disarmament verification - consortium for verification...
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Consortium for Verification Technology
Disarmament VerificationAregDanagoulian
MIT
Consortium for Verification Technology
NewSTARTtreaty,2011– Russia&USA
• Reducedeployedwarheadsto1550warheadseach-- ~3xreduction
• Howdotreatypartnersverifythattheothersideisdismantlingactualwarheadsandnotfakes?Theydon’t.
• Verification:deliveryvehicles – easier toverify.
• Problems:largeleftoverofnon-deployedwarheads• theftà nuclearterrorism,nuclearproliferation• rapidrearmamentintimesofpoliticalcrisis
à Authenticatewarheads,withoutrevealingclassifiedinformation!
Consortium for Verification Technology
Overall View of Thrust Area
• Treaty verification is not the same as weapon detection
• The goal of verification is to confirm that an object presented as “X” is “X”.– Negotiate protocols to establish acceptable level for
“confirmation.” • Critical Issues:
– clear all real warheads (completeness)– detect all fakes/hoaxes (soundness)– reveal no classified information (“zero knowledge”)
Consortium for Verification Technology
Thrust Area V Subprograms• VerificationUsingInherentlyTrustworthyInstruments(Univ.ofMichigan)
– SARADC’swithnon-uniformbinresolution– Lead:DavidWehe– Student:FredBuhler– Collaboratingwith:LLNL
• AutomatedUraniumEnrichmentMeasurements(UIUC)– Lead:KatyHuff– Student:MarkKamuda– Collaboratingwith:DAF
• ZeroKnowledgetemplateverification(Princeton+Yale)– neutronradiographyà comparisontoatemplate– Leads:AlexGlaser,Francescod’Errico,RobertGoldston.– Student:SebastianPhilippe,MikeHepler– Collaboratingwith:PPPL,DAF
• PhysicalCryptographicVerificationofNuclearWarheads(MIT)– transmissionNRFtoproduceaphysicalhashofanuclearwarheadà comparisontoatemplate– Leads:AregDanagoulian– Students:JaysonVavrek,Ruaridh Macdonald,EllieImmerman,BobbyNelson,JakeHecla– Collaboratingwith:PNNL
Consortium for Verification Technology
Three core components:• First stage secure SAR for generating windows (6-bits). • Residue (error) amplifier• Second stage SAR for fine measurement within window (8-bits)
Untrusted ObserverLearns Nothing
SAR1
++
-SAR2
SecureMeasurementUnit(SMU)forTreatyVerification [UMich,Wehe]
Consortium for Verification Technology
Consortium for Verification Technology
Automated Uranium Enrichment Measurements with NaIUsing an Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
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Twoorder-reductiontechniqueswerecomparedtousingthefullspectrumasthefirstneuralnetworklayer.
Usingthefullspectrumtooklongertotrainthanthetwoorderreductiontechniques,butachievedasimilarfinalerroronasimulatedvalidationdataset.
Despitethegoodperformanceonthevalidationset,theneuralnetworkperformedpoorlyonrealHEUspectra.
Fig.2:Gamma-rayspectrumofHEU.Collectedwith2x2in.NaIin30seconds.(Kamuda,2017)
Isotope
UnattenuatedGamma-rayIntensitiesfor
HEU[%]
Input:fullspectrum[%]
Input:10Autoencoder
nodes[%]
Input:First10principalcomponents
[%]
U235 36.8 25.6+/- 0.013 14.9+/- 0.003 18.2+/- 0.004
U234 44.0 18.1+/- 0.015 15.3+/- 0.004 14.3+/- 0.002
Th231 19.0 13.8+/- 0.004 13.8+/- 0.001 14.5+/- 0.003
Others <0.2 42.5 56.0 53.0
Average neural network output from 10 HEU spectra. Different orderreduction techniques are compared. An example spectrum is shown below.
Fig. 1: Training error curves for the three neural networks taughtin this work. Note, despite taking longer to reduce the error, thefull spectrum neural network performed similarly to both orderreduction techniques. (Kamuda, 2017)
[UIUC]
Consortium for Verification Technology
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MAKING SUB-MeV NEUTRONS
Goal: Design a moderator configuration that maximizes fraction of neutrons with energies < 1 MeV to selectively drive fission events (e.g. in U-235 vs U-238) and detect these with shielded side detectors and provide isotopic sensitivity
MODERATED DT SOURCE
RESULTS
In preparation of experimental campaign at PPPL, can different configurations of (20%-enriched and depleted) uranium cubes be distinguished?
Source: Authors
FROM A MODERATED 14-MeV DT GENERATOR
Talk by CVT Fellow Mike Hepler, coming up
[Princeton]
Consortium for Verification Technology
[MeV]Eenergy 2.1 2.12 2.14 2.16 2.18 2.2 2.22 2.24 2.26 2.28
s (liv
e)
⋅A
µin
terp
. co
unts
per
1.0
0 k
eV
per
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014template (DU) spectrum
hoax (Pb) spectrum
template (DU) fit
hoax (Pb) fit
σdiscrepancy = 10.69
Verification Concepts with tNRF[MIT]
-- hoax-- template
• HighVoltageResearchLab– 2.5MeVbeam• Twoproxydevices:fulldiversion,halfdiversion
• 5-11s detection• Clearhonestdevice
• staytuned(arxiv)– submittinganarticlesoon
Otherprojects:• ZeroKnowledgeepithermal
radiography• nucleararchaeology• historyofverification(poster)
Consortium for Verification Technology
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INSTRUMENTS:algorithms (UIUC)
detectors (Yale)electronics (UM)
VERIFICATION CONCEPTS:NRF (MIT)
Neutrons (Princeton)
NATIONALLABS
DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION
Consortium for Verification Technology
Conclusion• Solidprogressonallprojects:
– isotopicsensitivityusing<MeVneutronsources(Princeton)– experimentaldataofwarheadverificationusingtNRF (MIT),newverification
conceptsusingepithermalneutrons– Uraniumenrichmen usingneuralnetworks(Illinois)– New,non-uniformADCforinformationsecurity:prototypeready(UM)