digested cases in remedial law

8/20/2019 Digested Cases in Remedial Law

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1. MARY ROSE A. BOTO v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR VILLENA, ET AL.

A.C. No. 9684, Septembe 18, !"1#$ACTS%

An Information for libel was filed against complainant Boto before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City and a warrant of arrest was issued on the same

day against her. After posting bail and before the scheduled arraignment, she filed a

Motion to Quash Information on the ground of lack of urisdiction since libel is within

the e!clusi"e urisdiction of the #egional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing the case, the

trial udge re$uired the trial prosecutor, %enior Assistant City &rosecutor 'illena to file

his comment within () days, but the latter did not file his comment nor mo"ed for

e!tension of time to file the same, resulting in the resetting of the case, delaying the

process by * months and "iolating her constitutional right to a speedy trial. In his

Comment, &rosecutor 'illena opposed the motion to $uash, contending that the court had

already determined probable cause, and mooted any $uestion about urisdiction, "enue

and sufficiency of e"idence against the complainant.

In her Complaint+Affida"it, Boto charged respondents 'illena, Manabat and e

ios with gross ignorance of the law for filing the information for libel before the MeTC

and for opposing the motion to $uash despite the knowledge that the said first le"el court

had no urisdiction o"er the case.

In their separate comments, the respondents denied liability. The trial prosecutor,

'illena, countered that the filing of the information was not within his discretion as he

was not the in"estigating prosecutor and that it was not his duty to re"iew the resolution

of the in"estigating prosecutor as he had no authority to appro"e or disappro"e an

information or its filing in court. -is participation commenced only after it was filed with

the MeTC. Manabat, the City &rosecutor who appro"ed the Information, stated that the

information was filed inad"ertently with the MeTC and that there was no ignorance of the

law or malice in"ol"ed as they had pre"iously filed cases of libel with the #TC.

Moreo"er, the inad"ertent filing was already corrected when the information was later on

filed with the #TC and that after the filing of the information with the #TC, the said court

issued an order finding that probable cause e!isted to hold Boto for trial. e ios, the

in"estigating prosecutor, a"erred that the information for libel against complainant was

filed before the MeTC due to inad"ertence and that no malice or gross ignorance of the

law attended it. -e added that the information was later on filed with the #TC+&asig after

the case filed before the MeTC was $uashed.

The records disclose that on ctober (/, 0)(0, the Information was properly filed

with the #TC, Taguig City.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the respondents should be held administrati"ely liable for gross

ignorance of the law.

RULIN&%

2es.

Article 34) of the #e"ised &enal Code pro"ides that urisdiction o"er libel cases

are lodged with the #TC. The criminal and ci"il action for damages in cases of written

defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the #TC of the pro"ince or


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city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended

parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

e ios admitted that inad"ertence attended the filing of the information for libel

with the MeTC. -e did not, howe"er, proffer any ustification or e!planation for the error.

-e did not claim that the mistake was either typographical or was a result of theapplication of a default form or template. In the Court5s "iew, it was plain carelessness.

As no malice can be attributed, he merely deser"es a reprimand.

Manabat, on the other hand, should ha"e been more cautious and careful in

re"iewing the report and recommendation of his subordinate. -e should not ha"e

appro"ed the information and its filing in the wrong court considering that his office was

"ery knowledgeable of the law that urisdiction in libel cases lies with the #TC. In fact,

he cited se"eral libel cases which his office filed with the proper court. As the head of

office, he should be admonished to be more careful as his office is in the forefront in the

administration of criminal ustice.

1hile e ios and Manabat can "alidly claim inad"ertence, 'illena cannot

in"oke the same defense in his handling of the case. Indeed, he did not file the

information with the MeTC as he was not the in"estigating prosecutor, but merely the

trial prosecutor. -e, howe"er, mishandled the case which preudiced the complainant.

'illena should ha"e e"en initiated the mo"e for the dismissal of the case on the ground of

lack of urisdiction. Instead of taking the initiati"e, he e"en opposed the motion to $uash

the information. At any rate, respondents are not barred from refiling the case before the

proper court if probable cause to hold the complainant liable really e!ists. -is dismal

failure to apply the basic rule on urisdiction amounts to ignorance of the law and reflectshis lack of prudence, if not his incompetence, in the performance of his duties.

6undamental is the rule that urisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the

courts, let alone the parties themsel"es, to determine or con"eniently set aside. It cannot

be wai"ed e!cept for those udicially recogni7able grounds like estoppel. And it is not

mooted by an action of a court in an erroneously filed case.

!. 'ECTOR TRENAS v. PEOPLE,

&.R. NO. 19(""!, )*+*- !(, !"1!

$ACTS%

%ometime in ecember (888, Margarita Alocila wanted to buy a house+and+lot inIloilo City. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager recommended theappellant -ector Treas to pri"ate complainant 9li7abeth, who was an employee and nieceof Margarita, for ad"ice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter:s name. To co"er the e!penses, 9li7abeth ga"e &(*), ))) to -ector who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared a eed of %ale with Assumption of Mortgage. -ector ga"e 9li7abeth a re"enueofficial receipt for &0;, ))). -owe"er, when she consulted with the BI#, she was

informed that the receipts were fake. 1hen confronted, -ector admitted to her that thereceipts were fake and that he used the &(0), ))) for his other transactions. 9li7abethdemanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, -ector issued in fa"or of 9li7abeth a check in the amount of &(0), ))), deducting from &(*), ))) the &3), ))) asattorney:s fees. 1hen the check was deposited with the &CIBank, Makati Branch, thesame was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. espite repeateddemands, appellant failed to pay.

An Information was then filed by the ffice of the City &rosecutor in the#egional Trial Court of Makati City. The #TC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of 9stafa.

ISSUE


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1hether or not the accused is re$uired to present e"idence to pro"e lack of urisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution e"idence. RULIN&%

=o.

The o"erarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases,"enue is urisdictional. A court cannot e!ercise urisdiction o"er a person charged with anoffense committed outside its limited territory.

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa wascommitted within the urisdiction of the #TC of Makati City. The Affida"it of Complainte!ecuted by 9li7abeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense wascommitted. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other e"idence was presented by the prosecution to pro"e that the offense or any of its elements wascommitted in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary e"idence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. Are"iew of the testimony of 9li7abeth also shows that there was no mention of the placewhere the offense was allegedly committed.

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner wasdishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa.Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution e"idence which e"en mentions that any of the elements of the offense werecommitted in Makati. The rule is settled that an obection may be raised based on theground that the court lacks urisdiction o"er the offense charged, or it may be consideredmotu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreo"er, urisdiction o"er the subect matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by e!press wai"er or otherwise. That urisdiction is conferred by theso"ereign authority that organi7ed the court and is gi"en only by law in the manner andform prescribed by law.

&etition granted.

#. PEOPLE v. MARIANO&.R. No. L4"(!/, )+e #", 19/6

$ACTS%

Mariano was appointed as a >iaison fficer by the Municipal Mayor =olasco of %an ?ose del Monte, Bulacan. -e was authori7ed to recei"e and be receipted for @%e!cess property of @%AI=9C for the use and benefit of said municipality. The saidaccused Mariano once in possession of the said items and far from complying with hisobligation and in spite of repeated demands, misappropriated and con"erted to his own personal use and benefit the said items "alued at /(/.*) or &;,/8/.3*

n ecember (, (8/;, the office of the &ro"incial 6iscal of Bulacan filed an

Information accusing pri"ate respondent Mariano of estafa.

n 6ebruary (8, (8/*, Mariano filed a motion to $uash the Information on thegrounds that the court trying the cause has no urisdiction and that the criminal action has been e!tinguished. In his motion to $uash, Mariano claimed that the items which were thesubect matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor =olasco of %an ?ose was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of mal"ersation of public property, and for which Mayor =olasco had been found guilty, andthat inasmuch as the case against Mayor =olasco had already been decided by theMilitary Tribunal, the Court of 6irst Instance of Bulacan had lost urisdiction o"er thecase against him.


