Harvard Institute forInternational Development

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Development Discussion Papers

Transition toward Democracy and Governancein Post Mengistu Ethiopia

John M. Cohen

Development Discussion Paper No. 493June 1994

© Copyright 1994 John M. Cohenand President and Fellows of Harvard College

HIID Development Discussion Paper no. 493

Transition toward Democracy and Governance in Post-Mengistu Ethiopia

John M. Cohen*

Abstract

In May 1991 forces led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) overthrew therepressive Government of Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam. A July 1991 National Conferenceattended by most political groups led to the approval of The Transitional Ethiopian Government(TGE). Shortly thereafter the TGE confidently began to take steps toward reconciling politicaland ethnic conflicts, promoting economic liberalism and development, restoring human rights,and establishing democratic governance.

This paper seeks to provide Ethiopianists and aid agency professionals with timely informationon status of the democratic transition and to identify useful research documents related to thatprocess. Towards these objectives it reviews TGE activities relating to the drafting of aconstitution based on democratic principles, decentralizing substantial power to regions anddistricts, establishing a credible electoral system and holding legitimizing elections, reformingthe judiciary, promoting human rights, supporting the emergence of an independent media, andfacilitating the emergence of democratically oriented civic organizations.

John M. Cohen is an Institute Fellow at HIID. This study is drawn from a field evaluationcarried out for USAID on its “Ethiopia Democracy/Governance Support Project” (March-May1994).

*The author is indebted to his co-evaluators Emmy Simmons and William Hammink, as well as to USAIDDemocracy and Governance advisors Stevens Tucker and John W. Harbeson, for their ideas and criticism. However,neither they nor USAID have approved or are responsible for the data and analysis presented in this paper.

HIID Development Discussion Paper no. 493

Introduction

In May 1991 forces led by the TigrayanPeople’s Liberation Front (TPLF) overthrew therepressive Government of Col. Mengistu HaileMariam, promising political and ethnic recon-ciliation, economic liberalism, human rights,and democratic governance.1 A July 1991 Na-tional Conference attended by most politicalgroups led to the approval of a TransitionalGovernment and set forth guidelines for draft-ing a new constitution, establishing a system ofregional decentralization, holding democraticelections, and ensuring basic human rights.

The Transitional Ethiopian Government(TGE) was dominated by the Ethiopian People’sRevolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), acoalition controlled by the TPLF. Its leader,Meles Zenawi, was named President andcharged with leading the country through atransition period legally established in the Con-ference charter as taking no longer than 2.5years, with regional elections scheduled forJune 1992 and national elections for 1994.Shortly thereafter, despite the persistence offundamental problems related to the politics ofethnicity and strategies of economic develop-ment, the TGE confidently began to take stepsaimed at effectively reaching its transition ob-jectives.2

1.. The social aspects of the fall of Haile Selassie’sGovernment, the unfolding revolution, and theMarxist disaster the country suffered are best de-scribed in: Christopher Clapham, Transformationand Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John W.Harbeson, The Ethiopian Transformation: The Questfor the Post-Imperial State (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1988); Edmond J. Keller, RevolutionaryEthiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).2.. Useful overviews of the end of the Mengistu re-gime and the launching of the TGE are found in:Paul B. Henze, Ethiopia in 1990 -- the RevolutionUnraveling (Santa Monica: RAND Report P-7707,March 1991); “Ethiopia: From Rebels to Rulers,”Africa Confidential, XXXII, 11 (1991), pp. 1-3; PaulB. Henze, Ethiopia in 1991 -- Peace Through Strug-gle (Santa Monica: RAND Report P-7743, 1991);“Ethiopia: Majorities and Minorities,” Africa Confi-dential, XXXII, 14 (1991), p. 1-2; Paul B. Henze,

It was during this period of optimism thatthe TGE, with the assistance of various aidagencies, began intensive efforts to draft a con-stitution, hold regional elections, reform thejudiciary, promote human rights, support theemergence of an independent media, decen-tralize power to regions and districts, and en-courage the emergence of democratically ori-ented civic organizations.

Optimism for a smooth transition towardthese objectives rapidly declined as problemsemerged, many of which are well documentedin standard journalistic sources.3 Foremostamong these problems were the steady with-drawal of opposition parties from the TGE andthe lack of administrative capacity to implementtransition policies and programs. As a result,the TGE’s formal mandate for the transitionperiod ended in January 1994. Most observersbelieve it is unlikely a constitution will beadopted and elections for a national legislatureheld before mid-1995. Such problems notwith-standing, the TGE appears dedicated to movingforward with its initial program. For example,on March 2, 1994, President Meles Zenawi reaf-firmed commitment to constitutional rule anddemocratic elections in a speech broadcast overthe Voice of Ethiopia Network:

“The main objective of the transitional pe-riod is to draft and approve the country’s con-stitution with the full participation of the peopleand, based on this, to hand over power to aconstitutionally elected government. The gov-ernment is committed to this objective...I wantto confirm that the transitional government willtake all necessary steps to ensure that the transi-tional period is democratic and successful and

The Defeat of the Derg and the Establishment ofNew Governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea (SantaMonica: Rand Report P-7766, 1992).3.. For example: “Ethiopia: Power-Struggles and theEthnic Weapon,” Africa Confidential, XXXIII, 9(1992), pp. 6-7; Colin Legum, “Series on Ethiopia”comprised of “Ethiopia: A Unique Experiment inDemocracy,” “The Critical Oromo Factor,” and “TheAmhara Factor,” Third World Reports (August1992); “Ethiopia: Poacher Turns Gamekeeper,” Af-rica Confidential, XXXIII, 14 (1992), pp. 6-7;“Peasants on Top,” The Economist (March 13,1993), pp. 52-3; “Ethiopia: Meles Dictates theAgenda,” Africa Confidential, XXXV, 2 (1994), pp.3-4.

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that it will create a conducive atmosphere forparties to participate in the constitutional con-gress.”

The purpose of this paper is to review theTGE’s progress toward its objectives and offertentative observations as to whether the transi-tion is likely to be successful.

In this regard it should be noted that sev-eral Western aid agencies are involved in as-sisting the TGE’s transition efforts. A complexcoordination framework has been formulatedby 22 ambassadors and representatives ofmulti-lateral agencies providing technical andfinancial assistance to this process. Relative tothe activities covered in this paper, the leadagencies are: (1) Constitution Commission(USAID); (2) Regional Administration (UNDP);(3) Election Commission (UNDP); (4) SpecialProsecutor’s Office (SIDA and CIDA); and (5)Judiciary (SIDA). Under such leadership differ-ent combinations of aid agencies are providingassistance in these and related areas. They willbe referred to when appropriate.

Initial Assumptions

In mid-1991 experienced Western observersand aid agency professionals held a number ofimportant assumptions about the commitmentof the TGE to democracy and governance.4 Themost important of those related to the focus ofthis paper are:

1. The TGE will maintain commitment andundertake significant concrete steps to

4.. The following assumptions are drawn from suchdocuments as: Transitional Government of Ethiopia,Ethiopia’s Economic Policy During the TransitionalPeriod (Addis Ababa: Government Printer, Novem-ber 1991); USAID, “Ethiopia Democ-racy/Governance Support Project (663-0007) (ProjectPaper Prepared by Ethiopia Mission, May 15, 1992);USAID/Ethiopia, Concept Paper: Back to the Future(Addis Ababa: Ethiopia Mission, June 10, 1993);World Bank, Ethiopia’s Economy in the 1980s andFramework for Accelerated Growth (Washington,D.C.: Country Operations Division, Eastern AfricaDepartment, Africa Region, Report No. 8062-ET,March 14, 1990); United Nations Development Pro-gramme, “Programme Document: Support to Eco-nomic and Financial Management” (Paper Preparedby the UNDP Mission, Addis Ababa, n.d.).

achieve a democratic political system basedon good governance and respect for basichuman rights.

2. Ethiopians at all levels of society,particularly in leadership, will embraceprinciples and support norms ofaccountability and constitutional limits.

3. Central to an effective transition is the needto liberalize Ethiopia’s historical pattern ofauthoritarian rule and introduce a moretolerant and participatory political systemthrough establishing a rule of law and civilsociety that is supported by: (a) elections;(b) constitutional revisions; (c) judicialreform; (d) human rights; (e) independentmedia and professional journalists; (f)devolved and participatory regional andlocal governance; and (g) representativecitizens organizations and NGOs.

4. The transition toward these goals isambitious, risky, difficult to carry out on asustainable basis, and likely to beambiguous and contradictory at variousstages.

5. A neutral body of experts will rapidly drafta Constitution confirming fundamentaleconomic, human, political, media, andassembly rights and submit it forconsideration to a representative group ofEthiopian citizens for revision andratification.

6. The Constitution will have a substantialeffect on the structure and functions of theregional government system, most likelyalong federal lines.

7. TGE will hold a series of elections for aninterim Council of Representatives, aConstituent Assembly to review andfinalize the Constitution, and the body (s) oroffices given power and authority under theapproved Constitution.

8. TGE will establish electoral rules that allowparties to be formed and openly contest allelections.

9. TGE will request and cooperate withinternational observers who will monitorelection processes. It will also supporttraining and orientation programs fordomestic observers drawn from civilsociety.

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10. TGE and the Ministry of Justice willpromote human rights and move towardthe establishment of a national humanrights commission.

11. TGE will be able to find suitable candidatesfor the large number of judges removedfrom office after the end of the PMAC-PDRE regime.5

12. The national and regional media will playan important role in informing citizens andstimulating their debate aboutconstitutional issues.

13. TGE will tolerate NGOs organizingsymposiums and workshops focused onbuilding consensus on human rights byinitiating processes linking Ethiopianindividuals and organizations with eachother and international human rightsgroups, assisting in the definition of humanrights, improving an impartial broad-basedhuman rights commission, and building acredible judiciary.

14. TGE will convert the state media monopolyto a genuine public corporation and allowthe establishment of independent mediachannels/initiatives.

15. Substantial opportunities will exist for theformation of interest groups promotingpolitical and economic objectives consistentwith democratic principles and goodgovernance.

16. Emerging interest groups will play asubstantial role in socializing citizens intoan awareness of the rights and duties thataccompany democracy and goodgovernance.

17. TGE will welcome support from bilateraland multilateral aid agencies for Ethiopia’semergency economic recovery needs andpolitical reforms.

18. Transition to democracy can only beaccomplished by Ethiopians and aidagencies can only have a minor catalyticeffect on the process through the provisionof support where needed and appropriate.

5.. The post-Haile Selassie government had severalnames, most notable, the Provisional Military Adminis-trative council (PMAC), established on September 12,1974; and the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia(PDRE), which replaced the PMAC in September 1987.

Important Events and Patterns thatHave Altered Original Assumptionsabout the Transition

Some of the above assumptions have heldup over the past two years. However, by May1994 a number of initial assumptions on the taskenvironment and the possibility of progress todemocracy and good governance have beenchanged by the course of events.6 These eventswill be described and analyzed in some detail inthe next section. Briefly, they are:

1. The transition period has been extendedbeyond the January 1994 deadline set by the1991 Transitional National Charter.

2. The Council of Representatives has not beenas assertive as expected and the degree towhich it is representative has declined forseveral reasons, the most important ofwhich are the effects of the flawed June1992 elections, the withdrawal of severalmajor opposition parties, and delays in thedrafting and approval of a constitutionsetting the framework for, among othermatters, the election of a nationallegislature.

3. The political tolerance and democraticcompetition called for by the NationalCharter has been less than expected byopposition groups and the aid agencies.

6.. The analysis of changed assumptions is based onthe author’s discussions in Addis Ababa as well asthe following selected reports: John W. Harbeson,“Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition: A PreliminaryAssessment” (Paper Prepared for USAID/REDSO/ESA, Nairobi, February 26, 1994); Louis A. Picard,“Regionalization in Ethiopia: Preparation of a Stra-tegic Action Plan” (Paper Prepared for the UnitedNations Development Programme, ManagementDevelopment Programme, New York, May 3, 1993);International Human Rights Law Group, “Ethiopiain Transition: A Report on the Judiciary and the Le-gal Profession” (Report Prepared by the IHRLG,Washington, D.C., January 1994); Leslie M. Fox, etal, “An Assessment of USAID’s Capacity for RapidResponse in Support of African Civil Society” (PaperPrepared by Associates in Rural Development forUSAID, Democracy and Governance Program,Washington, D.C., January 7, 1994).

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4. The validity of the first election, held forregional and local officials on June 21, 1992,was compromised, largely because: (a) TGEpreparation for the elections inadequateand untimely; (b) administrative andlogistical shortcomings seriously impairedthe electoral process; (c) TGE resolution ofemerging problems was poorly handled; (d)competitive participation did not occur; (e)strong ethnic based parties, particularly theOLF, withdrew from the election process;and (f) most of the population did notunderstand the purpose and rules of multi-party elections.

5. The designation of a ConstitutionalCommission was delayed, setting back thedrafting timetable and raising substantialquestions as to whether the ConstituentAssembly, charged with deliberating on theConstitutional Commission’s draft, couldcarry out its task before the end of 1994.

6. Initial progress toward prosecution ofofficials of the previous Government,particularly through the SpecialProsecutor’s Office (SPO), has sloweddown, largely because of the number ofcases and complexity of marshallingprosecution evidence, and, paradoxically,because the pressure from the TGE for morerapid prosecution has made it difficult tofully comply with international humanrights standards.

