POLITICAL CEOGRAPHY, Vol. 13, No. 3, May 1~4,290-295

Book reviews

Fax& Europe: The R&e of Racks and Xenophobia, G. Ford (ed.), Pluto Press, London, UK/Boulder, CO, 1992.

Tz3@ ei??-mKan ~~~~~o~ of 19a9: causes & Conseqzcences, G.-J. GIaef3ner and 1. Wallace, (eds), Berg, C&ford, 1992.

Developments in C&mm Politics, G. Smith, W. E. Patterson, P. H. Merkl and S. Padgett, Macmillan, London, 1992.

With the possible exception of the civil war in the Balkans, the reunification of Germany remains the most dramatic symbol of Central Europe’s geopolitical transformation in the wake of the Soviet decline and collapse. It was in Germany, after all, that the division of the Continent into two mutually hostile blocs was most palpable-a wall literally split the country into two pieces-and the conse- quences of revived German power remain the most important variable for the region’s future. Now that the initial flag-waving euphoria has subsided, Germans themselves and uneasy observers in other parts of Europe have tried to come to terms with the difficult questions raised by the events of the annus mimbilis of 1989-90: why did the old German Democratic Republic vanish with scarcely a whimper? What political and economic changes will arise from the new political geography of Centraf Europe? Why have racist political movements gathered momentum in Europe since German re-unification? Answers to these questions are suggested, generally with insight and good judgment, in the two vofumes of essays and the published report on Eumpean racism here considered. Even more i~npo~ntly, these works will help scholars to discern the contours of an emerging new relationship between politics and geography in Central Europe, a rela- tionship in which a new regionalism may supplant the bipolarity of the Cold War system.

The recent outbreak of deadly xenophobic violence in Germany is the most spectacular expression of the dislocation caused by dramatic political change in the region, but such viofence has to be understood against the background of the East German collapse which culminated in the reunification of the two Germanys. ?%e German Revolution of 1989 represents a valuable contribution to such an unders~ding. Events in eastern Germany were the driving force behind unification, as the books editors correctiy point out-German unity was achieved ‘with- out the assistance of its western part’, they argue-and the essays collected in this volume provide valuable insight into the sources of the GDR’s absorption into the Federal Republic (GlaeiSner and Wallace, 1992: x). The authors of the 11 essays examine the collapse of the GDR from the perspective of several disciplines-political science, sociology, German studies, history and others-but again and again they cite the structural defects of East German socialism as the ultimate source of the regime’s ‘implo- sion’. The pervasive bureaucracy which ran the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and through it the state, stultified individual creativity and posed an ~~u~oun~bie obstacie to needed reforms. As Gert-joachim GlaeEner explains in a perceptive essay on the GDR’s political structures, ‘The key fact that society and political life were wholly subordinate to the Party precluded any successful process of modernisation or adaptation and resulted ultimately in the collapse of the old system’ (1992: 6). This is also one of the key points which emerges from the essay on ‘Revolution in a classless society’ by Sigrid Meuschei. Although her essay’s style is sometimes opaque (attributable perhaps to the transia- tion), Meuschef makes the valuable and often ignored point that what turned into the revolution against the GDR began as a movement to reform, not abolish, East Ger-

Book reuiews 291

man socialism. By contriving a nation in which the social structure was composed almost entirely of state servants, however, the state and its bureaucracy created a situation in which the ‘socio-economic structures of a new society were prevented from developing by a homogenised social order’ (1992: 156). Any successful reform movement was thus bound to pose a threat to the state’s very existence.

The rigidity of the political structures in the GDR was mirrored in the creeping arthritis which disabled its economy. Three essays in this collection analyse in detail the failure of the East German economy to provide not so much what its people needed-East Germany was poor only by the standards of the most advanced industrial nations-but to give them anything remotely resembling what they wanted. For the most part, the authors subordinate economics to politics, arguing that the political system determined the persistent stagnation of the East German economy. ‘The socialist contries of eastern Europe were unable to transform themselves into modern, open societies’, Rolf Rei8ig writes. Like the many East German intellec- tuals-Stefan Heym, Crista Wolf and others- who hoped to reform socialism rather than simply submerge the eastern state in the west, Re&g feels that the GDR as it existed represented not the inevitable outcome of socialist ideals, but rather their betrayal. ‘The demise and eventual collapse of real socialism was preordained by the reversal of the socialist ideal: dictatorship, not democracy, state, not social ownership, a centralised command economy which denied competi- tion’ (1992: 26-27). Efforts made in the late 1970s and early 1980s to revitalize the economy around new industries such as microelectronics, as Mike Dennis points out, were not necessarily badly conceived, but were simply unable to keep up with the pace of change in a world market led by economies more supple and responsive than that of the GDR.

