720 ILCS 5/17-3

<C>Formerly cited as IL ST CH 38 <paragraph> 17-3 Effective: August 04, 2005

West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Currentness Chapter 720. Criminal Offenses Criminal Code Act 5. Criminal Code of 1961 (Refs & Annos) Title III. Specific Offenses + Part C. Offenses Directed Against Property + Article 17. Deception >>5/17-3. Forgery

<section> 17-3. Forgery.

(a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly: (1) makes or alters any document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such authority; or (2) issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or (3) possesses, with intent to issue or deliver, any such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or (4) unlawfully uses the digital signature, as defined in the Financial Institutions Electronic Documents and Digital Signature Act, [FN1] of another; or (5) unlawfully uses the signature device of another to create an electronic signature of that other person, as those terms are defined in the Electronic Commerce Security Act. [FN2]

(b) An intent to defraud means an intention to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property. As used in this Section, "document" includes, but is not limited to, any document, representation, or image produced manually, electronically, or by computer.

(c) A document apparently capable of defrauding another includes, but is not limited to, one by which any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property may be created, transferred, altered or terminated. A document includes any record or electronic record as those terms are defined in the Electronic Commerce Security Act.

(d) Sentence.

Forgery is a Class 3 felony.

CREDIT(S)

Laws 1961, p. 1983, <section> 17-3, eff. Jan. 1, 1962. Amended by P.A. 77-2638, <section> 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973; P.A. 90-575, <section> 90, eff. March 20, 1998; P.A. 90- 759, Art. 95, <section> 95-15, eff. July 1, 1999; P.A. 91-357, <section> 237, eff. July 29, 1999; P.A. 94-458, <section> 10, eff. Aug. 4, 2005.

FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION

Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, <paragraph> 17-3. [FN1] 205 ILCS 705/1 et seq. [FN2] 5 ILCS 175/1-101 et seq.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

The amendment by P.A. 77-2638 was necessary to conform penalties under this section with the Unified Code of Corrections.

P.A. 90-575, in subsec. (a), added subd. (4); in subsec. (b), added the second sentence defining "document"; and made a nonsubstantive change.

P.A. 90-759, in subsec. (a), added subd. (4); in subsec. (c), added the second sentence relating to an electronic record; and made a nonsubstantive change.

P.A. 91-357, the First 1999 General Revisory Act, amended various Acts to delete obsolete text, to correct patent and technical errors, to revise cross references, to resolve multiple actions in the 90th General Assembly and to make certain technical corrections in P.A. 90-567 through P.A. 90-810.

P.A. 94-458, <section> 10, in subd. (a)(4), changed "Financial Institutions

Digital Signature Act" to "Financial Institutions Electronic Documents and Digital Signature Act".

Prior Laws: Laws 1819, p. 215, <section> 6. R.L.1827, pp. 136 to 139, <section><section> 73 to 81. Laws 1831, p. 112, <section> 34. R.L.1833, pp. 185 to 188, <section><section> 73 to 81. R.S.1845, pp. 163 to 165, 175, <section><section> 73 to 81, 136. Laws 1867, p. 49, <section> 1. R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section><section> 54, 105 to 114.

Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section><section> 151, 277 to 286.

CROSS REFERENCES Abstracts of title, forgery, see 765 ILCS 45/23. Alcoholic liquor purchase identification card, forgery, see 235 ILCS 5/6-20. Animal control, certificates, etc., forgery, see 510 ILCS 5/26. Criminal procedure, hearsay exceptions, elder adults, see 725 ILCS 5/115- 10.3. Dentists' affidavit of identification or qualification, forgery, see 225 ILCS 25/40. Electronic Commerce Security Act, unauthorized or fraudulent use of signature device, civil remedy, see 5 ILCS 175/30-5. Health care worker background check, ineligible persons, violations of this section, see 225 ILCS 46/25. Labels, forgery, drugs and cosmetics, see 410 ILCS 620/3.10 Land title registration documents, forgery, see 765 ILCS 35/105. Limitation on prosecution, see 720 ILCS 5/3-5. Medical Practice Act, filing medical diploma of another as forgery, see 225 ILCS 60/57. Motor vehicles, Certificates of title, forgery, see 625 ILCS 5/4-105. Proof of financial responsibility, forgery, see 625 ILCS 5/7-403. Petitions, Liquor sale referendum, forgery of signature, see 235 ILCS 5/9-4.

Nomination of candidate for public office, forgery of signature, see 10 ILCS 5/10-4. Reward for arrest, see 725 ILCS 170/12. Veterinarian, filing diploma or certificate of another, forgery, see 225 ILCS 115/19.

LIBRARY REFERENCES Forgery k3 to 17. Westlaw Topic No. 181.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

108 ALR 5th 593, Evidence of Intent to Defraud in State Forgery Prosecution.

15 ALR 5th 391, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute.

Encyclopedias

Illinois Law and Practice Theft & Related Offenses <section> 33, Elements of Offense -- Intent to Defraud or Knowingly Uttering Forged Instrument.

Illinois Law and Practice Theft & Related Offenses <section> 35, Elements of Offense -- Capacity of Instrument to Defraud.

Treatises and Practice Aids

IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.39, Definition of Forgery.

IL Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal 13.40, Issues in Forgery.

NOTES OF DECISIONS Accountability, elements of offense 15

Accountability, sufficiency of evidence 90 Admissibility of evidence 73-87 Admissibility of evidence - In general 73 Admissibility of evidence - Alibi 77 Admissibility of evidence - Copies of documents 75 Admissibility of evidence - Documents 74 Admissibility of evidence - Expert testimony 83 Admissibility of evidence - Handwriting samples 76 Admissibility of evidence - Identification of defendant 84 Admissibility of evidence - Other acts 85 Admissibility of evidence - Other crimes, generally 86 Admissibility of evidence - Other crimes, subsequent 87

Admissibility of evidence - Prior inconsistent statements 79 Admissibility of evidence - Statements of accused 78 Admissibility of evidence - Witnesses, cross-examination 81 Admissibility of evidence - Witnesses, generally 80 Admissibility of evidence - Witnesses, rebuttal testimony 82 Admissions or confessions, instructions 114 Advisement, guilty plea 60 Aggravating factors, generally, sentence and punishment 122 Aggravating factors, prior convictions, sentence and punishment 123

Alcoholism or addiction, intent to defraud, sufficiency of evidence 99 Alias, generally, elements of offense 11 Alibi, admissibility of evidence 77 Alteration, elements of offense 8 Alteration, sufficiency of evidence 94 Another person, generally, elements of offense 11 Another person's authority, burden of proof 72 Another person's authority, elements of offense 13 Another person's signature, elements of offense 12 Appearance of genuineness, document apparently capable of defrauding 19 Application 2 Arguments and conduct of counsel, conduct of trial 68 Arrest without warrant, probable cause 26 Authority of another person, burden of proof 72 Authority of another person, elements of offense 13 Bank's name, checks, sufficiency of indictment 53 Bonds, sufficiency of evidence 103 Burden of proof Burden of proof - In general 69 Burden of proof - Authority of another person 72 Burden of proof - Instructions 112 Burden of proof - Intent to defraud 71 Burden of proof - Knowledge 70 Burden of proof - Venue 29 Capable of defrauding 18-23, 92 Capable of defrauding, checks, sufficiency of indictment 52 Capable of defrauding, document apparently capable, sufficiency of evidence 92 Capable of defrauding, document, instructions 116 Capable of defrauding, extrinsic facts, sufficiency of indictment 41 Capable of defrauding, generally, sufficiency of indictment 40 Charge cards, document apparently capable of defrauding 23 Checks, bank's name, sufficiency of indictment 53 Checks, capable of defrauding, sufficiency of indictment 52 Checks, document apparently capable of defrauding 21 Checks, generally, sufficiency of evidence 104 Checks, generally, sufficiency of indictment 51 Checks, intent to defraud, sufficiency of evidence 97 Checks, payee's name, sufficiency of indictment 54 Circumstantial evidence, generally, sufficiency of evidence 91 Circumstantial evidence, instructions 117 Circumstantial evidence, intent to defraud, sufficiency of evidence 96

Circumstantial evidence, venue 30 Concurrent sentences, sentence and punishment 128

Conduct of trial 64-68 Conduct of trial - In general 64 Conduct of trial - Arguments and conduct of counsel 68 Conduct of trial - Effective assistance of counsel 66 Conduct of trial - Indigents' right to expert witness 67 Conduct of trial - Right to jury trial 65 Confessions, instructions 114 Consecutive sentences, sentence and punishment 129 Consistency, verdict 120 Conspiracy, sufficiency of evidence 90 Construction and application 2 Construction with other law 3 Copies of documents, admissibility of evidence 75 Corporate existence, sufficiency of evidence 105 Counsel, argument and conduct, conduct of trial 68 Counsel, right to effective assistance, conduct of trial 66 Credibility, instructions 113 Credit cards, document apparently capable of defrauding 23 Credit, sentence and punishment 134

Cross-examination, admissibility of evidence 81 Date, sufficiency of indictment 35 Defenses 57 Delivery, elements of offense 10 Delivery, sufficiency of indictment 36 Description of document, generally, sufficiency of indictment 42 Description of document, introductory language of tenor, sufficiency of indictment 46 Description of document, necessity of exact copy, sufficiency of indictment 45 Description of document, purport or tenor, sufficiency of indictment 43 Description of document, purport, sufficiency of indictment 47 Description of document, tenor, sufficiency of indictment 44 Directed verdict, sufficiency of evidence 106 Discovery, review 139 Document apparently capable of defrauding 18-23, 92 Document apparently capable of defrauding - In general 18 Document apparently capable of defrauding - Appearance of genuineness 19 Document apparently capable of defrauding - Checks 21 Document apparently capable of defrauding - Credit cards 23 Document apparently capable of defrauding - Legal efficacy 20 Document apparently capable of defrauding - Public records 22 Document apparently capable of defrauding - Sufficiency of evidence 92 Document capable of defrauding, instructions 116 Document, sufficiency of indictment 39 Documents, admissibility of evidence 74 Double jeopardy, sufficiency of indictment 55 Effective assistance of counsel, conduct of trial 66 Efficacy, document apparently capable of defrauding 20 Elements of offense 6-15 Elements of offense - In general 6

Elements of offense - Accountability 15 Elements of offense - Alteration 8 Elements of offense - Another person, generally 11 Elements of offense - Another person's authority 13 Elements of offense - Another person's signature 12 Elements of offense - Delivery 10 Elements of offense - Injury 14 Elements of offense - Making 7 Elements of offense - Possession with intent to deliver 9 Endorsement, sufficiency of indictment 48 Evidence, admissibility of 73-87

Evidence, circumstantial, instructions 117 Evidence, circumstantial, intent to defraud, sufficiency of evidence 96 Evidence, circumstantial, sufficiency of evidence 91 Evidence, circumstantial, venue 30 Evidence, sufficiency of 31, 88-106 Evidence, sufficiency of, venue 31 Exact copy, generally, sufficiency of indictment 44 Exact copy, introductory language, sufficiency of indictment 46 Exact copy, necessity of, sufficiency of indictment 45 Expert testimony, admissibility of evidence 83 Expert witness, indigents' right to, conduct of trial 67 Extrinsic facts, capable of defrauding, sufficiency of indictment 41 Fact questions 108, 109 Fact questions - In general 108 Fact questions - Intent to defraud 109 False ID, intent to defraud, sufficiency of evidence 98 False pretenses 24 Forgery defined 5 Genuineness, appearance of, document apparently capable of defrauding 19 Guilty plea 59-63 Guilty plea - In general 59 Guilty plea - Advisement 60 Guilty plea - Multiple counts 63 Guilty plea - Sufficiency of indictment 62 Guilty plea - Voluntariness 61 Handwriting samples, admissibility of evidence 76 Identification of defendant, admissibility of evidence 84 Identification of defendant, generally, sufficiency of evidence 101 Identification of defendant, witness testimony, sufficiency of evidence 102 Identity of victim, sufficiency of indictment 49 Included offenses 32 Inconsistent statements, admissibility of evidence 79 Indictment, review 138 Indictment, sufficiency of 34-56, 62 Indictment, sufficiency of, guilty plea 62 Indigents' right to expert witness, conduct of trial 67 Indorsement, sufficiency of indictment 48 Information, review 138 Information, sufficiency of 34-56, 62 Injury, elements of offense 14 Injury, sufficiency of indictment 37 Instructions 111-118

Instructions - In general 111 Instructions - Admissions or confessions 114 Instructions - Burden of proof 112 Instructions - Circumstantial evidence 117 Instructions - Credibility 113 Instructions - Document capable of defrauding 116 Instructions - Intent to defraud 115 Instructions - Statutory language 118 Intent to defraud Intent to defraud - In general 16 Intent to defraud - Alcoholism or addiction, sufficiency of evidence 99 Intent to defraud - Burden of proof 71 Intent to defraud - Checks, sufficiency of evidence 97 Intent to defraud - Circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence 96 Intent to defraud - Fact questions 109 Intent to defraud - False ID, sufficiency of evidence 98 Intent to defraud - Generally, sufficiency of evidence 95 Intent to defraud - Instructions 115 Intent to defraud - Presumptions 17 Intent to defraud - Sufficiency of indictment 38 Intent to deliver, and possession, elements of offense 9

Introductory language, exact copy, sufficiency of indictment 46 Joinder of offenses 33 Jurisdiction 27.5 Jury trial, right to, conduct of trial 65 Knowledge, burden of proof 70 Knowledge, sufficiency of evidence 100 Law questions 110 Legal efficacy, document apparently capable of defrauding 20 Limitations statute 58 Loss, elements of offense 14 Loss, sufficiency of indictment 37 Making, elements of offense 7 Making, sufficiency of evidence 93 Maximum, sentence and punishment 127 Minimum, sentence and punishment 126 Mitigating factors, sentence and punishment 124 Multiple counts, guilty plea 63 Necessity of exact copy, sufficiency of indictment 45 Necessity of objection, review 137 Other acts, admissibility of evidence 85 Other crimes, generally, admissibility of evidence 86

Other crimes, subsequent, admissibility of evidence 87 Parole, sentence and punishment 130 Payee's name, checks, sufficiency of indictment 54 Plea bargain, sentence and punishment 133 Possession with intent to deliver, elements of offense 9 Preservation of issue, review 137 Presumptions, intent to defraud 17 Prior convictions, aggravating factors, sentence and punishment 123

Prior inconsistent statements, admissibility of evidence 79 Prior law 4 Probable cause 25-27 Probable cause - In general 25 Probable cause - Arrest without warrant 26 Probable cause - Search and seizure 27 Probation, sentence and punishment 131 Public records, document apparently capable of defrauding 22 Purport or tenor, description of document, sufficiency of indictment 43 Purport, sufficiency of indictment 47 Rebuttal testimony, admissibility of evidence 82 Reduction of sentence, review 140 Related offenses, sufficiency of evidence 89

Remand, review 141 Restitution, sentence and punishment 132 Review 136-141 Review - In general 136 Review - Discovery 139 Review - Indictment 138 Review - Preservation of issue 137 Review - Remand 141 Review - Sentence reduction 140 Right to effective assistance of counsel, conduct of trial 66 Right to expert witness, indigents', conduct of trial 67 Right to jury trial, conduct of trial 65 Search and seizure, probable cause 27 Seizure, probable cause 27 Sentence and punishment 121-135 Sentence and punishment - In general 121 Sentence and punishment - Aggravating factors, generally 122 Sentence and punishment - Aggravating factors, prior convictions 123 Sentence and punishment - Concurrent sentences 128 Sentence and punishment - Consecutive sentences 129 Sentence and punishment - Credit 134 Sentence and punishment - Maximum 127 Sentence and punishment - Minimum 126 Sentence and punishment - Mitigating factors 124 Sentence and punishment - Parole 130 Sentence and punishment - Plea bargain 133 Sentence and punishment - Probation 131 Sentence and punishment - Restitution 132 Sentence and punishment - Separate acts 135 Sentence and punishment - Statutory range 125 Sentence reduction, review 140 Separate acts, sentence and punishment 135 Signature of another person, elements of offense 12 Signature, sufficiency of indictment 48 Statements of accused, admissibility of evidence 78 Statute of limitations 58 Statutory language, instructions 118 Statutory language, sufficiency of indictment 50 Statutory range, sentence and punishment 125 Subsequent other crimes, admissibility of evidence 87 Sufficiency of evidence 31, 88-106

Sufficiency of evidence - In general 88 Sufficiency of evidence - Accountability 90 Sufficiency of evidence - Alteration 94 Sufficiency of evidence - Bonds 103 Sufficiency of evidence - Checks, generally 104 Sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence, generally 91 Sufficiency of evidence - Corporate existence 105 Sufficiency of evidence - Directed verdict 106 Sufficiency of evidence - Document apparently capable of defrauding 92 Sufficiency of evidence - Identification of defendant, generally 101 Sufficiency of evidence - Identification of defendant, witness testimony 102 Sufficiency of evidence - Intent to defraud, alcoholism or addiction 99 Sufficiency of evidence - Intent to defraud, checks 97 Sufficiency of evidence - Intent to defraud, circumstantial evidence 96 Sufficiency of evidence - Intent to defraud, false ID 98 Sufficiency of evidence - Intent to defraud, generally 95 Sufficiency of evidence - Knowledge 100 Sufficiency of evidence - Making 93 Sufficiency of evidence - Related offenses 89 Sufficiency of evidence - Venue 31 Sufficiency of indictment 34-56, 62 Sufficiency of indictment - In general 34 Sufficiency of indictment - Capable of defrauding, extrinsic facts 41 Sufficiency of indictment - Capable of defrauding, generally 40 Sufficiency of indictment - Checks, bank's name 53 Sufficiency of indictment - Checks, capable of defrauding 52 Sufficiency of indictment - Checks, generally 51 Sufficiency of indictment - Checks, payee's name 54 Sufficiency of indictment - Date 35 Sufficiency of indictment - Delivery 36 Sufficiency of indictment - Description of document, generally 42 Sufficiency of indictment - Description of document, purport or tenor 43 Sufficiency of indictment - Document 39 Sufficiency of indictment - Double jeopardy 55 Sufficiency of indictment - Endorsement 48 Sufficiency of indictment - Guilty plea 62 Sufficiency of indictment - Injury 37 Sufficiency of indictment - Intent to defraud 38 Sufficiency of indictment - Purport 47 Sufficiency of indictment - Statutory language 50 Sufficiency of indictment - Surplusage 56 Sufficiency of indictment - Tenor, generally 44 Sufficiency of indictment - Tenor, introductory language 46

Sufficiency of indictment - Tenor, necessity of 45 Sufficiency of indictment - Victim's identity 49 Surplusage, sufficiency of indictment 56 Tenor, generally, sufficiency of indictment 44 Tenor, introductory language, sufficiency of indictment 46 Tenor, necessity of, sufficiency of indictment 45 Tenor or purport, description of document, sufficiency of indictment 43 Validity 1 Variance from indictment 107 Venue 28-31 Venue - In general 28 Venue - Burden of proof 29 Venue - Circumstantial evidence 30 Venue - Sufficiency of evidence 31 Verdict 106, 119-120 Verdict - In general 119 Verdict - Consistency 120 Verdict - Directed, sufficiency of evidence 106 Victim's identity, sufficiency of indictment 49 Voluntariness, guilty plea 61 Waiver of objections, review 137

Warrantless arrest, probable cause 26 Witness credibility, instructions 113 Witness testimony, identification of defendant, sufficiency of evidence 102 Witnesses, cross-examination, admissibility of evidence 81 Witnesses, expert testimony, admissibility of evidence 83 Witnesses, generally, admissibility of evidence 80 Witnesses, rebuttal testimony, admissibility of evidence 82 1. Validity

Forgery statute [S.H.A. ch. 38, <paragraph> 17-3(a)(1)], as applied in case where checks alleged to have been forged by defendant were each for less than $300, did not create unreasonable distinction between offenses of forgery and theft so as to violate defendant's equal protection and due process rights, even though forgery was class three felony, while theft of less than $300 was classed as misdemeanor. People v. Henson, App. 4 Dist.1985, 90 Ill.Dec. 761, 136 Ill.App.3d 183, 482 N.E.2d 1044. Constitutional Law k 250.1(2); Constitutional Law k 258(3.1); Forgery k 2

Legislative classification of offense of signing name to check drawn on fictitious bank or with knowledge of insufficient funds in depository as misdemeanor of deceptive practice, and classification of drawing checks with intent to defraud using name of fictitious person as purported maker as forgery, with greater penalties for latter offense, did not deny defendant convicted of latter offense of equal protection of the laws. People v.

Lanners, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 290, 258 N.E.2d 390. Constitutional Law k 250.1(2) 2. Construction and application

Forgery statute did not change, but merely codified, prior Illinois decisions with respect to forgery offense. People v. Kelley, App. 3 Dist.1985, 85 Ill.Dec. 204, 129 Ill.App.3d 920, 473 N.E.2d 572. Forgery k 1

This section codifies and incorporates all prior forms of forgery into a single crime. People v. Merchant, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724.Forgery k 2

Legislature in enacting Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), intended to exclude from terms of forgery statute offenses relating to fictitious checks which were dealt with in Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, <section> 279 (repealed). People v. Meeks, App.1965, 55 Ill.App.2d 437, 205 N.E.2d 62. False Pretenses k 2

Section 277 (repealed) made no distinction between making, altering or counterfeiting an instrument with intent to prejudice, and uttering, publishing, and passing as true and genuine any such forged instrument with intent to damage or defraud, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited. People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Forgery k 1

Section 277 (repealed) was not directed solely against forgery of signatures, but included false making, altering and counterfeiting, when done with intent to damage or defraud any person. People v. Kubanek, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 573, 370 Ill. 646. Forgery k 9; Forgery k 10

Making of instrument containing false statements was not within Ill.Rev.Stat.1931, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), directed against false making of instrument. People v. Kramer, 1933, 185 N.E. 590, 352 Ill. 304. Forgery k 9 3. Construction with other law

Dismissal of employee's employment discrimination action under Title VII against her former employer was warranted as sanction for employee's improprieties and unlawful conduct; although employee's impersonation of former co-worker, through forged signature transmitted by facsimile to employer's personnel department, and use of her employee identification and

Social Security numbers did not violate protective order which prohibited disclosure of certain information obtained through discovery, such conduct wasdeceptive, fraudulent, criminal, and inexcusable. Greviskes v. Universities Research Ass'n, Inc., N.D. Ill.2004, 226 F.R.D. 595, subsequent determination 342 F.Supp.2d 763, affirmed 417 F.3d 752. Federal Civil Procedure k 1278; Federal Civil Procedure k 2791; Federal Civil Procedure k 2820

Forgery was not lesser included offense of alleged violations of Illinois Motor Fuel Tax Act (IMFTA), and thus statute prohibiting subsequent prosecution for offense of which defendant could have been convicted in formerprosecution or for offense with which defendant should have been charged in former prosecution did not bar prosecution for forgery, which was commenced after IMFTA prosecution. People v. Schram, App. 1 Dist.1996, 220 Ill.Dec. 225, 283 Ill.App.3d 1056, 672 N.E.2d 1237. Double Jeopardy k 162

The Illinois Controlled Substances Act (ch. 56 1/2 , <paragraph> 1401 et seq.)does not prevent prosecution under the Criminal Code of 1961 for crime of forgery, even though the Code may provide for a greater sentence. People v. Henderson, 1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 654, 71 Ill.2d 53, 373 N.E.2d 1338. Criminal Lawk 29(8)

Where defendant had delivered a false prescription, she could be prosecuted for both forgery and a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. People v. Henderson, 1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 654, 71 Ill.2d 53, 373 N.E.2d 1338. Criminal Lawk 29(8)

Delivery of a forged prescription for the purpose of obtaining a narcotic drugcould be prosecuted as a crime under both the forgery section of the Criminal Code and that provision of Uniform Narcotic Drug Act governing acquisition of drugs by fraud or deceit. People v. Merchant, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 636, 283N.E.2d 724. Controlled Substances k 37

Section of Negotiable Instrument Law (ch. 98, <section> 29, repealed) to effect that instrument was payable to bearer when it was payable to order of

fictitious or nonexistent or living person not intended to have any interest in it, and such fact was known to person making it so payable, or known to hisemployee or other agent who supplied name of such payee, did not provide immunity from criminal liability to person forging name of payee to a bearer check. People v. Dauphin, App.1964, 53 Ill.App.2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166. Forgeryk 8

Provision of Negotiable Instrument Law (ch. 98, <section> 29, subd. 3, repealed), to effect that negotiable instruments made out to payee known by maker to be fictitious were rendered bearer paper so that any endorsement was legally superfluous, could not be applied to State Auditor's warrant drawn on special funds, and therefore alleged fact that State Auditor knew payee was fictitious did not preclude prosecution for forgery of endorsement. People v.Gibbs, 1952, 108 N.E.2d 446, 413 Ill. 154. Forgery k 7(5)

Fact that the same elements constituted an offense under Federal Statutes did not prevent prosecution by state under R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 107(see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277; repealed). Hoke v. People, 1887, 13 N.E. 823, 122 Ill. 511. 4. Prior law

Procuring the forgery of a county judge's signature to a certificate for securing requisition for fugitive, within R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 114 (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 286; repealed). Langdon v. People, 1890, 24 N.E. 874, 133 Ill. 382.

The passing, uttering, or publishing of a false writing, purporting to be a contract for the purchase of a marble monument to be delivered on a future day, and paid for on delivery, knowing the same to be false, was not indictable under R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 107 (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 279; repealed), as the term "other written instrument," as therein used, only included such instruments as contained an absolute, unconditional promise or obligation to pay a sum of money or personal property. Shirk v. People, 1887, 11 N.E. 888, 121 Ill. 61. Forgery k 7(1)

Passing a fictitious school order with intent to defraud constituted violation

of <section> 279 (repealed). Langdale v. People, 1881, 100 Ill. 263. 5. Forgery defined

"Forgery" is the delivery of a check knowing it to be fraudulent and that it purports to be made by one who did not make it, with the intent to defraud. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255. Forgery k 16

"Forgery" is fraudulent making or altering of writing to another's prejudice, and fraudulent intent and making must combine to complete offense. People v. Dwyer, 1930, 173 N.E. 765, 342 Ill. 105. Forgery k 4

"Forgery" is the fraudulent making or altering of a writing with intent to prejudice the rights of another. Eliason v. Wilborn, 1929, 167 N.E. 101, 335 Ill. 352, affirmed 50 S.Ct. 382, 281 U.S. 457, 74 L.Ed. 962. Forgery k 1

All forgeries are a species of "fraud," which is definable as an act or courseof deception deliberately practiced with a view to gaining a wrong or unfair advantage, deceit, trick, or artifice, and as comprising all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, resulting in damage to another. Eliason v. Wilborn, 1929, 167 N.E. 101, 335 Ill. 352, affirmed 50 S.Ct. 382, 281 U.S. 457, 74 L.Ed. 962. 6. Elements of offense--In general

Essential elements of forgery are false writing or an alteration of instrumentwhich is apparently capable of defrauding and an intent to defraud. People v.Dauphin, App.1964, 53 Ill.App.2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166; People v. Armes, 1963, 28 Ill.2d 83, 190 N.E.2d 812.

