digested cases for injunction

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HELD:

She is not entitled to the writ prayed for.

The nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of

discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus isemployed to compel the performance, when refused, of a

ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to

require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the

issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a

clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the

imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It

never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary

that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be

clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything

which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give

to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The

writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a

command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform

a duty already imposed.

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to

demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS

Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty

of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.

Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.

Ministerial Acts (2nd Case)

Pimentel, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al.

FACTS:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the

Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of ForeignAffairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for

its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution.

In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article


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VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify

treaties belongs to the Senate.

ISSUE:

The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether theExecutive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have

a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome

Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the

United Nations even without the signature of the President.

HELD:

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power

to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of

the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to

giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the

ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to

refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its

consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.[21] Although the

refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its

behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly,[22] such

decision is within the competence of the President alone, which

cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This

Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the

President in the performance of his official duties.[23] The Court,

therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by thepetitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive

branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome

Statute to the Senate.

Hipos vs. Judge Bay (Mandamus to direct exercise of judgment in a

particular way)

FACTS:

On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape

and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were

filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur

Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by

respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal


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Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286.

The Informations were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor

Ronald C. Torralba.

On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a

Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the CityProsecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had

been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay

granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to

Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that

there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes

charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a

Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed

against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-

03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City

Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro

A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de

Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an

appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the

Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of

probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a

Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.

On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw

Informations in an Order of even date.

ISSUE:

CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE

BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY

VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY

PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSEAGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO

WITHDRAW INFORMATION?

HELD:

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel

the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors


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Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In

effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial

discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving

judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ ofmandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those

matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is never available

to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular

way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the

exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act

on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by

mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in

a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at

bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw

Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same.

Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners

believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in

the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw

Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been

to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge

Bay.

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information

is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or

the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound

discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains thediscretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot

impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole

judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to

dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the

arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of

the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon

reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the

court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the

substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due

process of law.

In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel

the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is

improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on

matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is

never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in

a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already


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taken in the exercise of either.24 The trial court, when

confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the

ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution

of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to

make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a

requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.

UP Board of Regents v. CA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in

Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy

(CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.

After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent

had finished her

dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. There were portions in private respondent's

dissertation that were lifted, without proper acknowledgment. Despite such findings, herdissertation was accepted by Dean Paz in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the

doctorate degree in Anthropology.

On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for AcademicAffairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent's name from the list of candidates for

graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. However, the letter

did not reach the Board of Regents on time, and thus the said Board approved the qualified

students for graduation including the private respondent.

Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not begranted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter

dated April 17, 1993.

Various committees were organized to investigate on the matter, which found that at least ninety

(90) instances or portions in private respondent's thesis which were lifted from sources without
http://www.facebook.com/groups/210544542340181/doc/397730910288209/http://www.facebook.com/groups/210544542340181/doc/397730910288209/


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proper or due acknowledgment. Thus, unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw

private respondent's doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University

Council which sent its recommendation to the Board of Regents.

Private respondent then filed a petition formandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her

degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether petition for mandamus would lie in this action.

RULING:

Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded

from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify theissuance of the writ ofmandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration

of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right

to the enjoyment of intellectual property.

The Court finds petitioners' contention to be meritorious.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act

required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the

law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully

excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is

entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law.

Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the

part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government

agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.


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Laguna Metts Corporation v. Caalam, et al.

*When and Where filed.*

FACTS:

This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C. Caalam and GeraldineEsguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC). The labor arbiter decided in favor

of private respondents and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal,

however, the National Labor Relation

s Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a decision dated February 21,

2008. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30,2008.

Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008 resolution of the NLRC on May 26,2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The motion alleged that, for reasons stated therein, the

petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period. Thus, a15-day extension period was prayed for.

In a resolution dated August 7, 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private

respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari.LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file

a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as

amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007. This was denied in a resolution

dated October 22, 2008.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the extension granted by the Court of Appeals proper.


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RULING:

The Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court

may exercise.

Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere

expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing

specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable toprevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very

nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.

