department. Aga Khan Rural Sup-port Program.

42. Taiwan and South Korea from Uphoff,Local institutional Development: Michael Brat-ton, "Farmer Organizations and Food Pro-duction in Zimbabwe." World Development,March 1986; Norman Uphoff, "ActivatingCommunity Capacity for Water Managementin Sri Lanka," in Korten. Community Manage-ment: Philippines from Benjamin Bagadicand Frances Korten. "Developing Irrigators'Organizations: A Learning Process Ap-proach," in Michael Cernea, ed., Putting Peo-ple First: Sociological Variables in Rural Develop-ment (New York: Oxford University Press.1985); India from V. D. Deshpande et al.."Water for People." in Korten. CommunityManagement.

43. Judith Tendler. "What Ever Hap-pened to Poverty Alleviation?" Ford Founda-tion. New York. March 1987.

251

44. Ibid.; Medea Benjamin, "SEWA: In-dian Women Organize," Seeds (OakhurstBaptist Church, Decatur, Ga.), August 1986;Jennefer Sebstad, Women and Self-Reliance inIndia: The SEMI Story (London: Zed, inpress).

45. Muhammad Yunus, Managing Direc-tor, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh. speech to1988 Conference of Society for InternationalDevelopmentWashington Chapter, April22, 1988.

46. Ibid.; Clyde Farnsworth, "Micro-Loans to the World's Poorest," New YorkTimes, February 21, 1988; Stall of the SelectCommittee on Hunger, "Access and Availa-bility of Credit to the Poor in DevelopingCountries and the United States," U.S.House of Representatives. Washington.D.C., 1988.

47. Bhoomi Sena from Guy Gran. "Learn-ing from Development Success: Some Les-sons from Contemporary Case Histories."National Association of Schools of Public Af-fairs and Administration, September 1983,and from Anisur Rahman, "Some Dimen-sions of People's Participation in the BhoomiSena Movement," United Nations ResearchInstitute for Social Development. Geneva.1981; Seth Mydans. "In the Big Manila LandPlan, Steps are Small." New York Times, Octo-ber 18. 1987; Tom Barry, Roots of Rebellion:Land & Hunger in Central America (Boston:South End, 1987); Alan Durning. "Brazil'sLandless Lose Again." World Watch (Wash-ington, D.C.), September/October 1988;Amnesty International, Brazil: Authorized Vio-lence in Rural Areas (London: 1988).

48. Paul Kurian, "Commercialisation ofCommon Property Resources. Kusnur Satya-graha." Economic and Political Weekly, January16, 1988.

49. Robert Wade. "Why Some Indian Vil-lages Co-operate." Economic and PoliticalWeekly. April 16. 1988; Joshua Bishop, "In-digenous Social Structures. Formal Institu-tions. and the Management of Renewable

Note; (Chapter 9) (237)

Natural Resources in Mali" (draft), SahelianDepartment, World Bank, Washington, D.C..August 1988: J. Arnold and Gabriel Camp-bell, "Collective Management of Hill Forestsin Nepal: The Community Forestry Develop-ment Project," and Donald Messerschmidt,"People and Resources in Nepal: CustomaryResource Management Systems of the UpperKali Gandaki," both in Board on Science andTechnology for International Development,Proceedings of the Conference on Common PropertyResource Management (Washington, D.C.: Na-tional Academy Press, 1986).

50. Brazil from various private communi-cations during author's visit, June 1988;"Philippines: 50,000 Strong National Fisher-folk Organization Demands Genuine Aquar-ian Reform," IFDA Dossier, May/June 1988;Sandeep Pendse, "The Struggle of Fisherfolkin Goa," Development: Seeds of Change. No. 2,1984; K.G. Kumar, "Organising FisherfolkCooperatives in Kerala," Economic and Politi-cal Weekly, March 19, 1988; Centre for Sci-ence and Environment, State of India's Envi-ronment 1984-85.

51. Julie Sloan Deslow and Christine Pa-doch, People of the Tropical Rain Forest (Berke-ley. Ca.: University of California Press,1988); Stephen Schwartzman and MaryHelena Allegretti, "Extractive Production inthe Amazon and the Rubber Tappers' Move-ment," Environmental Defense Fund, Wash-ington, D.C., May 28, 1987; StephenSchwartzman, Environmental Defense Fund.Washington, D.C.. private communication.April 13, 1988.

52. Private communications with variousmembers and officers of rubber tapper union.Acre. Brazil, une 23, 1988; Mary Helena Al-legretti and Stephen Schwartzman. "Extrac-tive Reserves: A Sustainable DevelopmentAlternative for Amazonia." EnvironmentalDefense Fund, Washington, D.C., 1987.

53. Allegretti and Schwartzman, "Extrac-tive Reserves"; Alan Durning. "Violence inthe Brazilian JungleA Global Concern,"Christian Science Monitor, August 23 1988.

54. Margaret Scott, "Loggers and LocalsFight for the Heart of Borneo," Far EasternEconomic Review, April 28, 1988.

55. Mark Shepard, Gandhi Today: A Reporton Mahatma Gandhi's Successors (Arcata. Calif.:Simple Productions, 1987).

56. Vandana Shiva, "Fight for Survival inIndia," Earth Island Journal, Spring 1988;"Protecting Doon Valley's Eco-System.Problems and Limitations," Economic and Po-litical Weekly, October 10, 1987; Jayanta Ban-dyopadhyay and Vandana Shiva, "Chipko:Rekindling India's Forest Culture," Ecologist,January/February 1987; Shobhita Jain,"Women and People's Ecological Move-ment: A Case Study of Women's Role in theChipko Movement in Uttar Pradesh," Eco-nomic and Political Weekly. October 13, 1984;observations of Lori Heise, Senior Re-searcher, Worldwatch Institute, during visitto Chipko eco-development camp, Garhal,India. Fall 1986.

57. Harrison, Greening of Africa; SandraPostel and Lori Heise. Reforesting the Earth.Worldwatch Paper 83 (Washington, D.C.:Worldwatch Institute, April 1988); ElizabethObel, "Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organiza-tion," Panascope (London), October 1987.

58. Harrison, Greening of Africa.

59. Ibid.; Bernard Lecomte, Project Aid:Limitations and Alternatives (Paris: Organisa-tion for Economic Co-operation and Devel-opment (OECD), 1986); "Can Outsiders Playa Positive Role in Strengthening GrassrootsMovements?" Food Monitor (World HungerYear, New York), Spring 1986; Peter Wrightand Edouard Bonkoungou. "Soil and WaterConservation as a Starting Point for RuralForestry: The Oxfam Project in Ouahigouya.Burkina Faso." Rural Africana, Fall 1985/Winter 1986.

60. Spreading networks traced in "NGONetworker" (newsletter). World ResourcesInstitute, Washington, D.C., and in Panos cope.Panos Institute, London; environmental

252


movement in Africa from Paula Williams,"Evolving Concerns." Letter/Report toPeter Martin. Institute of Current World Af-fairs, Hanover, N.H., October 1987; NalimLadduwahetty. Editor and Founding Mem-ber, Sri Iankan Environmental Congress.Colombo. Sri Lanka, private communication,February 10. 1988; Brazilian environmentalmovement from private communicationsduring author's visit, June 1988.

61. Annis, "The Next World Bank?"

62. Ibid.; Annis. "Can Small-Scale Devel-opment be a Large-Scale Policy?"

63. Steven Greenhouse, "Third WorldTells I.M.F. that Poverty has Increased," NewYork Times, September 29. 1988; interna-tional debt payments from World Bank.World Debt Tables: Extern' Debt of DevelopingCountries, 1987-88 Edition, Volume I. Analysisand Summary Tables (Washington, D.C.:1988); development assistance from JosephWheeler, Development Co-operation: Efforts andPolicies of the Umbers of the Development Assist-ance Committee, 1987 Report (Paris: OECD,1988).

64. Stephen Hellinger et al., Rid for JustDevelopment (Boulder, Colo,: Lynne Rienner,1988); Kurt Finsterbush and Warren VanWicklin, "The Contribution of BeneficiaryParticipation to Development Project Effec-tiveness," Public Administration and Develop-ment, 1987.

65. Robert Cassen and Associates, Does AidWork? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); charitiesas "growth field" from Joseph Wheeler. De-velopment Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of theMembers of the Development Assistance Committee,1986 Report (Paris: OECD, 1987); BrianSmith, "U.S. and Canadian PVOs as Trans-national Development Institutions," in Rob-ert Gorman, ed., Private roluntaY Organiza-tions as Agents of Development (Boulder, Colo.;Westview Press, 1984); Hendrik van derHeiiden, "The Reconciliation of :AGO Au-tonomy. Program Integrity and OperationalEffectiveness with Accountability to Do-

253

nors." World Development (supplement). Fall1987.

66. Robert Chambers, Rural Development:Putting the Last First (Essex: Longman Scien-tific & Technical, 1983).

67. Problems of overfunding based on nu-merous private communications in UnitedStates and Latin America, especially KevinHealy. Bolivia Representative, Inter-Ameri-can Foundation. Arlington. Va.. September29, 1988.

68. AID comment at "Rethinking U.S.Foreign Assistance," Forum held by Societyfor International DevelopmentWashing-ton Chapter, Washington, D.C., September16, 1988; Bengali example from Charles Elli-ott. "Some Aspects of Relations Between theNorth and South in the NGO Sector," WorldDevelopment (supplement), Fall 1987.

69. Cernea, Putting People First: Lecomte,Project Aid.

70. On new assistance compact, see AnneGordon Drabek, "Development Alternatives:The Challenge for NGOs An Overview ofthe Issues" and numerous other articles,World Development (supplement). Fall 1987,

71. Lecomte, Project Aid: Kingston Kajese,"An Agenda of Future Tasks for Interna-tional and Indigenous NGOs: Views from theSouth," and Brain Smith. "An Agenda of Fu-ture Tasks for International and IndigenousNGOs: Views from the North," World Develop-ment (supplement), Fall 1987.