To constitute offense of forgery, there must be a false writing or alteration of an instrument, the instrument as written must be apparently capable of defrauding, and there must be an intent to defraud. People v. Brown, 1947, 397 Ill. 92, 72 N.E.2d 859, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363; People v. Lantz, 1944, 387 Ill. 72, 55 N.E.2d 78; People v. Fore,

1943, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548; People v. D'Andrea, 1936, 361 Ill. 526, 198 N.E. 698; People v. Reichert, 1934, 357 Ill. 205, 191 N.E. 220; People v.Kramer, 1933, 352 Ill. 304, 185 N.E. 590; People v. Dwyer, 1931, 342 Ill. 105, 173 N.E. 765; People v. Pfeiffer, 1910, 243 Ill. 200, 90 N.E. 680, 17 Ann.Cas. 703; Goodman v. People, 1907, 228 Ill. 154, 81 N.E. 830; People v. Kubanek, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 573, 370 Ill. 646.

Defendant had intent to defraud, as element of forgery, with respect to forging the names of her two daughters, who were joint tenants with defendant,on deed adding defendant's new husband as additional joint tenant, where defendant intended that county register of deeds would record the deed and thereby create a right in the property for new husband, even if she did not intend to defraud the daughters. People v. Olson, App. 2 Dist.2004, 286 Ill.Dec. 561, 351 Ill.App.3d 534, 814 N.E.2d 211. Forgery k 5

The essential elements necessary to prove forgery are (1) a document apparently capable of defrauding another; (2) a making or altering of such document by one person in such manner that it purports to have been made by another; (3) knowledge by defendant that it has been thus made; (4) knowing delivery of the document, and (5) intent to defraud. People v. Hunter, App. 2Dist.2002, 265 Ill.Dec. 342, 331 Ill.App.3d 1017, 772 N.E.2d 380. Forgery k 1

Under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), there could be cases of "forgery" where the instrument did not purport to be the instrument of another. People v. Kubanek, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 573, 370 Ill. 646. Forgery k 4

Essential elements of "forgery" are false making of instrument in writing apparently capable of effecting fraud, together with fraudulent intent. Peoplev. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Forgery k 4

The term "falsely," as applied to making or altering a writing in order to make it forgery, does not refer to the contracts or tenor of the writing or the facts stated therein, but implies that the paper or writing is not genuine-- that in itself it is false or counterfeit. To constitute forgery there must be the making of a writing which falsely purports to be the writing

of another person or to be genuine or authentic. People v. Kramer, 1933, 185 N.E. 590, 352 Ill. 304. 7. ---- Making, elements of offense

Definition of "makes" in the context of forgery statute includes "endorses." People v. Connell, App. 5 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 743, 91 Ill.App.3d 326, 414 N.E.2d 796. Forgery k 9

The crime of forgery is complete with the making of a false instrument, the subject of forgery, with intent to defraud. People v. Meyer., 1919, 124 N.E. 447, 289 Ill. 184. Forgery k 14 8. ---- Alteration, elements of offense

Bookkeeper's completion of credit card application for business in manner not authorized by company president, when (either before or after president signedform) he added his name as party to whom corporate credit card was to be issued, constituted a "forgery" under Illinois law, notwithstanding the genuineness of company president's signature; by either preparing credit cardapplication form that falsely identified himself as authorized charger, or by adding his name after company president signed form, bookkeeper made or altered document knowing that document was capable of defrauding another, within meaning of forgery statute. People v. Murrah, App. 4 Dist.1993, 194 Ill.Dec. 496, 255 Ill.App.3d 742, 627 N.E.2d 1138. Forgery k 9; Forgery k 10

Forgery encompassed alleged conduct in falsifying enrollment and registration data in order to obtain educational grant funds for persons who were not entitled to them. People v. East-West University, Inc., App. 1 Dist.1987, 114Ill.Dec. 327, 163 Ill.App.3d 44, 516 N.E.2d 482, appeal denied 119 Ill.Dec. 390, 119 Ill.2d 563, 522 N.E.2d 1249, on subsequent appeal 202 Ill.Dec. 55, 265 Ill.App.3d 557, 637 N.E.2d 594. Forgery k 15

The general rule is that where authority is given to one to fill in blanks in an instrument, a filling in of blanks other than as authorized constitutes "forgery," where the other elements of forgery are present. People v. Kubanek, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 573, 370 Ill. 646. Forgery k 9

Defendant's countersigning of traveler's check to make it negotiable and

passing it with intent to defraud constituted forgery. In this case the name of person to whom traveler's check was issued appeared at top of check, reciting that maker would pay to payee certain amount in money when check was countersigned with above signature. At bottom of check appeared words, "Countersign here," and immediately underneath appeared forged signature of person to whom check was issued. Defendant contended that alteration of checkthrough forged countersignature did not change its legal effect since it was already a genuine order for payment of money. People v. Ginsberg, 1930, 172 N.E. 716, 340 Ill. 328.

Changing a mortgage after execution without authority constitutes forgery. People v. Cotton, 1911, 95 N.E. 283, 250 Ill. 338. 9. ---- Possession with intent to deliver, elements of offense

Forgery and having possession of a forged instrument with intent to pass it are distinct felonies. People v. Chronister, 1942, 41 N.E.2d 750, 379 Ill. 617. Forgery k 1

Possession of counterfeits, knowing them to be such, with the intention of passing them constituted the offense under repealed statute (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 278; repealed). Brown v. People, 1848, 9 Ill. 439.

To convict one in whose possession counterfeit money is found it must be shownthat he knew it was counterfeit and intended to pass it. Brown v. People, 1848, 9 Ill. 439.

An indictment alleging that defendant had in his possession, knowingly, and without legal excuse, certain instruments and tools used in counterfeiting thecoin current in this state, sufficiently describes the offense. Miller v. People, 1840, 3 Ill. 233, 2 Scam. 233. 10. ---- Delivery, elements of offense

Even if delivery of the forged instrument was required to constitute offense of forgery, there was sufficient delivery where person went to bank vice-president with check in hand and gave it to him to open a savings account, even though the vice-president did not forthwith accept it as genuine. People v. Passantino, App. 2 Dist.1979, 24 Ill.Dec. 374, 67

Ill.App.3d 469, 385 N.E.2d 141. Forgery k 4

This paragraph does not require delivery of the instrument to constitute the offense if the instrument was made with the intent to defraud. People v. Passantino, App. 2 Dist.1979, 24 Ill.Dec. 374, 67 Ill.App.3d 469, 385 N.E.2d 141. Forgery k 4

Passing and uttering a forged instrument is not a separate crime from that of causing such an instrument to be uttered and passed. People v. Whitmer, 1938,16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317, appeal dismissed 59 S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S. 667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Forgery k 16

The passing of a forged instrument is a separate crime from attempting to passit. People v. Whitmer, 1938, 16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317, appeal dismissed 59S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S.667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Forgery k 19 11. ---- Another person, generally, elements of offense

Where order granting defendant's probation was not signed until after defendant signed certificate acknowledging probation conditions, alleged forgery by defendant's use of alias on acknowledgment did not occur during defendant's probation. People v. Kelley, App. 3 Dist.1985, 85 Ill.Dec. 204, 129 Ill.App.3d 920, 473 N.E.2d 572. Sentencing And Punishment k 2004

The gravamen of the offense of "forgery" is intentional deceit in making and uttering the instrument, and where a fictitious name is used as maker in furtherance of fraudulent scheme the State should not be blocked by a semanticdistinction as to whether "another," as used in statute, means only a living actual person not the maker, or includes as well "another" who in fact does not exist at all. People v. Bell, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 227, 318 N.E.2d 526. Forgery k 8

Word "person" as used in <section> 277 (repealed) meant a human being. Peoplev. Gould, 1932, 179 N.E. 848, 347 Ill. 298. Forgery k 4 12. ---- Another person's signature, elements of offense

Where document has been signed by person using his own alias, person has not made document which purports to have been made by another person within meaning of forgery offense, but has made document which merely purports to have been made by himself, where he uses name by which he is known and identified. People v. Kelley, App. 3 Dist.1985, 85 Ill.Dec. 204, 129 Ill.App.3d 920, 473 N.E.2d 572. Forgery k 8

Where defendant chose to be known by surname of man with whom she was living, received a paycheck in that name and asked friends and relatives to address her as such, defendant's signing of surname to check on which she had written account number of account listed in her true name did not constitute crime of forgery. People v. Kollmann, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 629, 342 N.E.2d 240. Forgery k 8

Act of wife in signing her insured husband's name to request for payment of cash surrender value on life policy and in receiving payment in return constituted forgery and could not be explained away by insurer as merely an act wherein wife falsely signed her husband's name. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Whiston, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 844, 333 N.E.2d 72. Forgery k 7(1)

The words "purports to have been made by another," as used in this section, include the use of a fictitious name, and the word "another" can mean not onlya different living person than the actual maker, but a nonexistent person purporting to be the maker, where such fictitious name is used with intent to defraud by concealing the true identity of the maker or giving the instrument a spurious credibility, so that fact that person who opened checking account actually signed check which was cashed by defendant after endorsing it with payee's name did not make the check a valid check in forgery prosecution. People v. Bell, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 227, 318 N.E.2d 526. Forgery k8

Defendant who drew check with intent to defraud, using name of fictitious person as purported maker, was guilty of forgery. People v. Lanners, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 290, 258 N.E.2d 390. Forgery k 8

A person may be guilty of a "false making" of an instrument within meaning of common-law definition of "forgery" where the instrument is false in any material part, and calculated to induce another to give credit to it as genuine and authentic, notwithstanding fact that person signs and executes theinstrument in his own name. People v. Mau, 1941, 36 N.E.2d 235, 377 Ill. 199. Forgery k 8

Indictment charging defendants with making, passing, and uttering fictitious note did not charge crime under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), because <section> 277 (repealed) did not apply to a case where thename of a fictitious person was signed to a note. People v. Gould, 1932, 179 N.E. 848, 347 Ill. 298. Forgery k 8

Indorsement by one who knows he is not the real payee, but who bears the same name, is a forgery. Beattie v. National Bank of Illinois, 1898, 51 N.E. 602, 174 Ill. 571, 66 Am.St.Rep. 318. 13. ---- Another person's authority, elements of offense

In forgery prosecution, State showed that defendant acted without authority inissuing free airline tickets to barter companies in exchange for promotional items; there was testimony that defendant, as airline's district sales manager, could offer tickets for promotional purposes only if he received prior approval from management to extend offer and that defendant did not haveauthority to issue tickets. People v. Panagiotis, App. 1 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 125, 162 Ill.App.3d 866, 516 N.E.2d 280, appeal denied 119 Ill.Dec. 393, 119 Ill.2d 569, 522 N.E.2d 1252. Forgery k 44(.5)

Where defendant, who was executor of estate, had authority to draw checks on estate account, he could not be convicted of the specific offense of forgery. People v. Lindquist, App. 3 Dist.1981, 53 Ill.Dec. 653, 97 Ill.App.3d 894, 424N.E.2d 66. Forgery k 6

Where defendant, although president of corporation, was not authorized to issue certificate of stock in question, certificate was forged despite defendant's office in corporation and genuineness of corporate secretary's signature. People v. Young, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609. Forgery k 12(3)

If alleged wrongdoers signed their names to check drawn against insurance company's account in bank without authority, their alleged conduct constituted"forgery" within meaning of the Liability for Forged and Raised Checks Act, even though they signed their own names. Barrett v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, App. 1 Dist.1954, 2 Ill.App.2d 70, 118 N.E.2d 631 . Banks And Banking k 148(2)

One who filled in checks over admittedly genuine signature of maker but in violation of his authority was guilty of "forgery," within Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed). People v. Kubanek, 1939, 19 N.E.2d 573, 370Ill. 646. Forgery k 9

County clerk could forge county order, although authorized to draw orders, since order is not collectible, although signed by clerk, unless countersignedby county treasurer, and clerk could forge treasurer's signature. People v. Kramer, 1933, 185 N.E. 590, 352 Ill. 304. Forgery k 7(3)

Conviction of county clerk for forgery of county order could not be sustained,where clerk's signature and county treasurer's counter signature were genuine,notwithstanding drawing of particular order by clerk and countersigning by treasurer were unauthorized. People v. Kramer, 1933, 185 N.E. 590, 352 Ill. 304. Forgery k 9 14. ---- Injury, elements of offense

Crime of forgery is complete with the making of a false instrument, the subject of forgery, with intent to defraud, whether or not any one is in fact defrauded. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149; People v. Meyer., 1919, 124 N.E. 447, 289 Ill. 184.

Though property or monetary loss may be the most common forgeries, they are not exclusive. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 1

Unlike theft, proof of loss is not required to complete offense of forgery. People v. Murray, App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 644, 262 Ill.App.3d 1056, 640N.E.2d 303. Forgery k 14

There is no requirement that someone actually be defrauded in order to convictdefendant who passes a forged document of forgery. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 14

Crime of forgery does not require that any person actually be defrauded of money or property; on the contrary, a person whose forgery is discovered whenhe tries to pass the document is nevertheless guilty of forgery. People v. Douglas, App. 1 Dist.1980, 41 Ill.Dec. 817, 86 Ill.App.3d 668, 408 N.E.2d 239. Forgery k 14

It is immaterial to crime of forgery whether anyone is in fact defrauded. People v. Henderson, 1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 654, 71 Ill.2d 53, 373 N.E.2d 1338. Forgery k 14

Consummation of fraud is not essential to forgery. People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Forgery k 14

Essential elements of "forgery" are false writing or alteration resulting in instrument capable of defrauding and act showing intent to defraud, but obtaining of credit upon such instrument is unnecessary. People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Forgery k 4 15. ---- Accountability, elements of offense

Every person who was guilty either of making and forging or uttering and passing, or attempting to utter and pass under the conditions named in Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), was deemed guilty of forgery. People v. Brown, 1947, 397 Ill. 92, 72 N.E.2d 859, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363; People v. Christison, 1947, 396 Ill.549, 72 N.E.2d 185; People v. Lantz, 1944, 387 Ill. 72, 55 N.E.2d 78; People v. D'Andrea, 1936, 361 Ill. 526, 198 N.E. 698.

One who causes or procures commission of forgery through an innocent third person is guilty. People v. Whitmer, 1938, 16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317,

appeal dismissed 59 S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S. 667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Forgery k 21

That salesman on business for his employer acceded to customer's request to drive customer to bank and wait for him, and that customer uttered a forged check while there, was insufficient to warrant conviction of salesman for forgery. People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Forgery k 21

One aiding or assisting with intent that instrument be uttered as genuine is guilty of forgery. Anson v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 145, 148 Ill. 494. 16. Intent to defraud--In general

False signing of another's name to instrument without intent to defraud or deceive someone does not constitute crime of forgery. People v. Bailey, 1958,15 Ill.2d 18, 153 N.E.2d 584; People v. Fore, 1943, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548.

Fraudulent intent is an essential element of forgery. Kotter v. People, 1894,150 Ill. 441, 37 N.E. 932; Anson v. People, 1893, 148 Ill. 494, 35 N.E. 145; Fox v. People, 1880, 95 Ill. 71.

Letter defendant wrote to trial court asking for leniency in her sentencing upon her conviction for retail theft, which purported to be from teacher in school district in which defendant worked, was document that could form basis for forgery charges, despite fact that letter was not written for pecuniary gain, as definitions of "intent to defraud," and "apparently capable of defrauding" contained in forgery statute were broad enough to include an intent to deceive for reasons other than pecuniary gain. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgeryk 7(1)

Definitions of "intent to defraud," and "apparently capable of defrauding," contained in forgery statute, are broad enough to include an intent to deceivefor reasons other than pecuniary gain. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 13

Intention to defraud is an essential element of crime of forgery. People v. Marks, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct.153, 385 U.S. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 103. Forgery k 5

The signing of another person's name with no intention to defraud is not a "forgery". Spellbrink v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., App.1946, 66N.E.2d 98, 328 Ill.App. 331.

17. ---- Presumptions, intent to defraud

Where forged instrument is uttered, an intent to defraud is presumed. Peoplev. Hackbert, 1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777; People v. Dauphin, 1965, 53 Ill.App.2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166; People v. Bailey, 1958, 15 Ill.2d 18, 153 N.E.2d 584.

Intent to defraud, as required element of forgery, may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and, if the forged document is delivered, then the intent to defraud will be presumed. People v. Hunter, App. 2 Dist.2002, 265 Ill.Dec. 342, 331 Ill.App.3d 1017, 772 N.E.2d 380. Forgery k 35

Intent to defraud may be inferred for purposes of forgery prosecution from facts and circumstances surrounding transaction, and if forged document is delivered, then intent to defraud will be presumed. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1992, 167 Ill.Dec. 274, 225 Ill.App.3d 170, 587 N.E.2d 543. Forgery k 35

Intent to defraud is presumed from uttering of forged instrument, and may alsobe inferred from surrounding circumstances. People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Forgery k 35

The intent to damage or defraud will be presumed where the forged instrument is uttered. People v. Adams, 1921, 132 N.E. 765, 300 Ill. 20, error dismissed43 S.Ct. 249, 260 U.S. 759, 67 L.Ed. 500.

When the forged instrument is uttered, the intent to defraud is presumed; andwhere the party is actually defrauded, the intent to defraud ordinarily

becomes conclusive. People v. Meyer., 1919, 124 N.E. 447, 289 Ill. 184. Forgery k 35 18. Document apparently capable of defrauding--In general

Mere acknowledgement of receipt of certificate of probation signed by defendant was not "document capable of defrauding another" within plain meaning of this paragraph. People v. Kelley, App. 3 Dist.1985, 85 Ill.Dec. 204, 129 Ill.App.3d 920, 473 N.E.2d 572. Forgery k 7(1)

For purpose of establishing essential element of crime of forgery that document has apparent ability to defraud another, it is not necessary that forged instrument be so skillfully prepared that it requires expert to detect it; further, it is not necessary that another actually be defrauded, and instrument need not be in due legal form to be found capable of defrauding another. People v. Tarkowski, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 367, 106 Ill.App.3d 597, 435 N.E.2d 1339. Forgery k 12(4)

One of the essential elements of forgery is that the accused made a document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another. People v. Teichler, App. 2 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 292, 311 N.E.2d 422. Forgery k 12(4)

Giving a false security in the form of a promissory instrument is the subject of a forgery. People v. Hackbert, App. 2 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777. Forgery k 7(2)

Application for charge account and charge slips for purchase of merchandise were documents "apparently capable of defrauding" within meaning of this section and were also subject of forgery prior to enactment of this section. People v. Moyer, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210. Forgery k 7(1)

A "forgery" under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), was notlimited to act of endorsing, by forgery, a signature on an instrument in compliance with the Negotiable Instruments Act, and inquiry was to ascertain whether endorsement rendered instrument capable of defrauding and was made forthat purpose, and, if so, it was a "forgery," and therefore typed endorsement on state warrant could constitute a "forgery". People v. Epping, 1959, 17 Ill.2d 557, 162 N.E.2d 366.

Labels and trademarks were not subjects of forgery. White v. Wagar, 1900, 57 N.E. 26, 185 Ill. 195. 19. ---- Appearance of genuineness, document apparently capable of defrauding

Test for determining whether forged document is apparently capable of defrauding another, as required to support conviction for forgery-by-delivery,is whether reasonable person might be deceived into accepting document as genuine. People v. Smith, App. 4 Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 516, 259 Ill.App.3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738, appeal denied 202 Ill.Dec. 929, 156 Ill.2d 565, 638 N.E.2d 1123. Forgery k 12(4)

Test of whether document has apparent ability to defraud another, thereby satisfying essential element of crime of forgery, is whether reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting document as true and genuine. People v. Tarkowski, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 367, 106 Ill.App.3d 597, 435 N.E.2d 1339. Forgery k 12(4)

Test for determining whether document is apparently capable of defrauding another is whether reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting document as being true and genuine; thus the document's capacity todefraud another need only be apparent, not actual. People v. Reynolds, App. 5Dist.1980, 40 Ill.Dec. 833, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64. Forgery k 12(.5)

Forged instrument need not be so skillfully executed as to require an expert to detect its falsity, test of whether document is "apparently capable of defrauding" within forgery statute is whether a reasonable and ordinary personmight be deceived into accepting the document as true and genuine. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 12(.5) 20. ---- Legal efficacy, document apparently capable of defrauding

An instrument, to form basis of charge of forgery, need not necessarily be in due legal form, but it is sufficient if instrument, supposing it to have been genuine, might be prejudicial. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526; People v. Dougherty, 1910, 92 N.E. 929, 246 Ill. 458.

An instrument without apparent legal efficacy or incapable of affecting the rights of another cannot be the subject of forgery. Goodman v. People, 1907, 228 Ill. 154, 81 N.E. 830; Klawanski v. People, 1906, 218 Ill. 481, 75 N.E. 1028; Brown v. People, 1877, 86 Ill. 239, 29 Am.Rep. 25; Waterman v. People, 1873, 67 Ill. 91.

Crime of forgery only applies to documents that could affect another person's legal rights. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 12(2)

Letter defendant wrote to trial court asking for leniency in her sentencing upon her conviction for retail theft, which purported to be from teacher in school district in which defendant worked, had a legal effect and was capable of affecting rights or obligations of another, such that it was proper subjectof forgery charge; sentencing judge was statutorily bound to consider "all evidence and information offered by the parties in aggravation and mitigation," in exercising his discretion to impose sentence on defendant, andthus letter could have altered his right and obligation to impose proper sentence in light of all facts available to him. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 12(2)

Bid quotations and other documents submitted as part of competitive-bidding process were apparently capable of defrauding, as required to support charge of forgery-by-delivery. People v. Smith, App. 4 Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 516, 259 Ill.App.3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738, appeal denied 202 Ill.Dec. 929, 156 Ill.2d565, 638 N.E.2d 1123. Forgery k 12(4)

An essential element of the crime of forgery is that the document as written must be apparently capable of defrauding another, and thus an instrument without apparent legal efficacy or incapable of affecting the rights of another cannot be the subject of forgery. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 12(.5)

Where a check recited that the sum payable was "$2500, twenty-five hundred andno/100 dollars," the alteration of the figures so as to read "2500/00" did notchange the legal effect of the instrument, so as to constitute forgery. Peoplev. Lewinger, 1911, 96 N.E. 837, 252 Ill. 332, Am.Ann.Cas. 1912D,239. 21. ---- Checks, document apparently capable of defrauding

Fact that forged cashier's check could not have been cashed absent defendant'sendorsement and he had told bearer not to cash it did not preclude forgery conviction, so long as reasonable person might be deceived into accepting document as genuine. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 20

In prosecution for forgery, fact that check defendant endorsed may have been overdue was relevant only to drawer's right to refuse payment on the check; thus, the check was "apparently capable of defrauding another" under this paragraph setting forth requirements of forgery. People v. Connell, App. 5 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 743, 91 Ill.App.3d 326, 414 N.E.2d 796. Forgery k 12(.5)

Where payee of check was food store and check was complete in every respect except genuineness when it was presented to checkout girl, it was "apparently capable of defrauding" for purposes of this section, though it may have been entirely blank when presented for approval to store's employee named in the indictment. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 12(.5)

Check which contained words "Void after 30 days", and which was passed 43 daysafter its date, was not void on its face and it could be subject of forgery, where check appeared to be ordinary payroll check commonly used in commercial world, and inscription was for benefit of drawer or maker who had option or election to refuse payment and where instrument was presented after 30 days. People v. Marks, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 153, 385 U.S. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 103. Forgery k 12(1)

Indictment charging defendants with making, passing, and uttering interest coupon containing words "payable according to tenor of said principal note" did not charge crime, since instrument did not contain unconditional promise to pay. People v. Gould, 1932, 179 N.E. 848, 347 Ill. 298. Forgery k 7(1)

Passing of counterfeited checks or drafts of the Canal Commissioners, commonlycalled "Canal Checks" with intent to defraud any person or body politic or corporate, knowing such checks have been falsely counterfeited constitutes an offense. Crofts v. People, 1840, 3 Ill. 442.

Counterfeiting of checks of Canal Commissioners, payable ninety days after date, constituted forgery. Crofts v. People, 1840, 3 Ill. 442. 22. ---- Public records, document apparently capable of defrauding

Anyone authorized to make up a record or execute an authentic matter of a public nature will be guilty of forgery if he makes such record or executes such authentic matter knowing that its contents are false and untrue, with theintent to defraud either an individual or the body politic by which he is employed. People v. Mau, 1941, 36 N.E.2d 235, 377 Ill. 199. Forgery k 15

Under Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), prohibiting forgeryof public records, deeds, leases, warrants, and other instruments, forged instrument did not need to be negotiable. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Forgery k 7(1) 23. ---- Credit cards, document apparently capable of defrauding

Person who without authority signs another person's name to sales slip as partof credit card transaction may be guilty of forgery; credit card itself establishes that there is line of credit, and credit card slip, like a check, purports to make use of the credit. People v. Murray, App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 644, 262 Ill.App.3d 1056, 640 N.E.2d 303. Forgery k 7(1)

Credit card sales draft was capable of defrauding another, although credit card was not signed, where draft bore the name, account number and signature

of authorized card user, and disclosed agreement between parties to it by obligating issuer of card to reimburse seller for item purchased on the draft and, in turn, by obligating card user to reimburse issuer. People v. Reynolds, App. 5 Dist.1980, 40 Ill.Dec. 833, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64. Forgery k 12(.5) 24. False pretenses

One falsely representing to the maker of a note the loss thereof, and inducinghim to execute a new note bearing the date of the original, and then passing the new note as the original, with intent to defraud, is not guilty of forgery. People v. Pfeiffer, 1909, 90 N.E. 680, 243 Ill. 200, 17 Am.Ann.Cas. 703. Forgery k 4

Inducing another by false pretenses to sign a note is not forgery. Hoge v. First Nat. Bank, 1886, 18 Ill.App. 501. 25. Probable cause--In general

Where defendant was charged with delivering a forged check with intent to defraud and testified in his defense that one payee was his employer to whom purported maker gave the check and who then endorsed it, and where appointed defense counsel failed to object that search of defendant incident to arrest for vagrancy was invalid on ground no probable cause existed for arrest, conduct upon which such arrest was based would probably not have been classified as a crime, and checks found on defendant in such search were permitted in evidence on issue of defendant's intent, motive and knowledge, defendant was deprived of substantial right through such failure to object andwas thus entitled to new trial. People v. Harter, App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 772,282 N.E.2d 10. Criminal Law k 641.13(6); Criminal Law k 1166.10(1) 26. ---- Arrest without warrant, probable cause

Police officer had probable cause to arrest defendant, where the officer was called to a pharmacy and told someone there was "trying to pass a fraudulent prescription," and where, upon arriving at the pharmacy and speaking with the pharmacist, the pharmacist walked outside with the officer and identified defendant who was seated in a parked automobile some 15 or 20 feet away.

