dialogues in strategy

Peter Franklin Nottingham Business School

Introduction

I wrote books which implied that there had to be a right way to run our organisations and our lives, even if we could not be completely sure of what it was. I was in the grip of the myth of science, the idea that everything, in theory, could be understood, predicted and, therefore, managed. (Charles Handy, 1994, p. 17.)

The fundamental purpose of this paper, Dialogues in Strategy is to begin the basis of a dialogue concerned with a critical evaluation of the study, literature and practice of strategy.

‘I should like to acknowledge the generous insight of my colleague John Fredericks who has influenced my thinking and this paper. AU errors remain mine.

Dialogues in strategy1 0 Dialogues in strategy looks at some of

the philosophical, epistemological and methodological issues associated with strategy. The paper argues that much strategy literature is impaired or faulty, and warns theorists and practitioners about the dangers of applying strategy theory unthinkingly. A more optimistic tone arises from the idea that strategic practice, including planning, provides managers with a sound source of organizational learning. The paper concludes by encouraging readers to join the Dialogue and thereby help improve strategic thinking, theov and practice.

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Lkklogues doesn’t pretend to be complete or balanced. Instead it celebrates the value of learning through dialogue, where participants jointly ‘suspend assumptions and enter into a genuine “thinking together”’ (Senge, 1990, p. 10) which entails ‘the free and creative exploration of complex and subtle issues’ (Senge, 1990, p. 236).

While encouraging the act of engaging in dialogue, this paper (Dialogues) takes a particular stance about the study and practice of strategy. In summary, it begins with the argument that much (but not all) of the writing on strategy is epistemologically sus pect or weak. It moves on to the contention, contained in much of the ‘theoretical’ literature, that strategic practice and (organizational) learning are inherently intertwined, the one reinforcing the other, and vice versa.

212 P. Franklin

It concludes on the positive note that while our understandings of strategy, planning and organizational learning are methodologically biased, and often instrumental and naive, the emerging literature on ‘strategic thinking’ and ‘strategic learning’ give cause for optimism about the study and practice of the art.

An initial methodological standpoint

We begin with the initial methodological proposition that much (but not all) of the writing on strategy is methodologically suspect or weak. I base this proposition on the tautology that some strategy literature adopts sound methodology, and the truism (and implied benefit of the doubt) that I don’t claim to have read all there is to be read about strategy.

Much of the writing on strategy is methodologically

suspect or weak

Some problems with current writing

As one example, much of the empirical work about management is superficial and anecdo- tal. And as another example, much of the ‘theory’ of strategy is little more than an extension of the micro- and industrial economics being published in the 1950s. While the findings from this literature may stimulate helpful debate, and (possibly) better management action, the fads and fashions of strategy2 are built on sandy foundations3 and fail to express sufficient health warnings.*

This is shared by Goddard and Houlder (1995, p. 100). 3Watson (1994) makes the same point. 4As an example, James Champy (1995) writes ‘Reengineering is in trouble’ (p. 1) ‘ “Reengineering” has proved to be an extraordinarily popular concept. The trouble is, popular concepts sometimes look like magic . . . Some managers, misled by wishful thinking . . .’ (P. 6).

If the hypothesis is proven (or for those who look for philosophical correctness, ‘not disaffirmed’), one important consequence is that readers (practitioners and academics), need to be alert to the ‘potential to be deceived’. In particular, readers need to be careful not unthinkingly to:

1. endorse strategy concepts (techniques, concepts, models, theories or paradigms) without first looking at their genesis and validity, and

2. apply such concepts to inappropriate contexts.

It may be argued that these warnings themselves represent an implied methodological stance. Hence, for clarity, I declare that my own research preferences involve the adop tion of ideographic methodologies which rely on empirical observation. I readily acknowledge the theory dependent issues which are associated with the design and the implementation of empirical research; and I recognize and value the theory building process which derives from good empirical research. As a sometime economist I also value the true hypotheticdeductive approach. My argument is therefore not with one camp or the other, but to warn of the unthinking use of (acceptable or flawed) strategy research outcomes.

