dlf vs belaire & park place owners - report by qubrex submitted to cci (competition commission...

Report on Data, Models, and Estimation of Market Share

of Builders Operating in the Luxury (High-End)

Residential Segment of Gurgaon

by

QuBREX - QuBit Real Estate eXchange

(A Unit of QuBit Technologies Pvt. Ltd)

Registered Office: 1/926, Naiwala, Karol Bagh, New Delhi – 110005

Branch Office: 3311, Sector 23, Gurgaon, Haryana – 122017

www.QuBREX.com

9811987371, 9871219911

May 08, 2011

www.QuBREX.com of 78

Table of Contents

1. Objective of the Report ..................................................................................................................... 3

2. Context of the Report ........................................................................................................................ 3

3. Concept (and Mis-Concept) of Market Share of an Enterprise ......................................................... 4

a. Definition of Market Share............................................................................................................. 4

b. Mis-Concept of Active Stock to Measure Market Share in JLL & Genesis Models ..................... 4

c. Misrepresentation of Accuracy of Data In JLL’s “Active Stock” (Market Share) Calculations .... 8

d. Misrepresentation of Continuous Reality by Discrete Temporal Snapshots in Jones Lang LaSalle

(JLL) & Genesis Models ....................................................................................................................... 9

e. Limitations of the JLL and Genesis Data & Models ...................................................................... 9

4. Relevant Geographic Market ........................................................................................................... 11

5. Relevant Product Market ................................................................................................................. 16

f. Data Collection & Creative Commons License ........................................................................... 17

g. Accuracy of Data & Information Collected ................................................................................. 18

h. Definition of Luxury Product in Relevant Geographic market .................................................... 19

i. Luxury Market Share (i.e., above Rs 7000 psf) of Various Builders Over The Years ................. 22

i. Market Share By Completed Properties ................................................................................... 24

ii. Market Share By Launched (Incl. new launches, under construction property, and

completed) Properties ...................................................................................................................... 35

j. Real Estate, Luxury, & Location .................................................................................................. 46

6. DLF's Pioneering “Walk to Work” Integrated Township of Gurgaon ............................................. 48

7. DLF & Consumer Preferences ........................................................................................................ 53

8. DLF & Sales Organizers Preferences .............................................................................................. 54

9. Conclusion of the Report ................................................................................................................. 55

10. About QuBREX ........................................................................................................................... 56

11. Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 57

k. Appendix A – List of Group Housing By Private Builders In Gurgaon ....................................... 58

l. Appendix B – DLF Takes Steps To Keep Speculators At Bay ..................................................... 74

m. Appendix C – Check Out These Super Luxury Flats ............................................................... 75


1. Objective of the Report

The report was made at the request of DLF Park Place Residents Welfare Association and Belaire

Owners Association, with reference to Cases 18 & 19 of 2010 in the Competition Commission of India.

The objectives of the report were to:

1. Collect specific data for residential projects in Gurgaon including launch dates, possession dates, number of apartments, current prices (March 2011) of accommodation, and their

locations. The list of residential projects has been enumerated in Reports of Jones Lang LaSalle

(JLL) (Mar 04, 2011) and Genesis (Mar 15, 2011).

2. Collect additional relevant data and information about the builders, their customers, and market

forces that help describe the property eco-system in Gurgaon.

3. Study the models put forth by JLL and Genesis and provide expert comments on whether the

models are in agreement with the property eco-system of Gurgaon.

2. Context of the Report

Cases 18 & 19 of 2010 have been filed in the Competition Commission of India, alleging that DLF is a

dominant player in the relevant geographic and product market, and relief is sought from the august

Commission. The Competition Act (2002) and the Competition (Amendment) Act (2007) lay down in

Section 19 of the said Act the Duties, Powers And Functions of Commission, and this report is a study

of the property market in light of Clauses 19 (4) (6) & (7).


3. Concept (and Mis-Concept) of Market Share of an Enterprise

One of the major elements of this report is the estimation of the market share of the enterprises (Clause

19.4 (a) of the Competition Act) operating in the relevant geographic and product market.

a. Definition of Market Share

Market share (from Wikipedia.org) in strategic management and marketing is, according to Carlton

O'Neal, the percentage or proportion of the total available market or market segment that is being

serviced by a company. It can be expressed

• as a company's sales revenue (from that market) divided by the total sales revenue available in

that market.

• It can also be expressed as a company's unit sales volume (in a market) divided by the total

volume of units sold in that market.

It is generally necessary to commission market research (generally desk/secondary research) to

determine. Sometimes, though, one can use primary research to estimate the total market size and a

company's market share.

b. Mis-Concept of Active Stock to Measure Market Share in JLL & Genesis Models

The first step in calculating the market share is to identify the relevant product and geographic market,

and then the market share calculations can be done. Unfortunately, as noted in the JLL and Genesis

reports, once the relevant product and geographic market is identified, the market share for Indian

Property Markets is hard to compute if these calculations are to be based upon a company's unit sales

volume, or on the company's sales revenue. The unit sales volume or the sales revenue is hard to

obtain for Indian Real Estate enterprises. Thus, some proxy or estimator has to be used for the unit

sales volume and sales revenue.

The Genesis and Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) Models use a proxy called “Active Stock” for calculating

market share. This questionable (and with shifting definition) artifact from the JLL Model called

"active stocks" (based on "active projects") is an intellectually formidable, but flawed and contrived,

parameter. The “Active Stock” has at least 3 different definitions between the JLL and Genesis reports,

and in some cases this "active" stock/ projects may actually be contradictory to what it is purporting to

measure.

www.QuBREX.com

Consider, for example, the sales data of two companies A & B in Figure

launched one project A1 in 2006 First Quarter, while company B has launched 4 projects B1 (in 2006

Quarter 1), B2 (in 2007 Quarter 1), B3 (2008 Quarter 2), and B4 (2009 Quarter 1). Company A sells

only 620 units over the time period 2006 to 2009, and thus is holding an unsold inventory

at the end of 2009 Fourth Quarter. Company B has sold out each of the 4 projects B1, B2, B3 and B4

within the same calendar year of each project's launch. At the end of 4 years company B has sold out all

the 4000 launched units, and is holding

The total market by unit sales volume in the example above is 620 + 4000 = 4620 units, out of which

the share of Company A is 620/4620, i.e 14% while that of Company B is 4000/4620, i.e. 86%..

It is now relevant to ask as to how do the JLL

market shares?

Figure 1

the sales data of two companies A & B in Figure 1 above. Company A has

First Quarter, while company B has launched 4 projects B1 (in 2006


only 620 units over the time period 2006 to 2009, and thus is holding an unsold inventory



the 4000 launched units, and is holding 0 inventory.



It is now relevant to ask as to how do the JLL and Genesis definitions of “Active Stock”

of 78

above. Company A has

First Quarter, while company B has launched 4 projects B1 (in 2006


only 620 units over the time period 2006 to 2009, and thus is holding an unsold inventory of 380 units





“Active Stock” represent these


Definition 1 -

JLL1

JLL Report

March 2011 –

page 23

Active Stock: A project which has been formally launched and

has units available for primary sale (still with developer) at the

end of a particular year is considered active during that year.

Active stock is the total number of units in active projects at the

end of a particular quarter/year.

Definition 2 –

JLL2

Genesis Report –

March 2011 –

page 19

74. In a second report, JLL calculated market share based on the

estimated value of active stock.

74.1 Therefore the way the active stock for a year is calculated is

that if the project is not completely sold out, all the units of the

project are included as active stock. If a project is launched in a

given year, and is sold out completely in the same year, it is still

considered to be an active project for the year and the total

number of units of the project is reflected in its market share for

the year. Therefore, all developments including the ones which

are completely sold out in the year of its launch get picked up by

market share calculations using this method.

Definition 3 -

Genesis

Genesis Report –

March 2011 –

page 20

74.5 JLL's methodology is a valid approximation of the market

share. However, in the methodology adopted, if an active project

continues to be active in the subsequent year/years, the units

thereof would be repeated in the subsequent year/years during

which the projects remain active. In order to consider the effect

of such duplication, we requested JLLS to calculate the market

share on basis of the data of all four years 2007-2010 by taking

the units of the active projects, only once, though the projects

may have remained active in more than one year, so as to avoid

duplication.

There a footnote (number 29) to this definition in the Genesis

report, that says "However, we were unable to audit the result

obtained by this exercise due to reasons of confidentiality."

Based on these 3 definitions in the JLL and Genesis reports, the calculations of "active stocks" for

companies A & B would be as in Figure 2.


Figure 2

Thus, the market shares calculated for Companies A & B based on the three definitions JLL1, JLL2,

and Genesis, would be as in Figure 3

Figure 3

Keeping in mind that the actual market shares over 4 years of A are 14% and of B 86%, it can be seen

that

• the original definition of JLL, i.e., Definition 1 (JLL1), shows that A's market share is 100%

while that of B is 0% for all the four years !