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n March (;, (8/* respondent ?udge issued an rder granting the motion to$uash on the ground of lack of urisdiction.

ISSUE%

1hether or not ci"il courts and military commissions e!ercise concurrent urisdiction o"er the offense of estafa of goods "alued at not more than &4,))) andallegedly committed by a ci"ilian.

RULIN&%

=o.

By reason of the penalty imposed on the offense of 9stafa which e!ceeds 4

months imprisonment, the offense alleged to ha"e been committed by the accused, now

respondent, Mariano, falls under the original urisdiction of Courts of 6irst Instance. This

is not disputed by respondent ?udge. 1hat he claims in his rder is that his courte!ercises concurrent urisdiction with the military commission and because the latter

tribunal was the first to take cogni7ance of the subect matter, respondent court lost

urisdiction o"er it .That statement of respondent court is incorrect.

#espondent court gra"ely erred when it ruled that it lost urisdiction o"er the

estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the mal"ersation charge against

Mayor =olasco before the Military Commission. 9stafa and mal"ersation are two

separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before the Court the accused in one is

different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that in the

present case, there is no situation in"ol"ing two tribunals "ested with concurrent urisdiction o"er a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which

first takes cogni7ance of the case ac$uires urisdiction thereof e!clusi"e of the other. The

Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular

offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent urisdiction

between it and respondent court to speak of. 9stafa as described in the Information falls

within the sole e!clusi"e urisdiction of ci"il courts.

4. )ESSE P'ILIP B. EI)ANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESI0ENTIAL TAS $ORCE1(6, REPRESENTE0 BY ATTY. VENTURA&.R. No. !"#696, )+e !, !"14

$ACTS%

The %pecial &residential Task 6orce (*4 conducted an in"estigation against some public officials of the ne %top %hop Inter+Agency Ta! Credit and uty rawback Center of the epartment of 6inance. The said public officials were the e"aluators ande!aminers of the Center who were in"estigated for possible gra"e misconduct inconnection with the anomalous issuance of 3; Ta! Credit Certificates amounting to atleast ((),(8;,(*.

%&T6 (*4 was created by former &resident ?oseph 9strada in ctober (888 tore"iew, in"estigate and gather e"idence necessary to prosecute the commission of irregularities in the "arious offices and agencies of the 6. The life of %&T6 (*4 wase!tended by former &resident Dloria Macapagal Arroyo in ctober 0))(. %&T6 (*4 wasfurther mandated to in"estigate the irregularities committed at the Center and to reco"er and collect lost re"enues. &ursuant to this mandate, Atty. #eyes, %&T6 (*4 lawyer+consultant, conducted an independent in"estigation on the alleged anomalous issuancesof TCCs to 9"ergreen 1ea"ing Mills, Inc.

By "irtue of its BI registration, 9"ergreen was entitled to a package of incenti"es such as ta! credits on capital e$uipment purchased and on raw materials usedin the manufacture, processing or production of e!port products and access to bonded


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manufacturingtrading warehouse system. 9"ergreen represented that it made local purchases for the purpose of manufacturing spun yarn and wo"en fabrics, which wereallegedly sold to direct e!porters through a common bonded warehouse, namely, 6ilipino-and Common Bonded Corporation. It submitted proofs of local purchases in the form of sales in"oices and deli"ery receipts of the supposed suppliers. 9"ergreen also submitted

certificates of deli"ery and receipts attesting to the sales made to direct e!porters. Thesecertificates represented the bases of 9"ergreen:s claims under the Ad"anced Ta! Credit%cheme or the Constructi"e 9!portation.

>ater, 9"ergreen:s application or claims for ta! credit were e!amined at 3 le"els, performed and conducted by the e"aluator, re"iewer and recommending officer from theCenter. 6rom ?anuary (88; to ?une (88, a total of 3; TCCs worth at least &((), (8;,(*were issued to 9"ergreen. These TCC:s were utili7ed either through own use or transfer to other companies.

Based on the In"estigation #eport submitted by Atty. #eyes, it appeared that

9"ergreen:s e!istence was $uestionable. The suppliers and buyers were in e!istent or could no longer be found. The sales in"oices and deli"ery receipts which were used as bases of the ta! credit claims of 9"ergreen were fake and the TCC transfers werefictitious.

6or said reason, %&T6 (*4 9!ecuti"e irector Atty. 'entura filed criminal chargesfor 'iolation of %ection 3EeF of #A 3)(8 and 9stafa Thru 6alsification of &ublicocuments, against those in"ol"ed in the anomalous transactions, and likewiseadministrati"e charges for gra"e misconduct against the public officials in"ol"ed.n ?uly (), 0))4, the &rosecution and Monitoring Bureau of the mbudsman rendered adecision finding the in"ol"ed public officials guilty of gra"e misconduct with the penaltyof dismissal from the ser"ice including all its accessory penalties and without preudice tocriminal prosecution.

9iansantos filed a petition for re"iew before the CA assailing the decision andorder of the mbudsman. -e argued, among others, that he could not be held guilty of gra"e misconduct as he dutifully performed his responsibilities as e"aluatorG that hisduties and responsibilities basically in"ol"ed the preparation of an e"aluation reportsubmitted to his immediate superior, AranasG that he was not pri"y to the process bywhich the TCC was issued because its appro"al and release were an altogether differentduty which he did not e!erciseG that he performed his duties based on the directi"es andmanner taught to him in the CenterG and that the documents submitted by 9"ergreenappeared to be authentic without any hint of falsity which he had no reason to doubt.

n May (, 0)(0, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of thembudsman.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the Court of Appeals gra"ely erred in its discretion when itaffirmed the assailed decision of the office of the ombudsman which amounts to lack or in e!cess of urisdiction.

RULIN&%

=o.

As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the ffice of thembudsman:s e!ercise of its in"estigati"e and prosecutorial powers, and respects theinitiati"e and independence inherent in the ffice of the mbudsman. 1hile thembudsman:s findings as to whether probable cause e!ists are generally not re"iewable by the Court, where there is an allegation of gra"e abuse of discretion, the mbudsman:sact cannot escape udicial scrutiny under the Court:s own constitutional power and dutyto determine whether or not there has been gra"e abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e!cess of urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Do"ernment.


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The petitioner failed to show the e!istence of gra"e abuse of discretion in thiscase. In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that there was no error committed bythe mbudsman. The record shows that there is enough e"idence on record warrantingthe finding of guilt for gra"e misconduct against the petitioner.

(. *2 0IMAYU&A et *3. v. $ERNAN0E, et *3.&.R. No. L1891#, Ap53 1(, 19!!

$ACTS%&laintiffs are Chiropractic octors who practice their profession in Manila.

imayuga appeared before the -onorable %ecretary of the Interior, the -onorableirector -ealth and the Board of Medical 9!aminers for the purpose of submitting to,and taking, an e!amination, if any was re$uired. -e was ad"ised that he could practicehis profession so long as there is no e!press pro"ision against it. The Board of Medical9!aminers informed plaintiff that it could not gi"e him any e!amination, because no one

of its members had any knowledge of chiropractics. The irector of -ealth held that hedid not ha"e any obection to the plaintiff5s practicing chiropractics in the &hilippines solong as there is no complaint against his treatment. efendants are about to arrest and persecute them in the e!ercise of their profession.

The defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the acts alleged donot constitute a cause of action and that the court has no urisdiction.

n %eptember, (80(, a complaint was filed against imayuga in the Court of 6irstInstance of Manila charging him with the illegal practice of medicine, and that the chargeis still pending in that court.

At the time the petition was presented before the Court, a temporary restrainingorder was granted against the defendants.

ISSUE%

1hether or not defendants acted with malicious moti"es when they were about toarrest plaintiffs.