While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for

certiorari beyond the 60-day period, the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SCdisallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph

that previously permitted such extensions.

With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)

days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial

is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be countedfrom the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a

corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court

exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be

filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of thecourts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial

agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and becognizable only by the Court of Appeals.


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In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition

shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Lapid v. Laurea

FACTS:

Spouses Ramon Isidro P. Lapid and Gladys B. Lapid, petitioners, are the parents of seven-year-

old Christopher B. Lapid, who was a Grade 1 pupil who was alleged to be summarily dismissed

by the officials of the respondent school, St. Therese of the Child Jesus, a private educationalinstitution providing preschool and elementary education at

Malabon, Metro Manila.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 169. According to petitioners, the schoolsmalicious imputation against their son tarnished their good name and reputation.

On November 18, 1998,4 petitioners filed a motion to declare respondent school as in default,

which motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 9, 1999.5 Petitionersmoved for a reconsideration, but said motion was likewise denied on March 11, 1999.

With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with

the Court of Appeals but such petition was dismissed for failure to indicate the material date,particularly the date of filing of motion for reconsideration with the RTC, as required by

Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed bypetitioners on the ground of formal and procedural deficiency, i.e., the petitioners failure to state

a material date in their petition for certiorari.


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RULING:

No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition for

certiorari and later denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

After a careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, particularly their respective

memoranda, we are constrained to agree with the ruling of the respondent appellate court which

dismissed the instant petition for certiorari. We find no reversible error in the assailed resolutionsof the Court of Appeals because in filing a special civil action for certiorari without indicating

the requisite material date thereon, petitioners violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second,

the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when

notice of the denial thereof was received. In the case before us, the petition filed with the CAfailed to indicate the second date, particularly the date of filing of their motion for

reconsideration. As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of

the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated

in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of

the petition, thus:

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is forthe purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than

sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore,

that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the

motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position todetermine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsiderationitself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. x x x (Stress supplied.)

Quo Warranto

G.R. No. L-36966 February 28, 1974


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THE PHILIPPINE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION

(PPSTA) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the 1972 PPSTA BOARD

OF DIRECTORS, petitioners,

vs.

Honorable SERGIO A. F. APOSTOL, Presiding Judge Court of First

Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City and EUFEMIA M. SANLUIS, respondents.

Facts:

On July 20, 1972, private respondent Eufemia M. San Luis as a

member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association

(PPSTA for short), a fraternal non-stock association of public

school teachers throughout the country, filed with respondent

court of first instance at Quezon City a complaint with

preliminary injunction for the annulment of the 1972 annual

elections of the PPSTA board of directors held on June 26-28,

1972 at Teachers Camp in Baguio City for having been held

outside its principal office at Quezon City against herein

petitioners as defendants.

Respondent court rendered without further hearing and trial its

decision of April 26, 1973 holding that " (T)he meeting held in

Baguio City being contrary to the by-laws of the corporation and

the Corporation Law, whatever acts therein made, including the

elections of the Board of Directors, are null and void," anddeclared as null and void all resolutions and corporate acts at the

29th (1972) annual PPSTA Representative Assembly, including

the elections of the 1972 PPSTA board of directors and the

formation of the PPSTA commission on elections which

supervised the elections and proclaimed the winners.

Issue:

Whether or not the action has complied with the requirements of

Rule 66 governing such special civil actions of quo warranto.

Ruling:

The Court sets aside the judgment of respondent court.

Respondent's action below was in essence one of quo warranto

which is governed by Rule 66 of the Rules of Court Section 6


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thereof provides that in order that an individual may directly

bring the action, he or she must claim to entitled to the public

office or position allegedly unlawfully held or usurped. 6

Otherwise, the action must be brought by the Solicitor General or

fiscal with leave of the court upon the complaint of the relator

under section 4 of the Rule. 7

Chief Justice Moran thus explained the application of the two

cited provisions:

The general rule is that actions for quo warranto should be

brought by the Solicitor General or a fiscal in cases of usurpation

of an office established by law or by the Constitution under color

of an executive appointment, or the abuse of a public franchise

under color of a legislative grant, for these are public wrongs and

not private injuries. Since, under our system all power emanates

from the people, who constitute the sovereignty, the right to

inquire into the authority by which a person assumes to exercise

the functions of a public office or franchise is regarded as

inherent in the people on the right their sovereignty. Hence, the

action should be brought by the Solicitor General or the fiscal

who represents the sovereign power.

