dissertation
TRANSCRIPT
What evidence is there to support the theory that Palestinian Jordanians are being
deliberately politically underrepresented and why does it matter?
Candidate number: 14863
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
MSc Population and Development
Abstract
Jordan and the West Bank have not always been separate entities. Politically the two
territories were united between 1950 and 1988. Yet the identities of Palestinians and
Jordanians have always been separate to some extent and the relationship has
frequently been lopsided in favour of the Kingdom. Despite Jordan being
demographically majority-Palestinian, political life has been dominated by the
minority-East Bank Jordanians. This dissertation will focus on the evidence for
political marginalisation, analysing population patterns to determine whether
candidate representation is statistically fair. Using a combination of expert interviews
and univariate analysis the research will demonstrate that there is a correlation
between areas of majority Palestinian Jordanians and underrepresentation in
parliament. Given the limited break down of data for sub districts, it was not possible
to use regression to come to this conclusion. The paper then analyses socioeconomic
indicators in areas of high concentration of Palestinian Jordanians. Specifically
considering unemployment levels and higher education for both men and women.
These statistics, combined with the testimony of expert interviews demonstrate the
link between political marginalisation and social exclusion. While bivariate analysis
of the quantitative data provides evidence of correlation, Key Informant interviews
provide evidence of causation. Thus the question of whether a lack of political
representation ‘matters’ is answered by the effects of marginalisation on key
socioeconomic indicators. Within this, I have considered specific government policies
that are biased against Palestinian Jordanians in regards to both higher education and
employment. In order to broaden the scope of the research for the future, more
socioeconomic indicators could be analysed. Urbanisation as a variable could also be
included in quantitative analysis, given sufficient data.
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 4
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 5
2.1. A brief history of relations between Jordan and Palestine..................................... 5
2.2. Election law and election reforms.......................................................................... 9
2.3. Discussion of patrimony and tribalism ................................................................ 12
2.3.1. Discussion of democracy..............................………………….………………13
2.3.2. Palestinian citizenship in Jordan…………………………………...……….…14
2.3.3. Opposition (Muslim Brotherhood).……………………………………....……15
2.4. Labour force participation and the public/private sector split...............................17
2.5. Employment as a socioeconomic indicator …......................................................19
2.6. Education as a socioeconomic indicator.............................................................. 20
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ................................................. 21
4. DATA AND METHODS ....................................................................................... 22
4.1. Quantitative data ................................................................................................. 22
4.2. Methodology ....................................................................................................... 26
4.3. Qualitative data ................................................................................................... 33
4.3.1 Methodology……………………….................................................................. 33
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 35
6. DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .............................................. 37
7. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 41
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 42
List of Figures
Fig. 1.0. Percentage House of Deputies vs. Percentage Population ...........……….... 22
Fig. 1.1. Urban and rural education ............................................................................ 23
Fig. 1.2. Education in Zarqa and Karak districts ........................................................ 24
Fig. 1.3. Unemployment male and female ................................................................. 25
Fig. 2.0. Political representation percentage difference ............................................. 27
Fig. 2.1. Unemployment ............................................................................................. 28
Fig. 2.2. Higher education .......................................................................................... 29
Fig. 2.3. Unemployment and higher education correlation ........................................ 30
Fig. 2.4. Higher education and political representation ............................................. 31
Fig. 2.5. Unemployment and political representation ................................................ 32
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 4
While Jordanians of Palestinian origin are widely recognised as being a majority
ethnic group in the Kingdom, there has never a government approved census to prove
this. At the same time, members of the civil service, armed forces and parliament are
more often than not East Bank Jordanian. There has been much speculation about
where this marginalisation has arisen from, with scholars considering anecdotal
reports of underrepresentation and more statistically robust data on voter turnout in
areas of high concentration of Palestinian Jordanians. However, there is a gap in the
research both in terms of data on statistical representation and on its effect. This paper
will consider the evidence for targeted underrepresentation and how it might manifest
itself on socioeconomic indicators. First I will discuss the context of Palestinians in
Jordan and the historical background before analysing the current state of election
law, including the one-man-one-vote law and the potential for opposition votes.
Following this, I will focus on the previous research on labour force participation in
Jordan and the reasoning behind choosing education and employment as key
socioeconomic indicators. Once this has been established, I will analyse the
quantitative data on the number of candidates vs. the population of their district to
decide if there is indeed targeted underrepresentation. This will be followed by
analysis of percentages in higher education and in employment in the governorates of
the Kingdom, keeping in mind the specific districts where Palestinian Jordanians are
most likely to live. Then I will seek to establish a correlation between the
socioeconomic indicators and levels of representation by analysing patterns between
the three variables. As this will demonstrate correlation but not causation, I will
continue the analysis through qualitative data from Key Informants. The combined
results will form the basis of the argument as to whether Palestinian Jordanians are
indeed underrepresented and what effect this has had on the socioeconomic status of
their community.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 5
2.1. A brief history of relations between Jordan and Palestine..................................... 5
The British mandate of 1922 officially separated the Palestine mandate from the
Emirate of Transjordan. In 1946 Jordan established independence from Britain (Abu-
Odeh). However, the four years following muddied the waters between what was
considered the Palestinian West Bank and the state of Jordan. Arguably this set the
tone for the brittle relations between the two groups. Jordan’s King Abdullah was
keen to absorb the Arab part of Palestine into his own newly formed country and in
1947 met with Golda Meir, later Prime Minister of Israel, to discuss his support for
the partitioning of Palestine. This left him isolated as the Arab League chose instead
to support the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and his campaign for a Palestinian state
(Abu-Odeh).
The issue changed radically with the events of 1948, when hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians fled their homes and Israel declared independence. At this stage many
Transjordanians supported the Palestinian plight but that did not mean that they
wanted to put their own state in jeopardy.
“On can argue that Transjordanians were careful at this point not to weaken their
identity by merging with the Palestinians or any other Arab people. They were well
aware that the Palestinians were not only much larger in numbers but also more
advanced in nearly all aspects of life. These facts were more constraints than stimuli
to merger.” (Abu-Odeh, p31)
Through the eyes of the Transjordanians, the 1948 war was a story of Arab states
having to defend Palestinians because they couldn’t defend themselves.
Following the ‘Nakba’ of 1948, Jordan and the West Bank formed a union in 1950,
effectively creating one state within the political settlement. Palestinians were given
the choice to adopt Jordanian nationality, which many refused (Abu-Odeh).
