Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc.  

 

Disarmament and

International Security Committee

Situation in Ukraine

Director: Nour Abraham    

 

                                 

     

   

             

   

 © 2016 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)

This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers University Model United Nations 2016. Use for other purposes is not

permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net

POLICY  DILEMMA  .................................................................................................................................  1  

CHRONOLOGY  ......................................................................................................................................  4  

1991:  FALL  OF  THE  SOVIET  UNION,  UKRAINIAN  INDEPENDENCE  .........................................................................  4  2004:  THE  ORANGE  REVOLUTION  ...............................................................................................................  5  2008:  RUSSO-­‐GEORGIAN  WAR  ...................................................................................................................  6  NOVEMBER  2013:  EUROMAIDAN  ................................................................................................................  8  FEBRUARY  2014:  UKRAINIAN  REVOLUTION  ...................................................................................................  9  

ACTORS  AND  INTERESTS  ....................................................................................................................  11  

THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  .......................................................................................................................  11  EASTERN  UKRAINE  .................................................................................................................................  13  WESTERN  UKRAINE  ................................................................................................................................  15  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION  ...........................................................................................................................  16  

POSSIBLE  CAUSES  ...............................................................................................................................  18  

GOVERNMENT  CORRUPTION  .....................................................................................................................  18  POST-­‐COLD  WAR  TENSIONS  .....................................................................................................................  20  NATIONAL  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  REGIONALISM  ...............................................................................................  21  DOMESTIC  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMY  .................................................................................................  23  COMPARISON  OF  CAUSES  .........................................................................................................................  25  

PROJECTIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS  .....................................................................................................  26  

CONCLUSION  .....................................................................................................................................  27  

DISCUSSION  QUESTIONS  ....................................................................................................................  28  

BIBLIOGRAPHY  ...................................................................................................................................  29  

WORKS  CITED  .......................................................................................................................................  29  WORKS  CONSULTED  ...............................................................................................................................  37  

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Policy Dilemma The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea is one of the most pressing issues

plaguing the international community currently. While the annexation itself brings up

questions about topics such as non-interventionism, military might, national sovereignty,

and posturing on the world stage, Russia’s military action is indicative of greater,

underlying conflict. In many respects, the military annexation of Eastern Ukraine at the

Crimean Peninsula can be seen as the culmination of issues involving national identity,

political instability, and economic hardship. On an international scale, the military seizure

of the peninsula represents a resurge in tensions between Russia and the world,

communicating Russian hostility and recrystallizing a dormant bipolar international

system. At the crux of this dilemma is the disconnect in narrative between all local,

regional, and international parties involved in the conflict.  

For the Russian Federation, the annexation of Crimea is an essential policy that

recalls the history of the region.1 According to President Vladimir Putin, the reintegration

of Ukraine back to the motherland would mean restoring the ontology of the first Slavic

state of Europe: the Kievan Rus’.2 This state, encompassing a group of ethnically and

religiously united people, would restore glory to a Russia divided after the abominable

Cold War.3 Given the significant Russian population of Ukraine demanding inclusion, the

policy taken by Russia seems all the more necessary through the lens of Moscow.4 At the

same time, the military annexation also communicates strength to the world; being

capable of stamping out revolution, inciting separatist sentiment, and undermining

Western demands has bolstered Russia’s image as a tour de force in the international

community. Finally, the annexation of Ukraine represents a very tactical decision – as it                                                                                                                          1 Birnbaum, Michael, and Demirjian, Karoun. “A year after Crimean annexation, threat of conflict remains.” The Washington Post. March 18, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-after-crimean-annexation-threat-of-conflict-remains/2015/03/18/12e252e6-cd6e-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html, Accessed April 19, 2016. 2 The Kremlin. “Address by President of the Russian Federation.” March 18, 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, Accessed April 19, 2016. 3 The Kremlin. “Address by President of the Russian Federation.” 4 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Ukrainians Who Identify as Ethnic Russians or Say Russian Is Their First Language.” April 19, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/map-ukraine-percentage-who-identify-as-ethnic-russians-or-say-russian-is-their-first-language-/25323841.html, Accessed April 19, 2016.  

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allows Russia a place to militarize against the threat of a hostile Eurasia, as well as

virtually complete access of the strategic Black Sea and Ukraine’s natural resources.5

Working in concert with the fact that this allows Russia more positional freedom with its

naval base in the city of Sevastopol, and the perception of Russia on the world stage

seems all the more complete.6  

Ukraine, conversely, represents a mixed bag of reception in response to the

annexation. While the people in Western Ukraine harbor an anti-Russian sentiment for

meddling in the 2004 elections and propping up of President Viktor Yanukovych, the

people of the Eastern bloc feel a strong connection between Ukraine and Russia and

advocate for greater relations between the two nations.7 Both camps entrenched in the

domestic conflict have had their sentiments exacerbated by protests and internal violence.

While the Orange Revolution represents the outrage in the corruption of the Ukrainian

political system, the reaction of unmarked gunmen at a Crimean airport represents an

opposing, polarizing counterpoint.8 These antagonistic convictions become further

amplified by the Ukrainian recession offset by the 2008 global recession, compromising

the economic stability of the nation.9  

To secondary parties, such as European nations and Balkan states, Russia’s recent

actions are viewed as worrisome and containing massive implications. For one, many

Balkan states have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the Cold

War came to an end in order to prevent further conflict and infringement by Russian

forces.10 This is exemplified by the European response to the 2008 Russian invasion of

                                                                                                                         5 CFR Backgrounders. “Ukraine in Crisis.” Council of Foreign Relations. August 25, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/ukraine-crisis/p32540, Accessed April 19, 2016. 6 CFR Backgrounders. “Ukraine in Crisis.” 7 BBC. “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline.” BBC News. November 13, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275, Accessed April 19, 2016. 8 BBC. “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline.” 9 Drach, Maryana, and Shtogrin, Iryna. “In Ukraine, Impact of Global Crisis Beginning to Sting.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. October 16, 2008. http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine_Impact_Global_Crisis/1330330.html, Accessed April 19, 2016. 10 Gligorijevic, Srdjan, and Watkins, Ameado, Dr. “NATO and the Balkans: The case for greater integration." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2007. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art3.html, Accessed April 19, 2016.    

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Georgia and the subsequent decline in relations.11 These ex-Soviet states, in short, look to

these events in fear that they will be the next targets of future Russian aggression.12  

Meanwhile, the United States is largely concerned with Russia’s behavior. During

the Cold War, the United States and Russia were often engaged in proxy wars,

specifically in the Central Asia in the states of Afghanistan, China, Iran, and Vietnam.13

Looking upon the recent developments in the Ukraine, as well as Russian involvement in

Syria, the United States is becoming increasingly worried that dormant Cold-War

antagonism will resurge and lead to an arm’s race or potential military conflict.14  

Overall, the military annexation of Crimea is a very timely and pressing issue for

the international community. While Russia sees its recent feat as a national victory and a

step towards a more complete Russia, the international community has become

increasingly concerned with Russia’s behavior. This discrepancy in narrative is perhaps

the most concerning aspect of the conflict; when certain nations interpret other nations’

actions differently, the potential that militarization and conflict ensue becomes much

greater a possibility. The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

was founded on the principle that nations diplomatically ease tensions lest an escalation

of arms ensues.15 In order to prevent such a conflict from again occurring, DISEC must

construct a solution that properly addresses the implications of military expansion while

being cognizant of the many competing narratives that make diplomacy unachievable.  