However, in a case involving merely the administration corporate

functions or duties which touch only private individual rights,

such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate officer,

or member, and the like the action for quo warranto may be

brought with leave of court, by the Solicitor General or fiscal

upon the relation of any person or persons having an interestinjuriously affected. Such action may be allowed in the discretion

of the court, according to section 4 and the court, before

granting leave, may direct that, notice be given to the defendant

so that he may be heard in opposition thereto, under section 5. 8

Respondent manifestly lays no claim herself to the office of

PPSTA director nor has the present action been filed with leave

of court by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon her relation as a

party having an interest injuriously affected, as required by the

cited Rule.

Her action must therefore fail on this score and the judgment

erroneously rendered by respondent court shall be set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review of respondent court is

hereby set aside and the complaint ordered dismissed. No

pronouncement as to costs.


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Quo Warranto

GR. No. L-48928 February 25, 1982

PARDO DE TAVERA vs. PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC.

Facts:

Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized

specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis and a member of the

Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in representation of

the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office as Executive

Secretary. The Board of Directors removed her from her position

averring that said position is held at the pleasure of the Board of

Directors and when the pleasure is exercised, it only means that

the incumbent has to vacate the same because her term hasexpired.

Plaintiff-appellant Mita Pardo de Tavera filed with the Court of

First Instance of Rizal a complaint against the Philippine

Tuberculosis Society, Inc.

On September 3, 1976, the court a quo rendered a decision

holding that the present suit being one for quo warranto it

should be filed within one year from plaintiff's outer from office;

that nevertheless, plaintiff was not illegally rendered or used

from her position as Executive Secretary in The Society since

plaintiff as holding an appointment all the pleasure of theappointing power and hence her appointment in essence was

temporary in nature. The case was remanded to this Court

considering that the appeal raises no factual issues and involves

only issues of law.

Issue:

Whether or not the instant case is an action for damages and not

of quo warranto.

Ruling:

While it is true that the complaint questions petitioner's removal

from the position of Executive Secretary and seeks her

reinstatement thereto, the nature of the suit is not necessarily

one of quo warranto because the respondents, except for one,

namely, Alberto Romulo, are not actually holding the office in


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question. Corollarily, the one-year period fixed in Section 16,

Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court within which a petition for

quo warranto should be filed, counted from the date of ouster,

does not apply to the case at bar.

The action is one for "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, andmust be brought within 4 years murder Article 1146 of the New

Civil Code. Nonetheless, the action will not prosper because the

By-laws of the Society stated that petitioner held an appointment

at the pleasure of the appointing power that is in essence

temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the

Board of Directors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the lower

court holding that petitioner was not illegally removed or ousted

from her position as Executive Secretary of the Philippine

Tuberculosis Society, Inc., is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Quo Warranto

G.R. No. L-46218 October 23, 1990

MADRIGAL vs. LECAROZ

Facts:

Joventino Madrigal's position as a permanent construction capataz in the

office of the Provincial Engineer was abolished. The abolition was

allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and

it appearing that his position was not essential. The Civil Service

Commission declared the removal of Madrigal from the service

illegal.

Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance (now

Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against public respondents

for mandamus and damages. The trial court issued an order

dismissing the petition on the ground that Madrigal's cause of

action was barred by laches because herein petitioner wasseparated from the service on November 25, 1971, and it was

only on December 15, 1975, or FOUR (4) YEARS and TWENTY (20)

DAYS after, that he filed this case for "Mandamus and Damages"

with the principal aim of causing his reinstatement to the public

position from where his service was terminated.


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Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners cause of action is barred by

laches.

Ruling:

That the instant case is one for MANDAMUS, and not QUOWARRANTO, is not of any significance, for the same principle

applies as held in these cases:

An action for reinstatement, by a public official, whether it be

quo warranto or mandamus, should be filed in court within one

year from removal or separation, otherwise the action will be

barred.