People v. Douglas, App. 1 Dist.1980, 41 Ill.Dec. 817, 86 Ill.App.3d 668, 408 N.E.2d 239. Arrest k 63.4(12)

Although defendant generally fit description given by victim of attempted burglary, on which charge he was subsequently convicted, officers, who arrested defendant on basis of their belief that defendant had passed stolen check at liquor store, did not have probable cause for warrantless arrest where, inter alia, officers made arrest in apartment of another person matching description of party who allegedly passed stolen check in question and, although defendant might have been present at check's passage, there was no evidence indicating that direct or accessorial liability could be assessed to defendant for passage of such check. People v. Hornal, App. 5 Dist.1975, 29 Ill.App.3d 308, 330 N.E.2d 225. Arrest k 63.4(6)

Possession of known counterfeit dollar with intention to utter or transfer same constitutes probable cause for arrest without warrant. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Luleich, 1900, 85 Ill.App. 643. 27. ---- Search and seizure, probable cause

Police officer's affidavit for a search warrant, which affidavit stated that two informants each related receiving "forged checks" from codefendant, while third informant related that she had known codefendant to provide "forged checks" for fraudulent passing, was sufficient to establish probable cause, despite defendants' argument that use of term "forged" was a legal conclusion rather than statement of fact. People v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 165, 70 Ill.App.3d 413, 387 N.E.2d 995. Searches And Seizures k 114

Search warrant, which commanded police to seize any negotiable instruments such as checks not in name of codefendant, all typewriters, and bogus identification, and other evidence of forgery which had been used in commission of or which constituted evidence of forgery, contained sufficient description of items to be seized. People v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 165, 70 Ill.App.3d 413, 387 N.E.2d 995. Searches And Seizures k 125

Arresting officer's inventory search of inoperable automobile prior to its

being towed away from traffic lane of street after accused driver and passenger had been arrested for failure to have an operator's license and for illegal transportation of alcohol was reasonable and proper; thus, stolen blank checks, which were found in glove compartment, were admissible in forgery prosecution. People v. Clark, App. 4 Dist.1975, 32 Ill.App.3d 898, 336 N.E.2d 892, affirmed 2 Ill.Dec. 578, 65 Ill.2d 169, 357 N.E.2d 798, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 2184, 431 U.S. 918, 53 L.Ed.2d 229. Criminal Law k394.4(12); Searches And Seizures k 66

Facts that searching officers had heard on their police radio that someone wasattempting to pass a forged postal money order, that they had known of a theftof 22 postal money orders from personal investigation that morning and prior to hearing radio dispatches, that they had intelligence to effect that the suspect was in a described vehicle with a given license number, that defendantwas found in the described vehicle, and that defendant fitted the description given, such as it was, furnished probable cause that a search of the vehicle would disclose stolen money orders or maybe the one someone had attempted to pass, and search was justified. People v. Butler, App. 4 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 541, 298 N.E.2d 798. Searches And Seizures k 62

In prosecution for forgery, where whiskey which defendant purchased with forged check, checks in automobile, and checks which defendant tossed out of window of automobile while being pursued by officers were in plain sight, items were not product of "search," and items were admissible. People v. Rice, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 329, 258 N.E.2d 841. Searches And Seizures k 15

Where defendant was arrested for passing check without sufficient funds and police after driving defendant's automobile to station searched it and found 89 forged checks in glove compartment and it appeared that automobile was in no way connected with crime of which defendant was accused, search without warrant was unreasonable and admitting of seized checks into evidence in trialfor forgery was error. People v. Lohagen, 1966, 35 Ill.2d 199, 220 N.E.2d 201 . Criminal Law k 394.4(12); Searches And Seizures k 66

Where defendant was indicted for forgery and moved to suppress number of forged checks taken by police from defendant's automobile in unreasonable search, it was not necessary that defendant allege possession of checks as mere possession was crime at time of proceeding. People v. Lohagen, 1966, 35 Ill.2d 199, 220 N.E.2d 201. Criminal Law k 394.6(1) 27.5. Jurisdiction

Evidence established that the forgery, which involved making a fraudulent deedwhich was filed in Wisconsin, was committed at least partly in Illinois, as basis for jurisdiction to prosecute defendant in Illinois; defendant induced notary public to sign the deed's acknowledgment, in defendant's presence, in Illinois, and notary's execution of the acknowledgment enabled defendant to file the deed, even if defendant had been in Wisconsin rather than Illinois when she added joint tenants' forged signatures to the deed. People v. Olson,App. 2 Dist.2004, 286 Ill.Dec. 561, 351 Ill.App.3d 534, 814 N.E.2d 211. Criminal Law k 97(.5) 28. Venue--In general

Forged financial document was "delivered," for venue purposes, in county from which defendant had copy of document "faxed" to commercial and corporate real estate firm with which he was negotiating lease. People v. Hagan, 1991, 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Criminal Law k 108(1)

Gist of offense of forgery was that defendant sent or caused to be sent document capable of defrauding; thus, venue was proper in either county from which document was "faxed" or county to which it was sent. People v. Hagan, App. 2 Dist.1990, 145 Ill.Dec. 322, 199 Ill.App.3d 267, 556 N.E.2d 1224, appeal allowed 151 Ill.Dec. 387, 135 Ill.2d 561, 564 N.E.2d 842, affirmed 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Criminal Law k 112(1); Forgery k 1

29. ---- Burden of proof, venue

Venue must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 564(2)

Situs of forgery need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. People v.

McIntosh, 1909, 90 N.E. 180, 242 Ill. 602. Criminal Law k 564(2) 30. ---- Circumstantial evidence, venue

In forgery cases, venue must often be proved by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence. People v. Hagan, 1991, 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Criminal Law k 564(3)

In forgery case, venue can be proved by circumstantial evidence. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 564(3) 31. ---- Sufficiency of evidence, venue

Evidence was sufficient to establish venue in county in which forgery prosecution occurred; only rational conclusion that could be drawn from uncontroverted evidence was that check, which formed basis for prosecution, was made out by defendant while riding in limousine in the county. People v. Turner, App. 2 Dist.1989, 128 Ill.Dec. 159, 179 Ill.App.3d 510, 534 N.E.2d 179, appeal denied 133 Ill.Dec. 676, 126 Ill.2d 565, 541 N.E.2d 1114. CriminalLaw k 564(1)

Evidence that the forgery was committed at a stop sign 150 to 200 feet from a Lakemoor house and that the defendant was on his way to another point in Lakemoor only a quarter of a mile away was sufficient to warrant conclusion that defendant was in Lakemoor, McHenry County, the entire length of the shorttrip and, hence, was sufficient to prove venue of the forgery count in McHenryCounty. People v. Stout, App. 2 Dist.1982, 63 Ill.Dec. 810, 108 Ill.App.3d 96, 438 N.E.2d 952. Criminal Law k 564(1)

In prosecution for forgery, evidence did not establish that the alleged forgery was committed in particular county alleged in the charge, in light of facts that forged prescription was not delivered in the county by defendant, originated in an out-of-state hospital, and was dated two days prior to evidence of defendant's presence within the state. People v. Smith, App. 5 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 698, 91 Ill.App.3d 242, 414 N.E.2d 751. Criminal Law k564(1)

Evidence that defendant's employer was located in county and that defendant lived and worked in county established venue in prosecution arising from thefts and forgeries of employer's checks. People v. Toellen, App. 3

Dist.1978, 23 Ill.Dec. 686, 66 Ill.App.3d 967, 384 N.E.2d 480. Criminal Law k564(1)

In prosecution against matron of Vermillion County Home for forging indorsements to Vermilion county warrants payable to employee of home, evidence that warrants were paid by Vermilion county treasurer, that matron believed that she had cashed warrants at county treasurer's office in such county, and that she used money in payment of wages of employees in such home,established the venue as laid in Vermilion county. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 564(5)

In prosecution for forgery of a bond, the fact that the seal which appeared onthe bond was kept in a vault in the county in which the defendant was being prosecuted, and never, so far as appears, was removed from such county, and that blanks for the bonds were kept there, was sufficient to justify the finding that the offense was committed in such county. People v. Adams, 1921,132 N.E. 765, 300 Ill. 20, error dismissed 43 S.Ct. 249, 260 U.S. 759, 67 L.Ed. 500. Criminal Law k 564(1)

There was testimony tending to show that the judge's name was signed to the petition in Kankakee County, Ill., but the petition was afterwards taken to Arkansas, and the defendant insinuated that the signature was attached in thatstate. Verdict of guilty of forgery in Kankakee county was not against the weight of the evidence. Langdon v. People, 1890, 24 N.E. 874, 133 Ill. 382. Forgery k 44(.5) 32. Included offenses

Where defendant's conduct constituted forgery, he could be prosecuted for thatcrime even though conduct also constituted lesser crime of deceptive practicesas dealt with in <section> 17-1 of former chapter 38 postdating the forgery statute, this section. People v. Roberts, App. 3 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 489, 326 N.E.2d 116. Criminal Law k 29(5.5)

The deceptive practice of the delivery of a check drawn on a real depository, knowing that it will not be paid by the depository, with the intent to defraud

and with the intent to obtain control over the property of another is not a lesser included offense of forgery by the delivery of a check knowing it to befraudulent in that it purports to be made by one who did not make it, with theintent to defraud. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255. Indictment And Information k 191(10)

One who presented a forged check to be cashed was guilty of "forgery" and not merely an attempt to commit forgery, though the check was not indorsed and wasnever cashed. People v. Christison, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 185, 396 Ill. 549. Forgery k 16 33. Joinder of offenses

Compulsory joinder statute did not require prosecution of alleged violations of Illinois Motor Fuel Tax Act (IMFTA) and forgery in same proceeding, even though both offenses were related, where IMFTA charges and forgery charges were based on separate acts. People v. Schram, App. 1 Dist.1996, 220 Ill.Dec.225, 283 Ill.App.3d 1056, 672 N.E.2d 1237. Double Jeopardy k 147

Refusal to sever charges of burglary and forgery was not abuse of discretion where burglary in which checks and check-writing machine were taken occurred one night and the following afternoon an unknown person cashed one of the checks using a stolen driver's license for identification and approximately two hours later defendant attempted to cash another check using the same driver's license; even if offenses were not part of the same comprehensive transaction, defendant was not prejudiced where he received identical concurrent sentences and jurors would have heard the same evidence at separatetrials. People v. Sockwell, App. 2 Dist.1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 405, 55 Ill.App.3d 174, 371 N.E.2d 100. Criminal Law k 622.7(2)

Indictment joining counts for forgery of a note and for uttering it is proper. Parker v. People, 1880, 97 Ill. 32. 34. Sufficiency of indictment--In general

Forgery information alleging that check payee knowingly delivered check with intent to defraud despite knowledge that check had been made in violation of

statutory prohibition against forgery of maker's signature apprised payee of nature of offense and was sufficiently specific to prevent any future prosecution arising out of same conduct. People v. Whitley, App. 5 Dist.1991,162 Ill.Dec. 459, 219 Ill.App.3d 917, 579 N.E.2d 1273. Forgery k 26

Indictment which charged that defendant, with intent to defraud, knowingly endorsed draft in such manner that it purported to have been made by authorityof copayees was sufficient to enable defendant to prepare his defense to forgery charge. People v. Martin-Trigona, App. 1 Dist.1982, 67 Ill.Dec. 291, 111 Ill.App.3d 718, 444 N.E.2d 527. Indictment And Information k 71.4(4)

Indictment charging in count one that defendant "did make, forge and counterfeit a certain check" and charging in count two that defendant "did pass, utter and publish a certain false, forged and counterfeited bank check" without allegations as to existence or nonexistence of obligor of check was legally sufficient to charge a forgery in count one and a fraudulent passing in count two, separate offenses under forgery statute (<section> 277, repealed) but both counts were insufficient to charge an offense under <section> 279 (repealed) relating to fictitious checks. People v. Meeks, App.1965, 55 Ill.App.2d 437, 205 N.E.2d 62. False Pretenses k 26; Forgery k 26; Forgery k 32

Forgery indictment need not allege that instrument forged, if genuine, would create legal liability. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Forgery k 29(1)

Indictment charging forgery of quitclaim deed was insufficient for failure to allege that purported grantor had any interest in property involved. People v. Schneider, 1929, 166 N.E. 529, 334 Ill. 630. Forgery k 29(4)

In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that the charge, in an indictment setting forth in different counts the forgery of an instrument and the uttering of the instrument so forged, related to the same transaction. People v. Dougherty, 1910, 92 N.E. 929, 246 Ill. 458. IndictmentAnd Information k 129(3)

An indictment for forging a theater pass must allege that on the date for which the pass was given there was an entertainment for which a "considerationwas required," in accordance with Ill.Rev.Stat.1903, ch. 38, <section> 105. An indictment for forging a theater pass must allege that the person whose name was forged had authority to issue such pass, and also allege who would bedefrauded by such issuance, and it is insufficient that the name of the party to be defrauded appears in the copy of the pass set out in the indictment, with the words "Sole Prop.," and that the name of the person issuing it appears in such copy preceded by the words "Adv. Agent." Klawanski v. People,1905, 75 N.E. 1028, 218 Ill. 481. Forgery k 29(1)

It is unnecessary to allege that the bills were for payment of money. Townsend v. People, 1841, 4 Ill. 326. 35. ---- Date, sufficiency of indictment

Date alleged in indictment as date on which defendant allegedly took forged note to bank was not an essential ingredient of offense of forgery by knowingly delivering a document knowing it to have been made apparently capable of defrauding another and, in absence of any effect on limitations periods, the State was not precluded from offering proof that offense was in fact committed on a slightly different date; the only evidence regarding an alternate date having been elicited from defendant on cross-examination he accordingly had no reason to complain. People v. Custer, App. 5 Dist.1972, 11Ill.App.3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753. Criminal Law k 1137(5); Indictment And Information k 176 36. ---- Delivery, sufficiency of indictment

Deletion of the word "delivered" from indictment which originally charged defendant with having "knowingly made, possessed, issued and delivered" promissory note on which he had forged two signatures was not prejudicial to defendant. People v. Broverman, App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 929, 282 N.E.2d 279. Criminal Law k 1167(4)

Charge of "uttering" and passing a forged instrument is broad enough to include attempt to pass it and successful passing, since "utter" and "uttering" mean to "offer." People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440.Indictment And Information k 190

37. ---- Injury, sufficiency of indictment

Indictment for forging indorsement to county warrant, which was payable solelyfrom the county tax when collected, was sufficient, notwithstanding absence ofallegation that warrant was, in fact, paid out of the county tax when collected. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Forgery k 29(1)

An indictment which charged that accused passed as genuine a false time pass upon a certain railway, with intent to defraud it, but did not state the use to which the false pass was to be put, nor that the company had any means of transportation over which the pass could be used, nor that the person whose name appeared on the pass as general manager of the railway company was in fact such officer, was bad. Goodman v. People, 1907, 81 N.E. 830, 228 Ill. 154. Forgery k 26 38. ---- Intent to defraud, sufficiency of indictment

Indictment charging that with intent to defraud defendant knowingly delivered to a druggist a prescription bearing the forged signature of a physician was not void for failure to allege or show that defendant was possessed of an intention to defraud, on ground that only payment of purchase price would bring about transfer of ownership of drugs and that the defendant was ready and willing to pay purchase price; forged prescription was capable of causing, or being used to cause, the transfer of prescriptive drug to one not entitled to receive it. People v. Merchant, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724. Forgery k 27

Omission, from indictment charging forgery of the word "knowingly" was not fatal, where the words "knowing said document to have been altered" and "with the intent" were included. People v. Broverman, App.1972, 4 Ill.App.3d 929, 282 N.E.2d 279. Indictment And Information k 89

In indictment for forgery identifying person to whom delivery was made and alleging that proscribed action was taken with intent to defraud, it was

unnecessary to include additional averment that it was done with intent to defraud specific person. People v. Crouch, 1963, 29 Ill.2d 485, 194 N.E.2d 248. Forgery k 29(5)

An indictment which fails to charge fraudulent intent in prosecution for forgery is fatally defective. People v. Fore, 1943, 51 N.E.2d 548, 384 Ill. 455. Forgery k 27

Where indictment for forgery did not charge intent to defraud, conviction was reversed notwithstanding that accused pleaded guilty and did not question sufficiency of indictment in trial court. People v. Fore, 1943, 51 N.E.2d 548, 384 Ill. 455. Criminal Law k 273.4(4) 39. ---- Document, sufficiency of indictment

Forgery indictment, which alleged that drug prescription was "apparently capable of defrauding another in that it purported to have been made by another" and that accused committed the requisite acts "knowing said document to have been thereby made," sufficiently alleged that such accused, who had presented the prescription to a pharmacy, knew that prescription bore a forgedsignature. People v. Mager, App. 5 Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 306, 341 N.E.2d 389. Forgery k 32

Credit card sales slip was "a document apparently capable of defrauding another" as used in this section, and failure to allege existence of the credit card was not fatal to indictment. People v. Roberts, App. 3 Dist.1975,27 Ill.App.3d 489, 326 N.E.2d 116. Forgery k 7(1); Forgery k 28(1)

An indictment, which alleged that city comptroller, who had custody and control of city's account books and records and whose duty it was upon presentment of special assessment bonds for payment to prepare in triplicate aspecial assessment disbursement sheet upon which mayor and treasurer relied inexecuting warrant and authorization for payment, fraudulently prepared a special assessment disbursement sheet, which falsely stated that certain bondswere owned by a fictitious person, by reason of which a warrant and authorization for payment to order of fictitious person were issued, charged the offense of "forgery". People v. Mau, 1941, 36 N.E.2d 235, 377 Ill. 199. Forgery k 31 40. ---- Capable of defrauding, generally, sufficiency of indictment

Forged financial document that defendant delivered to officer in commercial real estate firm with which he was negotiating lease, which indicated that defendant had thousands of dollars in his bank account when in fact true account balances were negative or very low, was document of type "capable of defrauding another," within meaning of forgery statute, notwithstanding that officer may have had other sources of information as to defendant's financial status. People v. Hagan, 1991, 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Forgery k 15

Free airline tickets issued to barter companies in exchange for promotional items showed on their faces apparent capacity to defraud another, as necessaryfor forgery indictment, where tickets appeared to be genuine free promotional tickets, but were not genuine because they had been issued without authority, and where tickets created obligation for airline to provide transportation to ticket holder, at least until fraud was discovered. People v. Panagiotis, App. 1 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 125, 162 Ill.App.3d 866, 516 N.E.2d 280, appealdenied 119 Ill.Dec. 393, 119 Ill.2d 569, 522 N.E.2d 1252. Forgery k 26

Information was sufficient to charge offense of forgery, where attached letterpurportedly from rear admiral of the United States Navy described retirement benefits to which defendant was entitled and letter was allegedly delivered tofinancial institution or possessed with intent to deliver to that institution;letter was facially capable of defrauding that institution. People v. Spencer, App. 4 Dist.1987, 112 Ill.Dec. 100, 160 Ill.App.3d 509, 513 N.E.2d 514. Forgery k 26

Forgery indictment reading that defendant "with intent to defraud, knowingly delivered * * * a forged document apparently capable of defrauding another, towit: a stock certificate," copy attached, defendant "knowing said stock certificate to have been thus made" was not deficient by reason of failure to specify how certificate was a "forged document apparently capable of defrauding another." People v. Young, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609. Forgery k 28(1)

Requirement that document forged be apparently capable of defrauding another is an essential element of crime and must be set forth in some fashion in indictment. People v. Moats, App. 3 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285. Forgery k 29(2)

Indictment charging forgery of grocery order ostensibly issued to needy persons by public welfare bureau was good as against motion to quash; there being sufficient allegations to show that instrument was susceptible of being used to defraud state. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Forgery k 29(2)

Indictment charging forgery of township treasurer's bond was not defective because not alleging that accused was duly elected or appointed township treasurer at time of alleged forgery, where township treasurer's bond set up in indictment was full, regular, and legal on its face and was apparently capable of defrauding. People v. Routson, 1933, 188 N.E. 883, 354 Ill. 573. Forgery k 29(4)

Indictment for counterfeiting a teacher's certificate had to set up that the certificate was complete for its purpose. Wallace v. People, 1861, 27 Ill. 44. 41. ---- Capable of defrauding, extrinsic facts, sufficiency of indictment

For purposes of crime of forgery, an indictment stating that a document is apparently capable of defrauding in that it was purported to be made by another sufficiently pleads extrinsic facts demonstrating the fraudulent character of the document. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 29(1)

Unless ability of document to defraud another is apparent on its face, state, in charging offense of forgery-by-delivery, must allege additional extrinsic fact showing ability of document to defraud. People v. Smith, App. 4 Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 516, 259 Ill.App.3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738, appeal denied202 Ill.Dec. 929, 156 Ill.2d 565, 638 N.E.2d 1123. Forgery k 29(2)

Although apparent ability of defendant's bid quotation to defraud was not

clear from its face, information charging forgery-by-delivery sufficiently setforth state's explanation why documents were capable of defrauding. People v.Smith, App. 4 Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 516, 259 Ill.App.3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738,appeal denied 202 Ill.Dec. 929, 156 Ill.2d 565, 638 N.E.2d 1123. Forgery k 29(2)

Forgery information was insufficient where it alleged that defendant, without authority, issued receipt for $2,000 downpayment purportedly made by recipientto third party, absent allegation of extrinsic facts demonstrating receipt's capacity to defraud. People v. Rennels, App. 5 Dist.1992, 169 Ill.Dec. 250, 227 Ill.App.3d 263, 591 N.E.2d 130, appeal denied 176 Ill.Dec. 815, 146 Ill.2d645, 602 N.E.2d 469. Forgery k 29(2)

Forgery indictment should allege facts to establish the document's capacity todefraud, if it is not apparent that the document would do so. People v. Toolen, App. 5 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 41, 116 Ill.App.3d 632, 451 N.E.2d 1364. Forgery k 29(2)

In indictment for forgery, instrument which is subject of charge must show on its face an apparent capacity to defraud another; otherwise, indictment must include averments of extrinsic facts establishing such capacity. People v. Reynolds, App. 5 Dist.1980, 40 Ill.Dec. 833, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64. Forgery k 29(2)

Where description of document in itself does not show that it was capable of defrauding, extrinsic facts must be alleged in forgery indictment sufficient to demonstrate its potential for fraudulent use. People v. Dismore, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151. Forgery k 29(2)

If indictment charging forgery merely sets out an instrument which is a nullity on its face, without any allegation showing how it could be made to act injuriously or fraudulently by reason of independent matter, no case is made, and same is true when instrument is imperfect and incomplete. People v.Moats, App. 3 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285. Forgery k 29(2)

An indictment charging that accused forged on his own check a certification ofthe check by a teller of the bank was not insufficient as failing, without theexistence of extrinsic facts not averred, to show the possibility of defrauding. People v. Wilmot, 1912, 98 N.E. 973, 254 Ill. 554. Forgery k 29(2)

Where the fraudulent character of an alleged forged writing does not appear upon its face, but can only be made to appear by innuendoes, introducing extraneous facts and circumstances, which show that the writing possessed a fraudulent character, not discernible except when read in the light of such facts and circumstances, the indictment must contain averments of such extrinsic facts. Goodman v. People, 1907, 81 N.E. 830, 228 Ill. 154. Forgery k 29(2) 42. ---- Description of document, generally, sufficiency of indictment

Forgery indictment based on "transcript of telephone quotations" for automobile parts for state vehicles was sufficient to withstand motion to quash as indictment referred to documents as "requisitions," which set "forth bids for vehicle parts" and stated that documents made or altered were auto parts requests which contained offers to supply those parts at a specified price when no authority to make those offers existed. People v. Toolen, App. 5 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 41, 116 Ill.App.3d 632, 451 N.E.2d 1364. Forgery k 28(1)

Every indictment for forgery or other crime the essence of which consists in the publication or fabrication of a written instrument had to on its face profess to set out the instrument according to its tenor, except where the instrument was in possession of the accused, destroyed, or for some other reason was not accessible to the grand jury, in which case the reason for not setting it out had to be distinctly averred. People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Forgery k 28(2); Forgery k 28(5)

It is necessary to sufficiency of indictment for forgery that it should set

forth instrument forged with strict verbal accuracy. People v. Greenspawn, 1931, 179 N.E. 98, 346 Ill. 484. Forgery k 28(2)

Revenue stamp was not an essential part of a note, so an indictment need not aver a forged note had a stamp attached. Cross v. People, 1868, 47 Ill. 152, 95 Am.Dec. 474. 43. ---- Description of document, purport or tenor, sufficiency of indictment

It is no longer necessary in forgery prosecution to attach to charging instrument copy of document in question or set it out in haec verba, but it ispermissible to give description of document. People v. Rennels, App. 5 Dist.1992, 169 Ill.Dec. 250, 227 Ill.App.3d 263, 591 N.E.2d 130, appeal denied176 Ill.Dec. 815, 146 Ill.2d 645, 602 N.E.2d 469. Forgery k 28(2)

To charge forgery as defined in Criminal Code, it is not necessary for indictment to include an exact copy of instrument, "tenor description," and itis sufficient if instrument be described in narrative form showing its salientaspects, "purport description," but if there is both a "tenor" and a "purport"description, they must be consistent. People v. Holloman, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 822, 333 N.E.2d 509, reversed 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456 Forgery k 28(2); Forgery k 28(3)

Indictment, in forgery prosecution, which failed to set out the forged instrument either in haec verba or by facsimile copy thereof attached was fatally defective. People v. Mustread, App.1968, 94 Ill.App.2d 440, 237 N.E.2d 348. Forgery k 28(2)

In forgery indictments, the instrument or document apparently capable of defrauding another, had to somehow be described, and it could be done in two ways, either by its purport or tenor, or by both. People v. Addison, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511. Forgery k 28(2); Forgery k 28(3)

In forgery indictment, if instrument was described by both as purport and tenor, the two descriptions had to be consistent. People v. Addison, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511. Forgery k 28(2); Forgery k 28(3)

Purport clause of indictment for forgery which charged that defendant made

check purported to have been made by payee and tenor clause which charged thatcheck was signed by drawer payable to and endorsed by payee were not inconsistent since "make" must be given definition and includes "endorses", and text of purport and tenor clauses was a charge that payee's endorsement had been forged. People v. Addison, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511. Indictment And Information k 73(1)

Purport clause of indictment for forgery which charged that defendant made check purported to have been made by payee and tenor clause which charged thatcheck was signed by drawer payable to and endorsed by payee was sufficient to state charge of forgery. People v. Addison, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511. Forgery k 28(2); Forgery k 28(3)

An indictment charging defendant with forging a check purporting to be by a designated maker for the payment of money to defendant, followed by what was alleged to be the forged instrument according to its tenor, set forth in haec verba, and showing the name of defendant as payee and the designated maker as such maker showed no fatal variance between purport clause and tenor clause. People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Indictment And Information k 73(1)

An indictment for forgery did not need to describe forged instrument by both its purport and tenor, but where indictment attempted to do so, the two descriptions had to be consistent and appear on face of indictment to refer tosame instrument. People v. Nickols, 1945, 63 N.E.2d 759, 391 Ill. 565. Forgery k 28(1); Indictment And Information k 73(2)

An indictment charging forgery of check purporting to have been executed for payment of money to named person, but setting out in haec verba a check namingno payee, was fatally defective and insufficient to sustain judgment on plea of guilty because of variance between purport and tenor clauses of indictment.People v. Nickols, 1945, 63 N.E.2d 759, 391 Ill. 565. Indictment And Information k 73(2) 44. ---- Tenor, generally, sufficiency of indictment

State's practice of attaching copy of relevant document and incorporating it into each count charging forgery-by-delivery would be approved, as a practicaland efficient method to both apprise defendant of charge and assist in determination of apparent capability of document to defraud another. People v. Smith, App. 4 Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 516, 259 Ill.App.3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738, appeal denied 202 Ill.Dec. 929, 156 Ill.2d 565, 638 N.E.2d 1123. Indictment And Information k 106

A "tenor description" of forged instrument was either exact or typed facsimile. People v. Addison, App.1966, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511. Forgery k 28(2)

While it is not necessary to set out in the indictment a forged instrument in haec verba, yet, when the pleader does so, he is bound to set out each and every part of the written instrument which constituted any part of the writtencontract. Trask v. People, 1894, 38 N.E. 248, 151 Ill. 523.

Where amount of alleged fictitious school order was plainly written in body oforder, figures in margin of such order were not strictly part of the contract,and in purporting to set out copy of such order in haec verba, figures in margin could be omitted without affecting sufficiency of indictment. Langdale v. People, 1881, 100 Ill. 263.

