do political parties matter in higher education? – an

Do political parties matter in higher education? Draft, do not cite. Jens Jungblut, University of Oslo __________________________________________________________________________________

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27th CHER Annual Conference

8 – 10 September 2014, Rome

Do political parties matter in higher education? – An analysis of party

preferences in higher education policy in four European countries

Jens Jungblut ([email protected])

Department of Education, University of Oslo

Draft Version, please do not cite


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1. Introduction

Studies on partisan policies in education have been somewhat of a blind-spot in political science.

However, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in this area, which to a limited extent also

addressed higher education (HE) policy (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2011). Parallel, HE policy itself

gained more saliency especially in Europe since massification led to a situation where a significant

part of the public budget is spent on HE and the sector is expected to deliver solutions for other

policy areas (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011).

The limited existing literature on partisan preferences in HE policy mainly uses data and coding of the

Manifesto Research Group / Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) for large-n analysis of party

positions (see for example Ansell, 2008, 2010; Busemeyer, Franzmann, & Garritzmann, 2013). This is

problematic as the CMP coding differentiates neither between different levels of education nor

between support for educational expansion and improvement. As contrary to secondary education,

access to tertiary education is skewed towards the more wealthy part of the population (Lucas,

2001), the difference between levels of education and the desire for educational expansion versus

educational improvement creates meaningful dissimilarities. Therefore, it is necessary to use a more

refined approach to uncover partisan preferences and the dynamics of party conflicts in HE policy.

Furthermore, the existing studies analyze the parties’ HE policies solely along one re-distributive

dimension. However, political parties also show differing preferences in connection to the way to

steer public sectors (Ansell & Lindvall, 2013; Gingrich, 2011).

Thus, this study provides an in-depth analysis of party positions in HE policy based on a two-

dimensional conceptual framework that combines a re-distributive dimension with one focusing on

control and steering of HE. Methodologically the paper employs a qualitative content analysis to

investigate the parts on HE from election manifestos of all relevant parties from four European

countries: the UK, Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), Norway and the Netherlands. The guiding

research questions are: In how far do political parties in the four countries differ in their proposed HE

policies? How well do the expectations based on the two-dimensional analytical framework describe

these partisan dynamics?

The next section will present the two-dimensional analytical framework and will be followed by the

presentation of the data and methods employed. The fourth section will present the party positions

in HE policy in the four countries, followed by a discussion of the main findings. The conclusion

summarizes the results, highlights their relevance for the existing literature and presents avenues for

further research.

2. Conceptualizing party conflicts in HE policy

The expectation of conflicts between parties starts from an assumption that they represent different

groups within a population with differing political views that offer opportunities for parties to get

electoral support in exchange for corresponding political actions (Peters, 2005). Therefore, it can be

expected that parties offer political programs that are appropriate to their electorate as well as the

ideological characteristics of the party. This idea that differences in the political views of a nation’s

population shape the political conflicts between the parties has already been well described in the

classic work by Lipset and Rokkan on societal cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).


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Most of the existing studies that analyze political party positions on HE policy do so using one

analytical dimension, which captures socio-economic conflicts and the question whether HE policy is

used as a tool for societal re-distribution (i.e. Ansell, 2008, 2010; Busemeyer et al., 2013) and are

often based on large-n analysis of the CMP data. Both choices introduce analytical problems as

discussed below.

Whereas the authors analyzing HE policy along the re-distributive dimension are right in their

assessment that political parties differ in this respect, a fact also supported by empirical studies

analyzing differences in policy outcomes (i.e. Busemeyer, 2007, 2009; Rauh, Kirchner, & Kappe,

2011), they are wrong in assuming that this is the only dimension that structures political

competition on HE. Another dimension where political parties show different priorities is linked to

the question how and by whom the control over the HE sector is exercised (Jungblut, 2014).This two-

dimensional approach to the analysis of party position in HE reflects the general trend in the

literature on party competition in other policy areas (i.e. Häusermann, Picot, & Geering, 2013; Kriesi,

1998; Kriesi, 2010). These two dimensions, their potential indicators and related expectations about

party positions in HE policy are presented below.

2.1 The re-distributive dimension

The re-distributive dimension of party conflicts in HE policy addresses its potential for socio-

economic change. Conflicts here are mainly about the question whether a party uses HE for re-

distribution or not. As participation in HE offers the possibilities to upgrade one’s skills, to limit the

threat of unemployment and to acquire more cultural capital, HE has the potential to serve as a

political tool for re-distribution (Ansell, 2010; Boix, 1997). Re-distribution normally manifests in the

form of enlarged public spending in the respective sector. Several studies have found that the

partisan composition of the government matters for the level of public HE spending (i.e. Busemeyer,

2007; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Schmidt, 2007). However, contrary to other more direct

forms of re-distributive actions, like welfare state programs, it is not possible to simply link parties of

the political left with more public spending for HE. Contrary to primary or secondary education, HE is

not a public good accessible by all members of a society (Ansell, 2010). Rather, participation in HE is

skewed towards the wealthy part of the population and socio-economic background of students is

found to be positively related to their likelihood of attending university (Lucas, 2001; Raftery & Hout,

1993). This means that the re-distributive capacity of HE is dependent on the existing level of

participation.

