distressed investing demystified: lessons from recent cases

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Page 1 2008 Stephen G. Moyer Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases Chartered Financial Analyst Society of Des Moines May 7, 2008 Stephen G. Moyer, CFA Director Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC

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Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases. Chartered Financial Analyst Society of Des Moines May 7, 2008 Stephen G. Moyer, CFA Director Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC. General Disclaimer. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 1 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Distressed Investing Demystified:Lessons From Recent Cases

Chartered Financial Analyst Society of Des Moines

May 7, 2008

Stephen G. Moyer, CFADirector

Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC

Page 2: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 2 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

General Disclaimer

The information/views discussed in this presentation are the author’s/speaker’s (“author”) alone and not necessarily those of Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC (“TCP”). The author has no direct holdings in any securities. TCP may from time to time have holdings of distressed securities of the type generically discussed herein. This presentation is for information purposes only. Nothing in these materials or the related discussion should be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any specific security. Investment in distressed securities involves substantial risk.

Page 3: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 3 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Tennenbaum Capital Partners

Institutional Asset Manager with ~$7.5 billion under management $6.5B Credit Opportunities Funds

– Long-Term Activist Orientation– 20 person investment team

$1.0B Multi Strategy Hedge Fund– Convert Arb, Risk Arb, Deep Value/Distressed, Capital

Structure Arb, Special Situation Equities– 6 person investment team

Page 4: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 4 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Highlights of the Current Distressed Market

Page 5: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 5 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Historic Default Rates

Source: E. Altman, NYU Solomon Center

Page 6: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 6 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Leveraged Loan Market Has Grown

Page 7: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 7 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Quality of Leveraged Loans Has Declined

Page 8: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 8 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Growth in Sr Debt Crowding out Sub Debt

Source: Bank of America/Carlyle

Page 9: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 9 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Size of US Defaulted & Distressed Debt Mkt

Source: E. Altman, NYU Solomon Center

Page 10: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 10 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

But Sprds Still Low Relative to Distressed Cycle

Page 11: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 11 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Prices Too High for Outsized Returns

Page 12: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 12 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Recession Could Trigger Explosion in Distressed Opportunities

Periods of Recession: 11/73 - 3/75, 1/80 - 7/80, 7/81 - 11/82, 7/90 - 3/91, 4/01 – 12/01

Source: E. Altman (NYU Salomon Center) & National Bureau of Economic Research

HIGH YIELD BOND MARKET 1972 – 2007

Page 13: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 13 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Four Reasons Why Superior Returns May Be Possible

Insufficient Information/Liquidity for Efficiency

Sale Decisions Not Related to Fundamentals

Investor Involvement Affects Returns

Imbalances in the Supply/Demand for Distressed Securities

Page 14: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 14 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Analyzing Distress Debt Investment Opportunities

Page 15: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 15 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Valuation Fallacies

GAAP Market--Going Concern Distressed Valuation

Sr Debt = 500 Sr Debt = 500 EV = 302 Sr Debt = 250 Sub Debt = 40 E = 12

Sub Debt = 200 Sub Debt = 200 AV = 1350

EV = 2500

E=650Shares 120Px 15Mkt Cap 1800

Amount Price ValueCash 200 Sr Debt 500 Sr Debt 500 Sr Debt 500 50% 250Tang Assets 970 Sub Debt 200 Sub Debt 200 Sub Debt 200 20% 40Goodwill 180 Equity 650 EV 2500 Equity 1800 Equity 120 0.10 12Total 1350 1350 Total 2500 2500 Total 302

Page 16: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 16 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Beazer Valuation Volatility

GAAP @ 6/30/07 Mkt Val @ 1/24/07 Mkt Val @ 10/4/07

Sr Notes 1250

Sr Notes= 1500 Sr Notes= 1500EV= 1682

Sub Notes 60 Asset Value AV = 4,000 Sub Note= 100 Sub Notes= 100 Mkt Cap 375

Other = 900 EV= 3450

Mkt Cap= 1850Equity= 1500

Page 17: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 17 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Bally’s Valuation Across TimeGAAP @ 12/31/06 Mkt Val @ 5/5/06 Mkt Val @ 3/19/07