Errors in the acquisition and use of knowledge

The fundamental failings to be found in some of the strategy literature are methodological ones. In summary, four types of failing can be distinguished. TYPE ONE: shaky empirical work. This failing is best characterized by casual empirical research which has neither a strong nor valid methodology. Often the symptoms of this failing are found in writings which include homilies, cliches and motherhood statements. Arguably (and unfortu- nately) much of Tom Peters’ recent published work falls into this category. TYPE TWO: the fallacy of what I will call intended and unintended association. In researching, writing and reading much of the

Strategic Change, August 1996

Dialogues in strategy 213

new strategy literature, it is tempting to look for analogies and unthinkingly see links or similarities from one circumstance (firm and/ or industry) to another. This failing is about the casual application of concepts, insights and experiences which are gained in one firm/ industry, to another firm/industry. By extension, authors often seem to act in complicit ways: they often fail to warn readers that they should apply concepts and techniques inappropriately; frequently authors seem to offer implicit encouragement to apply the ideas and experiences which have been gained from one particular organization/industry to another industry, usually without due regard to the business context, or the applicability of concepts/experiences outside the original case. As one example of this error, I have in mind the way that American authors have interpreted Japanese business strategy and sought (i) to derive meaningful insights, understandings and theory and (ii) (even worse) sought to suggest or (even worse) encourage nonjapanese firms to adopt Japanese business strategy without regard to the cultural contexts (see Thomas 1993, pp. 134-155). A more obvious example of the fallacy is the abuse of the case study method of teaching and learning. TYPE THREE: theory and process which bas potential to be abused and/or mislead. The third failing is the development and application of theory which is formulaic. This includes theory which is instantly attractive: common- sense ideas which appeal. This is theory which suggests strategic practice is easy: theory which encourages managers to follow the formulaic approach to strategic analysis, choice and implementation. Symptoms of this failing are theory which looks apt, and simple to adopt; theory which is attractive to the busy manager in search of a concept, technique or process which looks capable of delivering a quick fix.5

5J0hn Kay (1993, p. 364) denies the value of the military analogy underpinning much strategy literature, and makes the incisive point that ‘Success in business derives from adding value of your own, not diminishing that of your competitors, and it is based on distinctive capability, not destructive capacity.’

Other authors are more careful, warning readers against the misapplication of theory. As an example, see Champy (1995, chapter 1).

In itself, the claim that strategy suffers these methodological failings may be viewed as unimportant. Indeed, one might ignore the methodological issue exposed here, and point to strategic practice, possibly arguing that despite the aforementioned methodological failings, strategic management is now more ‘advanced’-more ‘professional’-than ever before.6 To adopt this approach, however, leads to the final methodological failing.’ TYPE FOUR: the fallacy that only Prediction’ counts. The fourth failing is to believe that only ‘prediction’ counts: that because strategic practice seems to benefit from the study of strategic theory and strategic thinking despite flawed methodology, one should ignore the flaws in the logical consistency of the theory (i.e. in its axioms), and/or ignore the flaws which emerge when trying to operationalize the concepts or underlying relationships. This is consistent with the view taken by the fundamentalists who support the hypotheticdeductive approach and consider a ‘good’ theory as one which is predictively very suggestive irrespective of the consistency of assumptions or the difficulties of operatio- nalizing any variables. To illustrate this failing, because I can predict that the price of a normal good will rise as a result of an increase in demand, I can (so the argument goes) ignore the realism or internal consistency of the underlying assumptions.8

From methodology to practice

Putting aside methodological issues, strategic practice seems to rely on the partial (i.e. biased and incomplete) adoption and application of an incoherent and incomplete collec- tion of concepts, techniques and approaches. My direct experience, and first- and second- hand casual observation of strategy making,

%ahdad and Hamel (1994) express a similar view. ’Mintzberg (1994b) implies that the net benefits of strategy theory and action are probably zero. *In Tony Watson’s (1994) colourful ethnographic study of ZCC, many managers could be diagnosed as suffering from this flaw.