RULIN&%

=o.

efendants are acting upon the written ad"ice of the city attorney as to theconstruction of the law. The records show that the defendants are seeking to dischargetheir official duties as they understand them, and there is no e"idence that either they areacting from malicious or dishonest moti"es. =either is there any e"idence that thedefendants are threatening plaintiffs with daily arrest or a number of oppressi"e prosecutions, or that they are disposed to in"ol"e them in e!pensi"e litigation. There is noallegation that 6iscal Torres was not acting in good faith in the gi"ing of his ad"ice, or that he is not honest in his opinion. The "ery most that is charged against him is that he ismistaken in the construction of a law, which has ne"er been udicially construed andwhich can be construed in the case now pending, to which one of the plaintiffs is a party.

The fact that the criminal charge was filed in %eptember (80(, and that up to dateonly one complaint had been filed, and that from one cause of another the case had notyet been decided, is a strong e"idence that there had not been any disposition on the partof the defendants to make numerous arrests and in"ol"e the plaintiffs in oppressi"elitigation.

6or such reasons, The Court declined to pass upon the constitutional $uestions presented and hold that the temporary inunction should be dissol"ed and the demurrer sustained, with lea"e to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.

b. 'ERNAN0E v. ALBANO


7/59

&.R. No. L19!/!, )*+*- !(, 196/

$ACTS%#espondent Albano, Congressman of Isabela, lodged a complaint with the ffice

of the City 6iscal of Manila against petitioner -ernande7, then the %ecretary of 6inance

and &residing fficer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for "iolation of Article0(4 of the #&C, CA 404 and #A 04*. The complaint re"ol"es around petitioner5s alleged

shareholdings in the @ni"ersity of the 9ast, Bicol 9lectric Co., #ural Bank of =ue"a

Caceres, MD Inc, and @ni"ersity of =ue"a Caceres and the claim that said corporations

obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during

petitioner5s incumbency as presiding officer thereof.

At the oint in"estigation of the charges before respondent 6iscal Don7ales, the

complainant mo"ed to e!clude the alleged "iolation of Article 0(4 of the #&C because it

was already resol"ed by the Court in a case which was ad"erse to -ernande7. 6iscal

Don7ales granted the motion.

Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the a"erment

that EaF "iolation of Article 'II, %ection ((, subsection E0F of the Constitution, punishable

under Commonwealth Act 404, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the pri"ate

enterprises affected there byG and that EbF "iolation of %ection (3 of #A 04* is not

criminal in nature. ismissal was deniedG reconsideration thereof failed.

To restrain the respondent 6iscals from continuing the in"estigation, petitioner

went to the Court of 6irst Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer

for preliminary inunction. The Court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained

from proceeding with the in"estigation of the charges le"elled against petitioner.

RULIN&%

=o.

The legal mandate in %ection (;, #ule (() of the #ules of the Court is that in all

criminal prosecutions the action shall

be instituted and tried in the court of the

municipality or pro"ince wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential

ingredients thereof took place. Thus, where an offense is wholly committed outside the

territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.

%imilarly, the City 6iscal of Manila and his assistants may not in"estigate a crime

committed within the e!clusi"e confines of, say, Camarines =orte. This proposition offers

no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting officers would then be o"erreaching the

territorial limits of their urisdiction, and, in the process, step on the shoes of those who,

by statute, are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They cannot unlawfully

encroach upon powers and prerogati"es of the 6iscals of the pro"ince aforesaid.

&etitioner seeks to bar respondent 6iscals from in"estigating the constitutional

"iolation charged. -is claim is that the Manila 6iscals are powerless to in"estigate him.

-is reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in

corporations domiciled in =aga City E#ural Bank of =ue"a Caceres, @ni"ersity of =ue"a

Caceres and Bicol 9lectric Co.,F and in Mandaluyong, #i7al EMD Inc.FG and that the

place where the crime is to be prosecuted is the situs of such shares.


8/59

In effect, petitioner asks us to car"e out an e!ception to the rule that said 6iscals

may not be enoined from conducting the in$uiry aforesaid. 1e would not hesitate to

state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential ingredient thereof was

committed outside the boundaries of the City of Manila, petitioner5s argument should

merit serious consideration. 6or, orderly administration of ustice so demandsG

multiplicity of criminal actions is to be ob"iatedG the long arm of the law cannot be used

in an oppressi"e or "indicti"e manner.

In the case at bar, the charges are not directed against the corporations. =ot mere

ownership of or title to shares is in"ol"ed. &ossession of prohibited interests is but one of

the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that

petitioner was the %ecretary of 6inance. %o also, the fact that while head of department

and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the

corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in

his dual capacity, not in Camarines %ur, but in Manila where he held his office.

%ince criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or

an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under

the facts obtained here, ha"e urisdiction to in"estigate the "iolation complained of.

. $ORTUN v7. LABAN&, et *3.L#8#8#, M*- !/, 1981

$ACTS%

&etitioner ?udge 6ortun was accused by a member of the bar and a former employee in a letter complaint of a possible irregularity in his claim for gasolineallowance, originally considered by them sufficing to hold him liable administrati"ely.After ; months, the letter+complaint was endorsed to the respondent city 6iscal who thenga"e due course to said complaint by issuing a subpoena. The petitioner contested thelegality of the issuance of said subpoena and asked for the dismissal of the complaint butwas unsuccessful. It appeared that the complaint was only filed by a disgruntled member of the bar who lost 4 out of 8 cases in the petitioner:s sala. =o effort was made either bythe respondent or any of the pri"ate respondents to dispel in any way the doubts raised as

to the bona fides in filing of the complaint.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the respondents acted in accordance with law.

RULIN&%

=o.

The petition made reference to an 9!ecuti"e rder outlining the procedure on

complaints charging go"ernment officials and employees with commission of irregularities. It is therein pro"ided that complaints against presidential appointees, and

udges are included among them, shall be filed with the ffice of the &resident or the

epartment -ead ha"ing direct super"ision or control o"er the official in"ol"ed. At

present, the department head is the %upreme Court, the Constitution ha"ing e!pressly

"ested the power of super"ision o"er all courts to this Tribunal. The remo"al of such

power in the epartment of ?ustice in (8/3, now the Ministry of ?ustice, is a recognition

of the need to preser"e unimpaired the independence of the udiciary, especially so at

present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the e!ecuti"e and the

legislati"e branches. Many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded.

1hen such a case occurs, this Court must act and promptly to set matters right. This is


9/59

what the Court did in its resolution immediately issuing a temporary restraining order

upon the petition being filed. It cannot be too strongly emphasi7ed that a udge of an

inferior court is deser"ing of the full protection of this Tribunal against any form of

"e!ation, incon"enience, or harassment, the more so when, as is $uite e"ident, haste and

recklessness marked the conduct of respondent City 6iscal. The power of administrati"e

super"ision precisely has been granted to the Court to assure that malefactors on the

bench suffer for their misdeeds. Con"ersely, howe"er, when a complaint was utili7ed to

embarrass and humiliate a member of the udiciary, it is broad enough to include such

remedial action in aid of a udge, who, to all the appearances is the "ictim of a deliberate

attempt to impugn his good name and reputation. The udicial power constitutionally

granted to the Court, independently of the grant of super"isory authority, ustifies the

inter"ention of the Court.

6. 0E LEON v. MABANA&/" P53 !"!

In %panish te!t.

/. PLANAS v. &IL&.R. No. L4644", )*+*- 18, 19#9

$ACTS%

In =o"ember (83, Carmen &lanas, then a municipal board member of Manila,

published a statement critici7ing the acts of certain go"ernment officials including &res.

Manuel Que7on in a newspaper. The following morning, she recei"ed a letter from ?orge

'argas, %ecretary to the &resident directing her to report before the Ci"il %er"ice

Commission C%C. %he was directed to e!plain and pro"e her allegations.