72. Breslin, Development and Dignity: IAF,"The Inter-American Foundation: Report ofthe Evaluation Group," Washington. D.C.,March 1984; Office of Technology Assess-ment, U.S. Congress, Grassroots Development:The African Development Foundation (Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1988); Oxfam from Ben Whitaker, A Bridge ofPeople (London: Heinemann. 1983); MichaelGallagher and Miriam Parel. Ashoka. Wash-ington, D.C., and Lenny Silverstein, Ashoka,Rio de Janeiro, private communications,Spring and Summer 1988.

Notes (Chapters 9 and 10) (2391

73. Mellinger et al., Aidfor Just Development;Chambers, Putting the Last First.

74. Annis, "The Next World Bank?"

75. Pierre Pradervand, "Traveling in aMammie Wagonor a Range Rover." FoodMonitor (World Hunger Year, Ncw York),Spring 1986.

76. Annis, "Can Small-Scale DevelopmentBecome a Large-Scale Policy?"

77. Zimbabwe from Jacobson, Planning MeGlobal Family, and from Timberlake, Only OneEarth: Valerie Miller, Between Struggle andHope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade (Boul-der, Colo.: Westview Press. 1985): BurkinaFaso and Kenya from Harrison, Greening ofAfrica.

78. Philippine National Irrigation Admin-istration from Benjamin Bagadion andFrances Korten. "Developing Irrigators' Or-ganizations: A Learning Process Approach,"in Cernea, Putting People First,- David Korten."Third Generation N(0 Strategies: A Key toPeople-Centered Development," World De-velopment (supplement), Fall 1987.

79. Bello, "The ZOTO experience."

80. Dexter Chavunduka et al., XhulumaUsenza: The Story of a R.A.P. in Zimbabwe'sRural Development (Bulawayo. Zimbabwe: Or-ganization of Rural Associations for Prog-ress. 1985); People of God from author's visitto Povo de Deus, Recife. Brazil, June 1988;Shelton Davis, "The Ayoreode-Zapoc6 Com-munal Sawmill: A Social Forestry Project inEastern Bolivia." Grassroots Development, Vol.9. No. 2, 1985.

81. Quoted in DeParle. "The Slum Be-hind the Sheraton."

Chapter 10. Outlining a Global ActionPlan

1. Christopher Flavin. Nuclear Power: TheFallout From Chernobyl. Worldwatch Paper 75

(Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute,February 1987),

2. Bill Keepin and Gregory Kats. "Green-house Warming: Comparative Analysis ofNuclear and Efficiency Abatement Strate-gies." Energy Policy, December 1988; Christo-pher Flavin, The Case Against Reviving Nu-clear Power," World Watch (Washington,D.C.), July/August 1988.

S. U.S. Department of Energy. Energy In-formation Administration. Monthly Energy Re-view, July 1988; Christopher Flavin and AlanB. Duffing, Building on Success: The Age of En-ergy Efficiency, Worldwatch Paper 82 (Wash-ington, D.C.; Worldwatch Institute. March1988); lntemalional Energy Agency, EnergyConservation in IBA Countries (Paris; Organisa-tion for Economic Co-operation and Devel-opment (OECD), 1987); carbon emissionfigures are Worldwatch estimates based onGregg Marland. Environmental Science Divi-sion, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, OakRidge, Tenn.. unpublished printout and pri-vate communication. September 9, 1988.

4. Michael Renner, Rethinking the Role of theAutomobile, Worldwatch Paper 84 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, June 1988);automobile growth of 3 percent annually. ora 75-percent increase by 2010. is consistentwith recent trends. Carbon emission figuresare Worldwatch estimates based on carbonemissions produced by different fuelsderived from Gregg Marland, "The Impactof Synthetic Fuels on Global Carbon DioxideEmissions," in W.C. Clark. ed., Carbon DioxideReview 1982 (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1982); unless otherwise noted, all car-bon estimates are based on this source. Deb-orah Bleviss. The New Oil Crisis and Fuel Econ-omy Technologies: Pillaring the LightTransportation Industry for the 1990's (NcwYork: Quorum Press, 1988).

5. World electricity breakdowns are basedon ICF Inc., Fairfax, Va., private communica-tion. October 21, 1988; estimate of electricityshare of fossil fuel use is Worldwatch esti-mate; energy efficiency potentials are de-

254

i


scribed in Flavin and Durning. Building onSuccess.

6. Lighting electricity figures are World-watch estimates based on U.S. figures and onUnited Nations. 1985 Energy Statistics Yearbook(New York: 1987); projected growth is basedon an assumed 3.percent annual growth rate.with carbon emissions based on replacingcoal-fired generation through efficiency im-provements; Arthur H. Rosenfeld and DavidHafemeister, "Energy-Efficient Buildings,"Scientific American. April 1988.

7. Office of Technology Assessment. U.S.Congress, industrial Energy Use (Washington.D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.1983).

8. Robert H. Williams and Eric D. Larson."Steam-lnjected Gas Turbines and ElectricUtility Planning," IEEE Technology and SocietyMagazine. March 1986; carbon emissionsprojections are Worldwatch estimate basedon a 30-percent improvement in the effi-ciency of plant with an 80-percent capacityfactor, carbon emission figures for 1 millionmegawatts of coal-fired capacity are based onan assumed 44-percent capacity factorderived from United Nations. 1 985 EnergyYearbook.

9. Carbon emissions in 1988 from Mar-land. unpublished printout; the 3-billion-tonfigure is based on the difference betweenconstant energy intensity of a world economygrowing 3 percent annually and a 2-percentannual reduction in intensity for 20 years;degree difference range derived from IrvingMintzer, A Mailer of Degrees: The Potential forControlling the Greenhouse Effect (Washington,D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1987).

10. Cynthia Pollock Shea, Renewable En-ergy: Today's Contribution. Tomorrow's Promise,Worldwatch Paper RI (Washington, D.C.:Worldwatch Institute. January 1988).

11. ICF Inc., private communication;Shea, Renewable Energy; c: :Don emissionsbased on replacing coal-fire I generation withrenewables.

255

12. International Energy Agency, Renew-able Sources of Energy (Paris: OECD. 1987);carbon displacement projections based on anassumed capacity factor of 20 percent for fu-ture wind and photovoltaic systems.

13. U.S. Department of Energy, BudgetHighlights, FY 1989 (Washington, D.C.:1988); John Holusha. "Government Agreesto Relaxation of Auto Mileage Standard for'89," New York Times. October 4. 1988.

14. William U. Chandler et al., Energy Ef-ficiency: A New Agenda (Washington, D.C.:American Council for an Energy EfficientEconomy, 1988); gasoline tax projections areWorldwatch estimates.

15. Flavin and Durning, Building on Success.

16. Appliance efficiency from Flavin andDurning. Building on Success; fuel economytarget from Chandler et al., A New Agenda.

17. Marland, private communication;World Bank, China: The Energy Sector (Wash-ington, D.C.: 1985); Christopher Flavin, Elec-tricity for a Developing World: New Directions,Worldwatch Paper 70 (Washington, D.C.:Worldwatch Institute. June 1986); Jose Gol-demberg et al.. Energy for a Sustainable World(Washington. D.C.: World Resources Insti-tute, 1987).

18. "Global Environmental Protection Actof 1988," S. 2666. U.S. Senate, introduced bySenator Robert Stafford, uly 28, 1988; "Na-tional Energy Policy Act of 1988," S. 2667.U.S. Senate, introduced by Senator TimothyWirth, July 28, 1988: "Global Warming Pre-vention Act of 1988," H.R. 5460, U.S. Houseof Representatives, introduced by Repre-sentative Claudine Schneider. October 5,1988.

19. "Conference Statement," The Chang-ing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Se-curity, Toronto, June 27-30, 1988; WilliamU. Chandler, Battelle Pacific Northwest Lab-oratory, "An Energy Efficiency Protocol forReducing the Risk of Global ClimateChange." background paper for ProjectBlueprint. Washington, D.C., June 15. 1988.


20. Brazil figure from Alberto W. Seizes etal., ''Relat6rio de Atividades do ProjetoIBDR-INPE 'SEQV-Ano 1987," Institutode Pesquisas Espaciais, Sio Paulo. Brazil,May 1988; 11.3 million figure from FAO,Tropical Forest Resources, Forestry Paper 30(Rome: 1982); new estimate for Brazil is 6.5million hectares greater than previous esti-mates (see World Resources Institute/Inter-national Institute for Environment and De-velopment, World Resources 1986 (New York:Basic Books. 1986)). which leads to conclu-sion that the FAO estimate is probably atleast 50 percent too low: for discussion offorest damage in industrial countries, seeJames J. MacKenzie and Mohamed T. El-Ashry, Ill Winds: Airborne Pollution's Toll onTrees and Crops (Washington, D.C.: World Re-sources Institute, 1988).

21. Sandra Post el and Lori Heise. Reforest-ing the Earth, Worldwatch Paper 83 (Wash-ington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, April1988).

22. For an analysis of the effects of govern-ment forest policies, see Robert Repetto, TheForest For the Trees? Government Policies and theNuuse of Forest Resources (Washington. D.C.:World Resources Institute, 1988).

23. Peter Truell. "Latin American DebtPrompts Action," Wall Street Journal. Septem-ber 22. 1988: "G-7 Summit Leaders' En-dorsement of Sustainable Development Wel-comed," International Environment Reporter.July 13, 1988.