Though it was not necessary to set out in indictment alleged fictitious schoolorder in haec verba, yet when pleader undertook to do so and averred that it was in the words and figures as follows, he was bound to set out every part ofthe written instrument constituting any part of the written contract; but if anything appeared on the paper constituting the order which was no part of thecontract, that could be omitted. Langdale v. People, 1881, 100 Ill. 263.

Indictment attempting to give a copy of a forged instrument had to copy it exactly, including errors in it. Brown v. People, 1872, 66 Ill. 344.

A substantial copy of a counterfeited bank note was sufficient in an indictment. Quigley v. People, 1840, 3 Ill. 301. 45. ---- Tenor, necessity of, sufficiency of indictment

Indictments for forgery need no longer set out in haec verba the document uponwhich offense is charged. People v. Dismore, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151. Forgery k 28(1)

In prosecution for forgery, if indictment explicitly identifies and describes instrument, it is not necessary that there also be "tenor description." Peoplev. Dzielski, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 581, 264 N.E.2d 426. Forgery k 28(2)

Inasmuch as this section is comprehensive and does not differentiate among instruments as to penalty imposed or elements of offense, but rather includes any document apparently capable of defrauding, the need to set forth in an indictment an exact copy of the instrument in haec verba, in addition to the foregoing purport description, no longer exists; disapproving People v. Crouch, 29 Ill.2d 485, 194 N.E.2d 248. People ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 225. Forgery k 28(2)

An indictment for forgery had to profess to set out the instrument according to its tenor, i.e., in exact copy, except where the instrument was in possession of the accused, destroyed, or for some other reason was not accessible to the grand jury, in which event the reason for not setting it outhad to be distinctly averred. People v. Dawdy, App.1967, 87 Ill.App.2d 424, 230 N.E.2d 883. Forgery k 28(2)

The forged instrument had to be set forth in the indictment. People v. Crouch, 1963, 29 Ill.2d 485, 194 N.E.2d 248.

Indictment for forgery or other crimes, essence of which consisted in publication or fabrication of written instrument, had to, on face, profess to set out exact copy of instrument, except where it was in possession of accused, destroyed, or for some other reason not accessible to grand jury. People v. Kimler, 1927, 155 N.E. 299, 324 Ill. 445.

An indictment for forgery, the essence of which consists in the publication orfabrication of a written instrument, had to profess to set out the instrument according to its tenor, except where the instrument was in the possession of accused, destroyed, or for some other reason was not accessible to the grand jury, when the excuse for not setting it out had to be distinctly averred.

The word "tenor," as so used, imported an exact copy--that the instrument was set forth in the very words and figures. People v. Tilden, 1909, 90 N.E. 218,242 Ill. 536, 134 Am.St.Rep. 341, 17 Am.Ann.Cas. 496. Forgery k 28(2) 46. ---- Tenor, introductory language, sufficiency of indictment

"Tenor" within requirement that indictment for forgery set out instrument according to its "tenor" imported an exact copy, that the instrument is set forth in the very words and figures, but it was sufficient if the indictment used any form of expression indicating that the copy set forth is exact, as "in the words and figures following", "as follows", or "that is to say". People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Forgery k 28(2)

An indictment which after alleging that defendant did unlawfully, feloniously,fraudulently and falsely make, forge and counterfeit a bank check purporting to have been made by a designated individual for the payment of money to defendant, alleged that said forged and counterfeit bank check with indorsements on the back, was in "words and figures as follows, to wit:" as shown by photostatic copy of the check which was made a part of the indictment, sufficiently set out the alleged forged instrument according to its "tenor". People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Forgery k 28(2)

An indictment reciting that alleged forged bank check "with indorsements on back, is in words and figures as follows, to wit:" sufficiently professed to set out the instrument according to its tenor. People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed.363. Forgery k 28(2)

Where an indictment for forgery attempted to set forth the forged instrument according to its tenor, it was sufficient to use any form of expression indicating that the copy set forth was exact, as "in the words and figures following," "as follows," "that is to say"; but an indictment for uttering and publishing a forged note, alleging that the note was in words and figures "in substance as follows," "to wit," did not purport to set forth the language

of the instrument and was fatally defective. People v. Tilden, 1909, 90 N.E. 218, 242 Ill. 536, 134 Am.St.Rep. 341, 17 Am.Ann.Cas. 496. Forgery k 28(2) 47. ---- Purport, sufficiency of indictment

Forgery indictment, which alleged that defendants, with intent to defraud, knowingly filed documents described as "all documentation required to receive Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Funds," for students who defendants knew were not entitled to such funds, identified allegedly forged instruments precisely enough that defendant could prepare their defense, especially in light of extensive pretrial discovery afforded to defendants and where collateral estoppel would apply to resolution of case. People v. East-West University, Inc., App. 1 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 327, 163 Ill.App.3d 44, 516 N.E.2d 482, appeal denied 119 Ill.Dec. 390, 119 Ill.2d 563, 522 N.E.2d 1249, on subsequent appeal 202 Ill.Dec. 55, 265 Ill.App.3d 557, 637 N.E.2d 594. Forgery k 28(1)

Forgery indictments no longer need include a copy of the document or set it forth in haec verba, but may instead give a description of the pertinent instrument. People v. Toolen, App. 5 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 41, 116 Ill.App.3d 632, 451 N.E.2d 1364. Forgery k 28(2)

Indictment which contained narrative description of instrument allegedly forged by defendant was sufficient to inform defendant of the charge he was called upon to defend and was sufficient to charge offense. People v. Moyer, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210. Forgery k 28(3); Indictment And Information k 71.4(4) 48. ---- Endorsement, sufficiency of indictment

An indictment which alleged "together with the indorsement on the back thereof, to wit:" followed by the tenor clause showing indorsement of defendant and of firm alleged to be defrauded, and alleging further that it was with intent to prejudice, damage and defraud the purported maker and indorser designated by name, sufficiently set forth the indorsement. People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill. 92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Forgery k 28(1)

An indictment alleging that check was falsely made with intent to defraud a

designated individual doing business as a designated firm, which was the indorser, was sufficient though check was not made payable to such indorser, and notwithstanding that indictment did not allege that his indorsement was inaddition to that of defendant. People v. Brown, 1947, 72 N.E.2d 859, 397 Ill.92, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 44, 332 U.S. 779, 92 L.Ed. 363. Forgery k 26

Indictment for forgery had to, on its face, profess to set out exact copy of instrument, except where not accessible to grand jury. Initials on back, which were not necessary part of forged check, did not have to be shown in indictment, where instrument was set out in haec verba. People v. Kimler, 1927, 155 N.E. 299, 324 Ill. 445. Forgery k 28(2)

It was sufficient in an indictment to describe the instrument as it was at thetime of the alleged forgery, and it was admissible though it bore indorsementsmade after the forgery. Sampson v. People, 1900, 59 N.E. 427, 188 Ill. 592. Forgery k 28(1) 49. ---- Victim's identity, sufficiency of indictment

Charging instrument alleging forgery need not allege, and state need not prove, the person whom defendant intended to defraud. People v. Smith, App. 4Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 516, 259 Ill.App.3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738, appeal denied202 Ill.Dec. 929, 156 Ill.2d 565, 638 N.E.2d 1123. Indictment And Informationk 101

It is not necessary to allege the identity of the person intended to be defrauded; the offense of forgery is committed in making and delivering the instrument with the general intent to defraud. People v. Moyer, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210. Forgery k 29(5)

Where execution and delivery of check was not denied at trial, and there existed adequate safeguards against subsequent and further prosecutions for same conduct, although indictment charging forgery failed to identify person to whom six-dollar check had been delivered but alleged that upon specified date, at service station with stated address, defendant, with intent to defraud, knowingly delivered a document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that if purported to have been made by an individual

when in fact it had not, indictment was sufficient to charge offense. People v. White, App.1971, 130 Ill.App.2d 775, 267 N.E.2d 129. Forgery k 26

Averment erroneously made in indictment for forgery, as to identity of person defrauded, was formal defect which could be amended. People v. Marks, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 153, 385 U.S. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 103. Indictment And Information k 159(4)

In forgery prosecution, that witness, whose name was forged and who testified at trial, did not appear before grand jury, as indorsement on indictment indicated, did not render indictment bad or harm accused in any way, where accused was well acquainted with witness. People v. Whitmer, 1938, 16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317, appeal dismissed 59 S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S. 667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Indictment And Information k 34(4); Criminal Law k 628(6)

Indictment need not give the name of the person to whom counterfeit money was given. Swain v. People, 1843, 5 Ill. 178, 4 Scam. 178. 50. ---- Statutory language, sufficiency of indictment

Indictment charging defendant with forgery was sufficient, as indictment was in language of forgery statute, and it alleged fraudulent character of letter written by defendant by stating that "it was purported to have been made by another." People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 26

An indictment which charges an offense in the language of the statute is deemed sufficient when the words of the statute so far particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused is apprised of the precise offense with which he is charged. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Indictment And Information k 110(3)

Counts of information were stated in terms of forgery statute under which defendant was charged and were sufficient, notwithstanding that there were no allegations as to who was defrauded or how the checks were capable of defrauding another, where counts did allege that defendant delivered

documents, the described checks, which were apparently capable of defrauding in that the checks purported to have been made by another. People v. Varellas, App. 2 Dist.1985, 93 Ill.Dec. 287, 138 Ill.App.3d 820, 486 N.E.2d 388, appeal denied, habeas corpus denied, affirmed 985 F.2d 563, rehearing denied. Indictment And Information k 110(15)

Where information charging forgery by delivery followed language of this paragraph that defined offense, and this paragraph sufficiently particularizedoffense so as to advise defendant of precise nature of charges against him, information was sufficient. People v. Hockaday, 1982, 66 Ill.Dec. 640, 93 Ill.2d 279, 443 N.E.2d 566. Indictment And Information k 110(15)

Forgery indictment which was in language of this section was sufficient in charging that check purported to have been signed by specified person as drawer, and that defendant knew check was made and signed by another, without otherwise making mention of unlawfulness relating to signature of purported drawer. People v. Dzielski, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 581, 264 N.E.2d 426. Indictment And Information k 110(15)

Alleged failure of indictment to contain formal language prescribed in 1870 Constitution would not invalidate forgery conviction, where such requirements were entirely absent from judicial article (Const.1870, Art. 6) which became effective on January 1, 1964. People v. Haynes, App.1966, 73 Ill.App.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 489. Indictment And Information k 17

An indictment which follows the language of the statute, and charges that defendant falsely and feloniously altered and changed a chattel mortgage, necessarily includes the element of a want of lawful authority, and is sufficient. People v. Cotton, 1911, 95 N.E. 283, 250 Ill. 338. Indictment AndInformation k 110(15) 51. ---- Checks, generally, sufficiency of indictment

Forgery indictment charging defendant with delivering, with intent to defraud,a document purporting to be a "State of Illinois Government check," sufficiently charged offense for forgery even though there was a misnomer in describing the allegedly forged instrument, in that such instrument was a

warrant rather than a check. People v. Davis, App. 3 Dist.1979, 27 Ill.Dec. 724, 71 Ill.App.3d 662, 389 N.E.2d 955. Forgery k 28(4)

Forgery indictment which described check as being of certain date, made payable to specified person in specified sum and drawn on specified bank, and charged that check was purportedly made and signed as drawer by certain named person was sufficient, without number of check or color, number of account, orother descriptive features. People v. Dzielski, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 581,264 N.E.2d 426. Forgery k 28(1)

Indictment charging that defendant forged a check of designated date, drawn onnamed bank for stated amount purporting to have been executed by named drawer for payment of money to defendant under a different name with intent to prejudice, damage, and defraud drawer, met the requirements of Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed). People v. Grass, 1947, 75 N.E.2d 756, 398 Ill. 364. Forgery k 26

An indictment charging that accused feloniously and fraudulently uttered and passed to named person as true and genuine a false and forged bank check, knowing the check to be false and forged, with intent thereby to prejudice anddefraud the named person, was sufficient to charge offense of "forgery". People v. Lantz, 1944, 55 N.E.2d 78, 387 Ill. 72. Forgery k 26

An indictment for forging a certificate on a check purported to have been madeby "W. W. Raymond, Teller," was not insufficient for failing to charge that hewas the drawee bank's teller. People v. Wilmot, 1912, 98 N.E. 973, 254 Ill. 554. Forgery k 29(4) 52. ---- Checks, capable of defrauding, sufficiency of indictment

Counts of indictment charging defendant with knowingly delivering to bank documents apparently capable of defrauding another, in that they were checks signed by makers other than defendant, was sufficient to fully apprise defendant of charged forgeries, despite defendant's contention that prosecution failed to explain in summary fashion why documents were apparentlycapable of defrauding another. People v. Carroll, App. 4 Dist.1994, 197 Ill.Dec. 213, 258 Ill.App.3d 371, 630 N.E.2d 1337, appeal denied 205 Ill.Dec. 171, 157 Ill.2d 508, 642 N.E.2d 1288. Indictment And Information k 101

Indictment, which charged defendant with delivering check that on its face waspurportedly signed by one with authority in whose name account was maintained and that was made payable to store where defendant presented it, sufficiently charged crime of forgery in that check as presented by defendant was already capable of defrauding and no further allegations concerning defendant's signing of name of another on both sides of check were necessary. People v. Mays, App. 3 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235. Forgery k 26 53. ---- Checks, bank's name, sufficiency of indictment

If the forged instrument is a check, a description of the instrument set forthin the indictment must identify, inter alia, the drawee bank. People v. Davis, App. 3 Dist.1979, 27 Ill.Dec. 724, 71 Ill.App.3d 662, 389 N.E.2d 955. Forgery k 28(1)

An indictment charging forgery of a certification of a check drawn "on the Night and Day Bank," and setting out a copy of the check, and of the forged certificate, which showed the name of the bank, sufficiently describes and alleges the existence of the bank. People v. Wilmot, 1912, 98 N.E. 973, 254 Ill. 554. Forgery k 29(5) 54. ---- Checks, payee's name, sufficiency of indictment

Indictment naming maker and drawee and amount but failing to describe, identify or even acknowledge existence of payee did not sufficiently charge offense of forgery of a check, inasmuch as the omission resulted in failure todescribe a "check." People v. Holloman, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 822, 333 N.E.2d 509, reversed 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456. Forgery k 28(1)

That check itself, showing name of payee, was introduced into evidence at preliminary hearing held two days prior to indictment and that record of trialwas replete with references to name of payee did not cure failure of indictment to name payee in forgery case. People v. Holloman, App. 2 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 822, 333 N.E.2d 509, reversed 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456. Forgery k 28(1)

Indictment for forgery was not defective for failure to indict defendant by alias allegedly used to designate defendant as payee of check forged. People

v. Grass, 1947, 75 N.E.2d 756, 398 Ill. 364. Indictment And Information k 81(5) 55. ---- Double jeopardy, sufficiency of indictment

Information which charged that defendant "with the intent to commit the offense of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and deceit, did then and there knowingly attempt to unlawfully obtain or acquire possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge contrary to the provision of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act" apprised defendant of the offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and to allow the pleading of a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. People v. Douglas,App. 1 Dist.1980, 41 Ill.Dec. 817, 86 Ill.App.3d 668, 408 N.E.2d 239. Controlled Substances k 62

Defendant's right to assert that reindictment for forgery to which he pleaded guilty was instituted in violation of his right to due process since same charges which were subject of reindictment had previously been nolle prossed in return for his making full restitution to victim of forgeries was waived byvirtue of his plea of guilty to reinstituted charges. People v. Curvin, App. 2 Dist.1980, 36 Ill.Dec. 734, 81 Ill.App.3d 481, 401 N.E.2d 575. Criminal Law k 273.4(1)

Indictment alleging that defendant, with intent to defraud, knowingly and unlawfully altered a stock certificate in such a manner that it purported to be for 5,000 shares, rather than for five shares as originally issued, and that altered certificate delivered and presented to a bank by defendant as collateral for a loan was sufficient in detail to inform defendant of charges against him and to bar a second prosecution for same offense, and fact that forged instrument was not set out in haec verba or by facsimile was not fatal. People ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 1969, 42 Ill.2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 225. Forgery k 28(2); Indictment And Information k 71.4(4) 56. ---- Surplusage, sufficiency of indictment

Word "counterfeit" was surplusage and could be disregarded in indictment for forgery charging that defendant had "counterfeited" handwriting of third person, where balance of indictment charged all elements essential to offense and, therefore, fact that defendant had made no attempt to actually copy or imitate third person's signature would not preclude proof of forgery under indictment. People v. Armes, 1963, 28 Ill.2d 83, 190 N.E.2d 812. Indictment And Information k 167

In indictment for uttering and passing forged check, allegation that credit was thereby obtained was surplusage. People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Indictment And Information k 119

An averment that a forged county collector's book was at the time of the offense in the office of the county treasurer is surplusage, and need not be proved. Loehr v. People, 1890, 24 N.E. 68, 132 Ill. 504. Forgery k 34(1) 57. Defenses

In prosecution for forgery, proof that defendant was a chronic alcoholic was not sufficient to raise issue of criminal responsibility. People v. Hibbler, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101. Criminal Law k 739(5)

Defendant's alleged amnesia concerning incident in which he forged endorsementon check did not warrant conclusion that he was not responsible for his acts at time of forgery. People v. Hibbler, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 263, 274 N.E.2d101. Criminal Law k 570(1)

Restitution, promised or performed, is not defense to theft or forgery. People v. Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990, rehearing denied 88 S.Ct. 17, 389 U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Forgery k 20; Larceny k 26

Where neither trial court, state's attorney, public defender, parole officers,nor defendant himself ever raised issue of defendant's insanity at time of commission of forgery or of defendant's competency during his three appearances in open court, record fell short of raising bona fide doubt of mental capacity of defendant and was insufficient to require trial court to

initiate insanity hearing. People v. Haynes, App.1966, 73 Ill.App.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 489. Criminal Law k 625.10(4)

In forgery prosecution, it is no defense that accused's employer, who finally paid the instrument forged by accused, as indebted to accused, and that accused intended to devote the money obtained through the instrument to the payment of the debt. People v. Meyer., 1919, 124 N.E. 447, 289 Ill. 184. Forgery k 5 58. Statute of limitations

Statute of limitations does not run against forgery, hence, in a prosecution for forgery of a warrant on the treasurer of a school board, that defendant had been convicted and punished by imprisonment in a penitentiary for nearly eight years for forging other warrants issued upon the treasurer was not ground for reversing his conviction. People v. Dougherty, 1914, 107 N.E. 695,266 Ill. 420. Criminal Law k 1186.1 59. Guilty plea--In general

Accused, who pled guilty to forgery, was not prejudiced on theory that plea negotiation was not timely disclosed to judge where judge openly concurred in plea agreement and where neither accused nor his retained counsel indicated dissatisfaction or lack of understanding with regard to negotiations. People v. Vronch, App. 2 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 689, 308 N.E.2d 58. Criminal Law k 273.1(2)

Indictments for forgery of orders by a school board corporation for the payment of money, which set out in haec verba the orders on which each indictment was based, and which charge in the various counts thereof that accused forged the orders, forged the indorsement of the payee, and that he uttered the instruments, were based on R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 105(see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277; repealed) and no count was based on <section> 107 (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 279; repealed), defining the uttering of a fictitious instrument for the payment ofmoney of a corporation which was not in existence, and under a plea of guilty to each of the instruments the court could enter one judgment in each case.

People v. Dougherty, 1910, 92 N.E. 929, 246 Ill. 458. Criminal Law k 980(1) 60. ---- Advisement, guilty plea

Where defendant was not advised of the nature of the charge and the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by law for forgery prior to the waiver of indictment, the defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty as well as his waiver of indictment. People v. Casley, App. 3 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 1001, 313 N.E.2d 477. Criminal Law k 274(3.1); Indictment And Information k 5

Sentence imposed upon defendant, following his guilty plea to forgery charge, where neither offer nor rejection of counsel was made during sentencing process would be set aside as imposed without effective waiver of counsel eventhough defendant, who had no counsel at any time, expressly waived his right thereto at an earlier stage of the proceedings. People v. Gillen, App. 5 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 134, 312 N.E.2d 644. Sentencing And Punishment k 400

Contention that accused was not properly admonished, prior to entering guilty plea to forgery, as to nature of charge, maximum and minimum sentence and thatthere would not be a trial of any kind if he pleaded guilty was without foundation in record. People v. Vronch, App. 2 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 689, 308 N.E.2d 58. Criminal Law k 1116 61. ---- Voluntariness, guilty plea

Evidence that defendant was present in court when State's attorney explained to court that extent of plea arrangement was that they agreed to nolle two pending counts of theft and a bail bond violation in exchange for defendant's plea of guilty to three counts of forgery, that defendant was properly admonished as to consequences of his plea and that defendant indicated he understood he could receive consecutive sentences for three forgery charges sufficiently indicated that defendant entered a voluntary plea of guilty. People v. Curvin, App. 2 Dist.1980, 36 Ill.Dec. 734, 81 Ill.App.3d 481, 401 N.E.2d 575. Criminal Law k 273.1(5)

Record in forgery prosecution established that defendant's plea of guilty was voluntarily entered only after full compliance by trial court with requirements of ch. 110A, <section> 402. People v. Anderson, App. 4 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 683, 327 N.E.2d 342. Criminal Law k 273.1(5)

In prosecution for forgery, defendant, a heroin addict who had been without medication for three weeks, failed to substantiate his assertion that physicaland mental coercion caused him to plead guilty, since there was no evidence that at the time of his plea defendant was suffering from withdrawal symptoms or that his behavior was other than normal. People v. Barnes, App. 2 Dist.1974, 20 Ill.App.3d 71, 312 N.E.2d 378. Criminal Law k 273.1(5)

Record established that defendant pleading guilty to forgery of check well understood nature of offense with which he was charged and to which he desiredto plead guilty and that court complied with requirement of ch. 110A, <section> 402, before accepting guilty plea, though court did not specificallyinquire about whether any force or threats had been used against defendant. People v. Gratton, App. 2 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 503, 311 N.E.2d 717. Criminal Law k 264; Criminal Law k 273.1(5) 62. ---- Sufficiency of indictment, guilty plea

Forgery indictment pertaining to a guest registration card, a restaurant checkand a balance statement was void for failure to allege manner in which items were capable of defrauding, and conviction thereunder could not be upheld, even though defendant had pleaded guilty. People v. Dismore, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151. Forgery k 29(2)

Information charging three counts of forgery was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon trial court to either accept plea of guilty or to impose criminal sanction where recitals therein did not describe completed check or document which would be capable of defrauding another in that name or existence of a payee was omitted. People v. Gilmore, App. 3 Dist.1975, 28 Ill.App.3d 130, 328 N.E.2d 53, reversed 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456. Forgeryk 28(1)

Complaint, which purported to charge forgery based on delivery of two checks, which failed to have copies of the instruments attached, which identified only

two parties to the instruments, i.e., maker and payee, and which failed to setforth the name of a drawee bank did not sufficiently identify forged instrument as an instrument apparently capable of defrauding another, thus depriving court of jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea and to enter a judgment of conviction. People v. Teichler, App. 2 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 292, 311 N.E.2d 422. Forgery k 28(1)

Instrument which was described in information charging forgery and which omitted amount and payee, could not be a "check" and could not be a "document capable of defrauding another" unless extrinsic facts were averred giving it such character, and, in absence of averment, information failed to charge an offense and conviction could not be upheld, even though whole record showed that check, in fact, was for a particular amount and even though defendant hadentered a plea of guilty to offense. People v. Moats, App. 3 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285. Forgery k 29(2) 63. ---- Multiple counts, guilty plea

Where defendant pleaded guilty to making a document apparently capable of defrauding another, conviction on plea of guilty to second count charging knowingly delivering such document with intent to defraud could not stand. People v. Oliva, App. 4 Dist.1975, 30 Ill.App.3d 194, 332 N.E.2d 56. Criminal Law k 29(5.5)

Prisoner who had been charged in information with uttering fictitious check and who had waived indictment and pleaded guilty to crime charged in information after court had read applicable statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, ch. 38, <section> 279; repealed) to him twice and explained range of possible penalties before accepting plea of guilty, was not entitled to have sentence voided on sole ground that clerk of court, in expanding judgment order in record, had erroneously recited that charge was burglary and larceny. People v. Michael, 1961, 23 Ill.2d 338, 178 N.E.2d 309. Criminal Law k 995(1) 64. Conduct of trial--In general

Trial court's failure to question venire panel regarding potential prejudicial

effect of venireperson's statements that he was a correctional officer and that he knew defendant did not constitute plain error in trial for forgery; venireperson did not state how he knew defendant or whether he met defendant in his capacity as correctional officer, each prospective juror was questionedextensively about ability to be fair and impartial and to keep open mind untilall evidence had been presented, and trial court instructed jurors as to law and that they were to decide case only on evidence presented in court. People v. Hunter, App. 2 Dist.2002, 265 Ill.Dec. 342, 331 Ill.App.3d 1017, 772 N.E.2d380. Criminal Law k 1035(6)

Court's statement, made before entering judgment in bench trial for forgery, to the effect that it was unexplained why defendant's husband, who allegedly could have corroborated defendant's denial of check forgery, had not been presented as witness did not indicate that the failure of the defendant's husband to testify was a substantial factor leading to the conviction in lightof otherwise unrebutted testimony of two witnesses to the effect that they observed defendant write the check in question. People v. Tervin, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 409, 318 N.E.2d 656. Criminal Law k 254.3

Where defendant was referred to by the wrong name throughout presentation of state's case against him for offense of attempted forgery without objection being raised by the defense, and where it was not until defense presented its sole witness that defendant's true name was disclosed to the jury on direct examination, the misnaming resulted in no substantial injustice to defendant. People v. Watson, 1966, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645. Criminal Law k 1165(1)

In prosecution against matron of county home for forging indorsements to county warrants, court's erroneous remark that witness had asked matron if shewent into rear entrance of witness' store at designated time, whereas in fact chairman of committee of board of supervisors in charge of county home had been asked such question, was not prejudicial, where remark passed unnoticed

by matron's counsel. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 1166.22(4.1)

In prosecution for uttering, publishing, and possessing alleged forged note, permitting jury to take to jury room a book containing samples of handwriting of deceased maker was prejudicial error where book contained matter which was not for jury's examination and which was in contradiction to testimony of defendant and her daughter. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 858(3)

Permitting jury to take to jury room indictment containing nolled counts in forgery case was improper. People v. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Criminal Law k 858(3) 65. ---- Right to jury trial, conduct of trial

Denial of requested jury trial to person charged with contempt for filing spurious will for probate and sentenced to imprisonment for 24 months was error under U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 3, <section> 2; Amends. 5, 6, 14. Bloom v. State of Ill., U.S.Ill.1968, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 391 U.S. 194, 20 L.Ed.2d 522. Jury k 24.5 66. ---- Effective assistance of counsel, conduct of trial

Trial counsel in forgery prosecution was not ineffective in failing to call witness who allegedly would have testified that defendant had made fraudulent purchases to ease her family's poverty; counsel could have reasonably concluded as matter of trial strategy that witness' testimony would not have helped, as type of purchases made cast doubt on defendant's claim. People v. Jordan, App. 3 Dist.1991, 154 Ill.Dec. 767, 209 Ill.App.3d 983, 568 N.E.2d 988 . Criminal Law k 641.13(6)

Attorney's involvement as prosecutor of defendant in burglary prosecution and later involvement as appointed defense counsel in forgery case resulted in conflict of interest situation inasmuch as forgery convictions resulted in revocation of probation which defendant received on burglary conviction;

thus, in light of such potential conflict of interest, appeal from burglary conviction was remanded for appointment of counsel, if desired by defendant, free from any taint of conflict of interest for purpose of permitting defendant to file motion to withdraw pleas of guilty to forgery charges. People v. Hoskins, App. 3 Dist.1979, 29 Ill.Dec. 848, 73 Ill.App.3d 739, 392 N.E.2d 405. Criminal Law k 641.5(1) 67. ---- Indigents' right to expert witness, conduct of trial