This new state made no mention of Palestine in its name; kept its capital in Amman
and was operated almost solely by East Bank Jordanians (Abu-Odeh). West Bankers
were given seats in Parliament but the hierarchy of Jordanians to Palestinians was
never in question. “Yes to the union, no to peace with Israel” was the slogan of many
Palestinian parliamentarians at the time (Abu-Odeh, p51). Yet at the same time, King
Abdullah was engaged in a series of secret negotiations with Israel over a peace
treaty.
In the same vein, Betty Anderson argues that Jordan wasn’t born out of conflict with
colonial powers but rather in conflict to other Arab states or at least indifference to
what was happening to them (p133). Her analysis of school textbooks from 1948 to
1968 shows Jordan engaged in a kind of whitewashing.
“Jordan’s population on both sides of the Jordan River is described as Jordanians.
There is no reference to the population of the West bank as Palestinians” (Anderson,
p68).
The Unity Act left East Bank Jordanians ruling over a majority Palestinian country
with an outsider King who originated from Saudi Arabia. This meant that establishing
a separate ‘Jordanian’ identity was more important than ever. Anderson argues
through her analysis of textbooks that regional Pan-Arab and Islamic solidarity were
emphasized in order to provide legitimacy to Jordanian rulers leading a majority
Palestinian country (p136); the invisibility of ‘the other’ i.e. Palestinians was key
(p74).
Arguably it was in 1950 that a Palestinian Jordanian identity was formed (Koldas).
However, the level of citizenship and sense of attachment to the Kingdom of Jordan
varied wildly. At one end were the 1948 refugees who often refused the Jordanian ID
card and lived in camps. At the other end of the spectrum was the well-off Palestinian
Jordanian businessmen who became more Jordanian than the Jordanians themselves,
particularly after the events of Black September (Koldas). “Though the Palestinians
outnumbered the Jordanians two to one, it was the Palestinians who had to adjust
[throughout the 1950s process of integration and assimilation of the two banks]”
(Abu-Odeh, p110).
The calm of the unity deal was broken when King Abdullah was assassinated by a
Palestinian in 1951. Previously viewed by Transjordanians as their more sophisticated
cousins, Palestinians came to be seen as troublemakers (Abu-Odeh).
At the same time the Fatah guerrilla movement, led by Yasser Arafat, established
numerous bases in Jordan and was allowed to organise there. Events came to a head in
1967 with the beginning of the Six-Day War. Pre-1967 West Bankers saw their
situation as temporary and therefore didn’t seek to create an alternate state (Abu-
Odeh) but from 1967 onwards the goal posts moved.
“A decisive change in the Kingdom's policy toward the Palestinians began to be
evident with the events of 1968 when the Palestinian Resistance Movement retaliated
against Israel from the Jordanian border.” (Koldas)
The Six Day War reignited Palestinian nationalism while at the same time moved
Arab states from rejecting Israel altogether to negotiating “land for peace” (Abu-
Odeh, p152). Following this, Fatah allowed splinter groups such as the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to operate out of Amman and didn’t discipline
them when they refused to fall in line with the Jordanian King’s wishes. In 1970 the
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) challenged the Jordanian regime and were
expelled from Jordan as a consequence. This war between the PLO and the Jordanian
regime cemented the animosity between the two groups and Palestinian-Jordanians
were left trying to negotiate a path through the middle. “In this respect, as Joseph
Nevo argued, the war at Karameh and the subsequent events of 1970 and 1971 led to
the crystallization of a Jordanian identity vis-a-vis a Palestinians identity” (Koldas).
Palestinian-Jordanian relations were at an all time low when a historic meeting
between Arafat’s adviser, Hani al-Hassan and King Hussein of Jordan occurred in
1977. In response to the suggestion that a unified Arab delegation could attend the
Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in October of that year, Al-Hassan gave
out mixed messages.
“In principle I would say it is not permissible to dilute the Palestinian personality in
any international conference. The emergence of the Palestinian political personality is
a basic reflection of the defeat of Zionist thought,” he said, while adding that
“solidarity” between Palestinians and the Jordanian state was essential (Al-Hassan).
Yet claims of solidarity were short lived and in 1986 King Hussein delivered a speech
that formally renounced its relations with the PLO. Two years later the West Bank
was no longer a part of the Kingdom. An interview with Salah Khalaf, deputy head of
the PLO and head of intelligence for the organisation, following King Hussein’s
speech of 1986 showed both sides mistrusted the other. While Hussein accused Arafat
of reneging on promises made to accept United Nations Security Council resolutions
242 and 338, Khalaf claimed no knowledge of agreeing to the settlements (Khalaf).
Hussein “hinted to the Palestinians in the areas that they should reconsider their
options and think of alternatives over than the PLO. In brief, Hussein was telling his
own people and the residents of the areas that for the time being, the PLO was no
longer a major component in the peace process” (Khalaf).
From 1957 onwards, political parties and elections had been banned but following
unrest in 1989, King Hussein reintroduced the idea (Lust-Okar).
2.2. Election law and election reforms.......................................................................... 9
Following the re-introduction of elections, Jordan took what was arguably a step
backwards for democracy but instituting a one-man-one-vote law in 1993. The move
was designed to curb the power of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), an offshoot of the
Muslim Brotherhood and the only real opposition party in Jordan. While previously,
Jordanians had tended to spread their votes between candidates that represented
ideological platforms they agreed with and independent candidates who could
distribute patrimony, now they were only left with the latter. The one-man-one-vote
clause was retained in the 2003 election reforms and remains to this day (El-Momani,
Hourani and Lust).
“In keeping with this, parliament saw the percentage of independent MPs—who
generally go along with the government—rise from 58 percent in 1989 to 80 percent
in 1993. The number of Islamist MPs, meanwhile, fell from 23 in 1989 to 16 in 1993”
(El-Momani, Hourani and Lust).
Along with maintaining the one-man-one-vote clause, the 2003 reforms also added an
additional 30 seats to Parliament, of which 16 per cent went to Amman. However,
urban areas, in particular Amman, Zarqa and Irbid were still heavily under-
represented and these were traditionally areas of mostly Palestinian-Jordanians (El-
Momani, Hourani and Lust). Overall the proportion of seats became more, not less,
weighted to East Bank Jordanians (Lust-Okar).
Added to this was a ‘women’s quota’, which reserved six seats for female candidates.
Women’s opposition groups in Jordan were partly against the move, as it seemed to
show that women couldn’t achieve seats on their own merit. Female candidates won
by obtaining the highest percentage of votes, which favoured smaller districts. These
were dominated by East Bank Jordanians and no women got seats in Amman in 2003.