Bank Debt = 201 Bank Debt = 198 Bank Debt = 225

Asset Value AV = 369 Sr Notes= 253 Sr Notes= 242 Enterprise Sr Notes= 200

Value EV = 650

Neg Equity 385 Sub Notes= 210Sub Notes= 300 Sub Notes= 300

Shares 41.3Price (Px) 0.34$

Enterprise Mkt Cap 14 Value EV = 1131

Shares 41.3Price (Px) 9.48$ Mkt Cap 391

Page 18: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 18 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

A Picture of Distress

AV = 302 Sr Debt = 500

Neg Equity = 398 Sub Debt = 200

Assets 302Liabilities 700Neg Equity 398 Equity 0Total 700 700

Page 19: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 19 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Its Nice to Have Options

Increase Asset Value Resize Capital Structure

Sr Debt = 500 AV = 302 Sr. Debt = 150

AV = 700 E = 152

Sub Debt = 200

Cash 200Sr Debt 500 Cash 200Sr Debt 150Tang Assets 500 Sub Debt 200 Tang Assets 102 Sub Debt 0Total 700 Equity 0 Total 302 Equity 152

700 302

Page 20: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 20 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Fulcrum Security

General meaning is that claim class which will receive majority of its recovery in post-reorg equity

Typically is point in the claim waterfall where EV ends

Sr Debt 500

Sub Debt 200

Page 21: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 21 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Distressed Investing Paradigm: How Much is There—Who Gets It—What Do They Get

Secured Debt Cash/Exit Loan

Sr Unsec DebtNew Debt

Trade Claims

EV=? Sub Debt Equity

Equity

Page 22: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 22 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Step 1: Valuation

EV=?

Valuation Approaches Standard– DCF– EBITDA Multiple– % of Revenues– Specialized Asset Valuations

(e.g. Aircraft, Ships, Real Estate) Use PV Discounting to Adjust for Cash

Flow Timing– Length of Reorganization Process– Expected Distributions/Realizations

Challenge: – Predicting Ch 11 impact on EV– Analyzing the Impact of the

Bankruptcy Rules on Recoveries

-

Page 23: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 23 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Equity in Control But May Only Have Option Value

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Enterprise Value ($)

Equ

ity V

alue

($)

Equity Value Equity Call Option Value

Page 24: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 24 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Can Voluntary Restructuring Resolve Distress?

If Over Leverage/Liquidity the Primary Source of Financial Distress:

– Bond Buy Backs or Exchange Offers May Be Effective– e.g. Rescap

If Problem is Management/Operations/Non-Financial Liabilities– Voluntary Acts by Financial Creditors Can’t Address Problem

Highly Liquid Markets Often Allow Deferral of Either Problem

The Holdout Problem

Page 25: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 25 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Hold-Outs Often Prevent Voluntary Solution That Would Avoid Dead Weight Loss

TDebt HFace E

Cash NewCash W Debt

ADebt Exchange L

Market L

HoldOut

Value: 40% 100% 60%

Page 26: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 26 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Key Considerations in Bankruptcy Recoveries

Pre-Planning/Time-In/Damage to Franchise Amt of Secured Debt and Type of Holders Recognition of Off-BS Liabilities Budgeting Exceptions to Absolute Priority Rule Tax Asset Preservation

Page 27: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 27 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Acceptance or Rejection of Executory Contracts BRC §365

Std. Def. Of Executory: Sufficient Performance Remaining on Both Sides that Nonperformance is a Material Breach

Used to Reject Uneconomic Contracts—Rejected Party Has Damage Claim as Pre-Petition Creditor.

Real Estate Lease Rejections Subject to Cap: 1Y or 15% not in excess of 3Y.

