G . R .   N o .   1 5 7 5 3 7 S e p t e m b e r   7 ,   2 0 1 1 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B.GOBERSAMIN,

: DOCTRINE:The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of theFamily Codeis not necessarily void if said portion hasnot yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At anyrate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights. 

FACTS:

On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr.Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver whereby heaffirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchasedthe two parcels of land (the property).In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold aportion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand.They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property.•

PETITIONERS:Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; andthat the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior l iquidation of the community propertybetween Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.•

Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he hadpurchased it with his own money.•

RTC’s RULING:Affirmed the validity of the sale.However, declared the property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,Rito, and Dina).o

The participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the lateMarta.o

Under Article 160 of theCivil Codethe law in effect when the property was acquired, all propertyacquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that theproperty thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife.ISSUE:Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? –NO RULING:  Article 130 of theFamily Codereads:Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of thedeceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnershipproperty either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon thelapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugalpartnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. S h o u l d   t h e   s u r v i v i n g   s p o u s e   c o n t r a c t   a   s u b s e q u e n t   m a r r i a g e   w i t h o u t   c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h   t h e   f o r e g o i n g requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of thesubsequent marriage

TY VS. CAArticle 40 – Exception to the Rule

In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church weddingdue to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage licenseincluding the specific license number designated. The lower court however ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be invoked in the case at bar.

HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”  This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in ’87) cannot be applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which was operational during her marriage with Reyes. 

Quiaovsquiao

FACTS:

 Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

 

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

 

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. After more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

 

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

 

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

 

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

 

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation decision states that the ½ share of Brigido in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

 

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

 

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor

In the case of Grande vs Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014), the Supreme

Court had the occasion to interpret Article 176 of the Family Code as amended

by Republic Act 9255. The provision reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental

authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.

However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has

been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the

civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten

instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an

action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime

of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The facts of the case as found by the Supreme Court are as follows:

In the case at bar, respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of

recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or

change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document

acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is

enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial

conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his

children’s surname as Antonio.

On the issue of whether or not the respondent father could compel his illegitimate

children to use his surname, the Supreme Court ruled the father could not. In

the Grande vs Antonio case, the SC voided the implementing rules and regulations

(IRR) of Republic Act 9255 insofar as the IRR makes it mandatory for the illegitimate

child to use the recognizing father’s surname, since this was contrary to the express

permissive wording of Republic Act 9255amending Art 176 which states that

‘illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been

expressly recognized by the father’. A relevant portion of the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Grande vs Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014) is hereunder

quoted:

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname

of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein

petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate

children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it

must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from

any interpretation.[16][Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255; Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, No. L-44717, August 28, 1985, 138 SCRA

273; Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 26419, October 19, 1970, 35 SCRA 270; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, No. L-25659, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA

111] Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,

therefore, has no legal basis.

xxx

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting

children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s

surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s

surname serves the best interest of the minor child.

xxx

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the … provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar

as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname

upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.

To conclude, the use of the word “shall” in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The

clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176 rendering the use of an

illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given

the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged

thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have

their names changed to “Antonio.” However, since these letters were not offered

before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to

sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.[27][Rule 132. Sec. 34. Offer of' evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not

been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.] A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the

evidence of, the children’s choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.

One aspect of the decision in Grande vs Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014)

is the invocation by the Supreme Court of the principle of the child’s best interest as

‘the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured’ — such a

principle was evaluted by the Supreme Court in Grande vs Antonio in the context of

the use of surnames when it said that ‘[o]n the matter of children’s surnames, this

Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname

serves the best interest of the minor child.’ On the other hand, the Supreme Court also

declared in Grande vs Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014) that ‘Art. 176

gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their

father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)

who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.’ It

will be interesting to see the future development of the illegitimate child’s apparently

sole or exclusive prerogatve to use the recognizing father’s surname as it interacts

with the best interest of the child principle. Even if Congress has apparently enshrined

in Republic Act 9255 in amending Article 176 of the Family Code a policy of allowing

the child to have a final say on the matter, such a prerogative (if we are to assume that

the child’s best interest has priority in the hierarchy of principles) of the child may be

disapproved by our courts in instances when the child’s choice is clearly not in his best

interest. After all, the discretion to determine what is or what is not in the child’s best

interest lies with our courts. The difficulty will not be in concluding that the child’s

best interest has primacy over the child’s choice, but in deciding at what point in the

factual situation a child’s choice is no longer in his best interest.