7. TGE decision making processes, neverparticularly transparent or open, appears tosome observers to be becoming moreopaque, especially in regard to planningdocuments related to land tenure,agricultural productivity, andregionalization.

8. Conflicting statements about the structure,functions, and legal responsibilities of theforthcoming regional government systemhave emerged from the Regional AffairsSector of the Prime Minister’s Office andthe Proclamations issued in the NegaritGazeta, making it difficult for aid agenciesto effectively support training needs ofrecently elected councilors, newlyappointed judges, and central ministrypersonnel transferred to regional, zonal, orwereda levels.

9. Serious misunderstandings exist betweenTGE insiders, central governmentministries, political parties, and Ethiopiancitizens over the legal, administrative,technical, fiscal, and budgetary powers tobe granted to all subnational governmentlevels.

10. Withdrawal of major opposition partiesfrom participation in democratic processes,whether due to events surrounding theflawed June 1992 election, TGE policies, orinternal political ideology and ambitions,has seriously hampered the Government’sefforts to move toward multi-party politics.

11. Emerging TGE controls on the organization,movement, and campaign activities ofopposition parties, as well as not so veiledthreats of succession and armed strugglefrom spokesmen of opposition parties, hascomplicated efforts to establish an effective,competitive multi-party system,compromising efforts to establish agreedrules, procedures for arbitration ofdisputes, and normative agreement thatcompetitors will accept the results ofdemocratic engagement.

12. TGE officials have not proven flexible,creative, or particularly conciliatory in theirdealings with issues raised or actions takenby opposition groups, although it must berecognized that conflict management haslargely been carried out through non-violent means.

13. Efforts by international mediators,particularly the Carter Center at EmoryUniversity, to bring opposition parties backinto the democratic process and futureelections has not been successful.

14. Despite party, media, and transparencyproblems identified below, there areindicators that a civil society is emerging.While not based on surveys and interviews,it appears to some that:

a. the number of Ethiopian citizensknowledgeable about democraticprocesses appears to have increasedmore rapidly than originally anticipatedgiven problems of literacy, languagegroup, and limited communicationsinfrastructure;

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b. through the efforts of the ConstitutionalCommission, there has been a limitedincrease in the flow of informationamong rural and urban populationsabout issues related to democracy andgovernance; and

c. there has been an increase in thenumber of organizations and groupsseeking to educate and involveEthiopian citizens in democratizationand governance issues and processes;however, they are still largely AddisAbaba based.

15. Also in the absence of any empiricalevidence based on surveys and interviews,some observers argue that there has been adecline in the trust Ethiopian citizens,particularly those living in Addis Ababa,have in the commitment of the TGEleadership to a democratic process leadingto the Government promised by theTransitional National Charter.

16. Progress by civil society organizations andNGOs in expanding public knowledge ofthe rights and duties of citizens in ademocratic country, through seminars,training institutions, community meeting,and other means, has been slower thanexpected, particularly in remoter areas ofthe country; indeed, the expectedflourishing of civic associations anddemocratic or human rights oriented NGOshas not materialized.

17. Aside from TGE action on the media, wheremost observers find the Government’sperformance unsatisfactory, there isdisagreement among observers over theextent to which the TGE has shown respectfor economic, human, political, andfreedom of expression rights. Sufficientevidence exists in support of those withnegative views that a changed assumptionabout TGE behavior appears to exist.

Analysis and Documentation

The purpose of this section of the paper isto provide documentation and analytical sup-port for the above observations on changedconditions relative to initial Western expecta-tions for the transition. Particular efforts will be

made to cite documents and reports that mightfacilitate further research on these and relatedtopics. This is important because not all Ethio-pianists agree on past patterns and futuretrends.7 More specifically, it is important be-cause the study of Ethiopian politics and gov-ernance has historically been plagued by falla-cies.8 The only way to address this problem is totry and make timely information available andcite materials in support of that informationwhere ever possible.

1. Constitutional DevelopmentThe legal basis of the TGE was established

by Charter July 22, 1991.9 The Charter, amongother provisions, establishes the structure of thenational government, adopts the UN Charter onHuman Rights, commits the Transitional Gov-ernment to democratic principles, confirms therights of nationalities to self determination, de-clares a policy of neutrality in foreign relations,and establishes a structure for elaborating cen-ter-regional relationships.

Specifically, the TGE consists of an 87member Council of Representatives (COR) anda Council of Ministers (COM) (Article 7). TheTGE is to exercise all legal and political respon-sibility for the Government of Ethiopia until ithands over power to a government popularlyelected on the basis of a new constitution (Arti-cle 8). As such the COR will oversee the selec-tion of a Chairperson, who will be Head ofState. This Head of State appoints a Prime Min-ister, who, subject to the approval of the COR,

7.. For a lengthy review of differences among Ethio-pianists on the politics of the revolution and its rela-tionship to ethnicity and society during the 1974-90period, see: Paul B. Henze, “Marxist Disaster andCultural Survival in Ethiopia,” Problems of Commu-nism, (Nov.-Dec. 1990), pp. 66-80.8.. This point is well made in: Paul B. Henze, “TheEthiopian Revolution: Mythology and History,”Northeast African Studies, XII, 2-3 (1990), pp. 1-15;and his “History and the Horn,” Problems of Com-munism,” (Jan.-Feb. 1983), pp. 66-75; A good re-view of the types of ethnic and local governance fal-lacies likely to hamper analysis of the democratictransition is found in: Clapham, Transformation andContinuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, pp. 195-219.9.. “Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia,” Char-ter No. 1 of 1991, Negarit Gazeta, 50th Year, No. 1,July 22, 1991.

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appoints the members of the COM on the basisof broad national representation, technicalcompetence, and unswerving adherence to theCharter (Article 9 [b-c]). Among other provi-sions, the Charter calls for the formation of aConstitutional Commission (CC) (Article 9 [g]),promotion of judicial reform and independence(Article 9 [f]), and establishment of a set of de-centralized regional and wereda councils (Arti-cle 13).

It should be noted that the TransitionalGovernment Charter provides a time period of2.5 years, with an extension of 6 months, toadopt a constitution and establish a Govern-ment elected and based on its provisions (Arti-cle 12). This period expired on January 22, 1994.There is no provision in the Charter that allowsit to be amended so as to take care of this delay.

The powers of the President, the COR, thePrime Minister, the COM, central governmentministries, agencies, and commissions, and re-gional, zonal, and wereda councils, were estab-lished by subsequent Proclamations issued be-tween August 1991 and November 1993.10

The CC was established by Proclamation inAugust 1992.11 The Transitional Period Charter,and its supporting Proclamations, provide thebasis on which the CC began its deliberations.

10.. “A Proclamation to Define the Powers andFunctions of the President of the Transitional Gov-ernment of Ethiopia,” Proclamation No. 1 of 1991,Negarit Gazeta, 50th Year, No. 2, August 12, 1991;“A Proclamation to Define the Powers and Duties ofthe Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers,”Proclamation No. 2 of 1991, Negarit Gazeta, 50thYear, No. 3, August 12, 1991; “A Proclamation toDefine the Rights and Duties of Members of theCouncil of Representatives,” Proclamation No. 4 of1991, Negarit Gazeta, 50th Year, No. 6, September5, 1991; “A Proclamation to Provide for the Estab-lishment of National/Regional Self-Governments,”Proclamation No. 7 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51stYear, No. 2, January 14, 1992; “A Proclamation toDefine the Powers and Duties of the Central andRegional Executive Organs of the Transitional Gov-ernment of Ethiopia,” Proclamation No. 41 of 1993,Negarit Gazeta, 52nd Year, No. 26, January 20,1993.11.. “A Proclamation to Provide for the Establish-ment of the Constitutional Commission,” Proclama-tion No. 24 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No.20, August 18, 1992.

In this regard, the CC is specifically chargedwith:

“(drafting)...in conformity with the spirit ofthe Charter, a constitution in accordance withwhich the new democratic Ethiopia shall be es-tablished and administered; upon approval bythe Council of Representatives to present theDraft Constitution for public discussion, to pre-pare the final Draft so gathered and, upon ap-proval by the Council of Representatives (and)in accordance with the public opinion of repre-sentatives, to submit same to the ConstituentAssembly.”12

Among the supporting powers and dutiesof the CC are: (1) to promote public discussionsabout constitutional issues through the media,educational institutions, seminars or symposi-ums, or other appropriate bodies; (2) to organ-ize the necessary forums and facilities to pres-ent the draft constitution for public discussion;(3) to communicate comments received on thedraft from various sources to the COR; (4) toreceive the comments on the approved draftfrom regional and wereda councils; and (5) topublicize and distribute to the public the draftconstitution after its approval by the COR (Ar-ticle 5). The CC is to be comprised of 29 mem-bers of equal vote, including 7 members of theCOR, 7 members of political organizations, 3members from trade unions, 3 members fromthe Chamber of Commerce, 2 members from theEthiopian Lawyers Association, 2 membersfrom the Ethiopian Teachers’ Association, 2members from the Ethiopian Health Profession-als’ Association; and 3 women representatives(Article 7). The Chairman of the CC’s ExecutiveCommittee (Article 10) is Ato Kifle Wadajo.

The CC began its work in March 1993. Be-tween then and the release of the draft in May1994, it met frequently, though one reviewstates that attendance was poor for reasons notwholly understood.13 Its Constitutional ConceptPaper was endorsed by the COR at its 84thRegular Session. In support of its legal delibera-tions the CC has drawn upon the discussions ata Constitutional Symposium, which took place

12.. There is a major drafting error affecting theEnglish translation of Article 4. This quote is basedon an attempt to make sense of what is most likely adropped line.13.. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition, p.10.

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in May 1993, kebele-level discussions of an is-sues paper on key constitutional issues andquestions drafted by the CC,14 and a number ofspecial discussions, such as: (1) November 27,1993 seminar for regional committees conduct-ing constitution related discussions; (2) Decem-ber 1, 1993 seminar for journalists; (3) December23, 1993 seminar for political and civic organiza-tions, professional associations, and scholars;(4) January 20, 1994 seminar with members ofreligious organizations and professional asso-ciations; and (5) a workshop on Islam and con-stitutional development.

The Constitutional Symposium merits somediscussion. On May 17-21, 1993, an NGOfunded through USAID, the Inter-Africa Group,organized a well regarded and influential con-stitutional symposium in Addis Ababa titled:“The Symposium on the Making of the NewEthiopian Constitution.” It is important to notethat other donors contributed to the IAG or-ganized symposium, most notably SIDA, CIDA,ODI, GTZ, The Netherlands, the Ford Founda-tion, and Oxfam. Most of the expenditures wereon travel and per diem for participants. Asidefrom plenary presentations, there were hun-dreds of panel meetings, numerous informalconsultations, and high media coverage of theevents and discussions.

A number of international experts attendedthe Symposium under aid agency funding. Theywere joined by Ethiopian legal experts. TheChairman of the CC publically noted those at-tending the Symposium, as well as CC membersthrough private discussions, benefitted greatlyfrom discussion stimulated by some of the par-ticipants. This influence is reflected in theMarch 1994 CC newsletter, which stated:

“Much has been gained from sharing theknowledge and expertise of internationally ac-claimed experts. The meetings and seminarshave often raised controversial issues and dis-

14.. The list of 73 questions is printed: TGE, Con-stitutional Commission Newsletter, No. 1 (March1994), pp. 7-9. One observer concludes the questionswere poorly phrased: Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Demo-cratic Transition, p. 10.

cussions have been lively and thought provok-ing.”15

Aid agencies have provided experts forboth the Symposium and general discussionswith members of the CC.16 It was not until May1993 that the IAG published papers by foreignand Ethiopian specialists on topics related tothe constitution.17 The extent to which these pa-pers were available to CC draftsmen or influ-enced their thinking has not been evaluated.

Until the recent completion of the draft,there was little public information on its thrustand content. Up till then the CC had providedonly a few glimpses of the draft, most notablythrough a newsletter, which was widely dis-tributed.18 It covered the following topics: (1)names of CC members and their organizations; 15.. Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Constitu-tional Commission Newsletter, No. 1 (March 1994),p. 1.16.. Most notably, USAID funded: (1) Dean JamesPaul: faculty of Rutgers University Law school, for-mer Ford Foundation funded Dean of Haile SelassieLaw School, co-author with Dr. Christopher Clap-ham on a case book for training law students on the1952 constitution, and long term scholar focused onconstitutional development in Africa; (2) Mr. PaulHenze: former State Department official with longservice at the US Embassy, widely connected toEthiopians from all sectors, and RAND corporationconsultant who has made major contributions to un-derstanding the political and economic patternsmarking the PMAC-PDRE regime and the transitionprocess; and (3) Professor Samuel P. Huntington:Distinguished Government Department Professor,Harvard University, Director of the John M. OlinInstitute for Strategic Studies at the Center of Inter-national Affairs, and specialist in comparative politi-cal systems and the relationship between politics andeconomic development.17.. The report’s 24 authored papers are divided into thefollowing topics: international context, Ethiopian con-text, constitutional choices, federalism and ethnic diver-sity, and constitutional order. Eighteen of the 24 papersare by foreigners, of which only 5 are known Ethiopianexperts. The Inter-Africa Group, Constitutionalism:Reflections and Recommendations - The Symposium onthe Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution 17-21May 1993 (Addis Ababa: Center for Dialogue on Hu-manitarian Peace and Development Issues in the Hornof Africa, May 1994).18.. Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Constitu-tional Commission Newsletter.

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(2) actions taken as of March 1994; (3) descrip-tion of basic constitutional concepts; and (4)presentation of the major issues to be discussedby the forthcoming CA. It is assumed that thelist of major issues comes from the check list ofissues discussed in the Kebele meetings but un-til now not available in English.