• The second definition of JLL, Definition 2 (JLL 2), shows that the market share of companies A

and B as being 50% each for all four years.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Thus, the various versions of "Active Stock" used by JLL as a proxy for the "market share" as

enunciated in Section 19 (4) (a) the CCI Act of 2002 are wrong and misleading. Paucity of data should

not be an excuse for creating loaded and biased metrics.

The definition of Genesis is reasonably closer to the market share, but it is based on misleading data

and biased analysis provided by JLL to Genesis, as discussed in the next section.


c. Misrepresentation of Accuracy of Data In JLL’s “Active Stock” (Market Share) Calculations

Not only are the calculations by JLL in both its reports completely divorced from reality, they are based

on data that has been presented in an intellectually dishonest way. For example JLL in its first report of

March 2011, on pages 15 and 17 states,

• In 2007 the total active stock in the residential market was 24,997 units. Out of this Unitech had

a market share of 14.71% ….

• In 2008 the total active stock in the residential market was at 37,846 units. Out of this DLF had

a market share of 11.8%

• At the end of 2010, the total active stock of Gurgaon has grown to 54,205 units of residential

apartments across categories.

• During the year 2007, the active stock of luxury residential market in Gurgaon was at 9,974

units. … Unitech had the largest market share accounting for 25.82% followed by Emaar MGF

at 18.06% ….

The accuracy of numbers like 24,997, 37,846, 54,205, 9,974 etc, and percentage significant to the

second decimal value like 14.71%, 11.8%, 25.82%, 18.06% without pointing out to the % error

possible in these numbers is intellectually dishonest. Nowhere in the report are the possible errors in

these numbers explained. Worse, as Genesis writes in footnote 29 of its report, the underlying data

was not even shared with them by JLL for reasons of "confidentiality" !

We fail to understand what was confidential about the data.

In any case, the claim that JLL could accurately find the “Active Stock” data, but not the sales data is

specious. As Genesis writes in its report (page vi) "We understand that JLL was not able to calculate

market shares on sales directly due to lack of definitive data on sales during any period. Developers and

their agents were also unwilling to disclose how many units were unsold at any point of time – JLL

could merely determine whether the development was sold out or not." No further explanation is

given about how JLL determines when an active project ceases to be active, i.e.

1. Within how many days, week, or months is JLL's data accurate about cessation of the project

being active? Even an inaccuracy of 15 days in the date of deciding when a project is no longer

active can dramatically change the market share results, especially in JLL's Definition 1.

2. What percentage of units have to be sold by developer before JLL considers it to be no longer

active? 75%? 80%? 99% ? 99.99% ? 100% ? What about a 500 unit project having 5 unsold

units after the 1st calendar year of its launch for the remaining 4 years – will the active stock of

it be 2000 units over 4 years?

3. What is the reliability of the sources of JLL about this cessation data given that developers and

their agents are generally unwilling to share sales data?

4. Some builders have a deliberate strategy to sell only a part of the project in the beginning, and

then sell it in phases over many years, at ever increasing prices, as they inch towards


completion. This is especially true of builders who have small land-banks and may not have

more land to launch another project after successfully completing the current project. Thus,

instead of launching one project after another like developers with large land-banks, smaller

developers may launch one phase after another within the same project. How was this

addressed by JLL?

Given that there are so many potential errors in the data, unless JLL's “Active Stock” data can be

audited and verified, all such data and any analysis based on it must be thrown out with prejudice.

d. Misrepresentation of Continuous Reality by Discrete Temporal Snapshots in Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) & Genesis Models

In addition to severe problems with the data on which JLL and Genesis have based their reports, there

is also a major problem with the model and how both JLL and Genesis calculate market shares on a

year-to-year basis.

Given the fact that the time period from when an apartment is booked to the time it is completed (4 to 5

years) is almost the same as the time period of the current studies (2006 - 2010), taking momentary and

discrete snapshots in time for market share is fraught with errors like the notion of “Active Stock”

clearly shows.

The major problem with calculation of market share based on “Active Stock” is that it takes a snapshot

of the market during a very small period of time. You cannot rest content with the arbitrary digital

snapshots in temporal space, but have to study the analog sweep of time in the marketplace. Thus, we

must study the market as it grows, not study some isolated moments divorced from the past and the

future.

e. Limitations of the JLL and Genesis Data & Models

The approaches taken by JLL and Genesis in their reports of March 2011 are erroneous and misleading.

Neither can the data of JLL be relied on, nor can the methodology of JLL and Genesis be relied upon.

• The reports of JLL and Genesis present a completely wrong and misleading concept of market

share by basing their analysis on the "Active Project" and "Active Stock" notion.

• The data on which “Active Stock” calculations are done for market share is suspicious, and is

presented with a façade of accuracy that is not possible because of the very opaque nature of the

property market, and the inherent difficulty (almost impossibility) of collecting the “Active

Stock” data accurately. The fact that the underlying data provided by JLL has not been audited

or verified, nor shared by JLL with anyone (even with Genesis who were tasked with writing a

report based on it!), gives the impression that the data has been fabricated and contrived.

• The model of taking arbitrary "market share" snapshots on a yearly basis without regard to the

long and multi-year process by which apartments are marketed, booked, constructed,

completed, and possession handed over, is erroneous. Also, the arbitrary snapshots in time are

limited views, without context of the past and future of the marketplace. Further, by narrowly


defining "market share" as newly "launched projects" from year-to-year, and ignoring the

"completed projects" market share over the years, JLL & Genesis give a partisan picture of the

market share.

• As we shall show in a later section, all these errors lead JLL and Genesis to use the wrong

quantitative criteria about "Luxury" in Gurgaon – they claim it to be Rs 4000 psf or Rs 80 lakhs

(assuming a normal luxury apartment will have a size of about 2000 sq.ft).

• Most importantly, the models of JLL and Genesis bias the study by ignoring the importance

commercial property has in influencing the purchase decision of a residential property. This is

done by asking the wrong rhetorical question about "substitutability" of commercial vs.

residential properties (page 10 para 29 of the Genesis report), and then summarily ignoring the

commercial market by glibly concluding that commercial property is not substitutable with

residential property. This wrong way of looking at the commercial property and residential

property relationship leads both JLL and Genesis to conveniently ignore the role commercial

property plays in the decision of buying residential property, and consequently leads them to

underplay the importance of Gurgaon being the Relevant Geographic Market.


4. Relevant Geographic Market

For most buyers wanting to invest in the DLF brand and its market strength, especially their dominance

in office and retail space market, the only option is to invest in the residential properties and it cannot

be in the commercial properties. Because, DLF as a business strategy, has pioneered the concept of

"Leased Grade A Office" spaces (see Figure 4), and does not sell a large part of its commercial

properties.

Figure 4 From www.dlf.in – accessed on May 01, 2011

DLF does sell the residential properties that it builds in the vicinity of these leased commercial spaces.

It is also well known that people like to live in reasonable proximity of where they work, or where they


think the tenant of their apartment will most probably work, or where they think the eventual buyer of

their residential investment might be working.

Majority of the commercial office and retail spaces built by DLF in the NCR region, are located

specifically in Gurgaon. They are not homogeneously spread over the National Capital Region but

concentrated in Gurgaon. DLF Cyber City in Gurgaon itself may have close to 20 million square feet of

DLF's Grade A office space (page 2 of the DLF Red Herring Prospectus) providing a working space for

over 2 lakh high paying jobs. In addition to office buildings in Cyber City, DLF has many other

commercial office spaces in Gurgaon. For perspective of the magnitude of DLF office space holdings,

it must be noted that the total population of Gurgaon, from the lowly rickshaw puller to the jet-setting

CEO, is estimated to be around 20 lakhs.

A corporate presentation by DLF dated Jan 2011 (See Figure 5) shows that of DLF's total 56 million

sq.ft of under-construction office space in Q3 2011 over 22 million sqft of office space development is

in Gurgaon itself – which is almost 40 % of the total commercial properties being developed by DLF

all over India. For context, DLF has presence in over 30 Indian Cities (See Figure 6). This underscores

the importance of Gurgaon to DLF.

Figure 5: From DLF Analyst Presentation Q3 FY 11

From the buyer's perspective, the attraction to buy in Gurgaon, in the proximity of the office spaces is,

thus, very high. Many people working in Gurgaon would find South Delhi too expensive and Noida too

far away for comfort. Majority of them will want to buy something in Gurgaon itself. The buying

decisions amongst various regions of NCR are also influenced by factors like:

a. law & order issues,

b. quantum of investment required, and

c. proximity to airport or railway stations etc,


which are very different amongst Noida, Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Greater Noida, Delhi and

Gurgaon. Further, the nature of property ownership is also different - e.g. properties in Gurgaon

are sold as freehold, whereas in Noida it is leasehold.

Figure 6: From www.dlf.in – accessed on May 01, 2011

From the builders & developers perspective, there are some local advantages that builders &

developers have in certain regions of NCR which are not available to them in the other regions. The

advantages for different builders vary as they move from Noida to Ghaziabad to Delhi to Faridabad to

Gurgaon. To naively imagine that any entity has similar strengths in all regions or places of NCR is


likely to be a wrong assumption, and buyers would be very well aware of the relative strengths and

weaknesses of the respective builders in different regions like

a. Existing Land Banks,

b. Ability to Manage Local Administrations,

c. Favorable Political Equations and

d. Track Record of Completed Projects.

