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JO H N DEWEY'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THEREFLEX-ARC CONCEPT AND ITS RELEVANCE

FOR BOWLBY'S ATTACHMENT THEORY

Gert J. J. Biesta 1 , Siebren Miedemaand Marinus H. van IJzendoorn

SUMMARY: In "The Reflex Are Concept in Psychology"(1986), John Deweygives a reconstruct ionof the reflex arc concept which forms the starting pointof a 'transactional paradigm' which is fundamenta lfor all aspects of Dewey'swork. In this article w e Star twith a reconstructionof Dewey's paradigm. Nextw e show tha t Bowlby's a t ta chm enttheory fits very well withinsuch a transac-tional paradigm because it is based on ethology. A closer analysis, however,

shows tha t the place of the mental in attachment theory is notcompletelyconsistent with the evolutionary assumptions of the transactional paradigm,and it issuggcsted tha t thisproblem can be solved from a Deweyan perspective.

Introduction

In 1896 John Dewey's "The ReflexArc Concept in Psychology" waspublished (PsychologicalReview, 3, July 1896, 357-370; EWS -lOg 2). Thisarticle has not only been considered a crucial S tep in the development of

Dewey's t h ink ing (cf. Bernstein, 1966, p. 15; H ah n, 1969, p. 27; Smi th ,1973,p. 122; S lccpcr, 1986, p. 21; Alexander, 1987, p. 41), but also an im portant s tepin the developmentof psychology (cf. Langfeld, 1943;Murphy, 1961, p. 27,29;McKenzie, 1975, p. xiv-xv). In this article Dewey criticizes the way thephysiologicalidea of the reflex arc is used in psychology. The alternative viewof behavior and the explanat ionfor behavior that Dewey develops,is almostunanimouslyconsidered to be the starting point for functionalism in psychol-ogy (cf. Titchener, 1898, p. 451; Langfeld, 1943,p. 148; Flgel, 1964, p. 194;Bernstein, 1966, p. 15; Phillips, 1971, p. 566; Eisenga, 1973,p. 102; Verbeek,

1977, p. 141; Lcahey, 1987, p. 270-271).W e shall draw on this article to introduce Dewey's position and give an

evaluation of its topicality. We shall then confrontDewey's ideas w ith someaspects of John Bowlby's atta ch m en t theory. It shouldbecome apparent thatDewey has formulated the parad igm w ithin which attachm ent theory can beplaced. Lookingat attachm ent theoryfrom a Deweyan perspective enables

Research fo r this article by the first author is supported by a grant from the Nethcrlands

Organizationof Scientific Research(N.W.O.).Thc completeworksof John Dewey arepublishedby S outhernIllinois UniversityPress,and arediivided into The Early Works (1882-1898), The Middle Works (1899-1924), and The Lateru/^ri-o / i o - > < ;- ,,,,, , rP n.fcrrrMt n s F.W. MW or LW followcd by a page numbcr.

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, mni:) 111 Aiicuicueai l :yi:iiuiujy ll

one to i nd ica tewhich e lements in thetheore t ica lf r amew o r k o f a t ta ch m en ttheory need f u r the r elaborat ion an d how th is mightbest be approached.

The Ref lex Are Concept in Psychology and Dewey's Critique

B y thc end of the n ineteenthCenturypsychologistswere conv incedt h a t

it was poss ib le to overcome the du al is t ic presuppos t ions of assoc ia t ionispsychology. Physiologyhad provided thestructural u n i t of a f f e r e n t nervcs ,c e n t r a ln e r v o u sSysteman d e f f e r e n tnerves .Psychologis ts t ransposed thisu n i tofstructure in to a u n i t oifitnction of per iphera l S t im ulu s , c en tra l process in gan d mo t o r response. This' reflexarc ' mode lwas though tsu ff i c i e n tto exp lainh u m a n behavior (cf.Smi th , 1973). The model resolvedboth the m a t t c r - f o r mdua l i sm ( 'Sensat ion 'an d 'idea') of associat ion is t psychology(by locat ingsen-s a t i o n san d ideas in one process) ,and the body-mindd u a l i s m(by t a k i n g the