%he appeared before the C%C but she $uestioned the urisdiction of the C%C o"er

the matter. %he said that as an electi"e official, she is accountable for her political acts to

her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal

laws, and not to e!ecuti"e officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which

petitioner is affiliated. 6urther, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was

made by her as a pri"ate citi7en and in the e!ercise of her right to discuss freely political

$uestions and cannot properly be the subect of an administrati"e in"estigationG that the

issue is only cogni7able by courts of ustice in case the contents of said statement infringe

any pro"ision of the &enal Code. The C%C, acting through Commissioner ?ose Dil,

howe"er took cogni7ance of the case hence &lanas appealed to the %upreme Court. The

%olicitor Deneral replied for the C%C arguing that under the separation of powers marked

by the Constitution, the court has no urisdiction to re"iew the orders of the Chief

9!ecuti"e which are of purely administrati"e in character.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the %C has urisdiction to re"iew orders issued by the &resident.

RULIN&%

2es.

The acts of the Chief 9!ecuti"e performed within the limits of his urisdiction are

his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain e!ecuti"e action in such cases.


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The rule is non+interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow

that the %C is precluded from making an in$uiry into the "alidity or constitutionality of

his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The

classical separation of go"ernmental powers "iewed in the light of political philosophy is

a relati"e theory of go"ernment.

In the present case, the &resident is not a party to the proceeding. -e is neither

compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The C%C is the party respondent and

the theory is ad"anced by the %olDen that because an in"estigation undertaken by him is

directed by authority of the &resident of the &hilippines, the %C has no urisdiction o"er

the present proceedings instituted by &lanas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that

a subordinate officer of the go"ernment is acting under orders from the Chief 9!ecuti"e

may be an important a"erment, but is neither decisi"e nor conclusi"e upon this court.

>ike the dignity of his high office, the relati"e immunity of the Chief 9!ecuti"e from

udicial interference is not in the nature of a so"ereign passport for all the subordinate

official and employees of the e!ecuti"e epartment to the e!tent that at the mere

in"ocation of the authority that it purports the urisdiction of this court to in$uire into the

"alidity or legality of an e!ecuti"e order is necessarily abated or suspended.

=e"ertheless, the %C ruled that the C%C can take cogni7ance of the case. &lanas

was not denied the right to "oice out her opinion but since she made allegations against

the administration it is but right for her to pro"e those allegations. The C%C has the right

to elicit the truth.

8. *. YOUN& v7. RA$$ERTY&.R. No. 1"9(1, $eb*- 14, 1916.

$ACTS%

n ecember 08, (8(;, the lower court issued a preliminary inunction against

the defendant, his agents, etc., Hordering them and e"ery one of them absolutely to desist

and refrain from in any manner whatsoe"er enforcing or attempting to enforce the

pro"isions of the regulation contained in Internal #e"enue Circular >etter =o. ;4/, in so

far as it refers to the language in which any day book shall be kept, and from arresting,

procuring the arrest or prosecuting criminally or administrati"ely any person who fails tomake the entries re$uired by said circular.H After the termination of the trial of the case

upon its merits, the preliminary inunction was made permanent. The defendant has

appealed.

The circular letter abo"e mentioned re$uires, among other things, e"ery merchant

and manufacturer, with certain specified e!ceptions, subect to the ta! imposed by section

;) of Act =o. 0338, to keep a record of their daily sales either in the 9nglish or the

%panish language, and pro"ides that any "iolation of or failure to comply with the

pro"isions of the circular will subect the guilty person to prosecution under the

pro"isions of section (* of Act =o. 0338.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the regulation is a proper case for inunction.

RULIN&%

2es.

1hile courts of e$uity ha"e no urisdiction o"er the prosecution and punishment

of crimes and misdemeanors and in ordinary criminal cases, such courts will not restraincriminal prosecutions e"en under a "oid law or municipal ordinance, yet courts or e$uity


11/59

may enoin the enforcement of an in"alid law or municipal ordinance where irreparable

inury to property rights would result or where persons would be subect to a municipality

of suits incurred by reason of the penalty attached to a recurring act or omission.

b. YU CON& EN& v. TRINI0A0&.R. No. L!"4/9, $eb*- 6, 19!(

$ACTS%

Act =o. 08/0 EAn act to pro"ide in what languages account books shall be kept,

and to establish penalties for its "iolationF, also known as the Chinese Bookkeeping

Act,J was passed by the &hilippine >egislature and appro"ed in (80(. It pro"ides<

%ection (. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or

corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other acti"ity for the purpose of profitin the &hilippine Islands, in accordance with e!isting law, to keep its account books in

any language other than 9nglish, %panish, or any local dialect.

%ection 0. Any person "iolating the pro"isions of this act shall, upon con"iction,

be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not

more than two years, or both.

2u Cong 9ng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber

business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand 9nglish, %panish, or any

local dialect. -e was arrested for "iolating Act =o. 08/0, and his books were sei7ed.

Trial was about to proceed when 2u Cong 9ng and another petitioner Co >iam

Eon behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the &hilippinesF filed a petition against the

fiscal, the collector of internal re"enue, and the presiding udge.

ISSUES%

1hether or not the temporary inunction issued by the court be stayed if pro"en

that Act =o. 08/0 is constitutional.

RULIN&%

2es.

The %upreme Court is granted both concurrent urisdiction in prohibition with

Courts of 6irst Instance o"er inferior tribunals or persons, and original urisdiction o"er

Courts of 6irst Instance when such courts are e!ercising functions without or in e!cess of

their urisdiction. It is a urisdiction, howe"er, which must be e!ercised circumspectly, for

otherwise, the court would usurp the powers of udges of 6irst Instance. The law ha"ing

gi"en to udges of 6irst Instance urisdiction to try criminal cases, the appellate court

should not meddle with the initiation or trial of such cases, e!cept for good reasons, and

should not permit the substitution of e!traordinary proceedings for appeal.

As before held by the Court, and by the 6ederal courts, e$uity has power, to be

e!ercised in power cases, to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional

statutes, and to grant preliminary inunctions where the constitutionality of a gi"en penal

law is doubtful and fairly debatable, and permanent inunctions where the laws are held

in"alid. The remedy by inunction to restrain the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes

or abuse of authority under a "alid statute, seems to be limited to cases where property

rights are threatened with irreparable inury or where persons would be subected to a

multiplicity of suits.


12/59

9. SAN&ALAN& v7. PEOPLE AN0 AVENI0A,&.R. No. L1616", Otobe #1, 196"

$ACTS%

n April (,(8*0, an information was filed by the assistant city fiscal with the

C6I of Manila against Magdalena %angalang et al., wherein it was alleged that she and

her cohorts committed theft by taking and carrying away (*,))) empty ute bags

belonging to the =A#IC. The case was dismissed due to insufficiency of e"idence. More

than ;years later, the same assistant city fiscal again charged petitioner and one >eandro

Castelo, this time with the crime of 9stafa alleged to ha"e been committed by them by

inducing one 9nri$ueta &asco$uin to buy certain =A#IC in"oices for (*,))) empty

sacks, which in"oices turned out to be fictitious and falsified. A third information was

filed for the same and identical offense of 9stafa charged in the second case in spite of

the order of dismissal therein which had long become final and conclusi"e. Again

in"oking double eopardy, the petitioner filed a motion to $uash the information, but therespondent udge denied the motion and ordered petitioner:s arraignment.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the respondent udge:s action is in accordance with law.

RULIN&%

=o.

An order sustaining a motion to $uash on the ground of double eopardy

constitutes a bar to another prosecution for the same cause. The record clearly shows that

in the second criminal charge petitioner:s motion to $uash on the ground of double

eopardy was sustained and the case dismissed as against her. In not therefore dismissing

the information in the third proceedings charging the petitioner with the same offense, the

responding ?udge committed gra"e abuse of his discretion.