DLF is the founder of New Gurgaon, and it has special strengths in this geographic market. To any

investor wanting to invest in Gurgaon, the first question is whether to buy a DLF or non-DLF property.

And to any buyer wanting to invest in DLF the question is where in Gurgaon – not where in NCR.

Figure 7 shows the DLF residential and commercial properties in Gurgaon on a Map. The Green pins

indicate DLF's commercial property & the red pins indicate a residential property. It can be seen from

the map that the DLF Land banks are close to the Delhi border, and have the residential properties

located in the orbit of the commercial properties.

Figure 7: Approx Map of Commercial Properties & Residential Properties of DLF in Gurgaon with

DLF City (3000 acres) very roughly outlined, and DLF's New Gurgaon (4000 acres) shown in the

horizon near Manesar. This view is as if looking from a plane in Delhi heading to Jaipur, flying over

the central artery of Gurgaon, i.e. the National Highway-8.


JLL and Genesis reports have wrongly ignored the importance of commercial spaces during the

decision making process of a buyer, by raising a misleading rhetorical question and then summarily

dismissing it. Genesis in its report on page 10, Section 3.1.1, asks "Is residential property separate from

commercial property?" Paras 29 & 30 go on to say, "From a demand perspective, a buyer or renter in

India would not view commercial and residential properties as substitutable (emphasis added) … It is

reasonable to conclude that these markets are sufficiently differentiated such that they should constitute

separate product markets."

The issue of commercial property is wrongly framed by Genesis as whether a buyer in the market

considers buying commercial space "substitutable" with buying residential space. Substitutable

means that a buyer can buy one or the other. And it is surprising that Genesis poses this question of

“substitutability” in the DLF context because DLF rarely sells its commercial spaces. In fact DLF has

pioneered the leasing of “Grade A Commercial Space,” and does not sell them. So, for someone

wanting to invest in the DLF brand and its strengths, there are negligible options for investing in the

"commercial properties” of DLF. The only choice is to invest in residential properties of DLF, many of

which are around these commercial properties of DLF.

It would be more appropriate to frame the commercial property versus residential property issue as

whether they are complementary or synergistic, i.e., does presence of commercial property in a

neighborhood increase the demand of residential properties too? The obvious answer is yes.

It can be safely concluded, for the reasons stated above, that the Relevant Geographic Market for the

study in Cases 18 & 19 of 2010 (DLF Park Place Resident's Welfare Association & Belaire Owners

Association) is Gurgaon.


5. Relevant Product Market

The petition (Cases 18 & 19 of 2010) has been brought to the august Commission by the owners of

DLF Belaire & Park Place Apartments. The product in question are the services provided by the builder

to build an apartment, specifically the DLF Belaire and DLF Park Place apartments located in Gurgaon.

• The DLF Belaire and DLF Park Place property has been identified by DLF in their Corporate

Presentation (May 2008-2009) and on their website (as shown in Figure 8) as falling in the

Luxury category, and in the same presentation DLF defines super-luxury properties as those

which fall above the price point of Rs 35,000 Per sq.ft.


• The current effective market price (inclusive of car parking and all additional charges) as of

March end 2011 of DLF Belaire is around Rs 9000 psf, and DLF Park Place also commands a

similar price per sq.ft in the current market.

• The Director General's Report (Report of Director General in Case of DLF Belaire – Vol I of III

– Case No. 19 of 2010 Page 58, Section 5.4.6) also mentions the relevant product as high-end

property costing in excess of Rs 200 - 250 lakhs.

• JLL and Genesis also accept that the relevant market is "Luxury" and have done market share analysis using this criterion.

Though qualitatively all are in agreement about the relevant market being "Luxury," JLL and Genesis

quantitatively define the "Luxury category" as anything above Rs 80 lakhs, or Rs 4000 psf (assuming

an apartment size of about 2000 sq.ft). The DG report defines high end or luxury as something costing

over 200-250 lakhs.


We undertook a comprehensive study to collect the data about all high rises in Gurgaon, and to analyze

the data for identifying the segments of affordable, mid-income, luxury, and super-luxury

(segmentation as per various corporate presentations of DLF) in Gurgaon.

The aim was to identify what could reasonably be considered as Luxury based on the price. It is

accepted by Genesis (on page no. 13, para 44), “We believe, on the basis of our discussion with JLL

and DLF, the most effective and most workable indicator of whether a residential property

should have luxury status is price.” We, in this report, have used PRICE as our working parameter

for identifying “Luxury Properties,” despite the fact that luxury involves other parameters like

‘amenities’, ‘location’ or ‘size’.

f. Data Collection & Creative Commons License

The procedures of collection of data in Indian real estate market are not well established, and much of

the data is hard to collect because of the very nature of the ways transactions happen. This has been

noted by both the JLL and Genesis reports, and is reiterated by us. But, there is specific data that can be

collected with a reasonable accuracy.

The data includes

1. Name of Builder,

2. Name of Project

3. Launch Year of the project

4. Completion Year of the project

5. Approximate Number of Apartments in the Project

6. Common Sizes (sq.ft) of Apartments (or Configurations)

7. Current Approximate Market Price (in Rs or Rs psf) as in March-end 2011.

We have a fairly comprehensive list of high rise apartments offered by Private builders like DLF,

Unitech, and Ansals in Gurgaon, launched in the time period from 1990 onwards till last quarter of

2010. Unlike JLL which has hidden its data under a cloak of confidentiality even from Genesis, we are

making this data available under the Creative Commons License Attribution-NonCommercial

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (This license lets others remix, tweak, and build upon our work

non-commercially, and although their new works must also acknowledge us and be non-commercial,

they don’t have to license their derivative works on the same terms.) Any non-commercial usage should

be attributed to www.QuBREX.com

The List of Group Housing projects by Private Builders like DLF, Ansals, and Unitech etc. is attached

in Appendix A.


g. Accuracy of Data & Information Collected

As with any large scale exercise of data collection, and especially with so many developers and

brokers not easily sharing data, there are some parameters that are pretty accurate and some that are

approximations in Appendix A. The approximations and minor inaccuracies in the data should not have

any major effect on the conclusions that are drawn from the data.

1. Name of builder - Accurate

2. Name of project - Accurate

3. Launch Year of project (as there are pre-launches, soft launches, launches by invitation and hard launches, so the launch dates may have error of a few months plus or minus). In case of

multiple phases, or in some cases re-launches, the errors in months of assigning a single date to

the project may be larger.

4. Completion Year of project – As possession is offered in phases, there might be an error of

few months plus or minus.

5. Total Number of Apartments (As sometimes they might have been calculated based on the

floor plans and the site layouts, the accuracy may be off by tens of apartments in larger

complexes).

6. Common Sizes (sq.ft) of Apartments (or Configurations) – We chose a set of configurations

(area in sq.ft of the various options like 2BR, 2BR+Study, 3BR, 3BR+SQ, etc) that represented

almost all price points in the project at which an apartment could typically be purchased. We

collected data on the common apartment sizes available in that projects so that the actual cost to

a buyer could be calculated for the actual options (i.e. 2BR, 2BR+Study, 3BR, 3BR + SQ, 4BR

etc) that a buyer would encounter while buying into that project.

7. Current Prices as of March 2011 - These are generally the market averages, and options a

little higher and little lower may be found in the market.

8. The Equally Weighted Average Number of Apartments by Configuration While we were

able to improve upon just low-high range of prices by getting the actual discrete prices, we were

not able to collect the breakdown of the number of apartments according to each configuration

in the project. It is a tedious and a very time consuming process of finding out, how many

apartments are 2BR, 3BR, etc but is doable for anyone interested in conducting this exercise.

So, we had to make an approximation about the number of apartments per configuration. We

knew the total number of apartments in the project, and then we made the assumption that each

configuration has the same number of apartments – i.e. if the total number of apartments was

1000, and there were 4 configurations (2BR, 3BR, 4BR, 5BR), then the number of apartments

in each configuration was one-fourth, i.e. 250. This exercise was necessary to be able to

calculate the market share by both the capital value and the number of apartments.

9. The Effective Market Price in Rs psf was calculated by dividing the Market Price of the

apartment in Rs by its area in sq.ft., where the Market Price includes Basic Sales Price +

EDC/IDC + Parking Charges + Club Membership + other charges as payable.

10. The Effective Market Value of Builders Project By Configuration (Rs crore) was calculated

by multiplying the Market Price of the apartment by the number of apartments for that

configuration.


h. Definition of Luxury Product in Relevant Geographic market

We first plotted all the 420 configurations in Appendix A in ascending order of the Effective Market

Price in Rs psf in Figures 9 & 10. This was done for all options available in 2006 and for all options

available in 2010 in Figure 9 & 10 respectively.