m i n d to be the processes in the b ra in ) . H u m an behav io r cou ld now bcex p l a i n edf rom the physical ,a n a t o m i c a ls t r u c tu r e w h ichm e a n t t h a t n o essen-t i a l d i s t inc t ion between a n i m a l an d h u m a n behavior was to bcmad e . T hemodel was, therefore,in ag r eemen t w i ththe theory of ev o lu t i o n .

In h is ar t ic le Deweyexpressesthe opmion tha t by u s i n gthe idea of theref lexar c concep t in psychology " the pr incip lesof exp lana t ionan d class i f ica-t ion w h i c hthe reflexa r c idea h as replaced (...) a r e n o tsu ff i c i e n t l yd i sp laced"(EW5:96). A c c o r d i n gto Dewey "(t)he older du a l i sm be tween Sen sa tionan didea is rcpeated in thc cur ren t dua l i smof per iphera lan d centra l s t ructuresan d f u n c t i o n s ;the o ldc r dua l i smof body an d s o u l f i n d sa d i s t i n c techo in thec u r r e n td u a l i s m between St imu lu san d response." (EW5:96). This iscausedby thc f ac t t h a t the s en s o r i - mo to r c i r cu i tor System is in te rp re ted f rom" p rc c o n c e i v e dan d p r e fo r m ula ted ideas o f r ig id d i s t in c t ion s between sen sa -t ions , t h o u g h t s an d ac ts ."(EW5:97). As a r esu l tpsychologicaltheory-bui ld-ing Star t sw i t h "dis jomtcd p a r t s " a n d mu s t t h en a t t emp tto expla in how thcsepara te pa r t s wor k toge theror i n t e r ac t . I n Dewey's o p in i on a t tc m p t stoexp la in th c i n t e r ac t i o ne i ther byi n t r o d u c i n gan "ex t ra -exper imen ta lsoul" orby g i v i n gan ex p l an a t i o n in te rms of" mech an i ca lp u s h a n dp u l l " (EW5:100),m u s t be re fu ted b c c a u s ethey c o n t r a d i c tthe b io log ica l - evo lu t iona rypoints ofd e p a r t u r ew h i c h f o r m th e bas ic as su m pt ion s bo thof physio log ic a lpsychologyan d of Dewey h i m s e l f .3

Becausc the theory o f evo lu t ion" i n c l u d e ( s )m a n u n d e r t h es a m eg c n c r a l i / a t i o nw i t h o th c r f a c t sof n a t u r e "(EW1:210), an o n to lo g ica l d u a l i s mt h a t p r c s u p p o s estw o s u b s t a n c c s( m i n d an d body) is imposs ib lc . Th is mc an s

A l t h o u g h f u n c t i o n a l i s mc an bet t e r b e v i c w c ds a l i n c o f rcasoning tha n a real schoolof though l( s c e , c g , I x M h e y,1987, p 278, Verbcek, 1977,p 126, Eisenga, 1973,p 1 0 1 ) ,o n eo f t h ces s cn l i a lchar

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lueury

that an "extra-experimental soul" does not fit into a physiologically basedpsychological theory .

Dewey also rejects the idea of "mechanical push and pull," because itpresupposes an organism a t rest tha tcan only be activated byStimulifrom thecnvironment. This notion of an isolated, autonomous organism is also con-tradictory to the theory of evolution. "The ideaof environment is a necessityto the idea of organisms,and with the conception of environment comes theimpossibility of considering psychical life s an individual, isolated thingdeveloping in a vacuum." (EW1:56). Organism and environment are notfrom the outset two autonomous entities. "Only by analysis and selectiveabstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two factors, onecalled organism and the other, environment." (LW5:220). This implies thatthe organism cannot be considered s an organism-at-rest, havinga complete-ly rested, neutraland unpreoccupied Status. "(T)he state of the organism isone ofaction which is continuous" (LW5:223). It is against this backgroun dthat Dewey reconstructs thereflex arc concept.