214 P. Franklin

suggests that practice varies within companies and across industries, and over time. Some of this practice is professionalized (for example, the application of a full-blown SWOT or competitor analysis, prior to simulations and the manipulation of sophisticated forecasting models); often it is informal, quick and dirty with ‘insights’ and actions derived rapidly from intuitive judgements which go on to search for a data series which meets managers’ precise specifications.

But to make it clear again, I am not supporting one practice to the exclusion of the other; I am not implicitly criticizing one approach or the other. In my experience both approaches have value; both approaches can be considered to be more or less appropriate to the circumstances of their application.

‘Good’ strategy practice

The implication of my last assertion9 is that ‘good’ strategy practice is an art which requires a continuous (and value-adding) interaction between doing and strategy and learning from experience.

Strategy practice requires interaction between doing strategy and learning from

experience

To express this more precisely, I see ‘good’ strategy practice as being defined by the closeness of attention which managers give to four sequential conditions outlined here. CONDITION ONE: choice. Good strategy practice will be facilitated by the choice of appropriate concepts, techniques and models. This implies that ‘good’ strategy practice will be facilitated by managers having an (ideally) experiential and theoretical understanding of the strengths and limitations of particular

PI am using the word ‘assertion’ deliberately: i.e. it is not an hypothesis, as I do not aim to test the assertion!

techniques, and that as a consequence, inappropriate techniques will therefore not be used unthinkingly. CONDITION TWO: adoption and application. Once appropriate concepts, techniques and models are chosen, the second condition is the careful adoption and application of these noting how and to what extent the concepts, techniques and models ‘fit’ the perceived context. This condition implies that it is no good being choosy about the techniques and slopm about their application (which in all probability would subsequently cause ‘false’ or misleading results). The condition also implies the need for an intimacy (if not an identity) between those who are charged with perceiving the environment, and those who choose the techniques. CONDITION THREE: don’t be blinded by results. Don’t be blinded or bowled over by the spurious accuracy of precise results. As Brian Loasby (1976, p. 37) wrote 20 years ago: ‘The price of precision is error. . .’: unless one understands the limitations of the techniques and models, one cannot understand the boundaries and limitations of any results. CONDITION FOUR: use one’s developed sense of judgement. The fourth condition is that analytical results should be tempered by the application of managers’ intellect, knowledge and experience, forged to help managers make judgements expressed in the context of the organization’s structure and culture, including the prospective benefits versus any hurdle conditions.10

FROM PRACTICE TO LEARNING

Expressed with the aforementioned four conditions, the strategic process involves practice. Ideally strategic practice produces learning. Strategic practice gives strategic managers” the opportunity to learn from experience.

“Mintzberg (1995) expresses this more fully in a typically trenchant statement. “Both Watson (1994) and Chattell (1995) share much the same view that all managers are (or need to act as if they were) ‘strategic’ managers.



Ideally strategic practice produces learning

Whether practice actually leads to learning, however, will inevitably depend on the manager’s (instinctive or acquired) powers of learning, as well as the form and degree of encouragement to learn which is espoused and levered by the organization. Indeed, as we shall argue, strategic practice (and hence strategic planning) is an important, and vital source of organizational learning. Citing Mintzberg (1994a, p. 11 1) in support of this contention:

. . . strategy making as a learning process can proceed in the other direction too. We think in order to act, to be sure, but we also act in order to think. We try things, and those experiments that work converge gradually into viable patterns that become strategies. This is the very essence of strategy as a learning process.