Handwriting analysis was still relevant and probative in prosecution for delivery of forged document after state amended charge to delete allegation that defendant had signed note and, thus, trial court erroneously impeded defendant's ability to present defense by not providing indigent defendant with handwriting analysis; handwriting analysis could have forced state to rely solely on circumstantial evidence rather than using alleged admissions that defendant wrote note in question, and could have weakened credibility of state's witnesses. People v. Dickerson, App. 4 Dist.1992, 179 Ill.Dec. 930, 239 Ill.App.3d 951, 606 N.E.2d 762. Costs k 302.2(2)

Where indigent defendant was charged with attempting to commit forgery by delivery of forged traveler's check, defendant had constitutional right to be allotted by state reasonable fee for purpose of hiring expert document examiner to testify to analysis of defendant's handwriting as compared with forged indorsement on traveler's check. People v. Watson, 1966, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645. States k 111 68. ---- Arguments and conduct of counsel, conduct of trial

Prosecutor's opening and closing argument references to "scheme" that forgery defendant was involved with to make money at expense of bank did not improperly and prejudicially imply that defendant was part of large scheme to defraud banks; "scheme" was defined by dictionary as plan reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension, and evidence was introduced that defendant presented check containing forged endorsement and fabricated work identification card to bank, that check was created from stolen check writing machine, and that check was drawn on accountwhich had been closed for more than 11 years. People v. Carr, App. 1

Dist.1992, 167 Ill.Dec. 274, 225 Ill.App.3d 170, 587 N.E.2d 543. Criminal Lawk 722.5

Clearly sufficient evidence existed to prove defendant guilty of forgery beyond reasonable doubt, and thus, reversible error resulting from prosecutor's closing argument remarks drawing attention to defendant's failureto testify required remand for new trial; salesman, who received forged treasury check in exchange for car, made unusually strong identification of defendant, and document examiner testified that defendant's handwriting samples and endorsement on the check were written by the same person. People v. Tate, App. 3 Dist.1987, 109 Ill.Dec. 140, 156 Ill.App.3d 950, 509 N.E.2d 801. Criminal Law k 1189

State's improper comments regarding failure of defendant to call witness, who was unavailable to defense and prosecution, to testify that defendant did not know check she cashed was forged constituted reversible error as witness' testimony would have been relevant to crucial issue of defendant's knowledge of forgery; thus, State's comment substantially prejudiced defendant. Peoplev. Wills, App. 2 Dist.1986, 104 Ill.Dec. 278, 151 Ill.App.3d 418, 502 N.E.2d 775. Criminal Law k 1171.1(5)

In prosecution for forgery and pledging fraudulent stock, prosecutor's argument during summation that defendant, when in need of money, used blank stock certificates to issue duplicate stock which he pledged for collateral for loan was based on reasonable inferences from evidence and was not prejudicial to defendant. People v. Young, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609. Criminal Law k 720(7.1)

Where defendant's opening statement conceded that defendant made and deliveredforged check but that it was not intended to defraud, fact that state's attorney had given notice of oral confession, which was never introduced into evidence, did not render denial of motion for directed verdict at close of state's evidence plain error requiring reversal on theory that knowledge of alleged confession might have improperly influenced trial court on motion for a directed verdict. People v. White, App.1971, 130 Ill.App.2d 775, 267 N.E.2d129. Criminal Law k 1035(1)

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine with intent to defraud bank, defendant was not prejudiced by action of assistant state's attorney in offering bonds in evidence by referring to them as counterfeit bonds where evidence was uncontradicted that bonds were spurious. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Criminal Law k 706(6)

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine with intent to defraud bank, to which defendant applied for loan on security of bonds, references made by assistant state's attorney to other bonds acquired by bank in connection with another loan as being stolen and statements relative to defendant's trying to withdraw them from bank before a certain date to avoid discovery of his possession were not prejudicial, where acceptance of debenture bonds would have given defendant possession of other bonds before date when bank would clip coupons and send them through for collection. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Criminal Law k 722.5

In forgery prosecution against matron of county home for forging indorsements to county warrants, remarks of state's attorney that people had been placed ata disadvantage in not knowing in advance what matron's defense would be, and that evidence would have been found to rebut matron's testimony that she had paid proceeds of warrants to persons who were dead at time of trial, were improper, since matron was not bound to state in advance what defense the testimony of her witnesses would tend to prove. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 713

In forgery prosecution, statement of prosecuting attorney in argument that expert witness for defendant had "testified for the defense as a handwriting expert in the Loeb-Leopold case, but I say to you gentlemen of the jury, what price glory when a man will sell his services in that kind of case, with little Bobby Franks mutilated and lying in his grave," was prejudicial error which was not cured by sustaining of defendant's objection to such statement. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 730(14)

In forgery prosecution, argument which was invitation to jury to conclude thatruling was erroneous which upheld defendant's objection to prosecution's offerto make demonstrations and tests before jury to determine whether there were carbon marks under alleged forged signature was prejudicial error which was not cured by sustaining of defendant's objection to such argument. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 730(5)

In prosecution for uttering, publishing, and passing alleged forged note, prosecution's development before jury of fact that probate court had disallowed defendant's claim on such note against maker's estate, was prejudicial error. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Judgment k 648 69. Burden of proof--In general

To obtain conviction for forgery, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that person, with intent to defraud, knowingly makes, alters, issues, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver, a document apparently capable of defrauding another in such a manner that it purports to have been made by another. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1992, 167 Ill.Dec. 274, 225 Ill.App.3d 170, 587 N.E.2d 543. Forgery k 4

It is not required that someone be actually defrauded to sustain conviction for forgery, nor did this paragraph require proof that defendant lacked authority to sign name which was on check or that such name was name of a fictitious person. People v. Eston, App. 4 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 448, 49 Ill.App.3d 747, 364 N.E.2d 609. Forgery k 6; Forgery k 8; Forgery k 14

In prosecution for forgery, defendant had initial obligation of controverting state's case by the equivalent of prima facie proof of his affirmative defensethat he did not possess requisite mental state to make him accountable for alleged offense because of his chronic addiction to alcohol; had defendant done so, state would have been required to assume burden of proving defendant guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kaylor, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 964, 267 N.E.2d 710. Criminal Law k 332

The similitude which must exist between a forged instrument and the genuine, to make it apparently capable of defrauding, need only be such that the court can say that a reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into acceptingthe same as true and genuine; but the forged instrument need not be so skillfully executed as to require an expert to detect its falsity. Goodman v.People, 1907, 81 N.E. 830, 228 Ill. 154. Forgery k 11 70. ---- Knowledge, burden of proof

It must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused knew that instrument was forged, before a forgery conviction can stand. People v. Mager, App. 5 Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 306, 341 N.E.2d 389. Forgery k 44(3)

Knowledge that the check was not authentic must clearly be proven in order to convict the defendant of forgery. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255. Forgery k 44(.5)

71. ---- Intent to defraud, burden of proof

In prosecution for passing forged county order, it was incumbent upon People to prove that accused signed other's name to order and passed it to bank with intent to defraud. People v. Bailey, 1958, 15 Ill.2d 18, 153 N.E.2d 584. Forgery k 35

To constitute forgery it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the forgery was committed with intent to defraud some named person. People v. Ernst, 1923, 138 N.E. 116, 306 Ill. 452. Forgery k 5 72. ---- Authority of another person, burden of proof

In order to establish forgery, State was not required to prove that defendant did not have authority to use another's name when endorsing checks. People v.Varellas, App. 2 Dist.1985, 93 Ill.Dec. 287, 138 Ill.App.3d 820, 486 N.E.2d 388, appeal denied, habeas corpus denied, affirmed 985 F.2d 563, rehearing denied. Forgery k 6

In a prosecution for forgery of a village bond, the state was not required to allege and prove that the persons whose names appeared on the bond were

officers of the village duly authorized to sign such bonds. People v. Adams, 1921, 132 N.E. 765, 300 Ill. 20, error dismissed 43 S.Ct. 249, 260 U.S. 759, 67 L.Ed. 500. Forgery k 12(3) 73. Admissibility of evidence--In general

Conduct from which jury might reasonably infer that defendant sought to flee when transaction was questioned was admissible in forgery prosecution to show consciousness of guilt. People v. Eston, App. 4 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 448, 49Ill.App.3d 747, 364 N.E.2d 609. Criminal Law k 351(3)

Fact that bill of particulars made no mention of drafts representing proceeds of allegedly forged note and that it indicated that date of offense was date of the note, did not bar admissibility of drafts or preclude cross-examinationof defendant relative to possibilities of his having taken note to bank on some other date; coming as it did on cross-examination and as part of the State's rebuttal to alibi defense, it was properly considered with relation tocredibility and trustworthiness of alibi testimony. People v. Custer, App. 5 Dist.1972, 11 Ill.App.3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753. Indictment And Information k 121.5

Where defendant was charged with attempt to commit forgery by passing one of aseries of stolen traveler's checks on forged indorsement, and where, after defendant was in custody, another check of the stolen series was allegedly cashed, defendant should have been allowed to offer evidence as to the passingof the later forged check. People People v. Watson, 1966, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221N.E.2d 645. Forgery k 37

Failure to read county warrants to jury was not prejudicial to defendant accused of forging indorsements thereon, where defendant admitted that she indorsed payee's name on the warrants and warrants were not taken to jury room. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 1168(2)

In a prosecution for forgery, evidence of embezzlement of employer's funds

subsequent to the forgery charged in the indictment was inadmissible. It was not error to receive in evidence a check indorsed by wife of accused on the theory that she was incompetent to testify, since her connection with the check was wholly immaterial to the issue on trial. Reception of checks havingno material bearing on issues was error. Testimony of experts as to method inwhich accused handled checks was properly received. People v. Moone, 1929, 166 N.E. 481, 334 Ill. 590.

In a prosecution for forgery and uttering a forged note, testimony, relative to a certain "deal," which the state failed to show had any bearing upon the guilt or innocence of defendant, was inadmissible. People v. De Vore, 1915, 110 N.E. 850, 271 Ill. 27. Forgery k 37

On trial of an indictment for forgery, evidence of a stenographer that she made the copy of the forged instrument from the original handed to her for that purpose, that she compared it with the state's attorney by first reading the original to him while he held the copy, and then by reading the copy to him while he held the original, and that the copy was true and correct, was sufficient prima facie that the copy offered in evidence was a true copy of the instrument alleged to have been forged. Cross v. People, 1901, 61 N.E. 400, 192 Ill. 291. Criminal Law k 403 74. ---- Documents, admissibility of evidence

Forged financial document admitted into evidence in forgery prosecution was sufficiently authenticated as document which defendant had transmitted by facsimile machine to officer in commercial real estate firm with which he was negotiating lease, based on testimony of operator of facsimile machine that document had been sent from her store and that store's facsimile machine was operating properly at time document was transmitted, as well as by testimony of officer in real estate firm that document had been delivered to his desk byhis secretary on same date that document was transmitted. People v. Hagan,

1991, 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Criminal Law k 444

In prosecution of husband and wife for forgery, driver's license application which had been taken from wife when she was placed in county jail and which had been signed with same name as allegedly forged check was relevant and admissible with respect to the wife. People v. Petty, App. 4 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 975, 295 N.E.2d 275. Forgery k 42

In prosecution of husband and wife for forgery, admission against wife only ofdriver's license application which had been taken from her effects when she was placed in jail and which had been signed with same name as allegedly forged check was not prejudicial with respect to husband where trial court instructed that exhibit was admitted solely as to the wife and should be disregarded as to the husband. People v. Petty, App. 4 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 975, 295 N.E.2d 275. Criminal Law k 1169.5(2)

Submission, for consideration as evidence by jury in forgery prosecution, of check containing words "suspect forgery" was reversible error where quoted words were not on check at time it was used by alleged forger, no attempt was made to explain presence of notation or any warning given jury to disregard notation despite defense counsel's objection at introduction of check and prosecuting attorney admitted that words were inflammatory and suggested that they be blocked out. People v. Goetz, App. 3 Dist.1973, 9 Ill.App.3d 691, 292N.E.2d 435. Criminal Law k 858(3); Criminal Law k 1174(6)

In prosecution for forgery, witness' identification of "People's Exhibit No. 1" as forged check given to him by defendant made unnecessary any proof of chain of possession of the fraudulent check. People v. Kaylor, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 964, 267 N.E.2d 710. Criminal Law k 444

In prosecution for forgery of note, checks bearing genuine signature of prosecuting witness and related in point of time to making of note was admissible as standards by which to compare questioned signature. People v. Jung, 1934, 193 N.E. 467, 358 Ill. 488. Criminal Law k 491(1)

An indictment for forgery, setting out the instrument in haec verba, is not

equivalent to a profert of the instrument, so as to require the production of it; and a copy is admissible in evidence when the proper foundation is laid, though the indictment does not count on a lost instrument or one the people cannot produce. Cross v. People, 1901, 61 N.E. 400, 192 Ill. 291. Criminal Law k 403 75. ---- Copies of documents, admissibility of evidence

Recordak facsimiles of checks in order to be admissible in prosecution for forgery must be competent as evidence whether they are offered as evidence of forgery or as primary proof of the records of the bank to show intention of the accused. People v. Wells, 1942, 44 N.E.2d 32, 380 Ill. 347. Criminal Lawk 438(8)

In prosecution for forgery of drawer's signature on checks, recordak facsimiles of other checks allegedly forged by accused introduced for the purpose of showing intention of the accused were inadmissible under the "best evidence" rule in the absence of showing warranting their admission as "secondary evidence", and the admission of such evidence was not harmless error. People v. Wells, 1942, 44 N.E.2d 32, 380 Ill. 347. Criminal Law k 402(1); Criminal Law k 1169.10 76. ---- Handwriting samples, admissibility of evidence

Where state intended to produce witness to testify that defendant signed traveler's check in witness' presence and then attempted to transfer the instrument on the forged indorsement, issue of handwriting on the check went to heart of defense, regardless of fact that indictment charged defendant withattempting to commit forgery by delivery of a forged check, which did not technically raise the handwriting issue, and defendant was entitled to introduce evidence on the issue of his handwriting as compared with the forgedindorsement on the check. People v. Watson, 1966, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645. Forgery k 37

An offer by defendant to write the name alleged to be forged for the purpose of comparison by the jury was properly refused. People v. Rosenbaum, 1921, 132 N.E. 433, 299 Ill. 93. Criminal Law k 404(5)

77. ---- Alibi, admissibility of evidence

Evidence on issue of whether defendant was out of town on date specified in indictment as day on which defendant allegedly delivered forged note to bank loan officer supported conviction of forgery by knowingly delivering a document knowing it to have been made apparently capable of defrauding another. People v. Custer, App. 5 Dist.1972, 11 Ill.App.3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753 . Criminal Law k 572

On issue of alibi, dentist's records showing defendant in prosecution for forgery on alleged day of crime had X-rays taken in office was incompetent evidence of facts stated therein. People v. Greenspawn, 1931, 179 N.E. 98, 346 Ill. 484. Criminal Law k 434

On issue of alibi, excluding X-ray pictures of defendant's teeth in prosecution for forgery, X-ray technician and dentist testifying to taking thereof on day of alleged crime was error. People v. Greenspawn, 1931, 179 N.E. 98, 346 Ill. 484. Criminal Law k 438(8) 78. ---- Statements of accused, admissibility of evidence

Admission of defendant's admission to a State's witness that he had served time for forgery was not an abuse of discretion since admission established that defendant intended to defraud the victim of the forgery charge in the case and that he knowingly made a check which was apparently capable of defrauding another. People v. Stout, App. 2 Dist.1982, 63 Ill.Dec. 810, 108 Ill.App.3d 96, 438 N.E.2d 952. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(5)

Where, at forgery trial, a bank loan officer testified that, in connection with a loan to defendant, the officer received a call from defendant indicating that he was in the process of driving back from his brother's home with his brother's signature cosigning promissory note, and where defense counsel then objected to this testimony because defendant's oral statements were not disclosed in discovery, defense counsel's objection was, under the circumstances, timely. People v. DeBord, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 672, 61 Ill.App.3d 239, 377 N.E.2d 1308. Criminal Law k 693

In prosecution against matron of county home for forging indorsement to countywarrants payable to employee of home, testimony of witnesses who had heard reading of matron's affidavit at hearing before board of supervisors, stating that signatures were genuine and were not signed by matron, were admissible toprove that matron had made prior statements inconsistent with matron's subsequent admission that she indorsed employee's name on warrants. People v.Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Witnesses k 393(1)

In forgery prosecution, statements of defendant regarding other instruments ofsame kind supposedly uttered by him are inadmissible. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Criminal Law k 369.4

In prosecution against operator of grocery store for forgery of grocery order ostensibly issued to such store by public welfare bureau and bearing forged signature of former relief client, subsequent conversations between defendant and head relief clerk as to dividing receipts on fraudulent orders were inadmissible under rule requiring exclusion of defendant's statements concerning collateral matters. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Criminal Law k 369.4

It is error to admit in evidence declarations of the defendant in respect of alleged forged instruments which are not produced to the jury or proved to be forgeries. Anson v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 145, 148 Ill. 494. Forgery k 41

On a trial for uttering a forged note and trust deed, evidence that defendant offered to a third person "a forged tax bill," which is not produced in evidence or shown to have been forged, is harmless error, where the witness does not state what defendant said, and it appears that the conversation was in regard to other matters, and it is not shown that defendant had the tax bill in his possession or was connected with its forgery, or that it was uttered or attempted to be uttered. Anson v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 145, 148 Ill. 494. Criminal Law k 1170.5(2) 79. ---- Prior inconsistent statements, admissibility of evidence

Refusal, in forgery prosecution, to allow defense counsel to call defense

witness' attention to prior inconsistent statements made by him after such witness, whose name appeared on forged drug prescription, testified that he had never seen prescription and had not gone to accused's house to have him get prescription filled for witness was an abuse of discretion, in view of witness' unwillingness to testify and fact that defense counsel was surprised by witness' testimony: and such abuse of discretion was reversible error, in that it deprived accused of only means by which he could have established his defense. People v. Mager, App. 5 Dist.1976, 35 Ill.App.3d 306, 341 N.E.2d 389 . Criminal Law k 1170.5(1); Witnesses k 380(5.1) 80. ---- Witnesses, generally, admissibility of evidence

In light of evidence as a whole, in forgery prosecution, testimony that officer at police station asked defendant whether her name was that which was on check which she presented and that she did not answer was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Eston, App. 4 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 448, 49 Ill.App.3d 747, 364 N.E.2d 609. Criminal Law k 1169.12

In forgery prosecution in which defendant claimed he had no knowledge of alleged forgery incident and that he was a chronic alcoholic, testimony of another alcoholic concerning amnestic experiences was inadmissible. People v.Hibbler, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101. Criminal Law k 360

In prosecution for uttering a fictitious check with intent to defraud, testimony of two witnesses from drawee bank that purported drawer of check hadno account in the bank and that there had never been an account in the bank inthe name of the purported drawer, and testimony of another witness that he hadchecked telephone directories in the city where the check was cashed and in the city where the bank upon which check was drawn was located, and that he had also checked the names of the subscribers of public utility companies and had failed to find the name of the purported drawer, and that he had never heard of and did not know of such a person, was competent to show nonexistenceof the purported drawer. People v. Kosearas, 1951, 102 N.E.2d 534, 410 Ill. 456. Criminal Law k 387

In prosecution for uttering a fictitious check with intent to defraud,

testimony of teller of bank which cashed the check that defendant had come to the bank later and had given teller his name and address and had advised teller that he had learned that "Martin J. Downey," the purported drawer of the check, did not have an account in the bank upon which the check was drawn,was self-serving so far as it tended to show that "Martin J. Downey" had giventhe check to the defendant, and the court properly excluded such testimony. People v. Kosearas, 1951, 102 N.E.2d 534, 410 Ill. 456. Criminal Law k 413(1)

In prosecution against matron of county home for forging indorsements to county warrants, secondary evidence of contents of matron's affidavit read at hearing before board of supervisors, and stating that signatures were genuine and were not signed by matron, was admissible, where no objection to sufficiency of notice to produce affidavit was made on trial and defendant's counsel stated that he did not have original of affidavit. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 402(2)

In prosecution for forgery, testimony of wife of accused was inadmissible. People v. Jung, 1934, 193 N.E. 467, 358 Ill. 488. Witnesses k 52(7)

Where husband was charged with forging wife's name, neither could testify as to his authority. People v. Ernst, 1923, 138 N.E. 116, 306 Ill. 452.

81. ---- Witnesses, cross-examination, admissibility of evidence

Cross-examination eliciting testimony that defendant was an attorney and bank vice president responsible for issuance of loan was proper where it was designed to cast doubt on defendant's assertion that forger never requested assistance in filling out loan application and that defendant never bothered to look over the forms which forger, who had known defendant for a period of 15 years, was signing in defendant's presence was relevant and material in regard to general credibility of defendant. People v. Christiansen, App. 3 Dist.1986, 97 Ill.Dec. 38, 142 Ill.App.3d 1050, 492 N.E.2d 241. Witnesses k 349

Defendant was not prejudiced by trial court's limitation of his cross-examination of authorized signator of checks concerning his financial

status, where evidence sought to be admitted was irrelevant to whether authorized signator had given defendant authority to write check in June, and where large portion of image of witness that defendant hoped to convey to jury, that is, that signator was spendthrift, overextended, and had motive to testify against defendant in forgery prosecution, was actually conveyed. People v. Dowdy, App. 2 Dist.1986, 94 Ill.Dec. 933, 140 Ill.App.3d 631, 488 N.E.2d 1326. Criminal Law k 1170.5(1)

Where defendant had testified on direct examination concerning conversation with police officer, but limited testimony to what had happened to a prior check given to him by the payee of forged check, although defendant had also told officer about possibility of defendant's companion having written check and why he had left drive-in facility at bank before completing transaction with forged check, prosecutor was entitled to place before jury rest of conversation which concerned defendant's driving around with his companion while companion "boosted," that is, shoplifted clothes. People v. Futia, App.4 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 177, 116 Ill.App.3d 68, 452 N.E.2d 109. Criminal Law k 396(2)

In prosecution for forgery, where accomplice was principal state's witness, refusal to permit cross-examination of such witness as to his reasons for expecting immunity or leniency was erroneous. People v. Moshiek, 1926, 153 N.E. 720, 323 Ill. 11. Witnesses k 372(2) 82. ---- Witnesses, rebuttal testimony, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution against matron of county home for forging indorsements to county warrants, admission of rebuttal testimony that matron had entered storeof chairman of committee of board of supervisors in charge of county farm after business hours at a time when chairman had testified that he was not in store was prejudicial error, since rebuttal testimony did not contradict chairman's testimony, but merely prejudiced jury against matron and discredited chairman, particularly where state's attorney in his argument referred to chairman as "Wiggling Frank Meyer" and stated that purpose of showing that matron and chairman had been meeting together after business

hours was that they were attempting to conceal something and defeat justice. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 1169.1(2.1)

In forgery prosecution, to rebut accused's testimony that, with the proceeds of draft on his employer forged by accused, he purchased grain and placed it in an elevator for his employer, evidence was admissible of a shortage of grain in the elevator. People v. Meyer., 1919, 124 N.E. 447, 289 Ill. 184. Criminal Law k 683(1) 83. ---- Expert testimony, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for uttering alleged forged note the signature on which had been retraced, testimony of physician who had examined deceased maker's eyes that in his opinion maker could not have retraced his signature was prejudicial error as invading province of jury. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 470(2)

In prosecution for uttering alleged forged note the signature on which had been retraced, physician could testify as to physical condition of deceased maker and condition of his vision, but could not express opinion as to whethermaker could have retraced his signature on note. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 470(2); Criminal Law k 473

In forgery prosecution, testimony of competent and unbiased handwriting experts should be subjected to same tests applicable to other witnesses, notwithstanding that evidence of such experts may be helpful to both court andjury. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 494 84. ---- Identification of defendant, admissibility of evidence

Testimony that officer received defendant's mug shot from United States PostalService was admissible to explain how defendant was initially linked to crime,where identification of person who attempted to cash forged check was at issue. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1992, 167 Ill.Dec. 274, 225 Ill.App.3d 170, 587 N.E.2d 543. Criminal Law k 374

Even though witness was shown photograph of defendant, where there was no

showing that photograph was seen by witness while defendant was in custody andwhere witness had observed defendant in well lighted drugstore for 15 minutes when defendant passed forged check, witness' in-court identification of defendant as one who passed forged check had origin independent of any view ofphotograph and was properly admitted. People v. Williams, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 261, 287 N.E.2d 186. Criminal Law k 339.10(11)

Where defendant, who had not yet been indicted, voluntarily agreed to go with police to be viewed by storekeeper whom he had allegedly defrauded, and where defendant had entered the store three times in one day, had been waited on by identifying witness each time, and had stayed in store a total of almost an hour, there was an adequate basis for in-court identification, and such identification was admissible and was not denial of due process. People v. Thomas, App.1971, 132 Ill.App.2d 198, 267 N.E.2d 703. Constitutional Law k 266(3.4); Criminal Law k 339.9(2) 85. ---- Other acts, admissibility of evidence

Evidence concerning other checks cashed and attempted to be cashed was properly admitted in prosecution of defendant for issuance of a fraudulent check for limited purpose of establishing identity, intent, knowledge, or a common scheme or plan. People v. Clark, 1969, 104 Ill.App.2d 12, 244 N.E.2d 842; People v. Vammar, 1926, 320 Ill. 287, 150 N.E. 628.