If a HE system has low participation rates, then it is mainly the wealthy part of the population that

attends HE and therefore enlarged public spending in this sector without significantly increasing

participation, would be a tool of reverse re-distribution (Ansell, 2010; Rauh et al., 2011). In contrast,

if a HE system has a large participation rate, parties of the political left favor higher public spending

in the sector because of its re-distributive capacities (Ansell, 2010). At the same time, they should in

general favor a widening of access to HE, both concerning the number of students and the entrance

requirements needed.1

1 Policies that loosen the formal entry requirements, by for example allowing people with advanced vocational education to enter HE, could partially balance out social selection during secondary education and make HE access less skewed.


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Another indicator is the level of private HE spending. Introducing or increasing tuition fees is a way to

shift some of the costs of HE to its users. In a situation where a left party is facing a HE system with

low participation rates, it might use this tool to limit the public costs for expansion of HE (Ansell,

2010). In contrast, in a situation where access to HE is already expanded, the preference for

expansion of private HE spending shifts to parties of the right, as they will use increased private HE

spending as a way to deter further access into HE to protect their electorate’s labor market

advantages (Wolf & Zohlnhöfer, 2009). Another way to increase the possibilities to access HE for less

privileged parts of society is increased student support. Therefore, when analyzing a party’s HE policy

position, the positions on student support also needs to be taken into consideration.

To sum it up, the re-distributive dimension of party conflicts in HE describes whether a party favors a

HE system that can be characterized as expansive or whether the party prefers a more restrictive

system (Jungblut, 2014). Four main indicators should be taken into consideration:

1. Public spending for HE

2. Access to HE, in terms of student numbers and access requirements

3. Private spending for HE

4. Student support

One can formulate several expectations on how different political parties position themselves on this

dimension (Jungblut, 2014). Social Democratic Parties (SDP) can be expected to support an expansive

HE system combined with limiting private HE spending, as this provides strong re-distributive

possibilities to its electorate and allows for social upward mobility. Rooted in the idea that

individuals should be able to use their skills to improve their socio-economic status by themselves

without state interference as well as the notion that the education system should cater to the labour

market’s needs to ensure the future well-being of today’s knowledge economy, Liberal Parties (LP)

can be expected to support an expansive HE system. This is mainly to ensure that the economy is

well supplied with qualified graduates. However, due to the Liberals’ focus on the ability of the

individual to shape his/her future, it can be expected that they favour some form of individual costs

for attending HE. This would have the positive effect that it would ensure that public spending for HE

would remain limited. A Christian Democratic Party (CDP) can be expected to be in favour of a more

restrictive HE system, on the one hand because of its desire to limit re-distribution and protect the

wealthier part of its electorate, but also on the other hand because of its support for vocational

professions. Conservative Parties (CP) can be expected to shield their electorate from re-distribution.

Therefore, they prefer a restrictive HE system. Such a system would on the one hand limit public

spending and on the other hand protect the labour market advantage of the CP’s electorate that

profits from the skewed-access to HE.

Comparable expectations are harder to formulate for other party families. Anti-establishment parties

(AEP) at the left and right fringe of the political spectrum are known for having only very limited

positions concerning HE policy, making it hard to conceptually pin point them (for details see Ansell,

2010: 137ff). Green parties (GP) are harder to place because their electorate is more and more

drawn from high income and highly educated strata, while their election manifestos hold diverse

positions having both politically left and right characteristics (Rauh et al., 2011). Thus, it can be


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expected that GP as well as AEP at the left and right end of the spectrum favor an expansive HE

system.2

2.2 The control dimension

The second dimension is linked to the question who controls how the HE sector (Jungblut, 2014), and

it is based on conceptual considerations from recent contributions to the field of party competition

that identify conflicts between managers and socio-cultural specialists or libertarian and

communitarian values (Bornschier, 2010; Kriesi, 1998), in essence highlighting differing preferences

linked to the distribution of authority, power, autonomy and steering. Ansell and Lindvall (2013) have

shown that political conflicts in education focus also on the amount of direct control of the state vis-

à-vis the educational institutions; different political parties prefer different levels of direct control

and that this significantly shapes the structure of the educational sector.

Since the early 1980s, the relationship between the state and the public sector has become more

open to changes (Gingrich, 2011; Olsen, 1988), which include the rise of new public management

(Christensen, 2011) and increasing relevance of markets. While there has been strong discursive

convergence, there is divergence with regards to implementation, due to institutional legacies as

well as decisions by actors (Pollitt, 2001). Therefore, shifts in the composition of governments can

cause changes in the objectives of reforms (Pollitt, van Thiel, & Homburg, 2007). Opening up the

state - public sector relationship has led to conflicts related to the question, who holds the effective

control over a certain public sector, which encouraged political parties to take diverging positions on

this issue (Gingrich, 2011).

Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) distinguish between four steering modes, which are useful for

describing the relationship between HE and the state: (1) the sovereign rationality-bounded mode,

where steering lies with the government, (2) the institutional mode, where steering decisions are

taken within autonomous universities, (3) the corporate-pluralist mode, where different stakeholders

negotiate the steering, and (4) the supermarket mode, which uses market mechanisms to steer the

sector. These modes differ with regard to whether a state control model or a state supervising model

is used (Vught, 1997). The different forms of political control over HE lead to differing levels of

centralisation of power between the state and the HE sector. As political parties have distinct

preferences how to steer a public sector and how much autonomy professional communities should

enjoy, it can be expected that these also play a role in their positions in HE policy.