Observers should soon know more. The CCcompleted the draft Constitution on May 13thand submitted it to the COR through PresidentMeles Zenawi. The press release stated nothingabout the content but did reveal that the draftcontains 11 chapters and 106 articles, with par-ticularly lengthy sections on human rights, asthere is little case law on this in Ethiopia andthe country cannot wait for it to emerge. Ob-servers note that the India model guides theFederal structure proposed, although the consti-tution will follow the American approach to-ward length rather than that of India, which is80+ volumes long.

Preliminary press releases, reinforced bythe comments of observers following the proc-ess, suggest that on the basis of considerablecompromise the following important decisionswere taken by the CC and recommended in thedraft: (1) the name of the country should be TheFederal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; (2) theConstitution should be the supreme law of theland taking precedence even over customarylaw; (3) rights to free speech thought and ex-pression should be guaranteed; (4) an inde-pendent judiciary should be established; (5) ex-tensive provisions should be adopted related tohuman, political, and democratic rights, sincethere is little time for such law to develop; (6)the form of government should be a federation,with states having the right of self-determination of culture and language but notas to secession (though some conflicting reportssay it will recommend allowing secession underspecified conditions, others suggest it is silenton the right to secession); (7) territorial bound-ary should encompass what are currently beingcalled “states,” probably numbering 9, exclud-ing Addis Ababa, which should be the coun-try’s capital city and administered by the Fed-eral Government; (8) the boundaries of statesshould follow the ethnic boundary demarca-tions now in force, and ethnic groups withinthese states should have the right to form theirown state; (9) states should have equal powersand rights; (10) the official Federal language

will be Amharic while the members of the fed-eration should be allowed to decide their ownofficial language; (11) there should be a primeminister and a nominal head of state; (12) thelegislative function should be performed by twochambers in parliament, namely an upperhouse, or “Council of Federation,” apparentlyappointed by ethnic groups or the councils ofthe states, rather than elected, and a lowerhouse, or “Council of People’s Representa-tives,” comprised of representatives elected bysecret ballot every 4 to 5 years; and (13) theprime minister, as well as the council of minis-ters he appoints, should be selected by thedominant party in the lower house of electedrepresentatives; (14) the prime minister and hiscouncil should be accountable to the lowerhouse; (15) the states should be given adequatetax powers to generate the revenue required tocarry out its legal activities, but the nationalgovernment should set policies and regulations,and, possibly, regulate budgets; and (16) statesshould be able to prepare their own constitu-tions and be responsible for a separate policeforce.

The approved draft is to be submitted to anelected Consultative Assembly (CA) rather thanto the general public as a referendum. Oneknowledgeable observer suggests that the majorconstitutional debates in the CA are likely to beover: (1) balance of power between center andthe regions; (2) right to secede; (3) judicial in-terpretation and review; (4) scope of economic,social, and individual rights to be incorporatedinto document; (5) referendum and recall; (6)human rights and their amendment; (7) role ofgovernment in the economy; and (8) nationaland regional language.19

The CA is to be comprised of one delegateelected from each of the country’s weredas,which do not appear to overlap entirely withconstituencies. There is some uncertainty overthe number of candidates to be elected. The Na-tional Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) putsthe figure at 548. Part of the problem lies in thefact that there are 22 special constituencies fordesignated national minorities, which are in-tended to ensure that these small groups havesome representation.

19.. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition,”pp. 11-12.

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By mid-May candidates were registered in527 of the 548 constituencies. Some 60 percentof the 1,476 candidates standing for the electionstated they were independent and not allied toany of the 39 political parties contesting thepoll. See Annex I for NEBE data on constituen-cies, voters, and candidates. The elections tookplace as scheduled on June 5, 1994. Informationon election results is due in early July

2. RegionalizationA central issue the constitution and subse-

quent political debate and policy making exer-cises will have to deal with is the structure ofsubnational government. From the beginningthe EPRDF has been committed to devolution ofsubstantial powers to regions, zones, andweredas located within boundaries based onethnic identity. However, for several reasonsthe TGE has had difficulties getting regionaland local governments up and running withoutundue delay.

Some delays have been due to the effects ofcivil war or the remoteness of regions. Otherdelays are due to the fact that in many regions,particularly in the west and south, historicallocal government structures continued to func-tion – although little research is available tooutsiders seeking to determine the extent towhich Haile Selassie’s provincial and municipalgovernment systems continue or have been al-tered by 17 years of military rule.20 Finally, and

20.. The major studies of Haile Selassie’s system are:W.H.E. Howard, Public Administration in Ethiopia:A Study in Retrospect and Prospect (Groningen:J.B.Wolters Press, 1956); John M.Cohen and PeterH. Koehn, Ethiopian Provincial and Municipal Gov-ernment: Imperial Patterns and Post RevolutionaryChanges (East Lansing: African Studies Center,Michigan State University Press, 1980). It is impor-tant to begin by noting that a provincial and munici-pal government system was in place at the time theTGE was established. However, more than a decadeof PMAC-PDRG rule had raised questions as to thestatus of the provincial and municipal governancesystem established by Haile Selassie and, as notedbelow, largely sustained by Mengistu’s government.Lack of access and research opportunities, com-pounded by the effects of guerrilla war, famine relief,villagization, resettlement, and a decade of ideologi-cal party politics, gave aid agencies little confidencethat Haile Selassie’s deconcentrated system of pro-

most importantly, delays have been occasionedby disagreements within and between the majorparties and senior line ministry civil servantsover the constitutional and legal type of decen-tralization that should be approved, as well asover the division of tax revenue and budgetaryallocation resources between the center and thenew regions, zones, and weredas. Significantly,the TGE appears to have failed to anticipate thecomplex policy, regulatory, service provision,and revenue/budgetary allocations issues thathave to be resolved.21

Initial regionalization reforms emerged inearly 1992 when the TGE issued ProclamationNo. 7 aimed at “providing for the establishmentof national and regional self-governments.”22 Itwas designed to implement provisions in theTransitional Charter aimed at carrying out theEPRDF’s historic objective of establishing a“federal” system of autonomous regions (some-times called “states” by those discussing theCharter) based on ethnic identities. Toward thisend, the Proclamation divided the country into12 regions, the boundaries of which were drawnalong ethnic lines. It also established 2 regionsthat were too diverse to be subdivided by eth-nic identity: the municipalities of Addis Ababaand Harar. These were given numbers andnames. In 1993, five of these regions (7, 8, 9, 10and 11) were collapsed into one region: South-ern Region. Hence, as of May 1994, there are 10regions: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Gam-

vincial administration, typified by the Italian uninte-grated prefectoral system marked by divided admin-istrative and technical control, still prevailed. Thiswas particularly the case because of the changes inthe number of provincial units, the use of militaryofficers as unit administrators, and the introductionof hierarchies of urban and rural associations or ke-beles.21.. Preliminary but inconclusive analysis of central-regional revenue, budgetary, and expenditure re-porting relationships is provided in a 1993 USAIDfunded study: Satish Chandra Mishra, “Public Ex-penditure Implications of Regional Economic Devo-lution” (Report Prepared as Part of the Public Ex-penditure review, USAID/REDSO, Addis Ababa,June 1993).22.. “Proclamation to Provide for the Establishmentof National/Regional Self-Government,” Proclama-tion No. 7 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No. 2(January 14, 1992).

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bella, Benshangui, Somali, Southern Ethiopia,Addis Ababa, and Harar. A rough map of theseregions is provided in Annex II.

Regions are divided into weredas, whichwere administrative subdistricts under HaileSelassie’s provincial government system, and,subject to minor changes made because of eth-nic patterns, appear to still have roughly thesame boundaries as they did under his regime.Between the regions and weredas are zones,which also roughly approximate the boundariesof awrajas during the imperial era. To date notall regions have been fully subdivided by zones.Official Government and aid agency reports onthe current numbers of such subnational unitsare conflicting, but it appears there are 56 zonesand 676 weredas. By way of comparison, in1973 there were 14 provinces (teklay ghizat), 99awrajas (cf. zones), 444 weredas, and 1339 mik-tel wereda (some of which must have been con-verted or combined into weredas).23

But, as noted in the section on “Constitu-tional Development,” NEBE states there are 548constituencies, including the 22 special con-stituencies for designated national minorities,which are intended to ensure that these smallgroups have some representation. Apparently,some constituency and wereda boundaries arenot coterminous or, rather some constituenciescontain more than one wereda.

Drawing the boundaries of these govern-ment units, particularly weredas, has not beenwithout difficulty, and some remain contested.Disputes are not numerous and appear to berelative localized. The most prominent disputesrelate to the boundary between Regions 4 and 5,one area on the border between Amhara andTigre Regions, and one area along the Amhara-Benishangul boundary.

Boundary disputes were anticipated by theProclamation, which provided that the TGEwould up-date the pre-1974 wereda boundarieswhen the “details of geographical borders ofeach nation, nationality and people are specifi-cally laid down.” Observers in Ethiopia reporthearing about numerous disputes over currentboundaries. This, as noted in the above sectionon “Election Support,” has serious implications

23.. Imperial Ethiopian Government, Statistical Ab-stract 1964 (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Office,1965), pp. 183-206.

for efforts to register voters and candidates orcarry out planned elections.

Indeed, it has serious, little analyzed long-term implications the success of democratiza-tion. The author of the only published study ofpost 1992 ethnic conflict, Jon Abbink, notes, onthe basis of his study of the Dizi and Suri inSouthern Ethiopia, that:

“The number of ethno-regional conflicts inthe world has grown in intensity during the lastfew decades as a result of political and eco-nomic crises, and one of the unsolved para-doxes of this world-wide trend is that thereseems to be a basic contradiction between thetwo core concepts of “democratisation” and“ethnic self-determination.”

“..Ethiopia is the first country in the Africancontinent where, in the post-colonial era, a partof the state has been allowed to break away(Eritrea, following the independence referen-dum held in April 1993), and where the politicalfabric is being radically rearranged in anauthorized fashion ‘from above’...a controver-sial nation-wide experiment in government andadministration is in progress, with power beingdiverted to ethno-regional units that haverather strict boundaries. Such rearrangementsare obviously not being achieved without greatdifficulties: fights over regional or ethnic ‘iden-tity,’ over rights of residence, and over educa-tional and language policy have been very fre-quent during the past few years.”24

Based on this observation, Abbink analyzes con-flict in the Maji area, finding that insecurityover boundaries and local authority, coupledwith weak central political administration, hasled to violent confrontations that are increas-ingly difficult to stop. He concludes that with-out strong assertion of central power it will bedifficult to reduce inter-ethnic violence, preventthe dominant ethnic group from suppressingminorities in their areas, build representativegovernment, guarantee an independent judici-ary, and foster pan-ethnic sharing in economicgrowth. To be sure Maji is at the fringe of theold empire, but Abbink has enough experienceto conclude, for Ethiopia as a whole, that:

24.. Jon Abbink, “Ethnic Conflict in the ‘TribalZone:’ The Dizi and Suri in Southern Ethiopia,”Journal of Modern African Studies, XXXI, 4 (1993),p. 675.

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“...in the interstices of state transformation,where traditional power relations fall apart andnew structures of a representative democracyare not yet established, traditional enmities andconflicts of interest are being completely politi-calised and played out on an ethnic basis. Thepolicy-makers have not yet come to grips withthese realities, either intellectually or adminis-tratively, not least because they know not howto handle the rising tide of movements for both‘democracy’ and ‘ethnic self-determination.”25

In this regard, a number of specialists in ethnicconflict have concluded that federal solutionscan promote secession or partition and exacer-bate intolerance toward minority groups leftbehind. This literature further argues thatdevolution to units larger than a district threat-ens minorities left in districts, which is clearly aproblem for the TGE, whose ethnic based sys-tem currently does not extend below thewereda.26

Finally, it should be noted that Ethiopia hasa long, complex history of regional administra-tion with shifting boundaries and changing pat-terns for administering them. This history com-pounds the problem of defining boundaries anddeveloping center-periphery relationships.27

Chapter 4 of Proclamation No. 7 details thestructure and functions of regional councils andgovernments. Briefly, these have the followingcharacteristics: (1) the head of the elected Coun-cil will be called either Chairman or President;(2) the Council will be served by an ExecutiveCommittee headed by a Secretary charged withoverseeing such administrative functions asaudits, inspections, personnel, documentation,archives, and public relations; (3) there will beseveral offices, most notably: judicial, publicprosecution, police and security; (4) there will

25.. Ibid., p. 682.26.. For example: Kingsley M. de Silva, Managing Eth-nic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies (Lanham: Uni-versity Press of America, 1986), p. 374; and his “De-centralization and Regionalization in the Managementof Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict,’ International Journal ofGroup Tensions, XIX, 4 (1989).27.. See: G.W.B. Huntingford, The Historical Geog-raphy of Ethiopia: From the First Century AD to1704 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); As-melash Beyene, “Some Notes on the Evolution ofRegional Administration in Ethiopia,” DevelopmentResearch, IX, 1 (1987).

be three support bureaus: public servants ad-ministration, planning and economic develop-ment, and finance; (5) there will be 4 commis-sions to monitor the remaining 17 bureaus,which mirror the central line ministries: ad-ministration, productivity and construction,economic services, and social services; and (6)personnel in field offices of line ministries aresupposed to have been transferred to the bu-reaus in early 1993.