Testimony and exhibits with regard to two allegedly forged checks not related to checks involved in indictment were more prejudicial than probative on issueof defendant's knowledge about checks he was charged with forging where defendant did not testify and evidence was not necessary for impeachment purposes and where other checks in no way clarified or confirmed defendant's intent or guilty knowledge, and thus evidence of other crimes, which merely served to raise impermissible inference as to defendant's propensity to negotiate stolen checks, exceeded permissible bounds and obscured issue of defendant's guilt. People v. Rodriguez, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 914, 107 Ill.App.3d 43, 437 N.E.2d 441. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(6)

In theft and forgery prosecution, evidence concerning other alleged forgeries

and thefts by defendant from his employer would have been admissible to show modus operandi. People v. Toellen, App. 3 Dist.1978, 23 Ill.Dec. 686, 66 Ill.App.3d 967, 384 N.E.2d 480. Criminal Law k 372(5); Criminal Law k 372(12)

Admission for purpose of showing intent, of two allegedly forged checks, in addition to check charged in indictment, which were both passed at direction of defendants and were cashed in a period of minutes in three different taverns in close proximity to each other was not erroneous as subsequent offenses were all part of same transaction. People v. Marks, App.1965, 63 Ill.App.2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 153, 385 U.S. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 103. Criminal Law k 369.2(4)

In prosecution for forging indorsements to county warrants, warrants were admissible to prove intent, though showing other forgeries. People v. Church,1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 371(5)

Proof of possession of other forged paper in forgery prosecution is not permitted, unless instrument is forged and possession was near enough to alleged offense to permit inference defendant intended fraud or knew instrument was spurious. People v. Greenspawn, 1931, 179 N.E. 98, 346 Ill. 484. Criminal Law k 374

In forgery prosecutions, state may prove that defendant, at about same time, possessed or tried to pass other forged checks, as showing intent and guilty knowledge. People v. Dunham, 1931, 176 N.E. 325, 344 Ill. 268. Criminal Law k 370

Evidence of other forgeries is not admissible to prove the forgery charged, but only to show guilty intent or knowledge. People v. Dunham, 1929, 166 N.E.97, 334 Ill. 516. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(5) 86. ---- Other crimes, generally, admissibility of evidence

Officer's testimony in forgery prosecution that he met with officers from various federal and state investigative agencies and departments in reference to problems with similar checks being cashed in Chicago vicinity in same manner in which defendant attempted to cash check did not improperly refer to defendant's involvement or participation in other crimes, but instead merely

indicated procedure by which police department undertook investigation of crime and circumstances leading to identification and apprehension of defendant. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1992, 167 Ill.Dec. 274, 225 Ill.App.3d 170, 587 N.E.2d 543. Criminal Law k 374

In forgery prosecution, checks that were part of batch of checks stolen in burglary in which checks specified in information were stolen were admissible since all four checks were involved in same burglary incident and since alleged forgeries of other checks had probative value on questions of defendant's knowledge and intent. People v. Rodriguez, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 914, 107 Ill.App.3d 43, 437 N.E.2d 441. Criminal Law k 369.2(6); Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(6)

In prosecution for forgery based on credit card sales draft, evidence that credit card had been stolen in burglary was probative of defendant's unauthorized use of the card and was admissible on that basis, despite defensecontention that evidence of the theft was inadmissible as evidence of prior orunrelated offense. People v. Reynolds, App. 5 Dist.1980, 40 Ill.Dec. 833, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64. Criminal Law k 369.2(3.1)

In prosecution for confidence game and for uttering a false, forged, and counterfeit check, similar offenses may be proved as tending to show guilty knowledge as well as a criminal intent before the criminal act charged. Peoplev. Chronister, 1942, 41 N.E.2d 750, 379 Ill. 617. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(3); Criminal Law k 371(5)

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine with intent to defraud bank, it was not error to admit other bonds and permit the people to prove that they were stolen bonds, where bank had acquired stolen bonds in connection with a loan made by defendant, and acceptance of debenture bonds for another loan would have given defendant possession of stolen bonds before date when bank would clip coupons and send them through for collection, since those facts showed motive. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill.50. Criminal Law k 369.4

In forgery prosecution, proof of other offenses similar to that charged, occurring at or about the same time, is admissible for purpose of proving

intent charged in indictment. People v. Moone, 1929, 166 N.E. 481, 334 Ill. 590.

Evidence of defendant's previous hypothecation of the forged instrument is admissible as tending to show his intent to pass it as genuine, and so is evidence that other forged instruments were in his possession shortly before the utterance of the one described in the indictment. Anson v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 145, 148 Ill. 494. Criminal Law k 382; Forgery k 38 87. ---- Other crimes, subsequent, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for confidence game and for uttering a false, forged, and counterfeit check, proof of offenses subsequent to date of alleged crime was contrary to presumption of innocence and could not establish guilty knowledge or intent on the prior occasion in absence of proof that defendant had formerly committed a similar offense. People v. Chronister, 1942, 41 N.E.2d 750, 379 Ill. 617. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(3); Criminal Law k 371(5)

In prosecution for confidence game and for uttering a false, forged, and counterfeit check, proof of offenses subsequent to date of alleged crime was contrary to presumption of innocence and could not establish guilty knowledge or intent on the prior occasion in absence of proof that defendant had formerly committed a similar offense. People v. Chronister, 1942, 41 N.E.2d 750, 379 Ill. 617. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(3); Criminal Law k 371(5)

Proof of similar offenses subsequent to the forgery charged is not admissible to show intent, unless there is also proof of a similar offense prior to that charged. People v. Moone, 1929, 166 N.E. 481, 334 Ill. 590. Criminal Law k 371(5)

Where defendant, in prosecution for forgery, was not shown to have previously committed similar offenses, evidence of two forgeries subsequent to that charged was improperly admitted to show intent. People v. Moshiek, 1926, 153 N.E. 720, 323 Ill. 11. Criminal Law k 370; Criminal Law k 371(5) 88. Sufficiency of evidence--In general

Defendant's convictions of forgery and mutilation of elections materials basedon alleged forging of absentee ballots for election in which defendant was successful candidate for mayor were supported by substantial evidence. People v. Lindbeck, App. 3 Dist.1990, 148 Ill.Dec. 175, 202 Ill.App.3d 831, 560 N.E.2d 477. Elections k 329; Forgery k 44(.5)

Evidence, including corroborated testimony of self-confessed criminal who had attempted to blackmail accused and others and who testified on a promise of leniency, sustained conviction of forgery. People v. Wicks, App. 4 Dist.1973,15 Ill.App.3d 318, 304 N.E.2d 134. Criminal Law k 512

Evidence, showing that wife of township tax collector issued false receipts and delivered them to county treasurer intending thereby to obtain credit on accounting for taxes by showing disbursement of tax monies to treasurer of school district and by claiming such credit on summary settlement sheet, was sufficient to support her conviction of forgery. People v. Haycraft, App.1972, 3 Ill.App.3d 974, 278 N.E.2d 877. Forgery k 44(3)

In prosecution against operator of grocery store for forgery of grocery order ostensibly issued to such store by public welfare bureau and bearing false signature of former relief client, evidence was insufficient to show that defendant committed forgery or issued forged instrument. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Forgery k 44(.5)

The person whose signature is alleged to be forged was not an indispensable witness to establish the forgery, where there was no uncertainty as to his identity. Anson v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 145, 148 Ill. 494. Forgery k 35

Upon trial for forging the signature of the county judge to a petition for a warrant of extradition, it was proved that the signature was forged by some one; that defendant was interested in procuring such warrant, and had tried to get the judge to sign the petition; that the petition was last seen in defendant's possession before it was sent to the governor; and that, when arrested for the forgery, defendant said, "I have done the whole thing, and am

willing to suffer the consequences." The jury was justified in finding him guilty. Langdon v. People, 1890, 24 N.E. 874, 133 Ill. 382. Forgery k 44(2)

Proof of one signature is sufficient when indictment is for forgery of several. Duffin v. Proper, 1883, 107 Ill. 113, 47 Am.Rep. 431.

The delivery of an apparent deed by husband to grantee for purpose of procuring satisfaction of judgment, where husband knew that it was not deed ofhis wife and was not acknowledged by her as it purported to be was of itself afalse representation and a gross fraud, and if the husband filled in the blanksigned by his wife, or caused it to be filled in by another, he was not only guilty of fraud, but of deliberate forgery. Prindiville v. Curran, 1908, 132 Ill.App. 162. 89. ---- Related offenses, sufficiency of evidence

Intent to commit theft may support forgery and theft charges involving postal money orders. People v. Butler, App. 4 Dist.1973, 12 Ill.App.3d 541, 298 N.E.2d 798. Forgery k 44(.5); Larceny k 55

The making of a forged instrument and passing it as a genuine instrument are two separate and distinct felonies, and proof of one is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the other. People v. Whitmer, 1938, 16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317, appeal dismissed 59 S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S. 667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Forgery k 34(5) 90. ---- Accountability, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence that defendant drove women companions to building where companions stole public aid check from a mailbox and that defendant voluntarily drove women to the bank, knowing that they intended to commit a forgery there, was sufficient to prove guilt of conspiracy to commit forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Charleston, App. 4 Dist.1977, 4 Ill.Dec. 709, 46 Ill.App.3d 141, 360 N.E.2d 822. Conspiracy k 47(3.1)

Where it was uncontested that it was defendant who presented check for approval to one store employee, even if third person presented check at cash

register, jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant and the third person were acting in concert, and it would be immaterial that defendant was not charged in the language of accessoryship or that the jury was not instructed in the law of accountability. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 48

Evidence, in prosecution for forgery, was sufficient to sustain conviction against defendant who, according to two accomplice witnesses, forged check which was subsequently cashed in the defendant's presence by an accomplice. People v. Tervin, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 409, 318 N.E.2d 656. Forgeryk 44(2)

On a trial for forgery, the evidence showed that one of defendants had used the forged note and trust deed as collateral for his own note, that he had in his possession the notarial seal affixed to the acknowledgment, and that afterhis arrest he stated that he had paid for having the seal made. The signatures to the note and the trust deed and the acknowledgment were all forgeries. The evidence showed said defendant's connection with the forgery, although he was not shown to have taken any part in passing the forged instruments on the person named in the indictment. Anson v. People, 1893, 35 N.E. 145, 148 Ill. 494. Forgery k 44(2) 91. ---- Circumstantial evidence, generally, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence was sufficient to support forgery conviction, as letter defendant wrote to sentencing judge asking for leniency in sentencing her on conviction for retail theft was printed on district's stationery and was apparently signed by teacher in district. People v. Muzzarelli, App. 3 Dist.2002, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 770 N.E.2d 1232, appeal denied 271 Ill.Dec. 937, 201 Ill.2d 600, 786 N.E.2d 195. Forgery k 44(2)

In forgery cases, proof must often be by circumstantial evidence. People v. Dauphin, App.1964, 53 Ill.App.2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166. Forgery k 44(.5)

Suspicious circumstances, without more conclusive evidence, are insufficient proof of guilt, as of forgery, even though defendant offers no explanation. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Forgery k 44(.5)

92. ---- Document apparently capable of defrauding, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence was sufficient for jury to find that check was apparently capable of defrauding another, even though payee portion of check was blank; under some circumstances check with blank payee portion is accepted and filled out or stamped by person receiving the check. People v. Turner, App. 2 Dist.1989, 128 Ill.Dec. 159, 179 Ill.App.3d 510, 534 N.E.2d 179, appeal denied 133 Ill.Dec. 676, 126 Ill.2d 565, 541 N.E.2d 1114. Forgery k 44(.5)

Evidence that forged instrument purporting to be judgment order against property owners' association was given to president of association who had no experience with law of legal documents and who believed that document was valid judgment order was sufficient to support finding that document was capable of defrauding another and to support defendant's conviction for forgery, even though forged document was legally defective as judgment order because it was undated, unsigned and unverified. People v. Tarkowski, App. 2 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 367, 106 Ill.App.3d 597, 435 N.E.2d 1339. Forgery k 44(2)

Unless instrument shows on its face that it is capable of defrauding, or such character is given it by extrinsic averments, forgery cannot be predicated upon it. People v. Moats, App. 3 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285.Forgery k 12(4)

A forged order for the payment of money, directed to the treasurer of the "Peoria Board of School Inspectors," and signed by order of the "Peoria Board of School Inspectors," by its secretary and president, while the corporate name of the board is "Board of School Inspectors of the City of Peoria," is sufficient to form the basis of a charge of the forgery of the order, since ifthe board legally ordered the payment of a valid claim against it, and issued its order in the form of the order forged, the payee therein could enforce payment as against the claim that the order was not issued in the proper corporate name. People v. Dougherty, 1910, 92 N.E. 929, 246 Ill. 458. Forgeryk 12(2)

93. ---- Making, sufficiency of evidence

In prosecution for forgery, proof that defendant endorsed check was sufficientproof that he "made" it, in the context of this paragraph. People v. Connell,App. 5 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 743, 91 Ill.App.3d 326, 414 N.E.2d 796. Forgeryk 44(2) 94. ---- Alteration, sufficiency of evidence

Defendant convicted of forgery failed to show possible motive or opportunity for bank employee who prepared cashier's check to alter amount of check after it had been prepared, as shown by carbon copy of check in the amount of $176, contrasted to check later drawn for amount of $176,000, and thus did not show that State failed to prove that it was defendant who altered check. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 44(3)

That accused president of insolvent corporation altered renewal note to indicate that he executed note as president, instead of as individual, was insufficient to sustain forgery conviction, where original note was executed by accused as president of corporation for corporation, and evidence did not show agreement to substitute accused's individual note for corporation's note,since alteration to make note conform to parties' intention would not constitute "forgery." People v. Reichert, 1934, 191 N.E. 220, 357 Ill. 205. Forgery k 5 95. ---- Intent to defraud, generally, sufficiency of evidence

Defendant had intent to defraud within meaning of forgery statute in connection with his falsification of labels on barrels of hazardous waste so as to make it appear that waste had been on-site less than 90 days, and therefore did not count as inventory; when defendant falsified labels, he intended to defraud Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) by causingit to assume lower amount of hazardous waste on-site than there actually was and, thus, he affected IEPA's right to monitor and regulate hazardous waste atplant. People v. Gawlak, App. 1 Dist.1995, 212 Ill.Dec. 712, 276 Ill.App.3d 286, 657 N.E.2d 1057. Forgery k 5

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had intent to defraud when he issued free airline tickets to barter companies in exchange for promotional items, and, therefore, evidence sustained conviction for forgery, even if evidence would not have been sufficient to show that defendant intended to deprive airline of its property, as essential element of theft. People v. Panagiotis, App. 1 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 125, 162 Ill.App.3d 866, 516 N.E.2d280, appeal denied 119 Ill.Dec. 393, 119 Ill.2d 569, 522 N.E.2d 1252. Forgery k 44(1)

In absence of evidence that defendant intended to defraud anyone by signing acknowledgement of receipt of certificate of conditions of probation with nameother than that under which he was charged and convicted, but name by which others knew him as well, State did not establish that acknowledgement was madeor altered by defendant in such manner that it purported to have been made by another, and thus, evidence was insufficient to establish forgery to support probation revocation. People v. Kelley, App. 3 Dist.1985, 85 Ill.Dec. 204, 129 Ill.App.3d 920, 473 N.E.2d 572. Forgery k 44(.5)

Where forged instrument is uttered, intent to defraud may be inferred, and it is immaterial whether any one is actually defrauded, if intent to defraud is shown. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Forgery k 16

Intent to damage and defraud by forgery was sufficiently shown by unexplained evidence that defendant's employers were actually defrauded. People v. Moone,1929, 166 N.E. 481, 334 Ill. 590. Forgery k 44(1)

A defendant against whom a fee bill for witness fees had been issued signed the name of one of the witnesses to a receipt for his fees. He did this without authority, but in the honest, though mistaken, belief that the witnesshad agreed to give him the fee. It did not constitute forgery, there being nointent to defraud. Kotter v. People, 1894, 37 N.E. 932, 150 Ill. 441. Forgeryk 5

96. ---- Intent to defraud, circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of evidence

Intent to defraud required by forgery statute may be inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. People v. Whitley, App. 5 Dist.1991, 162 Ill.Dec. 459, 219 Ill.App.3d 917, 579 N.E.2d 1273; People v. Meyer., 1919, 124 N.E. 447, 289 Ill. 184.

Intent to defraud by means of forged instrument may be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances, and if forged instrument is delivered, intent to defraud is presumed. People v. Eston, App. 4 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 448, 49 Ill.App.3d 747, 364 N.E.2d 609. Forgery k 35

Intent to defraud may be inferred under proper circumstances, and where forgedinstrument is uttered, the intent to defraud is presumed. People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 923, 322 N.E.2d 69. Forgery k 35

Where forged instrument is uttered, intent to defraud may be inferred from proved facts and circumstances surrounding transaction. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Forgery k 44(1)

In forgery prosecution, intent to defraud may be inferred from proved facts and circumstances, but such intent must be connected with defendant. People v. Ciralsky, 1935, 196 N.E. 733, 360 Ill. 554. Forgery k 44(1) 97. ---- Intent to defraud, checks, sufficiency of evidence

Attorney's endorsing name of co-counsel on back of client's settlement check so that attorney could promptly deposit check and begin negotiations with client's creditors did not constitute forgery, nor did it constitute dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation within meaning of disciplinary rule 1-102; there was no indication that at time of endorsement, attorney sought to deprive co-counsel of his share of attorney fees or to conceal fundsfrom co-counsel. In re Johnson, 1989, 142 Ill.Dec. 112, 133 Ill.2d 516, 552 N.E.2d 703. Attorney And Client k 38

Defendant who intended that other individuals treat forged cashier's check as genuine in order to avoid possible legal consequences of his failure to maintain client funds, by using check as "false security" for his debt to

client, failed to rebut intent element of forgery although he did not intend check as repayment. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 5

Fact that forgery defendant gave check to daughter of client, stating that check represented his own funds rather than her mother's and told her not to cash it, implying that check represented sufficient collateral for funds, and causing client to delay possible legal remedies she might have had, did not overcome presumed intent to defraud required for offense of forgery. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 35

Evidence that accused indorsed check alleged to have been forged was insufficient to prove charge of forgery. Under indictment for forgery, it hadto be proved that accused passed instrument indorsed by him with intent to prejudice person whose signature was forged. People v. Vammar, 1926, 150 N.E.628, 320 Ill. 287.

Proof that accused forged the name of the indorsee of a check, and delivered it to the secretary and treasurer of a corporation, and received from the corporation, through the secretary and treasurer, checks drawn by the corporation, and procured their payment to himself, sustains an allegation in the indictment that the forgery was with intent to prejudice, damage, and defraud the corporation. Sampson v. People, 1900, 59 N.E. 427, 188 Ill. 592. Forgery k 44(1) 98. ---- Intent to defraud, false ID, sufficiency of evidence

Defendant's convictions for forgery and attempted theft were supported by evidence that defendant was identified as the person who misidentified himselfwhen inquiring about status of credit application and location of boat dealership, who admitted to being silent partner to the actions of companion who forged name on credit application, installment contract, watercraft application and title registration form and who was present throughout series of meetings and transactions between boat sellers and individual forging name

on installment contract, watercraft application and title registration form established defendant's specific intent, both before and during forgeries, to defraud boat vendors. People v. Christiansen, App. 3 Dist.1986, 97 Ill.Dec. 38, 142 Ill.App.3d 1050, 492 N.E.2d 241. Forgery k 44(1); Larceny k 66

Defendant's use of fictitious driver's license to confirm what were clearly false signatures on back of two checks, which defendant procured for that purpose, was evidence of defendant's intent to defraud, thereby supporting hisforgery conviction; use of fictitious name was not a mere assumption of another's identity providing no evidence of guilt, where defendant was not using his own, established alias by which he had also been known for some timewhen he cashed checks, but was using fictitious identification to cash checks made payable to other parties as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise. People v. Varellas, App. 2 Dist.1985, 93 Ill.Dec. 287, 138 Ill.App.3d 820, 486N.E.2d 388, appeal denied, habeas corpus denied, affirmed 985 F.2d 563, rehearing denied. Forgery k 44(1)

Evidence that defendant sought to confirm authenticity of check by displaying crudely and obviously altered driver's license as to name, signature, date of birth and sex of person to whom license was initially issued supported conclusion of intent to defraud. People v. Eston, App. 4 Dist.1977, 7 Ill.Dec. 448, 49 Ill.App.3d 747, 364 N.E.2d 609. Forgery k 44(1) 99. ---- Intent to defraud, alcoholism or addiction, sufficiency of evidence

Defendant's statement that he was addicted to heroin at time of forgery and was under influence of drugs at time of offense did not overcome presumption of intention to defraud involved in the uttering of a forged instrument where defendant also stated that he recalled the entire incident and that we "decided that it would be safe to write a few more and they did and I cashed them." People v. Mallory, App. 1 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 561, 327 N.E.2d 62. Forgery k 35

Proof that defendant was a chronic alcoholic did not exempt him from criminal responsibility for cashing forged check in tavern on theory that he lacked requisite mental state to render him accountable for the offense. People v.

Kaylor, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 964, 267 N.E.2d 710. Criminal Law k 53

100. ---- Knowledge, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence supported forgery conviction of check payee; it indicated that payeesaw forgery of maker's signature and then cashed check. People v. Whitley, App. 5 Dist.1991, 162 Ill.Dec. 459, 219 Ill.App.3d 917, 579 N.E.2d 1273. Forgery k 44(3)

Evidence that defendant witnessed signature of person he knew could not sign document, knowing that document was going to be used to deceive bank, was sufficient for jury to find that defendant knew of fraudulent nature of document and was not innocently relying upon attorney's assurance that it was legal, and was sufficient to convict defendant of forgery on an accountabilitytheory. People v. Kunce, App. 3 Dist.1990, 143 Ill.Dec. 92, 196 Ill.App.3d 388, 553 N.E.2d 799, appeal denied 144 Ill.Dec. 262, 132 Ill.2d 550, 555 N.E.2d 381. Forgery k 44(1)

Evidence supported conclusion that airline did not have actual or constructiveknowledge that defendant had been issuing free airline tickets to barter companies in exchange for promotional items for purposes of determining whether airline ratified defendant's actions as defense to forgery prosecution. People v. Panagiotis, App. 1 Dist.1987, 114 Ill.Dec. 125, 162 Ill.App.3d 866, 516 N.E.2d 280, appeal denied 119 Ill.Dec. 393, 119 Ill.2d 569, 522 N.E.2d 1252. Forgery k 44(.5)

Fact that forgery defendant purchased cashier's check in the amount of $176 and later gave check to daughter of client showing amount of $176,000, impliedthat defendant knew that check had been altered by someone, as required for crime of forgery. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 35

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant knew that the check was forged when he cashed it at the restaurant and was sufficient to support conviction for forgery. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255. Forgery k 44(.5)

Since it was clear from the record that, at the time admittedly forged check

was given by defendant, hotel clerk was unaware that it was a forgery, the necessary criminal intent was shown under this section even accepting defendant's explanation that the check was given as security for a loan and that he intended to repay at a later time. People v. Hackbert, App. 2 Dist.1973, 13 Ill.App.3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777. Forgery k 5

101. ---- Identification of defendant, generally, sufficiency of evidence

Even if defendant's mother was person who actually "faxed" altered letter frombank to property owner, defendant's identity as sender was proved beyond reasonable doubt, where defendant had instructed his mother to fax letter. People v. Hagan, App. 2 Dist.1990, 145 Ill.Dec. 322, 199 Ill.App.3d 267, 556 N.E.2d 1224, appeal allowed 151 Ill.Dec. 387, 135 Ill.2d 561, 564 N.E.2d 842, affirmed 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Forgery k 44(3)

Evidence in prosecution for forgery, including evidence that defendant was in possession of purse belonging to putative maker of forged check more than one week before offense, and that defendant's fingerprints were on folded part of check, were sufficient to support conviction. People v. Futia, App. 4 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 177, 116 Ill.App.3d 68, 452 N.E.2d 109. Forgery k 44(.5)

Proof of existence of defendant's fingerprints on stolen and falsely endorsed check and her unquestionably probative and valid confession made it apparent that she was guilty of forgery beyond all reasonable doubt. People v. Harris,App. 2 Dist.1979, 24 Ill.Dec. 960, 68 Ill.App.3d 744, 386 N.E.2d 164. Forgery k 44(.5)

Uncontested evidence that it was defendant who presented check for approval before it was delivered at checkout counter at store was sufficient to sustainconviction of defendant as perpetrator of forgery, even though no one testified to seeing defendant go to the register and present the check or carry groceries out of the store, and though another person had been convictedof forging another check from the same checkbook on the same day and the handwriting on the two checks was allegedly the same. People v. Kent, App. 5

Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 44(2)

Evidence, including facts that alibi witness did not specifically account for defendant's presence at time check was being cashed and that defendant's fingerprints were found on back of check in question, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of uttering forged instrument. People v. Mays,App. 3 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235. Forgery k 44(3)

In prosecution for forgery, evidence of identification of defendant as the manwho presented check at another bank on day of alleged crime was insufficient. People v. Greenspawn, 1931, 179 N.E. 98, 346 Ill. 484. Criminal Law k 566 102. ---- Identification of defendant, witness testimony, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence that defendant presented credit card with name of another person and signed that person's name to sales slip to obtain leather coat and was positively identified by sales clerk as person who purchased coat supported forgery conviction, despite testimony of defendant's alibi witness. People v.Murray, App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 644, 262 Ill.App.3d 1056, 640 N.E.2d 303. Forgery k 44(.5)

Defendant was sufficiently identified as party who had delivered forged financial document for transmittal via facsimile machine to real estate firm with which he was negotiating lease, based on evidence that defendant had toldofficer in firm that he would be transmitting financial document by facsimile machine, and that operator of machine had specifically remembered defendant's being in store at around the time that document was transmitted. People v. Hagan, 1991, 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 145 Ill.2d 287, 583 N.E.2d 494. Forgery k 44(.5)

In prosecution for forgery, identification testimony of truck driver whose check was forged, although equivocal, that defendant was the hitchhiker he hadpicked up and let off before learning that a check of his that had been cashedwas not made out in his handwriting was not so dubious that any serious doubt of defendant's guilt existed where driver identified defendant based on

defendant's deformed right hand, his failure to observe defect in defendant's other hand did not fatally impair reliability of other aspects of his testimony, and his testimony that hitchhiker asked for his driver's license number and that forged check contained that number and other information pertaining to the truck tended to establish that defendant was the same personwho hitched the ride with the driver. People v. Danis, App. 2 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 798, 129 Ill.App.3d 664, 472 N.E.2d 1194. Criminal Law k 566

In prosecution for forgery, identification testimony of liquor store employee who accepted forged check was sufficiently persuasive to establish beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was the person who committed the forgery whereshe had had occasion to view defendant frequently during three-week period he visited the liquor store as a customer, she had helped defendant write the check upon which prosecution for forgery was predicated, and jury could have concluded that her failure to observe that defendant had two deformed hands, instead of just one as she testified, was not sufficient by itself to destroy validity or credibility of her identification. People v. Danis, App. 2 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 798, 129 Ill.App.3d 664, 472 N.E.2d 1194. Criminal Lawk 566

Testimony of identification witness, who had opportunity to view defendant at store on two occasions at close range under bright fluorescent lights, who wasable to furnish clear and accurate description of defendant at photographic lineup and at trial with exception of being uncertain as to whether defendant had a mustache at time of check-passing incident and much of whose testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses who were unable to make a positive identification of defendant was sufficient to support defendant's forgery conviction. People v. Hefner, App. 5 Dist.1979, 27 Ill.Dec. 96, 70 Ill.App.3d693, 388 N.E.2d 1059. Criminal Law k 566

Where store in which defendant allegedly cashed forged check was well lit and defendant spent several minutes directly confronting store personnel while trying to cash check, each store employee separately viewed photographs of

several suspects under conditions that did not appear suggestive and each identified defendant, and each employee positively identified defendant at trial, failure of employees to notice defendant's missing teeth or tattoo and discrepancies in original descriptions of height were factors to be evaluated by jury and did not raise reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. People v.Mays, App. 3 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235. Criminal Law k 566

Fact that witnesses differed on minor details concerning identification of person who attempted to cash forged paycheck and one was more positive than another did not render the identification of defendant insufficient. People v. Johnson, App. 4 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1048, 322 N.E.2d 519. Criminal Law k 566 103. ---- Bonds, sufficiency of evidence

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine bonds of corporation with intent to defraud bank, evidence, including uncontradicted evidence that bonds were forgeries and that defendant deposited them with bankin attempt to secure a loan on them, supported conviction as against contention that proof was required that corporation had issued and circulated bonds similar to forged bonds. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Forgery k 44(2)

Defendant was indicted for forging the name of S. to an injunction bond, and, upon the question whether S. authorized the signature, testified that, to the best of his recollection, S. said: "I could use his name on the bond." D. testified to an alleged admission by S. that he did, at one time, authorize defendant to sign his name. S. contradicted this testimony, and denied that he ever gave such authority to defendant or to anyone else. The evidence warranted a verdict of guilty. Aholtz v. People, 1887, 13 N.E. 524, 121 Ill. 560. Forgery k 44(1) 104. ---- Checks, generally, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant delivered forged check, knew

check was forged, and possessed intent to defraud currency exchange, so as to support conviction for forgery; cashier identified defendant as passenger of vehicle who placed forged check into sliding drawer, and, after defendant entered building to ask about delay, defendant immediately left building without check after teller told him she was trying to verify check. People v.Hunter, App. 2 Dist.2002, 265 Ill.Dec. 342, 331 Ill.App.3d 1017, 772 N.E.2d 380. Forgery k 44(1); Forgery k 44(3)