24. Marlise Simons, "Brazil Acts to SlowDestruction of Amazon Forest," New YorkTimes, October 13. 1988.

25. Terence Hpay. The International 47-opi-cal Timber Agreement: Its Prospects for TropicalTimber Trade, Development and Forest Manage-ment (London: International Union for Con-servation of Nature and Natural Resources/International Institute for Environment andDevelopment. 1986); Richard House. "Tim-ber Producers. Users Talk of Saving For-ests," Washington Post, July 23, 1988.

26. Postel and Heise, Reforesting the Earth.

27. Ibid.. with one important change: thecarbon-fixing rate was reduced from 6.5 tonsper hectare per year to 5.5 tons based onanalysis of data in Sandra Brown et al.. "Bio-mass of Tropical Tree Plantations and Its Im-plications for the Global Carbon Budget."Canadian Journal of Forest Research, Vol. 16.No. 2. 1986.

28. Area in Conservation Reserve fromLester R. Brown, "Breakthrough on Soil Ero-sion," World Watch (Washington. D.C.), May/June 1988. Calculation assumes a carbon-fixing rate of 5 tons per hectare per year,although higher rates-for example, withAmerican sycamores-have been achieved;see Gregg Marland. Oak Ridge National Lab-oratory, Testimony before the Comm. Ace onEnergy and Nat ural Resources, U.S. Senate,September 19, 1988. A 500-megawatt coal-fired plant emits 946,000 tons of carbon peryear, according to calculations by World-watch.

29. Postel and Heise. Reforesting the Earth.

30. Daniel J. Dudek, Offsetting New CO2Emissions (New York: Environmental DefenseFund. 1988).

31. Louise Sweeney. "The Greening ofKenya," Christian Science Monitor, October 7,1986; "Power Company to Fund Reforesta-tion to Offset Carbon Dioxide Emissions.Slow Greenhouse Effect," press release,World Resources Institute, Washington,D.C., October 11, 1988; Philip ShabecolT,"U.S. Utility Turns to Guatemala to AidAir," New York Times, October 12, 1988;Gary Moll, Vice President of Programs,American Forestry Association, Testimonybefore the Committee on Energy and Natu-ral Resources, U.S. Senate, September 19,1988.

32. Information on forest assessmentfrom Robert W. Harrill, Woods Hole Re-search Center, Woods Hole, Mass.. privatecommunication, October 6. 1988.

25g

(242)

33. Robert W. Herdt, Technological Potentialfor Increasing Crop Productivity in DevelopingCountries, paper presented to the meeting ofthe International Trade Research Consor-tium, December 14-18, 1986; Lester R.Brown with Erik P. Eckholm, By Bread Alone(New York: Praeger Publishers. 1974).

34. Francis Urban and Philip Rose, WorldPopulation by COnnify and Region. 1950 -86, andProjections to 2050 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of Agriculture (USDA). Eco-nomic Research Service (ERS), 1988);USDA, ERS, World Grain Harvested Arm, Pro-duction, and Yield 1950-87 (unpublishedprintout) (Washington. D.C.: 1988).

35. USDA. ERS, World Grain 1950-87;Herdt, Technological Potential.

36. USDA. ERS, World Grain 1950-87;U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), FAO Fertilizer yearbook 1986 (Rome:1986).

37. J. Dawson Ahalt, -Argentine Agricul-ture Struggles With Policy Changes." Choices,First Quarter 1988.

38. Milton J. Esman, Landlessness and Near.Landlesstiess in Developing Countries (Ithaca.N.V.: Cornell University Center for interna-tional Studies. 1978): R. Albert Berry andWilliam R. Cline, Farm Size, Factor Productivityand Technical Change in Developing Countries(draft. June 1976). summarized in SchlomoEckstein et al., Land Reform in Latin America:Bolivia, Chile. Mexico, Peril and Venezuela, StaffWorking Paper No. 275, World Bank, Wash-ington, D.C.. April 1978; Erik Eckholm, TheDispossessed of the Earth: Land Reform and Sus-tainable Development, Worldwatch Paper 30(Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch institute,June 1979).

39. Gary Lee, "Soviets Allow Land Leas-ing for Farmers," ll*ashingion Post. August 27,1988.

40. Edward C. Wolf, Beyond the Green Revo-lution: New Approaches for Third World Agricul-ture. Worldwatch Paper 73 (Washington.D.C.: Worldwatch Institute: October 1986).

Notes (Chapter 10)

41. Ibid.

42. ibid.

2.57

43. Kenneth Tull. "Bio-Intensive Garden-ing in the Philippines: An International insti-tute for Rural Reconstruction and UNICEFProject." in Kenneth Tull et al., Experiences inSuccess: Cast Studies in Growing Enough FoodThrough Regenerative Agriculture (Emmaus. Pa.:Rodale International. 1987).

44. M. Rupert Cutler. "The Peril of Van-ishing Farmlands," New York Times. July 1,1980.

45. OECD. Land se Policies and Agriculture(Paris: 1976).

46. Norman A. Berg, "Making the Most ofthe New Soil Conservation initiatives," Jour-nal of Soil and Water Conservation, January/February 1987; USDA, ERS, Cropland, Water,and Conservation Situation and Outlook Report,Washington. D.C.. September 1988; -SixthCRP Signup Adds 3.4 Million Acres," Agricul-tural Outlook. August 1988.

47. Sandra Postel, Conserving Water: TheUntapped Alternative. Worldwatch Paper 67(Washington. D.C.: Wor'dwatch Institute,September 1985).

48. Consultative Group on InternationalAgricultural Research, World Bank. AnnualReport 1987-88 (Washington, D.C.: 1988).

49. International Monetary Fund (1MF),International Financial Statistics, Washington,D.C., various months.

50. USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service(FAS), "Reference Tables for Wheat. Corn,and Total Coarse Grains: Supply-Distribu-tion for Individual Countries," Ithr/d GrainSituation and Outlook. Washington, D.C.. Janu-ary 1987: USDA. FAS, "Reference Tables onRice: Supply-Distribution for IndividualCountries.** World Grain Situation and Outlook,Washington. D.C., August 1986.

51. 1MF. International Financial StatisticsYearbook (Washington, D.C.: 1988).

52. Brown with Eckholm, By Bread Alone.

Notes (Chapter 10)

53. Population Information Program,"Population and Birth Planning in the Peo-ple's Republic of China" Population Reports,Series J, No, 25, Johns Hopkins University,Baltimore, Md January/February 1982;USDA, ERS, World Grain 1950-87.

54, Barber B. Conable, President, WorldBank, "Address to the Board of Governors,"Berlin, September 27, 1988; USDA, ERS,World Grain 1950-87; World Bank, World De-velopment Report 1988 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1988).

55, United Nations, Statistical Office,Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York, Sep-tember 1988.

56. Carl Haub, Population Reference Bu-reau, Washington, D,C., private communica-tion, October 17, 1988.

57. Quote from Economic and SocialCommission for Asia and the Pacific, Popula-tion of fapan, Country Monograph Series No.11 (New York: United Nations, 1984): Haub,private communication. See also Irene V.Taeuber, The Population of Japan (Princeton,NJ.: Princeton University Press. 1958).

58. Population Information Program,"Population and Birth Planning in the Peo-ple's Republic of China"; Haub, private com-munication.

59, United Nations. Monthly Bulletin;Haub, private connnunication.

60. United Nations, Monthly Bulletin.

61. Jodi L. Jacobson. Planning the GlobalFamily. 'tVorldwatch Paper 80 (Washington,D.C.: Worldwatch Institute. December1987).

62. Population Information Program."Population and Birth Planning in the Peo-ple's Republic of China": Pi-chao Chen. "11M Chinese Opt for Only One Child GloryCertificate," People (London). Vol. 9. No. 4,1982.

(243)

63. Population Information Program,"Population and Birth Planning in the Peo-ple's Republic of China": Chen, "1 1 M Chi-nese"; World Bank, World Development Report1988.

64. Department of International Eco-nomic and Social Afthirs, Fertility Behavior inthe Con tml of Development: Evidence from theWorld Fertility Survey (New 'York: United Na-tions, 1987).

65, Judith Jacobsen. Promoting PopulationStabikation: incentives for Small Families,Worldwatch Paper 54 (Washington, D.C.:Worldwatch Institute, June 1983).

66, Lester R. Brown and Edward C. Wolf,"Reclaiming the Future," in Lester R. Brownet al., State of 1he World 1988 (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1988).

67. Thomas E. Lovejoy. "Will Unexpect-edly the Top Blow Off ?" Plenary Address tothe Annual Meeting of the American Insti-tute of Biological Sciences, University of Cal-ifornia at Davis, August 14, 1988.

68. Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister forForeign Affairs, Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, Statement before the Forty-thirdSession of the U.N. General Assembly. NewYork, September 27, 1988.

69. United Nations Children's Fund (UNI-CEF), The Sink of the Irarld's Children 1989(New York: Oxford University Press. forUNICEF. 1989).

70. For Ghana and Peru, sec World FoodCouncil, The Global Slate of 1 1 unger and Malnu-trition; Michael Griffin. "Harsh Times co:Madagascar's Growing Numbers." People

(London). Vol. 15. No. 2. 1988.

71. Ruth Leger Sivard, World .1Gli&sr andSocial Expenditures 1937-38 (Washington,D.C.: World Priorities inc., 1987).

72. "Conference Statement," The Chang-ing Atmosphere,

258

Index

Afghanistan. 148Africa

AIDS in. 114. 115. 120carrying capacity study of. 27degraded land in. 13-14. 23. 2:. 28. 48dependence on grazing animals in, 23environmental refugees in. 61food production and consumption in. 13- 14.43. 55grain imports by. 16. 45grassroots organizations in. 156-58. 159. 164. 168hazardous waste export to. 70HIV prevalence in. 116population growth in. 40. 43public's concern toward environment in. 5recent major droughts in. 21. 22. 62sett einforcing cycle of drought and degradation in.