Like other management activities, strategic practice has the potential to facilitate learning. Unlike many other activities however, strategic practice gives managers the opportunity to think, act and learn in an holistic sense. Whether initiated ‘top down’ or ‘bottom-up’, strategic practice requires managers to look beyond their own functional chimneys and acknowledge their interdependence both with one another and within the characteristics of the system as a whole.12 But whether learning

‘ m e movement towards alternative organizational structures-horizontal organizations, business processed organizations, crossfunctional and diagonal teamworking can be at least partly explained by the desire to look for holistic approaches to decision making. ‘To reinvent their companies, American managers must throw out their old notions about how businesses should be organised and run. They must abandon the organizational and operational principles and procedures they are now using and create entirely new ones.’ (Hammer and Champy 1993, p. 1). Chattell (1995, p. 4) makes a similar point. ‘The complex question of understanding the nature of tomorrow’s successful organizations requires us to look behind and beyond our preoccupations with the structures, parts and mechanisms, and with our apparent confinements

takes place at all, may be thought to depend on two requirements.13 REQUIREMEhT ONE: individuals have con- fidence and competence (ability) in Suva- cing their learning. This requirement involves managers

(i) becoming aware that their day-today experiences provide a rich source of knowledge and learning and having some basic competence in the art of learning itself: i.e being confident and competent to surface and access their learning in a constructive and (ideally) coherent way and being willing to adopt the fruits of their learning as ‘knowledge’ and, (as appre priate) apply these fruits to their practice of strategy.

(ii)

(iii)

REQ UIREMENT TWO: encouragement: insti- tutionalized encouragement for managers to learn from their experiences (including practice and dialogue).

For organizational learning to take place there is a third requirement. REQUIREMENT THREE: organizational open- ess: The encouragement of managers, by the organization, to learn from their individual, joint or shared experiences in and out of the workplace. This requirement may need to be accompanied by a commitment to implement subtle and effective structures and processes designed to surface and embed an organization’s learning over time.’*

within them. It calls for a new and holistic perspective on the intellectual, conceptual, behavioural, psyche logical, scientific and social cocktail required for organizations to generate the dynamic behaviours required to prosper in turbulent conditions-conditions which have gone well beyond the operating limits of traditional functional organizations . . .’. I3Handy (1993a, p.238) makes this point slightly differently and at greater length. ‘*Intuitively I agree with Peter Hawkins (1 994) who argues that ‘organisational learning is more than the sum of the individual learning within the company’. I would also wish to repeat Peter Senge’s (1990, p. 3) definition of a learning organization as one where ‘people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.’


216 P. Franklin

Planning and organizational learning

According to some authors the strategy process provides organizations with an important source of organizational learning. Although these claims are rather patchy, poorly evidenced and diffused in the literature, there appears to be agreement that the planning process in particular provides poten- tially valuable learning opportunities for (people in) organizations.

On the basis of the literature opportunities for organizational learning through planning can be thought to exist in four domains:

the discovery, investigation and analysis of the environment; using alternative business scenarios to surface assumptions about the future business contexts and to unfreeze assumptions about the future; communication of the business plan and opportunities for people to learn, understand and commit to the (jointly developed?) vision and goals of the organization; the learning which stems from the match (and mismatch) between business goals and actual outcomes.

Concentrating on this last point Argyris (1994, chapters 1 and 7), Senge,l5 Peters16 and others are emphatic about the value of potential learning which flows from the differences between targets and outcomes. They argue that the inevitable gap between the initial targets and final outcomes of any plan give managers a unique opportunity to query the differences and learn why, and subsequently go on to deduce how the gap might be improved next time.

I5Senge (1990, p. 188) writes: ‘we think of planning as learning and of corporate planning as institutional learning’. I6In his unique style Peters, (1994, p. 7) writes: ‘When, oh when, will we learn to honor error? To understand that goofs are the only way to step forward, that really big goofs are the only way to leap forward?’

This essentially pragmatic and behavioural approach to learning is, in Chris Argyris language, a form of ‘single loop learning’. This is expressed in Figure 1.