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect

that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to

public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the

petitioner is ousted from his position. The reason behind this

being there must be stability in the service so that public

business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement

of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

ATTY. LUCKY M. DAMASEN,

vs

OSCAR G. TUMAMAO,

G.R. No. 173165

February 17, 2010

Facts:

On December 2, 2004, Nelia Tumamao, the Vice-Mayor of San Isidro, Isabela, died.[1][3] As aresult, a permanent vacancy was created in the Office of the Vice-Mayor.

Pursuant to Sec. 44 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,[2][4] Ligaya C. Alonzo (Alonzo) was

elevated to the position of Vice-Mayor, she being the highest-ranking member of the


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Sangguniang Bayan, that is, the one who garnered the highest number of votes for that office.[3]

[5] As a result, a permanent vacancy was created in the Sangguniang Bayan.

To fill up the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, San Isidro Mayor Abraham T. Lim(Mayor Lim) recommended to Governor Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca (Governor Padaca), the

appointment of respondent Oscar G. Tumamao (Tumamao), a member of the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the same political party to which Alonzo belonged On April 15,2005, Tumamao took his oath as a member of the Sangguninang Bayan before Mayor Lim.[4][7]

On April 26, 2005 and May 3, 2006, Tumamao attended the regular sessions of the Sangguniang

Bayan.[5][8]

On May 5, 2005, petitioner Atty. Lucky Damasen (Damasen) became a member of the LDP after

taking his oath of affiliation before the LDP Provincial Chairman, Ms. Ana Benita Balauag

(Provincial Chairman Balauag).[6][9] On even date, Damasen was able to secure from LDP

Provincial Chairman Balauag a letter of nomination addressed to Governor Padaca for hisappointment to the Sangguniang Bayan.[7][10] On May 12, 2005, Damasen was appointed as

Sangguniang Bayan member by Governor Padaca.[8][11]

On May 16, 2005, Damasen took his oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan beforeGovernor Padaca.[9][12]

On May 17, 2005, Damasen attended the Sangguniang Bayan session, but with Tumamao

present thereat, the former was not duly recognized.[10][13] Hence, in the afternoon of the sameday, Damasen filed with the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City (RTC) a Petition for Quo

Warranto with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[11][14] seeking to be

declared the rightful member of the Sangguniang Bayan, claiming that he had been nominated byLDP Provincial Chairman Balauag and had been appointed thereto by Governor Padaca.[12][15]The case was docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. 0234.

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72 hours. Thereafter, the RTC

issued an order extending the Temporary Restraining order to 17 days.


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Later, Tumamao presented Provincial Chairman Balauag who affirmed the contents of her letter

revoking the nomination of Damasen.[13][18]

On August 4, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision[14][19] ruling in favor of Damasen, The RTCbased its decision on Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160,[15][21] which provides for the rule on succession

in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sangguninan. The RTC ruled that the evidence submittedby Damasen proved that the requirements to be able to qualify for the position was fully

complied with. Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.

On June 14, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the appealed Decision, While Atty.

Damasen might have been appointed by Governor Padaca, this appointment must fly in the face

of the categorical and unbending sine qua non requirements of the statute.

Indeed, Atty. Damasen was nominated simply by Ms. Balauag, the Provincial Chairman of the

LDP, who obviously is not the highest official of this political party. It cannot escape notice that

the quoted provision particularizes: highest official of the political party concerned withoutany additional qualifying or restrictive words.

Issue :

Whether or not Atty Damasen , has the right to have the office as Sanguniang Bayan?

Held: Petition dismissed. Affirmed the reversal of the CA ruling.

Section 45.Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian.

Xxx

Xxxx

(b) Except for the Sangguniang Barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which

the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next


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higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner

hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the

sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the

vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate ofmembership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are

conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shallbe null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official

responsible therefore.[16][30]

As can be gleaned from the above provision, the law provides for conditions for the rule ofsuccession to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the

Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination

and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned.