Figure 9

Figure 10


It can be easily seen that in 2006 only 3 options (with an effective market price of Rs 4000 psf or

less as in March 2011) were available in all of Gurgaon out of a total of 207 options. In 2010 the total

number of options had increased to 420 and the options of effective market price below Rs 4000 psf

had also increased to 99. This increase in options of apartment configurations below Rs 4000 psf

happened after 2007 because on Feburary 05, 2007 the new Masterplan of Gurgaon Urban Complex

2021 was notified and many new sectors were brought under the ambit of R-Zone. It was possible to

launch low price residential options in these newer sectors (Sector 58 onwards, and including Sectors

37 C & D) because these newer sectors have low priced land compared to the Sectors 1 to 57 (which

includes DLF City, Ansal's Sushant Lok, Unitech's South City etc). These newer sectors also have no

urban infrastructure, no roads, no sewerage, no electricity, no schools, no hospitals, no malls, etc.

Table 1 below shows that the number options that have a current market value of Rs 4000 psf in

Gurgaon were 3 in 2006, 19 in 2007, 67 in 2008, 77 in 2009, and 99 in 2010. This represents only 1.4%

of the total options in 2006, 8.1% of the options in 2007, 22.7% of the options in 2008, 21.4% of the

options in 2009, and 23.5% of the options in 2010. Thus, if the JLL and Genesis contention that

everything above Rs 4000 psf is to be considered a luxury apartment is to be believed, then 98.6%

of all the options available to a buyer in 2006 were falling in the "luxury" segment. Or that 91.9%

in 2007, or 77.3% in 2006, 78.6% in 2009 and 76.4% of all the available options in 2010 fell in the

luxury category in Gurgaon. This is of course not right. One would expect the affordable, normal,

and mid-income range of the housing to dominate the market place, and luxury to be a small

subset of the whole market. Table 2 shows the options in Table 1 as percentages of total

availability.

Table 1: Price points are at current market value as of Mar 2011.

Table 2: Price points are at current market value as of Mar 2011.

In the Tables 1 & 2 we have also shown the number and % of apartment configurations, during the

years 2006 to 2010, that were available then and have an Effective Market Price today of less than Rs

7000 psf and Rs 8000 psf. The same data is shown in Figure 11.


Figure 11

In 2006 when the owners of the luxury apartments DLF Park Place & DLF Belaire purchased their

apartments, only 3 out of 207 options were available below the price point of Rs 4000 psf. It would be

wrong to claim that only 3 options in 2006 fell in the affordable, normal, and mid-income housing

category while 204 options were falling in the luxury category, but that is exactly what choosing Rs

4000 psf as the price point for starting of the luxury options in Gurgaon by JLL and Genesis implies.

Another reason why Rs 4000 psf cannot be considered as the starting point for luxury apartments is

because the circle rate or Collector's Rate in March 2011 for Group Housing Societies by private

builders like DLF, Ansals, Unitech etc is Rs 4000 psf. (http://gurgaon.gov.in/sro_ggn_apr2011.htm as

accessed on April 01, 20011). So if the Govt. Authority has the lowest rate as Rs 4000 psf in Gurgaon

for multistory apartments, this could be considered as the starting price for affordable and mid-income

housing and cannot be, in any case, the price of luxury housing. The price of Rs 4000 psf is where we

could assume affordable, normal, and mid-income housing to start.

Thus, the notion of JLL and Genesis as taking Rs 4000 psf, (or Rs 80 lakhs for a typical 2000 sq.ft

apartment) as Luxury in Gurgaon is not only wrong but also illogical. In fact, based on the circle rates

and actual options available in Gurgaon, the price of Rs 4000 psf may be taken as the starting point for

affordable, normal, and mid-income housing.

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Percentage of Options Available

Yearwise For Various Price Points in All

of Gurgaon

less than Rs 4000 psf




What then should be the starting point for Luxury? We believe a reasonable answer is provided in the

Genesis report on Page 14, para 45, where Genesis states that "an own-use buyer of normal

residential properly is unlikely to consider luxury residential properly as substitutable as prices

can be more than DOUBLE (emphasis added), with significant implications for affordability." Using the metric that the luxury housing prices are atleast double that of normal housing, we could

state that the luxury housing prices in Gurgaon should be atleast double of Rs 4000 psf, i.e Rs 8000 psf,

and atleast double of Rs 80 lakhs, i.e 160 lakhs. This tallies well with the segmentation as described in

the DLF Corporate presentation (May 2008-2009) where it is mentioned that DLF Belaire falls in the

Luxury category - the effective market price of DLF Belaire in Mar 2011 was around Rs 9000 psf,

while the total value of the smallest apartment size of about 2900 sq.ft would be (approx.) Rs 286

lakhs. Similarly, the price of DLF Park Place is approx. Rs. 9000 psf and the total value of the smallest

apartment size of about 1850 sq.ft. would be (approx.) Rs. 166 lakhs. The Director General's Report

also mentions Luxury being above the price range of Rs 200-250 lakhs.

Thus, we can safely consider “Luxury Apartments” as those that have an effective market price in

excess of Rs 8000 psf. For the purpose of this report, we have been a little more conservative and

have decided to set Rs 7000 psf as the lower price limit for the “Luxury Apartments.”

i. Luxury Market Share (i.e., above Rs 7000 psf) of Various Builders Over The Years

Market share analysis based on the number of properties that are currently valued more than Rs 7000

psf for DLF and other builders has been done.

The market share analysis has done for both

• Completed properties and

• Launched properties (which includes new launches, under construction property, and

completed property)

and has been done on basis of the

• Total Number of apartments completed or launched and

• Total capital value of apartments completed or launched (at current Market Price as of

March 2011)

Every completed property was launched at some time, but every launched property has not yet been

completed. Thus, the completed properties are a subset of the launched properties. Completed

properties are a track record of the builder, and is one of the major factors that a buyer in the residential

market considers. In some way, every completed apartment is a de facto sample flat for any project that

the builder may launch in the future. It may be said that the completed properties strongly influence the

consumer preferences in purchasing.


An analysis of the launched properties is also necessary to capture the new entrants in the Residential

Market, and also to look at the medium-term future of the market shares. But, every launched property

may not be completed, or may be completed after delays from the promised completion time.

We present market shares of both completed and launched properties (which includes new launches,

under construction property, and completed property).

• By Number of Apartments: Market shares have been calculated on the basis of number of

apartments, by determining the luxury configurations (2BR, 2BR + S, 3BR, 3BR+SQ etc)

which have and effective price more than Rs 7000 psf. The number of apartments of an eligible

configuration was calculated by equally weighting all the configurations in the project as

described in a previous section.

• By Capital Value of Apartments: Market shares have also been calculated based on the

capital value of apartments, by multiplying the number of apartments of a certain

configuration by the total market value of that apartment and then finding the percentage of the

total market's capital value.

The following is the list of charts for Market Shares for Luxury Apartments (costing in excess of Rs

7000 psf).

1. Market Share by Number of Apartments Completed by 2006





6. Market Share by Capital Value of Apartments Completed by 2006





11. Market Share by Number of Apartments Launched by 2006





16. Market Share by Capital Value of Apartments Launched by 2006






i. Market Share By Completed Properties

Based on Data in Appendix A, we have calculated the various market shares of the builders over the

years, by both the number of apartments completed and the capital value of the apartments completed.

As can be seen from Figure 12 below, in the years 2008 & 2010 no apartments with effective price in

excess of Rs 7000 psf were completed. Hence, the market shares were the same in 2007 & 2008 and

2009 & 2010.

Figure 12

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2006

2007

2009

Number of Luxury Apartments (Rs 7000+ psf)

Completed By Year



Figure 13

59.84%

23.08%

4.32%

3.93%

3.34%

2.98%

2.51%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Vipul

ITC

Market Share of Luxury Apartments (Rs 7000+ psf)

by Number of Apartments Completed By 2006



Figure 14

58.39%

20.84%

7.38%

3.46%

3.16%

2.68%

2.07%

2.02%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Vatika

ITC





Figure 15

58.39%

20.84%

7.38%

3.46%

3.16%

2.68%

2.07%

2.02%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Vatika

ITC





Figure 16

55.05%

21.74%

8.97%

3.17%

2.89%

2.45%

2.00%

1.89%

1.84%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Raheja (Saket)

Vatika

ITC





Figure 17

55.05%

21.74%

8.97%

3.17%

2.89%

2.45%

2.00%

1.89%

1.84%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Raheja (Saket)

Vatika

ITC





Figure 18

54.09%

20.61%

7.26%

6.20%

5.97%

3.82%

2.06%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

ITC

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Vipul

Ansal


by Capital Value of Apartments Completed By 2006



Figure 19

62.62%

16.29%

5.78%

4.76%

4.06%

3.92%

1.35%

1.23%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

ITC

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Ansal

Vatika





Figure 20

62.62%

16.29%

5.78%

4.76%

4.06%

3.92%

1.35%

1.23%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

ITC

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Ansal

Vatika





Figure 21

57.01%

19.37%

8.00%

4.16%

3.55%

3.42%

2.22%

1.18%

1.07%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

ITC

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Raheja (Saket)

Ansal

Vatika





Figure 22

57.01%

19.37%

8.00%

4.16%

3.55%

3.42%

2.22%

1.18%

1.07%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

ITC

Mahindra Gesco

Ambience

Raheja (Saket)

Ansal

Vatika




ii. Market Share By Launched (Incl. new launches, under construction property, and completed)

Properties

We have also done the market share calculations based on all the Launched properties (which includes

new launches, under construction property, and completed property). Not all launched projects

have yet been completed, so there are many more builders compared to analysis of Completed

Properties, and also the new entrants in the Gurgaon Market will show up in these market share

calculations.