The demise of the GDR did not, obviously, occur in a vacuum, and the editors have included several essays which consider the external forces which tended to undermine the state. The key factor here, of course, was the role of Gorbachev and the USSR As Martin McCauley points out, Gorbachev signed the

death warrant of the GDR, electing to cut foreign policy losses in Eastern Europe by making it clear that the USSR would not intervene to support the regime. To many observers the apparently sudden reversal of nearly a half century of Soviet foreign policy in Eastern Europe was puzzling in the extreme. The decision to retreat from East Germany and other client regimes in Eastern Europe, however, was the natural and obvious response to the USSR’s own internal econo- mic and political crisis. ‘Economically the greatest advantge to the Soviet Union was that it would cease to play the role of an imperial power .‘, McCauley writes. ‘Politically the Soviet Union would be freed from the need to observe “class solidarity” with its allies and to defend their interests even when these were contrary to its own interest’ (1992: 166). Experience had proved that Finland, Austria and other states were more valuable as economic and political partners for the Soviets than were the state’s own clients. In this context, the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, leading to the collapse of the Soviet-allied regimes, was perfectly logical.

It is one of the particular strengths of this collection that it takes quite seriously the non-tangible sources of the transformation of Eastern Europe, specifically those rooted in popular political culture and mentalities. No one who spent any time talking privately with citizens of the old regime in the late 1980s could fail to be struck by their deep apathy and utter failure to identify in any positive way with their state. From the point of view of preserving the regime, this had many effects, most of them bad. Laborers in the GDR, for one, saw no point in working very hard. This fact is emphasized in several of the essays, most tellingly that by Dennis, who details the government’s failed efforts to stimulate work- er motivation. Those who fled the state, and many who stayed to change it, had a ‘palpable sense of diminishing opportunities’, as Henry Krisch puts it, despite the Honecker govern- ment’s effort to convince them that hard work did, in fact, pay off (1992: 88). The failure to provide incentives, and the failure to meet in any meaningful way the increasing popular desire for some sort of participatory gov- erning structure, produced a fatal popular alienation from the regime. Indeed, popular

292 Book reviews

discontent was so deep, as John Sandford points out in an essay on the peace movement and the churches in the GDR, that once mass popular agitation got under way its goals soon became far more radical than those espoused by early leaders of reform, such as the East German Church.

There are few glaring weaknesses in the way these essays generally treat the socio- economic, political and cultural causes of the demise of the East German state, but to anyone with a background in political geogra- phy there is one conspicuous omission: none of the essays discusses in any systematic way the spatial dimension of this new &.scbluss. Despite occasional vague references to ‘geopolitical factors’ (referring mostly to foreign policy) shaping the course of events in the East, none of the authors makes more than passing reference to the role geography played in stimulating the drive toward unifica- tion This is most surprising, since spatial factors were, and always have been, crucial to the German predicament in Central Europe. In the specific case of the collapse of the eastern regime, for example, there is no doubt that the effect of the disparity in wealth and industrial development of the two states was compounded by their spatial juxtaposi- tion. It was the nearness, the tantalizing proximity, of West German material abund- ance, which made their own state’s relative (and only relative) poverty a continuing crisis for East German politicians. The German situation replicated the global North-South pattern of wealth distribution on a smaller and perhaps less extreme scale (this East-West divide, as Roland Sturm point out, will persist for some time in the new German state) (Smith et al., 1992: 124). Glaringly uneven development was the norm, with the western state as a core and the East as a sort of semi-peripheral economy (Short, 1982: ll- 12). East Germans could practically stand on tiptoe and gaze enviously over the barbed wire upon the material bounty of western capitalism, a situation which created a perpe- tual cultural crisis for the regime’s leaders. Furthermore, the actions and decisions of those leaders were always tempered by their awareness of treading the interface between East and West, which during the age of steadfast Soviet support for East European

socialism was also the fine line between coexistence and mutual nuclear annihilation. By ignoring the ways in which spatial factors affected the enormous disparities of wealth and power which separated the two Ger- manys in the late 198Os, the collection is deprived of a valuable analytical perspective. All these unique aspects of the German situation deserve more explicit discussion than they are accorded in The Caman Revolution of 1989.