                                                                                                                         11 CNN Library. “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.” CNN. March 31, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/, Accessed April 19, 2016. 12 Bilic, Ivana, and Veselinovic, Gojko. “The Balkans Watch Ukraine, But See Themselves.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. March 05, 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/balkans-see-selves-ukraine/25286891.html, Accessed April 19, 2016. 13 World Heritage Encyclopedia. “List of Proxy Wars.” World Heritage Encyclopedia. http://www.gutenberg.us/articles/list_of_proxy_wars, Accessed April 19, 2016. 14 Botelho, Greg, and Diamond, Jeremy. “U.S.-Russia military tit for tat raises fears of greater conflict.” CNN Politics. June 19, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/17/politics/russia-us-military-threats-rise-ukraine/, Accessed April 19, 2016. 15 General Assembly of the United Nations. “Disarmament and International Security.” http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/, Accessed April 19, 2016.  

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Chronology 1991: Fall of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Independence With Mikhail Gorbachev as the first and last president of the Soviet Union, the

Cold War slowly came to a halt and would drastically change the relationship between

Russia and its neighbors. In 1989, President Gorbachev authorized the pullout of Soviet

troops in Afghanistan and additionally limited the Soviet Union’s rapid military

expansionist policy.1617 Gorbachev’s escalation to power also saw a variety of revolutions

in 1989, leading to the autonomy of the former Soviet states.18 The Ukraine’s nationalist

progression during the dissolution of the Soviet Union was no exception to the trend.  

On August 19, government officials belonging to the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (CPSU) attempted a coup d’état against Mikhail Gorbachev in what was

famously known as the August Putsch.19 The coup, which aspired to gain control of the

Soviet Union’s collapsing communist polity, was met by popular political backlash and

fell to shambles in less than two days with Gorbachev resuming control.20 The failed

campaign signified the end of the CPSU and marked the end of the Soviet Union, which

later collapsed on December 26 that year.21  

The failed campaign had an impact in the Ukrainian political sphere as well. On

August 25, five days after the failed coup d’état, the Parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic passed the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine.22 The

document was drafted by Levko Lukyanenko, and was aimed at preserving communist

                                                                                                                         16 Keller, Bill. “Gorbachev Promises Big Cut in Military Spending.” The New York Times. January 19, 1989. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/19/world/gorbachev-promises-big-cut-in-military-spending.html, Accessed April 19, 2016. 17 “Text of Gorbachev Statement Setting Forth Soviet Position on Afghan War.” The New York Times. February 9, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/09/world/text-of-gorbachev-statement-setting-forth-soviet-position-on-afghan-war.html?pagewanted=all, Accessed April 19, 2016. 18 Suny, Ronald Grigor. “Empire Falls: The Revolutions of 1989.” The Nation. October 28, 2009. http://www.thenation.com/article/empire-falls-revolutions-1989/, Accessed April 19, 2016. 19 Sebestyen, Victor. “The Soviet Coup That Failed.” New York Times. August 20, 2011. Print. Accessed April 27, 2016. 20 Sebestyen, Victor. “The Soviet Coup That Failed.” 21 Sebestyen, Victor. “The Soviet Coup That Failed.” 22 Lapychak, Chrystyna. “Historic vote for independence.” Kiev Press Bureau. September 1, 1991. http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/1991/359102.shtml, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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control in Ukraine given the decay of communism in the Soviet Union.23 The declaration

centralized control over a majority of public resources in Ukraine, and was met with

popular approval and celebrations throughout the country.24 This mass public sentiment

was reinforced by a referendum in December, where over ninety per cent of the

Ukrainian population voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union.25 With that,

the Ukraine – formally a central geographic region of historic Russia – was one of the last

countries to leave the Soviet Union before its dissolution.  

2004: The Orange Revolution           The Orange Revolution, in many respects, represented a resurfacing of a

longstanding history of governmental corruption in the Ukraine since it achieved its

independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991. The current climate of Ukraine is a

reflection of the pent-up political frustration in the country since its inception.  

In 2004, the second president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma made a public address

claiming that he would not be running for reelection after serving as president for ten

years.26 These comments were made in the midst of allegations concerning governmental

corruption; most famous of these cases was the Cassette Scandal, in which public

officials accused former president Kuchma of the abduction of journalist Goergiy

Gongadze.27 Cassette recordings of the president supposedly authorizing the kidnapping

of the journalist accompanied the allegations.28 These events drew massive speculation

towards the political freedoms of Ukrainian citizens and marked a shift towards

westernization of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.  

The incumbent’s address thus paved the way for the 2004 Ukrainian presidential

elections. Two candidates, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, emerged on the

                                                                                                                         23 Lapychak, Chrystyna. “Historic vote for independence.”  24 Lapychak, Chrystyna. “Historic vote for independence.” 25 “The December 1, 1991 Referendum/Presidential Election in Ukraine.” Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1992. Print. Accessed April 27, 2016. 26 “Timeline: Battle for Ukraine.” BBC News. January 23, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4061253.stm, Accessed April 27, 2016. 27 Gentleman, Amelia. “Putin dodges Ukraine scandal.” The Guardian. February 12, 2001. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/feb/12/worlddispatch.ameliagentleman, Accessed April 27, 2016. 28 Gentleman, Amelia. “Putin dodges Ukraine scandal.”  

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ballot and represented divisive, bipolar policies. While Viktor Yushchenko advocated for

strained relations with Russia in favor of establishing greater connections with western

European nations, Yanukovych instead promised to maintain traditional, longstanding

Russo-Ukrainian relations.29  

In November 2004 during the election cycle, domestic and foreign monitoring

services found that government officials in favor of Yanukovych rigged the elections.30

This caused massive uproar in what was known as the Orange Revolution and resulted in

nationwide civil unrest – primarily in Kiev’s Independence Square.31 As a result of the

protests, the original vote was annulled and another vote was ordered in December

2004.32 On January 10, 2005, under much greater scrutiny, the Central Election

Commission of Ukraine concluded that Viktor Yushchenko was the winner of the

presidential elections with an eight per cent margin over Yanukovych.33  

Although this event was largely peaceful with no casualties reported, the Orange

Revolution marks the first mass protest against Ukrainian authority. In addition to

increased skepticism in the Ukrainian government, this revolution also marks a shift in

Ukrainian foreign policy. With Yushchenko emerging as the victor of the election, the

public opinion can be noted as shifting from largely pro-Russian to pro-European.  

2008: Russo-Georgian War Ever since Georgia achieved its independence from Russia in 1991, South Ossetia

and Abkhazia maintained that they are separate, autonomous nations that have rejected

Georgian influence.34 Upon its entry to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

in October 1993, Georgia has advocated for sanctions against both territories for their

                                                                                                                         29 “Profile: Viktor Yushchenko.” BBC News. January 13, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4035789.stm, Accessed April 27, 2016. 30 “Ukraine profile - Timeline.” BBC News. October 27, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123, Accessed April 27, 2016. 31 “Ukraine profile - Timeline.” BBC News. 32 “Ukraine profile - Timeline.” BBC News. 33 “The Elections of the President of Ukraine.” Central Election Commission of Ukraine. March 13, 2016. http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e, Accessed April 27, 2016. 34 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.”