As can be seen from Figure 23 below, no Luxury Apartments that cost more than Rs 7000 psf were

launched in 2007, hence the market share in 2006 & 2007 were the same.

Figure 23

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2008

2009

2010

Number of Luxury Apartments (Rs 7000+ psf) Launched

By Year



Figure 24

52.34%

16.85%

6.95%

4.30%

3.22%

2.46%

2.24%

1.98%

1.77%

1.55%

1.54%

1.47%

1.43%

1.06%

0.86%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Parsvnath

Ambience

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

MGF

Bestech

Raheja (Saket)

Emaar MGF

Vatika

ITC

Salcon

Silverglades


by Number of Apartments Launched (New, Under

Construction & Completed) By 2006



Figure 25

52.34%

16.85%

6.95%

4.30%

3.22%

2.46%

2.24%

1.98%

1.77%

1.55%

1.54%

1.47%

1.43%

1.06%

0.86%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Parsvnath

Ambience

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

MGF

Bestech

Raheja (Saket)

Emaar MGF

Vatika

ITC

Salcon

Silverglades






Figure 26

51.89%

16.38%

6.76%

4.18%

3.13%

2.39%

2.18%

1.93%

1.76%

1.72%

1.51%

1.50%

1.43%

1.39%

1.03%

0.83%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

Parsvnath

Ambience

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

MGF

Tata Housing

Bestech

Raheja (Saket)

Emaar MGF

Vatika

ITC

Salcon

Silverglades






Figure 27

51.43%

15.11%

6.24%

4.19%

3.86%

2.89%

2.20%

2.01%

1.78%

1.63%

1.59%

1.39%

1.38%

1.32%

1.28%

0.95%

0.77%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

IREO

Parsvnath

Ambience

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

MGF

Tata Housing

Bestech

Raheja (Saket)

Emaar MGF

Vatika

ITC

Salcon

Silverglades






Figure 28

49.49%

14.54%

6.00%

4.64%

3.71%

2.78%

2.60%

2.12%

1.93%

1.90%

1.71%

1.57%

1.53%

1.34%

1.27%

1.23%

0.91%

0.74%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Vipul

IREO

Parsvnath

Ambience

Emaar MGF

Ansal

Mahindra Gesco

M3M

MGF

Tata Housing

Bestech

Raheja (Saket)

Vatika

ITC

Salcon

Silverglades






Figure 29

53.09%

12.60%

7.37%

5.21%

4.66%

2.71%

2.67%

2.31%

2.31%

1.57%

1.56%

1.45%

1.02%

0.77%

0.70%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Ambience

Vipul

Parsvnath

ITC

Salcon

Emaar MGF

Mahindra Gesco

Bestech

MGF

Raheja (Saket)

Silverglades

Ansal

Vatika


by Capital Value of Apartments Launched (New, Under




Figure 30

53.09%

12.60%

7.37%

5.21%

4.66%

2.71%

2.67%

2.31%

2.31%

1.57%

1.56%

1.45%

1.02%

0.77%

0.70%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Ambience

Vipul

Parsvnath

ITC

Salcon

Emaar MGF

Mahindra Gesco

Bestech

MGF

Raheja (Saket)

Silverglades

Ansal

Vatika






Figure 31

54.25%

11.89%

6.95%

4.92%

4.40%

2.56%

2.52%

2.18%

2.18%

1.48%

1.48%

1.47%

1.36%

0.97%

0.72%

0.66%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Ambience

Vipul

Parsvnath

ITC

Salcon

Emaar MGF

Mahindra Gesco

Bestech

MGF

Tata Housing

Raheja (Saket)

Silverglades

Ansal

Vatika






Figure 32

53.98%

11.16%

6.53%

4.61%

4.13%

3.09%

2.40%

2.37%

2.05%

2.05%

1.39%

1.38%

1.38%

1.28%

0.91%

0.68%

0.62%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Ambience

Vipul

Parsvnath

IREO

ITC

Salcon

Emaar MGF

Mahindra Gesco

Bestech

MGF

Tata Housing

Raheja (Saket)

Silverglades

Ansal

Vatika






Figure 33

52.01%

10.75%

6.29%

4.44%

3.97%

3.21%

2.85%

2.55%

2.31%

2.28%

1.97%

1.34%

1.33%

1.33%

1.23%

0.87%

0.66%

0.60%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

DLF

Unitech

Ambience

Vipul

Parsvnath

IREO

Emaar MGF

M3M

ITC

Salcon

Mahindra Gesco

Bestech

MGF

Tata Housing

Raheja (Saket)

Silverglades

Ansal

Vatika





j. Real Estate, Luxury, & Location

Based on all the Market Share Figures presented in this chapter, it is apparent that DLF was and is the

most dominant player in the Luxury Residential Market with its market share being in excess of 50%

no matter how you slice and dice the data.

A large part of the success of DLF in the residential market is due to its almost absolute dominance in

the commercial sector. This is an outcome of DLF's "walk to work" concept which as DLF says on its

website, it pioneered. By building world class office spaces that it does not sell but leases to top

companies, it creates a magnet in its land-banks, in and around which people desire to have a

residential property – whether for self use or investment. The proximity of over 3000 acres of its land

to the Delhi border is a plus, and combined with office spaces that draw companies out of Delhi into

Gurgaon, it creates a chain effect of drawing the employees of the companies to Gurgaon too. This is of

relevance to the commission as it comes under the Competition Act Section 19.6 (b), i.e. location

specific requirements.

The location, the proximity to commercial office and retail spaces, social infrastructure like the DLF

Golf course, and now with its own rapid metro, own flyovers, and even its own roads DLF is heading

to solidify its lock on Gurgaon.

In its corporate presentation of May 2008 on Integrated townships, DLF has disclosed that in addition

to the 3000 acres that it has in established Gurgaon, it has another 4000 acres of land that falls in the

region of "New Gurgaon," (see Figure 34) i.e. the new sectors of Gurgaon that were notified on

February 05, 2007 in the Gurgaon Manesar Urban Complex Masterplan 2021. Thus, DLF will have

atleast 7000 acres of land in Gurgaon, of which 4000 acres is a clean canvas on which it will create

another integrated township like the 3000 acre one in Gurgaon called the DLF City.

A large chunk of the upscale Gurgaon is morphing into a tight integrated city with DLF at its center and

helm. And this is by design, and one more step in the direction of DLF's pioneering activity – the

integrated township.


Figure 34: DLF's Corporate Presentation of May 2008 discloses its plans for New Gurgaon: A 4000

acres township falling in the new masterplan for Gurgaon, with all segments of residential, commercial,

and retail.


6. DLF's Pioneering “Walk to Work” Integrated Township of Gurgaon

DLF city is a part of DLF pioneering Integrated Township concept, as described on their website.

Figure 35: From www.dlf.in – Accessed on May 01, 20011

As DLF's website www.dlf.in says, DLF has the unique ability for "creating the right mix of high

quality housing, state-of-the-art offices, IT parks, world-class shopping malls, digital

entertainment, leisure and recreation, efficient infrastructure, schools, hospitals and other

community spaces like parks and clubs.

One of the lynchpins of the integrated township is the "walk to work" concept that DLF claims to have

pioneered. See Figure 36 which is a screen grab from DLF's website. It says that "DLF has pioneered

the "walk-to-work" concept in the 3000 acre DLF city where well planned residential developments are

integrated with modern businesses and commercial complexes." It is this integration of the

commercial and residential that is the key to DLF's astounding success, and hence very strange that JLL

and Genesis in their reports should discount DLF's strength in the commercial space as being relevant

to understanding DLF's dominance in the Gurgaon residential market.


Figure 36: From www.dlf.in – Accessed on May 01, 2011


The residential, commercial (office and retail) are inter-linked like nowhere else in the DLF integrated

township of Gurgaon. DLF has pioneered the retail revolution as the screen grab from their website

shows (see Figure 37), they have pioneered integrated townships, pioneered golf course living, and

pioneered Grade A office space leasing.



