DOCID: 4165197

TOP fJECRETHCOP.'HNT//NOfOllNH!\·1 Jl NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CE'.NT.RAL SE:CUR!'TY ~'?ERV!CE

21 November 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defonse (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U/i'FOU07 :Report to th(~ Intelligence Oversight Board nn NSA Activities - INFO:R'lVLA.TION MEMORANDUM

(U/!T'OUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise statE:d in the enclosure, \Ve hav.:-! no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during thE! quarter ending 80 September 200f) were unlawful or con.trary to .Executive Order or PrE~sidential Directive, and thus required to he reported pursuant to Section 1.7 .(d) (>f Executive Order 1238:3.

(U/lrOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by means of inspections, survc~ys, traini ng, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. 'rhese activities and othHr data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary ufl'>~fonse <Intelligence Oversight) an; described in the enclosure.

/) f!/1n ,,>. t1 J.) • ' • //'/!( l !./, . .• t 'l.< r / YUYY1 '11 i' {-· £-i.;t . ·' li l·-BRIAN R. MCANDREW Acting Inspt)etor General

) rt;r-r·C~~? L'.NK"-VJTo T. POTENZA

General Counsel

(U/fFOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hen:~by make it our combined report .

. / / I /'1 0······-~f':\, I J

--11~(,\ e) ~vrt./_{/ KB~ITH B. A.LitX,ANDEH

Lieutenant General, U. S- Army Director, NBA/Chief, CSS

End: Qwlrtel'ly IWport @'pproved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014 , FOIA Case# 70809 (Litigation)

Thi:; Mcmonmdum is Unda~ifit'.d {Jpt'n Rc.!t\101.;~,1 \)f En\:'.io:;urc

~f"()P SEC.RElV/(~()P•l!t~~f!Pt~OfOR.?4//P.~l.R

DOC ID : 4165 1 97

'l{)f '.sLCRCf,iCOMlr~L;t~OFOR:l~, .. Mf<:

1. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

a. Reviews

(CNS!) Dtlring this quarter, the Office of Inspector General {OIG) reviewed various intelligence activities of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) to determine whether they were conducted in acc:ordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders (E.0.s), Attorney General (AG) procedures, and Department ofDHfense (DoD) and internal directives. With few excevtions, the issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating Hlements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.

b. (U) Jnspections . :: / \('.b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ................. .. .... :, •.

...................... . ...... ··:,../

, ... ···. . ... ·· /.' · ..

... ·(1) (U//FOUO) Along with inspectors from

··the NSA/CSS Q.JG con1pleted a joint L.,i_n_s-pe--'c-t .... ,ic-m_ o_f _t------------------;........, ·sincel .. ~vas

recently designated as a joint o:rganizationl its intelligence oversigl;t (10) pI'ogram needt~d adjustments to transition from anl tfo an NSNCSS 1.0 program. Those adjustmEmts were quickly completed. The center has begun quarterly reporting of intelligence activities to the NSNCSS OIG, and has submitted the IO training materials to the NSA/CSS OGC for validation. At the OIG recommendation, the 10 program m·anager is now included in exercise planning and new mission manag;ement meetings to establish managem.ont controls to prevent IO violations.

arid.the NSA/CSS OIG completed a joint inspection of th ... I l···The ... dP.i;:1,gnentation of th ·O. . .p~·ogram and process was / ./ commendable; however;···airanalysis .. of.~ sample oftra:ining records revealed th.;:;if.only 64% of the newly arrived employees reoo1.ved.initial·tr.aini~}g">:Afipding doc_µriiente<l the need for internal c<>ntrols in oversight oftraining. . ......................... : : :::::: :: : '"'""· · - ·( ·~) (l)

(b ) (3)-P . L . 86-36 c. (U) Inquiries

('i'S/ISI//MF) Reported in the first quarter fiscal year 2006, U.S. person information contained in a graphic chart was disseminated during briefings outsjde of NSNCSS. (Report dated 28 February 2006). .Research revealed that the originau)r had obtained a dissemination waiver. No violation occurred.

DERIVED FROf\-1: NSAiCSSM 123-2 DATED: ::?.4 FEBRUARY ·19% DECLASSIF.Y ON: Sou.r(!e Marked X1, D<ttt of Source 2006J I 06

TOP SCCRCT/ 'COMfNT//tifOfOIH<l:MR

86-36

DOCID: 4165197

lOP SF.CRCT/iCO~.H~ff/:NO! 'Ol.HL'MR

2. (U) GENERAL COUNSEL ACTIVITIES

-(0fi8t1 The NSA/CSS OGC reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they were conducted in accordance vvith applicable statutes, EOs, AG procedures, and DoD and internal directives. The OGC advised Agency elements on a number of questions, including the collection and dissemination of communications of or concerning U.S. persons; the reporting of possible violations of federal criminal law contained in Signals Intelligence (SIGlNT) product; the testing of eh~ctrnnic equipment, and the applicability of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). With few exct~ptions, the issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating el(:m1ents understand the restrictions on NSNCSS activities.

3. (U) SlGINT ACTIVITIES

a. tSllSi) Collection Against U.S. Persons

(1) (U) Intentional .. ·· ....