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dissidence.35 In response, Russia stationed peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia in 1994 in

order to prevent tensions from escalating.36 However, those tensions resurged after

Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili assumed office in 2004, when he aimed to utilize

military action as a means to restore order over the territories.37 Clashes broke out on

August 8, ending with a ceasefire agreement on August 19 and involving the further

stationing of Russian troops in Ossetia.38  

Since April 2008, Russia has maintained strong ties with both regions on both a

political and diplomatic level.39 In March 2008, Russia – identifying with Abkhazia and

South Ossetia for their separatist intentions and being present in both territories through

military forces – lifted CIS sanctions and dismissed them as archaic.40 This provocation

was met with international backlash, especially by Georgian politicians worried about the

potential loss of the territory and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) worried

about future escalations in the region.41  

Later that month, Russian jets downed Georgian spy drones flying over Abkhazia,

bringing further speculation from the international community.42 Although Russia denied

the allegations by the Georgian government, United States Department of State and

NATO officials backed the claims.43 Additionally, a May 26 report by the United Nations

                                                                                                                         35 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.” 36 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.”  37 Kramer, Andrew E., and Barry, Ellen. “Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal.” New York Times. August 12, 2008. http://nyti.ms/1SMnbGk. Accessed April 27, 2016. 38 Kramer, Andrew E., and Barry, Ellen. “Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal.” 39 “Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of the War in Georgia.” Library of Congress. June 09, 2015. http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php, Accessed April 27, 2016. 40 “Russian Federation Withdraws from Regime of Restrictions Established in 1996 for Abkhazia.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. March 06, 2008.http://web.archive.org/web/20080901193119/http://www.ln.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/79C58F476CAEC4E8C32574040058934C?OpenDocument, Accessed April 27, 2016. 41 “Russia criticized over Abkhazia.” BBC News. April 24, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7364544.stm, Accesed April 27, 2016. 42 “Russia ‘shot down Georgia drone.’” BBC News. April 21, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7358761.stm, Accessed April 27, 2016. 43“U.S. says concerned over downing of Georgian drone.” Reuters. April 23, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-russia-usa-idUSN2347608020080424, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) confirmed that the fighter jet was downed by

Russian aircraft technologies.44  

The temporary peace came to an end in August 2008, when violence began to

erupt once more. On August 7, the long-standing ceasefire between Ossetia and Georgia

came to a close with separatists groups attacking Georgian peacekeepers.45 Russian

military troops and air forces are quickly deployed after Georgia responds by sending

troops to the region. The conflict ensues until August 16 after being brought to an end by

international pressure for a ceasefire agreement.46 To this day, the humanitarian impact of

the conflict remains unclear. However, according an EU fact-finding report, the war

amassed over two-hundred civilian deaths over the nine days.47  

The conflict demonstrates the fragility of Russo-European relations and the vast

potential for military conflict. Paired with nationalist and separatist sentiments, the

prospects for violence in the Russo-European sphere are further enflamed as the means

available to resolve conflict become increasingly difficult.  

November 2013: Euromaidan           The Euromaidan revolution began as a reaction to the Ukrainian president Viktor

Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and EU-Ukraine

Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: documents intended to increase political and

economic relations between the European Union and Ukraine.48 In response, civilians –

dissatisfied with Russia’s heavy influence in Ukraine as the status quo – took to the

streets of Kiev on November 21 in mass demonstration: congregating in Independence

Square.49 The protests gathered right-wing nationalists and progressives alike under the

                                                                                                                         44 Finn, Peter. “U.N. Says Russia Downed Drone.” Washington Post. May 27, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/26/AR2008052600568.html, Accessed April 27, 2016.  45 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.” 46 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.” 47 “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts.” 48Buckley Neil. “Ukraine refuses to sign up to Europe deal.” Financial Times. November 29, 2013. https://next.ft.com/content/2a1380b2-58de-11e3-9798-00144feabdc0, Accessed April 27, 2016. 49 “Ukraine protests after Yanukovych EU deal rejection.”BBC News. November 30, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25162563, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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banner of anti-Russian sentiments, further underscoring the growing unpopularity of

Russia in Ukraine, specifically in the western block.50  

By early December of 2013, as many as eight-hundred thousand protesters

occupied Kiev’s city hall in response to the recent developments.51 Later that month, on

December 17, the Ukrainian government further exacerbated tensions by accepting

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s economic lifeline, which would agree to purchase

fifteen billion dollars’ worth of Ukraine’s national debt and reduce Russian gas prices

sold to Ukraine.52 In response to growing participation in protests, the Ukrainian

government passed strict anti-protest laws on January 16, which was met with further

unrest from protesters.53 After storming more government offices in the city Lviv, Prime

Minister Mykola Azarov resigned and parliament voted to annul the anti-protest

legislation in hopes to qualm the escalations.54 In addition, the two hundred thirty-four

political prisoners arrested since the beginning of the protests were released on February

14.55  

The Euromaidan protests demonstrate several ideas in the Ukrainian conflict.

Firstly, the protests are indicative of decades of political corruption in the Ukraine since

its founding. On another level, the popular protests leading up to 2014 demonstrate the

Ukraine’s desire for integration into the European Union.  

February 2014: Ukrainian Revolution           Despite actions taken by the Ukrainian government to temporarily subside

tensions, violence unexpectedly broke out two days later at Independence Square –

                                                                                                                         50 Luhn, Alec. “The Ukrainian Nationalism at the Heart of ‘Euromaidan.’” The Nation. January 21, 2014. http://www.thenation.com/article/ukrainian-nationalism-heart-euromaidan/, Accessed April 27, 2016. 51 “Ukraine’s anti-government protesters stage first mass rally in 2014.” Reuters. January 12, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-idUKBREA0B09820140112, Accessed April 27, 2016.  52 BBC. “Ukraine crisis: Timeline.” 53 “Ukraine’s president signs anti-protest bill into law.” BBC News. January 17, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25771595, Accessed April 27, 2016. 54 “Ukraine crisis: Parliament abolishes anti-protest law.” BBC News. January 28, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25923199, Accessed April 27, 2016. 55 BBC. “Ukraine crisis: Timeline.”

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killing over twenty people.56 Violence only continued to climb, culminating on February

20 with dozens killed in clashes and sniper fire between civilians and riot police. The

deaths soared in the hundreds in about seventy-two hours since the violence started.57  

On February 21, President Yanukovych signed an agreement with opposition

leaders, which decentralized presidential powers to parliament and called for early

elections to be held that December.58 In spite of this, Yanukovych disappeared from