DLF has pioneered many aspects of the real estate business in Gurgaon, which indicate its strength, and

its ability to almost act independently of what the competition may or may not do. Some of the

business practices pioneered by DLF that the commission may consider under Section 19.4 (m), i.e.

any other factor Commission may consider relevant for inquiry are

• Delay penalty – It is hard to pin down when this started, but Mr. TC Goyal, Managing Director

of DLF, during the launch of their project Express Greens (Manesar) at the DLF offices in Delhi

mentioned that the "Rs 5 per square feet per month" penalty was started by DLF. It was not

meant to penalize DLF or be looked as a penalty, but was just a good gesture on DLF's part to

make their own employees realize the cost of delay. Today of course, this Rs 5 per sq.ft penalty

is too paltry compared to the time-value of money from the buyer's point of view. This Rs 5 per

square feet per month penalty has found its way into the Buyers Agreement of every builder that

operates in Gurgaon.

• Early payment discount. This is different from the down payment discount that is given when

the buyer makes almost 90% of the payment towards an apartment within 30 days of booking

the apartment. Early payment was introduced by DLF during the launch of Express Greens

residential project in Manesar, and was 13% compared to 11% for the down payment discount.

In the early payment, the buyer could make any payment in advance before it was raised by

DLF, and DLF would pay 13% interest on it till the time the payment became due as part of the

construction-linked payment plan.

• Timely payment Discount – This is another innovation by DLF that has been copied by

builders like Emaar MGF. Here if a buyer were to make payments in a timely fashion, as and

when demanded, then towards the possession of the flat DLF would give a 5% discount on the

price at which the property was originally booked.

• Investor lock-in: In 2009, DLF came up with an innovative idea to keep out investors from

buying into their projects. DLF incorporated into the Buyers Agreement a clause that prevented

the buyer of the DLF property from selling the property for 1 year. This is market power that

few builders have. See Appendix B for a news item regarding this.

• ONE PAN one FLAT: DLF also decided that they did not want to sell more than one property

to a single buyer. So they instituted a check of the PAN number, and one PAN number was

eligible for buying only one flat. Other developers would be envious of such market power.

• SELLING BY invitation only: DLF pioneered the concept of “sale-by-invitation” for DLF

Aralias, its pioneering Golf course living project. In this concept you did not apply to buy an

apartment from the company, but the company reached out to you if they thought you were

deserving of living in the complex. DLF would invite you to buy into it. See Appendix for a

news item on the same.

• Forced resale back to company before registry of flat: In DLF Aralis and DLF Magnolias the

company restricts the resale of its apartments. If at any time you want to exit the project, before

the project is ready and registered in your name, the company forbids you to sell it in the open


market. The buyer had to surrender the apartment to DLF if they for any reason had to exit this

investment, and DLF would buy the same at a lower rate than what it was selling its apartments

for. No other developer in Gurgaon has been able to impose such onerous conditions on their

buyers. In addition to showing the market power, it also shows how DLF is able to restrict the

buying selling in the secondary market which should be of interest to the august Commission.

Even though Section 3.4 (e) is applicable to Combinations, the concept of "resale price

maintenance" can be investigated by the Commission under Section 19.4 (m).


7. DLF & Consumer Preferences

Consumer preferences in an important part of the Competition Act, and is referred to in Section 19.6

(g), and Section 19.7 (c). Consumer preferences are geography dependent, and also dependent on the

brand and market strength of an enterprise – until the enterprise turns on the consumers themselves.

Buyers of residential property want to be near the place of work (to be able to "walk to work"), want to

be near malls, near social infrastructure like clubs, and in general are very aware of location advantages

of any property that they invest in. To think buyers in DLF properties, or any builders properties are

location–agnostic as the JLL and Genesis reports suggest is wrong. The strength and its land bank of

the most prime land available that DLF holds in Gurgaon is an attraction to the buyers in selecting their

residential properties, as is the proximity to the commercial office spaces.

To have to buy far away from the place of work is to invoke costs in travelling, or transporting self, and

in terms of time expended. The commission can consider these issues under Section 19.6 (e) i.e.

transport cost.

In addition, the buyers of any residential property look to the past track record of the builder, and how

the completed properties of any builder are holding up. Buying a residential property is probably the

biggest purchase of their lifetime, for many buyers.

The market structure and size of market (Section 19.4 (j) of the Competition Act) from the point of

view of the buyer is very large. Many buyers will be spending almost half of their monthly salary on

this purchase for the next 15 to 20 years. Also once they move into DLF City, maintenance, security,

electricity, water, malls, etc are all going to be provided by DLF or by the DLF approved agencies.

Thus from the buyer's perspective the size of the market is huge, and at the same time the structure of

the market is opaque. As JLL and Genesis have in their reports pointed out, it is hard for even

professionals like them to get any meaningful information from the developers and their agents – just

imagine the plight of the residential buyer.

Thus, the buyers are very interested in the track record of the builder, and that is why in this report we

have also computed the market shares for completed properties. An additional benefit for the

developers of completed properties is that all the properties that a Developer completes become a sort

of "sample flat" for them, which help them in selling any project that the developer might bring out in

the future. Because the apartments are not consumed like consumer items, are not hidden like many of

the goods, are not invisible like many services, but are there for all to see for all times, the commission

may look at the special nature of the apartment under the Section 19.7 (a), i.e. Physical characteristics

or end-use of goods.


8. DLF & Sales Organizers Preferences

DLF has a strange arrangement with its Sales Channel, i.e. Independent Brokers.. After getting

authorization with DLF the broker has to commit to giving DLF at least 6 bookings in a year, or else

none of the commission will be released for any booking in that year.

After selling to one or two buyers on behalf of DLF, the broker is then tied into making 6 more

compulsory bookings quota – and in all likelihood the chances are that the Broker may not suggest the

best investment to the client, but suggest to client what is good for the broker. This is one such practice

that no other developer or builder has so far not been able to impose upon its brokers in Gurgaon.

In addition, as mentioned earlier DLF restricts sales of certain properties like DLF Magnolias (and

earlier DLF Aralias) by forcing the buyer to surrender their units to DLF only (which then it sells it at a

higher price). They buyers are not allowed to take help of brokers to sell their units in the secondary

market, thus restricting the resale market.


9. Conclusion of the Report

DLF has a strong presence in Gurgaon. The contrarian picture painted by Jones Lang LaSalle &

Genesis in the reports submitted by them on behalf of DLF are based on false data, wrong proxy for

market shares, misleading methodology, and illogical assumptions.

DLF has the ability to leverage its huge strengths in the commercial spaces into its sales of residential

properties in the integrated township of Gurgaon called DLF City.

DLF also currently has a dominating market share in completed and launched properties in the luxury

market of Gurgaon. And it is in a position to act independently of the market and competitive forces in

the geographic market of Gurgaon and product market of "luxury" apartments.

DLF has also been a pioneer in many concepts and business processes – some to the benefit of the

consumers and some to their detriment.


10. About QuBREX

QuBREX (QuBit Real Estate eXchange) is a division of QuBit Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (QBTPL)

The Managing Director of QBTPL, Dr. Sanjay Sharma, has done his B.E. (Chemical Engineering)

from University of Roorkee (now IIT Roorkee), his M.S. (Chemical Engineering) from North Carolina

State University, Raleigh, and Ph.D. from North Carolina State University. The Ph.D. thesis was in

Computer Science. Dr. Sharma is also a Co-Inventor for US Patent Number 6,490,569 B1 dated

December 03, 2002 "System for Combining Life Cycle Assessment With Activity Based Costing Using

Relational Database Software Application."

Dr. Sharma, and his team have been running Real Estate Consultancy & Brokerage Services for the last

6 years in the National Capital Region (NCR). They run community websites like

www.GurgaonScoop.com, www.NoidaScoop.com, and www.DelhiScoop.com, and have been

collecting and publishing real estate data about NCR on their website www.QuBREX.com for the last 6

years.

Dr. Sharma also hosts a weekly TV program called Property Watch on Sahara Samay TV Channel,

and regularly appears on the Money Guru – Property Show of Zee Business TV Channel.

Team Members Ms. Sonia Vaid & Mr. Sanjeev Kumar helped in collecting and analyzing the data for

the report.