Thus, this Court cannot countenance Damasens insistence in clinging to an appointment whenhe is in fact not a bona fide member of the LDP. While the revocation of the nomination given to

Damasen came after the fact of his appointment, this Court cannot rule in his favor, because the

very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee must come from the political party asthat of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. To stress, Damasen is not a bona fide

member of the LDP.

In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of the electorate. He himself admittsthat he was previously a member of the Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position of Mayorunder the said party on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise, he did not resign from the said party

when he joined the LDP, and even admitted that his joining the LDP was not because of party

ideals, but because he just wanted to.[17][46] How can the will of the electorate be best served,given the foregoing admissions of Damasen? If this Court were to grant herein petition, it would

effectively diminish the party representation of the LDP in the Sanggunian, as Damasen would

still be considered a member of the Lakas-CMD, not having resigned therefrom, a scenario thatdefeats the purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs contrary the ratio ofNavarro.

Lastly, the records of the case reveal that Tumamao has the nomination[18][47] of Senator

Edgardo J. Angara, the Party Chairman and, therefore, the highest official of the LDP. Inaddition, he is a member in good standing of the LDP.

[G.R. No. 131977. February 4, 1999]


20/32

PEDRO MENDOZA,petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES,

respondents.

Facts:

In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z.

Dario, informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent

Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the

letter reads:bb

"Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos

and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for

all government benefits due [him]."

Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureauof Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."

Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages

and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.

On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition forquo warranto against respondent Allas

before the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.[i][3] The case was tried and onSeptember 11, 1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition. The court found that

petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his

security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of

respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster ofrespondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the

reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and otherbenefits appurtenant thereto.

On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On

July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by

respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a partyto the quo warranto petition.[ii][5]

Petitioner filed a special civil action forcertiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals

questioning the order of the trial court.[iii][6] On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition.[iv][7] Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner claims that:

"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued,

considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject

position."


21/32

Issue:

Whether or not Mendoza validly ousted from his office amounting to illegally dismissed?

Held:

Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show bywhat right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to

the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or

authority from the state. In other words, a petition forquo warranto is a proceeding to determinethe right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its

enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.

The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fisca against

individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for

the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without beinglegally incorporated.The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who

claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised byanother.

Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted

position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.[x][14] If

the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent isentitled to the office.[xi][15] If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the

respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office,

judgment may be rendered as follows:

"Sec. 10.Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping,intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or

franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded

therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such furtherjudgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,

privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires."

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or

unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or

franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.


22/32

The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the

discretion of the court and on the relief sought

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor inoffice. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.[xiii][21] A judgment in quo

warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor maytrace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ ofquo warranto itself.

It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether heis constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the

office to which he lays claim.[xiv][22] In the case at bar, the petition forquo warranto was filed

by petitionersolely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court wasthe qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas,

not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial

court's decision.

G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006

MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P.

CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON

C. TABORA, Petitioners,

vs.

JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P. MALLARI,Respondents.

Facts:

On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,Camarines Sur forquo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory

Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners.

Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had

been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, butsometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of

said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedlybelonged to Respondents.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court

in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein

(herein respondents) to be residents of Naga Citybvg, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the


23/32

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action forquo warranto should be brought in the Regional

Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the

respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive thecase folder of the subject case forquo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for

transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents

below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmativedefenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy ofquo warranto.

Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative

defenses.

On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.

From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to

try and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2

of RA 8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to tryand decide these cases to the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .

Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings.

On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer

from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to tryand decide intra-corporate dispute.

Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately

elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Co-Equal court having concurrent jurisdiction and whether or

not the following Circular AM No 00-11-03-SC will be applied in this cases?

Held: Petition Granted.

Note, further, that respondents petition forquo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-

03-03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that suchpetitions shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of thedesignated Special Commercial Court. Since the official station of the designated SpecialCommercial Court for Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents

should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having been in effect for

four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for almost two years by the time

respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why respondents were not aware of theappropriate court where their petition should be filed.


24/32

The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial

court to order the transfer of respondents petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is

specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearlystated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk ofCourt in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, had been in effect

for almost two years. Thus, the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,Camarines Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.