Additional Considerations for Collective Bargaining, Retiree Benefit and Electric Power Agreements

Page 28: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 28 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Acceptance v Rejection Tradeoff

Secured Debt Secured Debt

Trade Claims Trade Claims Increase by K Damages Sr Debt

Sr Debt Jr DebtEV ImprovementFrom K Rejection Jr Debt

Page 29: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 29 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Step 2: Determine Claim Status

General Rule: All Claims equal unless:– Secured– Statutory Priority– Legally Subordinated– Structurally Subordinated

Senario 1 Senario 2 Senario 3Secured Debt Secured Debt Secured Debt

Sr Unsec Debt Sr Trade Sr Unsec DebtUnsec Claims

Trade Claims Debt Sub TradeDebt Claims

Sub Debt Sub Debt

Equity Equity Equity

Page 30: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 30 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Contractual Subordination

All Unsecured Claims Essentially Equal Unless They Agree to Subordination

Subordination is Contractual Provision Entitling Benefited Claim to Recover Value Until Whole Before Sub Claim Gets Anything

Subordination Provisions Should be Reviewed to Determine What Claims Specifically Benefited

Issues Can Arise Relating to Acquired or Later Issued Debt

Page 31: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 31 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Operation of Subordination Provisions

$50Trade Claims

$50$75 Bank Debt

$100Sub Notes

Dead Co.

Equity

Assets 75 Pro Rata Effect of Adjusted RecoveryRecovery Subrogation Recovery %

Trade Claims 50.00 18.75 0 18.75 37.5%Bank Debt 50.00 18.75 31.25 50.00 100.0%Sub Notes 100.00 37.50 -31.25 6.25 6.3%Total Claims 200 75.00 75.00

Page 32: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 32 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Structural Subordination in Complex Capital Structures

Hold CoLimited Sr NotesAssetsOpCo PublicEquity Equity

Operating SubSecured Debt

Operating Trade ClamsAssets Sub Debt

Equity

Page 33: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 33 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Every Structure Unique

Hold CoLimited Sr NotesAssetsOpCo PublicEquity Equity

Operating SubSecured Debt

Operating Trade ClamsAssets Sub Debt

Equity

Senario 4Secured Debt

Sub TradeDebt Claims

Sr Unsec Debt

Equity

Page 34: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 34 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Step 3: Predicting Outcome of Reorganization Process

Reorganization v. Liquidation Post-Reorganization Capital Structure Allocation of Capital Structure to Creditor Constituencies Political Considerations

Page 35: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 35 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Politics of Plan Valuation

Sr CreditorsJr Creditors + EquityManagement

LowHighLow

Claim >% of EVMore EV to shareOptions/Equity in the Money

Importance: Be Skeptical of Plan Valuation

PartyDesired

Valuation Motive

Page 36: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 36 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Example: Sub Note Outcomes Turn on Plan Structure and Valuation

Analyze the Impact of– Lower (4.5x) v Higher (5.5x) Plan Valuation– Amount of Post-Petition Unsecured Debt

$0 v $600 Assume

Sr Debt Claim = $850 Px = 75 Sub Debt Claim = $250 Px = 25

Page 37: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 37 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Equity Split: Low ValuationValuation EBITDA 250Valuation Multiple 4.5Plan Value 1125

LeverageBank Facility 150 0.6xNew Sr Debt 0Value of Equity 975Allocation Claim Recov % EquitySr Debt 850 850 87%Sub Note 250 125 13%Equity 0 0%

LeverageBank Facility 150 0.6xNew Sr Debt 600 2.4xValue of Equity 375Allocation % EquitySr Debt claim 250 250 67%Sub Note claim 250 125 33%Equity 0 0%

Moderate Leverage/Low Valuation Plan

Low Leverage/Low Valuation Plan

Low Valuation Scenario

Lower valuation multiple

Difference in debt

Allocation of equity impacted by debt assumption

Page 38: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 38 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Low Valuation/Change Debt