The discussion on the illegitimate child’s discretion to use his recognizing father’s

surname under Article 176 of the Family Code brings to mind other provisions of the

New Civil Code which makes it obligatory upon a person to use the surname of another

as an incident to that person’s status. For instance, under Article 364 of the New Civil

Code, ‘[l]egitimate and legitimated children shallprincipally use the surname of the

father’ and under Article 365 of the New Civil Code, ‘[a]n adopted child shall bear the

surname of the adopter’ [emphasis supplied]. Even the Supreme Court in Republic

vsCapote (GR 157043, 2 Feb 2007) has held on the basis of the first sentence of Article

176 of the Family Code (‘[i]llegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be

under the parental authority of their mother’) that unrecognized illegitimate

children shalluse their mother’s surname. Notwithstanding these seemingly

compulsory provisions, it must be remembered that even if the New Civil Code or

Family Code provisions state that it is mandatory for a person to use a certain name or

surname (eg, obligatory by virtue of that person’s legitimate, illegitimate or

unrecognized status as a child), a change of that surname may still be authorized by

our courts under the exception of Article 376 of the New Civil Code. Article 376 of the

New Civil Code (stating that ‘[n]o person can change his name or surname without

judicial authority’) is implemented by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court which authorizes

a substantive change of surname. For instance, inRepublic v CA & Wong (21 May

1992, GR 97906), the Supreme Court allowed an adopted child to revert back to using

the surname of his biological parents despite the seemingly mandatory character of

Article 365 of the New Civil Code which states that ‘[a]n adopted child shall bear the

surname of the adopter.’ The Supreme Court in Wong, responding to the Solicitor

General’s argument that reversion to the biological parents’ name ‘violates Articles

341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of

the adopter’, held that ‘[i]f we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to

its conclusion, then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any person,

regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation

of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the petition is granted.

Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have

been the intendment of the law.’ The case ofAlfonvsRepublic(GR No. L-51201, May 29,

1980) also illustrates this point, where the Supreme Court allowed the petitioner

(legitimate child) to use the surname of her mother ‘Alfon’ instead of that of her

legitimate father ‘Duterte’, on substantive grounds under Rule 103, namely that it will

avoid confusion. The point from all this is that even if Article 176 of the Family Code

(as amended byRepublic Act 9255) were construed as to compel an illegitimate child to

use his father’s surname, that illegitimate child can still use a surname (other than that

of his father) based on substantive grounds warranted by Article 376 of the New Civil

Code through a Rule 103 proceeding.

Republic v. De Gracia

07/21/2014

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Persons and Family Relations.  Article 36 Family Code. Psychological Incapacity.Republic v. De GraciaG.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014

FACTS:Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their conjugal abode and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from “utter emotional immaturity”.

ISSUE:Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity?

HELD:The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.

 

SUSAN LIM-LUA,

Petitioner, vs.

DANILO Y. LUA,

Respondent.G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013SUMMARYMother of two seeks spousal and child support from rich husband.FACTSOn September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of 

P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and

dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing,RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the timeplaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand,and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months that lapsed). Respondent filed an MFR asserting that petitioner is not entitled tospousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwellingfrom their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-

being in accordance with family’s social and financial standi

ng. Asto the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as wellas the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable andbeyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of therespondent. The MFR was denied. His second MFR also having been denied,respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.

CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed

the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court said that the trial court should not havecompletely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchaseand maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and thecredit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inuredto the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well, and thusordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total supportin arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted thelack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed.ISSUEW/N the CA erred in deducting said amount from the current total support in arrearsDECISIONThe SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

 

 As a matter of law, theamount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generallyobliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, inkeeping with the financial capacity of the

family. The general rule is to the effect thatwhen a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for thesupport of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not haveallowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accruedsupportpendente lite

!

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014.

PERALTA, J p:

FACTS:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She filed a Petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge MamertoCaliflores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in HansaoPharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent also presented as witness a certain EufrocinaNatinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondent and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.

ISSUES:1. Did the RTC correctly apply Rule 108 of the Rules of Court?2. is the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract in effect a declaration that the marriage is void ab initio?

RULING:

1. YES. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. It provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate. HTCSDE

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent's signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

2. NO. The SC maintained that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, the SC ruled that it cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

In Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz GalelaMarinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, the SC ruled that a "petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry."

In this case, however, the SC found that aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.

Republic v. Cantor

07/21/2014

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Persons and Family Relations.Article 41 Family Code.Presumptive Death.

Republic v. Cantor

G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013

FACTS:

Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a violent quarrel.

After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration

of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for her husband

and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the

OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article 41 of the Family

Code?

HELD:

Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique

circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in determining the same. Maria

Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not give her any

information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerry’s name in the patient’s directory whenever

she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it

may be sensed that her search was not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent.

Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should have been

recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael LimIn Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but

were childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents

were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the

children making it appears as if they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998,

Primo died.  She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December

2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given

under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she

filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial

court.  Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18

years and seven months old.  Michelle and her husband including Michael and

Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already

remarried.  Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was

not present in the case at bar.  In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly

exercised parental authority.  The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint

adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in consonance with the

concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to

the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt

jointly.  The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are

certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen.  He must

meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The requirements on

residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise

be waived pursuant to Sec 7.  Parental authority is merely just one of the effects

of legal adoption.  It includes caring and rearing the children for civic

consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and

physical character and well-being.