[2][4] Otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 44 provides:

Section 44.Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, andVice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-

governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy

occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest rankingsanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian

member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be.

Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian

members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking

sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking

sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(b) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by thedrawing of lots.

(c) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a

higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,

voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of hisoffice.

For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be

determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to thetotal number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.


25/32

G.R. No. L-13602 April 6, 1918

LEUNG BEN, plaintiff,

vs.P. J. O'BRIEN, JAMES A OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY, judges of FirstInstance of city of Manila,defendants.

Facts:

An application for a writ ofcertiorari was filed to quash an attachment issuedfrom the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.

ON December 12, 1917, an action was filed in the Court of First Instance of

the city of Manila by P. J. O'Brien to recover from Leung Ben the sum of

P15,000 alleged to have been lost by the OBrien to the Ben in a series of

gambling, banking and percentage games two or three months prior to the

institution of the suit. In his verified complaint the OBrien asked for an

attachment, against the property of the Ben, on the ground that the latter

was about to depart from the Philippine islands with intent to defraud his

creditors. The attachment was issued; and acting under the authority

thereof, the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited

by Ben with the International Banking Corporation.

Ben for his part moved to quash the attachment, but was dismissed in theCFI. Leung Ben then filed petiiton for the writ of certiorari against OBrienand judges of the CFI. The prayer is that the Honorable James A. Ostrand, asthe judge having cognizance of the action in said court be required to certifythe record to this court for review and that the order of attachment whichhad been issued should be revoked and discharged. with costs. Upon thefiling of said petition in this court the usual order was entered requiring thedefendants to show cause why the writ should not issue. The response of thedefendants, in the nature of a demurrer, was filed upon January 21, 1918;and the matter is now heard upon the pleadings thus presented.

Held:

Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court hasoriginal jurisdiction by the writ ofcertiorari over the proceedings of Courts ofFirst Instance, wherever said courts have exceeded their jurisdiction andthere is no plaint, speedy, and adequate remedy. In the same section, it is


26/32

further declared that the proceedings in the Supreme Court in such caseshall be as prescribed for Courts of First Instance in section 217-221,inclusive, of said Code. This Supreme Court, so far as applicable, theprovisions contained in those section to the same extent as if they had beenreproduced verbatim immediately after section 514. Turning to section 217,

we find that, in defining the conditions under which certiorari can bemaintained in a Court of First Instance substantially the same language isused as is the same remedy can be maintained in the Supreme Court of FirstInstance, substantially the same language is used as is found in section 514relative to the conditions under which the same remedy can be maintainedin the Supreme Court, namely, when the inferior tribunal has exceeded itsjurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequateremedy. In using these expressions the author of the Code of Civil Proceduremerely adopted the language which, in American jurisdictions at least, hadlong ago reached the stage of stereotyped formula.

In section 220 of the same Code, we have a provision relative to the finalproceedings in certiorari, and herein it is stated that the court shalldetermine whether the inferior tribunal has regularly pursued its authority itshall give judgment either affirming annulling, or modifying the proceedingsbelow, as the law requires. The expression, has not regularly pursued itsauthority as here used, is suggestive, and we think it should be construed inconnection with the other expressions have exceeded their jurisdiction, asused in section 514, and has exceeded their jurisdiction as used in section217. Taking the three together, it results in our opinion that any irregularexercise of juridical power by a Court of First Instance, in excess of its lawfuljurisdiction, is remediable by the writ ofcertiorari, provided there is no other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; and in order to make out a case for thegranting of the writ it is not necessary that the court should have acted inthe matter without any jurisdiction whatever. Indeed the repeated use ofexpression excess of jurisdiction shows that the lawmaker contemplated thesituation where a court, having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend itsauthority as well as the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawfulpower.