Low Val/Low Lev Low Val/Med LevBank-150 Bank-150

Sr Rec

DebtEV=1125 Sr Rec EV=1125 $600

Equity Sr Rec Sub

87% Equity Eq

67% 33%

Page 39: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 39 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Equity Split—Higher Valuation

Valuation EBITDA 250Valuation Multiple 5.5Plan Value 1375

LeverageBank Facility 150 0.6xNew Sr Debt 0 0.0xValue of Equity 1225Allocation Claim Recov % EquitySr Debt claim 850 850 70%Sub Note claim 250 250 20%Equity Recovery 125 10%

LeverageBank Facility 150 0.6xNew Sr Debt 600 2.4xValue of Equity 625Allocation % EquitySr Debt claim 250 250 40%Sub Note claim 250 250 40%Equity Recovery 125 20%

Moderate Leverage/Higher Valuation Plan

Low Leverage/Higher Valuation Plan

Higher Valuation Scenario

Higher multiple

Allocation of equity impacted by debt assumption

Page 40: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 40 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

High Valuation—Change Debt

High Val/Low Lev High Val/Med LevBank-150 Bank-150

Sr Rec

DebtEV=1375 EV=1375 $600

Sr Rec Sub Sr Sub

70% 20% 40% 40%

Page 41: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 41 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Recovery Upside From Conservative PlanPLAN TRUE

Low Val ValueLow Lev Higher

EBITDA 250 250Val Multiple 4.5x 6.0xEnt. Value 1125 1500Less: WC Debt 150 150Less: LT Debt 0 0Equity Value 975 1350

Sr Note Claim 850 850Debt 0 0Equity % 87% 87%Equity $ 850 1177Total Recovery 850 1177% of Claim 100% 138%

Sub Note Claim 250 250Debt 0 0Equity % 13% 13%Equity $ 125 173Total Recovery 125 173% of Claim 50% 69%

EquityDebt 0 0Equity % 0% 0%Equity $ 0 0Total Recovery 0 0% of Claim NA NA

Assumed TRUE value high enough to cover all debt with some value to equity.

Senior Notes recover substantially more than their claim due to low Plan value.

Low Plan value results in Sub Notes and Equity receiving less than entitled to had Plan value been accurate.

Page 42: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 42 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Analyzing a Complex Case: Calpine

Page 43: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 43 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Calpine Corporate Structure

Calpine Holdco

   

               

         

CalGen   CFCC II     CPN Energy

            Services

   

CPN Canada Var Projects

       

Page 44: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 44 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Calpine – Liquidity Challenge in 2007

FY04E Cash: $2B

2005 2006 2007 2008

Maturities ($MM) 410 617 1481 2121

Bond Price 101.5 99.5 76 74.5

Page 45: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 45 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Calpine Filing

Files Ch 11 on 12/20/05 at 10:57 NYT—no bond or coupon payments for at least 30 days

Since CDS contracts expire at 11:59PM GMT, all CDS expiring on 12/20/05 lapsed without Credit Event

Date of filing likely driven by requirement to make large payments to gas suppliers on 25th of each month.

Page 46: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 46 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Calpine Corp--Holdco Waterfall Recovery Analysis--As of 2/06Assets Liabilities/Claims 39447 Est $ Est Avg %Cash (PF@11/05=$2.66B) 1,500.0 Claim Recovery Recovery

Admin Costs 400.0 400.0 100.0%Equity-CalGen 826.2 DIP Loan 850.0 850.0 100.0%Equity-CCFC 1 635.7 Avail for Creditors 5,756.3 Equity-Gilroy - Equity-CES - 1st -TL 646.1 646.1 100.0%Equity-Cal Energy/Unconsol Inv - Avail for 2nd Lien 5,110.2 Total Sub Stk Value 1,461.9