Evidence supported finding intent by defendant to knowingly deliver forged document, so as to support forgery conviction, where defendant presented checkcontaining forged endorsement and fabricated work identification card to establish her identity as endorser, check was created from stolen check writing machine and drawn on account which had been closed for more than 11 years, and defendant left check and identification card at teller's window andfled when it appeared there was problem with cashing check. People v. Carr, App. 1 Dist.1992, 167 Ill.Dec. 274, 225 Ill.App.3d 170, 587 N.E.2d 543. Forgery k 44(1)

Defendant who endorsed check in representative capacity for copayees who gave him no authority to do so, with intent to permanently deprive copayees of funds, was properly found guilty of forgery. People v. Martin-Trigona, App. 1Dist.1982, 67 Ill.Dec. 291, 111 Ill.App.3d 718, 444 N.E.2d 527. Forgery k 4

Despite defendant's attempts to show a tax fraud scheme by employer, evidence that defendant took employer's checks, endorsed them, and deposited them in his personal account was sufficient to support theft and forgery convictions. People v. Toellen, App. 3 Dist.1978, 23 Ill.Dec. 686, 66 Ill.App.3d 967, 384 N.E.2d 480. Forgery k 44(.5); Larceny k 55

Where all of witnesses, including defendant, testified that check, the principal document in forgery case, was the one involved, conviction of forgery was not improper on ground of lack of chain of evidence with regard tothe check. People v. Johnson, App. 4 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1048, 322 N.E.2d 519. Forgery k 44(.5)

Where defendant took stand, his testimony was to be considered and weighed in

accordance with rules applicable to any other witness, and jury was entitled to disbelieve his accounting for possession of forged checks. People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 923, 322 N.E.2d 69. Criminal Law k 554

Although rejection of defendant's testimony would not compensate for any deficiency in State's proof, it was incumbent upon defendant, after he electedto explain his possession of forged checks, to tell reasonable story or to be judged by improbabilities of one not reasonable. People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 923, 322 N.E.2d 69. Criminal Law k 554

Where there was no dispute that checks were forged, jury in prosecution for forgery could consider that defendant attempted to cash one of them and that five similar checks were found in automobile he was driving, together with testimony that defendant appeared "scared and nervous" following his request to tavern operator to cash check. People v. Timmons, App. 2 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 923, 322 N.E.2d 69. Forgery k 42

Evidence sustained forgery conviction of defendant who presented to drive-in bank facility a check on which he was not the payee. People v. Lyons, App. 5 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 695, 290 N.E.2d 313. Forgery k 44(.5)

In prosecution for forging certification of check submitted with bid of defendant's company for construction of sewer with intent to prejudice Sanitary District of Chicago and for uttering a false check, knowing it to be false, evidence established that people's exhibit and check bearing forged certification had been legally filed with Sanitary District, notwithstanding absence of testimony by person actually receiving such exhibit and check. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Forgery k 44(3)

Evidence sustained conviction for forging certification of check submitted with bid of defendant's company for construction of sewer with intent to prejudice Sanitary District of Chicago. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Forgery k 44(2)

Signature on check used by corporation on its valid checks was sufficient to warrant conviction for falsely passing forged instrument. People v. Cohen,

1931, 175 N.E. 559, 343 Ill. 437. Forgery k 8

Testimony of payee of check fraudulently procured by margin clerk and check furnished sufficient evidence of corpus delicti to support conviction for forgery of indorsement by clerk. Fraudulent procurement of broker's check by margin clerk maintaining false account showed intent to defraud broker in prosecution for forgery. People v. Dwyer, 1930, 173 N.E. 765, 342 Ill. 105. Forgery k 44(.5)

On trial for forgery of a bond given by a traveling salesman, it appeared thatit purported to be signed by one K.K. denied the signature. Accused testifiedthat it was signed in his presence. It was witnessed by a lawyer, who testified that it was brought to him by accused, who called him to witness thesignature of K.; that he met K. on the street, and asked him if he had signeda bond for the accused, and he said that he had. It appeared that K. had signed two other bonds for the accused, and at the time was in trouble becauseof a shortage of the accused under one of such bonds. Experts testified that the signature was not in the handwriting of K. Verdict finding accused guiltywas not contrary to the evidence. Howell v. People, 1899, 52 N.E. 873, 178 Ill. 176. Forgery k 44(2)

105. ---- Corporate existence, sufficiency of evidence

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine bonds of corporation with intent to defraud bank, proof of corporation's existence by general reputation was sufficient, as against contention that there was no evidence that corporation had any legal existence. People v. Goldstein, 1937,12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Criminal Law k 567

In forgery case, evidence showing user of privileges legally conferred only onbanking corporations was prima facie evidence supporting allegation of bank's corporate character. Evidence that defendant, knowing bank's financial difficulties, complied with cashier's request and sought to obtain cash or draft from another bank on basis of checks known by him to be forged, sustained conviction of attempting to utter forged check. People v. Dunham,

1931, 176 N.E. 325, 344 Ill. 268. Forgery k 44(.5) 106. ---- Directed verdict, sufficiency of evidence

Evidence of forgery authorized denials of motions for directed verdict of not guilty made at close of case for the People and at close of all the evidence. People v. Whitmer, 1938, 16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317, appeal dismissed 59 S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S.667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Forgery k 47 107. Variance from indictment

Under proper construction of ch. 38, <paragraph> 17-3, under which no distinction between issuing document and delivering one is intended, evidence adduced at trial of defendant on forgery charge did not vary from allegations of indictment, and he was proved guilty of forgery offenses beyond reasonable doubt though his name did not appear on either check in question. People v. Stevens, App. 4 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 52, 128 Ill.App.3d 823, 471 N.E.2d 581. Forgery k 34(2); Forgery k 44(.5)

Variance between forgery indictment which alleged that defendant delivered check to particular employee of store and proof which showed that such employee merely approved check and that defendant delivered check to another employee at checkout counter was not material since victim was the payee storenamed in the indictment, not its employee, and defendant was not misled in preparing his defense, as indicated by the record, despite his contention to the contrary. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 34(5)

Where indictment only charged forgery and fraudulent passing of a check and prosecution proved that obligor was nonexistent but did not offer proof as to existence or nonexistence of payee whose name was allegedly forged or as to existence or nonexistence of individual who allegedly signed as obligor's agent, evidence was insufficient to support offenses charged which did not relate to fictitious checks. People v. Meeks, App.1965, 55 Ill.App.2d 437, 205 N.E.2d 62. Forgery k 34(2)

There was no fatal variance between indictment, charging uttering and passing of forged note, and bill of particulars, reciting that the People would prove that accused caused forged note to be uttered and passed. People v. Whitmer, 1938, 16 N.E.2d 757, 369 Ill. 317, appeal dismissed 59 S.Ct. 360, 305 U.S. 576, 83 L.Ed. 363, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 461, 306 U.S. 667, 83 L.Ed. 1062. Indictment And Information k 121.4

Variance between allegations of indictment charging defendant with forging certification of check with intent to prejudice Sanitary District of Chicago and with uttering forged check knowing it to be false, and proof which showed check had been made payable to order of the "Chicago Sanitary District," was not fatal, since certification was clearly forged with intent to defraud Sanitary District of Chicago, check was of such a character as might be used for purpose of defrauding, and criminal intent was established when check was filed with clerk of such Sanitary District. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Forgery k 34(6)

Evidence of employee's forgery of indorsement on check fraudulently procured from employer payable to third party did not show obtaining of money by false pretenses at variance with indictment for forgery. People v. Dwyer, 1930, 173N.E. 765, 342 Ill. 105. Forgery k 34(2)

Evidence of cashier's initials on back of forged check was not at variance with indictment not mentioning them. People v. Kimler, 1927, 155 N.E. 299, 324 Ill. 445. Forgery k 34(3)

On a trial for forging a draft, a variance in the description of the residenceof the drawee as shown on the draft is immaterial, since that is no part of the draft itself. Trask v. People, 1894, 38 N.E. 248, 151 Ill. 523. Forgery k34(7) 108. Fact questions--In general

Issue of whether document is apparently capable of defrauding is element of offense of forgery, and is not question of law, but is question for fact

finder. People v. Mattingly, App. 4 Dist.1989, 129 Ill.Dec. 573, 180 Ill.App.3d 573, 536 N.E.2d 257, appeal denied 136 Ill.Dec. 599, 127 Ill.2d 631, 545 N.E.2d 123. Forgery k 47

Whether credit card sales draft was capable of defrauding was jury question; thus prosecutor's statement that law was clear that the document was capable of defrauding was error, but the error was harmless since the evidence was sufficient to support beyond reasonable doubt the conclusion that the draft possessed apparent capacity to defraud. People v. Reynolds, App. 5 Dist.1980,40 Ill.Dec. 833, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64. Criminal Law k 717; Criminal Law k 1171.1(3)

Under evidence that forged signature on check was badly written and clumsily misspelled and testimony of bank employees that defendant who allegedly forgedendorsement seemed to be possessed of normal faculties and did not appear to be intoxicated, question of whether defendant was so intoxicated at time of forgery incident that he was incapable of forming necessary intent was for jury. People v. Hibbler, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101. CriminalLaw k 739(5) 109. ---- Intent to defraud, fact questions

Whether element of fraudulent intent on part of defendant who knew when he cashed check that it bore forged endorsement was proven beyond reasonable doubt was jury question. People v. Dauphin, App.1964, 53 Ill.App.2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166. Forgery k 47

Whether forged check was uttered with intent to defraud was for jury. Peoplev. Katz, 1934, 190 N.E. 913, 356 Ill. 440. Forgery k 47

The intent to damage or defraud does not arise merely from the forgery of an instrument, the intent in such case being for the jury to be determined under the facts and circumstances. People v. Adams, 1921, 132 N.E. 765, 300 Ill. 20, error dismissed 43 S.Ct. 249, 260 U.S. 759, 67 L.Ed. 500. Forgery k 47 110. Law questions

In prosecution for forgery, it was not error for the trial court to prohibit defense counsel from arguing to the jury that an endorsement was not a "making" within the forgery statute, as the issue was one of statutory construction, and as such was a question of law for the court to decide. People v. Connell, App. 5 Dist.1980, 46 Ill.Dec. 743, 91 Ill.App.3d 326, 414 N.E.2d 796. Criminal Law k 717 111. Instructions--In general

Jury instructions were deficient in that they were phrased in such a way as todeny jury option of finding forgery defendant had not signed all three sales receipts and thus might not have been guilty of all three counts of forgery and therefore not guilty of theft over $300, though jury received separate verdict forms for each count. People v. Friedman, App. 1 Dist.1986, 98 Ill.Dec. 638, 144 Ill.App.3d 895, 494 N.E.2d 760. Forgery k 48

In prosecution for uttering a forged check, to which accused had signed his mother's name as drawer, where evidence as to accused's intent to defraud indorsee and as to accused's alleged authority to sign mother's name to check was conflicting, the giving of instructions erroneously stating the law with respect to reasonable doubt, and jury's right to disregard testimony of any witness believed to have wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact inissue, constituted prejudicial error. People v. Flynn, 1941, 38 N.E.2d 49, 378 Ill. 351. Criminal Law k 1172.2

Refusal of instructions requested by defendant in prosecution for forgery was not error, where instructions given at defendant's request fully instructed asto defendant's theory of the case. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 829(1)

Refusal to give requested instructions in forgery prosecution was not error, where requested instructions were fully covered by those given. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Criminal Law k 829(1) 112. ---- Burden of proof, instructions

Instruction to find defendant guilty of forgery if jury had abiding conviction, amounting to moral certainty, of truth of charge, was improper as

substituting abiding conviction for proof beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 789(9)

Instruction that "it is sufficient if, from all the evidence, that jury can reasonably believe that the crime of forgery as charged in the indictment was committed" within county in which defendant was being prosecuted, did not mislead jury to think that a conviction could be had on evidence not proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, where the instruction related only to venue, and told jury that venue was not an element of crime which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and other instructions charged that commission of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Adams, 1921, 132 N.E. 765, 300 Ill. 20, error dismissed 43 S.Ct. 249, 260 U.S. 759, 67 L.Ed. 500. Criminal Law k 823(15) 113. ---- Credibility, instructions

Instruction in prosecution for forgery that jurors might disregard testimony of witnesses, whether or not corroborated, if, in opinion of jurors, in the light of their experience and common observation, such witnesses might be mistaken, was improper. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 785(3)

Instructions in prosecution for forgery to disregard evidence of witnesses whom they believed to have willfully made contradictory statements out of court as to material matters in evidence, except as such evidence might be corroborated by credible evidence of facts in evidence, was improper as makingconflicting evidence alone amount to conclusive impeachment. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 785(12)

In a prosecution for forgery, instruction as to the credibility of defendant'stestimony was not objectionable as singling out the defendant and calling attention to his testimony alone. People v. Dougherty, 1914, 107 N.E. 695, 266 Ill. 420. Criminal Law k 811(6) 114. ---- Admissions or confessions, instructions

While the trial court, in forgery prosecution, improperly gave IPI Instruction3.06 on admissions where there were no out-of-court admissions in evidence, the error was harmless since the instruction did not mislead the jury and was superfluous. People v. DeBord, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 672, 61 Ill.App.3d 239, 377 N.E.2d 1308. Criminal Law k 1172.6

Where defendant's statement to police acknowledged that he knew that check wasnot made by person who appeared to have made it, and that, knowing this, he went to store and attempted to have it cashed, defendant acknowledged all essential elements of forgery, his statement was a confession, and trial courtdid not err in giving confession instruction and refusing admission instruction. People v. Cartwright, App. 4 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 180, 337 N.E.2d 237. Criminal Law k 516; Criminal Law k 781(4)

Where defendant, charged with attempting to utter forged check, admitted it was forged, court could assume in instructions that check was forged. People v. Dunham, 1931, 176 N.E. 325, 344 Ill. 268. Criminal Law k 761(9)

Offers by a person arrested for forging a check to settle the matter by payingthe amount of the check, or a greater sum, were not confessions, so as to authorize an instruction on the subject of confessions in a prosecution for the crime. Michaels v. People, 1904, 70 N.E. 747, 208 Ill. 603. Criminal Lawk 516 115. ---- Intent to defraud, instructions

An instruction that, if defendant passed a bogus check as charged in indictment, the intent to defraud would be presumed, was erroneous for failureto require knowledge by defendant of fictitious character of check. People v.Chronister, 1942, 41 N.E.2d 750, 379 Ill. 617. Forgery k 48

An instruction to the effect that, if the defendant forged the name of the person mentioned in the indictment, the law presumes that he intended to damage and defraud such person, is erroneous, since the intent to damage or defraud is to be determined by the jury. Kotter v. People, 1894, 37 N.E. 932,150 Ill. 441. Forgery k 35 116. ---- Document capable of defrauding, instructions

Plain error exception did not apply to preclude waiver, due to failure to object at trial, of defendant's objection that forgery instruction given to jury did not include element that document in question was capable of defrauding another; evidence was not closely balanced, and document in question (preprinted bank check) was readily capable of defrauding another. People v. Mattingly, App. 4 Dist.1989, 129 Ill.Dec. 573, 180 Ill.App.3d 573, 536 N.E.2d 257, appeal denied 136 Ill.Dec. 599, 127 Ill.2d 631, 545 N.E.2d 123 . Criminal Law k 1038.1(4)

Trial court's failure to instruct jury regarding element that document was apparently capable of defrauding another deprived defendant of fair trial in forgery prosecution; jury was not otherwise so informed by the court or counsel. People v. Turner, App. 2 Dist.1989, 128 Ill.Dec. 159, 179 Ill.App.3d510, 534 N.E.2d 179, appeal denied 133 Ill.Dec. 676, 126 Ill.2d 565, 541 N.E.2d 1114. Criminal Law k 1173.2(2); Forgery k 48

In prosecution for forgery based on credit card sales draft, trial court did not err in failing to give jury instruction, sua sponte, defining what constituted a document capable of defrauding another. People v. Reynolds, App. 5 Dist.1980, 40 Ill.Dec. 833, 85 Ill.App.3d 549, 407 N.E.2d 64. Criminal Law k 824(1)

Forgery instructions reciting, inter alia, that State was obliged to prove that check in question appeared to have been made by another was sufficient tocharge offense of forgery in the instant case, and any failure to specify thatit was incumbent on the State to prove that the check was apparently capable of defrauding was harmless error, if error at all. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Criminal Law k 1172.2

Question of whether document is "apparently capable of defrauding" within forgery statute is one of fact for the jury, and when an issue regarding this question is presented by the facts of a particular case, a special instructionincorporating the language of this section which defines such phrase should begiven by the court. People v. Kent, App. 5 Dist.1976, 40 Ill.App.3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890. Forgery k 47; Forgery k 48

117. ---- Circumstantial evidence, instructions

Eyewitness evidence that defendant used alias and performed acts which aided and abetted forger before forgery of documents pertaining to sale of boat was sufficiently direct to support refusal to charge jury on pattern jury instruction directing jury not to find defendant guilty unless facts or circumstances proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence, which is tobe given only in those cases where State's case is entirely circumstantial. People v. Christiansen, App. 3 Dist.1986, 97 Ill.Dec. 38, 142 Ill.App.3d 1050,492 N.E.2d 241. Criminal Law k 814(17)

Where circumstantial evidence in forgery case was more damaging to defendant than the direct evidence and any omission in instructions on circumstantial evidence could only have been to defendant's advantage, error, if any, in refusing to give pattern instruction on cases in which there is some circumstantial evidence was harmless. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255. Criminal Law k 1173.5

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine with intent to defraud bank, charge that circumstantial evidence is the proof of such facts connected with commission of crime tending to show guilt or innocence and thatcircumstantial evidence is legal evidence and must be so considered by jury was not objectionable as ordering jury to convict defendant on facts tending to show guilt, especially where court gave instruction on circumstantial evidence at defendant's request setting out in detail necessary elements whichdefendant said were omitted from instruction complained of. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Criminal Law k 823(14)

In forgery prosecution, giving of duplicate instructions on subject of circumstantial evidence was error, notwithstanding that such giving may have been result of an accident. People v. White, 1937, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 365 Ill. 499. Criminal Law k 806(1) 118. ---- Statutory language, instructions

In prosecution for uttering a forged check, an instruction defining the various kinds of forgery in the language of the statute should not have been

given, since the offenses of making a forged instrument and of uttering a forged instrument were distinct crimes. People v. Flynn, 1941, 38 N.E.2d 49, 378 Ill. 351. Criminal Law k 808.5

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine with intent to defraud bank, instruction defining forgery in language of statute was properlygiven. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Criminal Law k808.5

In prosecution for forgery, instruction which was a literal copy of statute defining forgery, but contained references to many matters inapplicable to theparticular case, was improperly given. People v. Moshiek, 1926, 153 N.E. 720,323 Ill. 11. Criminal Law k 808.5

Giving, on a prosecution for forgery of a note, an instruction in the languageof R.S.1874, p. 348, div. 1, <section> 105 (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277; repealed), and including all the various modes in which the crime could be committed and the instruments which could be the subjects of forgery, was not error, though the parts constituting most of it, having nothing to do with forgery of a note, were unnecessary; there being nothing in it calculated to mislead the jury in the application of the law to the particular case. People v. McIntosh, 1909, 90 N.E. 180, 242 Ill. 602. Forgeryk 48 119. Verdict--In general

Oral pronouncement that a verdict was being entered in favor of the defendant on one of the forgery counts amounted to a directed verdict on that count, which could not thereafter be withdrawn without violating double jeopardy principles, notwithstanding that the trial court did not direct the jury to return a verdict, enter a judgment of acquittal, or discharge the defendant. People v. Stout, App. 2 Dist.1982, 63 Ill.Dec. 810, 108 Ill.App.3d 96, 438 N.E.2d 952. Double Jeopardy k 61

Where defendant was charged in indictment in separate counts of forging an

instrument and of issuing and uttering it and jury found defendant guilty under both counts and both counts were treated as having arisen from same offense and but one judgment and one sentence was entered on the verdict and punishment for either of the offenses was the same as that which was imposed, judgment on the verdict was proper. People v. Price, 1947, 74 N.E.2d 794, 397Ill. 613. Criminal Law k 29(5.5)

In prosecution for uttering forged debenture bonds as genuine with intent to defraud bank, general form of verdict omitting any finding of intent to defraud was sufficient and did not impliedly acquit defendant of essential element of crime, where defendant had applied to bank for loan on security of bonds and said he had just bought them, since intent to defraud could be presumed from circumstances under which defendant uttered bonds. People v. Goldstein, 1937, 12 N.E.2d 642, 368 Ill. 50. Forgery k 49 120. ---- Consistency, verdict

Verdict convicting public employee of forgery for altering records was not "legally inconsistent" with verdict acquitting employee of related charge of official misconduct; conviction on former charge did not conclusively establish that forgeries were performed by employee in her official capacity. People v. Fiore, App. 1 Dist.1988, 120 Ill.Dec. 85, 169 Ill.App.3d 601, 523 N.E.2d 996. Criminal Law k 878(4)

There was no repugnancy between separate verdicts of jury finding assistant ofauditor of public accounts guilty of obtaining money by means of confidence game, forgery of specified state warrant, larceny based on Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 207 (repealed), and embezzlement by public officer or his servant, where warrant was properly in possession of the State by and through its agents, and it was prepared and wrongfully used by defendant and was wrongfully taken from the State and fraudulently converted, and proceeds thereof were appropriated by defendant, being a public officer, or his servant, and case involved instrument, which was seemingly valid on its face, and which was embezzled under statutory definition, was falsely forged, and was then fraudulently uttered. People v. Epping, 1959, 17 Ill.2d 557, 162 N.E.2d 366. Criminal Law k 878(4)

121. Sentence and punishment--In general

Where gist of offense of forgery is intent to defraud involved in making of forged instrument or knowingly uttering the same, the offense is not less inimical to society, nor any more or less harmful, by reason of the identity of the party defrauded or intended to be defrauded. People v. Marks, 1965, 63Ill.App.2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 153, 385 U.S. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 103; People v. Crouch, 1963, 29 Ill.2d 485, 194 N.E.2d 248.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering defendant's record in fixing years of extended term upon defendant's convictions for forgery. Peoplev. Futia, App. 4 Dist.1983, 72 Ill.Dec. 177, 116 Ill.App.3d 68, 452 N.E.2d 109 . Sentencing And Punishment k 94

Where defendant's burglary conviction may have influenced court when imposing sentences for forgery convictions, a new resentencing hearing as to the forgery offenses was required when burglary conviction was reversed. People v. Vallero, App. 3 Dist.1978, 19 Ill.Dec. 48, 61 Ill.App.3d 413, 378 N.E.2d 549. Criminal Law k 1181.5(8) 122. ---- Aggravating factors, generally, sentence and punishment

In forgery prosecution, trial court could properly consider elderly person in whose name defendant obtained credit card, not credit card company, to be the victim of offense and could accordingly consider fact that victim was 60 yearsof age or older as aggravating factor in sentencing. People v. Jordan, App. 3Dist.1991, 154 Ill.Dec. 767, 209 Ill.App.3d 983, 568 N.E.2d 988. Sentencing And Punishment k 122

In imposing sentence on defendant convicted of forgery, trial court could consider as proper factor in aggravation the fact that defendant did not express remorse at sentencing hearing, even though he had maintained his innocence throughout trial, where there was no evidence that defendant's punishment was increased because he did not admit his guilt. People v. Danis,App. 2 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec. 798, 129 Ill.App.3d 664, 472 N.E.2d 1194. Sentencing And Punishment k 114

Sentence of three years and four months to ten years' imprisonment on each of 142 counts of forgery and five counts of theft of which defendant was convicted was not excessive, in view of the serious and continuing nature of defendant's conduct and the magnitude of the forgery and theft offenses. People v. Einstein, App. 1 Dist.1982, 62 Ill.Dec. 285, 106 Ill.App.3d 526, 435N.E.2d 1257. False Pretenses k 54; Forgery k 51

Sentence of three to nine years for conspiracy to commit theft, seven counts of forgery, two counts of attempt theft and two counts of theft was not excessive, where codefendant not only devised and practiced scheme to defraud various banks and steal from numerous individuals, but she also actively recruited others to join her, and her attitude was shown by her statement to aparty involved that "anyone who says crime does not pay is a fool"; fact thatshe was a college graduate and had been gainfully employed could be considered, but did not mandate probation or a reduction of sentence. People v. Collins, App. 1 Dist.1979, 26 Ill.Dec. 165, 70 Ill.App.3d 413, 387 N.E.2d 995. Conspiracy k 51; Forgery k 51; Larceny k 88

Sentencing defendant upon conviction of forgery to term of not less than threenor more than nine years' imprisonment while his two accomplices did not receive any sentence of imprisonment was not an abuse of discretion, where evidence showed that defendant was much older man than accomplices, that defendant had history of forgery convictions spanning 20-year period and that defendant was not only the instigator of forgery but, in fact, coerced one accomplice into participating in crime. People v. Schmidt, App. 3 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1035, 324 N.E.2d 246. Sentencing And Punishment k 56

Although defendant was eligible for probation, trial court did not abuse discretion in imposing sentence of two to seven years upon conviction of forgery, where presentence report reflected defendant's almost constant embroilment with the law. People v. Johnson, App. 4 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1048, 322 N.E.2d 519. Sentencing And Punishment k 1872(1)

Where, in prosecution for forgery and pledging fraudulent stock, both charges grew out of one transaction and only one sentence could have been imposed for two offenses, court erred in failing to specify in judgment the offense or offenses for which defendant was sentenced. People v. Young, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609. Criminal Law k 995(3)

Sentence of not less than 18 months and not more than five years for forgery did not constitute an abuse of discretion in view of fact that, inter alia, defendant was in jail upon conviction of aggravated battery involving a sawed-off shotgun at time of probation hearing, and in view of fact that he was convicted of two forgeries. People v. Ehn, App. 2 Dist.1973, 14 Ill.App.3d 547, 302 N.E.2d 489. Forgery k 51

Under Unified Code of Corrections, sentence of not less than three nor more than ten years for forgery was not manifestly excessive in view of fact that trial court had thoroughly investigated and duly considered all material factors bearing upon proper sentence, that defendant had extensive history of prior offenses, including two burglary convictions and a conviction of deceptive practices, and that check involved was one of 15 or more such checkspassed within period of a week. People v. Elliott, App. 5 Dist.1973, 10 Ill.App.3d 941, 295 N.E.2d 256. Forgery k 51

Sentence of three to five years in penitentiary on plea of guilty to forgery did not constitute cruel, unusual or excessive punishment where sentence imposed was within limits fixed by this section and where defendant had committed forgery 33 days after being released from prior sentence for forgeryand had forged 5 or 6 more checks while out on bond on second charge. People v. Dye, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 480, 258 N.E.2d 589. Sentencing And Punishment k 1488

In view of defendant's prior record and his stated reason for forging check, reviewing court could not justifiably tamper with sentence of 2 to 8 years, imposed under this section providing penalty of $1,000 fine or 1 to 14 years or both, as against defendant's contention that 8-year maximum offended against modern day purpose of penology to rehabilitate offender. People v. Siegmund, App.1969, 118 Ill.App.2d 338, 254 N.E.2d 189. Forgery k 51 123. ---- Aggravating factors, prior convictions, sentence and punishment