32. 47. rstatus of women in, 29. 40. 158. 163see also individual countries in

African Development Foundation. 171African Ministerial Conference on the Environment

(1985). 38African NGOs Environmental Network. 38Aga Khan Rural Support Program (Pakistan). 165-64Agency for International Development. U.S. (AID). 39.

169Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of

Environmental Protection (1972). 153agriculture

climate change's impact on. 4. 10-11. 14-16. 29-30environmental trends and resource constraints on.

42. 46future strategy for international. 184-88irrigation use and intensity of. 49land and labor drawn to industry from. 44. 46. 47maximum physical response to inputs in. 53-54production trends in global. 12-13. 14t = nologies used for. 42. 44. 461' d World unsustainable. 60-64see also cropland: crops

agroforestry. 35. 39. 185. 186Agroforestry Outreach Project (Haiti). 39AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). 113-31

epidemiological shift in. 117human and social vulnerabilities exposed by. 128-31impact of on Third World. 118. 121latency period for. 114. 123prevalence by region, 115-16prevention methods and initiatives for. 121-22.

123-24. 125. 126-28

psychological toll of, 113, 121repressive measures and discrimination as reaction

to, 122-23. 129urban prepeadence of. 116UV radiation effect on patients with. 83worldwide total of people with. 113. 115see also health; human immunodeficiency virus

air pollution. see pollution, airalbedo. impact on rainfall of increase in. 30Algeria. 45. 63Alliance for Responsible CM Policy. 85American Forestry Association. 183American Institute of Biological Sciences. 192American Lung Association. 106American Medical Association (AMA). 194American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), 89 91Amnesty International. 165Amu-Darya (Soviet Union). 50-51Anderson. James. 79Annis. Sheldon. 172Antarctica, 17. 18, 78-81Applied Energy Services (Virginia). 183aquifers. see groundwaterAral Sea. water level fall of. 4-5. 26. 51. 142Arctic. 80-81Argentina

auto production and owne.ship trends in. 99-100grain exports from, 45lack of auto emission controls in. 107ozone layer depletion over. 80

armamentsdisbanding stockpiles of. 147expenditures and human development priorities. 137grassroots pressure for elimination of. 147negotiations for controls on. l45trade. 134-35. 136see also military

Army Corps of Engineers. U.S.. 87Ashoka (United States). 171Asia

AIDS in, 115auto ownership in. 99chemical fertilizer use in. 52community movement in. 156. 161. 162. 164-67conversion of flooded to irrigated riceland in. 51cropland conversion to nonfarm uses in, 46food production and emnsumption in. 14. 16. 44. 45HIV prevalence in. 116land distribution confrontations in. 165salinized land in. 26

259

(246) Index

Asia (eontintied)sea level rise impact on. 104 Isee aim individual countries in

Association for Sexual Education (Guatemala). 126Ashayde, E/iana, 161Atkinson. Roger. 80Australia

AIDS prevention in, 124auto emission standards in, 107grain exports from, 46ozone layer depletion over, 80

automobiles, 97-112alternative fuels for. 101-3, 108-9improved CFC efficiency for air conditioners in. 90land requirements for infrastructure used by, 110trends in production and use of, 97. 98-100. 101-2.

109-12urban residents reliance un. 110Sff also transportation

Ayoob. Mohammed. 136AZT, 118

Bandyopadhyay. Jayanta. 32Bangladesh

environmental refugees in, 4, 65flooding in. 4. 5. 11.64 -65imported oil expenditures by. 101marginal disaster-prone areas M. 64. 65sea level rise impact on, 11. 72-74self-help groups in. 156

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 163Barker. Randy, 53, 54Belgium. 89Bengal. Bay of. 25. 74Bcrry, Wendell. 141Shave. Vinoba. 156Bhoomi Sena Land movement (India), 165Bhopal. India, toxic leak in. 69biological cycles. disrupting, 32, 47-48. 59-63, 64biomass. sr, forests; fueloodbiotechnology. impact on agriculture of. 54. 187birth control. we family planningStaining °them 122Blueprint for the Peace Race. 146Bolivia. 173Bongaarts. John. 120Borneo, 166Botswana. 63Boutding, Kenneth. 136Brahmaputra River. 25-26, 65. 72Brazil

auto emission standards in. 107auto production and ownership trends in. 99deforestation in, 4, 26. 29. 31food insecurity in. 14grain imports by. 45grassroots movements in. 156. 161-62. 166. 168,

17$growth of women's movement in. 163imported oil expenditures by. 100-1national land use policy of. 29ozone layer depletion over. 80Proakoot (ethanol fuel) program in. 101. 102

Brether, Jeremy. 7British .Nntarctic Survey. 78Brundtland, Gro Harlem (Prime Minister of Norway).

8. 19.20. 194

260

z

Burkina Fasocarrying capacity study of. 27desertification Anion Plan in. 38environmental refugees of, 62grassroots organizations in, 158immunization of children M. 172

Bush. George. 147

Cairo Plan, on environmental degradation. 38-39California

automobile proliferation impacts on. 110methanol Biel use program in. 109renewable energy use in. 178salinized land in. 26University of. 106. 150

Campaign for Peace and Democracy/East and West.147

Canadaacid deposition damage in. 142auto emission standards in. 107carbon emission reduction gm! of, 8. 19. 194CFC use reductions in, 89environmental policy change in, 8food production changes due to climate change in.

15grain expt ris from. 57-58hydrogen vehicle fuel R&D in, 103impacts of Rt..ist severe droughts in. 41. 57-58imported air pollution as foreign policy consideration

by, 17-18coil erosion costs to. 60

carbon emissionsreduction goals. 8. 19. 194sources of, 4. 8-9, 10, 71, 106-9. 177strategies for lowering. 175-80

.nlizrdensztaol.015.338.CCIArdREena(Ul 169Caribbean Basin, 63, 114carrying capacity. land degradation and. 27, 28Censers for Disease Control (CDC). U.S., 125Central America

CATIE activities in, $9environmental alliance among countries in. 153grassroots movements in. 156land degradation as cause of migration in, 64see also Latin America: individual countries in

Centre of Science for tillages (India). 160Chad. 13, 27, 62Chapman. Duane. 53. 54Charney, J.G., 30Chernob1. Soviet Union. 5-6, 59, 69. 144Chile. 80China

agricultural policy in. 43-44auto ownership trends in. 100'barefoot doctors' in. 163carbon emissions in, 9, 179chemical fertilizer use in. 52climate change effects in. 3. 10cropland conversion to nonfarn uses in. 47economic reforms in, 36food production trends in. 12.43 -44. 54, 58grain imports by. 44-45impacts of recent severe droughts in. 21.41. 43. 52.

55independent community groups in, 158, 172irrigation use in. 49, 50. 51

military to civilian resource conversion by. 150-51population control in. 188. 189-90. 191ree.or.ttion of degraded land in, 33-34soil erosion and salinization in. 26

Chipko (India). 167chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)

effects from atmospheric release of. 8-9, 77, 78. 144emission reduction methods for. 814-92global production and market value of. 86international cooperation to control. 18-19. 78.

93-96properties and uses of, 85, 86, 87

Christian Base Communities. 156cities

AIDS spread from. 116air pollution in large. 106environmental refugees* migration to. 61. 62. 63-64health care changes brought about by AIDS in.

130-31independent development organizations in. 364traffic restraints in inner. 108transport systems for. 110. 111. 112

Clean Air Act. U.S. 108climate change

alternative fuels* impacts on. 109causes of. 8-9. 71. 102. 106-9. 143-44developing an energy strategv for reducing. 175-80effects of. 3- 1.9 -10. 12. 14-16. 29-31. 71-75. 80,

107food security's threat from. 14-16inevitability in onset of, 3-4. 8. 9-10. 11. 29. 41-42.

58. 71. 78international cooperation so minimize. 11-12. 19-20.

93-96modeling on. 3. 9. 11. 29research on. 19. 95

coal. szz fossil fuelsColorado. 109Colorado River. 26Commission on California Stale Government

Organization and Economy'. 110community groups. set grassroots organizations:

independent development organizations:nongovernmental organizations

Conable Barber. 160. 188Congress. U.S.

alternative fuel encouragement by. 109climate change hills in. 8. 180hazardous waste export legislation in. 70Superfund enactment by, 67

Conservation International. 153Conservation Reserve Program. U.S. 33. 42, 43. 46,

48. 56-57. 182-83. 186Consultative Group on NI emational Agricultural

Research (CGIAR) 187Convention on the Law of the Sca, 18Convention on LongRange Transbmindary Air

Pollution (1979). 6. 18. 152conversion, economic. 149-53Costa Rica. 39Cbie d'Ivoire 62Countreras Lopez. 148Crodynamics (New Jersey). 02cropland

conversion of highly. erodible. 42. 43. 46. 48, 56-57distribution and desertification of. 24-25, 27, 28-09food productivity and degraded. 26. 42. 43. 51

Index (247)increasing productivitv potential of. 52-55irrigated. 26. 49. 50. 51restoration methods for. 33-'46. 37shrinking base of. 46-49use of idled and highly erodible. 12. 13. 46-47lee als agriculture; crops

cropsdecreased yields of. 4. 10-11, II 13. 15. 29-30.