Ukraine the following day amidst an uncertain political crisis.59 According to media

reports, the President left to the city of Kharkiv for an alleged summit. In lieu of this,

civilians resumed the protesting and the storming of government offices.60  

Two days later, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to ban Russian as the second

official language of Ukraine, established Olexander Turchynov as interim president in an

attempt, and disbanded the Berkut police unit – responsible for the deaths of protesters –

as a means to keep the national crisis under control.6162 However, this only sparked

resentment amongst the Pro-Russian block, leading to the presence of Pro-Russian

gunmen in Crimea.63 In March that year, Crimea votes to leave Ukraine to Russia with an

overwhelming ninety-five per cent of voters.64  

                                                                                                                         56 Traynor, Ian. “Ukraine: protesters and police clash on worst day of Kiev bloodshed.” The Guardian. February 19, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/18/ukraine-protesters-clash-police-reform, Accessed April 27, 2016. 57 “Ukraine crisis: What we know about the Kiev snipers.” BBC News. April 3, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26866069, Accessed April 27, 2016.  58 Higgins, Andrew, and Kramer, Andrew E. “Ukraine Has Deal, but Both Russia and Ukraine Wary.” The New York Times. February 21, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/world/europe/ukraine.html, Accessed April 27, 2016. 59 Malkin, Bonnie. “Ukraine crisis: Viktor Yanukovych leaves Kiev for support base.” The Telegraph. February 22, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10655335/Ukraine-crisis-Viktor-Yanukovych-leaves-Kiev-for-support-base.html, Accessed April 27, 2016. 60 Frizell, Sam. “Ukraine Protesters Seize Kiev As President Viktor Yanukovych Flees.” TIME. February 22, 2014. http://world.time.com/2014/02/22/ukraines-president-flees-protestors-capture-kiev/, Accessed April 27, 2016. 61 “Ukraine: Speaker Oleksandr Turchynov named interim president.” BBC News. February 23, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26312008, Accessed April 27, 2016. 62 “Ukraine ‘disbands elite Berkut anti-riot police.’” BBC News. February 26, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26350088, Accessed April 27, 2016. 63 Higgins, Andrew, and Erlanger, Steven. “Gunmen Seize Government Buildings in Crimea.” The New York Times. February 27, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/crimea-ukraine.html, Accessed April 27, 2016. 64 “Crimea referendum: Voters ‘back Russia union.’” BBC News. March 16, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097, Accessed April 27, 2016.  

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While the Ukrainian government – and particularly the leadership of parliament –

took measures to dissolve the political conflict, the Ukrainian Revolution demonstrates

that the conflict involves a deep ethnic, cultural, and linguistic schism between the Pro-

Russian separatists and the Pro-Europe unionists.  

Actors and Interests The Russian Federation The Russian Federation is deeply invested in the Ukraine – and particularly the

Crimean peninsula – for a number of reasons, some obvious and others less apparent.

Since it’s “Russification” under the Russian czarina Catherine the Great in the eighteenth

century, the Ukraine has been politically, economically, and culturally linked to Russia.65

Despite the Ukraine achieving its independence in 1991, the ties between the Russian

Federation and its former state have remained very prominent, and these ties become

apparent amidst the current tensions in the Ukraine.  

Firstly, Russia’s ontological interests in maintaining its ties with the Ukraine are

important in assessing the current developments. As made apparent by Russia’s recent

referendum in the Crimean peninsula, up to ninety-five per cent of the population voted

in favor of leaving the Ukraine to Russia.66 This outcome stems from the fact that a

majority of the population of Crimea – about seventy-seven per cent - identifies as

ethnically and linguistically Russia, as compared to the national thirty per cent.67 In a

Kremlin address on March 18, 2014 made in response to the referendum two days before,

Russian president Vladimir Putin even evoked powerful religious and nationalist imagery

                                                                                                                         65Coalson, Robert. “Putin Pledges to Protect All Ethnic Russians Anywhere So, Where Are They?” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. April 10, 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html, Accessed April 27, 2016. 66 “Crimea referendum: Voters ‘back Russia union.’” 67 Said, Hashem. “Map: Russian language dominant in Crimea.” Al Jazeera America. March 15, 2014. http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/3/map-russian-the-dominantlanguageincrimea.html, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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in his speech.68 The outcomes of the referendum, according to Putin, reflect an ethnic

unity of the greater Russia and the desire to restore the first Slavic state: the Kievan Rus’.  

Extending further from the idea of a greater, unified state is Russia’s profound

economic investments in the Ukraine. Two essential gas and oil pipelines – the Urengoy-

Pomary-Uzhgorod and the Druzhba, respectively – are responsible for transporting half

of their exports to Europe, which constitutes eighty per cent of its energy market.69 In

addition, the Ukraine is a key consumer of Russian gas. According to the Russian public

Joint Stock Company Gazprom, the Ukraine purchased approximately thirteen billion

dollars’ worth of gas in 2013.70 Moscow realizes the disastrous economic impact that

would result in continued disarray in the Ukraine, and seeks to bring an end to conflict

through exerting control of key provinces. The Eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk

contain caches of iron and coal that may be of interest to the Russian government, given

that recent reports have found that these ores have been covertly transported from the

Ukraine to Russia.71 Lastly, the Black Sea territory constitutes a gateway to Europe in

terms of trade, where it comprises thirty-eight per cent of the country’s seaborne trade.72  

The military and geopolitical implications of a Russian annexation are perhaps

Russia’s greatest motivators in the conflict. Seizing the Crimean peninsula would allow

Russia to upgrade its military faculties by seizing control of Sevastopol, a city in Crimea

containing bases for Russia’s Navy and Black Sea fleet.73 Such a military feat would also

result in Russian control of other weapons and military resources in Crimea.

Additionally, Russia’s annexation of Crimea would allow it security by creating a

                                                                                                                         68 “Address by President of the Russian Federation.” The Kremlin. March 18, 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, Accessed April 27, 2016. 69 Grigas, Agnia. “One year since Crimea’s annexation: Russia’s interests run deep.” The Hill. March 23, 2015. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/236487-one-year-since-crimeas-annexation-russias-interests-in, Accessed April 27, 2016.  70 Grigas, Agnia. “One year since Crimea’s annexation: Russia’s interests run deep.” 71 Grigas, Agnia. “One year since Crimea’s annexation: Russia’s interests run deep.” 72 Gorodyankin, Gleb, and Zhdannikov. “Trading house Trafigura wins huge chunk of Rosneft oil supply.” Reuters. March 27, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-trafigura-rosneft-idUSKBN0MN1D520150327, Accessed April 27, 2016. 73 Yuhas, Alan, and Jalabi, Raya. “Ukraine crisis: why Russia sees Crimea as its naval stronghold.” The Guardian. March 7, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/ukraine-russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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satellite state to curb the influence of potential Western aggressors such as the European

Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, this

action would communicate strength to the rest of the world and positive reception

domestically. After Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008, for instance, Putin’s approval

rating reached an all-time high of eighty-three per cent; one could expect similar

outcomes in the Ukraine.74  

Eastern Ukraine The Eastern Ukraine, since before the beginning of the conflict, has largely sided

with the Russian Federation and ultimately desires separation from the rest of the

Ukraine. While the population Eastern Ukraine prioritizes security and a means of living

over all else, the fact remains that there is a profound distrust of the Ukrainian

government that lives with the citizens of Eastern Ukraine. This distrust is rooted in

decades of what Eastern Ukraine perceives to be an undermining of the ethnic Russian

population by means of historical loose ends and Ukrainian leadership.  

While “Russification” under Catherine the Great led to the gradual transformation

of Ukraine into a Russian-speaking and Russian-ethnic population, the 1954 transfer of

Crimea to the Ukraine also lies at the heart of the massive Russian representation in

Ukraine. When Chairman Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR authorized the transfer of the

Crimean peninsula to Ukraine, he also increased the Ukrainian population of Russians by

approximately one million people.75 This was followed by criticisms from the Supreme

Soviet of Russia, who accused Khrushchev of treason.76 Crimeans – subject to a shift in

governance - agree that this transfer has been a long-standing fault requiring correction

via unification.  