According to Chapter 4 of Proclamation No.7, wereda administration will be subordinate tothe national and regional government. Its juris-diction over the rural and urban kebeles is to bedetermined by national or regional government.Briefly wereda government consists of a di-rectly elected council having “powers necessaryto prepare, determine and implement within itsown areas plans concerning social services andeconomic development; as well as to implementlaws, policies and directives” of the nationaland regional governments. Basic administrativeaction is to be handled by an executive commit-tee comprised of 9 to 15 council members andheaded by a chairman responsible for oversee-ing the following basic units: judicial, publicprosecution, audit and control, security andpolice force, and services and development of-fices.

The TGE appears to be waiting for the Con-stitutional process to resolve issues and ambi-guities over the relationship between the na-tional and subnational governments. However,this delay has risks. For example, a recentlypublished report by the National DemocraticInstitute concluded:

“Rather than mollify the yearnings of vari-ous nationality groups for their assumed rightsto self-determination, the TGE’s attempt to em-power various nationalities through Proclama-tion 7 may have broadened and deepened eth-nic discord...friction...also emerged from thecontrary expectations of OLF and EPRDF lead-ers concerning the authority of na-tional/regional governments. Elements of theOLF had long hoped to establish the independ-ent state of Oromiya and sought an arrange-ment from the EPRDF similar to the plan forEritrea. The EPRDF, however, intended re-gional autonomy only within the context of a

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unified Ethiopia, with Eritrea representing aunique solution to past colonial injustices.”28

In this regard, Harbeson concludes:“In political terms the regional govern-ments take on almost federal character,while in economic resource and policysetting terms the regional governmentsremain clearly subordinate to the cen-tral government, although they will ac-quire broad latitude in the implementa-tion of centrally determined economicpolicies. In cultural terms, illustratedespecially by language policy, the re-gions are afforded something ap-proaching autonomy.”29

Harbeson’s view is reinforced by the fact that amajor Government policy statement on regionalreforms strongly suggests, with few details, theoutline of a devolved federalism without rightto succession or extensive subnational controlover technical policies, laws, and regulations.30

Because of its availability, further descrip-tion of the complexities of Proclamation No. 7 isnot necessary. More importantly, further de-scription would be misleading because: (1) theoutcome of the CA’s constitutional delibera-tions can not be predicted; (2) there is, as dis-cussed shortly, ambiguity within the proclama-tion and between it and other proclamations,particularly in regard to taxes, budgets, andtechnical control over line ministry policy, leg-islation and regulations, which may or may notbe clarified by the emerging constitutional draft;(3) the TGE has yet to further clarify the organ-izational structure of line ministry activities inthe field; and (4) there are no detailed fieldstudies of how the proclamation is being im-plemented and what constraints are being en-countered.

These complicating factors are importantfor several reasons. First, Christopher Claphamnotes that as of 1988: (1) the formal structure of

28.. National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs and the African-American Institute and theAfrican-American Institute, An Evaluation of theJune 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia (Washington,D.C.: NDI, 1992), pp. 21-22.29.. Harbeson, Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition,”pp. 31-2.30.. Regional Affairs Sector, The System of RegionalAdministration in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: PrimeMinister’s Office of the TGE, January 1994).

local government in Ethiopia did not change inthe years following the revolution, though therewas turnover of officials holding administrativegovernment positions under the emperor; (2)line ministries and local governments at provin-cial and municipal levels was operativethroughout the country; (3) leadership ceased toseriously consider regional autonomy, let alonesecession, after 1978; and (4) the September1987 constitution used the term “autonomousregions” but ensured that regions were entirelysubordinate to the national government.31

Clearly, whatever the commitment of the TPLFto its historic objective of “regional autonomy,”and whatever statements it makes about futurefederal structures and functions, the residue ofthe Haile Selassie and PMAC-PDRG regimes’position on decentralization is going to make itunlikely that the political and legal issues on theform of decentralization expected to emergefrom the transition process will be easily re-solved much less implemented by governmentfield agents under the technical, if not adminis-trative, jurisdiction of central line ministries.This outcome could change if the TGE movestoward restructuring of central ministries,thereby reducing their powers.

Second, in analyzing ongoing debates overregionalization it is important to distinguishbetween administrative and technical jurisdic-tion. Under Haile Selassie, field personnel ofline ministries were administratively under theMinistry of Interior’s governors but technicallyunder the supervision of their ministry superi-ors. In essence, Ethiopia has an unintegratedprefectoral system, similar to that of Italy.Similarly, analysis of existing proclamationsand statements suggests that the TGE is: (1)transferring administrative functions to re-gional/wereda councils and their executivecommittees; and (2) placing technical fieldagents of line ministries under the administra-tive supervision of council units while leavingtechnical supervision of their implementation ofnational policies, regulations, and activities totheir line ministry directors at national head-quarters.

31.. Clapham, transformation and Continuity inRevolutionary Ethiopia, pp. 195-204. It should benoted that Clapham is the only student of govern-ance under the PMAC-PDRG to have spent consid-erable field time in Ethiopia.

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Third, there is little or no documented in-formation on deeper aspects of field, local, andmunicipal government, particularly in regard tocurrent patterns and directions of change. In-deed, it is difficult to determine the currentstate of municipalities. Several examples can begiven: (1) there are an estimated 200 towns andmunicipalities with varying powers and legalauthority; yet, the current operations of theseunits is rarely acknowledged, much less dis-cussed, in reports and memoranda on decen-tralization and regionalization in Ethiopia; (2)the role of rural and urban kebeles under theemerging regional system have not been clearlyspelled out; (3) there are reports that the TGE iscurrently in the process of transferring centralgovernment personnel to regions, zones, andweredas; yet, there is no data on the numbers,patterns, or effects of such transfer; (4) it is as-serted in some aid agency reports that the newexecutive committees of the regional councilshave little or no administrative capacity; yet, theold Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Financeadministrators, tax officials, budget officers,auditors/accountants, and clerks are probablystill in place in many local government jurisdic-tions and there are no studies supporting sup-positions that there is no capacity outside AddisAbaba to provide support for councils and theircommittees; and (5) there are general state-ments about decentralization of central ministryheadquarters or field staff to regions, zones,and weredas; yet, there are no studies about theform and limitations of such decentralization.

Clearly civil war has affected local and mu-nicipal government in some geographic areas.But since government administrative servicesand activities are being carried out at the locallevel in most areas it seems quite likely thatsome capacity does exist. In sum, there ispressing need to get a better picture on suchtopics as supervisory jurisdictions, administra-tive and technical capacities, revenue sources,budgetary systems, allocation and expenditurepatterns, and municipal governance. Until thisis done it will not be possible to evaluate thekinds of boldly asserted but questionable fac-tual statements made in Government and aidagency reports on regionalization.32

32.. For example: Louis A. Picard, “Regionalizationin Ethiopia: Preparation of a Strategic Action Plan”(Paper Prepared for the United Nations Development

Only one study has been identified that ad-dresses these kinds of issues. It related to asser-tions by some government officials that budgetand expenditures are to be transferred to coun-cils, which assertions fail to describe how thiswould be done or consider what problems andconstraints were likely to effect the effort. Thatstudy, undertaken by Satish Chandra Mishra, ispreliminary.33 What is important is it shows thekind of research that is greatly needed and itsuggests that under emerging legislation, thecenter will dominate the regions through itscontrol of major revenue sources and budgetaryallocations.

Late May 1994 TGE press releases, unsup-ported by textual documentation, suggest somedirection related to this problem is contained inthe draft constitution submitted to the COR forthe just elected CA. It seems likely, that in re-gard to persons, firms, and property withintheir established boundaries, states will begiven the power to levy and collect taxes relatedto employment, land use, agricultural cess,sales, houses, licenses, and royalties. But TGEstatements also suggest that the constitutiondraft will recommend that the central govern-ment determine economic, sectoral, and socialpolicies and regulations. How tax revenues willbe administrated relative to national vs. statepriorities, how revenue sharing relative tocommon tax sources will be handled, and howbudgetary equity will be assured (between thenational and regional governments, as well asamong zones and weredas within regions) can-not be predicted until the constitution is for-mally approved and released. But clearly, de-veloping a growth oriented and equitable reve-nue and budget allocation system for a countryas ecologically diverse and economically imbal-anced as Ethiopia will be much more difficultthan current statements by the government orsome aid agencies suggest. Moreover, if, aspredicted in this paper the center is alreadymoving to maintain technical supervision overfield agents and projects/programs paid for by,and to some extent administered by, the re-

Programme, Management Development Programme,New York, May 3, 1993), pp. 1-20.33.. Satish Chandra Mirsha, “Public ExpenditureImplications of Regional Economic Devolution”(Report Prepared as Part of the Public Expenditurereview, USAID/REDSO, Addis Ababa, June 1993).

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gions, then these revenue and budget issues willbe even more complex and contentious.

Despite these problems, it is possible to re-flect on regionalization issues. First, the Re-gional Affairs Sector of the Prime Minister’sOffice established an administrative frameworkfor national, regional, and wereda elections.This was done by Proclamation No. 11 of Feb-ruary 1992. The problems related to this frame-work will be discussed below in the section on“Election Support.” Here it need only be notedthat the Regional Affairs Sector appears to havelimited policy making and administrativeauthority, that its actions largely reflect deci-sions taken elsewhere in the TGE by influentialpolitical actors.

Second, in the face of numerous questions,the TGE issued two additional Proclamations.The first, Proclamation No. 33 of 1992 at-tempted to define how revenue would beshared between the central government andregional, zonal, and wereda “self-governments.”34 The second, Proclamation No.41 of 1993, sought to define the powers and du-ties of the Central and Regional Executive Or-gans of the Transitional Government.35 Bothproclamations will be analyzed shortly.

Some observers who have read this legisla-tion and reflected on its meaning and relation toboth TGE policy statements and the inheritedsystem of Haile Selassie and the PMAC-PDRGargue that: (1) the debate over the form of de-centralization is going to be fierce and pro-longed; (2) Proclamations 7, 11, 33 and 41 areinconsistent with each other, statements of dif-ferent units of the TGE, and with public sectoradministrative patterns established under HaileSelassie and probably still on the ground inmany areas; (3) formulating and implementingdecentralization reforms will take a consider-able period of time; (4) development of systemsfor sharing revenue and budgetary power will

34.. “Proclamation to Define the Sharing of revenueBetween the Central Government and the Na-tional/Regional Self-Governments,” ProclamationNo. 33 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 52nd Year, No. 8(October 20, 1992).35.. “Proclamation to Define the Powers and Dutiesof the Central and Regional Executive Organs of theTransition Government of Ethiopia,” ProclamationNo. 41 of 1993, Negarit Gazeta, 52nd Year, No. 26(January 20, 1993).

be an extremely complex process unlikely tolead to substantial budgetary resources to theregions; (5) the proclamations fail to address thestatus of municipalities and towns; and, mostimportantly, (6) a struggle will emerge betweenTGE political factions arguing for “power to thepeople” and experienced central civil servantswho recognize that development requires uni-form national policy and skilled administrativeand technical implementation leadership.

These questions are compounded by a pa-per commissioned from Samuel P. Huntingtonas part of his services to the CC. The paper re-flected the concerns of embassies, aid agencies,and observers like the previously cited Jon Ab-bink, over a decentralization reform based onethnicity, although no pretense was made thatthe paper was based on analytical insights intothe intricacies of the particular Ethiopian politi-cal context. Huntington pointed out that thecombination of party and regional ethnicity wasunstable and potentially volatile:

“...ethnicity is likely to be central to Ethio-pian political parties, elections, and politicsgenerally. Attempts to suppress ethnic identifi-cations or to prevent ethnic political appeals arenot likely to be successful...Parties and otherpolitical groups will undoubtedly be organizedprimarily on ethnic lines. Drawing regionalboundaries on ethnic lines, however, supple-ments what is unavoidable with what is undesir-able...the combination of ethnic territorial units andethnic parties cumulative cleavages and can have adisastrous effect on national unity and political sta-bility.” (emphasis added)36

The concerns of Huntington have been re-flected in the political infighting that occurredamong groups and parties contending for con-trol over regional and wereda councils. For ex-ample, it was reported that on April 6th, at ameeting of the region Five Council in Jijiga,those attending declared the Regional ExecutiveCommittee (REC) removed for neglect of dutyand financial irregularities.37 The REC re-sponded that the Council meeting was invalidbecause many of those attending and votingwere “new faces,” so that its decisions wereillegal and invalid. The result was two groups

36.. Huntington, “Political Development in Ethio-pia,” pp. 14-6.37.. “Turmoil in Ethiopia’s Region Five,” SomaliaNews Update, III, 12 (April 22, 1994).

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claiming to head the Regional Council. Much ofthe argument between the two groups appearscentered on questions of whether the capitalshould be Gode or Jijiga and which clans shouldhave positions of power on the Council. It wasfurther compounded by party disputes over theremoval of the President of the Council in early1994 for expropriation of money from theCouncil’s budget. Among the range of partiesinvolved in this case were the Western SomaliLiberation Front, the Ogaden National Libera-tion Front, the Ethiopian Somali DemocraticLeague, the Western Somali Democratic Party,and Al-Ittihad, an armed Islamic fundamental-ist group (the EPRDF had no co-party in theregion to represent it). Clearly, under ethnicfederalism it is possible for politics in the re-gions to get complex and convoluted, making itdifficult to carry out programs aimed at build-ing the capacity of regional and wereda coun-cils.