11. Appendices

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Bu

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In

Gu

rgao

n

Launch

Year

Completion

Year

Equally

Weighted

Average

Number of

Apartments

By

Configuration Builder

Project

Location

Approx

Area

sq.ft

Market Price in

Rs (Lumpsum

or Approx

Calculated)

Effective

Market

Price Rs

psf

Effective

Market Value

of Builder's

Project By

Configurations

(Rs crore)

2008

119

Pal

City Park

Sector 95

2100

5,326,500

2,536

63

2008

119

Pal

City Park

Sector 95

1690

4,315,850

2,554

51

2008

119

Pal

City Park

Sector 95

1500

3,847,500

2,565

46

2008

119

Pal

City Park

Sector 95

1375

3,539,375

2,574

42

2007

336

Tulip

Petals

Sector 69

1550

4,047,500

2,611

136

2009

500

SARE Group

Royal

Gardens

Sector 92

1900

5,382,500

2,833

269

2009

500

SARE Group

Royal

Gardens

Sector 92

1665

4,738,875

2,846

237

2009

500

SARE Group

Royal

Gardens

Sector 92

1712

4,879,600

2,850

244

2009

500

SARE Group

Royal

Gardens

Sector 92

1416

4,072,800

2,876

204

2009

500

SARE Group

Royal

Gardens

Sector 92

1180

3,441,500

2,917

172

2007

113

Raheja (Saket)

Navodaya

Sector 92

2350

7,029,750

2,991

79

2007

75

Raheja (Saket)

Vedaanta

Sector 108

2780

8,409,300

3,025

63

2007

75

Raheja (Saket)

Vedaanta

Sector 108

2490

7,558,150

3,035

57

2008

500

Piedmont

Taksila

Heights

Sector 37 C

2219

6,826,670

3,076

341

2007

113

Raheja (Saket)

Navodaya

Sector 92

1990

6,190,150

3,111

70

2007

75

Raheja (Saket)

Vedaanta

Sector 108

1795

5,608,075

3,124

42

2007

113

Raheja (Saket)

Navodaya

Sector 92

1100

3,478,500

3,162

39

2007

75

Raheja (Saket)

Vedaanta

Sector 108

1365

4,324,525

3,168

32

2008

88

Pal

Aquapolis

Sector 70 A

2650

8,513,750

3,213

74

2007

113

Raheja (Saket)

Navodaya

Sector 92

1498

4,871,330

3,252

55

2008

240

ILD

Spire Greens Sector 37 C

3450

11,221,000

3,252

269

2008

225

Mapsko

Casa Bella

Sector 82

3500

11,387,500

3,254

256

qbtpl1

Typewriter

To get the full data table call 9811987371 9871219911 or write to [email protected]

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2010

143

ABW

Verona Hills

Sector 76

1500

7,252,500

4,835

103

2004

143

Ardee

Palm Grove

Heights

Sector 52

1850

8,945,000

4,835

128

2008

128

Tulip

Purple

Sector 69

1550

7,496,250

4,836

96

2006

2010

170

Bestech

Park View

Residency

Sector 3

1920

9,312,000

4,850

158

2010

100

Godrej Frontier

Garden Vista Sector 80

1950

9,477,373

4,860

95

2004

2010

250

JMD

Gardens

Sohna Road

2020

9,842,980

4,873

246

2009

105

Bestech

Park View

Next

Sector 66

1850

9,016,250

4,874

94

2010

143

ABW

Verona Hills

Sector 76

1250

6,093,750

4,875

87

2006

2010

170

Bestech

Park View

Residency

Sector 3

1780

8,725,260

4,902

148

2009

105

Bestech

Park View

Next

Sector 66

1750

8,631,250

4,932

90

2009

117

BPTP

Park Prime

Sector 66

1600

7,904,320

4,940

92

2010

100

Godrej Frontier

Garden Vista Sector 80

1475

7,302,757

4,951

73

2007

175

Spaze

Privy

Sector 72

1900

9,438,000

4,967

165

2006

2010

170

Bestech

Park View

Residency

Sector 3

1565

7,806,775

4,988

133

2004

163

Clarion

The Legend

Sector 57

2587

12,976,300

5,016

212

2007

175

Spaze

Privy

Sector 72

1800

9,046,000

5,026

158

2009

117

BPTP

Park Prime

Sector 66

1275

6,433,599

5,046

75

2009

295

Tulip

Orange

Sector 69-70

1437

7,255,375

5,049

214

2009

295

Tulip

Orange

Sector 69-70

1137

5,792,875

5,095

171

2009

117

Unitech

Sunbreeze

Sector 69

1337

6,822,747

5,103

80

2004

163

Clarion

The Legend

Sector 57

2370

12,150,000

5,127

198

1991

1997

250

DLF

Silver Oaks

DLF Phase I

1950

10,000,000

5,128

250

2009

117

Unitech

Sunbreeze

Sector 69

1501

7,706,481

5,134

90

2009

100

Unitech

Vistas

Sector 70

1530

7,857,680

5,136

79

2007

175

Spaze

Privy

Sector 72

1600

8,232,000

5,145

144

1996

2002

86

Malibu Estate

Malibu

Towne

Sohna Road

2940

15,200,000

5,170

131

2006

2010

170

Bestech

Park View

Residency

Sector 3

1415

7,324,905

5,177

125

2009

100

Unitech

Vistas

Sector 70

1560

8,084,360

5,182

81

2009

117

Unitech

Sunbreeze

Sector 69

1100

5,709,100

5,190

67

2004

2009

171

Vatika

Jasminium

Sohna Road

3000

15,800,000

5,267

270

qbtpl1

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2002

2005

556

Ansal

Valley View

Estate

Faridabad

Road

1300

6,890,000

5,300

383

2002

2005

556

Ansal

Valley View

Estate

Faridabad

Road

1756

9,306,800

5,300

517

2009

100

Unitech

Vistas

Sector 70

1115

5,912,440

5,303

59

1998

2004

96

Ansal

Sushant

Apartment

Sushant Lok

1

1545

8,200,000

5,307

79

1996

2002

86

Malibu Estate

Malibu

Towne

Sohna Road

2430

13,000,000

5,350

112

2009

19

Emaar MGF

Emerald

Estate

Sector 65

1395

7,537,150

5,403

14

1996

2002

86

Malibu Estate

Malibu

Towne

Sohna Road

1586

8,600,000

5,422

74

1996

2002

86

Malibu Estate

Malibu

Towne

Sohna Road

1616

8,800,000

5,446

76

2009

19

Emaar MGF

Emerald

Estate

Sector 65

1280

7,006,600

5,474

13

2002

2005

556

Ansal

Valley View

Estate

Faridabad

Road

627

3,448,500

5,500

192

2002

2005

556

Ansal

Valley View

Estate

Faridabad

Road

977

5,373,500

5,500

299

1998

2004

96

Ansal

Sushant

Apartment

Sushant Lok

1

1153

6,350,000

5,507

61

2009

180

Unitech

The

Residences

Sector 33

1870

10,338,000

5,528

186

2009

180

Unitech

The

Residences

Sector 33

1545

8,583,000

5,555

154

2004

482

Sweta Estates

Central Park

II

Sohna Road

2950

16,508,750

5,596

795

2005

2010

14

Vatika

Acacia

Sohna Road

1936

10,841,600

5,600

15

2005

2010

14

Vatika

Acacia

Sohna Road

2086

11,681,600

5,600

16

2003

2010

123

Parsvnath

Greenville

Sohna Road

2125

11,950,000

5,624

146

2003

2010

123

Parsvnath

Greenville

Sohna Road

1886

10,611,600

5,627

130

2004

2010

467

Orchid

Petals

Sohna Road

2337

13,178,284

5,639

615

2004

482

Sweta Estates

Central Park

II

Sohna Road

2350

13,313,750

5,665

641

2004

2009

467

Orchid

Petals

Sohna Road

1805

10,235,260

5,671

478

2007

34

TDI

Ourania

Golf Course

Road

4000

22,700,000

5,675

77

2010

104

Unitech

Exquisite

Sector 71

4612

26,227,200

5,687

273

qbtpl1

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Verandas

2005

64

Salcon

The

Verandas

Sector 54

5330

65,043,500

12,203

416

2005

64

Salcon

The

Verandas

Sector 54

4495

57,312,750

12,750

367

1997

2002

130

ITC

Laburnum

Sector 28

3300

42,500,000

12,879

553

2005

204

DLF

Magnolias

Golf Course

Road

9175

137,519,375

14,988

2799

2008

94

DLF

Magnolias - II

Golf Course

Road

9175

137,519,375

14,988

1286

2005

204

DLF

Magnolias

Golf Course

Road

5825

87,855,625

15,083

1788

2008

94

DLF

Magnolias - II

Golf Course

Road

5825

87,855,625

15,083

821

1997

2002

130

ITC

Laburnum

Sector 28

3800

57,500,000

15,132

748

2006

120

Ambience

Caitriona

DLF Phase

III

7244

109,660,000

15,138

1316

2006

120

Ambience

Caitriona

DLF Phase

III

6333.5

96,002,500

15,158

1152

2002

2007

126

DLF

Aralias

Golf Course

Road

5850

150,000,000

25,641

1890

2002

2007

126

DLF

Aralias

Golf Course

Road

5600

150,000,000

26,786

1890

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s T

o K

eep

Sp

ec

ula

tors

At

Bay

http://www.m

ydigitalfc.com/real-estate/dlf-takes-steps-keep-speculators-bay-921

DLF takes steps to keep speculators at bay

By Shilpa Shree Jun 17 2009

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The company insists on lock-in clause for new buyers, besides selling only one flat to a PAN

DLF, India’s largest publicly traded real estate company, has begun taking measures to keep speculative buyers away. It has incorporated a one

in period for all new buyers. The company is also offering only one flat to a person and using the buyer’s PAN number as a ch

Rajeev Talwar, executive director of DLF, told FC Estate that his company has initiated a slew of measures to be included in the contract that is to be

signed between the buyer and developer to ensure that the units are sold to genuine buyers.