1". Lope v7. C5t- ):;eL!(/9S, Otobe !9, 1966

$ACTS%

In the month of 6ebruary (84;, petitioner #oy 'illasor, as administrator of the

intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Meia and Dloria, together with his co+

petitioners Angelina Meia >ope7 and Aurora Meia 'illasor and other heirs of said

spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad >a7atin for the de"elopment

and subdi"ision of 3 parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. %ubse$uently

>a7atin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra e"elopment Corporation.

Months later, petitioners and the other co+heirs filed an action in the Court of 6irst

Instance of Que7on for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful

"iolation of its terms. Thereafter, >a7atin and the Terra e"elopment Corporation, in

turn, filed with the 6iscal5s ffice of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners

for an alleged "iolation of the pro"isions of Article (/0 in relation to those of Article (/(,

paragraph ;, of the #e"ised &enal Code. After conducting a preliminary e!amination, the

City 6iscal of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging

petitioners with the crime of falsification of a pri"ate document upon the allegation that

they made it appear in the contract that Aurora 'illasor was the HguardianH of the minor

Deorge Meia and that Angelina >ope7 was similarly the HguardianH of the minor

Ale!ander Meia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the e!ecution of the document.


13/59

@pon petition of the parties thus charged, the City 6iscal of Angeles

rein"estigated the case on March /, (84* to gi"e them an opportunity to present

e!culpatory e"idence, and after the conclusion of the rein"estigation the parties charged

mo"ed for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles

had no urisdiction o"er the offense because the pri"ate document that contained the

alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said

city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the meantime the City

Court had set the Criminal Case for arraignment, the defendants secured from said court

se"eral postponements of the arraignment.

In "iew of the City 6iscal5s continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the

case, petitioners filed on =o"ember 04, (84* with the City Court a motion to $uash upon

the ground that said court had no urisdiction o"er the offense charged. The complainants

in the case, with the conformity of the City 6iscal, filed an opposition thereto, and on

6ebruary 3, (844 the respondent udge denied said motion to $uash and reset the

arraignment of all the defendants on March * of the same year. &etitioners filed the

present action for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE<

1hether or not the City Court of Angeles City has urisdiction to try and decide

the Criminal Case for alleged falsification of a pri"ate document by the parties named in

the information.

RULIN&%

=o.

It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was

committed not only determines the "enue of the action but is an essential element of

urisdiction. Thus, under the pro"isions of %ection 4 of the ?udiciary Act of (8;,

municipal courts ha"e original urisdiction only o"er criminal offenses committed within

their respecti"e territorial urisdiction. Indeed, the lack of urisdiction of the City Court of

Angeles o"er the criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to

compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment

and mental anguish that go with it.

11. RUSTIA v. OCAMPOCA&.R. No. 4/6", M* !(, 196"

$ACTS%

n %eptember 3), (83*, petitioner #ustia filed a criminal complaint for

dereliction of duty against respondent campo.

n ctober /, (83*, the respondent ?udge 'illareal, ha"ing been designated torecei"e the preliminary e"idence in support of the petitioner5s complaint, prior to the

issuance of the warrant for the arrest of the accused, proceeded in open court to recei"e

said e"idence, oral and documentary, and an affida"it of the clerk of the court, 'icente

Albert.

n ctober (*, (83* said respondent udge entered a resolution denying the

issuance of the warrant of arrest and dismissing the complaint.

&etitioner filed an appeal but it was denied.


14/59

ISSUE%

1hether or not an appeal lies from the resolution of the respondent udge

refusing to issue a warrant of arrest and dismissing the complaint.

RULIN&% =o.

In the case at bar, the complaint was not filed in the ustice of the peace court but

in the Court of 6irst Instance, under the pro"isions of section 3/ of Act =o. (40/, from

whose decision, in preliminary in"estigations of crimes denounced to it, no appeal to this

court is pro"ided. The appeal pro"ided for in section (; is from resolutions of ustices of

the peace ordering the release of an accused after conducting the corresponding

preliminary in"estigation, but not from resolutions of Courts of 6irst Instance ordering

said release. Inasmuch as the right to appeal is not inherent in e"ery accused, but granted

by the constitution of law, appeal does not lie from a resolution of a Court of 6irst

Instance refusing to issue a warrant of arrest and dismissing a complaint.

1!. BORLON&AN, )R. ET AL. v. PE


15/59

appro"ed by the Monetary Board of the B%&. Thus, the Monetary Board subse$uently

lifted &IC:s statutory recei"ership of the bank.

ISSUE%

1hether or not there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.

RULIN&%

=one.

Based on the documents and the complaint+affida"it of Atty. &eKa, the City

&rosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges e!isted. n

the strength of the same documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest. The

Court, howe"er, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the e!istence of

probable cause.

The re$uirement of personal knowledge should ha"e been strictly applied

considering that herein petitioners were not gi"en the opportunity to rebut the

complainant:s allegation through counter+affida"its.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the e!ercise of

the public prosecutor:s function without any showing of gra"e abuse of discretion or

manifest error in his findings. Considering, howe"er, that the prosecution and the court a

$uo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, the Court therefore

annuls their findings.

1#. Reto v7. C*7te3o, 18 L.). =19(#>, 5te: 5+ R*?o* v7. A3ve+:5*, CA&.R. No.#"/!"R, Otobe 8, 196!

RULIN&%

As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with the

Court. The Court:s duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the

e!ecuti"e or udicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done

without or in e!cess of urisdiction or with gra"e abuse of discretion amounting to want

of urisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not

be restrained or stayed by inunction, preliminary or final. There are, howe"er, e!ceptions

to this rule, one of which is where the charges are manifestly false and moti"ated by the

lust for "engeance.

14.

&UIN&ONA, et *3. v. CITY $ISCALL6""##, Ap53 4, 1984

$ACTS%Clemente a"id in"ested with the =ation %a"ings and >oan Association, Inc.

E=%>AF from March 0), (8/8 to March (8(. -owe"er, n March 0(, (8(, =%>A was

placed under recei"ership by the Central Bank. -ence, a"id filed claims for his

in"estments and those of his sister. n ?uly 00, (8(, a"id recei"ed a report from the

Central Bank that only &3)*,0(.80 of those in"estments were entered in the records of

=%>A. Thereafter, a"id demanded for the remaining balances of his in"estments but

Duingona ?r., who was then =%>A &resident, paid only &0)),))). n ecember

03,(8(, pri"ate respondent a"id filed an action charging the directors and officers of

=%>A with 9stafa for misappropriating the balance of the in"estments, at the same time


16/59

"iolating Central Bank Circular =o. 34; and related Central Bank regulations on foreign

e!change transactions.

At the inception of the preliminary in"estigation, The =%> officers mo"ed to

dismiss the charges against them for lack of urisdiction because a"id5s claims allegedly

comprised a purely ci"il obligation which was itself no"ated, but was denied.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the transactions between a"id and =%>A were simple loans

which are ci"il in nature, and not 9stafa.

RULIN&%

There was simple loan and not 9stafa.

There is merit in the contention of the petitioners that their liability is ci"il in nature and

therefore, public respondents ha"e no urisdiction o"er the charge of estafa. It must be

pointed out that when pri"ate respondent a"id in"ested his money with the bank, the

contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of

deposit. Thus, Article (8) of the =ew Ci"il Code pro"ides that fi!ed, sa"ings, and

current deposits of+money in banks and similar institutions shall be go"erned by the

pro"isions concerning simple loan.

The relationship between the pri"ate respondent and the =%>A is that of creditor

and debtorG conse$uently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the

Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for

its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. 1hile

the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, howe"er, no obligation

to return or deli"er the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to

return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation

punishable under Article 3(*, par. lEbF of the #e"ised &enal Code, but it will only gi"e

rise to ci"il liability o"er which the public respondents ha"e no+ urisdiction.