While the opportunity to practice single- loop learning through planning is important, there is a real possibility that this interpreta- tion of organizational learning causes a form of tunnel vision which diverts managers away from what I take to be the true strategic issues of seeking long-term survival by a continuous attention to defining, implementing and mon- itoring judgements and actions concerning ‘purpose’, ‘values’, ‘position’ and so on.

To be sure the concept of organizational survival is ambiguous. Certainly we can note that the legal entity will cease to exist on acquisition or insolvency. But if an organization is also defined as a social and behavioural entity, with people joining and leaving that entity over time in parallel with changing product and service portfolios designed to ensure the organization’s longevity, then the concept of organizational ‘survival’ takes on a different meaning.

At least partial support for my hypothesis can be found in the work published by Arie P. de Geus (1988). de Geus tells of research undertaken by Shell. Summarizing these findings he notes:

‘a full one-third of the Fortune ‘500’ industrial listed in 1980 had vanished by 1983’ only 40 companies can be considered to have existed over the ‘long term’; (i.e. between 100 and 700 years), these being companies which have ‘as their main driving forces their own survival and the development of their potential’ (de Geus, 1995, p. 29). and of these 40 successful companies, using de Geus’s language, ‘their history shows that these companies are in business, any business, so long as it helps them to continue being in a viable work community.’

In de Geus’s thinking, the longevity of these successful organizations can be explained in


Dialogues in strategy 21 7

Governing Variables -

Fig. 1. Single- and double-loop learning.

COnseqUenCeS Mismatch w

part by their ability to learn from the past: being adaptable, thoughtful and imaginative about the future. To borrow two of his metaphors: successful organizations behave holistically, behaving like a ‘living system’ or a ‘living being’ (de Geus, 1995, pp. 28 and 29).

Longevity of successful organizations can be

explained by their ability to learn from the past

Taking these metaphors literally, de Geus sees links between individual and organizational learning occurring through the planning process. de Geus (1988, p. 71) writes:

The only relevant learning in the company is the learning done by those who have the power to act.. . So the real purpose of effective planning is not to make plans but to change the microcosm, the mental models that these decision makers carry in their heads.

Here de Gem captures the idea of ‘double- loop’ learning by encouraging readers (individuals and organizations) to review the variables (assumptions, models and prejudices) which inform and underpin judgements, decisions and actions. His thinking closely resembles that of Peter Senge, who

encourages learning organizations to engage in dialogue, and to surface assumptions and mental models about the worldsl7 that managers (singly, jointly and in teams) create and occupy.

Strategy as a means to the fiture

If we disassemble the previous argument, we can restate two key issues concerning the study and practice of strategy:

1. that strategic practice is informed by managers’ perceptions of reality. Strategic practice is affected by managers’ mental models, or mental maps, which cause them to diagnose, prognosticate and act as if their perceptions were scientifically founded.’*

”The concept of ‘worlds’ is used here as shorthand to indicate something about individuals’ perceptions of the worlds which they occupy, and in this process of perceiving having a view about (i) their current and desired future positions in their worlds as well as (ii) how they might seek to influence worlds (universes or environments) which they occupy to their own benefit. ’*Rosabeth Moss Kanter, (1994, p. 281) makes a similar point writing about organizational change. ‘Organi- sational change is stimulated not by pressures from the environment, resulting in a buildup of problems triggering automatic response, but by the perceptions of that environment and those pressures held by key actors. Organizations may not respond to environments so much as ‘enact’ them-create them by the choice to selectively define certain things as important.’


218 P. Franklin

2. that the purposeful or deliberate adoption of a strategic approach to management is inherently tied up with developing visions about the future which others (i.e. those managers who are outside the strategy formulation process) will be expected to implement.

Strategic practice is informed by managers’ perceptions of

reality

This focus on managers’ visions about the future is reflected in Hamel and Prahalad’s (1994) idea of strategic intent outlined first in the Harvard Business Review and subsequently in their book Competing for the Future.