Co-ordination

An adeq uate psychologicaluse of the reflex arc idea shou ldnot Startwithdisjointed parts, but has to begin with an organic unity. "What is wanted isthat sensory Stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall beviewed ... s divisions of labor, fun ctioning factors, w ithinthe single concretewhole, now designated the reflex arc" (EW5:97). "The process all the way

around is assumed to be the uni t" Dewey writes (in a letter to Angell; seeCoughlan, 1975, p. 139). According to Dewey "this reality m ay most con-vcnientlybe term ed co-o rdin ation ." (EW5:97).

Dewey gives a re interpre ta t ionof "the famil ir child-candle instance"from James' Principles ofPsychology to demonstrate how he is using the termco-ordination. "The ordinary Interpreta tion wouldsay the Sensationof lightis th e St imulusto the gra spi ng s a response, the bu rn resulting is aStimulusto withdrawing th e hand s response and soon." (EW5:97). But, from apsychological point of view, this analysisis inadequate. "Upon analysis,w ef i n d t ha t w e begin not with a sensory Stimulus, but with a sensori-motorco-ordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certainsense it is the move-ment of body, head and eye muscles determiningth e quality of wha t iscxperienced. Inother words,th e real beginningis with the act of seeing; it islooking,and not a Sensationof ligh t." (EW 5:97). On the basis of this analysisDewey concludes tha t"both Sensationand movement lie inside, not outsidethe act" (EW5:98). Dewey is also usin g the term co-ordin ation in a m orecncompassingsense. With the stim ulus-response analy sis the w holeprocessof seeing lig ht reaching for it burning the hand withdrawingth e hand,can only be ch ara cteriz ed s "the repla cing of one sort of experience byanothcr" (EW5:99). O nlya fragmentary account of the state of affairs can be

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; _ ncu -.-

(EW5:314). So Dewey g ivcst h o u g h t a func t i on in s i t u a t i o n sin w h i c h thec o n t i n u i t yof act ion is at r i sk ,in those s i tua t ions inw h i c h i t is no tclear " wh a tk ind of responsesth e o rg a n i s msha l l m a k e " (Dewey, 1938, p. 107).

Dewey's Transactional Paradigm

Dewey typif ies h u m a n behav io rs a biological-physiological process of

co-ordination,a con t inu ingattunement of organism and environment to eachother s a result of w hichboth the organism and the environment change inordcr to realise a Situat ion of optimal adaptation. The word Optimal' mightsuggest that Dewey holds tha t it is possible to state which adaptation isabsolutelyoptimal. Dewey, however,keeps tel l ingus that both organism andenvironment change. So there cannot be one state of the organism thatwillalways guarantee an o p t im a l 'fit'. The activities of the organism bring aboutchanges in the env ironm ent wh ich in turncan distu rb the state of equilib riumreached. Optimal' m u s t be seen s strictly situation al. In a t tachmen t theory

a s imilar idea can be found in Hinde, who suggests that there is a rnge ofbehavioral stratcgiesfor adap t ingto different niches (cf. Hin de,1982b).

According to Dewey, the process of co-ordination becomes increasinglycomplcx and encompassing. M ental functionsoriginale wiihin this processand f u l f i la function in the increasing ref inementof the ever more complexand encompassing processes of co-ordination. Deweydoes not place themental alongside the physical (s had been the case in psychology beforeDewey) but neither does he deny the mental (s would become the case inpsychologyafter Dewey). Dewey'sfunctionalism does not stop at jus t indicat-ing the funct ion of t h ink ingin the process of (evolutionary)adapta t ion (a sortof funct ional ism that, e.g., can be found in Titchener, 1898). Dewey showsthat t h ink ing is one of the functions o f the organism; a function that hasdeveloped in the ongoingprocess of'interaction' ju s t s, for exam ple, can besaid of the digestiveSystem.