Election law 42 of 2001 had already broken up districts into smaller sizes, increasing
the overall numbers from 21 to 45. The distribution of seats only increased in pro-
regime areas and these new districts tended to centre on one tribe and their area of
power (Lust-Okar). This gerrymandering continued with the changes to the law in
2010 when the country was further divided into 120 electoral districts which, even at
the time, was considered as a fairly blatant attempt by the regime to “strengthen local
and ethnic divisions at the expense of national identity” (Assaf). These changes were
preceded by a period of unrest, led by former generals, who claimed that the regime
was “selling Jordan to Palestinians” (Assaf). The division of boundaries meant that
“the most underrepresented district had just over 46,000 voters per MP – while the
most overrepresented had less than 8,000” (Kao) and those areas with the most votes
were also those with the most Palestinian Jordanians.
The reform movement of 2011 onwards aimed to stop the new King’s ability to
dissolve Parliament, which was happening at an alarming rate. By 2012, the reformers
had succeeded in getting the election laws adjusted, although they still had to put up
with the regular dissolution of Parliament. The June 2012 reforms introduced a new
closed National List of 27 seats (18 per cent of the total number) and upped the
women’s quota from 12 to 15 seats, with 3 extra seats reserved for women from
Bedouin areas (Yaghi).
The National List meant that Jordanians were once again voting along ideological
grounds as seats were reserved for parties as well as individual candidates. However,
the IAF and other opposition groups wanted to get rid of the one-man-one-vote law
altogether and allocate 50 per cent of the seats for the List (Yaghi). At the same time,
members of the security forces, who were dominated by East Bankers were able to
vote for the first time, increasing the overall votes by 10 per cent (Kao) and a new
Independent Electoral Commission was set up to oversee the process (Tucker).
However as Joshua Tucker and others have argued, these changes were only cosmetic
in nature and did not address the root problem of overrepresentation of tribal, East
Bank Jordanian candidates.
“The new electoral law has also not substantially changed the gerrymandering of
electoral districts, due to which the traditionally more government-critical cities of
Amman and Zarqa – which also have the highest concentration of Palestinians, about
60% of the Jordanian population – are discriminated against the rural, Transjordanian
areas which represent the traditional backbone of the Hashemite monarchy” (Tucker).
Other scholars, such as Ellen Lust-Okar, have suggested that these reforms were only
ever intended as a smokescreen in order to obtain US aid by appearing to be
democratic. Certainly the amount of aid given would seem to be a motivating factor
for the Jordanian government.
“Jordan received an annual average of $780million in economic and military aid
(including supplemental funding) between 2002 and 2005, up from an average of
$246million per year between 1996 and 2001. By 2005 aid to Jordan has risen to more
than $1.5billion annually” (Lust-Okar).
2.3. Discussion of patrimony and tribalism ................................................................ 12
The dominance of East Bank tribes in Jordan’s system of governance merits further
analysis. As Ellen Lust-Okar has pointed out, in Jordan, “voters tend to cast their
ballots for candidates whom they think will afford them wasta, and not for reasons of
ideology or policy preferences” (Lust-Okar). The term ‘wasta’ in Jordan has come to
signify power and influence, usually based on the standing of the tribe.
“Wasta and informal institutions are vital to maneuvering in the public sphere. It is
critical for all aspects of life: getting into the university, achieving good marks once
there, finding employment, and conducting business” (Lust-Okar).
While traditionally, social units in Palestine consisted of a smaller number of
members grouped in what was known as a ‘Hamulas’, Jordanian tribes were much
larger and tended to dominate a region of the country (Abu-Odeh, p65). The tribal
system is intimately linked to the distribution of patronage and as such, can be
considered in a broader context of patrimonial states. Most “fragile” states are based
on patrimonial systems (Putzel and DiJohn) and although the framework is not
necessarily unconducive to the building of institutions, there are many examples
where a lack of formal institutions and a patrimonial state go hand in hand.
Ellen Lust-Okar cites the Jordanian democracy poll of 2003 in demonstrating that
voting on the basis of tribe rather than political platform is a very real phenomenon in
the Kingdom. Ninety tribes are currently represented in Jordan’s Parliament and the
numbers have increased from 77 in the 2007 Parliament (Lust, Hourani). At the same
time, this tribal dominance has forced Palestinian Jordanians out of the political
sphere and has arguably increased levels of violence as tribes demonstrate to the state
that their interests must be taken into account (Lust, Hourani). A lack of ‘policy’
candidates combined with a patronage based system has also led to a high turnover of
legislators meaning low levels of experience for candidates that make it to Parliament
(Lust-Okar).
“In 2004 only 18% of Jordanians believed that the MPs were primarily interested in
the concerns of society and the nation. In contrast, 68.9% believed that the MPs were
primarily concerned with their own personal and family interests” (Lust-Okar).
2.3.1. Discussion of democracy..............................………………….………………13
In the context of state building, democracy is often viewed as vital to the interests of
the country. However, the practical processes underpinning democracy, such as
elections, do not necessarily have the desired effect without the institutions to back
them up. States that institute elections without real accountability or feedback
mechanisms tend to go through a “revolving door of authoritarianism” (Snyder).
State-building often means allowing one group to dominate another (Hagmann and
Péclard, 2010). In Jordan this has been a process of allowing the minority East
Bankers to take control over the state at the expense of participation from the majority
Palestinian Jordanians. Also key to maintaining peace and control over a territory is
the distribution of rents, often via the patronage system (Rajesh, 2009). However,
maintaining control through patrimony, even in the presence of elections, does not
necessarily square with the concept of democracy and for Jordan, this has certainly
been the case. The importance of democracy as a concept lies in part with its ability to
create values and norms (Sen, 1999) and these are generated through institutional
constraints rather than at the ballot box (North, 2003). If one tries to instigate
democracy in a state without institutional constraints, for example in Afghanistan, a
system of authoritarian patronage remains (Gordon, 2011).
Despite the presence of the presence of the Independent Electoral Commission, the
constraints on power in Jordan remain limited. This and the manipulation of
boundaries and seats means its claims of being a democratic country are weak at best.
2.3.2. Palestinian citizenship in Jordan…………………………………...……….…14
In 2009, approximately two thirds of Jordan’s capital, Amman, was Palestinian
Jordanian. Others have estimated this as much higher. Most arrived 40 years ago but
42 per cent are still registered as refugees (Al Dajani). In 2010, Human Rights Watch
reported that between 2004 and 2008, 2700 Palestinian Jordanians had their
citizenship revoked and were effectively without a nationality (Zahran).