Recognizing that the TGE’s decentralizationreforms were more problematic than initiallythought, most aid agencies have chosen to waitand see what the structure and function of theemerging regional government system will be.Showing less caution, UNDP has begun plan-ning a $22.0 million regionalization program onthe basis of a consultant report marked by lim-ited awareness of the issues just raised, littleevidence of field inquiry, and questionable as-sumptions.38 This initiative is titled “Manage-ment of Economic and Technical Change”(METC).39 It is focused on building managerial

38.. Picard, “Regionalization in Ethiopia.” A cri-tique of this paper’s documentation, understandingand proposal is found in: Satish Mishra, “USAID’sPossible Contribution to Regional Devolution” (In-ternal USAID Memorandum to the Deputy Director,Addis Ababa, September 17, 1993).39.. UNDP describes the major donor activities inthe area of decentralization as the “ProgrammePlanning Framework for Upgrading the Economicand Social Conditions in Ethiopia.” Under thatframe work it cites four major initiatives: (1) eco-nomic recovery (World Bank/IMF); (2) Poverty Al-leviation and Social Action/Safety Net (WorldBank/UNICEF); (3) economic recovery and recon-struction; and (4) management of economic andtechnical change in both public and private sectors(UNDP). Under the UNDP initiative there appear tobe six programs, one of which is “participatory re-

capacity at the regional level through local andexternal training, supporting regional planningefforts at the center and in the regions, supply-ing computers, vehicles, office equipment, fur-niture, communications gear, and other com-modities to regions, and providing technicalexperts to assist regions to carry out the func-tions UNDP draftsmen appear to believe havebeen firmly delegated by the central govern-ment.40

While management training can always beuseful, UNDP appears to have the cart beforethe horse. As argued earlier, the situation is notas clear as it seems because different politicalgroups within the TGE and the civil servicehave conflicting views about the objectives andstructure of the declared regionalization pol-icy.41 Debates and power struggles among thesegroups, as well as the outcome of the Constitu-tional Development process, will determine the

gional development.” “Management of Economicand Technical Change in Both Public and PrivateSectors: Annex 2 Sub-Programme on ParticipatoryRegional Development.”40.. UNDP, “TGE National Programme for Man-agement of Economic and Technical Change(METC)” (Discussion Paper on the SupplementaryFunds Requirements for the Ethiopian Regionaliza-tion Process, Addis Ababa, n.d.). This project pro-posal is further elaborated by a subsequent UNDPproposal giving greater specificity to the proposedMETC tasks. “Annex 2: Sub-Programme on Partici-patory Regional Development” published as part of:UNDP, “Management of Economic and TechnicalChange in Both Public and Private Sectors,” (Pro-gramme Prepared by UNDP, Addis Ababa, June1993).41.. Among other factors, these groups can probably bedistinguished on the basis of their: (1) expectationsabout the possibilities and difficulties of empoweringlocal populations; (2) experience in managing large-scale institutions other than military units; and (3) un-derstanding of the difficulties of formulating policiesessential to development and implementing such poli-cies through the preparation of regulations, the provi-sion of basic services to urban and rural populations,and the identification, design, and implementation ofsustainable development oriented projects and pro-grams; and (4) appreciation of the complexities of pub-lic sector planning processes, revenue generation, budg-eting, expenditure, and accounting procedures in lineministries and agencies.

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final structure, functions, and scope of decen-tralization after the transition.

Current conflict among these groups is wellillustrated by the difference between the vague,conflicting 1994 pamphlet titled The System ofRegional Administration in Ethiopia, issued by theRegional Affairs Sector, and the language foundin Proclamation No. 7 of 1992 and ProclamationNo. 41 of 1993, just to pick two of the productsof ministries and agencies that appear to beseeking to retain the major policy, implementa-tion, and financial powers they held underHaile Selassie and the PMAC-PDRG.

Briefly, Proclamation No. 41, in describingthe powers and duties of ministries, agencies,and commissions, consistently uses clausessuggesting substantial central control of policyand implementation.42 For example, in regard tothe Ministry of Health, the Proclamation states,among other things, that the Ministry shall:

“...formulate the Country’s public health poli-cies and strategy and...supervise their implementa-tion; prepare and submit draft laws...on publichealth and supervise their enforcement; providetechnical and professional assistance to hospi-tals, health centers, clinics and research andtraining centers; determine and supervise standardsto be maintained by health services...operatedin the country; determine the qualifications ofprofessionals...at various levels; register and issuecertificates of competence to medical practitionersand pharmacists; undertake necessary quaran-tine controls; prepare and enforce essential drugs’list; control the quality standards of drugs andmedical supplies.” (emphasis added)43

This statement should be compared to the sameProclamation’s statement on the powers of theRegional Health Bureaus, which, among varioustasks, are charged with:

“preparing on the basis of the health policy ofthe country, the health care plan and programmefor the people of the region; ensure that profes-sionals engaged in public health services in theregion satisfy the prescribed standards;”(Emphasisadded)44

42.. “A Proclamation to Define the Powers and Du-ties of the Central and Regional Executive Organs ofthe Transitional Government of Ethiopia,” Procla-mation No. 41 of 1993, Negarit Gazeta, 52nd Year,No. 26, January 20, 1993.43.. Article 22, Proclamation No. 24, pp. 246-7.44.. Ibid., Article 51, pp. 264.

Proclamation No. 7 reinforces what is sug-gested by Proclamation 24’s allocation of dutiesto central and regional governments.45 It consis-tently uses clauses such as: (1) “without preju-dice to the powers of the center the bureaushall;” (2) “in conformity with central regula-tions the bureau shall;” or (3) in making policyor implementing activities they should “notconflict with the powers, policies, or regulationsof the center.” This emerging pattern of centralcontrol is further reinforced by ProclamationNo. 7’s provision that the regional councils areresponsible to the Council of Representativesand that the activities that regional bureauswish to carry out must be in accord with centralministry policy, regulations, and implied over-sight.

The pattern of regional/wereda subordina-tion to central line ministries that emerges in theabove analysis is reinforced in only one study.After reviewing the likely revenue and expendi-ture patterns under these proclamations andlegal notices,46 it estimates that at present theapproximate relative shares of the center andthe regions in: (1) domestic revenue generationwill find 14% going to regions and 86% to thecenter; and (2) expenditure allocations will find:(a) 22% of capital expenditure going to regionsand 78% to central ministries and agencies; and(b) 26% of recurrent expenditures going to re-gions.47 Further, this study notes that:

“...in the preparation of the recurrent andthe capital budgets the final approving agenciesare the central Ministries of Finance and Plan-ning and Economic Development rather thanthe regional councils. The later have theauthority to act as first stage filters in the budg-etary process only.”48

45.. A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishmentof National/Regional Self-Governments,” Proclama-tion No. 7 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No.2, January 14, 1992.46.. “1984 E.C. Budget Proclamation,” ProclamationNo. 26, 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year No. 22,September 7, 1992; “A Proclamation to Define theSharing of Revenue Between the Central Govern-ment and the National/Regional Self Governments,”Proclamation No. 33 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 52ndYear, No.7, October 20, 1992.47.. Mishra, “Public Expenditure Implications of Re-gional Economic Devolution,” pp. 5-7.48.. Ibid., p. 5.

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Clearly, in terms of resources the center isin the dominant position.

To be sure the language in both these andother key proclamations could be clearer. Legalambiguities prevail, though the language in theProclamations is clearer than that in the state-ments of the Regional Affairs Sector. What issuggested here is that these proclamationsprobably represent the efforts of experiencedsenior managers and professionals in centralinstitutions seeking to ensure that the devolu-tion of the powers from central ministries totheir parallel regional bureaus is limited andguided by central ministry technical controlover such matters as policy and regulatory im-plementation, national program implementa-tion, maintenance of nation-wide standards,budgetary processes, and so on.

In sum, it is not by chance that the currentlegislation, Proclamation No. 24, identifies 20line ministries that mirror 20 regional andwereda bureaus. It is likely that the former cen-tral government personnel who currently stafffield offices will be transferred to decentralizedunits or “bureaus.” On the other hand, it is alsolikely that technical supervision, and all the con-trol and powers that go with line ministryauthority over field agents, will rest with thecenter. If these predictions hold, subnationalgovernment personnel will be subject to thesame division of administrative and technicalsupervision that hampered the effectiveness ofprovincial civil servants during the administra-tions of Haile Selassie and the PMAC-PDRG.

3. Election Systems and ElectionsTransitional progress toward building a

credible electoral system and holding demo-cratic elections can best be described by consid-ering two different type periods: pre- and post-June 1992.

a. Pre-June 1992As discussed in detail in the section on

“Constitutional Development,” the legal basisof the TGE was established by Charter July 22,1991.49 Under the Charter, an 87-seat Council ofRepresentatives was appointed. It was selectedfrom among the leaders of the 27 political 49.. “Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia,”Charter No. 1 of 1991, Negarit Gazeta, 50th Year,No. 1, July 22, 1991.

movements that met at the Transitional Confer-ence and approved the Charter. Hence, therewere no national elections at the start of theTGE. Still, the TGE was dominated by theEPRDF party, which was controlled by theTPLF and expanded by other ethnic groups,known generally as People’s Democratic Or-ganizations (PDOs). The other major partymaking up the TGE was the OLF.

Regional and Wereda Council Electionswere called for under Article 13 of the Charter,which states:

“There shall be a law establishing local andregional councils for local administrative pur-poses defined on the basis on nationality. Elec-tions for such local and regional councils shallbe held within three months of the establish-ment of the Transitional Government, whereverlocal conditions allow.”

In anticipation of these elections, USAIDfunded a November 1991 visit to Ethiopia bythe National Democratic Institute for Interna-tional Affairs (NDI).50 The trip was arranged inresponse to a request from President MelesZenawi to former US President Jimmy Carter,who had visited the country earlier in themonth. The NDI team met with the President,major legal advisors, members of the COR,leaders of civic organizations and embassy rep-resentatives. Based on these discussions andother information, NDI’s team prepared adocument that: (1) reviewed the difficultiesEthiopia was likely to face in designing and im-plementing a democratic election system; and(2) outlined the electoral options that should beconsidered by the Council’s Committee on Elec-tions and Nationalities.51

In January 1992, NDI joined with both theInter-Africa Group (IAG), a Ethiopian civic or-

50.. NDI was established in 1983. Its objectives areto promote, maintain, and strengthen democraticinstitutions in new and emerging democracies. Sinceits establishment it has conducted democratic devel-opment programs in more than 60 countries. Its pro-grams focus on: political party training, election pro-cesses, legislative training, local government, civilmilitary relations, and civic education.51.. NDI, “Ethiopia Trip Report: NDI Elections Ad-visory Team” (Report Prepared by NDI, AddisAbaba, November 1991).

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ganization,52 and the newly formed NationalElection Commission (NEC) to carry out a one-day symposium for 30 members of the Councilof Representatives. These discussions centeredon issues related to electoral administration,campaign organization, and security.

The NEC was established in December 1991and functioned until November 1993, when itwas replaced by National Election Board ofEthiopia (NEBE). Its commissioners were se-lected from among the members of the Councilof Representatives with the objective of reflect-ing the major political groupings in the Council.It was charged with developing administrativerules and regulations for governing the overdueregional and local elections. Operating out ofoffices in the Institute of Ethiopian Nationali-ties, the NEC worked closely with the EPRDF,the Council, and electoral commissions estab-lished in 14 electoral areas.

The latter were established by ProclamationNo. 11 of 1992.53 It provided for electoral com-missions at three jurisdictional levels (region,zone, and wereda) and set forth the powers andduties of these election commissions, eligibilityrequirements for voters and candidates, regula-tions regarding the voter registration process,procedures for nominating candidates, and ac-

52.. The main focus of IDA is to mobilize Ethiopiansto participate in the democratic process throughgroup discussions on public policy issues, constitu-tional development, and the rule of law. The IDAseeks to maintain close ties with the TGE and oppo-sition parties. Because it has deliberately adopted anon-confrontational stance vis à vis the TGE, IAG issometimes described as being closely identified withthe both the TGE and its political positions and ac-tivities. However, the organization staff insists thatworking with the Government to achieve its objec-tives does not mean that it is controlled, or necessar-ily identified with, the Government. See the positionof IAG on this in: International Human Rights LawGroup, “Ethiopia in Transition: A Report on theJudiciary and the Legal Profession” (Report Preparedby the IHRLG, Washington, D.C., January 1994),pp. I/5-I/8. Strong criticism is made of IAG connec-tions to the TGE in: Ibid., p. 39.53.. “Proclamation to Provide for the Establishmentof the National, Regional, and Wereda CouncilsMembers Election Commission,” Proclamation No.11 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No. 7 (Feb-ruary 18, 1992).

ceptable forms of campaigning. Unfortunately,it proved difficult for the TGE to establish thesecommissions, and by the time the TGE calledfor elections such commissions, at all three ju-risdictional levels, were often missing or non-functional in many parts of the country. Amongthe problems that plagued the establishmentand effective functioning of these commissionswere: (1) failure to clear up some jurisdictionalboundaries among regions and weredas due toquestions of ethnicity and culture; (2) disputesamong parties within jurisdictions over the in-tentions of the TGE relative to its decentraliza-tion strategy; (3) limited understanding ofdemocratic electoral practices at regional andwereda levels; (4) unnecessary exclusion of cer-tain segments of society from the election proc-ess; and (5) lack of adequate resources and in-frastructure constraints.