In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely ci"il in

nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign e!change

transactions, the Court held that the public respondents acted without urisdiction when

they in"estigated the charges against the petitioners. Conse$uently, public respondents

should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case

to continue, e"en if the petitioners could ha"e appealed to the Ministry of ?ustice, would

work great inustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper

administration of ustice.

1(. SALON&A v7. PA


17/59

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila

area in the months of August, %eptember and ctober of (8). 'ictor Burns >o"ely, ?r,

one of the "ictims of the bombing, implicated petitioner %alonga as one of those

responsible.

n ecember (), (8), the ?udge Ad"ocate Deneral sent the petitioner a =oticeof &reliminary In"estigationJ in &eople ". Benigno A$uino, ?r., et al. Ewhich included

petitioner as a co+accusedF, stating that the preliminary in"estigation of the abo"e+

entitled case has been set at 0


18/59

espite the %C:s dismissal of the petition due to the case:s moot and academic

nature, it has on se"eral occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where

mootness was clearly apparent. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and

controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic

function of educating bench and bar on the e!tent of protection gi"en by constitutional

guarantees.

16. RO0RI&UE v7. CASTELO L6#/4, A;7t 1, 19(#

RULIN&%

The rule is based not only upon respect for the in"estigatory and prosecutory

powers granted by the Constitution to the ffice of the mbudsman but upon practicality

as well. therwise, the functions of the courts will be grie"ously hampered by

innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of in"estigatory proceedings conducted by

the ffice of the mbudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same

way that the courts would be e!tremely swamped if they could be compelled to re"iew

the e!ercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they

decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a pri"ate complainant.

There are instances, constituting e!ceptions to the general rule, when the Court

will inter"ene in the prosecution of cases, one of which is when the preliminary

inunction has been issued by the %upreme Court to pre"ent the threatened unlawful

arrest of petitioners.

1/. ROBERTS, ET AL. v. COURT O$ APPEALS&.R. No. 11#9#", M* (, 1996

$ACTS%

&etitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of &epsi Cola&roducts &hils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the &epsi =umber 6e"erJ

promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning 3;8J &epsi crowns. f the ; casesfiled against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the in"estigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.

n (0 April (883, the information was filed with the trial court without anythingaccompanying it. A copy of the in"estigating prosecutor:s ?oint #esolution wasforwarded to and recei"ed by the trial court only on 00 April (883. -owe"er, noaffida"its of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary in"estigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were foundin the records of the case as of (8 May (883.

n (* April (883, petitioners filed a petition for re"iew to the epartment of

?ustice seeking the re"ersal of the finding of probable cause by the in"estigating prosecutor. They also mo"ed for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in

abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public

prosecutor also mo"ed to defer the arraignment of the accused+appellants pending the

final disposition of the appeal to the ?.

n (/ May (883, respondent ?udge Asuncion issued the challenged order E(F

denying, on the basis of Crespo "s. Mogul, the foregoing motions respecti"ely filed by

the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of

arrest after ?une (883J and setting the arraignment on 0 ?une (883. In part, respondent

udge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial,


19/59

following whate"er opinion the %ecretary of ?ustice may ha"e on the matter would

undermine the independence and integrity his court. To ustify his order, he $uoted the

ruling of the %upreme Court in Crespo, which stated< In order therefor to a"oid such a

situation whereby the opinion of the %ecretary of ?ustice who re"iewed the action of the

fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the %ecretary of ?ustice should, as far as

practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for re"iew or appeal from the action of

the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter

should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

&etitioners went to the CA, arguing that the respondent udge had not the slightest

basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of

arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor:s ?oint #esolution had in fact

been forwarded to, and recei"ed by, the trial court on 00 April (883, the CA denied

petitioners: application for writ of preliminary inunction. The CA ruled that the ?oint

#esolution was sufficient in itself to ha"e been relied upon by respondent ?udge in

con"incing himself that probable cause indeed e!ists for the purpose of issuing the

corresponding warrants of arrestJ and that the mere silence of the records or the absence

of any e!press declarationJ in the $uestioned order as to the basis of such finding does

not gi"e rise to an ad"erse inference, for the respondent ?udge enoys in his fa"or the

presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. #oberts, et al. sought

reconsideration, but meanwhile, the ? affirmed the finding of probable cause by the

in"estigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.

ISSUES%

(. 1hether or not ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in denying, onthe basis of Crespo "s. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance

the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for

re"iew filed with the ? shall ha"e been resol"ed.

0. 1hether or not ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in ordering the

issuance of warrants of arrest without e!amining the records of the preliminary

in"estigation.

3. 1hether or not the %upreme Court may determine in this proceeding the e!istence of

probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.

RULIN&%

(. 2es. ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of

Crespo "s. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance

of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for re"iew filed with

the ? shall ha"e been resol"ed.

There is nothing in Crespo "s. Mogul which bars the ? from taking cogni7ance of an

appeal, by way of a petition for re"iew, by an accused in a criminal case from anunfa"orable ruling of the in"estigating prosecutor. It merely ad"ised the ? to, as far

as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for re"iew or appeal from the action of

the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.J

1hether the ? would affirm or re"erse the challenged ?oint #esolution is still a matter

of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent ?udge Asuncion to deny the

motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds.

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whate"er opinion the

%ecretary of ?ustice may ha"e on the matter would undermine the independence and

integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering ustice.


20/59

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing

of the aforementioned motions at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to

withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for re"iew re"ersing

the ?oint #esolution of the in"estigating prosecutor. -owe"er, once a motion to dismiss

or withdraw the information is filed the trial udge may grant or deny it, not out of

subser"ience to the %ecretary of ?ustice, but in faithful e!ercise of udicial prerogati"e.

0. 2es. ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of

warrants of arrest without e!amining the records of the preliminary in"estigation.

The teachings then of %oli"en, Inting, >im, Allado, and 1ebb reect the proposition that

the in"estigating prosecutor:s certification in an information or his resolution which is

made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the udicial

determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In 1ebb, this

Court assumed that since the respondent ?udges had before them not only the 04+page

resolution of the in"estigating panel but also the affida"its of the prosecution witnessesand e"en the counter+affida"its of the respondents, they made personal e"aluation of the

e"idence attached to the records of the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on (0 April (883 with

the trial court. A copy of the ?oint #esolution was forwarded to, and recei"ed by, the trial

court only on 00 April (883. And as re"ealed by the certification of respondent udge:s

clerk of court, no affida"its of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the

proceedings during the preliminary in"estigation, or other documents submitted in the

course thereof were found in the records of this case as of (8 May (883. Clearly, when

respondent ?udge Asuncion issued the assailed order of (/ May (883 directing, amongother things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended

information, and ?oint #esolution as bases thereof. -e did not ha"e the records or

e"idence supporting the prosecutor5s finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he

made no specific finding of probable causeG he merely directed the issuance of warrants

of arrest after ?une 0(, (883.J It may, howe"er, be argued that the directi"e presupposes

a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional re$uirement for

the protection of indi"idual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conecture, or e"en

con"incing logic.

3. =o. the %upreme Court may not determine in this proceeding the e!istence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for

their prosecution for the crime of estafa.

rdinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in

an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the e!ecuti"e or udicial

determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in e!cess of

urisdiction or with gra"e abuse of discretion amounting to want of urisdiction. This is

consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed

by inunction, preliminary or final.

There are, howe"er, e!ceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to ree"aluate

the e"idence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of

arrest in this case. 6or the respondent udge did not, in fact, find that probable cause

e!ists, and if he did he did not ha"e the basis therefor. Moreo"er, the records of the

preliminary in"estigation in this case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the

ffice of the City &rosecutor of Que7on City to the ? in compliance with the latter5s

(st Indorsement of 0( April (883. The trial court and the ? must be re$uired to

perform their duty.