Although the Unity Act of 1950 automatically gave West Bank Palestinians the
opportunity to gain Jordanian citizenship, since then the issue has become much more
complex. In 1967 Jordan ceased to control the West Bank although it still claimed to
have sovereign rights to it and in 1983 the government began to issue colour-coded
cards for Palestinians. Green cards were given to Palestinians who at that time were
living in the West Bank, where as those Palestinians living in Jordan at the time of
issuance were given yellow cards (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Those who had taken
up Jordanian citizenship before this were safe but the yellow or green cardholders
could be disavowed of their nationality. During the First Intifada in 1988, King
Hussein severed ties with the West Bank, meaning yellow carders or green carders
who were in the West Bank at the time lost their Jordanian citizenship. Jordan’s 1969
law allows for dual-nationality but given that Palestine is not officially a state, it
cannot confer citizenship on people (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
Al-Dajani has argued that this limited citizenship gave Palestinian Jordanians fewer
work opportunities and thus the community and particular women in the community,
became more entrepreneurial. Working in the private sector in this way means that
Palestinian Jordanians often face a more insecure kind of employment (Al-Dajani)
and that the government is able to tax them in a way they cannot do with the public
sector (Zahran).
The Jordanian government has often defended its used of limited citizenship by
claiming to defend the right of Palestinians to their own sovereign state. In effect, they
have argued that to confer citizenship would be to give up entirely on the Right of
Return and would be supporting Israeli plans to move the population of the West
Bank to Jordan (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
To further confuse the issue, Jordanian officials have also reportedly told Palestinian
Jordanians that they must renew their West Bank residency permits through the Israeli
Civil Administration in order to retain Jordanian nationality.
“This Israeli permit grants the right to reside in the West Bank, and, therefore (for
those permit-holders residing elsewhere) the right to return to the West Bank should a
Palestinian state come into being. Some Jordanians have been unable to renew this
permit, and on this basis had their Jordanian nationality withdrawn” (Human Rights
Watch, 2010).
Added to this are reports of citizenship being removed while Palestinian Jordanians
are interacting with the state for some other reason (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
Thus participation in the workings of the state is a source of fear for some within the
community. Removal of citizenship is likely to cause problems across the spectrum
from employment to education and more.
2.3.3. Opposition (Muslim Brotherhood).……………………………………....……15
The Islamic Action Front (IAF), or the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, has been the
largest and most well-organised opposition group in the Kingdom for many decades.
Legalised in 1945, the party has well known ties to the regime and has been
instrumental in helping the government combat extremism (Koldas). Traditionally the
Front has been seen as a source of political participation for Palestinian Jordanians.
They have also “supported the idea of a split vote, whereby voters could cast one vote
for their constituency representative and another for a state-wide party list based on
proportional representation. As the biggest and best organized party, the Brotherhood
would obviously benefit from proportional representation, as would the presently
underrepresented Palestinians.” (Susser). The IAF spoke out against the one-man-one-
vote law in 1993 but have more recently boycotted parliamentary elections altogether,
leaving Palestinian Jordanians or East Bankers looking for reform, little outlet to
express their views (Yaghi).
Ironically, despite posing as the main opposition to the regime, the IAF is in fact
dominated by East Bank Jordanians, including their current secretary general, Zaki
Bin Rashid (Zahran). In 2008, the government created a law designed to ensure that
the Front was the only opposition party allowed (Zahran). Some have argued that
King Hussein (and later King Abdullah) used the IAF as a counter to more secular
opponents who would have been more acceptable to the West and thus garnered more
international support for change (Lust-Okar).
Regime support for the Brotherhood was arguably also motivated by economic
factors, particularly during the financial crisis of the 1980s. In 1983 Jordan began
rapidly losing money when it decided to support Iraq in the war against Iran. By 1988
the deficit had increased 47.6 per cent from the previous year and the Kingdom was in
crisis. At this stage all opposition was technically illegal in Jordan but following the
unrest of the ‘Jordanian Intifada’ of 1989, the regime began to increase support for the
IAF (Lust-Okar, divided). Lust-Okar argues that this was motivated by a need to curb
unrest and that by mobilising a loyal opposition party such as the Brotherhood, the
regime could ensure that they would return the support. In this sense the Front, once
inside the fold, the Front had more to lose by trying to overturn a government that
supported its existence.
However, relations soured in the 1990s as the Jordanian King switched policies on
engagement with the West Bank.
“In part, the rift between the Brotherhood and the palace was due to the king's foreign
policies. His engagement with Arafat in the peace process raised considerable
opposition, which he hoped to reduce by repressing the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Following the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, the Jordanian regime cracked down on
protests supporting the Palestinian cause (Koldas). However, since then the IAF has
played an important role in integrating Palestinian Jordanians into the wider society,
providing a bridge to some extent between opposition and regime (Koldas). Other less
well known movements have tried to demand reform, with some even calling for an
end to the regime altogether. These have been largely divided along both geographical
and ethnic lines but united against corruption (Sprusansky).
2.4. Labour force participation and the public/private sector split...............................17
As previously mentioned, the problems of obtaining full citizenship led many
Palestinian Jordanians to opt for the private sector and entrepreneurialism, more out
of sense of necessity than choice (Al-Dajani). According to Lust-Okar:
“More than 30% of males from the predominantly Transjordanian areas of Ma’an,
Tafilah, Ajloun, Jarash, Mafraq, and Madaba are employed in the public
administration and defense sectors, compared with only 10.3% of males in Amman."
As East Bank Jordanians dominate the intelligence services, the regime has
traditionally been reliant on them. Arguably the current King Abdullah is more so
than his father was because of his lack of knowledge about the language and the
context of Jordan (Zahran). This in turn has affected the way that economic policies
have been instigated, as the regime has needed to generate income and pay its
Transjordanian civil service while keeping the same Transjordanians happy.
Historically, the regime has taxed the private sector, where most Palestinian
Jordanians work, heavily in order to fund its employees.
“Jordanian Palestinians are encumbered with tariffs of up to 200 percent for an
average family sedan, a fixed 16-percent sales tax, a high corporate tax, and an
inescapable income tax. Most of their Bedouin fellow citizens, meanwhile, do not
have to worry about most of these duties as they are servicemen or public servants
who get a free pass” (Zahran).
At the same time, Palestinian Jordanians have profited from certain government
policies such as the Qualified Industrial Zones, which offer lower tariffs to clothing
factories the export to the United States. This tariff will only apply to factories that get
a certain percentage of their inputs from Israel (Zahran).
However, even with preferential export tariffs, Jordan has suffered prolonged bouts of
recession. From the 1980s onwards, the government has been in financial crisis and is
heavily reliant on the United States for aid. The loans they have received have come
with stipulations such as lowering taxes in the private sector. Although the move to
neo-liberal economic policies was instigated by East Bankers, arguably it was
Palestinian-Jordanians who benefitted most from the reforms (Assaf). Yet the
economic reforms were wrapped in a new nationalist campaign known as ‘Jordan
First’. Designed to rally all Jordanians around the reforms, in fact it further
marginalised Palestinian Jordanians (Assaf).