It may be observed in this connection that the word jurisdiction as used inattachment cases, has reference not only to the authority of the court toentertain the principal action but also to its authority to issue the

attachment, as dependent upon the existence of the statutory ground. (6 C.J., 89.) This distinction between jurisdiction to issue the attachment as anancillary remedy incident to the principal litigation is of importance; as acourt's jurisdiction over the main action may be complete, and yet it maylack authority to grant an attachment as ancillary to such action. Thisdistinction between jurisdiction over the ancillary has been recognized bythis court in connection with actions involving the appointment of a receiver.Thus in Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield and Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), a receiver


27/32

had been appointed without legal justification. It was held that the ordermaking the appointment was beyond the jurisdiction of the court; andthough the court admittedly had jurisdiction of the main cause, the orderwas vacated by this court upon application a writ ofcertiorari. (See Blancovs. Ambler, 3 Phil. Rep., 358, Blanco vs. Ambler and McMicking 3 Phil. Rep.,

735, Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil. Rep., 404.)

By parity of reasoning it must follow that when a court issues a writ ofattachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularlyand in excess of its jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to justify theSupreme Court in granting relief by the writ ofcertiorari. In applying thisproposition it is of course necessary to take account of the differencebetween a ground of attachment based on the nature of the action and aground of attachment based on the acts or the conditions of the defendant.Every complaint must show a cause of action some sort; and when thestatue declares that the attachment may issue in an action arising upon

contract, the express or implied, it announces a criterion which may bedetermined from an inspection of the language of the complaint. Thedetermination of this question is purely a matter of law. On the other hand,when the stature declares that an attachment may be issued when thedefendant is about to depart from the Islands, a criterion is announced whichis wholly foreign to the cause of action; and the determination of it mayinvolve a disputed question of fact which must be decided by the court. Inmaking this determination, the court obviously acts within its powers; and itwould be idle to suppose that the writ ofcertiorari would be available toreverse the action of a Court of First Instance in determining the sufficiencyof the proof on such a disputed point, and in granting or refusing the

attachment accordingly.

We should not be understood, in anything that has been said, as intending toinfringe the doctrine enunciated by this court in Herrera vs. Barretto andJoaquin (25 Phil. Rep., 245), when properly applied. It was there held that wewould not, upon application for a writ ofcertiorari, dissolve an interlocutorymandatory injunction that had been issued in a Court of First Instance as anincident in an action ofmandamus. The issuance of an interlocutoryinjunction depends upon conditions essentially different from those involvedin the issuance of an attachment. The injunction is designed primarily for theprevention of irreparable injury and the use of the remedy is in a great

measure dependent upon the exercise of discretion. Generally, it may besaid that the exercise of the injunctive powers is inherent in judicialauthority; and ordinarily it would be impossible to distinguish between thejurisdiction of the court in the main litigation and its jurisdiction to grant aninterlocutory injunction, for the latter is involved in the former. That the writofcertiorari can not be used to reverse an order denying a motion for apreliminary injunction is of course not to cavil. (Somes vs. Crossfield andMolina, 8 Phil. Rep., 284.)


28/32

But it will be said that the writ ofcertiorari is not available in this cae,because the petitioner is protected by the attachment bond, and that he hasa plain, speedy, and adequate remedy appeal. This suggestion seems to besufficiently answered in the case of Rocha & Co vs. Crossfield and Figueras(6 Phil. Rep., 355), already referred to, and the earlier case there cited. The

remedy by appeal is not sufficiently speedy to meet the exigencies of thecase. An attachment is extremely violent, and its abuse may often result ininfliction of damage which could never be repaired by any pecuniary awardat the final hearing. To postpone the granting of the writ in such a case untilthe final hearing and to compel the petitioner to bring the case here uponappeal merely in order to correct the action of the trial court in the matter ofallowing the attachment would seem both unjust and unnecessary.

G.R. No. L-9698 January 6, 1915

AGAPITO NAPA, petitioner,

vs.JOHN P. WEISSENHAGEN, acting judge of the Court of First Instance ofSurigao, ET AL., respondents

Facts:

In February, 1913, there was begun in the justice's court of Gigaquit,Surigao, an action for the summary recovery of the possession of land undersection 80 and following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffin the case at bar being the defendant there and the defendants JulianLarong and Hermenegildo Bayla being the plaintiffs.

The justice's court tried the cause, found in favor of the plaintiff and ordereddelivery of possession. The decision was rendered on the 14th of April, 1913,and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.