..:-·! ( b ) (1) · · f(b) (3) -P. L. 86-36

! (b ) (3) -18 USC 798 •( b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

. . .

a. ('f!SttSI) During this quarter, the Direct"or, NSA/ChiefCSS (DIRNSNCHCSS) granted approval for consensual collection _against[Z)p.S. p~rsons. DIRNS.AJCHCSS also a roved non-consensual collection o: U.ff com ani~s

agents of foreign powers . U.S . ... / .... c-it-iz-,e-n_s_b_e .... lieve(lto .. Jiave been held .. against th~fr will · .S. citizen" takeh hostage -·~nd U .S . ..i~ilitary m¢m ¢t bdieved t<> .. b~.v~{been t aken hostage . :'. .. DIRNSA/C~CS$-approv.e'ii c.or.lsensual collection against U .. $.. persons \.vas .. :routine]y..Jermiii~:i.~d this qrnlrl~r~ ..

b. CBI/SB The AG gr·::~·:-~··;~t"f~odt;··~;·~~:n:~~~:~ke··c.~m±nuni~~ti~;.$. .oOU .s. persons overseas during this quarter .................. ::::··· ..... ::--. .. \O! // ....... ········

. . , , - . . . , . .::::: :: ::'.'.'.'.':;;•iM·r~ .. ; .... ;· 1 l

(2) (U) Unintentional .......... ·········

.................... (b) (3)-P .L. 86-36

.......

(8f/Sifflf.r>)I Htist;~~~:··~n which SIGINT analysts inadvertently collected communications to, from, or about U. S. persons while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking were reported this quarter. All of the incidents were reported to responsihle oversight officials, and correctiv.e actions were taken.

2 TOP fj[CRr5/,'COMlt~1:/NOFORN.'av\R

DOCID: 4165197

b. (U/IFOUO) Dissemination of U.S. identities

(1) (U) Intentional

(0/fSB In accordance with section 7 of United States Signals Intelligence Directive CUSSID) SP0018, U.S. identities w~:re disseminat<:!<l l lti@(!s during this quarter. 'l'he following table shows the justification and the number ot'ihst~nces of dissemination.. In the aunmasked by Analyst" column, the U.S. identity waii"':rev..galed in a serialized end product; in the "Unmasked at User Request" column, a U.S. / \( b l (1)

identity was released to ·a user at the uS(}r's request. /. (b l (3> - P · L . 86- 36

:-····-- ·-----·-- ----·----.. ------·-r-----~--,-- -···--·· ... i ... .. · :-::: .

l JUSTIFIC:ATION _-_-_:. . . ... · Unmasked · unmas~ed at : .. . · :·~OTAL. ,:·· \ _____ -_ · .. by Analyst User Request_.. . ·'\:";·"·

7.2.c Necessary

-------·----------7.2.c 1 Foreign Official

7.2.c:.3 Inten\ati.onal Na.rcotic.s

7.2.c.4 Criminal Activity

, 7 .2.c.7 U.S. Government Official ~·~~--~~~-~ I TOTAL L_... _ _ __ _

(2) (U) Unintentional /././

((J/181) D11ring this quarterOs';~INT products were cancelled because they contained the identities of U.S. persons, organizations, or entiti<~s. In all inst..~nces, the reports were eithf~r not reissued or were reissued with the proper minimization .

(3) (U) Raw Traffic Dissemination ............. ·"(b)(1)

........................... (b)_~3J.~_P.L 86-36

a. .(£/,tgl) SIGlNT Production Chain. I ........ ·•··•·•··•·

l.Jrfie SID ensures that the pe1·sonnel are trained by the ...._~~~~~~~~~----'

3 TOP :SCCR~:TFCOMlHT, f?<iOFOR.NCMR

DOC ID : 4 1 651 97

TOP ~:eCRET/:C0?1ll"p((','iNOfOR?C'M.R

. OGC on NSA/CSS's lega.l restrictions and on ;proper handling and dissemination of SIGINT data I 1-Sueht>e:rsonswork.ih}fitf'of"\vith ....... ......... (6}(1) SID during this quarter included -representatives ofl (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~ I

b. (8//.~f) Outside the SIGINT Production Chain. ·'#""'""'':/ (bl ( 3 l - P · L · __ ,;.__ _____ _._ ___ :--~--.~-;-' ·c -'°

prQject manager within the NSA inappr.opffa.tely discussed raw SIGINT containing a . . person's identity wy!t l····..... I/ I kAt. the directio~ .. 9.f.thr(NSA/CSS OGC, the I \. ffhe project manager was reeducated

86-36

on TS.\\7 traffic handling procedures anH. the approval mechanisms required to 1:elease U.S. person information. \ (b)(1)

(b)(3)-P .L. 86-36 4. (U) Other Activities (b)(3)-so use 3024(i)

a. (U//FOYO) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (F-ISAJii1~i~~~;: : ~ : : ~: - P • L • 8 6

-3 6

(l) (Tg/,'81//tofF') There have bee nsta~-~~~· .. :~~~s quarter where FISA data was access ~din :::::: ::::''""' '"(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

·Whilethes.Edi-1.cidents were not violations, they were ....._ _____________ ___,

cases of mishandling very sensitive data.

