Evidence Digest for Jan5.. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

2. People v Dominguez

Facts:

The accused Prudencio, is the then Mayor of the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental,

and was promoting the re election of former President Marcos. On Feb. 7, 1986, the day before the snap

election, Prudencio, together with his brother Roger went to visit their second cousin Judge Boligor,

known to have been promoting the candidacy of Corazon Aquino. Upon arriving at Judge Boligor’s

house, a certain Rodolfo Macalisag, brother in law of Mayor Dominguez, appear, talked to the Mayor

and hide under the shadows. The Mayor then and his brother proceeded to enter the house, however,

10 minutes later Rodolfo followed with an M-16 armalite automatic rifle and soon after bursts of gunfire

was heard. The Dominguez brothers came out of the house and sped away while Rodolfo came out of

the house and disappeared into the darkness. Judge Bologor and her husband’s body were found inside

the house with multiple bullets wound in their vital parts.

The prosecution’s case rested solely on the testimony of a certain Oscar Cagod who witnessed

the events from across the street. The defense, however, question the witness’ credibility because he

had been convicted when he was 12 yrs. Old, of murder, a crime involving moral turpitude thus,

accordingly his testimony deserved no credence.

Issue: Is the witness qualified to testify?

Held: Yes. Rule 13, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court expressly states that conviction of a crime unless

otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualifying a witness from testifying. Thus, the

fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to disqualify or discredit a witness; the testimony

of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other

witness must be examined for its relevance and credibility.

5. U.S V. Concepcion

Facts:

On Dec. 2, 1913, several policemen went to the house of the defendant, Teresa Concepcion, where she

lives with his husband, Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving at the defendant’s house, the policemen obtained

permission to enter and immediately searched the premises for opium. While the defendant is searching

the house, Felix ordered Teresa to take the can of opium from beneath the pillow and throw it away.

Upon doing so, policemen caught Teresa and took possession of the can. When ask of who is the owner

of the illegal item, Teresa admitted that it was her, however, Felix intervenes, and states that he owns

the house and is responsible for everything in it. The policemen believed that it was Felix, thus they

arrested him for the violation of the Opium Law. He was later bought to trial and was acquitted.

After 10 months, a complaint was filed against Teresa for the same act, base on the same event. The

prosecution presented as witness the testimony of the husband, during the previous (husband’s) trial as

against Teresa. The lower court accepted such testimony over the defendant’s objection.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Is the husband’s testimony admissible?

Held: No. A husband cannot be examined for or against her husband without his consent; nor a wife for

or against her husband without her consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be,

without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during

the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other,

or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other."

It will be noted that said action prohibits a husband from giving testimony against his wife without her

consent, except in a civil action between husband and wife, and in a criminal action when the crime was

committed by one against the other. The present is not a civil action between husband and wife, neither

it is a criminal action where the crime was committed by one against the other. It would seem to clear,

therefore, that the testimony of the husband is not admissible if the wife objected. The testimony of the

husband should not have been admitted.

8. Guerrero v St. Claire Realty corp.

Facts: Isidro Guerrero verbally willed that the subject parcel of land be adjudicated in favor of his son,

Andres. By virtue of his verbal will, and upon his father’s death, Andres possessed said land and

cultivated it through his tenant, Dominador Ramirez. After Japanese Occupation, he entrusted that land

to his sister Cristina, with Dominador continuing his tenancy until Andres’ death. Andres’ heirs

subsequently discovered that the land was in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, by virtue of a

deed of sale allegedly executed by Cristina in his favor. Manuel’s heir subsequently sold the same land

to St. Clare’s Realty Company.

Andres’ heirs are now asking the court to annul the aforementioned sales and to award the ownership

of the land to them. As witness, Laura Cervantes testified as to her mother Cristina’s illness as to loan

which Manuel granted Cristina, and as to the fact that the land was lent by Cristina to ANDRES. The

defendants’ counsel objected to Laura’s testimony on the ground of the Dead Man’s Statute.

Issue: Does the Dead Man’s Statute apply?