                                                                                                                         74 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years.” Gallup. July 18, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx, Accessed April 27, 2016.  75 Kramer, Mark. “Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?” Wilson Center. March 19, 2014. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago, Accessed April 27, 2016. 76 “USSR’s Nikita Khrushchev gave Russia’s Crimea away to Ukraine in only 15 minutes.” Pravada Russia. February 19, 2009. http://www.pravdareport.com/history/19-02-2009/107129-ussr_crimea_ukraine-0/, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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Eastern Ukrainians have only more firmly embraced their separatist sentiments

after recent actions set forth by the Ukrainian government. When Ukrainian President

Viktor Yushchenko was placed in power as a result of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the

Eastern Ukraine – namely the oblasts of Crimea, Donetsk, and Crimea – perceived the

ousting of Yanukovych as an authoritarian grab that undermined their political voice.77

These regions largely backed Yanukovych: the former governor of Donetsk; the re-vote

that resulted after the Orange Revolution – to many in these provinces – signified an

inherent distrust in the Eastern Ukraine as responsible for their political autonomy.  

These attitudes were rekindled after the international response to Yanukovych’s

opting out of the European Union trade agreements, which led to the Euromaidan

protests. In an attempt to calm the protests, the Ukrainian government passed legislation

to appease the Ukrainians protesting the government – one of which annulled a second

language law that made Russian the second official language of Ukraine.78 However,

many Ukrainians identify strongly as Russian; for instance, the Donetsk oblast contains

no Ukrainian-language schools, and teach entirely in Russian.79 This legislation, among

others, has reinforced previous notions of distrust in Eastern Ukraine’s self-

determination, and has resulted in the presence of many unmarked gunmen in Crimea’s

airport.80  

Today, Crimeans strongly desire political autonomy. In a “2013 Crimea Residents

Survey” by Baltic Surveys and the Gallup Organization, sixty-five per cent of Crimeans

believe in some support of autonomy from the Ukraine, with an additional twenty-three

per cent of Crimeans in support of annexation by the Russian Federation.81 On top of

                                                                                                                         77 “Putin: Russia helped Yanukovych to flee Ukraine.” BBC News. October 24, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29761799, Accessed April 27, 2016.  78 Kupfer, Matthew. “Language Continues to Divide Ukraine.” The Moscow Times. October 13, 2014. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=509372, Accessed April 27, 2016. 79 Memmott, Mark. “Crisis in Ukraine: Gunmen at Airport; Yanukovych Vows to Return.” NPR. February 28, 2014. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/28/283811761/gunmen-take-over-crimean-airports-ukraine-blames-russia, Accessed April 27, 2016. 80 Evans, Robert. “Ukraine death toll rises to more than 4,300 despite ceasefire.” Reuters. November 20, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-un-idUKKCN0J40X820141120, Accessed April 27, 2016. 81 International Republican Institute. “Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea May 16 – 30, 2013.” United States Agency for International Development. May 2013. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec705.pdf, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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this, a majority of Crimeans cites issues such as unemployment and price control to be

the most important issues facing Crimea.82 This suggests that while there exists some

level of importance of Russia, economic security seems to take precedence.  

Overall, it could be said that a significant minority of Ukrainians are displeased

with the direction of Ukrainian politics towards a pro-Europe future. To them, the

involvement of the international community in what they perceive to be a local question

of self-determination is both worrisome and indicative of Western interference with their

political future. Paired with the governmental suppression and lack of economic

opportunity in the eastern regions, many Eastern Ukrainians have decided that the current

Ukrainian leadership is not representative of them. Any future prospects of cooperation

from the Eastern Ukraine must address these venerable conditions.  

Western Ukraine By contrast, the majority of citizens in the Ukraine have expressed a desire to

move towards a more European policy. Likewise, this interest is rooted in years of

political corruption since Ukraine achieved its independence in 1991. After noticing what

they perceive to be the failure of continued Russian relations, many Ukrainians – and

particularly those in the Western Ukraine – desire a shift towards statehood in the EU, as

well as NATO membership or protection.  

The first notable example of Ukraine’s distrust in the government was the Orange

Revolution, in which pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych illegitimately won the

2004 presidential election. This brought into question the scope of involvement of Russia

in Ukraine’s domestic affairs, and led to overall dissatisfaction with the Russian

government as exemplified by the protests. The Euromaidan protests in 2013 once again

demonstrate the profound disapproval of Ukraine in the government and increased

involvement in Russia. In Kiev, hundreds of thousands of people protested municipalities

and government offices as a result of Yanukovych’s refusal to proceed with EU relations

                                                                                                                         82 International Republican Institute. “Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea May 16 – 30, 2013.”  

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in favor of an economic timeline by Russia.83 In fact, Euromaidan has even united right-

wing nationalists and social progressives alike under the common cause of curbing

Russian involvement in Ukrainian politics.84  

Instead, the Ukrainian people in the westernmost provinces – and as a whole –

approve on adopting European institutions as a means to alleviate the adverse economic

conditions and political corruption that runs rampant in Ukraine. One 2014 Gallup study,

for instance, found that while Ukrainian approval of the Russian government saw a ninety

per cent decline after the conflict, recent developments presented no considerable change

in public opinion about leadership in the EU, United States, and Germany.85 In addition,

the study found that a majority of Ukrainians associate organizations such as NATO with

increased security, despite being somewhat divided on the issue.86  

In all, the non-separatist Ukraine has universally condemned the Ukrainian

government, which appears to be at the source of the revolution and conflict in Kiev. This

dissatisfaction with Ukrainian leadership is paired with attitudes of distrust in Russia’s

sphere of influence as well as a favorable view upon integration into the European Union,

and potentially NATO.  

The European Union Many countries within the European Union are divided about the state of affairs in

the Ukraine. On one hand, many countries in the Union are detached from the recent

developments, seeing involvement in the crisis as potentially dangerous; chief among

these countries being the United Kingdom. At the same time, Post-Soviet satellite states

such as Latvia and Estonia express reasonable concern over the events in the Ukraine,

worried that they will be next in a long line of Russian aggression. However, some

countries – such as Germany and France – have been at the forefront of resolving the                                                                                                                          83 Diuk, Nadia. “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution.” World Affairs Journal. March/April 2014. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine%E2%80%99s-self-organizing-revolution, Accessed April 27, 2016. 84 Luhn, Alec. “The Ukrainian Nationalism at the Heart of ‘Euromaidan.’”  85 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Ukrainian Approval of Russia’s Leadership Dives Almost 90%.” Gallup. December 15, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/180110/ukrainian-approval-russia-leadership-dives-almost.aspx, Accessed April 27, 2016. 86 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Ukrainian Approval of Russia’s Leadership Dives Almost 90%.”

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conflict, seeing a resolve to the conflict as a way to maintain the geopolitical and

economic order of Europe.  

With the United Kingdom exhibiting mixed feelings on its status in the European

Union, their activity in the EU has dramatically declined in recent years.87 While the UK

recognizes Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU, conducts regular talks with

representatives from the Ukraine, and has imposed sanctions on Russia, it has effectively

taken backseat in the diplomatic process through the European Union.88 Other countries,

such as Belgium, are worried about confrontations with Russia amidst the conflict, and

have retreated from pursuing a solution. In fact, most of Brussels’ faculties with regards

to foreign policy are employed within other member states of the European Union.  

