DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 113087 June 27, 1994

REBECCO PANLILIO, ERLINDA PANLILIO and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, petitioners, vs.HON. JOSEFINA G. SALONGA, Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati Branch 149 and FE V. FEDERIS,respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners.

Paruangao, Abesamis, Eleazar and Pulgar Law Office for private respondent.

 

 

MELO, J.:

Through a supplication for a writ of habeas corpus initiated by the natural mother, the Honorable Josefina Guevara Salonga, Presiding Judge of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati, was persuaded to accede to the requested writ albeit the grandparents of the minor child had been previously designated guardians ad litem by another coordinate court in Naic, Cavite. It is petitioners' submission in the recourse before us that the action pursued by the natural mother vis-a-vis the reaction thereto of the Makati court is punctuated with congenital and procedural infirmity.

Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio who was born on July 7, 1990, is said to be the natural child of petitioner Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and private respondent Fe V. Federis (p. 69, Rollo) while principal petitioners Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio are the natural grandparents of the minor, being the parents of Jose Marcel E. Panlilio.

Owing to the so-called cruelty, moral depravity and gross neglect of private respondent, the grandparents felt obliged to exercise substitute parental authority over the minor which apprehension led to the initiation on December 14, 1993 of special proceedings geared towards securing their appointment as guardians ad litem of the ward (p. 87, Rollo). The Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Naic, Cavite, before whom the case was eventually raffled, issued an order on December 16, 1993 in the following tenor:

This is a verified petition for the deprivation of parental authority of the natural mother herein respondent Fe V. Federis. The petition is sufficient in form and substance.

WHEREFORE, the Court believes that it is to the best interest of the minor Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio, the natural grandson of petitioners, for Spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio who are presently in custody of the minor, to be appointed guardian ad litem pending determination of the merits of this case.

(p. 22, Rollo.)

On December 22, 1993, a petition for habeas corpus was submitted by private respondent and later assigned to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati. The natural mother's remedial measure tersely narrated how she was allegedly duped into permitting her son on one occasion to go with herein petitioners in Makati only to wait in vain on account of the vehement and persistent reluctance of petitioners to return the child despite repeated demands therefor (p. 56, Rollo). The Makati court immediately ordered the issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpus on December 23, 1993 in this manner:

Whereas, a duly verified petition has been filed in the above-entitled case by Fe V. Federis alleging that the minor Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio is presently detained and restrained of his liberty by Sps. Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio and Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and/or all persons having custody of the child.

NOW, therefore, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, you are commanded to take the body and person of Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio before this Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, Metro Manila, and to make a return of the writ both to be done on December 27, 1993 at 9:30 in the morning, at which date and time the parties will be heard.

Witness the Hon. JOSEFINA GUEVARA SALONGA of this Court, this 23rd day of December, 1993, at Makati, Metro Manila

(p. 60, Rollo.)

which was supplemented on December 29, 1993 by a hold departure order of Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio until further orders (p. 62, Rollo).

In the meantime, herein petitioners moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on the basis of litis pendentia as well as lack of cause of action (p. 70, Rollo), while herein private respondent filed her own motion to dismiss in the Cavite custody case anchored on improper venue and the existence of a prejudicial question (p. 132, Rollo).

When petitioners' motion to dismiss was submitted for resolution on January 7, 1994, the Makati judge hearing the habeas corpus case supposedly made a verbal order to produce the body of the minor child on January 10, 1994 which prompted herein petitioners to forthwith file the petition at bench (p. 2, Rollo).

Following the filing of said petition which had a corollary plea for issuance of a restraining order, this Court resolved to:

. . . ISSUE the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER prayed for, restraining the implementation of the verbal orders of respondent Judge made in open court on January 7, 1994 in Sp. Proc. No. 3711, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch

149 and from conducting further proceedings in the case, effective today and until further orders from this Court. (Feliciano, Jr., no part)

(p. 26, Rollo.)