The same cannot be said, fortunately, for the broad range of essays included in the collection Developments in German Politics. The volume, one of a series on contemporary western politics put out by Macmillan, treats a broad range of issues pertaining to Germany and the Germans since reunification. The I6 authors of the contributions-mostly political scientists, but a few other disciplines are also represented-treat topics including the new political system, foreign policy, the economics of the new state, political ideologies, and current issues like immigration and unem- ployment. Although this collection suffers from the endemic liability of topical ‘current affairs’ collections-events have already su- perseded the discussion of a few issues, such as the abortion controversy-it nonetheless offers a wealth of useful data and informed interpretation to any scholar of contemporary German or European politics and political geography. The breadth of current topics considered makes this a particularly valuable collection: in addition to the usual foreign policy and economic essays, Eva Kolinsky provides a perceptive analysis of the circum- stances, expectations and disappointments of German women in the new state, for example, and Barbara Marshall gives a detailed account of the history and prospects of German migration policies.

Those essays treating the new security and foreign policy situation in Central Europe are particularly strong parts of this collection. William E. Paterson, director of the Europe Institute at the University of Edinburgh, has contributed an outstanding analysis of the new dangers and opportunities created by the revival of the German colossus. His essay, entitled ‘Gulliver Unbound’, includes a sensi- tive analysis of the interplay of geography and politics in Central Europe. As Paterson points

Book reviavs 293

out, the old bipolar organization of the region had excluded Mitteleuropa: states in the region were on one side or the other, East or West, and Germany was enmeshed in a web of responsibilities and restraints which kept it effectively oriented toward the West. The old rules, however, have vanished, and this has led , as Paterson points out, to a ‘rediscovery of Mittehmpu’, Central Europe as an auton- omous and unaligned region, probably under informal German leadership (Smith et al., 1992: 149). Germans and others have used the term since the beginning of this century to denote various schemes for mutually benefi- cial political and economic arrangements (W. Smith, 1991: 227; Faber, 1992: 396; Meyer, 1955). It wasn’t heard much during the era of the two Germanys, for obvious reasons, but it has recently returned to signify a pluralistic, loosely federalized, postmodern formula for international cooperation in Central Europe (Betz, 1990: 173-192).

The new interest in Mitteleuropu is far from a purely German conception: enlightened non-German politicians, including the Czech Vaclav Havel, have suggested that some sort of loose federalism might benefit all the states of the region (Havel, 1992: 11). Nonetheless, geography and other factors make it likely that Germany stands to benefit more than any of its neighbors from a new Central European political order. The region has 118 million new potential consumers, Eastern Europe offers skilled workers to help in relocating labor-intensive sections of German industry and, as Paterson puts it, ‘The geographical position of Germany, its contacts in the area and the strength of its export-oriented eco- nomy guarantee that Germany will be the major beneficiary of a growth in East Euro- pean demand’ (Smith et al., 1992: 148). Germans have accordingly given a high priority to strengthening ties with the area- witness Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s repeated references to Prague and Warsaw as the hearts of Europe-but Central Europeans them- selves seem as eager to open up to the Germans. Even in a region notable for long memories, the prospect of potential wealth has begun to soften the recollection of German imperialism among the younger generations. As Paterson points out, German political structures enjoy a great deal of

respect in the region, and the German social market model of economic organization is proving considerably more attractive than American- or British-style ‘deregulatory agen- das’ (Smith et al., 1992: 148). Consequently, what appears to be gradually emerging is a loose economic entente, with Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary as partner/satellites of the German center.