Southeastern Europe – comprised of states that have formally been part of the

Soviet Union – has reacted to the Ukrainian conflict with mixed reactions, but

apprehension being chief among them. To the Balkan states, imagery of the breakup of

Yugoslavia is conjured, causing considerable support for Russia.89 In Serbia – for

instance – pro-Russian protesters took to the streets in Belgrade in response to the

happenings, carrying signs saying, “Crimea is Russia, and Kosovo is Serbia.”90

Meanwhile, the domestic response in Bosnia has been less than positive of Russia’s

involvement in the Ukraine.91 Likewise, the Romanian President Traian Basescu has

called upon Moscow to seize their military development in the Ukraine and halt further

escalations.92  

Rising above all nations in the European Union is Germany’s Prime Minister

Angela Merkel. Alongside France, Merkel has taken an active role in bringing resolve to

the conflict in the Ukraine. There are a variety of reasons for the scale of Germany’s

                                                                                                                         87 Walsh, James. “UK’s EU referendum explained: will Britain leave the European Union?” The Guardian. February 18, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/18/brexit-explained-united-kingdom-european-union-referendum, Accessed April 27, 2016. 88 “Political issues between Ukraine and Great Britain.” Embassy of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 2016. http://uk.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-uk/diplomacy, Accessed April 27, 2016.  89 Bilic, Ivana, and Veselinovic, Gojko. “The Balkans Watch Ukraine, But See Themselves.” 90 Bilic, Ivana, and Veselinovic, Gojko. “The Balkans Watch Ukraine, But See Themselves.” 91 Bilic, Ivana, and Veselinovic, Gojko. “The Balkans Watch Ukraine, But See Themselves.” 92 Marinas, Radu. “Romania’s Basescu slams EU for soft Putin stance.” Reuters. July 21, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-romania-idUSKBN0FQ1W320140721, Accessed April 27, 2016.

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involvement. Firstly, Germany has had a track record of involvement in the European

Union – particularly with respect to the Eurozone conflict.93 Furthermore, Germany is the

most strategically adept nation in dealing with Ukraine; it is the largest country in

Europe, strategically located at the center of Europe, and is by and large the economic

powerhouse of the EU.94 Finally, as a massive consumer of Russian energy, it is within

Germany’s best interest to urge the EU into action.95 Recently, Germany has spearheaded

a round of economic sanctions against Russia.96 France has also worked alongside

Germany after a tango between Germany and the UK in terms of how to deal with the

conflict.97  

Overall, the voices within the EU are too fractured with respect to the Ukrainian

conflict. While Germany has taken the primary initiative in handling the crisis, and has

even attracted crowds within the Union to take action against Russia, more work could be

done in order to unify Europe under a common effort. At the same time, any military

dimension to EU strategy remains distant. With geopolitical and economic interests as the

primary stake in the conflict, the EU is highly interested in seeing the situation in the

Ukraine reach a calm.  

Possible Causes Government Corruption Decades of corruption by the Ukrainian government have been the tipping point

that led to the conflict within the Ukraine. By and large, this factor is the most important

in assessing the conflict, as it is at the source of dissatisfaction from the Ukrainian

electorate. At the same time, corruption in Ukraine has even pervaded into public spheres

as well. Either way, without the Euromaidan revolution serving as the catalyst for

                                                                                                                         93 Troianovski, Anton. “Greek Crisis Shows Germany’s Power Polarizes Europe.” Wall Street Journal. July 6, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanys-power-polarizes-europe-1436231408, Accessed April 27, 2016. 94 Speck, Ulrich. “German Power and the Ukraine Conflict.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 26, 2015. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/03/26/german-power-and-ukraine-conflict, Accessed April 27, 2016. 95 Speck, Ulrich. “German Power and the Ukraine Conflict.”  96 Speck, Ulrich. “German Power and the Ukraine Conflict.” 97 Speck, Ulrich. “German Power and the Ukraine Conflict.”

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violence, the international community would not react to the conflict to the magnitude

that it has.  

According to Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index

(CPI), the Ukraine received a score of twenty-five – putting it at a rank of one hundred

forty-four out of the one hundred seventy-seven countries surveyed as one of the most

corrupt governments in the world, and the most corrupt government in continental

Europe.98 In addition, a 2008 Global Corruption Report found corruption to be rampant

in the sectors of vehicle inspection, law enforcement, health care, the courts, and higher

education.99  

As previously noted, the legacies of Ukrainian presidents – such as Kuchma,

Yushchenko, and Yanukovych – have been marked by governmental corruption and

deliberate cover-ups. President Leonid Kuchma’s Cassette Scandal, for instance, brought

into speculation the legitimacy of the freedom of press; additionally, Kuchma’s alleged

involvement in the 2004 presidential elections was a factor leading to the Orange

Revolution of that year.100 While the first two years of the Tymoshenko’s involvement as

Prime Minister brought Ukraine’s CPI to all-time highs, the subsequent years during the

presidency of Yushchenko was marked by constant political standoff between him and

Tymoshenko; as a result, the Ukraine has not been able to salvage its increase in CPI.101

Finally, the presidency of Yanukovych was especially detrimental to Ukraine’s prospects

for tackling corruption, as Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU cooperation and trade

agreements sparked the Euromaidan protests.102  

However - at this current state of affairs - government corruption has even

pervaded mainstream public discourse, and is only headed towards a direction of greater

                                                                                                                         98 “2013 Corruption Perceptions Index -- Results.” Transparency International. 2013. https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results, Accessed April 27, 2016.  99“Global Corruption Report 2008: 7.4 - Europe and Central Asia.” Transparency International. 2008. Print. Accessed April 27, 2016. 100 Karatnycky, Adrian. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” The New York Times. April 12, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20050301faessay_v84n2_karatnycky.html?pagewanted=print&position=, Accessed April 27, 2016. 101 “A political soap-opera, continued.” The Economist. May 29, 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/11458058, Accessed April 27, 2016. 102 “Ukraine protests after Yanukovych deal rejection.” BBC News.

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mistrust. In a 2013 Gallup survey, sixty-three per cent of Ukrainians felt that the

government was becoming increasingly corrupt from the previous five years.103

Additionally, only nineteen per cent of Ukrainians were confident in their government.104

This, in turn, has led to corruption becoming embedded in Ukraine’s culture. In 2013,

approximately thirty-two per cent of Ukrainians were encountered with bribe situations;

of them, eighty per cent followed through and gave bribes or presents.105 In a sense, the

presence of corruption in the public stems from the lack of resources offered by

government. In the absence of effective government, the people have resorted to other

means in order to secure their needs.  

Post-Cold War Tensions The dormant bipolar system during the Cold War manifests itself in modern-day

conflicts involving Europe, the United States, and Russia, and the conflict in the Ukraine

is no exception to this maxim. Due to its strategic location and unique history, the

Ukraine has been proxy conflict for the international community. While Russia wishes to

celebrate its might to the world stage, western nations are interested in bring this crisis to

a close in fear of future conflict and resurgence of a bipolar system.  

It is worth noting that the conflict in Ukraine stems from the European Union trade

agreements that Viktor Yanukovych failed to sign despite years of negotiations with the

EU. However, despite the win-win scenario of signing the bilateral trade agreements,

mutual cooperation did not result. There must have been an external factor or third party

that disturbed this scenario and altered the outcome. Thus, it is extremely vital to analyze

the factors that Russia and the Post-Cold War order play on the way the conflict has

developed over time.  