Petitioners are of the fundamental impression that their appointment as guardians ad litem by the Cavite court was rendered illusory by private respondent's expedient act of filing in Makati a petition for, and issuance of the writ of, habeas corpus. Suggestion is made that private respondent's maneuver is tantamount to the abhorred practice of shopping for a friendly forum. Even then, petitioners are confident that their momentary custody of the ward by virtue of a lawful court order bars the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus due to the proscription under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court which pertinently provides:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court of judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed . . .

By contrast, private respondent harps on certain perceived flaws on procedural matters starting from the filing of the petition for termination of her parental authority in Cavite up to the promulgation of the order appointing petitioners as guardians ad litem. Moreover, private respondent emphasizes the salient features of the Family Code with particular reference to the exercise of parental authority by the mother over her own illegitimate child and the general caveat that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother except when the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. At any rate, she maintains that petitioners' appointment as guardians ad litem poses no obstacle to her own recourse designed to regain custody of her child via a habeas corpus petition.

We perceive merit in the petition.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas corpus case on account of the previous assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court, and the designation of petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Republic vs. Reyes (155 SCRA 313 [1987]), thus:

. . . the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of higher importance in the administration of justice that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur 605). As this Court ruled in the case of Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34 [1964], a Judge of a branch of one should not annul the order of a judge of another branch of the same court. Any branch even if it be in the same judicial district that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of the CFI either exceeds its jurisdiction (Cabigo vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 84 [1949]) or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525 [1952]). Thus, in the case of Parco vs. Ca, 111 SCRA 262, this Court held that the various branches of the Court of First Instance being co-equal cannot interfere with the respective cases of each branch, much less a branch's order or judgment.

(pp. 324-325)

Consequently, even as the appointment of principal petitioners is still subject to the outcome of the case lodged before the Cavite court, not to mention the possible courses of action which private respondent may pursue in said case to vindicate custody of her child, it cannot be gainsaid that the immediate assumption of authority by the Makati court, although possibly motivated by a noble goal, is tantamount to defeating the very essence of the order emanating from the Cavite court. While habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of minor children as enunciated in Salvana and Saliendra vs. Gaela (55 Phil. 680 [1931]; 5-B, Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 694) yet this principle is understood to presuppose that there is no other previous case whose issue is necessarily interwoven with the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding. Verily, the existence of an anterior suit, such as the termination of private respondent's parental authority in the Cavite court, coupled with the order appointing principal petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward, is sufficient to momentarily stave off private respondent's short-cut and subtle attempt to regain custody of her son at another forum, by reason of the corollary principle that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction (Valdez vs. Lucero, 43 OG, No. 11, 2835; 1 Francisco Revised Rules of Court, 1973 ed., p. 115;St. Anne Medical Center vs. Panel, 176 SCRA 755; 761 [1989]). Justice Paras, in Lee vs. Presiding Judge, MTC of Legaspi City, Branch I (145 SCRA 408 [1986]), echoed oft-repeated truisms:

It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts" (Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 552, 556 [1970], please see cases cited therein).

In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. (14 Am, Jr. 435-436, cited in Francisco, Vicente, Revised Rules of Court, pp. 57-58, Vol. I, 1965 ed.).

(p. 416)

And certainly, given the propensity of the Makati court to intrude and render nugatory an order or decision of another co-equal court, certiorari is the appropriate relief against deviation from the doctrine of judicial comity(Annotation on Judicial Interference by One Court in the Actuations of Another Co-equal Court, 99 SCRA 84; 89).

Of course, we are not unmindful of private respondent's protestations on the manner the order of petitioners' appointment as guardian ad litem was effected but her insinuations on this score should be first addressed to, and resolved by, the Cavite court, not to mention the availability of appeal therefrom in the event an unfavorable decision is finally made. Not to be ignored too, is private respondent's reliance on Articles 176 and Article 213 of the Family Code, with reference to the parental authority of the mother over her illegitimate child and the general proscription that no child under 7 years shall be separated from the mother except under certain cases. Again, these matters would be relevant in and capable of resolution in the case filed in Cavite, but may not now be utilized by herein private respondent to assail the authority of the Cavite court for the simple, nay, obvious

reason that these considerations are matters of defense which may be availed of by private respondent to ward off the suit for termination of her parental authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Honorable Josefina G. Salonga, Presiding Judge of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby directed to dismiss the habeas corpus case. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on January 12, 1994 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., took no part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

 EN BANC

ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI,                                  Complainant,

              - versus -

JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City,                            Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)

    Present:

      CORONA, C.J.,      CARPIO,      VELASCO, JR.,      LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,      BRION,

           PERALTA,      BERSAMIN,      DEL CASTILLO,      ABAD,      VILLARAMA, JR.,      PEREZ,      MENDOZA,

           SERENO,* and      REYES,** JJ.