To paraphrase their important contribution, Hamel and Prahalad (1994, p.129) define three characteristics-three requirements of strategic intent:

a sense of destiny: it must encourage emotional allegiance-something which employees can engage with and believe worthwhile; a sense of direction: it must imply a competitively unique point of view about the future; a sense of discovery: it must demonstrate a sense of exploring new competitive territory-an exciting spectacle of a new destination.

‘Strategic intent is our term for . . . an animating dream.’ (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994 p. 129.)

Both the explicit and the implied invocation here is to emote: to express a strategic intent which excites people to commit to the strategic intent as if it were their own expression of their own aspirations of their own organization.

In this conception of strategy, the pursuit of strategic intent represents an idealized expression of strategic formulation and implementation. In this conception there are no doubters: the intent is feasible, the goal is intuitively understandable, success can be easily charted and people happily commit to the goal (and the implied ethics of ‘beating’ the competition). l9

This conception of strategy also requires organizational learning. Adopting Peter Senge’s language for a moment, organizations which are to be successful in pursuing strategic intent must be ones which are open to dialogue; that is, open to the value of sharing ‘mental models’ about the world, and keen to build ‘shared vision’.

The learning organization= creating the future . . . This idealized view characterizes the (learning) organization as a tightly knit community which is intent on creating for all a future which has emerged from continuous dialogue among its mernbers.*O

As members join and leave the community, we can imagine the organization’s view of the future will hardly change: the purpose, beliefs and rules of the organization are inherited and adopted by the newcomers; those leaving the community endow these lifelong values in perpetuity.

More importantly, the continued exploita- tion of the learning process is assumed. Here, in real time, individuals (singly and in teams) make continuous assessments of the adequacy (measured by the degree of stretch as well as the power to emote) of the firm’s strategic intent and the associated implementation plan.

I9I am tempted here to repeat Charles Handy’s parody about competition. Handy (1994, p. 1 1 ) writes: ‘Only one firm can be the industry leader, only one country top economically, there are always richer or more successful neighbours to compare ourselves with. Competiton is healthy, maybe even essential, but there has to be more to Life than winning or we should nearly all be losers.’ *’?his is consistent with Thomas’s (1993, p. 37) idea of the ‘objectively rational, unitary ends’ approach to management.



In this vision, continuous (if individually minor, discrete and short-term) changes are made to targets and processes; each ideally consistent with the others; all ideally consistent with the binding intent.

In this idealized vision organizations are adaptive organizations constantly fine tuning the objectives, targets and processes which characterize their strategy. These are also future-looking learning communities which are ‘pulled together’ and ‘pulled along’ (Watson, 1986, p.41) by a shared purpose and by coherent systemic (institution-wide) processes. In this vision strategic practice provides an ideal medium for organizational learning: in this vision organizational learning taps and enhances individuals’ energy in the pursuit of intent and provides an opportunity for individuals to continue to have a place in the ‘dominant coalition’ which exists over the long run.

Learning to unlearn

Attractive as these ideas are, no one claims them to be easy to adopt. On the contrary, Senge claims that the adoption of these behaviours is a ‘lifelong’ matter, where individuals, singly, jointly and in teams learn to think together, surface, share and question assumptions, and develop shared pictures of the future.

Linking these ideas to Hamel and Prahalad’s thinking, some part of the process will involve managers ‘unlearning’. Hamel and Prahalad (1994, p. 61) assert:

What prevents companies from creating the future is an installed base of thinking-the unquestioned conventions, the myopic view of opportunities and threats, and the unchallenged precedents that comprise the existing managerial frame.21

~~

*lIncidentally, but importantly, critical theory encourages social scientists to evaluate critically ‘the neopositivistic and technicist understandings’ which have dominated much of management studies (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992, p 15).

