distributed group key securing a dynamic peer groups

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    Efficient GroupEfficient Group Authenticated KeyAuthenticated KeyAgreement Protocol for Dynamic GroupAgreement Protocol for Dynamic Groupss

    Kui Ren*, Hyunrok Lee*, Kwangjo Kim*, and Taewhan Yoo**

    * IRIS, Information and Communications University, Daejeon, Korea** Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea

    WISA 2004 (23-25, Aug)

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    Contents

    Introduction

    EGAKA Overview

    Notation and Primitives

    EGAKA

    EGAKA-KE (Key Establishment)

    EGAKA-KU (Key Update)

    Complexity & Security Analysis

    Conclusion

    Q & A

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    Introduction (1/3)

    Secure group communication

    A (large) group of users communicate with one another ina secure way

    Ex) Teleconferencing, Collaborative work,

    Multiple interactive game, VPN (Virtual Private Networks),Wireless Ad-hoc Networks

    Dynamic Peer Groups

    Relatively small (~ 100 of members)

    No hierarchy

    Frequent membership changes

    Any member can be sender and receiver

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    44

    Introduction (2/3)

    Group Key Management

    A group key

    Shared only by current group members

    Communication encrypted/decrypted by the group key

    Difficult aspect Dynamics

    Join Backward secrecy

    Allow the joining member(s) to decrypt future messages, but notprevious messages

    Leave:

    Forward secrecy Prevent the leaving member(s) from decrypting future messages

    Burst behavior: Multiple joins and/or multiple leaves simultaneously.

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    Introduction (3/3)

    Classification Group Key Distribution

    One party generates a secret key and distributes to others

    Not suitable for dynamic groups

    Group Key Agreement

    Secret key is derived jointly by two or more parties Key is a function of information contributed by each member

    No party can pre-determine the key

    Motivation Need Group Key Agreement

    Strong security Dynamic membership management

    Adapt to heterogeneous environments

    Efficiency in communication and computation

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    EGAKA Overview (1/2)

    EGAKA Efficient Group Authenticated Key Agreement protocol Important Properties

    Distributed Fault-tolerant Efficient dynamic group membership management Mutual authentication among group members Secure against both passive and active attacks

    Can be built on any two-party authenticated key exchangeprotocols E.g. Diffie-Hellman protocol, password based protocol

    Achieves scalability and robustness in heterogeneousenvironments

    provides efficient member join services Low communication and computation costs, and they are constant

    to the group size.

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    77

    EGAKA Overview (2/2)

    Trust Model

    Any single current member can authenticate thenew members and accept them.

    Assumption Do not consider insider attacks

    The secrecy of group keys and the integrity of groupmembership

    The size of dynamics group < 200

    Group members in dynamic groups have different securityprimitives

    For generating the group key

    Use Common two-party key exchange protocol

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    Notation and Primitives (1/4)

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    99

    GK

    1M

    6M

    5M

    4M

    2M

    3M

    3K

    4K15K

    135K

    26K

    246K

    123456K! 0!l

    3!d

    3!l

    2!l

    1!l

    6!N

    15B B

    )K( 1 51 5 hB !

    2B

    4B

    4B

    1N

    22N2N

    24N

    11N 12N

    1N 2N N 4N1 6 2

    Root node

    Interior node

    Isolated Leaf node

    Key pair: Kij & BijLeaf node

    Notation and Primitives (2/4)

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    1010

    GK

    M M5M

    M

    M

    M

    K K5K

    5K

    K

    K

    5K! 0!l

    3!d

    3!l

    2!l

    1!l

    6!N

    15B B

    )K( 1 51 5 hB!

    26B

    4B

    46B

    NN

    N4

    N

    N N

    N N N 4

    NK 5K 6K K

    KP5* = {N32, N21, N11}

    CP5* = {N31, N22, N12}

    Notation and Primitives (3/4)

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    1111

    GK

    1M

    6M

    5M

    4M

    2M

    3M

    3K

    4K

    15K

    135K

    26K

    246K

    123456K! 0!l

    3!d

    3!l

    2!l

    1!l

    6!N

    1B B

    )( 11 hB !

    26B

    4B

    246B

    2N

    22N23N

    24N

    11N 12N

    31N 32N 33N 34N1K 5K 6K 2K

    M2s view of the group which could be divided into l subgroups

    Notation and Primitives (4/4)

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    1212

    EGAKA

    Two basic sub-protocol

    EGAKA-KE : Key Establishment Protocol

    EGAKA-KU : Key Update Protocol

    Both sub-protocols are subtle integrations of above

    mentioned binary key tree structure, one way functions

    and two-party key agreement protocol, as well assymmetric encryption algorithm.

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    1313

    EGAKA-KE

    EGAKA-KE includes two phases:

    Phase I

    To complete group entity authentication by applying any

    chosen two-party authenticated key agreement protocol

    Phase II

    The group key generation process.

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    1414

    EGAKA-KE: Phase I (1/6)

    Tasks to accomplish

    choose the two-party protocol in common

    generate the key tree structure

    perform mutual authentication according to generated tree

    structure

    establish peer-to-peer session keys among members.