143-44sea level rue impact on. 10-11UV radiation effect on. 83Fields in experimental plats of. 53-54ire obis agriculture: cropland

Cutler. Rupert. 186

data collectionon AIDS. 116. Mt 119on CEC production and consumption. 86. 88on fertility rates and women's status. 163on forest status. 4. 9. 26-27. 29. 31. 65. 183-84on inundation from sea level rise. 72-74on ozone layer deple:ion 78. 79-81by satellite. 4. 26. 28. 31. 180. 184on soil erosion rates. 47.49on worldwide desertification. 22. 23, 27. 28

debtagricultural input use and Third World. 52effect on food security of. 13. 14, 55owed so United Nations. 20. 148Third World buying power and. 99Third World military expenditures and. 137-38

deforestationcarbon emissions from. 4,14. 9. 10data collection on trends in. 4. 9, 26-27. 29, 31, 65.

183-84hydrological cycle alteration from. 4, 31-32incentives. 181*natural' disasters from mountain. 64-66results of. 26-27so ado forests; reforesiation

Deforestation and Desertification Control NGONetwork. 38

degradation. land. 21-40as cause of wars, 142causes of. 23-29. 62consequences of, 12-14. 22contradiction between naiionai sovereignty and

global impact of. 141-45effect on Bangladesh of Himalayan watershed, 64-65environmental refugees created by. 59, 60-61global arms race and. 136-41land tenure and. 28-29local action so pvvent and clean up. 165-68military resource ernanneling to present and clean

up. 149-53nitrogen-fixing trees to combat. 35. 185, 186or also desertification

Denmark, 80. 89. 90. 146Department of Agriculture. U.S. (USDA)

erodible cropland removal by. 42. 43. 46, 48. 56-57groundwater study by. 50world grain estimate by. 55

Department of Transportation. U.S.. 178desertification

allsedo's impact on. 30droughts and floods caused by. 31-32evapotranspiration's impact on. 30

261

(248) Index

desertification (roitotted)from poor irrigation practices. 26baking spread of. 33-37implementing worldwide cnntrol of, 37-40land use changes and. 29, 62Nairobi conference on. 22, 37-38see also degradation, land

developing countries, sno Third World:I' :idualcountries in

development assistance agenciesAIDS funding from. 128cooperation with NGOs by. 38-39. 40grain prices effect on aid from. 14shortcomings of programs by. 169-72support of misguided land use policies by, 23. 29working relationships between community groups

and. 169-72development. economic

food production and industrial. 44. 46. 47grassroots organizations shortcomings in. 163-64reforming systems and policies for. 168-72

development. sustainablecarrying capacity and. 27-28of deforested land. 27grassroots organizations efforts toward. 154-68institutional foundation for.'natural' disasters resulting front disc girding. 66need for national-local alliances for. 172-73

Dominican Republic. 39Dorfman. Ariel. 160Dow Chemical Company. 85. 91Dregne. Harold. 37. 61drinking water, sno fresh water: groundwaterdroughts

effects of African. 62harvest reduction from. 41. 42. 43.52. 55. 57-58increasing frequency of. 9-10, 2940likelihood of continuing severe, 41-12. 58recent major. 3-4. 21. 29sclf-reinforcing conditions for. 32. 63

Dudek. Daniel. 183Dumas, Lloyd. 137. 140du Pont de Nemours & Company. E.L. 85, 91

Eastern EuropeAIDS in. 115CFC reduction strategies in. Ms. 03-94consequences of permanent war economy urn. 13s1energy policies in. 180environmental awakening .n. 6-7grain trade by. 45independent community groups in. 138pollution threats in. 68, 89. 107private autos in. 98, 99Ire also individual countries in

East Germany. see German Democratic Republic (GDR)Economic Commission for Europe (ECU. 6, 18economies

of agricultural adjustments caused by s'limate change.29-30. 84

of MIA epidemic. 120-21. 122. 125. 126. 128. 130of auto use and production. 98. 99. 100-3. 110-11of CFC reduction and replacement. 85. 89, 90-91,

93of degraded land control and restoration, 34, 35. 57of focd production. 4. 12. 14. 42.44. 46. St 53. 54global military. 136-41. 145-5:1

262

of hazardous waste control and disposal. 67. 68. 69.70

health care, 106. 118-119. 120-27of irrigation use. 34. 49of nuclear power dependence, 176of sea level rise. 11 71. 73-74. 75Third World grassroots groups' effect on industrial

countries' policies of, 1611-69we also funding

ecosystemsclimate change's effect on. 10humaminduced activities affecting. 64-66international cooperation to protect coastal, 18UV radiation effect on. 83-84

educationBrazil's popular movement for. I6I-62programs for AIDS. 122, 123to promote environmental action. 5. 7see also training

efficiencyof JUI^ fuel. 101-6. 108imps ed CFC use. 89-90improving energy, to achieve global action plan

goals, 173, 176-79increase in fuelwood use. 27photosynthetic. and crop yield limit, 54water use, for irrigation, 51

Egyptgrain imports by. 45habitable land in. 74land degradation in, 63salinized land rehabilitalion by. 37sea level rise impacts on. 11. 72, 74

Eisenhower. Dwight D.. 137Elbe Rive,, I52Environmental Defense Fund, 183E..vironmental Project on Central America. 153Environmental Protection Agency. U.S. (EPA)

Clean Air Act enforcement responsiblity of. 108CFC regulation by. 90hazardous waste cleanup by. 6604011C layer depletion report by. 94. 95UV radiation projections of. 82.84

Environmental Protection Committee (Soviet Union),68

erosion. soilcauses of, 26. 46-17Conservation Reserve's impact on. 33estimate of topsoil loss to. 25. 49food insecurity threat from, 13 -14, 25. 48methods for controlling, 33. St 35-36on rangelands. 23

Ethiopiafood securits in. 13land allocation in. 36land degradation in. 65mass migrations in, 61restoration of degraded land in. 34-35. 6soil erosion in. 47. 61

Europeauto standards in, 10$, 104, 107, 108CFC use in. 86. 108Chernobyl's effect on. 69depletion of ozone layer ovvr. 4. 77forest damage in, 6. 106public's concern toward environment in. 4-5transport A,SICMS in. 111

Index

see also Eastern Europe; Western Europe; individualcountries in

European Commission. 17European Economic Community (EEC)

auto emissions standards in. 107CFC use reduction in. 89environmental regulation by. 17negative results of consensus-building process within,

152UV research in. 84

European Parliament. 7. 17, 70exports. see trade

family planning. 163. 188-92; see also populationFarmar. Joseph. 78Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

air pollution policy of. 6CFC and halon reduction efforts of. 89- tel. 9`2. 96compulsory AIDS testing in. 122grassroots movements in. 158green political movement's roots in. 7hydrogen vehicle fuel R&D in. 103public concern over realdsterben in. 6UV research in. 84

Federal Reserve. U.S.. monetary policy of. 140fertilizer

diminishing returns on use of. 54land degradation masked by use of. 49subsidies. 52worldwide growth in use of. 48, 32

Pincher& Harvey. 130fisheries. 11. 83-84food. see gainFood and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 26-27. 184food security

climate ehange's threat to. 14-16environmental deterioration's threat to. 12-14strategy for ensuring future. 184-88trends in global. 55-58

Ford Motor Company. 103forests

clearing of tropical. 4. 8. 9. 26. 29. 31climate ehange's impact on. 10effects of unsustainable use of. 28. 47-48independent organizations' protection of, 166-67pollution damage to. 6. 28. 106strategy to preserve and expand. 180-84see also deforestation: fuelvdood: reforestation

fossil fuels, & 9. 71. 102. 106-9France. 89. 92. 96Freedom and Peace (Poland). 6Freire. Paulo. 139fresh water

competition for. 56shortages of. 50, 162see also groundwater

Friends of the F.arth. 153fuelsrood

effects of shortages in. 47-48as limiting factor in carrying capacity, 27. 28see also deforestation; forests

fundingCairo Plan. 39desertification control. 37energy efficiency improvement. 178-80environmental research and awareness events, 7new approaches to protect ozone layer, 95

(249)reforestation. 182-83Third World AIDS presernion. 126UV radiation research. 84see also economics

Gambia. 27. 40Gandhi, Mahatma, 156G: adhi, Rajiv, 4$Ganges River

Bonding of. 64-65sea level rise impact mu. 72sedimentation transported b.. 25-2(1

Gardner. Richard. 20Gay Men's Health Crisis (New York), 123Gayoont. Maumoon Abdul. 71. 75General Motors Corporation, 105German Democratic Republic (GDR). 10301141i. Dumas. 142Giap. Vo Nguyen. 8glasnost

AIDS and. ISOenvironmental activism sunder. 6greenhouse. 153

Global Action Planagenda for. 174-92need for immediate action on. 192-94

Global Programme on AIDS (GPM-WHO. 113,125-26

global warming. see climate changeGorbachev. Mikhail

auto ownership and prrestroska policy of. 99disarmament overtures by, 138, 143. 140, 147. 148erosion-limiting measures proposed by. 47

Gorse, Jean Eugene. 27Goa. Andre. 112Goto. Hirotoshi. 89grain

alcohol fuel derived from. 101, 102. 109drop in world reserves of, 41, 33-38. 187hybrid strains of. 54, 53. 186prices and supplies of. 42. 57. 58trends in world production of. 4. 12. 15. 16.4'2,

43-44. 55. 187yield levels of. 52-53

Gramecn Bank (Bangladesh). 164-65Grapes of irratA. The. 60grassroots organizations. 154-73

characteristics of. 155. 158common factors for effective action by. 169-61desertification combat by. 30-40. 162difficulty in involving poor people in. 158 -Mteconomic development efforts by. 38-10. 163-44environmental-oriented civil disobedience by. 166.