As a consequence, Hamel and Prahalad argue that managers must learn to unlearn. The managers of successful companies must learn to abandon ‘habits that hinder future success’ and (moving to different philosophical language) must learn to be aware of and critical about the existing paradigms which govern the way that they view tomorrow’s organization. Hence, as Alf Chattell (1995, p. 7) writes, they must ‘reinvent’, ‘innovate’, and ‘change the rules of the game’, so as to be ‘in the forefront of making the future happen.’

Managers must learn to unlearn

Concluding remarks: from pessimism to optimisim

This paper began with a quotation from Charles Handy’s recent book, The Empty Raincoat, a frank and sometimes pessimistic view of the way that individuals’ (and organizations’) previous experiences can be exploited in turbulent chaotic times.

Other writers, such as Tom Peters (1987), Hamel and Prahalad (1994), Hammer and Champy (1993), Champy (19951, Hammer (1995) and Handy (1992), have all sought to confront the problem as to how turbulence, change and uncertainty can best be managed. Whilst each has proposed a different a p proach-a different solution-there is enough commonality to suggest that the theory and practice of (strategic) management are witnes- sing a significant paradigm change.

To oversimplify for a moment, this paradigm change takes account of every aspect of management. Evidenced in a number of writings, new organizational structures are being proposed and implemented (Ostroff and Smith, 1992); (Hammer and Champy, 1993); greater attention to employees’ spiritual needs is being advocated (Chattell, 1995, chapter 9); empowerment within cross-functional multidisciplinary ‘diagonal’ teams is


220 P. Franklin

being encouraged (Peters, 1993); new forms of ownership are being proposed (Handy, 1991); and even the very meaning of capital- ism is being reevaluated (Handy, 1993b).22

This very debate-this very dialogue-is evidence of continuing progress away from the scientific management approach associated with F. W. Taylor (1947), and evidence of the shift away from a largely deterministic view of the world borrowed and developed from the microeconomics and industrial economics of the early 1950~.~3

If the development of the strategic theory itself is to take some of its own medicine, it needs to ‘abandon’ some of its restraining assumptions and prejudices24 and shift from an undue reliance on a formulaic view of the world25 into one which focuses on the ‘inside- out’ behavioural process which puts people first (as clients) and constructs systems second (as intelligent servers). All of this speaks of a renaissance: a shift

from a machine-industry paradigm into a social and behavioural one where the process of shared strategic thinking is deemed to be an essential component of the strategic practice .26

On this basis it is both possible and sensible to become optimistic about the future of strategic thinking, theory and practice. In the spirit of this paper, it is sensible if not obligatory for readers to participate in, and

22See Alf Chattell (1995, p. 199) who writes: ‘There is a real opportunity in close prospect where technology and new concepts of organization and management can redefine the realistic missions of organizations in terms which until recently might have seemed esoteric and perhaps mystical. Organizational missions which are concerned with giving wings to the human spirit, will at some not too distant point, be the only ones which make sense. ’ 23Not being meant as a criticism, much of the thinking and analysis contained in Porter (1985) is based on the traditions and paradigms of early industrial economics. For early and definitive views of the nature and boundaries of industrial economics see Andrews, 1951; 1952; Andrews and Brunner, 1975; Andrews, 1949. 2 4 D ~ ~ k e r ‘Every organisation has to prepare for the abandonment of everything it does.’ 25Mintzberg (1994b) classifies this as the ‘Core “Design School” Model’. ’qwo recent books take this view further: Garratt, 1995; Cunningham, 1995.

encourage the dialogue and help us jointly to improve all three.

It is both possible and sensible to become optimistic about the future of strategic thinking, theory and practice

Autobiographical note

Peter Franklin is Bass Leisure Dean of Nottingham Business School and Professor of Business and Management Education. He acts as consultant to a number of organizations and has published in a number of journals including the Journal of Industrial Econom- ics, the Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, the Journal of Risk and Insur- ance and the Geneva Papers in Risk and Insurance. Professor Franklin takes a special interest in the intricate and important interrelationships between education and industry, and he is currently researching the intricate relationships between ‘strategy’ and ‘organizational learning’ in medium and large organizations.

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