2nd Lien 3,775.1 4,455.1 121.3%Generating Assets Avail for Unsecureds 655.1 ERCOT 400.5 NEPOOL 93.5 Ben-Unsec Notes 801.7 139.3 17.7%NYPOOL 160.0 UnBen-Unsec Notes 5,161.3 422.0 9.6%OTHER 55.5 GUC 1,000.0 93.9 9.4%SERC 440.0 Total 6,963.0 655.1 WECC-Gas 93.4 WECC-Thermal 2,512.5 Available for Equity - Unleveraged Generating Assets 3,755.3 Encumbered Gen Assets 289.1

Total Assets w/ $ 7,006.3

CalGen Est $ Est Avg %Region MW $/KW Value Class Claim Recovery RecoveryERCOT 2,705.0 500.0 1,352.5 1st Lien 835.0 835.0 100.0%MAIN 513.0 350.0 179.6 2nd Lien 740.0 740.0 100.0%SERC 2,434.0 225.0 547.7 3rd Lien 830.0 830.0 100.0%SPP 994.0 300.0 298.2 WECC 1,484.0 575.0 853.3 Total 8,130.0 3,231.2 Avail to Holdco Equity 826.2

CCFC 1 Not Filed Est $ Est Avg %Region MW $/KW Value Class Claim Recovery RecoveryERCOT 1,208.0 500.0 604.0 1st Lien 377.3 377.3 100.0%NEPOOL 528.0 550.0 290.4 2nd Lien 415.0 415.0 100.0%FRCC 400.0 400.0 212.0 Pref Int 300.0 300.0 100.0%WECC 1,081.0 575.0 621.6 Total 3,217.0 1,728.0 Avail to Holdco Equity 635.675

Page 47: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 47 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Key Valuaton Assumptions Color KeyPlant ValuationsCANADA 400 "owned" assets where valuations ERCOT 500 varied on % basis.FRCC 400MAIN 350 Geysers--valuation fixed at $2.5B NEPOOL 550NYPOOL 800PJM 600 "encumbered" assets where equitySERC 225 valued on $/Kw basis.SPP 300WECC-B 575WECC-P 350GEYSER 3350Base Valuation Adj % 100%Value of Equity in Proj ($KW) 50

Page 48: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 48 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

GUC Claim Assumption

Initially reflected significant executory contract rejection claim assumption

CPN had forward power delivery contracts with no gas hedge When gas prices increased, contracts became unprofitable Four largest contracts were estimated to be underwater by $1B Weigh risk that public policy would prevent rejection

Page 49: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 49 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Calpine: The Waterfall and the Effect of Subordination of 7.75s on

$2B DIPEst $850MM Drawn

$646 1st lien

$3.775B 2d lien

25% Pro Rata Distrib Effect of Subordination$801MM Ben Unsec $801MM Ben Unsec

46 Recovery

$5.1B Unben Unsec $5.1B Unben Unsec

$1B GUC-Est $1B GUC-Est

$650 Cvt Sub $650 Cvt Sub

Page 50: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 50 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Calpine Corp--Holdco Waterfall Recovery Analysis 7,006.3

Coupon Mat Amt 9/30 Claim 12/20 Claim/Face Px-1/20 Claim-2Y Recov-E$ Recov %Admin Costs 400.0 400.0DIP Loan 850.0 850.0

Avail for Creditors 5756.31st -TL 9.625% 9/30/14 646.1 659.1 102.0% 103.4 100.0% 646.1 100.0%

Avail for 2d Lien 5110.2

2nd-Notes L+575 7/15/07 490.0 498.8 101.8% 122.6% 600.6 122.6%2nd-TL L+575 7/15/07 735.0 748.2 101.8% 122.6% 901.0 122.6%2nd-Notes 8.500% 7/15/10 1,150.0 1,192.1 103.7% 85.5 120.4% 1384.6 120.4%2nd-Notes 9.875% 12/1/11 400.0 402.1 100.5% 87.0 120.0% 479.9 120.0%2nd-Notes 8.750% 7/15/13 900.0 933.9 103.8% 85.5 121.0% 1089.0 121.0%