The cause having arrived in the Court of First Instance for determination onthe appeal, a motion was made by the appellee to dismiss the appeal on theground that it had not been perfected within the time required by law. Thecourt entertained this motion, granted it, and dismissed the appeal.

The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ ofcertiorari for the revision

of the record of the court below, the revocation of the judgment enteredupon the order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set asidethe whole proceeding to the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction todismiss the appeal.

Held:


29/32

As is seen, a mere statement of the case is sufficient to deny the reliefprayed for. It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance hadjurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the appeal and the exercise ofthat jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised inaccordance with the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed

by the practice of the country. We have held in numerous case that a writofcertiorariwill not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to whichit is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing theacts complained of. We have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of thesubject matter and of the person, decision upon all question pertinent to thecause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneousthey may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. A Court of First Instancehas jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice'scourt and, therefore, had jurisdiction to decide every question pertainingthereto. This being the case, the consideration of the motion and thedismissal of the appeal as a consequence thereof are not acts in excess of

jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court ofone of the fundamental question before it does not, except perhaps in casesinvolving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way itmay decide. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause, theright to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does notdepend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon therightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should be distinguished fromthe exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not thedecision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there isjurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all otherquestion arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

(Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. Rep., 245; Gala vs. Cui, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; DeFiesta vs. Llorente, 25 Phil. Rep., 554.)

The writ ofcertiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of aninferior court could be corrected no longer exists. Its place is now taken bythe appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors canbe corrected only by that method. The writ in this country has been confinedto the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally usedfor any other purpose. (Id.)

The facts that the complaint in the justice's court appeared in its phraseology

somewhat like a complaint in ejectment, and that the judgment of thejustice's court took on also something of the color of a judgment in such anaction; and the fact that such judgment contains some provisions which ajustice's court is perhaps without authority to insert in its judgments is of noparticular consequence in the proceeding before us. If the judgment of thejustice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable, although the losingparty might have been able to rid himself of it by other means. Having beenappealed, it stands upon substantially the same footing in the appellate


30/32

court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of ajustice's court and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is asfull and complete as it is in any other.

San Pedro vs Asdala

G.R. No. 164560

Facts:

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt, praying that the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.78978, be reversed and set aside.

Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and

Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of QuezonCity, Branch 42, a Complaint[2] against herein petitioners and Wood CrestResidents Association, Inc., forAccion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title andDamages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Privaterespondents alleged that subject property located in Batasan Hills, QuezonCity, with an assessed value ofP32,100.00, was titled in the name of spousesApolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evidentbad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land thatencompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents hadallegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subjectproperty. It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer

Certificate of Title over their alleged property was spurious. Privaterespondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute ownersof the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possessionof subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or itsmembers be ordered to pay actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] said complaint onthe ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of theaction, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The MeTC then issued an Order[4]

dated July 4,2002 denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under BatasPambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive originaljurisdiction over actionsinvolving title to or possession of real property of small value.

Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petitionfor certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn4


31/32

87. However, in its Decision[5] dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed thepetition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTCPresiding Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, inaccordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending B.P.Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint forAccion

Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of realproperty located in Quezon City, with an assessed value notexceeding P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the Decision wasfiled by petitioners, but was denied in an Order[7] dated July 3, 2003.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petitionfor certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering thedismissal of the complaint forAccion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdictionover the same. In the assailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003,

the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was notavailable to petitioners as they should have availed themselves of theremedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution ofdismissal was denied per Resolution[8] dated June 1, 2004.

Held:

The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have beenentertained from the very beginning.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders orresolutions of the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari,as provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court expounded as follows:

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a

decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because such

recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitionerhad an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for

review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorariwas,

therefore, the correct remedy.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn10


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x x x x

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the

aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not beentertained remedies of appeal and certiorariare mutually

exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorariis not

and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's

own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned

such loss or lapse. One of the requisites ofcertiorari is that there

be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate

remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this

case, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is

grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by

Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and theinstant petition must, therefore, fail.[11]

For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, actedproperly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the groundthat petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal insteadofcertiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have beengiven due course at all.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/164560.htm#_ftn11

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