The fly in the ointment, however, has been the vexing problem of how to deal with the relocation of peoples which has accompanied political change in the region. The general European movement from the relatively poor East and South to the wealthy North and West has called forth surprisingly hostile domestic political reactions in Germany and other states of the European Community. Inevitably, this has complicated international relations in the region. The problem has been most thorny precisely for the Germans, who have received the largest portion of migrants from the East. The newcomers are composed of many groups-ethnic Germans, economic refugees, asylum seekers from Yugoslavia and from violence in other states-and this has complicated both government and popular responses toward them. As Barbara Marshall’s insightful essay on German migration policy points out, the German ethnics have been seen as a net gain to the country by most Germans, but the other groups have met increasing popular resentment and hostility as they compete for jobs and housing. The result has been a recrudescence of explicitly xenophobic political activism by fringe groups on the right of the German political spectrum, as well as an increase in random racially motivated violence by alienated social groups, such as German skinheads (Smith et al., 1992: 255-263).

The explosion of racist and xenophobic groups throughout Western Europe since reunification has been the most obvious problem to arise from the collapse of the old European order, and it has been highly publicized (not to say sensationalized) in the world media. What has been less publicized, and hence less widely understood, particular- ly in North America, is the extent to which the upsurge in racism and xenophobia in Europe preceded the political changes of 1989-90, as well as the degree to which such phenomena

294 Book reviews

are now omnipresent in Europe, visible not only in Germany and France but also in what were seen as more liberal states such as Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. In fact, anti-foreign movements which exploit racial hostility have been gaining ground in Europe since the mid-1980s at least. The book Fascist Europe: 7he Rise of Racirm and Xenophobia provides a valuable corrective to the misperception that these movements grew suddenly from the ‘social stresses’ created by the new European situation.

In many ways, it must be emphasized, this is not a good book. It began, in fact, not as a book at all, but as a bureaucratic document, the ‘Report of the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia’. This Committee, convened in October 1989 by the European Parliament, delivered its report in October of the following year, so the material presented here, outside the introduction, deals with subsequent events not at all. Given its origin, it is no surprise that the report reads like the product of bureaucrats-tendentious, self- important, verbose-but it also has serious flaws in its scholarly apparatus. The crucial chapter on organized racist groups is accom- panied by no footnotes whatever, only a final list of sources (many of whom appear anonymously), despite claiming to provide highly detailed accounts of alleged racist incidents and groups. The editor also repeat- edly begs questions when framing his arg- uments, as when he decribes Tory pride in ‘Britain’s racist immigration policies through- out the 1980s’ (Ford, 1992: 182). It seems improbable that Tory MPs themselves de- scribe the policies as racist, and many reasonable persons could view Britain’s offi- cial positions on immigration during the decade as motivated by factors other than racial hatred.

All these caveats having been noted, the book must still be considered a valuable tool for all scholars concerned with the rela- tionship between ethnic&y and politics in contemporary Europe. It supplies a wealth of data, on a country-by-country basis, pertaining to ethnic minorities and the media, the anti-racist policies of the European Parliament and of individual governments, racist and xenophobic movements from the large to the

tiny, as well as many similar topics. The books treatment of these movements as national instances of a continental phenomenon is justified, and significant. If the history of Europe in this century teaches anything, it is that the consequences of racism and ethnic hostility, even when apparently confined to individual countries, inevitably reach across borders and destabilize the international system. Sarajevo in 1914, Danzig in 1939 and Bosnia in 1993 all confirm this truth. Most informative, in this respect, is the report’s chapter on ‘general policies’ instituted across national boundaries. The report focuses on the role of economic dislocation in promoting racism and xenophobia, and suggests that the best way to integrate immigrants harmonious- ly is to reform labor laws to make employ- ment and business ventures more accessible to the immigrant community (Ford, 1992: 117-121).

The committee’s report concludes with a series of concrete recommendations, includ- ing state-assisted language study, economic changes, government educational efforts and others, designed to protect and assist mem- bers of victimized minority groups. Not all the recommendations seem well advised. The adoption of explicit ethnic quotas for advance- ment in media industries, for example, has at least the potential to create more hatred and segregation than healing, as the recent experience of the USA with %irmative action’ programs might suggest. On the whole, however, the committee’s suggestions for opening European states up more completely to their newest members are all very well, and to be commended. The German experience suggests that something deeper and more thorough may be needed, however, some- thing which some of the essays in these books hint at but which none, not even the report on ‘fascist Europe’, suggests explicity: a rework- ing, perhaps in a pluralistic, postmodernist sense, of the entire concept of nationality, of who deserves inclusion, and who doesn’t, within the framework of the state.