These technical problems, as well as deeperpolitical problems, were revealed in the April1992 “snap elections,” which were held in 450 ofan estimated 676 weredas. Specifically, in lateJanuary 1992 the TGE called for the “selection”of election officials in the approximately 30,000kebeles, which are sub-units of the weredas.54

There were no formal campaigns or secret bal-lots. Those selected at public kebele meetingswere supposed to represent members of the twoleading political forces in the kebele and to ad-minister polling sites at the forthcoming re-gional and wereda elections. The oppositionparties charged that these snap elections weremarked by serious irregularities and led toEPRDF domination of kebele election machin-ery. The TGE canceled or disallowed some ofthe results of these elections. It also claimed tohave learned from them and decided to moveforward with the scheduled regional and localelections, seeking to hold them in June beforethe onset of the rainy season.55

In early June, to address some of theseproblems, the NEC issued “Electoral Rules of

54.. Kebeles emerged as a result of the rural andurban land reforms which established peasants asso-ciations and urban dwellers associations, both ofwhich came to be called kebeles. See: John M.Cohen and Peter H Koehn, “Rural and Urban LandReform in Ethiopia,” African Law Studies, 14(1977), pp. 3-62.55.. Transitional Government of Ethiopia, ElectionCommission Bulletin, Issue No. 3 (May 1992).

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Implementation.” These tried to address ambi-guities in Proclamation No. 11 as well as to offergreater specification in regard to the proceduresfor organizing the commissions, and the re-sponsibilities of commissions, as well as theregulations governing voter and candidate reg-istration, campaign activities, and balloting andcounting procedures. These rules were chal-lenged by several opposition parties, most no-tably the OLF, underlying the fact that the rulesof the game were not agreed upon immediatelyprior to the election.

Even though elections were postponed toJune 21, 1992, some 11 months after the ap-proval of the Charter, irregularities and griev-ances were inevitable. The call for electionscame in early 1992, when the TGE issued aProclamation to provide for the election of na-tional, regional, and wereda council members.56

The major objectives of the TGE in calling forelections was to: (1) provide regional and localgovernments with a popular mandate and sanc-tion the replacement of non-elected administra-tors designated by the TGE; (2) facilitate theresolution of simmering armed conflict amongdifferent contending ethnic groups, particularlyin southern Oromo areas; and (3) demonstratethe commitment of TGE to democratic plural-ism.

The significant political problems facing theJune elections are well summed up in an NDIstudy published after the elections:

“Planning and Preparation for the electionsencountered several formidable challenges.Ethiopia’s predominantly peasant society,overwhelming illiterate, has little collective ex-perience with the formal structures of demo-cratic government, exists in a poor state of eco-nomic development, and is just emerging fromyears of war and famine. Additional impedi-ments to creating a meaningful electoral systeminclude: intensified intra-ethnic mistrust and

56.. “Proclamation to provide for the Establishmentof the National, Regional and Wereda CouncilsMembers Election Commission,” Proclamation No.6 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No. 6, Febru-ary 9, 1992. It was amended shortly thereafter by:“Proclamation to provide for the Amendment of theCreation of Appropriate Conditions for conductingNational/Regional Self-Governments ElectionsProclamation.” Proclamation No. 12 of 1992, Nega-rit Gazeta, 51st Year, No. 7, February 18, 1992.

violent conflict; the wide availability of weap-ons; a gross disparity of power between theEPRDF and all other movements; the lack ofgenuine, functioning political parties; a publicadministration woefully ill-prepared to conductformal elections across Ethiopia’s large terri-tory; and perhaps most important, considerableambivalence regarding the TGE’s proposedelectoral transition to a new, ethnically-basedfederalism. Some Amhara political leaders, forexample, asserted that the TGE’s experimentimplied the sacrifice of an Ethiopian nationalidentity and effective central government. Al-ternatively, certain quarters within the OLF be-lieved that the proposed ethnic federalismwould merely co-opt the OLF into yet anothernorthern dominated system, and that Oromoswould thereby forfeit an historic opportunity toachieve true sovereign independence for Oro-mia.”57

As noted above, in regard to the NEC andProclamation No. 11 of 1992, the major technicalproblem with the elections was that the legalfoundations for regulating elections and theregistration of parties were not widely agreedupon. It would not be until after the April andJune elections that a more specific set of lawsand regulations would be issued.

Twenty-three countries responded to therequest of the TGE for international electionobservers and funded members of the Joint In-ternational Observer Group (JIOG). Of the morethan 200 observers provided, 70 were fundedby USAID. That aid agency also funded a localmonitoring effort carried out by the EthiopianFree Elections Observer Association (EFEOA).

It was clear from the beginning that theEPRDF was likely to dominate the elections.The fact that most parties have regional basesincreased inter-ethnic tensions, threatening thehopes for fair and broad based elections. Majordisputes arose over the encampment of TPLFand OLF forces during the elections. The ethnicfactor, as much as technical and administrativeproblems with the election process, contributedto election failure in a number of areas. In Har-beson’s words:

57.. NDI, An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elec-tions in Ethiopia, p. 2.

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“The June 1992 regional elections wereflawed not only for numerous technical reasonsbut because of the coalition’s very insecurity.”58

The potential for EPRDF domination be-came increasingly likely when during the runup to the elections a number of opposition par-ties began to withdraw from transitional institu-tions and processes. Just before the elections,the OLF and four other opposition groups boy-cotted them, with the OLF also withdrawingfrom the TGE and decamping its troops.59 Thiswithdrawal, compounded by cases of impro-prieties and harassment of non-EPRDF candi-dates during voter registration and balloting,resulted in the EPRDF and its affiliated partieswinning nearly 97 percent of the seats, resultingin a situation where there is minimal oppositionin the newly elected councils.60 Further, theSouthern Coalition (SEPCD) was dismissedfrom the Government after the Paris ConferenceDeclaration in early 1993 and the All AmharaPeople’s Organization (AAPO) emerged to givevoice to growing opposition to the TGE fromthat ethnic group.61 As a result, by mid-1993 theinitially broad political base of the TGE wassignificantly narrowed.

58.. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition,”p. 24.59.. Several reasons for this are cited in journalistic re-ports, the most commonly cited being the OLF leader-ship’s accusation that the EPRDF was giving militarysupport to its rival, the Oromo People’s DemocraticOrganization, which separated from the OLF to join theEPRDF during the period of the armed struggle. Theother major reason given is that the OLF’s demand for aguaranteed right for its region to secede was not agreedto by the EPRDF. A number of other interpersonal andarcane reasons are also cited in the press but there islittle documented information on the reasons for dis-agreement between the two groups.60.. Carter Center at Emory University, “Ethiopia,”Newsletter, 1993, p. 4.61.. In late April, 1994, the AAPO officially an-nounced its transformation to a political party inorder to comply with government legislation. Themost commonly reported reasons for Amhara oppo-sition are a belief that EPRDF policies will lead tothe dismemberment of historic Ethiopia and an an-ger among Amhara of academics, professionals, andholdovers from the ancien regime that the country isbeing governed by provincial upstarts.

The most useful study of the election proc-ess was prepared by the staff of the NDI.62 Itoutlines in some detail the contextual setting,the national electoral process, differences in thatprocess across regions, the problems thatemerged during the election process, and theeffects of those problems on the future of elec-toral democracy and civil society. As a result,the relationship between these patterns andconstraints and the activities of NDI and AAIneed only be summarized here.

Briefly, the June 21 1992 elections did notreach TGE and international community objec-tives because, in the words of NDI’s report: (1)competitive participation, for the most part, didnot occur; (2) administrative and logisticalshortcomings seriously impaired the electoralprocess; (3) elections failed to resolve the nag-ging ethnic problems concentrated in the south-ern regions of the country; and (4) despite whatmay have been the TGE’s best intentions, thevoting exercise did not educate a majority of thepopulation regarding the nature of genuine,multiparty elections.63 Further, many electionswere not effectively carried out until later.64

After the troubled elections, the TGE issueda subsequent Proclamation establishing an Elec-tion Review Board charged with looking intogrievances and complaints emerging from al-leged irregularities in the regional and weredaelections.65

b.Post-June 1992Since the elections three laws central to es-

tablishing a democratic electoral system wereissued: (1) a Proclamation on the registration ofpolitical parties;66 (2) a Proclamation providing

62.. NDI, An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elec-tions in Ethiopia, passim.63.. Ibid., pp. 3-5.64.. For example, regional election occurred in: Afarin November 1992, Somalia in January 1993, Ben-shangul in April 1993, and Harar in May 1993.65.. “Election Review Board Establishment Procla-mation,” Proclamation No. 21 of 1992, NegaritGazeta, 51st Year, No. 17, July 30, 1992.66., “Political Parties Registration Proclamation,”Proclamation No. 46 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 52ndYear, No. 37, April 27, 1993.

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an electoral law for the country;67 and (3) Regu-lations defining the procedures for electoralexecution and determination of decisions ofNational Electoral Board regulations.68 The firstdefines political parties and sets rules for theformation, registration, internal governance,and operations of parties. Its most notable pro-visions ban the registration of parties aimed atfomenting conflict by preaching hatred amongpeoples on the basis of differences in race, re-ligion and ethnicity, as well as organizationsbased on commercial or industrial activities,non-profit welfare purposes, trade unions, pro-fessional associations, mutual help organiza-tions, religious organizations, and social forma-tions.

The second is a very comprehensive lawthat seeks to meet Western standards relative tovoters, parties, candidates, and election proc-esses. In this regard, it declares that electionsshall be based on free, direct and equal popularsuffrage, voting to be secret, and decisions to bebased on majority rule. Provisions are providedfor registration of persons over 18 years of ageand the eventual establishment of constituencysize and boundaries. Among the Proclamation’smost important provisions are the specificationand registration criteria for candidature, theguarantee of freedom of campaigning, the rightof candidates to media access, the rights of rec-ognized parties and NGOs to observe the elec-toral process, the content of voter registrationdocuments and electoral rolls, and the filing ofcomplaints arising from the electoral process.

The April 1994 regulations were issued bythe NEBE. They are in essence an election coderelated to establishment of polling stations, re-sponsibilities of polling station observers, elec-toral registration rules and processes, registra-tion of candidates, voting, counting and an-nouncement of results, standards for observersand the media, and procedures for grievancehearings. Presumably it incorporates the more

67.. “Proclamation to Provide for the Electoral Lawof Ethiopia,” Proclamation No. 64 of 1993, NegaritGazeta, 52nd Year, No. 56, August 23, 1993.68.. “National Electoral Board of Ethiopia Regula-tions: Definition of the Procedure for Electoral Exe-cution and Determination of Decisions,” RegulationNo. 1 of 1994, Negarit Gazeta, 53rd Year, No. 82,April 1, 1994.

salient lessons learned from the June 1992 elec-tions.

To ensure the effective and impartial im-plementation of these and other provisions, theProclamation establishes the NEBE to replacethe NEC. It is comprised of 7 members ap-pointed by the Council of Representatives onthe basis of national representation, technicalcompetence, integrity, and experience. ThisBoard has legislative and judicial powers toconduct elections, promote public civic educa-tion relating to elections, to organize and trainmanpower required for conducting elections,analyzing election results, and recommendingrevisions in the election laws to the Council ofRepresentatives. Most importantly the Board isgiven responsibility for interrupting electoralprocesses or nullifying electoral results where itfinds fraud, rectifying electoral irregularitiesand deciding on complaints, confirming electionresults, and officially announcing the results.

The passage of these Proclamations, whichshould have been in place before the June 211992 elections, help clarify the rules of the elec-tion process. They governed the June 1994 Con-stituent Assembly elections described earlier.

Still, one observer lists several legal flaws inthese new proclamations:

“...the requirement of two years residencyin a constituency as a voting requirement; inex-act definition of constituencies and the possibil-ity that the boundaries could be altered for po-litical advantage; the high number of signaturesrequired for candidate nomination; five yearresidency requirements for candidates; and alimited window for voter election complaints.”69

These and other problems were anticipatedin 1991 by Paul B. Henze, whose paper“Thoughts on the Formation and Operation ofPolitical Parties in Ethiopia” notes:

“Dividing a country up into ethnically de-fined administrative regions can be fascinating,but it can have hideous consequences decadeshence, as we see in the ex-Soviet Union. Itmakes no allowance for population movementsthat are bound to occur as modernization anddevelopment accelerate; it creates entitlement

69.. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Transition to Democ-racy,” p. 30.

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and leads to irrational use of energy and re-sources.”70

Harbeson takes Henze’s point one step fur-ther by correctly noting the relationship be-tween the election law and the eventual consti-tutional and legal laws on decentralization. Spe-cifically, he states:

“Underlying the poor condition of the po-litical party system lies a conflation of two fun-damental but distinct issues by all par-ties...(these are) those of redefining the Ethio-pian state and establishing rules of the game fora party system to structure party competitionduring elections and at other hands. The partiesneed, on the one hand, to reestablish andbroaden collaboration and consensus on thedesign of the new Ethiopian state as expressedin a draft constitution, and, on the other hand,to define their policy differences and the termsof their electoral competition with each other.”71

It is important to note that throughout theperiod reviewed, the Carter Center at EmoryUniversity in Atlanta has been periodically in-volved in trying to mediate - or otherwise en-courage a dialogue - between the TGE and theopposition parties, most notably the OLF andAAPO. This discontinuous, and at time some-what superficial effort, has been carried out un-der its International Conflict Resolution Pro-gram. It is based on former President JimmyCarter’s November 1991 meeting with PresidentMeles Zenawi and a subsequent September1993 request by President Zenawi for CarterCenter assistance in promoting dialogue andmediation. The most recent effort by the CCEU,which ended in failure, occurred February 5-8thin Atlanta.72

70.. Paul B. Henze, Cover Letter to Paper on“Thoughts on the Formation and Operation of Politi-cal Parties in Ethiopia,” November 15, 1991, p. 2.71.. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition,”p. 27.72.. Carter Center, “Carter Center Statement onEthiopia Negotiations” (New Release by CarrieHarmon, Director, Public Information, March 23,1994), which noted: “...we have been unable to finda mutually acceptable basis for talks between thegovernment and opposition groups. President Carterhas urged all parties to continue to seek a peacefulsolution to the problems that divide them so thatEthiopia can achieve sustained peace, democracy,and economic development. President Carter has

Some knowledgeable observers believe thatthe EPRDF and the OLF are closer than therhetoric of some of the latter party’s spokesmen.Evidence for this is found in the patterns of thejust completed elections for the CA.