W hile psychology (and p hiloso phy ) before Dewey had draw n heavily onconcepts suchs ' m i n d ' and 'consciousness', the in t roduc t ionof evolutionaryideas leads to a shif t of a t ten t ionfrom 'mind' to the interaction of organism

and environment . "Theold centerwas

m in d ...The new

centeris

indef in i teinteract ions ..." is Dewey's summary of this 'Copernican Revolution' (cf.LW4:232).

As we have citcd above: "Only by analysisand selcctive abstractioncanwe differentiate the ac tua l occurrence in to tw o faclors, one called the or-ganism and the othcr, env ironm ent." (LW5:220). Bccause of the fact that thetcrm ' in teract ion ' imp l ics tw o separate entitites, Dewey,in his later works,prcfers to use the tcrm ' t ransact ion 'to denote the ini t ial totali tywith in which ,from a certain perspcctivcand forcertain reasons, organismand environment

can be dist inguishcd (cf. Dew ey & Bentley, 1960, p. 122-124).

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, 216 Kecent Trends in l heoreticai rsycnoiugy n

Bowlby's Attachment Theory: 'Behavior Systems' and 'ControlTheory'

Bowlby'sattachment theory is an ethological theory (Bowlby, 1988, p. 1)based upon "analytical biology and control theory, which together haveelucidated the basic principl es that unde rlie adaptive ,goal-directed behavior"

(Bowlby, 1982, p. 37). Eth ology dep artsfrom the p rinciples ofevolutionarytheory. Bowlbypraises ethology for not only studying the morphological andphysiological characteristics of animals from the Darwinian framework ofadaptation-for-survival,but also their 'behavioral equ ipm ent' (cf. Bowlby,1982, p. 54-55).

O ne of thecentral concepts in Bowlby's theory is the ethological concept'behavior System'. A behavior Systemis a System postulated to explain be-havior by th ink ing of more complex behavior s a compilation of, andcooperation between, more simple behaviors. The concept "is used in anexplanatory sense to refer to Systems postulated s controlling behavior"(Hinde, 1982b, p. 62). W ith the h elp of this concept, explanations of behavio rare given in which there are "lower-level Systems controllin g behavioralacts,""control Systems postulated to explain interrelations between the severaltypes of behavior" and "higher-order control Systems" (Hinde, 1982b, p. 66).Bowlby elaborates on this (hierarchically ordered) classification of behaviorand behavior Systems by differentiating (in increasing order of complexity)"rcflexes," "fixed action patterns" and behavior in which "a fixed action

pat tcrn is combined with a s imple sequence that is dependent on feedbackfrom the en vi ron m en t" (Bow lby, 1982,p. 67). Bowlby notes tha t"just s thercare many different types of behavioral Systemsso there are a number ofdiffcrent ways in w hich their activitiescan be co-ordinated" (Bowlby, 1982,p. 74). V ariou s m ore or less'elementary' behav ioral acts areobserved and arethcn placcd in a coherent System. This systematization is based on thefunction that more elem entary behavior perform sin reachinga certain goal,and providcs the means by w hich ethology tries toexplain behavior.

While in the m ore elementary'behavior Systems',patterns of behaviorare such that thcy go 'straight for the goal', in the case of more complexbehaviors (andthe corresponding more complex behavior Systems) principlesof 'control theory' are introduced. The main concepts of control theory are'setting', 'set-goal' and 'feedback' (Bowlby, 1982, p. 43). In the case of, forexample, a the rmos ta tth e sct-goal is keeping th e temperature at a certainIcvel and the set t ing is the actual tem perature thatis wanted. While in thecase of a thermostat the 'setting' has to be instituted by a human bcing, it isalso possible to envisage a System w hichreccives its setting from anothcr

System. Bowlby gives the example of au tomat ic anti-aircraft guns whichrcccive their Informat ion from a rad ar-s crecn (cf. Bow lby, 1982,p. 44). It isBowlby's opinion that "this typeof System is rcplicated in living organisms"(Bowlby, 1982, p. 44). W hich behavior system m ustbe activatcd in w hat way,

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218 Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology11

So in Bowlby's elaboration of attachment theory two cognitive abilitiesare postulated: "(a) a means of receiving andstoring instructions regardingth e set-goal, and (b) a means of comparing th e effects of performance withinstruction and changing performanceof it" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 70).