There are some hints that Germans have already begun to develop what Peter Pulzer, in Deuelopments in Germam Politics, de- scribes as a ‘post-national democracy’ (Smith et al., 1992: 326). The fears many observers entertained on reunification of a resurgent

Book reviews 295

‘Fourth Reich’ remain unrealized: Germany’s posture toward the American-led crusade on behalf of the West’s petroleum interest- ‘Operation Desert Storm’-in 1991 was ambivalent at best. ‘The Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated the desire of both the govern- ment and the public to remain a military and diplomatic pigmy while accepting economic superpower status’, Pulzer points out (Smith et al., 1992: 324). Germans, in other words, remain most reluctant to bully other nations. The German self-image, as many observers note, is still overshadowed by the cataclysmic past, particularly the crimes of the National Socialist past (Sheehan 1992: 171-172). Among the young (up to age 40 or so), as Peter Merkl observes in an essay on ‘A new German identity’, acceptance of German responsibility for the Second World War has produced skepticism of traditional nationalist identities. As a result, he cites polling data which suggest that what young and middle- aged Germans most desire in terms of realizing their national identity is not interna- tional self-assertion but material improve- ment. While this frequently produces a tendency typical of German society to look to a larger, ever more-powerful state to ensure material well-being-large majorities appear to expect government assistance with every- thing from abortion and child care to education and career transitions-it has also produced a striking pacifism at the level of international relations (Smith et al., 1992:

346-347). It remains difficult to sort out exactly what

the new Germany holds in store for its neighbors. These three books, each in its own way a valuable source of understanding of contemporary German politics, present a number of contradictory trends, The interna- tional economic muscle of the new Germany, perhaps destined to be the worlds leading economic power, remains a contrast to the stagnating eastern third of the nation. The ‘two-thirds society’, as Steen Mangen de- scribes it, in which one-third of the popula- tion remains outside the economic and

political mainstream, threatens to become a troubling reality (Smith et al., 1992: 225). The great regional disparity in distributions of wealth is paralleled by a jarring disconso- nance in popular attitudes. Rising domestic hostility to foreigners contrasts with a persis- tent reluctance to employ force at the international level, and a considerable pacifist movement. It was to be expected that the historic events of 1989-90 would jolt the stability, which sometimes verged on bore- dom, of life in the old Germany. No old order passes quietly. These books suggest several possible futures for the new Germany, however: peaceful economic giant, regional hegemon, self-absorbed foreign policy re- cluse, and others. The rest of Europe, and the world, can only wait to see how the reunited Germany recovers from the shock of collision with the new.

References

Bm, H.-G. (1990). Mitteleuropa and post-modern

German Identity. New German CritQue 43, 173-192.

FABER, K.-G. (1982). Zur Vorgeschichte der Geopolitik.

Staat, Nation und Lebensraum im Denken deuts-

cher Geographen vor 1914. In WeZfpolitik, Euro-

pagedunke, RegicwzI&mus. Fe.sacbn’j~ fiir Heinz Gollwitzer (H. Dollinger and H. Gtunder eds), pp. 389-406. Miinster: Aschendorff

HAVEI., V. (1992). A Dream for Czechoslovakia. The New

York Rem&u of Books 39, 8-13.

MEYER, H. C. (1955) Mittelewcpa in G-n Thought and Action, 1815-1945. The Hague: Mattinus Nijhoff.

SHEEHAN, J. J. (1992). National history and nationa identity in the new Germany. German ~nrdies

Reuiew, special issue, winter 1992. 163-174.

SHORT, J. R (1982). An infroductiion to Political Geogr@y. London: Routledge.

SMITH, W. D. (1991). Politics and tbe.Sciences 0jCulhue in Germany 1840-1920. New York: Oxford University Press.

David T. Murphy Department of Histo y, Philosophy and Political Science, Anderson Univemly, Andmon, Indianu, USA