Thru 2nd Lien 4,321.1 Avail to Unsec 655.1 4223.3xUnsecured Notes

Sr Notes 7.625% 4/15/06 102.2 103.6 101.4% 36.5 116.9% 18.0 17.6%Sr Notes 10.50% 5/15/06 139.2 140.6 101.0% 36.5 122.3% 24.4 17.6%

Sr Notes 8.750% 7/15/07 190.3 197.5 103.8% 36.5 121.5% 34.3 18.0%

Sr Notes 7.875% 4/1/08 173.8 176.9 101.8% 34.0 117.7% 30.7 17.7%Sr Notes 7.750% 4/15/09 180.6 183.1 101.4% 37.0 117.1% 31.8 17.6%Other GUC 1000.0 1,000.0 100.0% 93.9 9.4%Sr Notes 8.625% 8/15/10 411.2 423.5 103.0% 25.5 120.5% 39.9 9.7%Sr Notes 8.500% 2/15/11 682.8 703.0 103.0% 26.0 120.2% 66.2 9.7%Sr Cvt Notes--OID 6.000% 9/30/14 641.7 651.4 101.5% 16.5 113.7% 61.3 9.5%Sr Cvt Notes 4.000% 12/26/06 1.3 1.3 101.9% 23.8 110.1% 0.1 9.6%

Sr Cvt Notes 4.750% 11/15/09 633.8 636.7 100.5% 23.8 110.1% 59.9 9.4%Sr Cvt Notes 7.750% 6/1/15 650.0 677.8 104.3% 9.5 120.0% 0.0 0.0%CPN Guar Canadian Notes--Pari UnsecSr Notes-Can CDN200MM 8.750% 10/15/07 170.7 173.4 101.6% 30.8 119.3% 16.3 9.6%Sr Notes-Can USD 8.500% 5/1/08 1,515.9 1,533.4 101.2% 35.0 118.4% 144.4 9.5%Sr Notes-Can Eur175 8.375% 10/15/08 141.3 143.4 101.5% 33.8 118.5% 13.5 9.6%Sr Notes-Can GBP200 8.875% 10/15/11 214 217.4 101.6% 33.8 119.6% 20.5 9.6%Total Unsecured 6,848.8 6,963.0

Total Calpine Debt 11,169.9 655.1

Equity 0.0Per Share 569.38241 0.00

Page 51: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 51 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Benefited V Unbenefited—Sprd Calculation

Pricing Relationship--Benefited V UnbenefitedBenefited 36.50 40.58 44.27 47.96 51.65 55.34 59.02Unbenefited 19.79 22.00 24.00 26.00 28.00 30.00 32.00Spread 16.71 18.58 20.27 21.96 23.65 25.34 27.02

Page 52: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 52 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Hedged Trade Between Unsecured Notes

Trade IdeaSell--Unben 8.5 '11 26.00Buy--Ben 10.5 '06 36.50Investment 10.50Scenario 1 Unben Correctly priced

8.5 '11 26.00Adj 10.5 '06 47.96 ReturnProfit 11.46 109.1%

Scenario 2 Benifited Correctly priced

10.5 '06 36.50Adj 8.5 '11 19.79 ReturnProfit 6.21 59.1%

Page 53: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 53 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

The Make-Whole Controversy

In 2006, Debtor sought to refinance a costly DIP with new facility that would pay-off CalGen secured debt thus freeing excess collateral value.