21/59

18. AL0IVIA v7. REYES&.R. No. 1"!#4!, )3- #, 199!

$ACTS%

&etitioner was charged with $uarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor5s

permit in "iolation of an rdinance of the Municipality of #odrigue7, #i7al.

The offense was allegedly committed on May ((, (88). The referral+complaint of

the police was recei"ed by the ffice of the &ro"incial &rosecutor of #i7al on May 3),

(88). The corresponding information was filed with the MTC of #odrigue7 on ctober

0, (88).

&etitioner mo"ed to $uash the information on the ground that the crime had

prescribed, but the motion was denied. n appeal to the #TC of #i7al, the denial was

sustained by the respondent udge.

In the present petition for re"iew on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the

information was filed way beyond the two+month statutory period from the date of the

alleged commission of the offense, hence the charge against her should ha"e been

dismissed on the ground of prescription.

6or its part, the prosecution contends that the prescripti"e period was suspended

upon the filing of the complaint against her with the ffice of the &ro"incial &rosecutor.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the filing of informationcomplaint before the fiscal:s office constituting a

"iolation of a special lawordinance interrupts prescription.

RULIN&%

=o.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 3), (83, two

months before the promulgation of the #ule on %ummary &rocedure on August (, (83.

n the other hand, %ection ( of #ule (() is new, ha"ing been incorporated therein with

the re"ision of the #ules on Criminal &rocedure on ?anuary (, (8*, e!cept for the last paragraph, which was added on ctober (, (8.

As it is clearly pro"ided in the #ule on %ummary &rocedure that among the

offenses it co"ers are "iolations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the

charge against the petitioner, which is for "iolation of a municipal ordinance of

#odrigue7, is go"erned by that rule and not %ection ( of #ule (().

@nder %ection 8 of the #ule on %ummary &rocedure, Hthe complaint or

information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary

e!amination or preliminary in"estigation.H Both parties agree that this pro"ision does not pre"ent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary in"estigation if he wants to.

-owe"er, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or

not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary in"estigation. This means that the

running of the prescripti"e period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in

court and not on any date before that.

If there be a conflict between the #ule on %ummary &rocedure and %ection ( of

#ule (() of the #ules on Criminal &rocedure, the former should pre"ail as the special

law. And if there be a conflict between Act. =o. 3304 and #ule (() of the #ules on

Criminal &rocedure, the latter must again yield. &rescription in criminal cases is asubstanti"e right.


22/59

It is the Court:s conclusion that the prescripti"e period for the crime imputed to

the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May ((, (88), and ended two

months thereafter, on ?uly ((, (88), in accordance with %ection ( of Act =o. 3304. It was

not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the ffice of the &ro"incial &rosecutor

on May 3), (88), as this was not a udicial proceeding. The udicial proceeding that

could ha"e interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of

#odrigue7, but this was done only on ctober 0, (88), after the crime had already

prescribed.

19. BUREAU O$ CUSTOMS v. PETER S'ERMAN, ET AL.&.R. No. 19"48/, Ap53 1#, !"11

$ACTS%

#espondent:s company, Mark %ensing &hilippines, Inc. imported from Australia

0**, /),))) pieces of finished bet slips and 0)*, 0)) rolls of finished thermal papers

from ?une 0))* to ?anuary 0))/. The shipment was released from the Clark %pecial

9conomic one, and was brought to the &hilippine Charity %weepstakes ffice for its

lotto operations in >u7on. -owe"er, M%&I did not pay duties or ta!es prompting the

Bureau of Customs to file a criminal complaint before the ? against the respondents.

%tate &rosecutor #ohaira >ao+Tamano found probable cause against respondents

and recommended the filing of Information against them.

#espondents filed a petition for re"iew before the %ecretary of ?ustice during the pendency of which the Information was filed on April ((, 0))8 before the Court of Ta!

Appeals.

nly respondents Caigal and >ingan were ser"ed warrants of arrest following

which they posted cash bail bonds.

n March 0), 0))8, the %ecretary of ?ustice re"ersed the %tate &rosecutor:s

#esolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information.

&etitioners motion for reconsideration ha"ing been denied, it ele"ated the case by

certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, &rosecutor >ao+Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to

1ithdraw Information with >ea"e of Court to which petitioner filed an pposition.

#espondents mo"ed for the dismissal of the Information.

The CTA granted the withdrawal of the Information.

ISSUE%

1hether or not a public prosecutor has the power of direction and control o"er

prosecution of criminal cases.

RULIN&%

2es.

It is well+settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the e!ecuti"e department of

the go"ernment whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are

faithfully e!ecuted. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute "iolators.

All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted

under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws,


23/59

the e!igencies of public ser"ice sometimes re$uire the designation of special prosecutors

from different go"ernment agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The designation does

not, howe"er, detract from the public prosecutor ha"ing control and super"ision o"er the

case. The participation in the case of a pri"ate complainant, like petitioner, is limited to

that of a witness, both in the criminal and ci"il aspect of the case.

As petitioners: motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA #esolution did

not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution

of the case belongs, the present petition fails.

!". PEOPLE v7. PA0ICA&.R. No. 1"!64(, Ap53 /, 199#

$ACTS%

The records show that >eon Maraas, ?r. EappellantF, #omeo &adica, >eslie Dans,

6lorentino 6abrigas, #omeo &rade7, >eonardo Maraas and >eopoldo Maraas were

originally charged in the latter part of (8/ with kidnapping for ransom with murder of

6rancis Banaga and illegal possession of firearms before Military Commission =o. 0/.

-owe"er, on ?anuary ((, (8/8, counsel for accused >eon Maraas, ?r. prayed for the

transfer of the case to the ci"il courts.

n August (/, (8(, the ffice of the &ro"incial 6iscal of #i7al filed an

information for kidnapping for ransom with murder against the accused, but with the

e!ception of appellant whose name was inad"ertently not included therein. A separatecharge for illegal possession of firearms was lodged but the case was later placed in the

archi"es some time in (8*.

Accused #omeo &adica and appellant were both arraigned on ?anuary (*, (80

and, with the assistance of their respecti"e counsel, both pleaded not guilty. It appears,

howe"er, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of

H>eonardo Maraas.H

-owe"er, upon disco"ery of the omission of appellant5s name in the original

information, the prosecution filed a motion on =o"ember (4, (8; for the admission of an amended information including appellant5s name as one of the accused. The appellant

entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned on the amended information. Accused

&adica was discharged from the information to be utili7ed as a state witness.

After more than years of trial, the trial court rendered its assailed decision

pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder

and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga,

father of 6rancis Banaga, the sum of &3),))) as indemnity for the death of the child.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the failure of the prosecution to charge appellant as an accused in

the original information is a fatal defect.

RULIN&%

=o.

The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege the name

of the accused, failing which the complaint or information would be rendered in"alid.


24/59

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under the

original information and that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the name of

H>eonardo Maraas.H At that uncture, appellant should ha"e raised the error as to his

identity by filing a motion to $uash on the ground of lack of urisdiction o"er his person.

But appellant did not do so but instead "oluntarily appeared at the arraignmentand pleaded not guilty under a different name. Conse$uently, the trial court ac$uired

urisdiction o"er his person and it could ha"e rendered a "alid udgment of con"iction

based on the original information e"en without need of an amendatory information to

correct appellant5s name.

The subse$uent amendment to insert in the information >eon Maraas, ?r.5s real

name in"ol"ed merely a matter of form as it did not, in any way, depri"e appellant of a

fair opportunity to present his defense. Moreo"er, the amendment neither affected nor

altered the nature of the offense charged since the basic theory of the prosecution was not

changed nor did it introduce new and material facts. %uch an amendment is e!plicitlyallowed under the second paragraph of %ection /, in relation to %ection (;, #ule (() of

the #ules of Court, the pertinent portion of which pro"ides that the information or

complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without lea"e of court, at any time

before the accused pleadsG and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by

lea"e and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without preudice to

the rights of the accused. At any rate, whate"er irregularity may ha"e attended the

inclusion of appellant5s name as an accused in the amended information has been wai"ed

by his subse$uent appearance and entry of plea at his arraignment under said amendatory

information.