The response from Transjordanians was to protest against the regime, leading to
further gerrymandering in the 2010 election law reforms and an announcement from
the King a year later that he would “set aside $500 million for salary increases for
government employees” (Assaf). This policy of effectively buying off East Bankers at
the expense of the private sector has not brought about growth and Jordan continues
to be in recession.
“…in the last few years, Amman has experienced an economic downturn. Inflation
rose from a low of 1.6 per cent in 2003 to a whopping 13.9 per cent in 2008; poverty
rates hover around 13-14.2 per cent, and unemployment is officially at 12 per cent,
but unofficially at 30 per cent” (Tobin)
2.5. Employment as a socioeconomic indicator …......................................................19
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in 1944 that having a job was a basic
human right and in the decades that followed numerous members of congress tried to
legislate for ‘full employment’. From the 1970s onwards this policy fell out of fashion
as governments began to fear inflation more than unemployment (NYtimes).
However, as an indicator of economic health, employment has retained its status.
“‘I know that people get scared of inflation and Wall Street is a natural ally in this
fear," Mr. [Amartya] Sen said. ‘But the real costs of unemployment are very high.
Having a job confers not only income, but social recognition and self-respect, which
comes with having the sense of being wanted by society.’” (NYtimes)
Equally in developing countries, the process of industrialisation has, in classical form,
hinged on the movement of agricultural ‘excess’ into specialisation. As Ken Shadlen
has argued, although countries may have used different instruments to produce
growth, the underlying objective of increasing their position on the international
division of labour remained the same. The mobilisation of a labour force as seen in
the Communist countries in the 1950s and more recently in East Asian countries, has
been key to overall growth (Krugman). Thus the measure of employment can tell us a
lot about the development of a country.
Millennium Development Goals 3 and 8 both address the need for people to be in
employment: the former calls for women to have their fair share of employment in
non-agricultural jobs, while the latter sets a target of “decent and productive work for
youth”. In countries outside the global North, people are more likely to be engaged in
the informal economy. This particularly applies to those excluded from society
(Gough and Wood). Thus when considering data on employment rates in the South,
this must be taken into account. Job security is another important factor when
considering employment rates. Social Policy in the West has relied on the idea that
most people are a part of the labour market and therefore have the facilities for
savings and investment (Gough and Wood). In Jordan, where the public sector offers
the most secure income and is dominated by East Bankers (Assaf), ‘employment’
rates for Palestinian Jordanians may appear lower if based on opinions of what counts
as ‘being employed’.
2.6. Education as a socioeconomic indicator.............................................................. 20
As a country progresses, it will usually find that more jobs require education; meaning
investment in education is key to maintaining development (Lee). The theory of The
Demographic Transition, which underpins the development of any country (Dyson),
states that while mortality decline is the only causal factor leading to fertility decline,
factors such as mass education can act as a catalyst to this process. Tim Dyson argues
that this in turn will lead to pressure for a more equitable distribution of power within
a country (Dyson).
Contemporary economists have identified a lack of investment in human capital, most
often in the form of low education rates, as a key factor in stalling development
(Rodrik). Botswana, where growth rates have been among the most impressive in the
world, has invested heavily in education. This is seen by many economists as an
essential part of the country’s development strategy (Rodrik). Lin and Chang identify
education as a ‘coordination externality’ and thus essential if technology is going to
be used to upgrade an economy (Chang and Lin). While export orientation is certainly
not the only growth strategy, it has been arguably highly successful in regions such as
East Asia and there is a strong empirical link between export sophistication and the
percentage of the labour force with more than primary education.
At a more holistic level, education can be considered as a basic human right and not
just as a means to an end (Sen, 1983). MDG Goal 3 includes a clause on the right of
universal primary education for women and girls but Sen and others would argue that
this should be extended across the board. Not only is education likely to increase
capabilities and freedoms (Sen), it is also negatively correlated with conflict, meaning
those with education are more likely to live in peace (Stewart and Brown).
However the measure of education is not just a question of numbers in schools.
Primary education in Jordan is already, to all intents and purposes, universal and
therefore simple analysis of these figures will tell us nothing. Even those with tertiary
or higher education will not necessarily be learning the same skills as they might in
the North. Employer survey reports in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, show that
while number in schools and universities are growing, tertiary graduates are still
weaker overall in problem solving, business understanding, computer use and
communication skills than their Northern counterparts (UNU-Wider). Therefore it is
important to consider both quantitative and qualitative data when considering the state
of an education system.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES.......................................................21
The following analysis will seek to answer firstly whether Palestinian Jordanians are
politically underrepresented. This will be based on the assumption that the population
is mostly living in Amman and Zarqa governorates and to a lesser extent, in Irbid.
Through the Key Informant interview, the research will also seek to answer how
different areas are over or underrepresented, if this indeed the case and to get
information more broadly about how the Palestinian Jordanian population interacts
with the regime. The analysis will then focus on the impact that this political
underrepresentation might have, establishing whether there is a correlation between
political participation and levels of higher education and employment. Through KI
interviews, it will seek to broaden this analysis to include information about
marginalisation in the systems of higher education other than simple figures and in the
area of labour force participation both in the public and private sectors.
4. DATA AND METHODS ....................................................................................... 22
4.1. Quantitative data ................................................................................................. 22
In order to further analyse both the alleged political marginalisation of Palestinian
Jordanians and the potential affect it has had on the specific socioeconomic indicators
of employment and education, I will consider statistical information from both the
Jordanian government and The Demographic Health Surveys Program (DHS) of 2012.
This will always be with the view of taking the most recent data possible. Figure 1.0
shows a breakdown by governorate of the number of candidates per governorate in the
House of Deputies (parliament) compared to the number of people living in the
governorate. I have added to this a percentage breakdown, giving an indication of the
percentage population vs. the percentage of candidates in each specific governorate.
We assume for all these data that the primary regions for Palestinian Jordanians are
Amman, Zarqa and to a lesser extent, Irbid. These data are taken from the Jordanian
Department of Statistics.