167forming alliances between national governments and,

172-73land tenure struggles by. 161. 165literacy rate improvement by. 159. 161-62paths of action for. 159-60shortcomings of. 162. 168in Third World urban areas, 164see also independent development organizations:

nongovernmental organizationsGreenbelt Movement (Kenya). 167. 183'green councils' (Colombia). 150greenhouse diem see climate changeGreenland. 80

263

(250)

Green Party (West Germany). 7. 158Greenpeace, 153Green Revolution. 40, 43. 52groundwater

drawdowns of 42. 48. 50, 63. 73impact on agricultural productivity of rise in. 51pollution of, by toxic wastes. 70sea level rise impact on. 73Mr oho fresh water

Guatemala. 39. 126

habitabilitydecline and human migration. 60. 61-62increase in environmental refugees as measurement

of. 59-76toxic waste threatening human. 66-70

Haiti, 59. 64, 117Hall. Gloria °ludas. 126halons

curtailing emissions of. 92international cooperation to control, 18-19. 78,

93-96ozone layer depletion caused bv. 78properties and uses of 87

Hanks, John, 28Hansen. James, 3. 8. 9harambec movement (Kenya). 158Hare. Kenneth F.. 22, 31Harrison. Paul. 167Harvard Institute of International Development, 120Haney, Hal. 146hazardous waste, see waste, hazardoushealth

AIDS impact on child, 114. 117. 119-20. 125. 127care changes brought about by AIDS. 130-31care systems and AIDS in Third World. 11$-119.

126-27effects of autos. 97. 106-9, 109-10effects of ozone layer depletion, 4. 78. 143-44effects of U's radiation, 82-83NC:Os' training support of community workers fur.

162-63problems from hazardous waste contamination, 67.

68. 69. 70Herdt, Robert 53Higino de Almeida. Ivair, 166Himalayan watershed. 4. 25-26, 64-65Hirschman. Albert. 159. 100Holland, water engineering expertise OIL 71. 75Honduras, 39Huang He (Yellow River). 47human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)

characteristics and transmission metlinds for.114-15

factors rendering people more susceptible soinfection by. 115

multiplier effect of, 119worldwide total of people infected with, 115se also AIDS

Hungary, 122hydrological cycle. 4. 29- 3'3,04 -66

Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), 91, 92inipors, see tradeincentives

African beef export. 63against ea= ownership, in Eastern Europe, 99

26.4

Index

Brazilian auto export. 99foc chlorinated solvent recovery and recycling. 69.

96-91. 95deforestation, 181energy efficiency improvement. 178-80for land restoration. 34. 36. 39, 182-83population control. 191Inc relocation from polluted areas. 67. 68for removing highly erodible cropland &oat

production, 33. 34water-use, 186-87we also subsidies

independent development organizations. 155-56. 159,102. 164, 170: see also grassroots organizations;nongovernmental organizations

Indiaauto ownership trends in, WOcommunity movements in. 156. 162. 164degraded land in. 26. 28, 32. 48. 63. 65dependence on grazing animals in. 23drinking water shortages in. 50environment-oriented civil disobedience in. 165erasion control in. 35-36food production trends in. 12. 41, 43. 52, 55. 58irrigation use in. 49. 50. 51lack of auto emission controls in. 107projected population increase in. 40recent major droughts in. 21. 32reforestation in, 38self-reinforcing cycle of drought and degradation in,

32indonesia

agricultural trends study its, 54auto exports by. 100food production trends in. 12. 43. 58national land use policy of. 29resettlement policy in. 43

industrial countriesauto ownership and production concentration in. 98,

100carbon emissions by. 9. 71CFC reduction strategies in, 93consequences of permanent war ecotionly on. 138-41effect of higher grain prices on consumers in, 14environmental policy change in. 8grassroots organizations in. 158hazardous waste export by, 70military spending by. 134-35. 137, 139. 141population trends in, 18$progress toward AIDS prevention in. 121-25responsibility for climate change of. 8. 9. 75, 77. 78,

144. 175toxic disasters in, 69see oho individual countries

industryagricultural land and labor drawn to. 44, 46, 47CFC and halon emissions control by, 78CFC recycling by. 89-91constraints on future growth in auto. 97, 99-100,

101-2employment in defense, 134military expenditures' impact on competitiveness of,

139. 140, 141movement of chemical plants to developing countries

by, 69ozont-deplction chemical substitute development by.

95

Index

Institute for Transportation and Development Policy(Washington. D.C.). 1 1 1

Inter-Ameriran Development Bank. 166Inter-American Foundation. 171IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces treaty. 146International Association of Agricultural Economists.

194International Business Machines (IBM), 89international cooperation

for AIDS prevention. iI3. 125-28an environmental degradation solutions. 141-45to minimiz" climate change. 19-20. 93-96necessity of. for environmental action, 7-8. 16-20.

93-96. 151-53for ocean protection. 18

International Council of Scientific Unions, 19International Fund for Agricultural Development

(IFAD), 40International Ccosphere-Biosphere Program. 17International institute of Tropical Agriculture (Nigeria).

35International Jaycees. 194International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA). 36International Monetary Fund (IMF). 160, 172International Society of Tropical Foresters. 194International Tropical Timber Organization (TI-To).

181

Iran. 133. 136. 148Iraq, 26. 133. 136. 140irrigation

degradation from poor practices of, 26economics of using. 49groundwater drawdown from. 12. 13use and intensity. 26. 49-50. 51. 186sit also agriculture; eropland: erops; groundwater

Israel. 178. 186Italy

Chernobyl's effects on. 5. 6green political movement in. 7hazardous waste export by, 70, 144rice Field trend ;n. 53toxic disaster in. 69

Japanauto emission standards in. 107. 108CFC use in. 86. 89. 92. 96cropland conversion protection in. 186grain production and imports by. 44. 45hydrogen vehicle fuel R&D in, 103military spending and industrial competitiveness of.

141multilateral initiatives funding offer by. 20population control in. 189, 190. 191private auto ownership in, 98, 100rice yield trend in. 53. 35transport systems in. I l

Jazairy, Idriss. 40Johansen. Robert. 136Joslyn. David. 39

Kennedy. John F.. 146Kenya

agricultural development project in. 40grassroots organizations in. 158, 167, 172growth of women's movement in. 163imported oil expenditures by. 101

literacy program in. 139reforestation in. 38. 172

Kumar, Devendra, 160

(251)

Labour Party (U.K.). 146Lal. Rattan, 35land, see cropland: rangeland: tenure. badLatin America

AIDS in, 114. 117. 123auto ownership in. 99dependence an grazing animals in. 23external debt of. 55food production and consumption in. 14, 43. 45,

55grassroots movements in. 156. 161-62land degradation causes in. 63land distribution confrontations in, 165NCO desertification control network for. 38population distribution and trends. 43. 64se. also Central America: individual countries in

legislation. lie individu.1 statutesLibya. 45. 63livestock

consumption of products from. 55population and desertification. 27. 28regions dependent an grazing. 22-23watering holes contribution to desertification. 3

loansaccess to. 28. 39-40, 164-65land as collateral for. 28World Bank, 29

Louisiana. 68Love Canal (New York). 69Lovejoy. Thomas. 192

MacKenzie. Debora, 66Madagascar. 15Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (Kenya). 167Malaysia, 100Maldive Islands. 75Mali. 27. 38. 62Mann. Jonathan. 113. 12546. 129. 131Mareos, Ferdinand. 172, 173Margolis- Mac. 66Mauna Loa observatory (Hawaii). 47Mauritania. 27. 62McCloy-Zorin Joins Statement of Agreed Principles for

Disarmament Negotiations (1961). 146. 147media, environmental action mobilization role of, 7.

194Melman, Seymour. 138Mexico

auto production and ownership trends in. 99-100food production and import trends in. 12.43, 45. 58lack of auto emission controls in, 107

Middle EastAIDS characteristics in. 115dependence on grazing animals in. 23hazardous waste export to. 70irrigation in. 49see also individual countries in

Midgley. Thomas. Jr.. 85military

conflicts and AIDS spread, 116conflicts with no victors, 148growth and increase in wars. 135number of people in. 134, 149

265

(252)

military leonanued)R&D. 139resource rechanneling to civilian use from, 149-55spending's impact on budget deficits, 140warfighting strategies changes by. 156worldwide expenditures for, 128, 155. 154ur also armaments

Millions of Trees Club, 38minorities. AIDS among. 115. 117. 125Mintz. Y.. 30Mintzer. Irving. 177modeling

AIDS transmission spread and impact. 120-21atmospheric climate change. 3. 9. 11 15. 20, 30-31,

47-48, 81.96UV radiation. 82

Molina. Mario. 78monitoring

forest status, 4. 26. 29, 51 78, 70, 147, 180. 184ozone layer changes. 78, 7C-81satellite. 78. 79. 147seismic nuclear testing. 147

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete theOzone Layer. 18-19. 78

loopholes in. 93-94need to move beyond. 93-96signatories to. 93.UNEP work on. 152

Morgun. Fyodor, 68Morocco, 45. 63mortality

AIDS effeet on infant, 114. 117. 119-20auto's contribution to. 109-10caused by climate change.growth in military power and increase in. 138-36infant. 13. 14. 114, 117. 119-20. 161

Mortimore, Michael. 52Moscow. University of. soil erosion laboratory. 47Mozambique. 13Mrazek, Robert. 147Mulwa, Francis, 159

Naa movement (Burkina Faso). 168Nairobi conference (1977). 22. 57-58National Aeronautics and Space Administration. V.S.

(NASA)climate change evidence from. S. A. 9Goddard Institute for Space Studies. S. 184ozone depletion research by. 4. 80. 81Ozone Trends Panel. 81, 82

National Association of Small Farmers (Colombia). 136National Center for Atmospheric Res h (Colorado).