Implementation of the steps required tocarry out the Constituent Assembly electionswent relatively well. For example voter registra-tion was carried out adequately despite logisticsproblems, limited abilities of some lower-levelelection officials, and “official” boycotting of theprocess by the OLF, AAPO, Southern Coalitionand other opposition parties. The NEBE esti-mates that outside Addis Ababa, where about50-60% of expected registration levels werereached, 70-80% levels were reached. Candidateregistration was initially delayed. But by mid-May it had been carried out satisfactorily and intime to meet ballot printing deadlines.

Annex I is included because it providesdata on the number of voters registering for theJune 5 1994 CA election, the number of con-stituencies, and the number of candidates regis-tered. As such, it can provide a marker for fu-ture progress on democratization and the suc-cess of the NEBE in strengthening registrationprocesses and numbers.

Importantly, given EPRDF-OLF differences,the number of independent candidates is largerthan the number of candidates registered asmembers of a party. For example, AgenceFrance Presse reported on June 13th that only538 of the 1,447 registered candidates werefrom the EPRD. This suggests that those whoregistered as “independent” are members ofthese opposition parties, most probably the OLFand other southern parties. Further evidence forthis comes from the fact that the involved po-litical parties, and individuals identified withparties that have withdrawn from the process,met with the NEBE and the Ministry of Infor-mation to promote fair access to the mediaduring the election campaign for the Constitu-ent Assembly. No information is available onthe results of this dialogue.

On June 6th, Samson Getahun, the NEBEhead of legal affairs, told Reuters that pollingwent smoothly and that there was a large turn-

offered his assistance, and that of the Carter Center,in the future if asked by the major opposition partiesand the government.”

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out of the 15 million registered voters.73 How-ever, Agence France Press reported on June13th that there was “little sign of enthusiasm,but rather a disciplined showing at the polls bypeople carrying out their civic duty.” Reportsfrom other observers note that there was novoting in Region 5 and Dire Dawa, the ballotwas poorly designed, voters were not ade-quately informed about the purposes of theelection or the election process, voter turnoutwas moderate to good, little manipulation ofthe electoral process occurred, and independ-ents appear to have done well in many areas ofthe country. These observers conclude fromthese findings that the elections went far betterthan the June 1992 ones, that a solid step in thelearning process about elections and democracytook place for both the Government and voters,and the Government deserves credit for carry-ing out the election on time. Final figures on theelections are due by July 1st.

4. Judicial Reform and Human RightsGovernment efforts in this area are concen-

trated on prosecuting members of the previousregime for alleged criminal actions andstrengthening the capacity of subnationaljudges.

a. Special Prosecutor OfficeThe Office of the Special Prosecutor (SPO)

was established by Proclamation No. 22 of 1992.The SPO has operated since early 1993 and ischarged with investigating crimes committedby officials of the former regime, particularlythe estimated 50,000 extra-judicial executionsthat took place during the PMAC-PDRE’s 17year rule. In this regard, the SPO aims to havethese cases prosecuted under international legalprinciples as crimes against humanity, which ifthis occurs will make Ethiopia’s trials the mostextensive human rights trials since Nuremberg.

This is not an insignificant task. It is esti-mated that 1,500 to 2,000 former governmentofficials serving under the PMAC-PDRE werearrested after the TGE came to power in May1991. This number has been reduced to roughly1,200 since the releases of February-March 1993.These were occasioned because of habeas cor-pus proceedings and delays in moving toward 73.. Tsegaye Tadesse, “Ethiopia Poll Completed With-out Incident,” Reuters, June 5, 1994.

prosecution. SPO prosecutors still must decide,from a large number of detainees, who toprosecute.

Responsibility for overseeing extraditionand prosecution is held by the former Ministerof Justice, Ato Girma Wakjira, as the Chief Spe-cial Prosecutor. He is carrying out his dutieswith the assistance of 20 prosecutors, some ofwhom are inexperienced and some of whomhave long experience in criminal experience butwere not connected to the WPE or otherwiselinked to PMAC-PDRE excesses.

Decisions on prosecution are overdue andthe Government is under increasing pressurefrom the international community and humanrights groups to file cases against those to becharged and release those who will not becharged, whether because of presumed inno-cence or lack of evidence. Aid agencies havehelped the SPO respond to these pressures. Forexample, USAID assisted the SPO by: (1) pro-viding legal experts to the Special Prosecutor’sOffice (SPO);74 and (2) funding the phased visitsof forensic experts from the Argentine contrac-tor Equipo Argentina to review evidence re-lated to SPO prosecutions.75 DANIDA andSIDA are funding computer specialists to de-velop a relational data base that can organize anextremely large number of file documents con-taining references of multiple official involve-ment in regard to those deprived of their legal

74.. These lawyers have strong academic back-grounds in international human rights law and rele-vant practical experience in its application, and areadvising the SPO on the human rights provisions ofinternational law and how to incorporate them intoexisting domestic civil and criminal codes, as well asa proclamation that can guide eventual prosecution.They also assist in preparing prosecutors on how useinternational legal instruments, handle sensitive in-formation, and anticipate standard types of defenseoffered governments during such prosecution. One ofthese lawyers is profiled in: American Bar Associa-tion Journal. “Traveling Human Rights Lawyer,”ABA Journal (March 1994), pp. 40-1.75.. Members of Equipo Argentina spent time inAugust 1993 meeting with SPO personnel to discussexperiences in the use of forensic evidence in caseprosecution and to formulate terms of reference for amore substantive visit by the Equipo team in early1994.

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rights or executed through extra-judicial ac-tions.76

Martin Hill of Amnesty International, Lon-don, recently stated that the move towardprosecuting these 1,200 former officials, as wellas efforts to obtain the extradition of majorsenior officials of the Mengistu regime, includ-ing the junta leader himself, is “a major triumphfor human rights and democracy.”77 Relative tothe Project, he further stated that “The work ofthe forensic team is very important because itwill be very difficult to bring successful prose-cution without bodies and without their identi-fication.”

b. Judicial Training and Human RightsMovement toward a rule of law and an in-

dependent judiciary began in earnest with a1992 Proclamation to provide for the establish-ment of an independent judicial administra-tion.78 This reform of the Ministry of Justice wasfollowed by a Proclamation establishing a Judi-cial Administration Commission, to select andadminister judges, an Office of the Central At-torney General,79 defining the legal profession,80

and, most importantly, a Proclamation estab-lishing a Central Supreme, High and First In-

76.. One newspaper report notes: “The special prose-cutor’s office...has so far received 250,000 pages ofgovernment documents, from death warrants to cal-culations of the cost of executions...Col. Mengistu’swas a vicious but highly bureaucratized system -virtually every decision was noted, and copies sent tosuperiors.” George Alagiah, “Ethiopia’s pursuit ofFormer Regime May Spawn Biggest Trial ForCrimes Against Humanity Since Nuremberg,” TheGuardian (May 23, 1994).77.. Africa Link, IV, 1 (1994). See also: Alagiah,“Ethiopia’s pursuit of Former Regime.”78.. “A Proclamation to Provide for the Independ-ence of Judicial Administration,” Proclamation No.23 or 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 51st Year, No. 19,August 8, 1992.79.. “A Proclamation to Provide for the Establish-ment of the Office of the Central Attorney General ofthe Transitional Government of Ethiopia,” Procla-mation No. 39 of 1992, Negarit Gazeta, 52nd Year,No. 24, January 11, 1993.80.. “A Proclamation Regulating to Attorneys,”Proclamation No. 74 of 1993,” Negarit Gazeta, 53rdYear, No. 5, October 22, 1993.

stance Courts independent of the Ministry ofJustice.81

On the personnel side, many central, re-gional and wereda judges were removed forsuch reasons as WPE membership, extra-legalactions, and corruption. To replace them theMinistry of Justice appointed a commission toselect 600 people to act as judges within the re-gional system. Many of these persons have nolegal training. Hence, it is extremely importantto provide them with training in the philosophyof an independent judiciary, the principles ofthe rule of law, the established court proceed-ings and regulations, human rights, and thelaws and codes of Ethiopia.

Progress in aid agency efforts to assist theTGE to train these new lawyers appears to havebeen delayed because under the 1992 Proclama-tion just described, has been delayed by the re-organization of the Ministry of Justice, whichlost control of judicial administration, althoughit was assigned the functions of training judgesand providing legal draftsmanship support toTGE institutions.

Still, opportunities to train exist. For exam-ple, the Ethiopian Human Rights and PeaceCouncil, located at Addis Ababa UniversityLaw School, is currently designing workshopsfor lay judges that will be focused on humanrights and democratization issues. Eventually, ithopes to expand workshops to cover judicialindependence, supervision of the judiciary,rights of citizens, public defenders, and legalrepresentation for the poor. As presently de-signed, with initial funding from DANIDA,Phase I workshops will begin in June in Awasaand Bahir Dar. Phase II will hold workshops inRegions 1 and 4. Depending on the area, work-shops will be held in Amharic, Oromiya, So-mali, and Tigrinya. If these go well, aid agenciesmay provide further assistance to judicialtraining.

Finally, it is important to note that the In-ternational Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG)reviewed the status of judicial reform, the legalprofession, including legal training, and civicorganizations involved in the promotion of hu-man rights. The terms of reference for thisstudy were to: (1) review the present state of

81.. “A Proclamation to Amend the Central Gov-ernment Courts Establishment,” Proclamation No.72 of 1993, 53rd Year, No. 1, October 7, 1993.

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judicial and legal affairs in Ethiopia; (2) analyzerecent laws governing judicial administration,jurisdiction of the courts, and the Law School’scurriculum; and (3) give aid agencies a betteridea of where problems existed in the judicialand legal system so they could use their re-sources more effectively. Unfortunately, theutility of the lengthy findings and recommenda-tions contained in the resultant report was ne-gated by the apparent anti-TGE biases of theprincipal author and his decision to circulatethe draft report to the Ministry of Justice andother TGE officials without thorough editingand without prior review by the fundingagency.

The final report was released in April 1994.It includes the critical responses of TGE offi-cials.82 In this regard, it is worth noting that Mr.Makau published several extra-curricular andhighly critical articles on the TGE just prior tothe release of the IHRLC draft.83

A new look at the judicial sector is currentlybeing carried out with SIDA funding. This is apreliminary step toward an emerging large-scale SIDA program for assisting Ethiopia’s ju-diciary.

5. Media ReformSeveral significant changes in the overall

environment affecting the media have occurredsince 1992. The most important of these was anew press law proclaimed in October 1992. Itprovided the legal outlines for the rights andresponsibilities of a free press in Ethiopia.84

82.. International Human Rights Law Group,“Ethiopia in Transition: A Report on the Judiciaryand the Legal Profession” (Report Prepared by theIHRLG, Washington, D.C., January 1994). The let-ters include those of the SPO, the Minister of Justice,the IAG, which was criticized in the report for beingtoo close to the TGE, and the widely circulated andangry letter to “Dear Vern,” written by an unknownbut obviously well connected Ethiopian. A responseto these criticisms, by Mr. Reed Brody, ExecutiveDirector of IHRLG, prefaces the report and should beconsidered.83.. Makau Mutua, “Democracy’s Bid Fades in Ethio-pia,” Christian Science Monitor (August 18, 1993); andhis “Ethiopia: The New Oligarchy,” Africa Report(September/October 1993).84.. “A Proclamation to Provide for the Freedom ofthe Press,” Proclamation No. 34 of 1992, Negarit

Following approval of this law, 173 new privatepapers and periodicals registered with the Gov-ernment. But there are only about 30 regularlypublished private weekly newspapers and 13magazines.

Many of the founders and editors of thenew private papers are those dismissed fromthe Government of the previous regime fol-lowing the installation of the TGE. Most ob-servers have concluded that the private presssees itself as the Government’s opposition. Be-yond this view there is disagreement amongthose who follow media prosecutions. Someoutside observers argue that the free press isfrequently unprofessional, sensational, and car-rying out a hearsay-based vendetta. Others ad-mit to these problems but assert that they arelargely due to TGE secretiveness, which limitsthe information flow, leading to questionable,sometimes sensational, speculation by privatepress reporters and editors.85 Most observersalso note there is conflict between and amongprivate presses, much of which appears to re-late to charges and counter charges as to who istoo close to the TGE. In any case, it is clear thatthe TGE needs to better understand the impor-tance of accurate information flows and thepress needs to follow professional standardsrelated to the release, verification, and presenta-tion of information.