Figure 1.0 (Jordan Department of Statistics)
GovenorateHouse of Deputies
House of Deputies % Population
Population %
Amman 18 26.08695652 2,419,600 38.72
Madaba 3 3.75 156,300 2.5
Jerash 2 2.5 187,500 3
Ajloun 3 3.75 143,700 2.3
Karak 9 11.25 243,700 3.9
Ma'an 3 3.75 118,800 1.9
Aqaba 2 2.5 136,200 2.18
Zarqa 6 7.5 934,100 14.9
Mafraq 3 3.75 293,700 4.7
Tafileh 3 3.75 87,500 1.4
Irbid 9 11.25 1,112,300 17.8
Balqa 8 10 418,600 6.7
Total 69 6,252,000 100
Figure 1.1 details the comparative levels of education for women in urban and in rural
areas of Jordan. This ranges from ‘no education’ to ‘higher education’ and is a
percentage of all women in these categories. The only areas that are considered to be
between 80 and 100% urban by DHS 2002 standards are Amman and Zarqa. Balqa,
Madaba and Irbid are all considered to be between 60 and 80% urban with the rest of
the country termed 60% or less urban. These data are taken from the 2012 DHS
Household Survey of Jordan.
Figure 1.1 (DHS 2012 Household Survey of Jordan)
Figure 1.2 gives a further breakdown of education for both men and women, this time
considering two specific governorates in the Kingdom: Zarqa and Karak. These areas
were chosen as contrasting regions as the former is a highly urban area, primarily
comprised of Palestinian Jordanians where as the latter is a highly rural area,
primarily composed of East Bank Jordanians. These data are also taken from the DHS
2012 Household Survey of Jordan.
Figure 1.2 (DHS 2012 Household Survey of Jordan)
Figure 1.3 shows the percentage of men and women who were unemployed at the
time of the survey in 2013. This is broken down by governorate and is taken from the
Jordanian Department of Statistics. Again, the regions of Zarqa and Karak are
highlighted in order to provide a comparison between a largely urban, Palestinian
Jordanian governorate and a largely rural East Bank Jordanian governorate.
Figure 1.3 (DHS 2012 Household Survey of Jordan)
4.2. Methodology ....................................................................................................... 26
Using the data available from the DHS Household Survey of Jordan 2012 and the
Jordanian Department of Statistics, I will use both univariate analysis and bivariate
analysis. For the former, I will consider the distribution, central tendency and
dispersion of the values for each indicator. Initially this should give further
information about the values for political representation in each governorate and then
I will consider the values for higher education and employment in the same areas.
Following this, I will analyse the correlation between the variables, considering the
relationship between first higher education and employment, then political
representation and higher education and finally political representation and
employment.
The values for figure 2.0 have been obtained by calculating the percentage difference
between percentages of representatives in parliament and total percentage of
population compared to the Kingdom as a whole. As such, we can see the difference
between representation and population in each governorate with a higher difference
indicating more underrepresentation and a negative difference indicating
overrepresentation. The distribution ranges from -188.46 in the most overrepresented
area of Karak, to 49.66 in the most underrepresented area of Zarqa. The mean of the
difference in representation is -38.79, indicating that a large proportion of the
Jordanian population are overrepresented. The dispersion of the values shows a wide
variation from ‘0’ towards overrepresentation, particularly in the areas of Karak,
Tafileh and Ma’an and a smaller variation towards underrepresentation in the areas of
Zarqa, Amman and Irbid and to a lesser degree, Jerash and Mafraq.
Amman
Balqa
Zarqa
Madaba
Irbid
Mafraq
Jerash
Ajloun
Karak
Tafileh
Ma'an
Aqaba
-200.00 -150.00 -100.00 -50.00 0.00 50.00
Political Representation % difference
Political Representation % difference
Figure 2.0
The percentage of the population who are unemployed in each governorate is shown
in figure 2.1. The value is an average, taking a mean of the individual data for men
and women. The distribution ranges from 32.65% in Amman to 2.1% in Aqaba,
meaning the range is very wide. The mean for all values is 8.34%, meaning that the
values for Amman and Irbid are both outliers from the norm. Analysing the dispersion
of values shows that higher percentages of unemployment are highly concentrated on
these two governorates and to a lesser extent in Zarqa, Balqa and Karak, with the rest
of the values varying much less.
Amman
Balqa
Zarqa
Madaba
Irbid
Mafraq
Jerash
Ajloun
Karak
Tafileh
Ma'an
Aqaba
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Unemployment %
Unemployment %
Figure 2.1
In figure 2.2 we can see the values for people whose highest educational achievement
falls into the category of ‘higher education’, as set by the DHS Household Survey of
Jordan 2012. As the values for men and women are separated, I have taken a mean of
the two in order to simplify for analysis. The distribution of values is much less broad
than for the other variables analysed. In the case, the range is from 28.3% of those
surveyed having completed higher education (in Amman) to 15.9% in Ma’an
governorate. The mean is set at 21.55%. This appears to be high in a regional context.
However it is not possible to make direct comparisons using the same data from DHS
as the categories vary between “higher education” (Jordan), “more than secondary”
(Egypt) and “high school and higher” (Turkey). For the Jordanian values, other than
the capital, Irbid, Madaba, Karak, Ajloun, Balqa and Zarqa all score close to the
mean, with Ma’an and Mafraq as the only real outliers.
Amman
Balqa
Zarqa
Madaba
Irbid
Mafraq
Jerash
Ajloun
Karak
Tafileh
Ma'an
Aqaba
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Higher Education
Higher Education
Figure 2.2
For the second stage of analysis, I will consider how these three variables correlate to
one another to determine a pattern. On the x-axis is listed the governorates 1-12. I
have listed them in the following order:
1. Amman
2. Balqa
3. Zarqa
4. Madaba
5. Irbid
6. Mafraq
7. Jerash
8. Ajloun
9. Karak
10. Tafileh
11. Ma’an
12. Aqaba
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 140
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Higher Education %Unemployment %
Figure 2.3
The y-axis shows both percentages of higher education in the regions and
unemployment percentages. There is a small positive correlation between higher
education and unemployment. The highest percentages are both located in the capital,
Amman. However there appears to be no correlation between higher education and
unemployment in the southern governorates of Karak, Tafileh, Ma’an and Aqaba.
In figure 2.4, the x-axis again represents the twelve governorates in the same order
with the y-axis representing both percentages of people (male and female averaged)
who completed higher education and the difference in percentage between numbers of
candidates and population in an area. In the case, the higher the percentage difference,
the more underrepresented an area is by candidates. In this case we can see that there
is no correlation between the two variables.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
Higher Education %Political Representation % difference
Figure 2.4
In figure 2.5 the values for unemployment and political representation are plotted
against each other to determine correlation. Again, the higher the value for the
variable, ‘political representation’, the more underrepresented an area is. In this
instance we can see a small positive correlation between underrepresentation and
unemployment. In Amman (point ‘1’ on the x-axis) there is both high unemployment
and mass underrepresentation. Where as in Karak, for example, we can see that both
unemployment is lower and representation is comparatively higher.