15National Council of Women (Kenya). 167. 183National Irrigation Administration (Philippines,. 172National Science Foundation. U.S. (NSF), 82National Wastelands Development Board (India). 48natural gas, see fossil fuelsNatural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). 147Nepal

deforestation of Himalayan watershed in. 4. 25-26.64-65

populated marginal disasterprone areas in. 64. 65Netherlands. the. 89Newcombe. Kenneth. 47New Smallest. 66New York State. Department of Health. 67

2C6

Index

New Zealand. 80Nicaragua. 50, 156. 172Nicholson. Sharon. 30Niger

earrying capacity study of, 27desertification in, 25environmental refugees in, 62food insecurity in. 13land use pattern changes in. 62rangeland restoration in. 36women's movement growth in, 163

Nile Riverdegradation a. watershed. 65disputes over water rights of. 142subsidence impact on. 72

nitrogenfixing trees, 35. 185, 186Noble. David. 140nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

AIDS prevention programs of. 123. 125. 126alternative defense policy development by. 146environmental policies influence by, 153UNEP cooperation with. 58, 39yr also grassroots organizations; independent

development organizationsNorth America

AIDS in, 114. 117climate change effects in. 3-4. 10, 15-16. 29-30dependence on grain exports from. 57-58depletion of ozone layer over. 77grain production and trade by. 12. IS. 29-50, 45. 57impacts of recent severe droughts in, 4. 21. 24, 41.

42, 43. 52. 55. 57transport systems in. I l lme also individual countries in

NorwayCFC use reductions in, 89. POenvironmental policy change in. 8. 19. 20. 194

NOZE 11 (National Ozone Expedition). 79nuclear power

accident potential from using, 176accidents at reactors producing. 5-6. 59. 69-70. 144Chernobyl's effect on attitudes toward. 5-6international disputes over use of. 144

nuclear weapons. see armaments: militaryNyoni. Sithembiso, 159

Ocean Drilling Program. 25°den. Michael Dee. 140Ogallala aquifer, 50oil

alternative fuels to. 101-3. 108-9. 178crisis's effect on auto production, use, and efficiency,

98. 100. 101. 103-4trade. 100-1see also fossil fuels

Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD). 105. 104. 106

Organization of African Unity, 70Our Common Future. 142Oxfam. 168. 171ozone. 77-96

chemical causes of depletion in layer of. 77. 78.79-81

hole in layer of, over Antarctica. 18. 77. 78-81impacts of depletion in layer of. 4. 77-78, 80. 143-44international cooperation to protect layer of. 18. 78reducing emissions of chemicals depleting. 4. 88-93

UV radiation effect on ground-level. 84set also chlorofluorocarbons: halons

index (253)

toxie chemical production promotion, 68trade-offs between military and social or

environmenal. 150pollution, air

alternative fuels' effect on, 109reducing transponation- caused, 106-9transboundary. 4-3, 6. 18-20. 142urban residents exposure to high levels of, 60, 68

populationAIDS' impact on productive members of. 120desertification control by slowing growth in. 40displaced. 59-76grain production trends in relation to, 55growth and food insecurity, 12, 13. 14.42-43growth and land degradation, 27-29, 47, 63, 64living in disaster-prone areas, 64-65, 66NGOs' ellons toward slowing growth in, 163relocation of. caused by hazardous waste

contamination, 66.67, 68stabilizing growth in, as element of global aetion

plan, 188-92see also family planning

Population and Community Development Association(Thailand). 163

Pradervand. Pierre. 172Pravda. 68precipitation, acid. 6. 142Presidential Commission on the Human

Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic. U.S 129private sector, see independent development

organizations: nongovernmental organizationsprivate voluntary organizations (PV0s), see independent

development organizations: nongovernmentalorganizations

Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions(Helsinki). 6. 18

Public Health Service, U.S.. 125public opinion

AIDS misperceptions in, 122. 123on arms reduction. 145. 147on nuclear power use. 5-6, 176toward environmental threats. 4-8, 89, 194

Pakistan, 26, 37, 163-64Palawan Center for Appropriate Rural Technology

(Philippines), 160Panama. 39Pan American Development Foundation. 39Panos Institute, 122pastoralists. 23, 62-63pastureland, see rangelandPaz. Octavio, 161perestroika, 99Persian Gulf, see Middle East: individual countries

surroundingPeru

food insecurity in, 14grassroots organizations in, 161. 162Villa El Salvador's success in, 161

pesticides, see agriculturePetroferm (Florida). 91Petrovsky, Vladimir F.. 148Philippines

conversion of flooded to irrigated riceland in, 51erosion control in. 38grassroots organizations in. 160, 161, 164inequitable land distribution in, 28'people's power revolution in. 173projected population increase in, 40renewable energy use in. 178unnatural disasters in, 66

Plan of Action to Combat Desertification, 22. 31, 37-38Pokrovskiy. Vadim. 130Poland. 5, 6. 68poliey

agricultural. 16, 29.43-44. 45. 58. 60. 63. 184-88agricultural. U.S.. 42. 43, 46. 48. 56-57elimate change's effect on, 8. 16. 72-73. 74. 94-95.

175-80development, and sea level rise. 72-73, 74effects of industrial countries' industrial. 75Federal Reserve monetary. 140foreign, in relation to development agencies, 171foreign, in relation to transboundary air pollution.

17-18future energy, 175-80future forest, 181-84grassroots mobilization's support by national

government. 172-73green movement's influence on. 7Indonesian resettlement. 43innovative fuel efficiency and transponation. 98, 106,

112of international development agencies. 165. 166,

168-72international environmental degradation and national

security, 141-45international insecurity fostered by national security.

133-41for land rehabilitation encouragement. 33-34. 36. 37nonprovocative defense. 146ozone-layer depletion control, 94-95population control. 188-92public opinion's influence on environmental, 5-8. 89.

194Third World auto production and ownership. 99.

100. 111-12

Rahman. Sheik Mujibur (Bangladesh), 65Rainforest Action Network, 153Ramo. Simon. 139rangelands

degradation of. 23. 27restoration methods for. 36-37. 39

Raskin. Marcus, 147Reagan. Ronald. 105. 108Red Cross. 126reforestation

as component of future forest policy, 181-84by grassroots organizations. 167promotion of. 38, 39see also deforestation: forests

refugees, environmental, 59-76biological cycle disruption leading to. 48. 59-63. 64created by unnatural disasters. 64-66from hazardous waste site eontaminalion. 66-68number of, 60, 75-76from rising sea level, 71-75from toxic disasters, 5.68 -70

renewable energy. 103. 109. 177-78, 180Replogle. Michael, 111

2R 7

(254) Index

researchagricultoral. 35. 40. 187AIDS. 116. 120-21on auto fuel alternatives and elliciencs 102.3. 103.

108on Bangladeshi social and economic stratilicalitm.

159biotechnological. 54On climate change. 19. 95on fossil fitel cauted health damage. 106on hydrological tytle. 31on military products. 139on ntilitary to cisiliau reS0111-(1,. (WIWI non, 150on ozone laser depletion. 71M1on sea level rite. 72-74Cy radiation. 84

Research Foundation for Science. Terbno logs andNatural Retources Policy (India). 32

Resotirces for Future (REF). 84Rotary International. 194Rowland. Sherwood. 78. $1

Satati Eneas, 31Sale. Kirkpatrick. 110salinizalion cropland degraded In. 26. 51saltwater intouion. C-3111/31 1,1V tint IC/el rise. 10-11Salvation Arniv, 131Santey. Jose. 181Sarvodaya Shrainadana (Sri Lanka). 156. 16(1Scandinavia. 6. 17-18. 78sea level rise. from climate change. 10-11. 71 -73security

food. 4. 12-16. 162, 184-8$global. 145-33national. 133-36

Self-Employed 1Voirien's Association (SI'.VA) (India).164

self-help groups. tzz grassrotos organizations:independent development organizations:itongoven nt,tl organizaii tttt s

Senegal. 27. 35. 138Serrano, Angeles, 173sextons transtintied diieam's ISTD:o. 115. 127Sharp. Gene. 132Shevardnadze. Eduard. 17, 192Shiva. Vandana, 167Sliukla. j.. 30Sivard. Ruth. 135Social Democratic Party (Wes; Germany), 146soil. v. agriculture: erotion toilSolar Energy- Research !minute. U.S.. 92Solomon. Susan. 79Somalia. 13South Africa. 2$South America. we 1.3iiis America: indiV14111:11 coot

inSouth Korea

auto cenitsions standards in. 107grain production and imports hs. 4. 33grassroots organizationt in. 164imported oil expenditures by. 101national-local alliance in. 172

Soviet Cnionabandonment of eroded land in, 46, 48agriculture in. 43. 46. -17, 48. 49. 30-51. 185CFC use in, 93-94. 96changing attitud io United Nations h.-, 19. 20. 148

268

coluptikoq AIDS letting in. 122t equences of permanent war economy On, 138-39

environmental awakening in. 6-7tt vi t ontnental refugees in. 5. 59. CO

fossil fuel use in. 9. 107. 173fuel efficiency in. 103independent community groups in. 138international cooperatiun proposal by. 17lack of moo emission controls in. 107nuclear power in. 6. 59. 69ozone layer depletion over. 77-78. 80pollution threats in. 4-5. 26. 08private auto production and ownership in. 98-99

specie's, extinction of, 4. 10Sri Lanka, 156. 160, 104. 16$standards

a fuel economy and pollution. 97-98. 105. 106.107

CFC and halms emitsion 78, 90Clean Air Act-mandated. 109National Ambient Air Cbiatity, 106

Steint.eck John. 60Stockholm group. 107Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SAI.T). 143Stratospheric Protection Program (Ktpan). 90Strong. Maurice. 20subsidence. tea level rise and. 71-72. 73. 74subsidies

agricultural. 46. 32. 33:Hilo use encouragement. 110-13Brazilian ethanol fuel production. 101. 102VI also incentives

Sudancrop Field increase in. 40nitrogen4ixing trees used in. 35unnatural disasters in. 65. 60

Superbarrio (Mexico). 161Superfund 67Survisal International. 133stistainabilitv

agricultural, 49-50. 51. 430 -134grassroots organizations' efforts toward. 153, 134-68of world food production. 42. 43-14

SwedenCFC and halon emission reduction efforts in. 89, 92.