     Promulgated:

        September 6, 2011

 

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 

 

 

D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:

 We resolve the administrative complaint against respondent Acting

Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi

City, Branch 8, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service.[1]

 The Factual Antecedents

 The antecedent facts, gathered from the records, are summarized below. Civil Case No. 06-2954[2] is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan

City RTC against the Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others.

 On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding

the MSU liable for damages amounting to P2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made.[3] 

 On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution.[4] The

MSU, however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSU’s depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.[5]

 The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution,

albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU.[6]  The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order.  The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.[7]  The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.

 The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a

TRO on April 8, 2009.[8] After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSU’s LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[9]

 On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the

application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[10]  On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[11] The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion and dismissed the case.[12]

 On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the

private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSU’s LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[13]

 The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of

the Iligan City RTC.[14] He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.[15]

 In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator

(OCA) found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting that this is the respondent Judge’s second offense.[17]

 The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative

matter and to require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records on file.[18]

           Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010,[19] stating that he learned from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is “basically a good Judge,” and “an admonition will probably suffice  as  reminder  to  respondent  not  to  repeat  the  same  mistake in the future.”[20] The respondent Judge filed his manifestation on September 28, 2010.[21]

 

The Court’s Ruling 

          The Court finds the OCA’s recommendation well-taken.           The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:[22] no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.[23] The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.[24]

 Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been

issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.[25] A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.[26]To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[27]

 Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of

administrative sanctions. 

In Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,[28]  the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for issuing a TRO that interfered with or frustrated the implementation of an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction. In Yau v. The Manila Banking Corporation,[29] the Court held that undue interference by one in the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. 

In Coronado v. Rojas,[30] the judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the law when he proceeded to enjoin the final and executory decision of the

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on the pretext that the temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed against the HLURB’s writ of execution, but only against the manner of its execution. The Court noted that the judge “cannot feign ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the enforcement of the writ of execution, thus frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a co-equal body.”[31]

 In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,[32]  the Court penalized two judges for

issuing a TRO against the execution of a demolition order issued by another co-equal court. The Court stressed that “when the respondents-judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere with the order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law.” [33]

 To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may

violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,[34] speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[35]

 In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of

judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain[36] Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSU’s account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSU’s allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37]

 

The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Court’s deliberations, finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent;[38] a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with another court[39] which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any other court,[40] or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.[41]  In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.

 It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of

execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary.[42] As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its opposition  before the issuing court — Iligan City RTC — which denied this opposition.

 That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually

dismissing the petition before him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can use.[43]  His lack of familiarity with the rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary through his demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan public that the kind of interference he exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily, i.e., that an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and

manifested that the respondent Judge is “basically a good Judge,”[44] and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judge’s liability.  This liability and the commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainant’s personal opinion but on the facts he alleged and proved, and on the applicable law and jurisprudence. 

 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and

to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[45]

           Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court — after prolonged deliberations — holds that a fine of P30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for suspension since this is the respondent Judge’s second offense.           WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.           SO ORDERED. 

.       FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS REMEDIAL LAW is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640].  It is also known as Adjective Law. SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates, defines, and regulates rights. 

PROCEDURE is the method of conducting a judicial proceeding.  It includes whatever is embraced in the technical terms, pleadings, practice, and evidence.  It is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put to action [Manila Railroad vs. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523]. 

JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto & Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245].  It is the power with which courts are invested with the power of administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases.  In order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties [Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, 166 SCRA 39]. 