DiscussionA comparisonof Dewey's ideas w ith attachm ent theory shows tha t both

depart from evolutionary theory. In both cases we also find a similarstrategyfor the explanation of behavior: complexbehavior is explained by seeing it sa co-ordinated composition of more elementary behavior, and elementarybehavior is in the end viewed s biological-physiological. From thisw e canconclude tha t the 'paradigm' for ex plainin g behavior Dewey form ulatedaround th e tu rn of the Century has, in the last tw o or thrcedecades, led to a

flourishing research-program, especially since the introduction of ethologyinto psychology.

Dewey's significance liesin the fact that he has shown thatan elaborationof (m onistic) evol utionary principlcs neednot imply tha t there is no place formenta l ' faculties' in the explanationof hum an behavior. O n thecontrary: themental mustbe considered s real s th e material (the physiological). Thereis no argument for viewing certain 'results' of the proccss of evolutionarydevclopment(s, e.g., th e mental , but also language and cul turc ) s havinga

lower Statusor s being Icss relevantto the process of adaptat ion and changethan othcr 'results' (s,e.g., reflexes or the digestive S ystem).

When w e apply Dewey's elaborationof the evolutionary principlcstoa t t achment theory, we are led to theconclusion that th e latter is unclear onth e issue of the Status of the mental. Whilst attachment theoryconsidcrs th ephysiological-biologicallevel to be real, it is often the case that s soon smenta l functions are introduccdin ex plainin g behav ior, recourseis made tothe levcl of explanation. Ethology wantsto explain behavior by postulatingbehavior Systems. Hindc dcscribes an attachment behavior System s "aSystem postulated s controlling the scveral types of attachment behavior"(Hinde, 1982b, p. 64). Tb bc able to explain more 'complex' behavior, theprinciples of control theoryare applied. Exactlyat the point at which thoseprinciplcs are in troduccd,menta l capacitiesarcpresupposed in order to arr iveat an adequatcexplanat ion .

In atta ch m ent theory, thcn, thereis a differcncc betwcen th e ways inwhich the physiological and the mental level are discussed. This diffcrcncecan be partly traccd to a diffcren cc betwecn descriptionand explanation. But

In Iheorclical psychology there is also a reassessmcnt of Dewey's ideas. See, for cxample,Natsoulas (1983) wh o discusses the way inwhich the concepls 'conscious' and 'consciousness'should be used an d clahoratescxplicillyon ideas Dewcy formula tcds early s 1906 (see Dewey,1906).

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Dewey and Attachment Theory

besides the fact that, from a philosophicalpoint of view, the validityof such arigid distinction between description and (theoretical) explanation can bequestioned,Dewey has shown us tha t in thiscase there is no need to mak e anysuch distinc tion. Moreover, any such distinction is contrary to the evolution-ary principles subscribedto by at tachment theory.

We conclude that further research needs to be done into the ways in

which the m ental is used in attach m ent theory. We think th at a Deweyanperspective might be helpful in re alizing a more adequate conceptualizationof the mental. A reconceptualization is not only necessary for theoreticalreasons, tha t is, to get a theory that is consistent with its basic evolutionaryassumptions. But also, to the extent to which attachment theory ascribestomentalcapacitics a directinfluenceon behavior, a more a deq uate an d consis-tent way ofviewing these capacities can contri bute to thepractical relevanceof attachment theory.

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