95green political mosement in. 7nuclear power plant closings in. 6

Swedish International Devoopment Authority, 171Switzerland. 89Ssr-Darya Riser (Susie' Cnion). 50-51Syria 26. 37

Taiwanauto exporis by. 100grain production and imports by. 44. 53g1:14,51"410IS organizations in. 164

taxon auto ownership in Eastern F.urope. 99'carbon.' 178environmental. on automobiles. I l lfuel efficiency encouragement. 106to fond reforestation program:. 18243

technologyagricultural. 42, 44. 46. 55-33. 184. 185-86. 187auto fuel alternatives and fuel efficiency, 101, 102-6,

108-9

CFC and baton reduction, 78. 90-91.94-95global insecurity and increase in sophistication of

military. 135Green Revolution. 40land rehabilitation. 21. 33, 34, 35, 96military application of new, 135. 145pollution control. 68renewable energy. 177-78. 180as a tool for Third World rural change. 160

Tend ler. Judith, 164tenure, land

degradation and. 28-29lack of secure 27-29land restoration and, 36. 39-10self help groups' fight for, 161

Teramura, Alan. 83Terrence Higgins Trust. 123testing

difficulties in AIDS. 115-16mandatory AIDS, 122toxicity. of CFC replacement chemicals. 91-92

Thailandauto exports by. 100conversion of flooded to irrigated ricctand in. 51imported oil expenditures by. 101lack of secure land tenure in, 28local subsidence in Bangkok, 7?

Third Worldagricultural trends in. 14. 33-37, 47, 51. 53-55

60-64AIDS' impact on. 115. 118-21, 125-28air pollution in. 9. 84CFC use and control its, 87, 89.93. 108child health in, 114. 117, 119-20. 127climate change's disproportionate imp.,;.t on. 10-11

71- 75,95 -96debt problem in. $2, 57demographics of, 47, 48, 61. 159. 190energy efficiency in, 100-1. 103-1 179-80food security trends in. 12-14, 33-37. 47. 58.

60-64forced urbanization in. 48. 61industrial world's hazardous waste and chemical

plants in, 69-70land degradation issues in. 32. 39-97, 47.48. 61.

64-66land distribution and tenure problems in. 28-29largescale NGOs' cooperation with independent

groups in. 162-64military conflicts and expenditures in. 133-35.

137-38. 147-18transport in. 99 -101. 111-12sir also individual countries

'30 percent club'. 6. 18. 152Thomas. Lee. 108Three Mile Island. 70Times Beach. Missouri, 67Tolba. Mostafa, 37. 96Toronto climate conference (1988), 8, 19, 180toxic WSW:. set Wa bazardoustrade

arms, 134-35. 136automobile, 99-100deficit, U.S.. 140-11grain. 4. 14. 15. 16. 41. 44-46. 57-58in hazardous waste, 70. 144oil. 100-1

Index (255

trainingcommunityity health workers, 162-63political organization. 159sexism in programs of. 29sir also education

TransAfrican Highway. 116transportation

air pollution caused by. 106alternatives to private ammo-centered system of.

109-12energy efficiency improvement for. 100-1. 103-6.

179oil need for, 100-1private auto-centered ayscems of. 97, 98-100err alit' automobiles

Tropical Agricultural Research and Training Center(CATIE) (Costa Rica). 39

Tropical Forestry Action Plan, 184Tunisia. 38.45. 63

Uganda. 13ultraviolet (UV) radiation, effects of increase in. 81.85Unifoam (Switzerland). 90Union Carbide. 69, 91United Kingdom (U.K.). 55, 89, 92, 96Visited Nations

Children% Fund (UNICEF). 192Conference on Desertification (UNCOD). 22. 31debt owed to. 20, 148Development Programme. 32. 33-34General Assembly, 146. 147peacekeeping efforts by, 148-49strengthening of. to deal with global commons. 20Sudano-Sahelian Office. 38sustainable energy projects backing by, 179World Food Council. 14err also additional specific programs and organizations

United Nations Environment Progri mmc 11.1NEF9CFC control plan by. 18. 93desertification trends and control by. 22. 37, 61. 63Global Environment Monitoring System. 184international cooperation with. 152mass migrations and urbaniration problems reported

by. 61Soviet proposal to transform. 19

United Stasesagricultural sector hs, 25. 29, 42. 46-47. 48. 49. 50.

51.54AIDS in. 116. 117. 122. 123, 124-25, 129air pollution and emission standards in. 6. 9. 84. 106.

107. 108CFC use and reduction in, 18. 86, 89. 92, 96climate change effects in. 3-4. 10, 11, 15-16, 18.

29-30. 73consequences of permatiem war economy on. 138.

139-41debt seolement to United Nations by. 20energy me and efficiency in. 9. 100. 103. 104. 108.

175, 178food track and production by 4. 15-16, 53. 57-58grassroots organizations in. 158hazardous waste disposal in, 67impacts of recent severe droughts in. 4l, 42, 43.

57migration to, 64nuclear accidents its. 70ozone layer depletion over. 4. 18

2J9

(256)United States (continued)

public concern toward environment and policychange in. 4. 8. 29

trade deficit of 140-41transport sector in, 98. 100. 103, 104, 107, 108UV research in. 84set also specific agencies

Ural Mountains, 68Uruguay. 80

Vermont. 66vetiver grass (khio). 35-36Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone

Layer, 18Vietnam. 8Village Awakening movement (India). 156Virgin Lands project (Soviet Union). 46voluntary agencies (Volags), see independent

development organizations: nongovernmentalorganizations

uvildsterben. 6. 106(Vadirgion Post, 68. 68waste. hazardous

disposal of. 5. 67. 89environmental refugees from. 66-70export to Third World of. 70. 144

Weiss. Ted. 149Western Europe

AIDS in. 114. 117, 122, 123. 124air pollution in cities of. 84environmental cooperation in. 17food production and trade in. 55Green Party influence in. 7nuclear power disputes in. 144population growth rates in. 46transport sector in. 98. 100see also Eastern Europe: Europe

West Germany. see Federal Republic of GermanyWhite, Lynn, 7Wisconsin. University of. 105

270

Index

W 33333enAIDS transmission to babies from. 114. (17. 119-20role of, in grassroots community movements. 158.

161, 162, 163, 164, 167slaws of. 29.40, 158, 163

Wong, Dattik James, 167Woods Hole Research Center (Massachusetts). 72-73,

184World Rank

AIDS treatment study by. 119community organizations' opinion of. 169environmental deterioration study by. 27food security report by. 13. 14. 185sustainability of projects funded by. 29. I 11. 166,

169, 179, 181Tropical Forestry Action Plan sponsorship by. 184

World Commission on Environment and Development.142

World Food Programme (W FP). 34World Health Organization (WHO). AIDS work by.

113. 115. 116, 119, 122, 125-26World Meteorological Organization, 19World Altlitaly and Social Expenditures 1987-88, 135World Neighbors (United States). 38World Resources institute (WRI) (United States). 177.

184World Summit of Health Ministers (London). 129World Wide Fund for Nature. 28World Wildlife Fund, 153

Yellow River Conservancy Commission. 47Yellowstone National Park. 4yields, crop

decreased 12. 13, 29, 20, 53physical constraints on. 53. 54relationship between grain prices and, 52. 54

Yunus. Muhammad, 165

Zaire. 120-21Zambia, 120Zimbabwe. 158. 164, 172. 173

A lasting victory over land degradation will remain a distant dream without socialand economic relbrms.

In the area ofchild health, AIDS has the greatest potential to erode hard-won healthgains in the Third World.

A global effort to cut world population growth in half by the year 2000 does not seemout of the question.

The five warmest years of the past century have all fallen in this decade.

When arms take precedence over needs basic to human development, people are notsecure.

Avoiding destructive climate change will require a fundamental reordering ofnational energy priorities.

In the end, it is we as individuals who are being tested.

This sixth annual examination of the world's ecological health by the Worldwateli Institute comesat a time when people are worried about record hot summers, polluted beaches, and drought-induced food shortages. This rising concern results from personal experiences in 1988 reinforcedby the news that global warming has arrived, that tropical forests are disappearing much fasterthan we thought, and that a thinning of the earth's protective ozone layer threatens the health ofpeople everywhere.

The 1989 edition warns that if we don't act quickly to reverse the environmental trendsundermining the human prospect, environmental deterioration and social disintegration willbegin to feed on each other.

State of the World 1989 includes a global action plan aimed at mobilizing the world communityto join together and fight these problems. In this new era of incre' sed awareness and concern, it istime to initiate major efforts to slow population growth, meet future food needs, reversedeforestation, and improve energy efficiency. The authors note the role that grass-roots organiza-tions can play in such efforts and urge a strengthening of the capabilities of internationalinstitutions.

Other chapters focus on the problems of land degradation, ozone depletion, overrelianci onautomobiles, and the global AIDS epidemic. In addition, the report describes how environmentaldeterioration is creating a new class of refugees and is forcing societies to turn from a narrow,military view of national security to a broader goal of enhancing global security. Cooperativeefforts for sustainable development must accompany the world's halting steps toward disarma-ment and economic conversion.

State of the World now appears in most iaajor languages, including Chinese, Arabic, andEnglish. The most recent translations are Italian and Russian. Last year the report was used bycorporate planners and government policymakers and was adopted for use in 751 courses in U.S.colleges and universities. The Los Angeles Timessays. "Without being preachy, State of the Worldis simultaneously an indictment of global stewardship and an exhortation for reform."

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