To capture the different political preferences towards the state – HE sector relationship four

indicators will be used that resemble the four steering modes:

1. The dominance of the government in controlling HE;

2. The autonomy of HE institutions to steer themselves;

3. Steering through negotiation between stakeholder groups;

4. Steering through market mechanism and competition.

Therefore, preferring a strong and active state that shapes the life of its citizens, a SDP will favour a

more centralised control of HE, and a dominant role of the government, sometimes in combination

2 In the case of extreme right parties due to the social composition of their electorate which is not participating in HE so far, or in the case of extreme left and Green parties due to their ideological preference for re-distribution.


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with the inclusion of stakeholders such as student unions or trade unions. A CDP, being generally in

favour of giving competences to local institutions, and putting an emphasis on the qualitative

homogeneity of public services will see an important role for the state in assuring an equal level of

quality also in HE. Therefore, they will opt for autonomous HE institutions that steer themselves,

while ensuring that the government uses its power to assure an even quality.

CPs support more de-centralised control, because they prefer smaller state structures and more

streamlined public services, often combined with forms of market competition. Furthermore, CPs are

not opposed to heterogeneity in the quality of HE given their preference for market competition.

Therefore, they should favour autonomous HE institutions which are competing in the marketplace.

Just like CPs, LPs support a small public sector, a more streamlined state structure and market

competition. They see heterogeneity in the quality of HE not as a problem for the state but rather as

an issue which is regulated through market mechanisms. They also support the autonomy of HE

institutions to enable them to compete freely with others and find their niche in the (inter-)national

HE market. Thus, LPs can be expected to favour market-based steering while granting HE institutions

substantive autonomy.

It can be expected that AEPs at the left and right fringe of the political spectrum, would also prefer

the government to be the dominant actor in HE steering. GPs, due to their more diverse electorate,

should favor a steering approach based on the inclusion of different stakeholder groups.

These eight indicators and the related expectations provide the conceptual basis for a qualitative

content analysis of election manifestos.

3. Methods and data

Even though the data for each country is presented in a concise manner in the following section, the

analysis is based on a detailed qualitative content analysis (QCA) of political parties’ election

manifestos. The focus is on those parts of the manifestos that address HE policy. The paper uses a

qualitative approach for two reasons. First, the analysis is exploratory, given that so far there is only

very limited research analysing in detail the differences between political parties. Second, the CMP

does not offer a separate and sufficiently elaborated coding for HE policy,3 necessary for

distinguishing between party positions for different educational sectors or more specific policy

preferences (Busemeyer et al., 2013, p.10). Given the aim of the study, it is necessary to employ a

more detailed approach and analyze in-depth a limited number of cases to uncover the substantive

party positions linked to HE.

The QCA performed for this paper is based on a coding scheme, generated using the indicators

presented earlier. The coding was performed by a single coder using the MAXQDA software package.

The data consists of election manifestos of all relevant parliamentary parties in the four countries

under study for two consecutive elections that lead to differing governments. Election manifestos are

seen as the best possible data source to extract policy positions from as they are public documents,

geared towards a greater audience and written in a rather clear fashion to get policy positions

transported to the electorate (Budge, 2001). They are the only collective policy statement a party

makes, written by the party leadership and functioning also as a unifying pressure towards both the

3 One code is used combining both expansion and improvement, see: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/


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members and the leaders (Laver & Garry, 2000). The manifestos have been retrieved from the raw

data of the CMP project, the database of polidoc.net and directly from the parties.

The countries for this study, Norway, the Netherlands, the UK4 and the German Bundesland of North

Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), were chosen for several reasons. First, as HE policy in Germany is within

the competences of the Bundesländer and not the federal level, it is necessary to analyse the

partisan dynamics on HE on this level. NRW was chosen because it is the largest federal state.

Second, the countries differ in terms of several institutional variables that potentially impact the

partisan competition on HE, such as varieties of capitalism (Iversen & Stephens, 2008), HE and skill

systems (Graf, 2013), types of democracies (majoritarian or consensus) (Lijphart, 1999). At the same

time, all are European countries, ensuring a common socio-cultural and historical background and

therefore the applicability of the two-dimensional cleavage structure (Busemeyer et al., 2013 p.531).

Focusing on two consecutive elections limits the timeframe of the analysis in order to minimize the

influence of intervening supra-national or global dynamics, such as the Bologna Process or shifts in

the so-called global scripts (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011).

In total the database consists of the following election manifestos:

Table 1: Overview of countries, elections and parties’ manifestos included.