“We have introduced a few self-regulatory measures. We issue only one unit for a PAN

also introduced a one-year lock-in period to ensure that someone just does not buy and sell it immediately to make quick bucks,” said Talwar. He s

company would not transfer the title of the property in the name of the buyer for a year after a property is booked.

Over last few months, the company has clarified that speculative buyers are partially responsible for the downturn, as the pr

due to many speculative buyers artificially inflating prices.

“We have seen some good response for our projects in the recent past. The market is firming up, buyer interest was always the

loans are low,” added Talwar.

While a few Mumbai-based developers have increased the prices of their projects in the recent past, Talwar says DLF has not increased the prices

in any of its projects. “We are watching the market. We may not increase the prices in nea

Commenting on DLF’s initiatives, Anuj Puri, country head of Jones Lang LaSalle Meghraj, a property consulting company, said,

encouraging bulk bookings these days. Moreover, if a buyer is selling

the customer is selling. This discourages the person from selling. These clauses are included in the contract that is signed

developer.”

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Check out these super luxury flats

January 21, 2006 19:59 IST

http://www.rediff.com/m

oney/2006/jan/21spec4.htm

Sitting on his tenth floor office in New Delhi's [ Images ] Connaught Place, Dr Vijay Vancheswar, vice

is jubilant. "Look at this building!" he says of DLF Place, where his office is located.

"Built in 1992, but doesn't it look new? It's easily the best-looking building in Connaught Place. It's because we're all about maintenance and upkeep. We

don't build something and then go away and leave it alone -

in clause for new buyers, besides selling only one flat to a PAN-card holder

has begun taking measures to keep speculative buyers away. It has incorporated a one

in period for all new buyers. The company is also offering only one flat to a person and using the buyer’s PAN number as a check.

tor of DLF, told FC Estate that his company has initiated a slew of measures to be included in the contract that is to be

signed between the buyer and developer to ensure that the units are sold to genuine buyers.

measures. We issue only one unit for a PAN-card holder. This is to ensure that the buyer is genuine. We have

in period to ensure that someone just does not buy and sell it immediately to make quick bucks,” said Talwar. He s

company would not transfer the title of the property in the name of the buyer for a year after a property is booked.

Over last few months, the company has clarified that speculative buyers are partially responsible for the downturn, as the property market was overheated

“We have seen some good response for our projects in the recent past. The market is firming up, buyer interest was always there and interest rates on

based developers have increased the prices of their projects in the recent past, Talwar says DLF has not increased the prices

in any of its projects. “We are watching the market. We may not increase the prices in near future but may do it later,” he said.

Commenting on DLF’s initiatives, Anuj Puri, country head of Jones Lang LaSalle Meghraj, a property consulting company, said, “Developers are not

encouraging bulk bookings these days. Moreover, if a buyer is selling at a premium, the developers are asking for 15-20 per cent of the premium at which

the customer is selling. This discourages the person from selling. These clauses are included in the contract that is signed between the buyer and

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http://www.rediff.com/m

oney/2006/jan/21spec4.htm

] Connaught Place, Dr Vijay Vancheswar, vice-president - corporate communications, DLF Universal,

of DLF Place, where his office is located.

looking building in Connaught Place. It's because we're all about maintenance and upkeep. We

- we invest in community."

Pa

ge

75

of

78

has begun taking measures to keep speculative buyers away. It has incorporated a one-year lock-

tor of DLF, told FC Estate that his company has initiated a slew of measures to be included in the contract that is to be

card holder. This is to ensure that the buyer is genuine. We have

in period to ensure that someone just does not buy and sell it immediately to make quick bucks,” said Talwar. He said the

y market was overheated

re and interest rates on

based developers have increased the prices of their projects in the recent past, Talwar says DLF has not increased the prices of units

“Developers are not

20 per cent of the premium at which

between the buyer and

corporate communications, DLF Universal,

looking building in Connaught Place. It's because we're all about maintenance and upkeep. We

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This is one way of describing their latest projects, the super-luxury apartment complexes 'The Aralias' (launched in 2004, it is expected to be finished late

this year) and 'The Magnolias' (launched last year, it is expected to be finished late-2006).

Short of shooting people as they walk through the gates, DLF has done almost everything else to keep up an almost superhuman aura of exclusivity

around these two projects.

All the flats are offered out on invitation only; there is no marketing to speak of; and if you wander into the DLF office in your shorts and ask about them,

you will more likely be met with the cold shoulder than the glad eye.

According to Vancheswar, 'The Magnolias', which started out with a price tag of Rs 4,500 per sq ft when it was launched last September, has now reached

a price of Rs 6,000 per sq ft for an apartment, and Rs 6,500 per sq ft for a penthouse. Despite the fact that the project is not even half done, all of the flats

have been leased out. Why is it so popular?

"First of all, these are among the first really high-segment luxury accommodation that is available. And people who buy in this super-luxury segment are

often looking for exclusivity," says Vancheswar, "This is exactly what we offer. We screen all our candidates very closely, so that we can make sure each

and every resident is someone we want to be part of this community. There is no re-selling policy, that is, when someone buys a flat, we don't allow them

to sell it to anyone but DLF. This keeps up a sense of community, and keeps speculators out. And of course, DLF is a known name in property

development."

DLF has a fixed price at which they buy back their flats; for instance, the buy-back price now is Rs 5,000 per sq ft for The Aralias, "compared to the starting

selling price of Rs 1,800 back in 2004," according to Vancheswar.

So how do you get on to one of these exclusive lists? There are only 252 flats in The Aralias, and 300 (although many more are planned) in The

Magnolias, so chances are the likes of you and I will have to sit this one out.

"After we had started this by-invitation-only scheme with The Aralias," says Prerna Aggarwal, chief manager - marketing, "there was a lot of pent-up

demand for the Magnolias. We catered to this clientele first, and there was really no way other than word of mouth for anyone else to find out about it.

Even the section on our website was password-protected."

So letters are sent out, along with an application form that asks about your profession, age, and income ("although a lot of people left that one blank!"

laughs Vancheswaran). People are then short-listed, depending on how the management at DLF feels they would fit into the community ("it's not just about

money, but also class", according to Aggarwal). It is only once you have signed on the dotted line that the one piece of marketing does go out to you.

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This is where Gopika Chowfla, of Gopika Chowfla Graphic Design, comes in. If you're one of the lucky people who do get a flat, you will also get sent to

you a lovely concept book full of pictures - a flower here, a golf ball there (The Magnolias will overlook the to-be-extended DLF golf course), and park

benches covered in red autumn leaves.

"There is really nothing concrete in this book," says Chowfla of her creation. "It doesn't tell you what kind of a flat you'll get, whether you'll get a golf

membership - it doesn't commit to anything at all. Rather, it tries to sell a lifestyle, a way of thinking. It also helps word spread, adds to the intrigue and the

feeling of exclusivity."

In fact, it isn't really clear what kind of a flat you will get until the last minute - this is because you can play a large part yourself in the final design. There

are three main kinds of apartments at The Magnolias; the standard apartment (which is 5-bedroom), the duplex and the penthouse.

But this is all you can know; when you buy the apartment, you can pull down the walls and redesign the layout according to your own tastes, and you have

to put in the walls and floors by yourself, because the price of the apartment is only for the empty shell.

Of course, there is an option where you can ask DLF to do the interiors for you (at a price of Rs 1,500 per sq ft), but you can do it yourself as well, if you

want to give your apartment an individual feel.

What is the impact on the industry of this kind of never-seen-before endeavour? "There is a lot of hype around luxury these days," says Chowfla. "No one

wants to interview the property developer who is doing middle segment work; everyone wants to talk of superlatives - this is just natural."

Vancheswaran, by his own admission, only talks of the "premium, super-premium and luxury segments." DLF doesn't deal in property below this line. But

given the opportunity, he says, he doesn't think that DLF would be averse to getting into the middle segment.

"We're on sound ground right now with Gurgaon," he says, "given the new stable government that has established itself. This is really vital. They have

promised to plough the External Development Charges that have accumulated back into infrastructure.

They have pledged crores into creating 10 lakh jobs over the next five years. You really need this kind of public-private partnership. When it comes to the

economically weaker segments, the government should provide subsidies on land.

Otherwise the margins are just too wide; costs would have to be cut somewhere, and no one would want to risk quality." "But," argues Chowfla, "you'd

have huge volumes as well. And all you'd have to do is provide housing with a little imagination, cut all the frills that you put on the luxury segment, but

design it with care and quality in mind. That's really what's needed today."

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At the end of the day, of course, businesses do need to think of the bottomline, and given the near-hysterical response to The Magnolias and The Aralias,

DLF is probably wise to invest in super-luxury.

There is clearly a market to tap into. Their clientele want peace, central air-conditioning, twenty-four hour power back-up, a nine-hole golf course outside

their bedroom window, and neighbours just like themselves. And they're willing to pay for it.

Samyukta Bhowmick in New Delhi

Source:

dlf vs belaire & park place owners - report by qubrex submitted to cci (competition commission...

Documents

luxury market share

definition of market

measure market share

market forces

relevant geographic

relevant product market

genesis data models

additional relevant