The CalGen debt matured in 2009 but was non-call until 4/1/07, thereafter callable at 102.5%

Debtor argued that non-call provision unenforceable and that call premium didn’t technically apply to pre-4/07 redemptions

Judge Lifland agreed non-call was unenforceable but awarded make-whole premium as a measure of damages

– But, make-whole premium was unsecured claim against Calpine

Page 54: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 54 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

The Calpine Canada Double Dip

CALPINE

Guarantee

Canada FinCo$

Loan AgreementCalpine Canada

Notes

Page 55: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 55 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Valuations SkyrocketedCalpine Corp--Holdco Waterfall Recovery Analysis 12,674.5

Coupon Mat Amt 9/30 Claim 12/20 Claim/Face Px-1-20-06Px 2-16-07 Claim-2Y Recov-E$ Recov %Admin Costs 400.0 400.0DIP Loan 850.0 850.0

Avail for Creditors 11424.51st -TL 9.625% 9/30/14 646.1 659.1 102.0% 103.4 106.0 100.0% 646.1 100.0%

Avail for 2d Lien 10778.4

2nd-Notes L+575 7/15/07 490.0 498.8 101.8% 122.6% 600.6 122.6%2nd-TL L+575 7/15/07 735.0 748.2 101.8% 122.6% 901.0 122.6%2nd-Notes 8.500% 7/15/10 1,150.0 1,192.1 103.7% 85.5 105.0 120.4% 1384.6 120.4%2nd-Notes 9.875% 12/1/11 400.0 402.1 100.5% 87.0 108.5 120.0% 479.9 120.0%2nd-Notes 8.750% 7/15/13 900.0 933.9 103.8% 85.5 121.0% 1089.0 121.0%

Thru 2nd Lien 4,321.1 Avail to Unsec 6,323.3 8907.8xUnsecured Notes

Sr Notes 7.625% 4/15/06 102.2 103.6 101.4% 36.5 106.0 116.9% 119.4 116.9%Sr Notes 10.50% 5/15/06 139.2 140.6 101.0% 36.5 107.0 122.3% 170.3 122.3%

Sr Notes 8.750% 7/15/07 190.3 197.5 103.8% 36.5 104.3 121.5% 231.3 121.5%

Sr Notes 7.875% 4/1/08 173.8 176.9 101.8% 34.0 103.5 117.7% 204.6 117.7%Sr Notes 7.750% 4/15/09 180.6 183.1 101.4% 37.0 104.5 117.1% 211.5 117.1%Other GUC 1000.0 1,000.0 100.0% 906.3 90.6%Sr Notes 8.625% 8/15/10 411.2 423.5 103.0% 25.5 98.8 120.5% 384.8 93.6%Sr Notes 8.500% 2/15/11 682.8 703.0 103.0% 26.0 98.8 120.2% 638.7 93.5%Sr Cvt Notes--OID 6.000% 9/30/14 641.7 651.4 101.5% 16.5 82.8 113.7% 591.4 92.2%Sr Cvt Notes 4.000% 12/26/06 1.3 1.3 101.9% 23.8 64.0 110.1% 1.2 92.5%

Sr Cvt Notes 4.750% 11/15/09 633.8 636.7 100.5% 23.8 93.0 110.1% 577.9 91.2%Sr Cvt Notes 7.750% 6/1/15 650.0 677.8 104.3% 9.5 93.1 120.0% 407.0 62.6%CPN Guar Canadian Notes--Pari UnsecSr Notes-Can CDN200MM 8.750% 10/15/07 170.7 173.4 101.6% 30.8 102.0 119.3% 157.6 92.3%Sr Notes-Can USD 8.500% 5/1/08 1,515.9 1,533.4 101.2% 35.0 101.6 118.4% 1393.3 91.9%Sr Notes-Can Eur175 8.375% 10/15/08 141.3 143.4 101.5% 33.8 101.0 118.5% 130.3 92.2%Sr Notes-Can GBP200 8.875% 10/15/11 214 217.4 101.6% 33.8 101.0 119.6% 197.6 92.3%Total Unsecured 6,848.8 6,963.0

Total Calpine Debt 11,169.9 6323.3

Equity 0.0 745.9Per Share 569.38241 0.00 1.31

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Page 56 2008 Stephen G. Moyer

Ultimate Outcome of Plan

Page 57: Distressed Investing Demystified: Lessons From Recent Cases

Page 57 2008 Stephen G. Moyer