Country Election year Parties UK 2005 Conservative, Labour, Liberal

Democrats 2010 Conservative, Labour, Liberal

Democrats NRW 2005 SPD, CDU, FDP, Greens, WASG5 2010 SPD, CDU, FDP, Greens, Die

Linke Norway 2009 AP, FrP, Høyre, KrF, SP, SV,

Venstre 2013 AP, FrP, Høyre, KrF, SP, SV,

Venstre Netherlands 2010 CDA, CU, D66, GroenLinks (GL),

PvdA, PVV, SGP, SP, VVD 2012 CDA, CU, D66, GroenLinks (GL),

PvdA, PVV, SGP, SP, VVD

4. Partisan HE policy position

This section presents the results of the QCA in a condensed tabular form, where a plus sign

symbolizes a party’s support and a minus symbolizes a party’s opposition. The use of brackets

indicates a less clear position, which will be explicated in the text.

4 In the UK the focus will be on England, as Scotland and partially also Wales have the authority to formulate their own higher education policy. Nevertheless, the political debate around higher education in England happens during the UK parliamentary elections. 5 In the 2005 elections both the WASG and the PDS ran as separate parties, with the WASG being the more successful one reaching more than 2% of the votes. In 2010 both parties had merged into the new party Die Linke.


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4.1 The UK

Of the four countries, the UK election manifestos include by far the fewest statements addressing HE

policy, in particular concerning the control dimension. Table 2 presents a summary of the party

positions.

Table 2: Party positions in the 2005 & 2010 UK elections.

Indicators Conservative 2005

Conservative 2010

Labour 2005

Labour 2010

Lib Dem 2005

Lib Dem 2010

Re-distribution

Public spending

+ +

Private spending

- + (+) - -

Access (student numbers)

(+) + + (-)

Access (qualifications)

+ +

Student support

+ + +

Control Government

control

Autonomy of HE institutions

+ + +

Stakeholder-based steering

Market mechanisms

+

With regard to the re-distributive dimension the Conservatives have a mixed profile. Concerning

private HE spending they move from proposing in 2005 to abolish tuition fees introduced by Labour,

to supporting the 2010 Browne Report which argued for significantly higher tuition fees (Shattock,

2012, p.166f), thus supporting an increase of private spending (Conservatives, 2005, p.9; 2010, p.17).

They don’t have a position related to public spending and the only policy concerning access to HE is

the suggestion in 2010 to provide 10.000 extra university places. While the support for an increase in

tuition in 2010 is in line with the conceptual expectations, the limited expansion in student numbers

and especially the anti-tuition fee policy of the Conservatives in 2005 is contradicting them. However,

compared to the other two parties the Conservatives still show the most restrictive preferences on

the re-distributive dimension. Another explanation for the Conservative’s proposal to abolish tuition

in 2005 is the 2.5 party system, which creates an incentive to propose opposing policy solutions

instead of using issue saliency to distance oneself from other parties.

Labour proposes to increase access both in relation to the entrance qualifications as well as a growth

in student numbers (Labour, 2005, p.41; 2010, p.3-7). Regarding private spending, Labour advocates

in 2005 to continue their policy of a maximum tuition of 3.000 GBP. They also support increased

public spending and the expansion of support for students from poorer families. In 2010 Labour still

proposes to enlarge student support and public funding, but does not address issues linked to private


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spending. Except for their general support for the existing level of tuition fees, Labour’s policies are

in line with the conceptual expectation that a SDP should favor an expansive HE system. The support

for a limited amount of tuition fee can be explained by either path dependency or as a way to finance

an expansion in access without putting too much additional pressure on the public purse (Ansell,

2010). As the tuition fees are combined with the demand for more support especially for students

from poorer backgrounds, their restrictive effect on access to HE is limited.

The Liberal Democrats show a stable preference in relation to private spending, as they support to

abolish tuition fees throughout the UK (Democrats, 2005, p.12; 2010, p.39). At the same time, they

want to enlarge student support, and they have no position regarding public funding. Concerning

access to HE, they show a mixed position since they support wider access in relation to the entrance

qualifications, but also a balance between HE and vocational training (Democrats, 2010, p.39). The

policies proposed by the Liberal Democrats are partially in line with the expectations; although

supporting an expansive HE system, as a Liberal party they should also support private funding,

which they do not. One explanation for this discrepancy is that by generally opposing tuition fees,

they are able to acquire a distinct political profile that separates them from the other two parties.

In relation to the control dimension, the Conservatives fulfill the conceptual expectations

(Conservatives, 2005, p.9; 2010, p.17). Labour is not positioned on this dimension in either of the

manifestos and the Liberal Democrats only address it in 2010 and favor, as expected, more autonomy

of HE institutions (Democrats, 2010, p.29). Such lack of party competition in the UK on the control

dimension is not entirely surprising, considering that ideas of New Public Management have been

embraced rather early in the UK (Pollitt et al., 2007), and that the British 2.5 party-system favors

political conflicts to be aligned along only one dimension rather than multiple dimensions as it is the

case in multi-party systems.

4.2 Germany - NRW

The election manifestos for the elections in NRW show a substantial amount of policy positions

linked to HE. Table 3 offers an overview of the parties’ positions.

Table 3: Party positions in the 2005 & 2010 elections in NRW.