:ranch allow~d FISA

st was cleare.d for FlSA access, the .·"

waspot. No one other..tJrn11 the analyst h~d access to tlie ,.....­... F_IS_A_ d_a_ta- .- H-e-\ d_j_d_n_o_t-query ~a~v -SIGlNT. d.atab~es, and the F1SA'cre1ated fil~,s··\Vern

dE!l€ted · ·· An .a.$.t~te ·111tellig~1{ce ov.9rsight·.prog:i;4~{n1anager at an NSAJCSS field site in the area 1.mcovered.the .. data:::m.'.ish:i:-\ri·9u:1:1Jfi1~ddent. and reported it to NSAJCSS Headquarters. . ,, ...... :;:::::;;:::>=;\');>)_ ( 3) -P. L . 86-36

.,;:I : · • • .. ··:::: .. ::::::· •. ::=· ·• .• "·.

(b) ('ffif/SifftofP) An NSA ......,. __________ ..._ _ _... ................. .._ ___ ......... ...__.........., F'ISA data from NSA ... addition to his work w ......... h .... il_e ....,d.,...e..,..t,-a1,.,.. l--ed..,.,_ ...... to- an__,i._n..,..te....,l....,li""'·g-en- ce- co_n_1_m_u_1....,1i..,..ty..,...----------............

L...-______ ,.........,......;;;.... ___ . __ .,.__,_t.l'ie:.a:nalyst periodically rocessec mtercep ··-(ill(

anguage collection. . .....-....___.....,int~rcepts and ....--........ --....... ,..... p...,,f,e-.,r-c-e-,p..,..t.-s.--. . ..-e- r_e_p__,orted

mana ·eril'ent \vhen he .realized No ... cme .. o,ther than>th.e cleared

······························· ....... :·::::::::::::::::,,

4 ( b ) (1) (b ) (3 ) -P . L . 86-36

TOP m::cRCl/'COfc1'fNT ":?~OrOIH4,'/f9fR

(b)(3)-P .L. 86-36

DOCID: 4165197

~{.p.),( l) ' I Err: · ·. · .. i'O 'tic~CR.LTi/COM1?<fL',f40F'ORN1 .. 1lvF' (b) ('3 .). -P.L. 86-36 '' (h )"(.3 )·:::1·8. USC 7 98 ........................................... '['th .) .... (_l) (bl (3.i-so"usc 3024(il ............................... ............... f (bl (3}::::.P .L. 86-36

\ (:;-(TS@Jl/Nf'lHiiID:;~ .,.,:~~ ~::;~d in the collection ot1 / '',,, I I b':rtSide·tfi·c .. ti.t.iie period authorized by the Foreign InteHig~nce Surveillance Court (F'lSQ). Although th-e after the FISC order was

\ signed ...._~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~---..--~~~~~~~--

\ rendering them unauthorized fo 'were deleted from the f land the asso.ciated £;!,<l.'t.~~:lmse .. wh.e.n .. .the·errorwas .. disc<YVerecUH ............. ·r :::::'{b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 I 1 ................................................................................................... ..

..... (a) ff8'i'SI1/ tn~) ?<mnnunicatio~s from. au. S. pe-~~~~.,,:w.-h(>_~~s also"anl ·-ririi ~ - P. L . 86- 36

~i1.1zen and an authonzed tar et wh.1le outs1de·ofthe· Umterl. States were " ~ =;~ 0~~ ;~~ 4 <il madvertently cotlecteq from ........ · .. · : r H:.rpcJ'i1recognition .of th~darget's location 0 .

I lw~A«fotasked and all intercepted. communications .. :Were · elete · . 'No reporting resulted from the collection. ·

__ ...,4) ~~~P.~!:.t~ ... i'""$S'""~µ;;;;. .. ~;;;;.·d_ .... l._· __ ._ .... _ ..... _ ..... _ .... _ ..... _ .... L-->e_re_;'_'ca,.._n_·"_ce_,l_l~_d...,· .,....-_ ... _ ..... _ ..... _ .... _ ..... _ ..... _ ... _· _...,.... :::::(6)(3)-P.L. 86-36 1henan .. ·afii.ilysfiri the 'N~A

...._~~--~------~---~~~~~~~~---~ · he intercepted communications

....... ... ···'

f .. Al.}..colJectionwa.s.J~tmiI.:1.a.ted, and the intercepts were del~ted 9r"~est:foyed as

--:-~-q-;:.,...: ..... •:s:s~::t::::1:nforce=~t ~ ~ : : : : : : )riff:~: -P . L . 86- 36

(~//8H During this quarter, the SID res4on.9.e<l't() I lfor linguistic support from the I J .....

c . (U) Working Aids

(U//¥0UO)-The SID Office of Oversight and Compliance maintains !\U.S. Identities in SlGil\i..,l"' and a matrix of dissemination authorities on its web page for use by the . NSAJCSS Enterprise. Th~~ E.O., NSA/CSS Policy Number 1-23, DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, and USSID SP0018 are also available on-line.

5