Home » Civil Law » Syed Azhar Abbas vs Gloria Goo-Abbas

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SPONSORED ADS 

Civil Law – Family Code – Bigamy – Void Ab Initio Marriage – Lack of a Marriage License Remedial Law – Evidence – Probative Value – Public Records

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.

 

Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.December 10, 2012FACTS:

The prosecution accused EfrenPana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was renderedacquittingEfren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melenciaandanother person guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court

affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the pen

alty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for themonetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages butdeleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the courtmade an award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the courtawarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. Thedecision became executory of October 1, 2001.Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered theissuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names ofEfren and Melencia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on executionwere issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash thewrit of execution claiming that the properties levied were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002, the RTC denied the motion. Thespouses moved for 

reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it issubmitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect.They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their propertyrelations. However, both RTC and CA held that property regime changed into ACP whenfamily code took effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that theCode shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested oracquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it istrue that the personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate orunclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none ofthem can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident thatArticle 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reac back and automatically convertinto absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains thatexisted before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and

executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencia’s civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.

 

SUPREME COURT:YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code have beencovered.

First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that EfrenandMelencia were married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime ofconjugal partnership of gains.Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code provides that the future spouses main inmarriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community or conjugal partnership of gainsor upon a complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, andclearly, under this situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modificationof settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership wasdissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legallyseparated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or failsto comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property underarticle 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolutecommunity or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case

ESTRELLITA JULIAJVO-LLAVE,

petitioner 

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

et al.,

respondents.G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011 First Division Del Castillo,

FACTS:Before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice -initially under the Islamic lawsand tradition, and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellitahas been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's wife, and upon his death,hiswidow.Private respondents Zorayda, the alleged wife of Sen. Tamano, and Adib, her son, in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’slegitimate children, filed a complaintwith the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano. Thecomplaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda under civil rites, and that this marriageremained subsisting when he married Estrellita. Zorayda further alleged that her marriage withSen. Tamano is governed by the New Civil Code as having been celebrated thereto. Moreover,the deceased did not and could not have divorced Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D.1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that themarriage of the deceased with Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have beenone contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they did notregister their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law. Instead of filing an Answer, Estrellitafiled a Motion to Dismiss where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslimswho were married under the Muslim rites. Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction totake cognizance of the case because under P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim PersonalLaws of the Philippines, questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'acourts.The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.

 

Thus, Estrellita filed a certiorari petition with the SC questioning the denialof her Motion to Dismiss. The SC referred the petition to the CA During the pendency of thepetition before the CA, the RTC continued 

to try the case since there can be no default in casesof declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When itwasAEstrellita's turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court suspended the proceedings in view of the CA's TROenjoining it from hearing the case. Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse toEstrellita. Estrellita then elevated the appellate court's judgment to SC by way of a petition for review on certiorari Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC orderedEstrellita to present her evidence. As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing wasreset, as well as the day before the scheduled hearing. Unhappy with the delays in theresolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, reasoning thatEstrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has notyet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of her petition on certiorari before the SC.The SC upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC, stating as one of the reasons that as shari'acourtsare not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precludedfrom assuming jurisdiction over such cases. A few days before the resolution of SC, the RTCrendered the judgment declaring Estrellita's marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. Onappeal, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC.Estrellita argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter wasprematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She invokes theapplication of the case of Judge Macias vs. Macias on her behalf. She maintains that shemerely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court's assurance that theproceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition

 

questioning the RTC's jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered anadverse judgment. She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent afinding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding couldbe held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as thelatter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts thatsuch law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage wassolemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased. Lastly, Estrellitaargues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial court's judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court's final resolution of her 

certiorari 

petition; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not evenconduct an investigation whether there was collusion;2. Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamanowasbigamous; and3. Whether or not Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita's marriagedeclared void

ab initio.

 RULING:

1.

Estrelita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and

her pending petition for certiorari or review on certiorari questioning the denial of themotion to dismiss before the higher courts does not all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC.

a.

Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued its judgment, as it shouldhave waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,subsequently, before the SC. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ailedthat the pendency of, a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedingsbefore the trial court. An application for certiorari is an independent action which isnot part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgmentcomplained of.

 

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petitionshall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restrainingorder or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the publicrespondent from further proceeding in the case."

 

In fact, the trial court respected theCA's temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did theRTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

b.

It can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. Shewas never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial todefend her interest. Estrellita obviously misappreciated

Macias 

. All the SCpronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finallyresolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerptstates that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of thepropriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellatecourts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of theproceeding of the case because after it denied the wife's motion to dismiss, itimmediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence

ex parte 

andresolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, thewife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended periodearlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file ananswe

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SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIAPosted by kaye lee on 10:15 PMJenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil RegistrarG.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock  and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:Yes.Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1)      Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2)      Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.Categories