While Russia has vested economic interests in Ukraine, it is additionally

concerned about its activity so that it may appear strong in the eyes of the international                                                                                                                          103 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Corruption a Major Obstacle for Ukraine’s Next President.” Gallup. May 23, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/170579/corruption-major-obstacle-ukraine-next-president.aspx, Accessed April 27, 2016. 104 Ray, Julie. “Ukrainians Disillusioned With Leadership,” Gallup. December 23, 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/187931/ukrainians-disillusioned-leadership.aspx, Accessed April 27, 2016.  105 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Corruption a Major Obstacle for Ukraine’s Next President.”

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community. With the 2014 Winter Olympics set in Sochi, and the G8 Summit predicted

to additionally take place in Sochi, Russia has been interested in maintaining a high

profile; a diplomatic disaster in Ukraine – where trade agreements are made with the

European Union – would appear as a loss to Russia, and thus not in its best interests.

Take into account the massive Russian population in Ukraine that the Kremlin feels

obligated to protect, as well as Ukraine’s character as a geographic and political foothold

into Europe, and Russia has all the more reason to interfere with Ukraine’s politics within

its interests of preserving the anti-European status quo.  

For actors such as the United States, this conflict represents a potential for

restarting Cold War-era relations with Russia. Wherein the United States could have

played a pivotal role in allowing the Ukrainian government to sway towards a pro-

European future, it predicts that such an action would disturb the current balance in the

political system. According to Professor Maxim Kharkevich of Moscow State Institute of

International Relations, “One of the key contradictions in the post-Cold War system of

international relations is the absence of a peace treaty to establish the new rules of the

game for the great powers.”106 Left unaddressed at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a

bipolar system remains – and those attitudes have manifested themselves in the conflict

over the Ukraine. Karkevich further notes, “even the exact term used to describe the

situation in Crimea – ‘accession’ vs. ‘annexation’ - is a source of considerable diplomatic

tension between Russia and the West.”107  

National Sovereignty and Regionalism Ideas of self-determination and national sovereignty are substantial factors to

consider in the Ukrainian conflict. While dissatisfaction with the current government

seems to take precedence over nationalism for the Ukrainian people, a sizeable number of

eastern Ukrainians still latch onto separatist ideas that have sparked the violence at the

ousting of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. Moreover, many citizens in the

                                                                                                                         106 Rozin, Igor. “To fix Ukraine, fix the post-Cold War system.” Russia Direct. April 11, 2014. http://www.russia-direct.org/russian-media/fix-ukraine-fix-post-cold-war-system, Accessed April 27, 2016. 107 Rozin, Igor. “To fix Ukraine, fix the post-Cold War system.”  

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eastern oblasts feel that they have been wronged by the current political leadership, and

will even resort to violent tactics in order to spur about political change.  

Attitudes between Western and Eastern Ukraine see a notable disparity in attitudes

about the direction of Ukraine. According to a 2014 Gallup Survey, thirty-nine per cent

of Western Ukrainians see NATO as a protection, whereas only three per cent of Eastern

Ukrainians share these sentiments.108 In regards to EU leadership, fifty-two per cent of

Western Ukrainians have a favorable opinion, while only nineteen per cent of Eastern

Ukrainians feel the same way.109 Only twenty-five per cent of Western Ukrainians

approve of Russian leadership, while sixty per cent of Eastern Ukrainians hold the same

opinion.110 These issues are fundamental questions in the Ukrainian revolution, and there

is a clear difference in behavior. This difference in behavior is indicative of the regional

divide between the Eastern and Western Ukraine.  

As previously noted, the Western Ukraine became more heavily invested in the

revolution as a result of two distinct actions. First, the Ukraine’s decision to repeal

Russian as the second national language of the Ukraine was intended to subside the

protesters in the Western Ukraine.111 However, this happened at the expense of the

population of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, civilians of the Crimean peninsula began to

protest the government, and several unmarked gunmen appeared at an airport in Crimea.

Secondly, the Russian Federation issued a referendum to the people of Crimea in

response, and ninety-six per cent of Crimeans voted to leave the Ukraine and join

Russia.112  

Even still, the disagreement on fundamental issues between Western and Eastern

Ukraine has predated the Euromaidan conflict. The first instance of separatist notions in

Ukraine’s modern history dates back to the early 1990s, where a smear campaign by

elites in the Eastern Ukraine was used to oust president Kravchuk so that Leonid Kuchma

                                                                                                                         108 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a Threat.” Gallup. March 14, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/167927/crisis-ukrainians-likely-nato-threat.aspx, Accessed April 27, 2016. 109 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a Threat.” 110 Ray, Julie, and Esipova, Neli. “Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a Threat.” 111 Kupfer, Matthew. “Language Continues to Divide Ukraine.” 112 “Crimea referendum: Voters ‘back Russia union.’”

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– who was profoundly pro-Russian – would become his successor.113 These notions

resurged during the 2004 Orange Revolution and once again in 2008 when the Party of

Regions – a pro-Russian party headed by Viktor Yanukovych – lost control of the

parliament.114 In tandem with the events in Georgia, a convention of separatists was

gathered at the outset, but later died down after the Prosecutor’s General Office of

Ukraine issued a cease-and-desist.115 In short, separatist ideas have flourished for much

throughout Ukraine’s history; Crimea’s violent response to current developments is a

result of pent-up ideas that haven’t come to fruition since Ukraine achieved its

independence over twenty years ago.  

Domestic and International Economy As with any conflict involving domestic tensions and violent clashes, economic

disparity has fueled many of the sentiments on either side of the conflict. Alongside

governmental corruption, economic stability remains a topmost desire for citizens all

across the Ukraine. Furthermore, economic incentives from parties like the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU, and Russia have made this conflict an international one.

From its oil and gas pipelines that extend to Europe, to its prospects as a member of the

European Union, the Ukraine is of great interest to international actors. These actors have

thus taken strides to promote their interests over other actors and introduce new

dimensions to the diplomatic crisis in the Ukraine.  

On a geopolitical level, President Yanukovych’s refused to sign trade agreements

with the European Union in favor of an economic timeline proposed by Russia has been

the cause of the revolution in the Ukraine.116 Russia’s interest in maintaining influence in

the Ukraine so that it has greater military and economic access to Europe, and the                                                                                                                          113 Kuzio, Taras. “Yanukovych’s Election Opens Up Crimean Separatist Threat.” European Dialogue. http://www.eurodialogue.eu/eastern-partnership/Yanukovych-Election-Opens-Up-Crimean-Separatist-Threat, Accessed April 27, 2016.  114Wolczuk, Kataryna. “Ukraine’s ‘regionalism of convenience.’” The Washington Post. May 6, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/06/ukraines-regionalism-of-convenience/, Accessed April 27, 2016. 115 “PGO vows to respond should politicians call on separatism.” Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. February 29, 2008. http://www.unian.info/politics/99820-pgo-vows-to-respond-should-politicians-call-on-separatism.html, Accessed April 27, 2016. 116 “Ukraine protests after Yanukovych EU deal rejection.”BBC News.