0 2 4 6 8 10 120
2
4
6
8
10
12
GovernoratePolitical Representation % differenceUnemployment %
Figure 2.5
4.3. Qualitative data ................................................................................................... 33
To widen the scope of analysis I have included qualitative data alongside quantitative
data, in the form of 4 Key Informant (KI) Interviews. The individuals were chosen for
their knowledge of Palestinian Jordanian issues and while they do not represent a
perfect range of opinions, their responses in interviews varied widely.
Key Informants:
Anis Kassim – Member of the Jordanian Bar Association, lawyer and expert on
international law and Palestinian Jordanian legal issues
Dr. Labib Kamhawi – Former Professor of Political Science at Jordan University,
Analyst and political writer, specialising in Palestinian Jordanian issues
Dr. Fawzi Samhouri – President of the Roots Center for Human Rights in Jordan
Adnan Abu Odeh – Former Adviser to King Hussein, ex-deputy head of Jordanian
intelligence services
I ran through a semi-structured interview with each KI, using questions based around
the topics of political and cultural participation, citizenship, education and labour
force participation. This semi-structured approach was used in order to give KIs to
express views on subjects that were ‘off-topic’, while maintaining some structure to
the process in order to allow for comparison and analysis.
4.3.1 Methodology……………………….................................................................. 33
In order to analyse the data from the KI interviews, I used a process of coding, with
an emic focus to allow the participants own terms and viewpoints to come across.
Doing this by hand rather than using software was a more holistic approach, with the
idea being that underlying patterns could emerge despite differences in language
usage or superficial terminology. Once I had highlighted sections of transcript and
‘coded’ these, a series of themes (or categories) emerged, which were as follows:
Palestinian Jordanian political participation- Extreme nationalism of Jordanians- Political exclusion of Palestinian Jordanians
o Proportional representationo Percentage of Palestinians in Amman and Zarqao Women’s quotao Trusto One-man-one-vote
- Muslim Brotherhood
The regime- International perceptions- Corruption - The nation state
o Pluralismo Colonialismo Monarchy
- Secret serviceso Voting in Parliament
- The constitution- Tribes- Patrimony - Reform- Consent- Judiciary - Institutional constraints - Bedouins
o Regime supporto Poverty
Israel- Right of Return- The Nakba
Unity- The Unity Act- Severance speech
The media- Publishes requests for citizenship withdrawal
Citizenship- ID cards- Stateless- Threats- Nationality law of 1954- Process of withdrawal
Education - Universities
o Makrumaho Admissions o Markso Violence
Labour force- Government jobs- Agriculture
o Weather patternso Salary security
- Entrepreneurialism
Arab Spring in Jordan- Poverty- Oppression - Freedom of speech- Terror law- Economic mismanagement
The economy- Debt- Taxes
o Different property taxes for Palestinian Jordanians - Tax burden- Discrimination
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 35
Key informants associated the theme of Palestinian Jordanian political participation
with a combination of exclusion in the form of election laws such as boundary
divisions and a nationalistic movement of East Bank Jordanians. They identified this
theme with geographical locations such as Amman and Zarqa and cultural differences,
such as tribal systems and ideological platforms.
The theme of ‘the regime’ featured widely in interviews and was strongly associated
with generalised corruption and a sense of dishonest behaviour. This led participants
to discuss the regime in relation to international perceptions of Jordan as opposed to
internal views. The theme stretched broadly from issues of nation state formation,
including institutions and patrimony to more specific issues such as voting patterns
and the way the regime influenced the behaviour of parliament.
Israel featured less broadly and was largely mentioned in relation to Palestinian
statehood and the idea of the Right of Return for Palestinian Jordanians. This was
interlinked with the theme of ‘unity’ and the unification and severance of the West
Bank from Jordan.
The media was also a less important theme, with participants using it to examine
specific issues in relation to citizenship – a much more important theme for Key
Informants. The latter theme had strong negative associations when considered in the
framework of Palestinian Jordanians. Participants associated it with threats,
statelessness and bureaucratic processes of identification and withdrawal.
In relation to the theme of ‘education’, KIs generally discussed the process of
university admission and grades. They also linked this to the more general theme of
corruption, talking negatively about the ‘makrumah’ system of hand-outs in the form
of free university places. This was then linked to violence and inequality in
universities.
The theme of ‘labour force participation’ was mostly discussed in terms of a
private/public sector split. While there were variations in the details, all participants
associate the former more with Palestinian Jordanians and the latter with East Bank
Jordanians. This was then linked by several KIs with a longer historical picture of
agriculture and the place of the salary in breaking the link between climate and
income.
Most KIs spoke about Jordan in the context of an Arab country and as such, the theme
of the Arab Spring came through. For Jordan, this was associated with poverty and
oppression, which came back to the theme of corruption.
Finally, under the theme of ‘the economy’, participants strongly associated economic
policy with taxation and an imbalance in the tax burden between Palestinian
Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians. This, in turn, was associated with the theme of
corruption, the regime and the portrayal of the regime to the international community.
6. DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .............................................. 37
In terms of the univariate analysis on the levels of political participation in each
governorate, we can clearly see that governorates which are known to be made up of
primarily Palestinian Jordanians are most likely to underrepresented in Parliament.
This is backed up by evidence from the KIs, all of whom confirmed that in general,
the Palestinians Jordanian population were deliberately underrepresented and that,
with some variation, the areas of Amman, Zarqa and to a lesser extent, Irbid, had the
highest concentration of Palestinian Jordanians.
“At that time the second district in Amman, which covers an area that harbours more
than 400,000 people, 90% of them are of Palestinian origin. They have 2 MPs. And
the governorate of Tafileh, which had 46,000 people, had 3 MPs. I said ‘come on
guys! This is crazy!’” - Dr. Labib Kamhawi
Key informants also identified a difference between ‘real’ participation and
superficial levels of participation. Exclusion tactics were seen as the election system
itself and the influence of the regime on voting once candidates succeeded in being
voted into Parliament.
“It is like a performance not real. I mean you can say ‘they are there, they are
participating’ but they are not.” - Adnan Abu-Odeh
“So the involvement of Palestinians in the political life in Jordan has been watered
down to the maximum. That of course is manifested in a very distinct and very visible
way in what they call the one vote election rule.” - Anis Kassim
“70% of the candidates are security agents and the security service can recruit people
from them. Now if there is a vote in the parliament more often than not you will see
that all of their mobiles [phones] are ringing. Most of them go out of the hall to
receive instructions on how to vote so nobody can tell me that this is a democracy.”