Indicators CDU 2005

CDU 2010

SPD 2005

SPD 2010

FDP 2005

FDP 2010

Grüne 2005

Grüne 2010

WASG 2005

Linke 2010

Re-distribution

Public spending

+ + + + + + + +

Private spending

+ + - - + + - - - -


- + + + + + +


+ + + +

Student support

+ + + (+) (+) + +

Control Government

control + + + +

Autonomy of + + + (-) + +


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HE institutions Stakeholder-

based steering + + + + + +

Market mechanisms

(+) + +

Overall the party positions on HE policy in NRW show quite stable profiles. In relation to the re-

distributive dimension, one can identify two blocks that align along the question whether a party

favors tuition fees or not. The first block consists of the CDU and FDP, who formed a coalition

between 2005 and 2010, promoting increased private spending by introducing tuition fees up to 500

Euros per semester (CDU, 2005, p.21; 2010, p.8; FDP, 2005, p.17ff; 2010, p.14ff), as well as expansion

of student support. The Liberals additionally focus on providing more merit-based stipends, financed

partially by private benefactors. While the FDP’s proposal to expand student support, especially using

merit-based measures, fits the expectations for Liberal parties, the CDU’s position in favor of more

student support contradicts the expectation towards CDPs, as they should be in favor of a more

restrictive system. One explanation may be that because the proposal to introduce tuition fees is

ground-breaking (there were no general tuition fees so far), aligning it with an increase in student

support limits opposition. As the increase in student support is mainly loan-based, additional public

costs and the expansive effect on the HE system can be considered as limited.

Concerning public spending and access, both parties show slightly different profiles. The Liberals, as

expected, support an expansive HE system by promoting more public spending and, especially in

2010, wider access to HE. The CDU proposes in 2005 to initiate a review of the federal regulation on

access to universities with the intention to limit the number of newly enrolled students, while at the

same time not positioning themselves on public spending (CDU, 2005, p.21). This is also in line with

the more restrictive HE system preferred by CDPs. In 2010 the CDU proposes to expand public

spending, increase student numbers, and widen access by making it easier for people with vocational

qualifications to enter HE (CDU, 2010, p.8f). This seemingly contradicts their preference for a more

restrictive HE system; however, because the increase in student numbers is linked to an expected

increase in the number of secondary school graduates, it mainly serves the purpose to keep the

relative level of participation equal. Overall, the Liberals as well as the Christian Democrats confirm

the conceptual expectations.

The second block is formed by the Social Democrats and Greens (in a coalition since 2010), and to a

certain extend the Left party. These parties, as presented in Table 3, behave in line with the

conceptual expectations (GRÜNEN, 2005, p.92ff; 2010, p.80ff; SPD, 2005, p.6; 2010, p.19ff; WASG,

2005).

With regard to the control dimension the party differences are also very pronounced. The FDP

confirms the expectations by supporting market mechanisms combined with autonomy for

universities (FDP, 2005, p.17ff; 2010, p.14ff). The CDU is expected to support a combination of

government control and autonomy of universities as a way to steer the sector. In their manifestos

they mainly support more autonomy of HE institutions. However, they also stress the need for a

diminished role of the state and propose a limited amount of market mechanisms to be introduced

(CDU, 2005, p.21). This partial discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the HE system of NRW,

like other German Bundesländer, is characterized by a dominant role of the government in steering


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(Vught, 1997). Therefore, even after the implementation of the CDU’s reform the government would

still have a role in steering HE.

The Social Democrats show a mixed profile. While some positions are in line with the expectations -

more involvement of stakeholders, in particular internal stakeholders and students and highlighting

the role of the government in higher education steering (SPD, 2005, p.6; 2010, p.21) – they also

propose, much stronger in 2005 than 2010, increased autonomy of HE institutions. Here also the

exceptionally strong role of the government in steering HE in Germany is relevant; the proposal of

the SPD in 2005 to give universities more room to manoeuver upholds the principle of a strong

government influence. Furthermore, in 2010, after CDU and FDP had implemented their autonomy

oriented reforms, the SPD opposes most of these reforms in their manifesto.

The Greens fulfill the conceptual expectations by supporting the involvement of stakeholders in the

steering of HE, combined with the demand for a strong role of the government (GRÜNEN, 2005,

p.92ff; 2010, p.80ff). Finally, the Left party argues, as expected, for more state control of the HE

sector, also combined with a stronger involvement of stakeholder groups (LINKE, 2010, p.11f).

4.3 Norway

In their manifestos to the 2009 and 2013 parliamentary elections in Norway all parties address HE on

both conflict dimensions. Even though there are many consensual topics, one can also find party

specific profiles (see Table 4).

Table 4: Party positions in the 2009 & 2013 elections in Norway.


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Indicators AP 2009

AP 2013

Høyre 2009

Høyre 2013

FrP 2009

FrP 2013

KrF 2009

KrF 2013

SP 2009

SP 2013

SV 2009

SV 2013

Venstre 2009

Venstre 2013

Re-distribution

Public spending

+ + + + + + + + + + + +

Private spending

- - - - - - - - -


(+) (+) + +


+ + + + + + +

Student support

+ + + + (+) + + + + + + + + +

Control Government

control + + + + + + + +


+ + + + +


+ + + +

Market mechanisms

+ + + + +


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In general the party competition in HE policy in Norway can be characterized as limited, not due to a

lack of positions in the manifestos but rather due to inter-party consensus, in particular, related to

the re-distributive dimension. Two very consensual policy issues can be identified: (1) the need to

spend more public money on HE and (2) the need to enlarge student support. The introduction of

private spending in the form of tuition fees for public universities is a taboo and no party promotes it,

while many parties actively oppose the idea, similar to other Nordic countries where fees for national

and EU students are also politically impossible, given the Nordic Model of HE with its focus on equal

access and public funding (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011). Access to HE is only a topic for a few parties

and there is generally less attention geared towards it. If it is addressed then mainly in connection to

widening access by making the transfer from vocational to HE easier. The absence of intense political

competition on the re-distributive dimension can be linked to comparatively high participation in HE

and the steady income from oil and gas leading to less scarce public funding.