Held: No. In this case, no claim or demand is being made against the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Also, the Guerreros are not the executors or administrators of the deceased. The Guerreros are being sued in their individual capacities as claimants of ownership of the subject lot which is not part of the estate. The Dead Man’s Statute cannot apply. The Rule expressly says, “against an executor or administrator or other representative of the deceased person”. The phrase “other representative” refers to those who like the administrator or executor are being sued in their representative and not personal capacity. The use of the phrase, “ against the estate of such deceased person” conveys the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are

to be asserted and defended in the litigation by person representing him, not the personal right of such relatives. 11. People v Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Atty. Sansaet was counsel for Paredes in a complaint undergoing preliminary investigation before the

tanodbayan for violation of RA no. 3019. The complaint was, however, dismissed on the ground of

double jeopardy based on their claim that Paredes was previously charged of the same offense which

was dismissed after arraignment. It turned out, however, that his claim of double jeopardy was based on

falsified documents so that both Paredes and Sansaet were charged of falsification. As his defense, Atty.

Sansaet claimed that it was Paredes who falsified the documents in his house and instigated and

induced him to file the motion using the falsified documents. Atty. Sansaet offered to become state

witness against Paredes.

Issue: Would the proposed testimony of Atty. Sansaet violate the attorney- client privilege?

Held:

No. The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and

client having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not

covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney

and client.

In the present cases, the testimonies sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the

communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he,

either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of

falsifying, the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to

Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been

committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present correspondents, later

committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the

pale of the attorney-client privilege.

Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the Commission of that crime of falsification which

he and Paredes concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is a well settled that in order that a

communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in

furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

In fact, it has also been pointed out to the court that the “prosecution of the honorable relation of

attorney and client will not be permitted under the very guise of privilege, and every communication

made to an attorney by a client for a criminal which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney

under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.

13. Lim V CA

Facts:

In case for annulment of marriage filed by the husband on the ground that the wife was suffering from a

mental illness called schizophrenia, plaintiff sought to present the psychiatrist from the National Mental

Hospital to testify as an expert witness. Defendant objected on the ground that the testimony sought to

be presented is privileged since the psychiatrist examined the patient in a professional capacity. The trial

court allowed her to testify as an expert witness and she was asked hypothetical questions related to

her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated defendant for nor

disclosed the results of her examination and the medicine she had prescribed.

Issue: Is the testimony barred by Sec 24(c), Rule 130 of the revised Rules on Evidence?

Held:

No. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and

confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,

untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the

witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and

efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: 1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. In the case, the defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proving the presence of all the requisites. The reasons follow: First, the psychiatrist was presented as an expert witness and she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview or treatment by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. Second, it is clear that the patient in this case was never interviewed alone. There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third person removes such information from the mantle of the privilege. Third, except for the defendants sweeping claim, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that the information given by the psychiatrist would blacken defendant’s character. The psychiatrist never disclosed any information regarding the defendant’s ailment. Finally, while it may be true that defendant opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to the witness, she did not interpose any objection to the testimony. Despite the trial’s

court’s advice that her counsel may object to the testimony once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule. 14. BANCO FILIPINO v. MONETARY BOARD

Facts: Doctrine: The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. Confidential communications are not necessarily absolute and privileged. The public officer who is asked to disclose certain documents relevant to the case has the burden of proof to show that public interest will be adversely affected thereby.

Facts: This is an off- shoot of the case regarding the closure of Banco Filipino. The subject of the petition is the Order of RTC Makati which granted the motion of Banco Filipino for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records which claims are needed for the preparation of its comments, objections and exceptions to the Conservator’s report. These documents sought to be produced include copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino among others. In issuing the order, the RTC considered the documents sought to be produced as not privileged because they constitute or contain evidence material to the issues present. Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the order and pray for the reversal and setting aside of the same. One of the grounds they invoked is that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. In its comment, Banco Filipino argued that the respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the records sought because it is based only on the generalized interest of confidentiality. It cited US v. Nixon, stating that when the ground for asserting the privilege as to the subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality; it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law. BF’s reason for asking the production of these documents is to prove that the CB Governor closed BF without an MB resolution and without the examiner’s reports on the financial standing of BF. MB on the other hand argued that US V Nixoatn finds no application, because the present case is not a claim of privilege only on a generalized interest. Rather, the MB deliberations are considered privileged under the rules of evidence (sec. 21, rule 130), precisely because of the Central Bank Act which states that they are confidential. Issue: WON the documents sought to be produced are considered privileged? Held: No. The documents are no privileged. Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice. The deliberations may indeed be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subjet of a suit pending before it. The disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties. The privileged under Sec. 21, Rule 130 is not intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this

invoked the rule and thus will not be applicable. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. In the present case, respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 1985, any disclosure of the letters, reports, transcripts at this time impose no danger or peril to our economy. On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents.