Final paper

Antonio Caruso

ID Number: I6023297

Tutorial Group 1 (08h45-10h45)

Tutor: M. Carree

Differences and similarities, contrasts and match points:

The work for a better Europe never stops

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Summary

Introduction 2

Section 1

The UK, France and Germany: three “personifications” of more 3

popular models

1.1 The VoC Approach 4

1.1.1 The role of the state 4

1.1.2 Labor Relations 6

1.2 The integration model 6

Section 2

The EU: Functioning and governance 7

Section 3

From top to bottom: the impact of the EU on member states 9

Section 4

Lobbying perspective 12

4.1 Transversal Lobbying 13

Conclusion 14

References 15

1

Introduction

From time immemorial there seems to have been a common desire for the re-creation

of a comprehensive political structure for Europe, in reminiscence of the legendary Roman

Empire; from Charlemagne to Napoleon the aspiration was one, to revive what had been the

spirit of the Roman era, with the creation of a common legal code or a common currency as a

symbol of power for example (The Economist, 2004, The History of an idea). Undoubtedly

influenced by history, in 1957 the founding fathers signed the Treaty of Rome, perhaps

unaware of what that date would signify for future generations, and in doing so gave birth to

what 50 years later is now the fulcrum of the old continent, namely the “European Union”.

More than fifty years after its birth there are still some doubts as to the effective functioning

of the EU; emblematic is the case of France and The Netherlands who have voted negatively

on the European Constitution (The Economist, 2007, Fit at 50?).

The main goal of this paper consists in the attempt of giving a general overview of

different aspects which characterize the EU and the overall impact had on member states,

hence proving the positive effects of the EU on those states, despite the opinions of many

pessimists and sceptics. Section 1 will attempt to explain and clarify reasons for the

differences which exist between the socio-political-economic patterns of the EU member

states in terms of corporatism, pluralism and statism, as existing related literature is very

broad and often unclear. In analyzing the main features of these patterns, three countries have

been selected which seem to embody the three most common systems; in turn these three,

allowing for basic variations due to the intrinsic characteristics of each country, may be used

as an initial framework for a successive classification of the socio-political-economic systems

of the other nations.

Section 2 will deal with the general purpose of the EU and how that governing body

works. This preliminary breakdown will permit, in section 3, an in-depth analysis of the

impact made by the EU on domestic systems of policy making and governance, taking into

consideration the previous classification of social, political and economic systems. In dealing

with this topic, reference will be made to the work of Schmidt (2006), who has endeavored to

explain and elucidate the concept as to how Europeanization has affected national policy-

making processes, shedding light on the manner in which this process (Europeanization) has

influenced individual member states in differing ways, depending on which position they

occupy along a continuum from statist to corporatist (Schmidt, 2006, p.671).

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At this point, hoping to have distinguished the three main subdivisions of capitalism, and

after having given a general overview of the model of governance adopted by the EU and its

subsequent consequences on member states, always bearing in mind their native aspects, the

scope of section 4 is to analyze in what is the role of lobbyists in the EU and which bodies,

namely Parliament, Commission and Council, have a higher degree of openness and therefore

provide more access points for influence. Subsequently the focus will be on recent studies

and fresh approaches in the field of lobbying, such as, to cite Gueguèn, “Transversal

lobbying”, highlighting how old methods of lobbying are now obsolete due the remarkable

dynamism that has overtaken Europe in the past two decades, using as examples, to attach

theory to fact, the cases of two commercial giants: Nokia and Michelin.

Section 1

The UK, France and Germany: three “personifications” of the more

popular models

As the topic dealt with in this first section has already been studied innumerable times

by several scholars, each having proffered their personal conclusions, one initial goal of this

paper is to formulate a comprehensible classification of the models of capitalism which have

developed in the advanced industrialized economies of Europe whilst at the same time, aided

by empirical evidence, attempting to define their principal features. To this end three nations,

the UK, France and Germany, will be presented as illustrative cases.

As Schmidt stated, in Europe during the post second world war period, three different

varieties of capitalism were developed and established, the first being of a pluralist mould,

which scholars labelled “liberal market economy”; the second being based on corporatist

principles, thus defined “coordinated market economy” and the last, developed principally in

France, being referred to as “state capitalism”(Schmidt, 2003 p.527). In the academic ambit,

the latter has been, and still is, at the centre of many disputes between different scholars, as

many of them do not consider it necessary to classify an ulterior model of capitalism as, they

affirm, in today’s world this particular one has lost its empirical validity due the deregulation,

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privatization and liberalization of financial markets (Schmidt, 2003 p.527). They also believe

that “state capitalism”, under certain aspects, could be seen as a mutation of the other two

forms of capitalism and therefore should not be classed as an individual form.

Notwithstanding their arguments, this thesis follows the idea of Schmidt in asserting the

existence of a third form, namely “the Statist model” (Schmidt, 2003 p.526).

1.1 The VoC Approach

According to the VoC (Varieties of Capitalism) approach, proposed by Soskice and

Hall (1999), in wanting to identify and classify the differences between the political and

economic institutions of various countries, it is necessary to keep in mind that each country,

throughout its history, has followed a different route to economic growth, due to national

circumstances, their diverse cultures, varying approaches to and modes of administration and

numerous other significant factors. In this way the equilibrium created within these

institutions varies, reinforcing some and weakening others, but in any case, in principle, the

assemblage of complementary institutional patterns is generally limited (Knell & Srholec,

2007 p.42). Starting from this idea, Hall and Soskice have outlined two main modes of

coordination, the first liberal, the second corporatist, to which this paper adds the Statist

model, comparing it from time to time with the its two precedents. As the field of analysis for

these institutions is broad, the focus of attention here will be placed solely on two main

aspects; respectively: the role of the state and labour relations. By observing how these two

aspects interact in the UK, Germany and France, the analysis will reveal which position each

country holds on the pluralism - corporatism scale.

1.1.1 The Role of the State

The role of the State is analyzed through a behavioural study of political authorities,

particularly those of governments, investigating ways in which various aspects in the life of a

country are regulated; for example concerning the formulation and implementation of

economic policies, social policies or safety policies. By so doing it is possible to discern

different levels of government action, from pure spectatorship to the opposite extreme of

tough leadership. Hence, according to the way in which the government’s role is perceived,

one can deduce which model is incorporated by that country.

In the UK, since the second world war, the state has tried to cover a role of pure

spectatorship, with the aim of limiting an over-invasive presence and influence on the market,

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by avoiding to take action as an arbitrator amid economic agents, preferring to leave the task

of general administration to self governing bodies. Nonetheless from time to time it has

continued to provide help for companies in difficult situations, for example by intervening

with policies of nationalization or by conducting planning tests (Schmidt 2003, p.528).

Unlike the UK, in Germany the state has always aimed at promoting business activities, very

often intervening in the market, providing funding for the industrial sector and supporting

innovation with high financial contributions for research and development, with the scope of

rendering the economic framework as favourable as possible for reaching an elevated level of

monetary growth and witnessing a healthy development of national productivity. A

superficial glance at this system might give the impression that such a concentrated

involvement on behalf of the state would hamper the market from proceeding autonomously

or from following the trends of competitors, but in actual fact, while on the one hand there

are firm state regulations which cover the more crucial aspects of business (those which

could, if handled imprudently, provoke negative effects on the market), on the other, more

often than not, the actual administration is left to the market agents themselves. For this

reason the German state is known as a “facilitator”.

Conversely, in France, the main purpose of the state is to preserve the identity of the

nation and promote “national interest” and “national will” (Kohler & Koch, 1998 p.12). As a

direct consequence of this the state’s intervention in the market is intense, taking wide range

action on nearly all fronts, from mediation in inter-firm relations, to the provision of

economic incentives and loans, sometimes with extremely low interest rates or even on

occasion without demanding any fiscal return at all; all with the sole aim of preserving and

maintaining employment and improving production in sub-developed areas, impersonating in

this way the role of an orchestral conductor (Schmidt 2003, p.530).

Owing to the never-ending economic challenge, which had its beginnings in Europe

and around the world in the early ‘70s with the first oil crisis and which was accentuated by

several economic after shocks, many countries have been forced to review their modes of

governance. Regarding the three nations under examination, it is note that the UK’s

noninterventionist structure became even more liberal. Dissimilarly in Germany, due to the

complexity of its organization, the process of reform was extremely slow and did not begin

until the early ‘90s. France, however, has experienced a change of direction, with the state

renouncing the leadership role and adopting an “enhancing role” (Schmidt, 2003 p.533), thus

positioning itself on the scale somewhere between Britain and Germany.

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1.1.2 Labor Relations

Although the two main aspects considered when analyzing labour relations are the

stringency of rules for the hiring and firing of workers, and the regulation of working hours,

there are still other facets which upon reflection (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.50) can explain

effective discrepancies between diverse labour markets and link these conclusions to the

tendencies of countries, whether corporatist or pluralist. Attention here will be placed on the

strictness of EPL (employment protection legislation) and on the percentage of collective

bargaining coverage.

The UK records a very low level of EPL. It utilizes a basic system of regulations in an

aim to reach the highest possible degree of flexibility and mobility in the labour market.

Rules are straightforward regarding the assumption and expulsion of personnel, and the state

offers an exceptionally low level of social security, so reconfirming its role as a spectator.

Moreover, an investigation of the percentage of collective bargaining coverage reveals that

only 33% of employees are covered by a collective agreement (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.52).

Germany instead presents a comparatively high level of EPL, being more oriented

towards job security, towards the maintenance of posts and also long-term employment; more

rigid rules are implemented regarding hiring and firing, and the state has a very active role in

the overall regulation of the labour market. Looking at the percentage of collective bargaining

coverage, in Germany as much as 68% of the employed workforce has a contract as a result

of collective bargaining (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.52).

Finally, the situation in France is quite different; although the EPL level is high, over

recent years the state has attempted to increase flexibility, for example in the regulation of

weekly working hours, but the state is always central to overall decision making, once again

confirming its role of “conductor”. In fact the percentage of collective bargaining coverage is

nearing 100%, actually stabilising at 93% (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.52).

1.2 The Integration model

Siaroff (1999) proposes an alternative method to that of VoC for verifying the

position held by any one model in a corporatist-pluralist continuum, which measures the

degree of “Integration” of countries. The term integration is defined as a cooperative model

in which economic administration focuses on the long term and involves various social

partners at various levels of management, from wage configuration to the formulation of

national policies regarding competitiveness. (Siaroff, 1999 p.189).

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Several factors are considered when defining the degree of integration of a state, from

the number of strikes effected to the legal and state support of trade unions; from the extent

of co-determination in the workplace to the nature of national industrial adjustment. (Siaroff,

1999 p.194). Hence, to pursue the work of Siaroff and measure the average level of

integration of representative EU countries over the past 50 years, on a scale of 1 to 5, wherein

1 indicates non-integrated economies, or rather those strictly pluralist, and 5 indicates

integrated economies, or rather those which lean more towards corporatism, it is evident that:

Germany has always maintained a high degree of integration, its average score being 4,125,

expressing a high level of corporatism. On the other hand the UK has registered an average

level of integration equal to 2 on the scale, so maintaining its pluralist and liberal reputation,

whereas France has experienced a slight increase in its level of integration, but still remains,

as far as this aspect is concerned, closer to the English model rather than that of Germany

(Siaroff, 1999 p.198).

Section 2

The EU: Functioning and governance

The main goal of this section is to understand how the European governance mode

works, but first of all we need to be clear on the function of the EU and what are the main

tasks of the three main European institutions. First, the European polity is defined as “sui

generis”, since it is governed without a government (Kohler & Koch, 1998, p.2); the making

of decisions on a European level has a strong impact on all member states which, by virtue of

their membership, are forced to receive and implement the policies determined upon, even if,

given the inherent characteristics of Europe, the European mode of governance does not

conform to the usual principles of democratic rule. Where there is no government and no

democratic representation, the ways and means of governing will be different. Without either

government or democratic representation the array of procedures and modes of governing

will be different (Kohler & Koch, 1998, p.2).

One main focus, which has long been, and still is, at the centre of disputes is that

concerning the amount of influence that the three main pillars of the EU, namely the

European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, individually hold; this discussion has

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particularly regarded the role of the former. The role of the EU Parliament in the

community’s legislative procedure has mutated from being inexistent to being consultative

and what is more, to possessing an authority which goes beyond consultative; in fact at the

present time the task of the EU parliament is to propose legislation, take decisions and make

amendments (Bouwen, 2002, p.380), although major decision-making is still largely a

prerogative of the Council of Ministers and The Commission. However this increasing

significance of the EU Parliament is also due to the fact of its essence as the only body to

enjoy the succession to power as the result of a democratic election involving all European

citizens, although the details and the distribution of seats differ from state to state, due the

autonomy of each in organizing elections.

The Commission is considered to be the most important institution in policy-making

processes, since it promotes the common interests of Europeans, encouraging member states

to implement policies of intergovernmental consensus; moreover, article 149 of the EEC

Treaty states that the Commission holds veto power, meaning it has the power to withdraw or

modify at any time any procedure leading to the adoption of a Community act (Bouwen, 2002

p.379).

Finally, the Council of Ministers has the most important role in the EU legislative process, as

it is the supreme decision-maker and, above all, the forum in which variant purposes and

powers of member states can be reconciled. The policy of the council being made up of

ministers from member states ensures that the national interest prevails, so to identify the

domestic interests of member states is of crucial importance. The Council has both executive

and legislative power, although it shares the legislative power with the EU Parliament in the

co-decision procedure. In general four main legislative procedures can be outlined: 1)

consultation procedure; 2) assent procedure; 3) co-operation procedure; 4) co-decision

procedure. Depending on which procedure is used the Council has the power to influence the

final shape of legislative proposal (Bouwen, 2002, p.381).

Given the imbalances between European institutions, the mode of governance cannot

help but be affected as the EC is both a compact body and a plurality of protagonists, be they

collective, corporate or individual, and also because the latter participate in the European

political process, thus influencing, in differing ways, policy-making processes (Kohler &

Koch, 1998, p.7).

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between the terms

“governance” and “government”. We can define governance as the array of processes and

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modes by which the complex system of the citizen’s preferences is translated into effective

political choices, or else as a plurality of interests and different visions coming together in

order to define a common course of action, primarily by obtaining the consensus of all

parties. Instead, the term government refers directly to that party equipped with indisputable

rights, whose policies and decisions become binding, whilst at the same time acknowledging

that it also is subject to a certain control under established procedures (Kohler & Koch, 1998

p.1).

Following the approach of Kohler & Koch in classifying the diverse modes of

governance, two main criteria should be kept in mind: the first is the “organizing principle of

political relations”, which in turn could be based on consociation principles or inspired by the

majority rule; the second distinctive criteria concerns the “constitutive logic of the polity”,

which will depend on whether the objective is the “common purpose” or for “parallel

interests”. Out of the combination of these four categories, four modes of governance are

defined (Kohler & Koch, 1998 p.11): 1) Statism, based on majority rule and common

purpose; 2) Corporatism, which combines co-association with common purpose; 3)

Pluralism, which incorporates majority rule and parallel interest; 4) Network governance,

which builds on consociation and parallel interest.

Having defined four macro categories, we are now able to identify the mode of European

governance: this falls into the Network category of governance, since the most suitable

governing principle at European level is consociation, and also because its nature as a

supranational organization confines it to a pursuit of parallel interests, rather than to aim for

the common purpose (Kohler & Koch, 1998, p.14), which would mean at times seeking to

reach a compromise, given the many parties involved in the decision-making processes.

After this brief overview of which institution in the EU is the most important, the definition

of their roles and the classification of the European mode of governance, the following

section will deal with the question of what is the EU’s impact on national policy making and

governance.

Section 3

From top to bottom: the impact of the EU on member states

The process of Europeanization refers to different phenomena and pattern changes

related to the construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules,

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procedures, policies and norms, which initially are defined and enforced at EU-level and

subsequently incorporated at domestic level, having differing impacts due to the diverse

political culture, traditions, social support, that is to say related to the socio-political-

economic patterns of the countries. Moreover, Europeanization has influenced not only the

traditional decision-making processes at domestic level, but also the routes by which the

overall societal actors can influence the European policy making process.

Ever since its origins the Achilles heel of the EU has been the problem relating to

enforcement, as compliance records vary significantly across the member states, this

depending mainly on institutional fit, capacity and willingness to implement policies

(Schmidt, 2006, p.672); indeed looking at the juncture reached by the transposition of

European policies, the EU faces a big challenge, not only in ensuring that each member state

implements the policies, but more importantly, that these rules are applied uniformly,

wherever countries have the right to choose how to implement the diverse policies, that is

when the European Directive is declared but does not directly come into force, being passed

instead to a national level.

As stated in section 2, the EU has a Network mode of governance, meaning that

interested parties have reasonably open access to and influence upon policy formulation,

while keeping in mind that stakeholders can bring their influence to bear only during the

initial phase and not during implementation when the policy is set and legal and regulatory

enforcement is the rule. In this way the EU has pluralized the national policy-making

processes, bringing it closer to a model of “Transnational Pluralism”, since the locus of

interest is now Brussels and not the national capitals. It has also tried to affect the

implementation processes in member states, promoting more legalistic and regulatory ways

of enforcement instead of facilitating the modes based on administrative discretion or self

regulation (Schmidt, 2006 p.671). In general the impact of Europeanization is differential, in

fact the more the pattern in a member state is statist, the more the Europeanization of national

policy making will be irrepressible, whereas the contrary happens with a corporatist country;

this is due to the diverse institutional fit of the countries, as the closer the fit, the less is the

disruption; according to Schmidt, we consider pluralism as a new default option between the

two (Schmidt, 2006, p.673).

It will be useful to distinguish possible diverse interaction between both EU and

national decision processes in order to understand what will be the impact of specific

policies; for example, when the EU has a strong leadership at the decision making stage,

without peripheral participation but with much opposition most probably the societal

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participation and cooperation on the treatise in question will be at risk; whilst when the

European decision-making process is very strong with high participation and level of

cooperation then the voice of national leadership in a given member state and subsequent

opposition will be reduced; summarily, when there is an alignment between the EU pattern

and the national one, then there will be no important changes. For this reason, when the EU is

more pluralist or corporatist in policy-making, it influences the traditional statist patterns by

pushing them towards pluralism or corporatism, whilst the more the EU policy-making

process is pluralist or statist, the higher will be the likelihood of a shift for traditional

corporatist patterns towards pluralism or statism (Schmidt, 2006 p.676).

Referring to the conclusions of the first section, in which were presented as case

studies three nations, the UK, Germany and France, defining them as prototypes of three

different patterns, respectively pluralist, corporatist and statist, it is now possible to see what

the overall impact of EU policy-making processes has on these three countries in relation to

their different frameworks.

In the UK the EU has not played a very significant role in regards to the changes in

policy formulation as the nation developed direct lobbying strategies which were effective in

the EU policy formulation process (Coen, 1998); conversely regarding policy

implementation, the UK has experienced several problems since the increase in regulations

emanating from the EU replacing the customary informal arrangements of the administration

of rules being handled by independent regulatory agencies. This represents an important

challenge not only for governing practices but also for the procedural ideas on democracy,

hence the increasing sway will probably advance the likelihood of legal conflict, thereby

undermining the traditional process of conflict resolution (Schmidt, 2006 p.684).

In Germany the EU has not played a great part in either policy formulation or

implementation, as, for example regarding implementation, the German notion of regulation

is very similar to that of the EU, since it assumes universal applicability of the rules (Dyson,

1992), and so the increase in regulations emanating from the EU does not cause any kind of

consternation; concerning policy formulation, in Germany the combination of consensus-

oriented state-societal relations and federal arrangements with an additional high regard for

the law, implies that Germany’s decision making culture is very close to that of the EU

(Schmidt, 2006, p.686).

Lastly, in France, although the statist model is historically characterized by a reactive

approach of society against the state, over the years there has been a significant change of

course, dictated by the increasing importance of policy formulation and implementation

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processes of social actors; albeit these changes are mainly due to the internal dynamics, there

is no doubt that the EU has been a very important dynamic in this process of reform

(Schmidt, 2006 p.683), pushing the French pattern towards greater pluralism with more

societal consultation and regulatory implementation.

Section 4

Lobbying perspective

In this last section, after the definition of the different patterns across countries in

section 1, having seen in section 2 the functioning of EU and its mode of governance and

having analyzed the differential impact of EU in section 3, now the aim of this part is to

understand how the different EU’s stakeholders, namely firms, EU associations and national

associations, lobby at European level throughout the use of the “exchange theory”, proposed

by Bowuen (2002), and with the new forms of lobbying, like the “transversal lobbying”

according to Gueguèn (2007).

In analyzing the European decision-processes by adopting a similar approach to the

traditional exchange theory model, Bouwen proposes a new framework for those

organizations who want to affect the decision-making processes, asserting that the most

important element, at the heart of any decision process, is information, which, when

furnished in the exact quantity and at the right moment, allows “access” and consequently the

possibility of influence; the political currency in the EU is information (Eising, 2007 p.386).

Nevertheless Eising criticizes Bouwen, as he affirms that access in itself does not directly

imply influence, as although the provision of good information permits access, it could

transpire that, after the furnishing, one cannot really aim at influencing the processes, since

the desired objectives may be different from those actually accomplished (Eising, 2007

p.387), because, as Eising stated, the access is affected by resource dependencies,

institutional opportunities and by the capabilities of interest groups (Eising, 2007 p.385).

In analyzing the structure and competencies of the EU, Eising finds several different

access points, subdividing in degrees of importance the three main pillars of the EU, namely

the EU Parliament, the Commission and the Council, and asserting that the Commission is

considered the most important access point, given the difficulties to obtain satisfactory results

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after a proposal is passed from the Commission to the Parliament and then to the Council for

the co-decision procedure; therefore interest groups should focus their attention principally

on lobbying the Commission (Eising, 2007, p.387).

Notwithstanding this, given the escalating role of the EU Parliament in recent years,

its importance as a lobbying objective has consequentially increased, although it should be

taken into consideration that that the formation of its members is a result of election by

national voters, so there is a higher likelihood that the MEP’s (members of European

parliament) are more open than the Commission to issues such as the environment or

unemployment (Eising, 2007 p.388); for this reason Kohler & Koch have defined this link

between the MEP’s and interest groups as “coalitions of the weak” (Kohler & Koch, 1997: 6-

7).

As a final consideration, owing to the infrequency of meetings, the Council of

Ministers is rarely the target of lobbying; interest groups focus their attention and efforts

rather on government departments at national level (Eising, 2007 p.388).

4.1 Transversal Lobbying

Considering the ongoing development of the EU in the last 50 years, it is logical that

methods of lobbying have changed according to the different phases to which Europe has

been subject, for instance, in the early years the most common method was fusional lobbying,

namely a hand in hand relationship between commission and professional officials. Over the

years the approaches have evolved, principally in diplomatic lobbying and then, with the

introduction of the single market, to a strategic form. Bearing in mind the continuous

development of the EU and the increase in the number of member states, nowadays the

companies, interest groups or associations have understood that the most effective mode of

influence consists in so-called “transversal lobbying” (Gueguen, 2007 p.13).

What exactly is transversal lobbying? It consists in the ability to build relationships

which pervade the overall chain of values, from the highest to the lowest levels, from the

producer to the consumer (Gueguen, 2007, p.15), radically transforming the common image

of a lobbyist as, in this new acceptation, lobbying does not consist in putting pressure on

people, but rather in aiding them to arrive at a common solution (Gueguen, 2007, p.135);

therefore, the new channels of influence will be characterized by a proactive approach rather

than an oppositional approach (Gueguen, 2007, p.17).

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To “involve the whole chain of values” means to be supported by the majority of the

parties who are either directly or indirectly influenced by the introduction of such norms or

rules; an empirical example of this mode of action is found in the Michelin company, leaders

in the manufacture of tyres, which in its lobbying strategy pushed for the implementation of

an international ranking system of tyres based on the Rolling Resistance level (Hanoteau,

2009 p.37), enjoying the political support of almost all its chain of values, from upstream to

downstream industrial partners, for example Peugeot PSA, French car maker, or by Rhodia,

French chemicals manufacturer (Hanoteau, 2009 p.39), in this way succeeding to obtain the

desired results.

To return to the first mentioned proactive approach, emblematic is the case of Nokia,

company leader in mobile devices, which in attempting to influence and reshape various

European directives concerning the environment, such as RoHS (2002/95/EC) and WEEE

(2002/96/EC) (Kautto, 2009, p.104) , has opted for a more collaborative way of acting against

the policy-makers, by adopting more constructive strategies, seeking to strengthen its

credibility and build trust within the Commission, providing necessary information,

managing most of the time to attain to the desired objectives.

Conclusion

This paper has endeavoured to give a panoramic overview of the EU situation; a

prerequisite was a prior analysis of the different socio-political-economic patterns developed

in Europe after the Second World War, so as to then follow on to an analysis of the European

governance and its function, thus enabling us to comprehend how European policies have a

differential impact in member states due to the diverse configuration of the institutions in

place, in terms of corporatist, pluralist and statist systems. The last section dealt with the

topic of lobbying at EU-level, classifying the three main European bodies, Parliament,

Commission and Council, in relation to their degree of openness, in terms of influence, to the

various stakeholders, focusing finally upon a new approach of lobbying, namely transversal

lobbying, now very common since the number of members in the EU has increased

considerably, specifically amounting to 27 countries. Despite the great achievement of this

goal, many are still sceptical and pessimistic regarding the EU, not understanding that the EU

is not a ready defined organism, set to function, but rather a continuous work in progress.

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Naturally this great expansion will require some changes and improvements, but we should

look at the EU not as a “super state”, but rather as a framework in which nations can

strengthen each other, together prosperously pursuing the path which leads to integration

(The Economist 1999, My continent, right or wrong).

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