Concerning the conceptual expectations along the re-distributive dimension both the Social

Democrats and the Socialist Left fulfill the expectation of supporting an expansive HE system

(Arbeiderpartiet, 2009, p.24ff; 2013, p.30; Sosialistisk-Venstreparti, 2009, p.17ff; 2013, p.51ff). The

liberal Venstre fulfills the expectations only partially. As expected, they support an expansive HE

system, however they do not prefer private spending (Venstre, 2009, p.29ff; 2013, p.17ff), primarily

because of the mentioned taboo concerning fees. The positions on the re-distributive dimension of

both the conservative Høyre and the Christian Democratic KrF are even more contradictory as they

do not support a restrictive HE system. However, also here one can contextualize this discrepancy.

First, it is questionable whether a really restrictive HE system is per se a viable policy option in a

Nordic welfare state. Second, the support of both Høyre and KrF for more public funding can be

explained with the exceptionally good funding situation of the Norwegian public sector. Third, the

well-funded public sector and the Nordic Model explain why both parties argue for more student

support. Noticeably, Høyre plans to increase the cap on personal income with which students are still

eligible for student support, to strengthen the rights of students in private HE institutions, promoting

increased student numbers in the economically important fields of engineering and technology

(Høyre, 2009, p.9ff; 2013, p.15ff). Finally, Høyre is one of only two parties that do not position

themselves against private spending in either of its manifestos. Thus, in the context of Norwegian

discussions, Høyre can be seen to partially fulfill the expectations towards CPs; they take the most

restrictive position in a political discourse generally geared towards expanding HE.

Due to the small number of existing European farmer’s parties, no conceptual expectations have

been formulated in relation to this party family. The Norwegian SP supports on the re-distributive

dimension an expansion of the HE system. However, they support an increase in the number of

students only in relation to the economically important subjects in the sciences and refrain from

positioning themselves explicitly against private spending (Senterpartiet, 2009, p.40ff; 2013, p.59ff).

This position is in line with their general profile as a protector of the Norwegian welfare services but

also encompasses their earlier orientation to more conservative economic policies (Allern, 2010,

p.172). The populist right FrP by and large fulfills the expectations of supporting an expansive HE

system (Fremskrittspartiet, 2009, p.62ff; 2013, p.70ff).

The parties’ positions on the control dimension are more diverse and two groups can be identified.

The first supports a stronger role of the government in steering, combined with stakeholder

involvement. As expected one can find the Social Democrats (Arbeiderpartiet, 2009, p.25ff; 2013,


14

p.30) and the Socialist Left in this group, the latter combining this with a greater role of stakeholders

(Sosialistisk-Venstreparti, 2009, p.17ff; 2013, p.51ff). Finally, the Farmer’s Party SP supports a

dominant role of the government in HE steering, combined with a focus on stakeholder involvement,

especially concerning representatives of the municipalities (Senterpartiet, 2009, p.40ff; 2013, p.59ff).

Even though no conceptual expectations on the position of Farmer’s Parties have been formulated,

the policies on HE steering proposed by SP fit their general profile of being a left-leaning non-urban

party (Allern, 2010, p.172f).

KrF’s position on the control dimension fits the expectations outlined earlier, given their focus on the

coherence of educational offerings throughout the country and common standards for the

monitoring of first year students (Kristelig-Folkeparti, 2009, p.71ff; 2013, p.61ff). However, they lack

the expected support for more institutional autonomy of universities.

The second group favors market mechanisms combined with a focus on the autonomy of HE

institutions. This group includes Høyre, Venstre and FrP. Venstre’s and Høyre’s positions fit the

expectations. The profile on the control dimension of the populist right FrP does not fit the

expectations outlined earlier in relation to anti-establishment parties at the right fringe of the

political spectrum, but rather resembles the profile of a Conservative party, since they promote

steering of HE based on institutional autonomy and market mechanisms.

This divergence could be explained by the fact that FrP is not a classical case as they have, contrary to

other anti-establishment parties, a quite elaborate section on HE policy in both manifestos.

Furthermore, this illustrates the normalization of FrP in recent years (a trend that lead them to be

part of the government coalition in 2013). Today’s FrP is more of a neo-liberal populist party (Allern,

2010, p.211f), and their position on the control dimension also resembles this more liberal shift.

4.4 The Netherlands

In the Dutch multiparty system not all parties focus equally on HE policy, but all parties address it in

one way or another (Table 5).

Table 5: Party positions in the 2010 & 2012 elections in the Netherlands.


15

Indicators CDA 2010

CDA 2012

CU 2010

CU 2012

D66 2010

D66 2012

GL 2010

GL 2012

PvdA 2010

PvdA 2012

PVV 2010

PVV 2012

SGP 2010

SGP 2012

SP 2010

SP 2012

VVD 2010

VVD 2012

Re-distribution

Public spending

+ + + + + (+) + + + + + + + + +

Private spending

+ + + + (+) (-) - - (+) + + (-) - + (+)


(+) + (+)


(+) +

Student support

(+) (+) (+) (-) (+/-) + (+/-) (+/-) (+/-) (+) (+) (+) (+) + (-) (-)

Control Government

control + (+) + + + + +


+ + (+) (+) + (+) + + + +


+

Market mechanisms

+ + + + + + +


16

In relation to the re-distributive dimension, access to HE is only addressed by a few parties, while all

other indicators have been addressed by nearly all parties. With the exception of PVV, who does not

take any position, all parties support the idea to expand public spending. In relation to private

spending and student support, the parties show diverging preferences.

The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) by and large fulfills the expectations towards CDPs. They plan

to increase private spending (higher tuition fees) and support more public spending, but only in

relation to research, innovation and areas of excellence (CDA, 2010, p.28ff; 2012, p.45f). Contrary to

the expectations, CDA supports to keep the grant-based student support system stable. Although this

can be seen as being in favor of re-distribution, it also reflects the social responsibility inherent in the

ideological basis of CDPs. The second CDP, the Christian Union (CU), has a similar profile. They

support higher tuition fees, but also more general public spending (ChristenUnie, 2010, p.26; 2012,

p.31), as well as grant-based student support. The third CDP, the orthodox Calvinist SGP, has a similar

policy profile as CDA and CU, supporting an increase in fees and general public spending (SGP, 2010,

p.18f; 2012, p.10), but favoring a diversified support system with additional student loan schemes. All

three CDPs, as expected, support a more restrictive HE system, but, in line with the idea of Christian

social responsibility, they also maintain the existing grant-based student support system.

The manifestos of the populist right PVV offer barely any positions in HE. Concerning re-distribution

they propose that all foreign students should pay tuition, leading to a limited increase in private

spending (PVV, 2010, p.29&31; 2012, p.43&45). Furthermore, PVV wants to keep the student

support system stable. Due to the lack of explicit HE preferences, it is not possible to definitively

position PVV on this dimension.

The preferences of the liberal VVD are in line with the expectations: more public spending (to

enhance the quality of HE), more access, allowing universities to determine fees (thus increasing

private spending), shift from grants to loans in student support and abolish additional fees for

students who study longer (VVD, 2010, p.13&17; 2012, p.24f). In total, their position is favoring an

expansive system in combination with more private funding.

The second liberal party D66 supports, as expected, a more expansive HE system that shifts costs

towards the users. They advocate an increase in public funding to improve the quality of education

(financed by a shift from a grant-based to a loan-based student support) combined with increased

grants for students from disadvantaged backgrounds to prevent negative effects on accessibility ,

expanding access to students younger than 17 (pending necessary qualifications), increase of tuition

fees for secondary degrees as well as abolishing fees for students who study longer (D66, 2010,

p.37ff; 2012, p.24ff). Although somewhat contradicting, these are only minimal changes to the

existing fee regime.

Another party that behaves according to the expectations are the Social Democrats (PvdA), as they

support an increase in public funding, a shift towards loans combined with scholarships for

disadvantaged students, limiting fees for secondary degrees, abolishing fees for longer studying, and

an increase in student numbers in technology subjects and the PhD level (PvdA, 2010, p.26f; 2012,

p.9f&20). The Greens (GroenLinks) also fulfill the expectations. In 2010 they support a limited

increase in public spending (focusing on EU spending for HE) and suggesting a “student wage” for

every student to enhance access (GroenLinks, 2010, p.24ff), a position maintained in 2012 through a

focus on life-long learning and adult education in HE (GroenLinks, 2012, p.17f). Overall, their idea is


17

to limit private spending (reducing fees or abolishing additional ones for longer studies) and increase

public spending, shifting student support from grants to loans while increasing the number of grants

for disadvantaged students to maintain access.

The Socialist SP, as expected, supports an expansive HE system, increasing public spending, keeping

the grant system and expanding it for disadvantaged students. In 2010 they propose to increase

access to HE, keep tuition fees stable (correcting for inflation), while opposing the idea of

differentiated fees (SP, 2010, p.25f), while in 2012 they proposes to limit private spending (abolishing

additional fees for longer studying, banning higher fees for second degrees) (SP, 2012, p.31ff).

In relation to the control dimension the parties show distinct profiles. In general, the three CDPs

(CDA, CU and SGP) support, as expected, more autonomy for HE institutions. CU wants to limited the

autonomy in relation to the role of humanities and the importance of ethics (ChristenUnie, 2010,

p.26; 2012, p.31), which is in line with Christian values. While the CU completely fulfills the

conceptual expectations, the CDA and the SGP combine the focus on autonomy with more market

mechanisms, giving them a profile that is more in line with the expectations towards liberal or

conservative parties. This pattern - parties combining enlarged autonomy with more market

mechanisms or a strong role of the government with more stakeholder involvement - is recurrent

and will be addressed later on.