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    1515

    EGAKA-KE: Phase I (2/6)

    Hello, I want to use

    DH protocol, and M4can be the one to

    generate the key treestructure

    M1

    M2 M3

    M4

    M5M7

    Hello, here is the

    key tree structure

    2M

    3M

    5M 1M 1M 1M 4M M 2M

    2M

    3M

    7M

    M6

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    1616

    EGAKA-KE: Phase I (3/6)

    3rE

    1r

    E

    M1

    M2 M3

    M4

    M5

    M7

    M6

    2r

    E

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    1717

    EGAKA-KE: Phase I (4/6)

    122Sr

    E 133Sr

    E

    M1

    M2 M3

    M4

    M5

    M7

    M6

    155Sr

    E

    377Sr

    E

    266Sr

    E

    2 Sr

    E

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    1818

    EGAKA-KE: Phase I (5/6)

    151312 ,, KKK 3713,KK 262412 ,, KKK15K 37K

    26K

    24K

    Execution Results of EGAKA-KE: Phase I

    jirr

    ij E

    Session Key

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    1919

    EGAKA-KE: Phase I (6/6)

    Rounds = 2 (except for protocol negotiation step)

    Two-party key exchange protocol executesexactly n-1 times to finish the entityauthentication among group members

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    2020

    EGAKA-KE: Phase II (1/5)

    15B 15B 37B37B 26B37B

    4B

    37B

    1357}{: 2461 KBM 246}{: 13572 KBM

    246B

    37B 15B 15B

    1357B

    4B 4B

    26B

    246B 246B 246B 1357B

    1357B

    )||(2461357

    BKBKhKG

    !

    3!round

    1

    }{:151 K

    24

    }{:262 K

    1

    }{:

    K

    24

    }{:44 K

    15

    15

    7

    7

    26

    4

    1!round

    26B 15B 15B 37B37B 26B

    4B

    37B

    1215,

    1357371 KKBBM

    1226

    ,24642

    KKBBM

    37153 KBM

    246B

    37B 15B 15B

    1357B

    4B 4B

    26B

    2!round

    26B

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    2121

    EGAKA-KE: Phase II (2/5)

    15B

    M1s view of the group

    Round 1

    M1 knows

    M1 yet to know

    M1 needs to

    compute

    37B

    2 6B

    1357B

    KG

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    2222

    EGAKA-KE: Phase II (3/5)

    15B

    M1s view of the group

    Round 2

    M1 knows

    M1 yet to know

    M1 needs to

    compute

    37B

    2 6B

    1357B

    KG

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    2323

    EGAKA-KE: Phase II (4/5)

    15B

    M1s view of the group

    Round 3

    M1 knows

    M1 compute

    37B

    2 6B

    1357B

    KG

    )||(2 61357

    BKBKhKG!

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    2424

    EGAKA-KE: Phase II (5/5)

    Rounds = d, where d equals to , n is the sizeof the group.

    No computational expensive operation is neededin this phase.

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    2525

    EGAKA-KU: Member Join Protocol (1/5)

    6M

    joinr,6E

    Sponsor

    1!round:broadca t

    ubgrou

    6M

    2!round

    Sponsor

    subgroup

    subgroup

    ,363S

    E3

    M :c mputes 6

    6

    rrK E! ),(, 3636 KhB !

    :broadcasts ,}||{,}||{

    5

    5

    KKMBMB

    G

    :computes 36K ,, 36B6M )||( 24 356'

    BBhKG !

    iM :computes])5,[i

    3M

    ))|| 36 356 BBB !

    )||( 24

    !

    "

    #

    'BBh

    $

    !

    363,Sr

    E36

    }||||{ 32415 KMBB

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    2626

    EGAKA-KU: Member Join Protocol (2/5)

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    2727

    EGAKA-KU: Member Leave Protocol (3/5)

    6M

    7M

    151312 ,, KKK 15K 3613 ,KK36K 47K 2447 ,KK

    2412 ,KK

    Sponsor

    6M

    Leaving

    )(b

    subgroup

    subgroup

    )(a

    Sponsor

    6M

    7M

    Leaving

    1312 ,KK

    subgroupsubgroup

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    2828

    EGAKA-KU: Member Leave Protocol (4/5)

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    2929

    EGAKA-KU (5/5)

    In Member Join Protocol: only fixed 6 exponentialoperations are needed for any member to beadded to the group and update the group key.Moreover, this cost is constant to group size. This

    property is very useful in scenarios with frequentmember additions.

    Member Leave protocol is not as efficient asmember join protocol, but its robust and fault-tolerant.

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    Complexity and Security Analysis

    Complexity Analysis

    Communication and computation costs

    Comparison between EGAKA and other well known key

    establishment protocols

    A-DH is used as the underlying two-party authenticated key

    agreement protocol in order to provide a quantificational

    comparison.

    Security Analysis

    Provide informal security analysis. (Formal analysis is undergoing) Secure against both passive and active attacks

    Do not consider insider attacks

    Provide forward and backward secrecy

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    3131

    Comparison

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    Conclusion

    In this paper, we propose EGAKA (Efficient GroupAuthenticated Key Agreement) protocol Distributed

    Fault-tolerant

    Efficient dynamic group membership management

    Mutual authentication among group members

    Secure against both passive and active attacks

    Can be built on any two-party authenticated key exchangeprotocols

    E.g. Diffie-Hellman protocol, password based protocol

    Achieves scalability and robustness in heterogeneous environments

    provides efficient member join services Low communication and computation costs, and they are constant to

    the group size.

    Support fault-tolerant property to achieve robustness in memberleave service

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    Thank you for yourattention

    Q&A