Record did not support defendant's assertion that trial court improperly considered the specific length of a prior forgery conviction sentence in imposing a three-year sentence for defendant's third forgery conviction after her probation was revoked; comments by trial court that sentences should get

progressively more severe for repeat offenders and that it would make no senseto give a shorter sentence than the one defendant served for a prior same offense were not inherently wrong. People v. Dean, App. 5 Dist.1984, 81 Ill.Dec. 653, 126 Ill.App.3d 631, 467 N.E.2d 353. Sentencing And Punishment k2032

Sentence of defendant, upon his conviction of forgery, to two to ten years' imprisonment, consecutive to sentence being served in another state, was not excessive in view of nature of offense and defendant's character and history, which revealed, inter alia, four prior convictions for same or similar offenseand a drinking problem; minimum of two years was not excessive in light of defendant's record of prior convictions for same offense, and maximum sentenceimposed was proper in light of apparent chronic nature of defendant's conduct and his admitted need for rehabilitation. People v. Reynolds, App. 4 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 788, 348 N.E.2d 864. Forgery k 51

Where defendant's background as presented to trial court indicated that defendant had not responded to variety of rehabilitative measures which had earlier been attempted and where his conduct reflected lack of self-control and utter disregard to authority and did not indicate likelihood of early rehabilitation, sentence of from three to nine years for forgery imposed upon revocation of defendant's three-year probation was not excessive and did not amount to sentencing of defendant upon improper consideration of defendant's subsequent conviction in Wisconsin for grand theft. People v. Pfleger, App. 2Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 656, 348 N.E.2d 497. Sentencing And Punishment k 2032

Where defendant, who was convicted of forgery upon her plea of guilty, had a record of prior convictions one of which was a felony, sentence of one to ten years was not excessive. People v. Anderson, App. 4 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 683, 327 N.E.2d 342. Forgery k 51

Sentence of from two to six years for forgery was not excessive in view of defendant's background which trial court properly considered and which

included prior convictions of burglary and forgery, for which defendant was onprobation at time of commission of the charged offense, and an extensive history of drug addiction. People v. Whitlow, App. 5 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d285, 327 N.E.2d 275. Forgery k 51

In view of defendant's admission that he had been convicted of "a bunch" of burglaries, sentence of two to six years was not excessive for forgery. Peoplev. Gratton, App. 2 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 503, 311 N.E.2d 717. Forgery k 51

Minimum sentence of one and one-half years for forgery was within trial court's discretion in view of defendant's prior record of criminal conduct. People v. McConnell, App. 5 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 744, 310 N.E.2d 392. Forgery k 51

Taking into account defendant's background and prior violations, sentence of two years probation, conditioned upon his serving six months in county jail, less time previously served, upon plea of guilty to forgery, which sentence was within statutory limits prescribed for the crime, was not excessive and should not be reduced. People v. Obermoeller, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 890, 275N.E.2d 459. Forgery k 51

Sentence of not less than 6 nor more than 14 years for forgery of endorsement on check was not excessive under evidence that defendant had been convicted of4 previous felonies. People v. Hibbler, App.1971, 1 Ill.App.3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101. Forgery k 51

Sentence of from two years to ten years for forgery imposed upon defendant whohad previously been involved in several fraudulent or fictitious check chargeswas not excessive. People v. Kaylor, App.1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 964, 267 N.E.2d710. Forgery k 51

Sentence of from 5 to 14 years imposed on defendant convicted of forgery was not unduly harsh, even though only $45 was involved, and did not violate Const.1870, Art. 2, <section> 11 (see, now, Const. Art. 1, <section> 11), requiring that all penalties shall be proportionate to nature of offense, where defendant had been convicted of larceny or forgery on at least five

occasions over previous 22-year period. People v. Haynes, App.1966, 73 Ill.App.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 489. Forgery k 51 124. ---- Mitigating factors, sentence and punishment

Where forgery prosecution has been instituted for manifest purpose of collecting money, seriousness of offense is greatly mitigated. People v. Palmer, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 934, 274 N.E.2d 658. Sentencing And Punishmentk 66

In prosecution for conspiracy, theft and forgery, where defendant was mastermind behind scheme in question and most active participant, stealing purchase orders, forging signatures and selling stolen goods and codefendant was involved in but one step of the scheme, court's granting codefendant probation and sentencing defendant on his pleas of guilty to concurrent terms of two to six years was not error, and sentence imposed on defendant who had no prior criminal record was not excessive. People v. Blumenthal, App.1971, 1Ill.App.3d 189, 273 N.E.2d 668. Sentencing And Punishment k 67; Sentencing And Punishment k 56 125. ---- Statutory range, sentence and punishment

Sentence of one to five years' imprisonment on conviction of forgery and pledging fraudulent stock was not excessive. People v. Young, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609. Forgery k 51; Fraud k 69(1)

Punishment of imprisonment for term of from two to six years was within limitsprescribed by this section for offense of forgery and was not abuse of discretion or violative of Const.1870, Art. 2, <section> 11 (see, now, Const. Art. 1, <section> 11) requiring penalties proportioned to nature of offense. People v. Dzielski, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 581, 264 N.E.2d 426. Forgery k 51

Imposition of sentence of not less than 3 nor more than 12 years upon revocation of probation which had been granted upon defendant's plea of guiltyto charge of forgery was not excessive. People v. Davis, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 278, 248 N.E.2d 532. Sentencing And Punishment k 2032

Sentencing defendant to penitentiary for not less than eight nor more than fourteen years for conviction of forgery of thirty-five dollar check was not improper. People v. Mace, App.1967, 79 Ill.App.2d 422, 223 N.E.2d 725.

Forgery k 51

Prison sentence of three to ten years for theft and forgery was not excessive. People v. Green, App.1966, 74 Ill.App.2d 308, 218 N.E.2d 840, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2051, 387 U.S. 930, 18 L.Ed.2d 990, rehearing denied 88 S.Ct. 17, 389 U.S. 890, 19 L.Ed.2d 200. Embezzlement k 52; Forgery k 51

Sentence of not less than three nor more than seven years imposed on one convicted of forgery was not excessive. People v. Shockey, App.1966, 67 Ill.App.2d 133, 213 N.E.2d 573, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 186, 385 U.S. 887, 17 L.Ed.2d 115. Forgery k 51

Where prisoner was sentenced upon forgery charge "for a term of not less than one year nor more than 20 years and the court fixes the minimum sentence at two years and the maximum sentence at ten years," the sentence of not less than one year nor more than 20 years was mere recital of statutory penalty andthere was no doubt or uncertainty that latter portion of sentence was intendedto be controlling, and error in recitation did not require reversal. People v. Stucker, 1955, 5 Ill.2d 55, 124 N.E.2d 893. Sentencing And Punishment k 1125

Forgery was one of crimes for which court could not fix limit or duration of imprisonment under Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, ch. 38, <section> 802 (repealed), since penalty was prescribed by <section> 277 (repealed) at imprisonment in penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 14 years. People v. Donovan, 1941, 35 N.E.2d 54, 376 Ill. 602. Forgery k 51 126. ---- Minimum, sentence and punishment

Since federal determinate sentences do not have minimum or maximum terms, <paragraph> 1005-84 of former chapter 38 providing that the aggregate minimum period of consecutive sentences shall not exceed twice the lowest minimum termauthorized by Illinois law for the most serious felony involved did not preclude imposition of state term of two to eight years for forgery to run consecutively to previously imposed federal sentence of five years even though, if the five-year determinate federal sentence was viewed as imposing afive-year minimum, the aggregate minimum sentence of seven years exceeded

twice the lowest minimum term for the Illinois forgery conviction. People v. Dye, 1977, 13 Ill.Dec. 695, 69 Ill.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630. Sentencing And Punishment k 634; Sentencing And Punishment k 643

Imposition of minimum sentence of 3 1/3 years of forgery was within trial court's discretion. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 309, 319 N.E.2d 112. Forgery k 51

Since forgery was a class 3 felony whose minimum sentence could not exceed one-third of maximum set by court, defendant's sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years must be modified so that the minimum term was reduced to three years and four months. People v. Johnson, App. 1 Dist.1974, 18 Ill.App.3d 162, 309 N.E.2d 341. Criminal Law k 1184(5) 127. ---- Maximum, sentence and punishment

Imposition of five-year sentence for forgery, which was maximum permissible, was not abuse of discretion notwithstanding defendant's lack of significant prior criminal history, fact that actual forgery caused no harm, that he expressed remorse and desire to make restitution, and had high potential for rehabilitation, where forgery was considered by sentencing court as part of larger scheme which resulted in depriving a widow in her eighties of much of her life's savings and court heard testimony from other former clients of defendant who had lost money entrusted to him. People v. Bokuniewicz, App. 2 Dist.1987, 111 Ill.Dec. 892, 160 Ill.App.3d 270, 513 N.E.2d 138. Forgery k 51

Imposing upon defendant convicted of forgery a sentence for a term of one to twenty years was error in view of Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), specifically prescribing a punishment of one to fourteen years forsuch crime. People v. Reynard, 1947, 73 N.E.2d 404, 397 Ill. 244. Forgery k 51 128. ---- Concurrent sentences, sentence and punishment

Concurrent sentence of from one to three years for defendant convicted of one count of theft and two counts of forgery was not excessive. People v. Kuknyo,

App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 790, 315 N.E.2d 657. Forgery k 51; Larceny k88

Defendant, convicted of theft for taking checks and convicted of two counts offorgery for delivering to a bank two separate checks forged by him, was properly sentenced to concurrent terms on each of the three charges. People v. Kuknyo, App. 1 Dist.1974, 21 Ill.App.3d 790, 315 N.E.2d 657. Sentencing And Punishment k 532 129. ---- Consecutive sentences, sentence and punishment

Sentence of 10 to 14 years for forgery to run consecutively to previously imposed federal sentence for the armed robbery was not excessive. People v. Rose, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 374, 287 N.E.2d 195. 130. ---- Parole, sentence and punishment

Sentence of not less than three nor more than nine years' imprisonment upon conviction of forgery, approximately the maximum penalty allowable, was not violative of goal of providing parole authorities with opportunity to rehabilitate, where evidence showed the 38-year-old defendant had a history offorgery convictions spanning 20-year period and that past efforts to rehabilitate him were to no avail. People v. Schmidt, App. 3 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1035, 324 N.E.2d 246. Forgery k 51 131. ---- Probation, sentence and punishment

Where the only written notice given defendant was the probation revocation petition, which alleged that he had violated his probation by committing offense of forgery, and where trial court, contrary to petition, revoked probation on basis that State had shown that defendant committed separate distinct, and nonincluded offense of deceptive practices, defendant did not have notice or any opportunity to defend against deceptive practices charge. People v. Good, App. 4 Dist.1978, 22 Ill.Dec. 777, 66 Ill.App.3d 32, 383 N.E.2d 253. Sentencing And Punishment k 2013

Trial court which noted defendant's prominence in community and his relationship to youth of community as teacher and principal and merely emphasized that educated, prominent individual with many friends and associates was not automatically entitled to probation and stated that probation was refused because of number and seriousness of forgery offenses

and the effect on justice did not arbitrarily refuse to grant probation solelybecause defendant was member of class of prominent individuals. People v. Waud, 1977, 14 Ill.Dec. 870, 69 Ill.2d 588, 373 N.E.2d 1. Sentencing And Punishment k 1888

Accused who was convicted of forgery had no constitutional or statutory right to probation or vested interest in probation merely because trial court, when placing accused on probation, established a program to treat his alcoholism. People v. Baylor, App. 2 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 309, 319 N.E.2d 112. Sentencing And Punishment k 1846

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation to defendant whowas convicted of forgery of a check and who was, at the time of sentencing, onprobation for deceptive practices charge involving a similar check-cashing incident. People v. Tervin, App. 4 Dist.1974, 23 Ill.App.3d 409, 318 N.E.2d 656. Sentencing And Punishment k 1872(3)

Court did not abuse discretion in denying probation after defendant's conviction of forgery and pledging fraudulent stock where defendant's application for probation was investigated, defendant presented witnesses on his own behalf, and defendant was attorney who was well versed in business matters. People v. Young, App. 4 Dist.1974, 19 Ill.App.3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609 . Sentencing And Punishment k 1888

Absent indication of confusion in judge's mind, fact that comment was made by judge as to a burglary offense did not indicate that judge was unjustified in accepting probation officer's recommendation in denying probation for forgery offense. People v. Vronch, App. 2 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 689, 308 N.E.2d 58 . Sentencing And Punishment k 1886

Where nearly ten years had elapsed since defendant who was convicted of forgery had committed previous offenses of forgery and uttering fictitious checks, testimony indicated good prospects for defendant's future good behavior and testimony of bank officer indicated that officer was primarily concerned not only with recovering amount of forged check but with collecting personal debt which defendant owned bank, sentence of one to seven years in

prison was excessive; probation for three-year period would be appropriate. People v. Palmer, App.1971, 2 Ill.App.3d 934, 274 N.E.2d 658. Forgery k 51

Where defendant's character, propensities, and past delinquencies, including convictions for forgery and possession and sale of narcotics, were not indicative of good rehabilitation potential, determination that defendant was not good probationary risk and should be sentenced to not less than two nor more than seven years for having cashed forged check was not an abuse of discretion. People v. Buford, App.1970, 125 Ill.App.2d 424, 261 N.E.2d 23. Forgery k 51 132. ---- Restitution, sentence and punishment

Trial court was limited, in imposing sentence following guilty plea to one count of forgery, to ordering restitution for the losses caused by the conductcharged in the information, namely, the forging of a $100 check, and could notorder restitution for additional checks allegedly forged by defendant. People v. Exum, App. 4 Dist.1999, 241 Ill.Dec. 481, 307 Ill.App.3d 1000, 719 N.E.2d 342. Sentencing And Punishment k 2145

Defendant's failure to move in trial court to withdraw guilty plea to forgery charge did not preclude her from arguing on appeal that trial court exceeded its authority in ordering restitution that exceeded the amount charged in the information. People v. Exum, App. 4 Dist.1999, 241 Ill.Dec. 481, 307 Ill.App.3d 1000, 719 N.E.2d 342. Criminal Law k 1026.10(3) 133. ---- Plea bargain, sentence and punishment

Sentence of from one to eight years on charge of forgery, upon a plea of guilty previously negotiated and finalized in open court, was not an abuse of judicial discretion. People v. Lewton, App.1972, 2 Ill.App.3d 882, 277 N.E.2d781. Forgery k 51 134. ---- Credit, sentence and punishment

Where, at all pertinent times prior to defendant's sentence to probation upon conviction of two counts of forgery, lowest minimum term of imprisonment for forgery was one year and defendant was entitled to credit against sentence of

imprisonment for time served on probation, highest aggregate minimum term thatcould be imposed upon revocation of defendant's probation was two years and defendant was entitled to credit against consecutive sentences for time servedon probation. People v. Willingham, App. 4 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 612, 349 N.E.2d 120. Sentencing And Punishment k 2041 135. ---- Separate acts, sentence and punishment

Convictions of both burglary and forgery with concurrent sentences were properwhere convictions were based upon separate acts in making unauthorized entry into grocery store with intent to commit forgery and in acting with intent to defraud grocery store by presenting check drawn on account of another capable of defrauding that person. People v. Drake, App. 4 Dist.1988, 123 Ill.Dec. 56, 172 Ill.App.3d 1026, 527 N.E.2d 519. Criminal Law k 29(11)

Where information charged defendant with forgery in that he knowingly issued and delivered check in question with intent to defraud, and count charging attempt theft recited that defendant attempted to obtain by deception control of funds from bank, attempt theft conviction would be vacated in that one act supported both convictions, that is, defendant's presentation of forged checksto bank for payment. People v. Austin, App. 1 Dist.1981, 48 Ill.Dec. 939, 93 Ill.App.3d 495, 417 N.E.2d 671. Criminal Law k 29(10)

Forgery and attempt theft offenses, which together formed the basis for defendant's consecutive sentences, were separate and distinct acts requiring different elements of proof and could not be said to have arisen from a singlecourse of conduct; there was a substantial change in the nature of defendant's criminal objective, and the separate offenses constituted a departure from a single course of conduct; therefore, the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper. People v. Lowther, App. 2 Dist.1980, 41 Ill.Dec. 540, 85 Ill.App.3d 735, 407 N.E.2d 1038. Sentencing And Punishment k606; Sentencing And Punishment k 609

Where both perjury and forgery convictions were based on underlying act by defendant of misrepresenting her identity in city primary election, one of

such convictions had to be vacated. People v. Thomas, App. 5 Dist.1979, 32 Ill.Dec. 371, 76 Ill.App.3d 969, 395 N.E.2d 601. Double Jeopardy k 147

Where one forged check delivered to automobile dealer was payable to dealer for purchase price of automobile and second forged check delivered to dealer was payable to Secretary of State for license and title transfer, checks were capable of defrauding and intended to defraud different people and there was sufficient independent motivation to support multiple sentences for forgery, even though issuance of checks was all part of scheme to obtain automobile. People v. Willingham, App. 4 Dist.1976, 38 Ill.App.3d 612, 349 N.E.2d 120. Sentencing And Punishment k 521

Where defendant was sentenced for both forgery and theft arising out of same transaction, only the greater sentence should have been imposed, though the sentences were to run concurrently. People v. Rose, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 374, 287 N.E.2d 195. Sentencing And Punishment k 532 136. Review--In general

If handwriting analysis by bona fide expert would reveal that defendant did not write note in question in prosecution for delivery of forged document, then error in denying funds to indigent defendant for handwriting analysis wasreversible. People v. Dickerson, App. 4 Dist.1992, 179 Ill.Dec. 930, 239 Ill.App.3d 951, 606 N.E.2d 762. Criminal Law k 1166(1)

Error in convicting defendant on conspiracy charge, the inchoate offense, did not constitute error affecting conviction on principal charge of forgery; hence, forgery conviction could stand. People v. Schmidt, App. 3 Dist.1975, 25 Ill.App.3d 1035, 324 N.E.2d 246. Criminal Law k 1186.1

Where defendant was charged with both theft and forgery arising out of single transaction, and a sentence was imposed only for forgery, conviction for theftmust be reversed. People v. Johnson, App. 4 Dist.1975, 24 Ill.App.3d 1048, 322 N.E.2d 519. Criminal Law k 1186.1

In prosecution for forgery, where defendant's objection to admission of

testimony of witness who drove automobile in which defendant was apprehended was sustained, defendant could not complain of fact that witnesses did not testify state did not establish that driver of automobile did not commit forgery. People v. Rice, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 329, 258 N.E.2d 841. Criminal Law k 1137(5)

Even if evidence of items from defendant's wallet should not have been admitted in prosecution for forgery, where items were not required to support conviction but were purely cumulative, admission of items would not require reversal of conviction. People v. Rice, App.1970, 122 Ill.App.2d 329, 258 N.E.2d 841. Criminal Law k 1169.2(5)

Jury in prosecution for forgery must be accurately instructed and record must be free from prejudicial error, where evidence of guilt is not clear and convincing. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill. 149. Criminal Law k 805(1)

In prosecution for forging certification of check with intent to prejudice Sanitary District of Chicago and with uttering a false check, knowing it to befalse, Supreme Court would take judicial notice that Sanitary District of Chicago was a body politic and corporate in view of fact that such District was incorporated by a public statute. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698,361 Ill. 526. Criminal Law k 304(7) 137. ---- Preservation of issue, review

Where defense counsel neither made a pretrial motion to suppress defendant's identification nor objected when defendant was identified by storekeeper who allegedly received forged draft from defendant, due process objection could not properly be made upon appeal. People v. Thomas, App.1971, 132 Ill.App.2d 198, 267 N.E.2d 703. Criminal Law k 1036.1(7); Criminal Law k 1044.1(4)

Matron of county home accused of forging indorsements to county warrants couldnot complain on appeal of admission of evidence of good character after date of alleged offense and up to date of indictment, where her counsel agreed to admission of such evidence. People v. Church, 1937, 7 N.E.2d 894, 366 Ill.

149. Criminal Law k 1137(5)

Validity of instruction on presumption of innocence in prosecution for forgerywas not reviewable by Supreme Court, in absence of objection or exception to giving of instruction. People v. D'Andrea, 1935, 198 N.E. 698, 361 Ill. 526. Criminal Law k 1038.1(5); Criminal Law k 1056.1(3.1) 138. ---- Indictment, review

Failure of indictment for forgery to name payee of check did not in and of itself render judgment based thereon void and subject to attack for first timeon appeal. People v. Brown, App. 3 Dist.1976, 37 Ill.App.3d 398, 346 N.E.2d 165. Criminal Law k 1032(5)

Where indictments charged that defendant, with intent to defraud, knowingly made check, document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purported to have been made by a particular party, indictments allegeddate of occurrence, name of drawee bank and amount of check, transcripts of preliminary hearing established payee named in check, and trial transcript further showed that check was offered and admitted into evidence, that defendant denied making of check and that failure to name payee in indictment in no way prejudiced defense to charge, indictment was sufficient to apprise defendant of precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading resulting in conviction as bar to future prosecution arising out of same conduct and thus, indictment was sufficient towithstand attack raised for first time on appeal. People v. Gilmore, 1976, 63Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456. Indictment And Information k 71.4(4)

Defect in forgery indictment arising out of failure to allege manner in which items were capable of defrauding could be raised by defendant for first time on appeal. People v. Dismore, App. 5 Dist.1975, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 342 N.E.2d151. Criminal Law k 1032(5) 139. ---- Discovery, review

Failure of the State to disclose, in forgery case, defendant's oral statements

to bank loan officer was error, but the error was not reversible, as defendantdid not ask for a continuance or an opportunity to interview the loan officer while he was on the stand, and as defendant admitted signing his brother's name to note but claimed that he did so with his brother's authority. People v. DeBord, App. 4 Dist.1978, 18 Ill.Dec. 672, 61 Ill.App.3d 239, 377 N.E.2d 1308. Criminal Law k 1166(10.10)

Where it was not clear that there was either handwriting analysis or report made thereof by FBI and it was not apparent that hand writing analysis report,if there was one, was favorable to defendant or material to his guilt or innocence, alleged failure of State to turn over to defendant, prior to trial on charges of uttering forged instrument, handwriting analysis made by FBI didnot constitute serious error warranting reversal following defendant's failureto pursue matter further at trial level. People v. Mays, App. 3 Dist.1976, 38Ill.App.3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235. Criminal Law k 1037.1(1)

Defendant was in no position to claim surprise or prejudice on introduction oftwo drafts, which represented proceeds of allegedly forged note and which defendant had deposited with bank in which he maintained an account, notwithstanding the People's answer, to pretrial motion seeking disclosure of favorable evidence, that they were in possession of no such evidence, since drafts were admittedly of defendant's own making and he certainly knew of their existence and availability. People v. Custer, App. 5 Dist.1972, 11 Ill.App.3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753. Criminal Law k 1169.1(2.1)

Two drafts, which represented proceeds of allegedly forged note and which defendant had deposited with bank in which he maintained his account, were notevidence that would have been considered favorable to defendant since they constituted an integral part of defendant's plan to obtain and withdraw proceeds of note from the accepting bank; accordingly, defendant's pretrial motion to compel disclosure of all evidence favorable to him and in control ofthe prosecution did not call for disclosure of the drafts and the People's answer that they were in possession of no such evidence did not prohibit them

from placing drafts in evidence. People v. Custer, App. 5 Dist.1972, 11 Ill.App.3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753. Criminal Law k 627.8(6) 140. ---- Sentence reduction, review

Presumption that trial court, in imposing sentence on defendant convicted of forgery, considered defendant's limited period of law-abiding behavior as mitigating factor was applicable where there was no statement in the record tending to indicate otherwise. People v. Danis, App. 2 Dist.1984, 84 Ill.Dec.798, 129 Ill.App.3d 664, 472 N.E.2d 1194. Criminal Law k 1144.17

In forgery prosecution wherein defendant pled guilty, record, including a presentence report, did not warrant reduction of two to six-year concurrent prison sentences for each offense, which defendant claimed was committed to maintain a heroin habit. People v. Brom, App. 2 Dist.1975, 27 Ill.App.3d 936,327 N.E.2d 479. Criminal Law k 1183

Imposition of sentence of 6 to 14 years on defendant who was 18 years old at time of offense, who was convicted of forging $18 check, who had reasonably good employment record, and who had been previously committed to mental hospital was excessive and would be reduced to minimum of two years and maximum of six years. People v. Griffin, App. 5 Dist.1972, 8 Ill.App.3d 1070,290 N.E.2d 620. Criminal Law k 1183

Although trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation granted defendant on his plea of guilty to crime of forging a check in the amount of $14.25, the sentence of two to five years for the forgery was excessive and would be reduced from one to three years, where record showed that, after trial judge had announced he was revoking defendant's probation, the chief probation officer, without any verification, was permitted to reciteinto the record that defendant had been incarcerated for several offenses. People v. Spinnie, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 711, 288 N.E.2d 510. Sentencing AndPunishment k 2032

Sentence of eight to fourteen years' imprisonment for forgery should be modified to provide a minimum sentence of three years, six months, and a maximum sentence of ten years. People v. Williams, App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 261, 287 N.E.2d 186. Criminal Law k 1184(4.1)

Sentence of from one to fourteen years in the penitentiary, entered upon defendant's plea of guilty to crime of forgery, would not be reduced, where record showed that, although defendant knew before sentence was pronounced that state's recommendation would be one to fourteen years, he nevertheless waived probation, waived a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, and waived the opportunity to speak in his own behalf, and where state's attorney, trial court and defendant's own counsel deemed the sentence proper. People v. Gilbert, App.1970, 130 Ill.App.2d 719, 264 N.E.2d 856. Criminal Law k 1183 141. ---- Remand, review

Remand was required for trial court to order state crime lab to perform handwriting analysis of indigent defendant and for limited hearing on results to determine whether defendant did not sign note in question so that his forgery conviction should be vacated and he should be given new trial with opportunity to weaken state's case by presenting analysis results in order to contradict credibility of state's witnesses. People v. Dickerson, App. 4 Dist.1992, 179 Ill.Dec. 930, 239 Ill.App.3d 951, 606 N.E.2d 762. Criminal Lawk 1181.5(3.1)

Where Appellate Court's decision affirming forgery conviction, with resulting sentence of not less than two nor more than 14 years, had not become final at time Unified Code of Corrections became effective, case would be remanded to trial court for requisite hearings and imposition of a sentence in conformity with requirements of Code. People v. Custer, App. 5 Dist.1972, 11 Ill.App.3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753. Criminal Law k 1181(2)

Where statement of trial court that "the matter is more aggravated by the circumstances of perjury and so forth" tended to indicate that trial court, infixing sentence for forgery, considered certain information not in record as evidence, otherwise valid conviction would be affirmed but sentence would be vacated and cause remanded for resentencing. People v. White, App.1971, 130 Ill.App.2d 775, 267 N.E.2d 129. Criminal Law k 1182

Trial judge's advisory recommendation that minimum and maximum limits of imprisonment under sentence to indeterminate term of from 1 to 14 years

imprisonment should be 1 year and 14 years, respectively, coincided with penalty for forgery prescribed by Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, <section> 277 (repealed), so that it was unnecessary to remand cause with directions to enter a proper sentence. People v. Lantz, 1944, 55 N.E.2d 78, 387 Ill. 72. Criminal Law k 1188

720 I.L.C.S. 5/17-3, IL ST CH 720 <section> 5/17-3

Current through P.A. 95-1 of the 2007 Reg. Sess.