JURISDICTION VENUE

The authority to hear and determine a case The place where the case is to be heard or tried

A matter of substantive law A matter of procedural law

Establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter

Establishes a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent

Fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties

May be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties

PRINCIPLE OF THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION is a situation where the court is called upon to decide a particular situation and release the parties from their correlative obligations but if it would result in adverse consequences to the parties and the public, the court would go beyond its power to avoid negative consequences in the release of the parties [Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793; Naga Telephone Co. vs. CA, 48 SCAD 539]. ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION: 

(1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case

(2) Jurisdiction over the parties (3) Jurisdiction over the res

It is conferred by law (BP 129), and does not depend on the objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or anyone of them [Republic vs. Sangalang,

159 SCRA 515].

It is not waivable, except in cases of estoppel to question or raise jurisdiction[Tijam vs.

Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29].It is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not, to recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter resolved only after and as a

Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the filing of the initiatory pleading, like a complaint.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by the proper service of summons, or by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to the authority of the court[Paramount

Industries vs. Luna, 148 SCRA

564].

It is acquired by the seizure of the thing under legal process whereby it is brought into actual custody of law, or it may result from the institution of a legal proceeding wherein the power of the court over the thing is recognized and made effective [Banco-Español Filipino

vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291].

result of the trial.

  ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: 

(1) Territorial jurisdiction (2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter

(3) Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

It is determined by the geographical area over which a court presides, and the fact that the crime was committed, or any of its essential ingredients took place within said area [US vs.

Jueves, 23 Phil. 100].

It is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information in accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of its commission [US vs.

Mallari, 24 Phil. 366].

It is acquired by the voluntary appearance or surrender of the accused or by his arrest [Choc vs.

Vera, 64 Phil. 1066].

INSTANCES WHEN A COURT MAY LOSE JURISDICTION EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN ATTACHED TO IT: 

1 When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued exercise of jurisdiction[Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717].

2 Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by a subsequent law.  The reason is that, the State loses the power to prosecute when the law is repealed, hence, the court has no more power to decide [People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000].

3 When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where the court fails to provide counsel for the accused who is unable to obtain one and does not intelligently waive his constitutional right [Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663].

4 When the proceeding s in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated, abandoned or declared void [Seven vs. Pichay, 108 Phil. 419].

5 When the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment [Bengzon vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 284].

6 Once appeal has been perfected [Alma vs. Abbas, 18 SCRA 836].

7 When the law is curative [Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331].DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY:  Should one branch be permitted to equally assert, assume, or retain jurisdiction over a case in controversy over which another coordinate or co-equal branch has already assumed jurisdiction, then that would be sanctioning undue interference by one branch over another.  With that, judicial stability would be meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice[Parcon vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262].JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS: 

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of the kind, nature, value or amount therof; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. [Sec. 2, RA 7691]. 

JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC): 

1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,

where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000, or for civil actions in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P50,000 except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC;

3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds P200,00, or in Metro Manila where such demand or claim exceeds P400,00;

4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds P200,00 or probate mattes in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P400,000;

5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising

juridicial or quasi-judicial functions;7. In all civil actions and civil proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and damages of whatever kind,

attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P200,000, or in such other cases in Metro Manila where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds P400,000. 

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS (CA): 

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs;3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of

RTCs  and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or omissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948;

4. The CA shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in (a) cases falling within its original jurisdiction, such as actions for

annulment of judgments of RTCs, (b) cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction where a motion for new trial based only on newly discovered evidence is granted by it. 

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT (SC): 

1. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and other petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the SC en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon;

3. Cases on matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.

4. The Supreme Court has the power to:(a)    exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus;

(b)    review, revise, reverse, modify, of affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(1)    all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulations is in question;

(2)    all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;

(3)    all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;

(4)    all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed in reclusive perpetua or higher;

(5)    all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

 CLASSES OF JURISDICTION: 

General – power to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from the plenary powers of the court.Special or Limited – restricts the courts jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject to such limitations as may be provided by the governing law.

Original – power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law.

Appellate – authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review.

Exclusive – power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage.Concurrence/Confluent/Coordinate – power conferred upon different courts, whether of the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the same stage of the same case in the same or different judicial territories.