Cuadra vs Monfort

35 SCRA 160 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of Parents

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monfort’s dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states “that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting;

MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying “aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,” it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and

playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child.

AMADORA VS CA

Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 2180 – Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic Schools – Liability of Teachers and Heads of School

In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.

The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.

The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.

For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-

academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.

The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.

In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.

ELCANO VS HILL

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana  includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.

AMADO PICART VS FRANK SMITH JR.

37 Phil 809 – Civil Law Torts and Damages – Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.’s car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.

ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.

HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smith’s negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.