Anis Kassim
“Some Palestinians who are willing to act within the confines of the regime and play
by the rules of the game are not really excluded but Palestinian political participation
has been systematically eroded since the 1970s civil war until today and it actually led
to the emergence of a class of Jordanians who became very much anti-Palestinian.” -
Dr. Labib Kamhawi
When measured against values for higher education, levels of political participation
seem to have little correlation. However, KIs identified a system of hand outs, or
‘makruma’ that appear to undermine this analysis.
“The university seats have become one source of appeasements to the tribes” Adnan
Abu Odeh
Thus we must consider one of the limitations of the research. As Palestinian
Jordanians are identified as living primarily in Amman and Zarqa and these are the
most urban areas of the Kingdom, we would expect socioeconomic indicators to be
higher than rural areas.
“Poverty is not spatially bipolar but distributed along a spectrum. Rural areas are the
poorest; megacities and large cities are the richest, and smaller towns of varied sizes
and slums in larger cities lie in between. The implications of the spatial location
poverty along a spectrum are nontrivial.” (Rural-Urban disparities)
However, we are not able to control for urbanization, as there is not a sufficiently
detailed breakdown of sub-districts. It is possible to make generalised assumptions
based on the quantity of literature demonstrating higher socioeconomic indicators
across the board in urban areas. Thus the similarities between urban and rural areas
for values in Jordan could be taken as an indication that urban areas – i.e. Amman and
Zarq – are lower than they otherwise would be. Certainly KIs identified a disparity
between marks that East Bank Jordanians needed to attain in order to gain access to
higher education and those that Palestinian Jordanians needed to attain:
“You cannot take a kid whose average is 60% and put him with students who scored
95%. He cannot match, he cannot cope, especially if he is not from a solid
background – if he comes from a Bedouin family in the dessert he doesn’t have the
cultural background to cope.” - Anis Kassim
“Here in Jordan more than 50 or 60% of the seats in our universities it is, we call it
‘quotas’, which is exceptionals. This is against constitution and against citizenship.” -
Dr. Fawzi Samhouri
According to the quantitative data, there is a weak positive correlation between
underrepresentation and unemployment. Again, this should be taken in the context of
the research limitations meaning that, although the data does not exist to control for
levels of urbanisation, we can make some general assumptions on that basis. Thus we
can see that in Jordan, highly urban areas suffer from greater unemployment than
rural areas, which runs counter to the general trend of urban socioeconomic
indicators. Therefore the correlation may be stronger with this assumption taken into
account. From the KI interviews, we can also see that there is a schism in the work
force between the public and private sector, with Palestinian Jordanians almost
entirely excluded from the former.
“When you talk about the private sector in Jordan you have to be very careful because
when you come to the people you see in Amman (shop keepers etc.), most of them are
Palestinians. Maybe 98% are Palestinians because they don’t have any chance of
getting a job in the government.” - Adnan Abu Odeh
They connected this exclusion with the Jordanian regime’s argument that subsuming
Palestinian Jordanians into the state would mean giving up on the Right of Return. A
number of KIs also attributed the labour force split to historical differences in
livelihoods. East Bank Jordanians were associated with a pastoral mentality, meaning
they were more attracted to a regular salary that would ensure protection from the
seasons, where as Palestinians were seen as entrepreneurial by nature.
“The salary over the course of the years has become the attraction for every woman
and man in Jordan – to get a job with the government because you don’t have to
worry about the cycle of the climate.” - Adnan Abu-Odeh
“Who will see a bright engineer from Karak or Salt but he loves to go and work in the
Ministry of Public Works or the municipality of Amman or in the Ministry of Water.
He doesn’t like to go to the private sector unless he’s an exception but the general rule
is that everything should be guaranteed by an employment contract.” - Anis Kassim
This adds a layer of complexity to the quantitative data because Jordanians – both
East Bank and Palestinian origin – tend to associate the term ‘employment’ with a
government salary. Therefore the term ‘unemployed’, as described by the Jordanian
Department of Statistics, could simply mean small scale private business owner.
Combining the two sets of data, we can see conclude that while Palestinian Jordanian
areas of Jordan do tend to have higher rates of unemployment, Palestinian Jordanians
in general tend work in the private sector and that this is largely due to public sector
exclusion.
KIs also strongly associated the labour force split and the interaction between the
regime and the Jordanian workforce with corruption on a large scale:
“Because of the tax structure, the private sector bears the big burden of taxation and
this is Palestinian. So the Palestinians, in this sense, are financing the police force that
discriminates against them.” - Anis Kassim
“Amman municipality for example they need about 8000 staff. The number of their
staff, according to the rumours not statistical, more than 15,000.” Dr. Fawzi
Samhouri
“When I was sent to court, to high criminal court, that’s what they call it, when I was
accused of sedition of the regime, all these things blah blah because of an interview
on TV. It so happened that the lawyer is Strawneh [tribal name], the judge is
Strawneh, the prosecutor general is Strawneh, all these from one family. It never
happens in the world! It never happens! It’s against the law, even. They’re all
cousins!” - Dr. Labib Kamhawi
“Corruption has become rampant and you can safely say that all economic missions
are either to finance corruption to delete the negative impact of corruption on the
economy.” - Dr. Labib Kamhawi
7. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 41
In conclusion, there seems to be little doubt that Palestinian Jordanians are
deliberately underrepresented when analysing both former texts on the subjects and
the testimonies of the Key Informants, combined with the statistical data on
candidates. This is done through gerrymandering of district boundaries, quotas for
women and by ensuring that once in Parliament, candidates feel they cannot vote
against regime decisions. The impact that this has on the Palestinian Jordanian
population is more complex. While I chose to analyse higher education and
employment as two key socioeconomic indicators, these do not give the full picture of
impact. According to the qualitative data from KIs, the ‘makruma’ system, instigated
by the regime, has directly effected the Palestinian Jordanian population by ensuring
seats at universities for lesser candidates from East Bank Jordanian origins. We can
safely assume that if Palestinian Jordanians had greater political influence, these hand
outs would not operate in the same way. However, the quantitative data does not fully
endorse this, showing that higher education participation is in fact slightly higher in
areas where there is a high concentration of Palestinian Jordanians. Yet if we take this
in the context of urbanisation, even without the relevant dummy variable we can
assume that the urban areas where Palestinian Jordanians live would normally have
higher socioeconomic indicators across the board. This assumption of urbanisation
creates a starker picture in relation to unemployment figures as majority Palestinian
Jordanian areas of the Kingdom have higher values that those with East Bankers. At
the same time, the information from the KIs shows that this is further complicated by
a split between private and public sectors. This split clearly stems from and feeds in to
a lack of political participation for Palestinian Jordanians. Thus the question of why
underrepresentation matters seems clear: a lack of influence in the decision making
processes of the country has led to discrimination in the socioeconomic fields of both
education and employment, despite the urban surroundings.
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