The TGE has periodically arrested and trieda number of journalists, mainly from the privateside but also including several governmentjournalists. The best available evidence suggeststhat as of late March 1994 there were 18 jour-nalists in jail.86 All had been arrested under pro-

Gazeta, 52nd Year, No. 8, October 21, 1992. Thisfollowed: “A Proclamation to Provide for the Deter-mination of the Application of State Owned MassMedia,” Proclamation No.6 of 1991, Negarit Gazeta,51st Year, No. 1, October 3, 1991.85.. The EFPJA claims that the free press has ex-posed corruption and nepotism, as well as provokeddiscussion and public debates on vital issues relatedto the economy, urban land lease policy, rural land,status of expropriated urban houses, the constitution,ethnic purges in the public sector, and TGE-Eritrearelations. Press Release (Addis Ababa, May 13,1994).86.. The Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Associa-tion issued an April 22, 1994 press release giving thenames, charges, and sentences for 30 journalists and

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visions of the penal code of 1957. Those arrestedand their supporters claimed that the arrestswere made only because the Government isoversensitive to criticism and desires to sup-press opposition statements and views. The va-lidity of this claim is difficult to judge. Someobservers say that the arrested journalists de-serve their treatment because of false and mis-leading articles. Other observers point out thatserious journalists have also been arrested andthe effect is to hinder the advancement of a re-sponsible, independent private press.

Despite arrests and harassment, it is esti-mated that 3-5 new press organs start eachweek. But new presses frequently go underquickly, largely because they lack the financialbase required to establish themselves and be-cause their editors and journalists are jailed.

There are three different press associations.The first was established under the PMAC-PDRG and still exists. The second, the EJA, or-ganized in July 1993, includes over 400 dues-paying members. Of these, only 15-20 journal-ists are from the private sector. According tothe President of the EJA, their 400 membersrepresent 90% of all journalists in Ethiopia. Theother association, the Ethiopian Free Press Jour-nalists Association (EFPJA), started in March1993, and has a small membership. This associa-tion is not open to government journalists.

In summary, few journalists have any for-mal journalism training and many of those whodo, received their training in Eastern Europe.Further, there is no code of ethics nor facility tojudge peers against this code outside of a crimi-

claiming that an additional 13 existed, the names ofwhich have not been released by the CID. EFPJA,“To All Concerned” (Press Release, Addis Ababa,April 22, 1994). Contrary to this statement, theMinister of Justice stated on April 20th that onlythree journalists from the private press were impris-oned on court decisions, one of whom is detainedonly because he has not paid his fine. Perhaps thequalification “on court decisions” is the distinguish-ing factor. The Minister dismissed the Amharicservice of the VOA’s report that 24 journalists andeditors of the private press had been arrested in pastmonths. He said journalists were arrested for print-ing pornographic press products, interfering withreligious affairs, inciting people against the govern-ment, and spreading rumors and unfounded infor-mation.

nal court of law. Most western journalists haveconcluded that the emerging private pressseems to have lost an historic opportunity to bea strong, credible countervailing force. For themthe private press has instead engaged in unpro-fessional reporting, focusing on only a few in-flammatory issues such as ethnicity and region-alism. Substantial progress needs to be made bythe owners and editors of private presses intraining their journalists and ensuring responsi-ble reporting and analysis.

6. Civic Associations and AdvocacyGroups

The emergence of various kinds of politicaland civic organizations in the nongovernmentsector is expected to be an important element inEthiopia’s democratic transition. This was re-cently highlighted in the April 29, 1994 testi-mony of Irvin Hicks, Ambassador Nominee toEthiopia, to a Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee:

“As the democratic process takes shape, Iam concerned that too many groups remainoutside the political process. President Meleshas pledged that the TGE will work to makewider participation possible – a pledge that theU.S. intends to make effective, providing thoseEthiopians desiring a participatory democracyan opportunity they would do well to seize. Ifconfirmed...I would do my utmost to promotepeaceful dialogue among Ethiopians and dis-courage those who, after thirty years of war andsuffering, still appear attracted to violent solu-tions to Ethiopia’s complex problems.”

In other African countries, political liberali-zation has led to the rapid emergence of civicaction and interest groups. But in Ethiopia theformation of such organizations has occurred atonly a moderate pace. In the absence of reliabledata on such organizations, it can only be esti-mated that there are at most 10-20 civic actionand interest groups actively involved in thedemocratic transition. Some groups, such as theEthiopian Free Election Observers Association(OFEOA), which early on in the transitionplayed a more active and visible role in thepublic policy debate, seem to have loweredtheir profiles. New groups have been slow toemerge. In sum, such associations are not atpresent taking up leadership or advocacy rolesin the policy debate surrounding the politicaltransition.

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Three hypotheses may help explain whythis is the case: (1) organizational harassment orover-regulation by the TGE, or what might betermed a hostile operating environment; (2) lackof interest by the populace; (3) financing prob-lems (linked either to external funding agenciesor to the organization’s own capacities to re-quest, raise, and/or manage funds); and (4) ex-tremely thin leadership in great need ofstrengthening.

Many civic associations and advocacygroups are inadequately prepared to take onresponsibilities. Even when resources are avail-able, several of the organizations, particularlythose operating in the civic sector, have dis-played a marked inability to generate, evenwith substantial encouragement, either substan-tive ideas or proposals for aid agency fundingof even modest quality. Beyond this some asso-ciations and groups appear more interested inrent seeking than in promoting civic awareness.

Funding problems constrain the activity ofmost civic associations and advocacy groups.At present such organizations rely almost en-tirely on external support. Few are in any waymembership organizations. Observers believethat fund raising opportunities within the coun-try are quite restricted.

Such organizations also appear constrainedby confusion surrounding TGE requirementsfor registration. Proactive civic action groupsappear particularly inhibited by the registrationrequirements. Some observers think that regis-tration has become more difficult as a result ofthe refusal of opposition parties to participate inthe process. They also note that the withdrawalof these parties led to disillusionment with theTransitional Government’s commitment to anopen process and a conclusion, whether true ornot, that citizen groups would not be allowedparticipate freely in the debates relating to theestablishment of a new government system.

It is presently difficult to get any picture onthe extent of public interest in civic action ac-tivities. Views on the level of voters’ interestvary. Most observers believe it will be difficultto stimulate proactive civic action groups be-cause of the historical legacy of non-debate ofand non-participation in political questions. Es-tablished associations and groups are cautious,especially those dependent on outside sourcesof funding and focused on topics related topeace, human rights, and the civics of democ-

racy. “Development” NGOs appear to beemerging from the established “relief” NGOcategory and may eventually complement themore civic action oriented organizations. Butprogress toward this transition is slow.

Because of the low level of NGO or civicorganization activity, rate at which various tar-get groups (voters, community leaders, judges,etc.) are being reached through associationsponsored civic education or other kinds oftraining activities is low. It should be noted thatdonor funding helps local associations andgroups withstand possible harassment by localofficials, though there is little evidence that thishappens to non-party affiliated civic associa-tions and advocacy groups.87

If the constitutional process (drafting, elec-tion of the Constituent Assembly, and debate inthat forum) goes as expected, there should beample new opportunities for debate of criticalissues raised by the Constitution and in prepa-ration for the regional and national electionsrequired to establish a permanent government.To take advantage of this opportunity, a reori-entation of civic education is needed, particu-larly in regard to regional issues and govern-ance. For this to happen it will be necessary forthe currently weak central organizations to de-centralize. Doing this may prove quite difficult.

In regard to civic action associations andadvocacy groups, aid agencies should considerfunding an activity that trains members in lead-ership, assists them in improving their organ-izational design and operation, informs mem-bers in proposal writing format and technique,and advises members on standard reportingand accounting practices.

Economic Development and theDemocratic Transition

The TGE recognizes that a successful transi-tion to both democracy and the control of inter-ethnic conflict rests on stimulating broad basedeconomic growth. In aid negotiations in 1992the Government appeared prepared to invest ininfrastructure and agricultural development,

87.. The veracity of claims is difficult to determine. Itappears the Oromo Relief Association has been har-assed, but this probably results from its failure to breakits link with the OLF.

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ensure food security, promote the progress andsecurity of the rural and urban poor, introduceeffective environmental protection policies,make a transition to a market based economy,improve fiscal, monetary, and budgetary man-agement, and strengthen public investmentplanning and implementation.88

In this regard there is pressing need for theTGE and aid agencies to have a better under-standing of the relationship between effectiverural based development and the possibility ofestablishing and sustaining ethnicity-based de-mocracy and improved governance in Ethiopia.The Huntington paper discussed earlier raisesgrave questions as to whether it is possible forany poor under-developed rural based countryto achieve, establish, and sustain a democraticgovernment, particularly when it is organizedalong ethnic regional and political lines.89 In hisanalysis, Huntington recognizes a poor countrycan overcome this deep structural constraint ifit has: (a) committed leadership; and (b) a wellconceived and financed development programaimed at improving the income and well-beingof farmers and the urban poor. The exampleHuntington offers the TGE is Ghandi and Ne-hru’s efforts to promote democracy and devel-opment in India after 1948.

Hence it is imperative that the TGE and aidagencies formulate and implement an effectiveeconomic development strategy. Initial work onthis topic took place shortly after the end of thePMAC-PDRG, which in turn grew out of WorldBank-SIDA efforts to get the Mengistu regimeto reverse its support for agrarian socialism andmove toward a market-based small holder sys-tem.90 But whatever work has been carried out

88.. World Bank, Ethiopia’s Economy in the 1980sand Framework for Accelerated Growth (Washing-ton, D.C.: Country Operations Division, EasternAfrica Department, Africa Region, Report No. 8062-ET, March 14, 1990); World Bank, “Memorandumand Recommendation of the President of the Inter-national Development Association to the ExecutiveDirectors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 104.9 Millionto Ethiopia for an Emergency Recovery and Recon-struction Project” (Paper Prepared by the WorldBank, Report No. P-5702-ET, March 9, 1992).89.. Huntington, “Political Development in Ethiopia: APeasant-Based Dominant-Party Democracy?” passim.90.. This decade-long debate is reviewed in: John M.Cohen and N. Isaksson, “Food Production Debates in

by aid agencies relative to agricultural and ruraldevelopment since the end of the PMAC-PDRGdoes not appear to have been expressly linkedto the economic growth conditions that supportthe emergence of democratization. What workhas been done could provide the basis forlaunching such studies.91

Available evidence suggests the TGE policyon agricultural and rural development favors:(1) usufruct with long leaseholds and Govern-ment ownership; (2) unimodal small holderproduction systems; (3) regional/ethnic deter-mination of land tenure rules based on Gov-ernment determined range of variations; and (4)partial exchange to free market system in local

Revolutionary Ethiopia,” World Development, XIII,12 (1985), pp. 1211-30. This article was the subjectof a sustained debate over whether or not there was acompromise policy that stood mid-way between theagrarian socialism advocated by the communist leftin the PMAC-PDRG and a western style, land own-ing small-holder system: Siegfried Pausewang, et al.,Ethiopia: Options for Rural Development (London:Zed Books Ltd., 1990).91.. The importance of land tenure and agriculturaldevelopment is not a strong component in the docu-ments reviewed. For example see the schedules offinancing by major aid agencies and brief text in:International Development Association, “EmergencyRecovery and Reconstruction Project” (Memoran-dum and Recommendation Prepared for the Execu-tive Directors, Report P-5702-ET, Washington,D.C., March 9, 1992), pp. 10-15; 23-4. One aca-demic study of the type needed is: Solomon Bekure,“Priming the Pump of Economic Growth: A Strategyfor Agricultural Development in Ethiopia” (PaperPresented Symposium on Economic Development inEthiopia During the Transition Period, Africa Hall,Addis Ababa, January 1992).

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markets.92 In support of these activities, sus-tained research and analysis is required on: (1)agricultural and rural development policy, asset in a larger macro-economic context; (2) gen-eral trends in agricultural production and basichuman services that have marked the 1990s; (3)the position of aid agencies on Governmentpolicy and potential support for agriculturaldevelopment; and (4) the likelihood of theabove patterns and trends leading to the signifi-cant increase in income and standard of livingrequired to build a sustainable rural base for thepromotion of democracy and progressive gov-ernance in a country marked by regional andpolitical ethnicity.

92.. For example: Transitional Government ofEthiopia, Ethiopia’s Economic Policy During theTransitional Period (Addis Ababa: GovernmentPrinter, November 1991), pp 21-6.

Annex I: Results of Voter and Candidate Registration for June 5, 1994,Constituent Assembly Election (by Region)

Region No. Registered Voters

(Est. eligible voters)

No. of Constituencies3

(Minority NationalityConstituencies)

Total No. CandidatesRegistered

(Party/independent

Region 1 1,226,208 37 (2) 69 (37/32)Region 2 337,341 6 33 (31/2)Region 3 3,107,183 137 (1) 404 (139/265)Region 4 4,444,423 178 564 (166/394)

(560)Region 5 *** *** ***Region 6 155,494 8 (2) 27 (6/21)SouthernPeople’s

3,531,269 108 (15) 258 (122/136)

Region 12 49,360 2 (1) 14 (3/11)Region 13(Harar)

35,304 2 (1-Harari) 8 (5/3)

Dire Dawa 35,728 2 8 (3/3)Region 14Addis Ababa

539,946 (1,128,781) 53%

23 62 (27/35)

Total 13,462,2561 503 (22)2 1447 (539/904) [1443]

Source: National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)

Notes:1 NEBE’s figures indicate total registration of 13,621,6002 NEBE’s figures indicate a total of 548 constituencies of which 22 are National Minority constituencies –presumably the difference is accounted for by Region 5.3 The number of constituencies is based on estimated population; special constituencies have also beenallocated to certain minor ethnic/national groups who, it was felt, would otherwise by unrepresented inGovernment due to their size.