The two liberal parties VVD and D66 by and large fulfill the conceptual expectations - more

autonomy and more market. In 2010 D66 limits their support for more autonomy by proposing to set

a minimal number of students underneath which study programs are not allowed to be continued

and create a new system of Bachelor degrees (group existing programs in more general and efficient

clusters). Although both of these proposals limit the universities’ room to manoeuver, other

proposals, i.e. more freedom for HE institutions to decide who to admit enlarges autonomy

significantly.

PvdA, as expected, focuses mainly on a strong role of the government in HE steering and in 2012 also

on stakeholder involvement, especially linked to external stakeholders (regional authorities and

businesses). GroenLinks supports government control by regulating stronger the core activities of

universities. This focus on the government as the dominant actor is not in line with the conceptual

expectations, but can be attributed to the background of GroenLinks being a merger of several anti-

establishment parties on the left fringe of the political spectrum, who in turn would be expected to

be in favor of a strong government role. At the fringes of the spectrum, SP fulfills the expectations by

supporting a strong government but PVV supports more autonomy of HE institutions (proposing

more freedom for them in student selection), which is not in line with the conceptual expectations.

However, the very limited amount of policies makes it hard to definitively position PVV on the

control dimension.

5. Discussion and conclusion

The analysis has delivered some interesting results. First, it was shown that parties do offer different

policies in HE and that these differences can be structured along two dimensions, one capturing re-

distributive conflicts and the other conflicts linked to the control of HE. Second, the analysis supports

Ansell’s finding (Ansell, 2010, p.137ff) that anti-establishment parties at both ends of the political

spectrum show less interest in HE (i.e. the German Die Linke or the Dutch SP and PVV). Third, even

though most of the parties fulfilled the conceptual expectations, party competition depends not only


18

on the party’s ideological background but also has a “national flavor”, since the existing HE system is

the point of departure for the parties’ policy proposals (i.e. the fee taboo in Norway, or the strong

role of the government in NRW). This is in line with the argument that the existing HE system creates

path dependencies for parties’ policy proposals and thus limits possibilities to pursue more ideal

party positions (Ansell, 2010).

Concerning positions on the control dimension, the parties often combined two of the four steering

modes presented in the conceptual framework. Parties that favor a centralized control often

combined stakeholder involvement with a strong role of the government, while those that prefer

decentralized control combined autonomous universities with the use of market mechanisms. On the

one hand, for implementing market mechanisms autonomous HE intuitions are a pre-requisite. On

the other hand, the link between stakeholder steering and a strong role of the government reflects

the impact of NPM and post-NPM reforms (Christensen, 2011). These shifts in the approach to public

sector steering made it hard, even for parties that generally favor an interventionist state, to rely

solely on classic governmental steering methods. Therefore, involving stakeholder groups, especially

those that can be expected to be ideologically closer to the parties’ positions (i.e. students in the

case of SDPs and GPs), combined with significant government influence, offer the possibility to

harmonize the parties’ desire for influence with the specificities of diverse and modern HE systems.

Policy harmonization on the European level could generate the expectation of policy convergence.

However, the analysis shows that parties offer diverging policies in HE, supporting earlier claims that

policy convergence in HE takes place, when governments follow similar policy agendas (Heinze &

Knill, 2008). The divergence in the parties’ preferences towards HE implies that political parties

indeed matter in HE policy.

In relation to the guiding research questions, the study has shown that political parties do have

distinct HE policies and that these differences were by and large in line with the conceptual

expectations:

The parties propose different policies along both dimensions. On the re-distributive dimension SDPs

and GPs support expansive HE systems with limited or no private costs for higher education. LPs also

support expansive HE systems; however, they prefer some form of private spending. CDPs showed a

preference for more restrictive HE systems; however, they still maintained student support systems

and were less restrictive than CPs. In relation to the control dimension, SDPs and GPs preferred more

centralized control combining a strong government with stakeholder involvement. LPs and CPs

showed a preference for more de-centralized control, supporting autonomous HE institutions and

market mechanisms. CDPs showed a mixed profile on this dimension, calling for further analysis.

Furthermore, the analysis confirmed that AEPs on both ends of the political spectrum have only

limited positions concerning HE. Finally, the results have demonstrated that the structure of the

existing HE system influences the party competition by providing path dependencies. This accounts

for cross-national variation in HE preferences of parties with similar ideological backgrounds.

This has several research implications. Party families were found to show distinct sets of preferences,

not only in relation to the re-distributive but also to the added control dimension. Given the limited

number of cases, studies including more and different cases using a similar conceptual approach

would allow to validate the findings presented above. This can be done for other European countries,

given socio-cultural similarities and the common HE area, but it should also be expanded to other


19

regions (see also:Peralta & Pacheco, 2014). Finally, this calls for investigation in how far different

policy position lead to differing policy outputs and outcomes once a party gets into government;

especially, as the existing studies in this area only address re-distributive questions. All in all, this

study expanded the knowledge base on partisan dynamics in HE, highlighting the two-dimensionality

of partisan conflicts and policy profiles of different party families.


20

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do political parties matter in higher education? – an

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