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European Union’s willingness to expand its trading base, explains why the conflict has

received the international attention that it has.117  

Internally, the Ukraine sees economic hardship on a staggering level. In fact,

Ukraine’s economy is smaller today than it was in 1992: one year after the collapse of the

Soviet Union.118 Corruption on a government level has resulted in lack of output in the

form of public services; according to a 2012 study by two Ukrainian academics, a

“shadow economy” in Ukraine is predicted to equal forty-four per cent of the nation’s

output, and consists mostly of corruption and illegal activities.119 As a result, the Ukraine

has accumulated approximately thirty-five billion dollars’ worth of debt from the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and even Russia’s nationalized natural

gas conglomerate Gazprom.120 In addition, it is predicted that Ukraine’s economy will

fall by three per cent by 2014, after hitting a plateau in recent years.121  

Currently, Ukrainians prioritize economic stability over any other policy in order

to stabilize the conflict. Based on a 2014 International Republican Institute survey, forty-

seven per cent of Ukrainians felt that their financial situation has worsened in the past

twelve months.122 Additionally, sixty-five per cent of Ukrainians agreed that the

country’s financial situation would worsen over the next twelve months.123 Fifty-one per

cent of Ukrainians feel that they are unable to pay to live in the face of upcoming

economic hardships brought about by higher tariffs and prices.124 Addressing these key

issues is essential in bringing end to the ongoing conflict.

                                                                                                                         117 Grigas, Agnia. “One year since Crimea’s annexation: Russia’s interests run deep.”  118 “Ukraine economy: How bad is the mess and can it be fixed?” BBC News. May 1, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26767864, Accessed April 27, 2016. 119 “Ukraine economy: How bad is the mess and can it be fixed?” 120 “Ukraine economy: How bad is the mess and can it be fixed?” 121 “Ukraine economy: How bad is the mess and can it be fixed?” 122 International Republican Institute. “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine.” March 2014. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf, Accessed April 27, 2016. 123 International Republican Institute. “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine.” 124 International Republican Institute. “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine.”

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Comparison of Causes   Despite the vast number of parameters fueling the destabilizing conflict in

Ukraine, the lack of communication - between the Ukrainians and their constituents, as

well as between the varying groups within the Ukraine - seems to be the point to which

all factors converge. At the same time, the Ukrainian question can be stratified into a

local, regional, and international conflict - each of which plays an important role in the

development of the conflict and its prospects.  

Firstly, the foundation of the unrest lies within a general lack of communication

and understanding. For one, the Ukrainian government has failed to be accountable

towards the Ukrainian people - as indicated by opinion polls, survey research, and past

revolutions in the history of the nation. By the same token, the eastern Ukraine feels

betrayed by acts of appeasement towards the western demographic, and clearly aligns

with the Russian side of the geopolitical and cultural spectrum. A resolution to this

conflict must look to address both conditions of the dispute.  

One must also consider the dimensions of the conflict: each ranging in size.

Locally, as previously indicated, there appears to be a cultural divide between the oblasts

of Ukraine; from public opinion to primary language, literature suggests that there is a

factual basis for the regionalist sentiments. Regionally, this has worked to create a

dichotomy, with the eastern oblasts aligning - politically, militarily, and economically -

with the Russian Federation, and the western sides aligning towards the European Union.

The United States, and other western powers, are perhaps more interested in the

international consequences of the conflict; a Russia that is able to secure the strategic

Ukraine might disturb the geopolitical equilibrium in the post-Cold War era to the

modern day, and may cause a resurgence in the political system. This, too, must be

carefully considered in pursuing a strategy to resolve the scenario.  

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Projections and Implications The current, ongoing conflict in the Ukraine has become the most catastrophic

affair in the country’s history since World War 2.125 While the crisis saw its inception

over an internal response to the rejection of bilateral trade agreements, the many facets of

Ukraine’s history, society, and geography have caused the conflict to escalate to

international proportions with many stakeholders in the nation’s future. The way in which

the international community responds to this conflict may have a variety of potential

repercussions locally, internationally, and diplomatically – all of which must be carefully

and deliberately considered.  

How the country decides to respond to the conflict could change the domestic

landscape of the Ukraine. While it is hard to gauge future violence, violence has seen a

steady increase since the Euromaidan in late 2013; tangent to this is the devaluation of

the Ukrainian hryvnia and stagnation of national GDP, which are only expected to

contribute to the growing anti-government fervor.126 Ukraine is also hard-pressed with

addressing the regionalist sentiments of the Eastern Ukraine; while governmental reform

may subside the desire for autonomy in the eastern oblasts, the latest resurgence of

regional sentiment has had violent repercussions.  

The Ukrainian question involves other state actors as well. Russia’s seizure of

Crimea would increase its military and economic capabilities, as it would have access to

naval bases, trade routes, and oil and gas pipelines. The European Union would bear the

brunt of an annexation, as a majority of its energy resources are traded into Europe

through the Ukraine. In addition, a Ukraine that backs on diplomatic talks with the

European Union may also prompt other nations to reconsider their membership with the

Union; given that many states are currently ambivalent about their membership, this

could be the tipping-point in their national policy.  

                                                                                                                         125 “Ukraine turns its back on its ‘worst year since World War II.’” EuroNews. December 30, 2014. http://www.euronews.com/2014/12/30/ukraine-turns-its-back-on-its-worst-year-since-world-war-ii/, Accessed April 27, 2016.  126Krasnolutska, Daryna, and Marchak, Daria. “Ukraine Facing Backlash From FX Borrowers Sunk by Hryvnia.” Bloomberg. June 18, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-17/ukraine-facing-backlash-from-fx-borrowers-sunk-by-hryvnia, Accessed April 27, 2016.

RUMUN 2016 27

Finally, how the international community decides to move forward is precedent

setting. Should Russia proceed with an annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, it would

present itself as a growing hegemon that would disturb the political balance of Europe –

continuing its trend towards regional domination since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

Post-Soviet states may be reasonably concerned, and the European Union and the United

States would potentially address a resurging bipolar system. On the other hand, a military

confrontation with Russia could rip apart unaddressed tensions at the seams and may be

potentially catastrophic. The Disarmament and International Security Committee, then,

must strike a balance and determine the most sustainable and least entrenching solution

that addresses the roots and lurking variables of the conflict.  

Conclusion In many respects, the recent violence that has resulted from the ongoing protests in

the Ukraine are a manifestation of unresolved loose ends since the nation achieved its

independence over twenty years ago. Possessing a confusing relationship with Russia that

has wavered between presidents, Ukraine was seen as a country that Russia felt obligated

to assert itself within. The widespread corruption in government has its origins in Nikita

Khrushchev’s transfer of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine – considered illegal by

Russians and Crimean natives alike. The oligarchy system and economic disparity also

have historical components that remain unaddressed. Finally, the clash between the West

and Russia over Ukraine points to the vacuum left by the dissolution of the bipolar

system at the end of the Cold War. A sufficient resolution to the conflict in the Ukraine

must adequately address each of these nuances in order to bring about an agreeable and

equitable answer to the turmoil.    

 

 

 

 

 

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Discussion Questions ● Does ethnic homogeneity qualify as a chief factor in a territory’s self-

determination?  

● Is a bipolar model of the international community a sustainable one? A multipolar

model? A unipolar model?  

● What role should Russia play in the future of the Ukraine? The European Union?  

● How should the international community respond to the regionalist sentiments? A

potential Crimean annexation?  

● Does the recent violence merit a response by NATO forces?  

● Are economic reconciliations a viable substitute to recognizing Eastern Ukraine’s

sovereignty?    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RUMUN 2016 29

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