!1. *+: !!. PEOPLE O$ T'E P'ILIPPINES v. $ELICIANO, )R., et *3.&.R. No. 196/#(, M*- (, !"14

$ACTS%

n ecember , (88;, at around (0


25/59

the #ules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the CA which affirmed the decision of the#TC. The decision of the CA was then brought to the %C for re"iew.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the Information is sufficient as to fully apprise the accused+

appellants of the charge against them.

RULIN&%

2es.

It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them "iolates

their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against

them. They argue that the prosecution should not ha"e included the phrase Hwearing

masks andor other forms of disguiseH in the information since they were presentingtestimonial e"idence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell

off.

@pon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor

against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. #ule ((), %ection (,

paragraph ( of the #ules of Criminal &rocedure pro"ides that< A complaint or information

is sufficient if it states the name of the accusedG the designation of the offense gi"en by

the statuteG the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offenseG the name of

the offended partyG the appro!imate date of the commission of the offenseG and the place

where the offense was committed.

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase Hwearing

masks andor other forms of disguiseH in the information does not "iolate their

constitutional rights.

9"ery aggra"ating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.

6ailure to state an aggra"ating circumstance, e"en if duly pro"en at trial, will not be

appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the

aggra"ating circumstance of Hwearing masks andor other forms of disguiseH in the

information in order for all the e"idence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the

trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggra"ating circumstance because, like nighttime,

it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his

crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial e"idence that tends to pro"e

that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not pre"ent them from including

disguise as an aggra"ating circumstance. 1hat is important in alleging disguise as an

aggra"ating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The

inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise theaccused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to

conceal their identity.

The introduction of e"idence which shows that some of the accused were not

wearing masks is also not "iolati"e of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes

that Hthe act of one is the act of all.H This would mean all the accused had been one in

their plan to conceal their identity e"en if there was e"idence later on to pro"e that some

of them might not ha"e done so.


26/59

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated

murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is

that the elements of the crime ha"e been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to

the time, place, and persons in"ol"ed in the offense.

!#. *+: !4. PEOPLE O$ T'E P'ILIPPINES v. MAMARUNCAS, ET AL.&.R. No. 1/949/, )*+*- !(, !"1!

$ACTS%

Around noontime on 6ebruary (, (884, Baudelio Batoon, #ichard Batoon, ?uanitoDepayo and a certain =itoJ were working on "ehicles inside Baudelio Batoon:s autorepair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.

Baginda &alao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants #enandangMamaruncas and &endatum Ampuan. Baginda &alao wore desert camouflage fatigueswhile his 0 companions wore &hilippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda &alaoshowed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was ser"ing it againstBatoon.

The arri"al of Baginda &alao:s group prompted ?uanito Depayo and #ichardBatoon to stop their work and obser"e what was happening.

Baudelio Batoon told Baginda &alao to ust wait awhile, as they would settle thematter after he finishes tuning+up an engine he had been working on.

Baginda &alao reacted by slapping the "ictim:s stomach and pointing a .;* caliber pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab &alao:s gun, causing the 0 of them tograpple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun, #enandangMamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind Batoon:s right thighwith a .3 cal. homemade gun. &endatum Ampuan, who was also standing behindBaudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoon:s left arm pit with a .;* cal.homemade pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda &alao finished him off with a single .;* cal. shot to the back. ?uanito Depayo and #ichard Batoon saw the entirescene, stunned and unable to do anything. 6rom their "antage points 3 to four ; metersaway, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed "iew of the entire incident.

Meanwhile, &olice Inspector Draciano Miares, then Commanding fficer of theIligan City &=& Mobile 6orce Company, was riding a ci"ilian car along the highway,heading towards Iligan City proper. -e was accompanied by his dri"er, %&3 1illiam2ee, and %&3 Deorge Aleo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Miares to order his dri"er to stop the car. Theyalighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw 3 menin camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground.Inspector Miares: group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they weredoing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they were policemen.

The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. uring the e!change of gunfire, Baginda &alao ran behind the Batoon house, while#enandang Mamaruncas and &endatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car.Inspector Miares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while %&3 2ee likewise hitAmpuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were thencaptured by the policemen. The lawmen also ga"e chase to Baginda &alao but he escaped.

ther responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were e"entually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was broughtto the hospital by his wife but he was pronounced dead on arri"al.

The #egional Trial Court held them guilty as principals by direct participation inthe killing of Baudelio Batoon. It ga"e full faith and credence to the e"idence of the


27/59

prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and rendereda "erdict of con"iction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the #TC ecision. %aid courtruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses: testimonies pointed out by the

appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probati"eweight of said testimonies. #egarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuan:sname in the Information, the court held that such error was only a formal defect and the proper correction was duly made without any obection on the part of the defense.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the information filed before the trial court was substantiallydefecti"e.

RULIN&%

=o.

Appellants a"er that the Information filed before the trial court was substantiallydefecti"e considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same personwhen in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able tocomprehend the Information read to him.

Appellants failed to raise the issue of the defecti"e Information before the trialcourt through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to $uash the information. Their failure to obect to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted toa wai"er of the defect in the Information. bections as to matters of form or substancein the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.J #ecords e"en show thatthe Information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect butappellants did not comment thereon.

!(. PEOPLE O$ T'E P'ILIPPINES v. LOMA@UE&.R. No. 189!9/, )+e (, !"1#

$ACTS%

Appellant was charged under separate Informations for (3 counts of #ape by%e!ual Intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter HAAAH, a minor. 9!ceptas to the dates of occurrence and the age of HAAAH at the time of the commission of thecrimes, the accusatory portions in the Informations are similarly worded as theInformation in the criminal case. In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of >asci"iousness committed against his stepdaughter AAA.J.

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the Informations. %oonthe cases were set for &re+Trial where only the minority of HAAAH was stipulated upon.Accordingly, the oint trial on the merits ensued.

After trial, the #TC found HAAAH to be a credible witness and reected the

defense of denial and alibi proffered by the appellant. It rendered a decision declaringappellant guilty of / counts of rape by se!ual intercourse.

Appellant thus assailed his con"iction before the CA. The CA affirmed thedecision of the #TC.

ISSUE%

1hether or not the special $ualifying circumstance of relationship was properlyalleged in the Information and pro"ed during the trial.

RULIN&%


28/59

=o.

@nder Article 044+B of the #e"ised &enal Code , rape is $ualified and the penaltyof death is imposed when the "ictim is below ( years of age and the offender is a parent,ascendant, step+parent, guardian, relati"e by consanguinity or affinity within the third

ci"il degree or the common+law spouse of the parent of the "ictim. To ustify theimposition of the death penalty, howe"er, it is re$uired that the special $ualifyingcircumstances of minority of the "ictim and her relationship to the appellant be properlyalleged in the Information and duly pro"ed during the trial. These two circumstancesmust concur.

The Court held that the court a $uo erred in finding appellant guilty of rape in its$ualified form. Indeed, the subect Information clearly a"ers the special $ualifyingcircumstances of minority of HAAAH and her filiation to the appellant. 1hile the prosecution was able to sufficiently pro"e HAAA:sH minority through the latter:stestimony during the trial and by the presentation of her Certificate of >i"e Birth showing

that she was born on %eptember (*, (8*, it howe"er, failed to pro"e the fact of relationship between her and the appellant. =otably, said alleged relationship was note"en made the subect of stipulation of facts during the pre+trial. The allegation thatHAAAH is the stepdaughter of appellant re$uires competent proof and should not be easilyaccept

digested cases in remedial law

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