developing engineering leadership at nasa dr. ed hoffman nasa chief knowledge officer
TRANSCRIPT
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Developing Engineering Leadership at NASA
Dr. Ed HoffmanNASA Chief Knowledge Officer
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I. Cassini: Creative Solutions in a Complex Project Environment
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Cassini-Huygens
U.S. - European mission to explore Saturn
NASA and Italian Space Agency: Cassini spacecraft
European Space Agency: Huygens probe
Launched October 1997
6.7 year voyage to Saturn
Total cost to date: $3B+
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Cassini• Delivered Huygens
probe to Titan• Remained in orbit
around Saturn
Huygens• Released by Cassini to
land on surface of Saturn’s moon Titan
Cassini
Saturn
Titan
Huygens
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The Complex Project Environment
Complex Project-Based Organization
Functional Organization
Problems Novel Routine
Technology New/invented Improved/more efficient
Team Global, multidisciplinary Local, homogeneous
Cost Life cycle Unit
Schedule Project completion Productivity rate
Customer Involved at inception Involved at point of sale
Survival skill Adaptation Control/stability
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DIMENSIONS Technical Organizational StrategicCHARACTERISTICS
RISK
Interfaces
Technology development requirements
Interdependencies among technologies
Technical
Partners and suppliers Distributed/virtual team
Decentralized authority
Horizontal project organization Intensive learning needs
Talent requirements
Social
Stakeholders
Socio-political context
Funding
Geopolitical interests
Political
Complexity
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Journey to Saturn included “gravity assists” (slingshot acceleration effects) from Venus, Earth and Jupiter - incredibly precise timing
Cassini orbiter would “insert” Huygens probe in orbit of Titan (one of Saturn’s moons)
Complex communications among Cassini, Huygens, Deep Space Network, and ground system
Technical Complexity: Zero Room for Error
Huygens descent to surface of Titan
Cassini trajectory to Saturn
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Italian Space Agency ESA
Cassini high-gain antenna; radio subsystemequipment
Organizational + Strategic Complexity
NASA
Cassini orbiter; launch vehicleand associatedintegration & test
Huygens probeand associatedcommunications equipment on Cassini orbiter
International partnerships affect organizational and strategic complexity
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Organizational Complexity
• 260 scientists
• 17 countries • 10 time zones
• 18 scientific instruments (payloads) with Principal Investigators
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Project Management Challenge
All 18 payloads had reserves:• Cost ($ per fiscal year) • Mass (kg)• Power (watts)• Data rate to the spacecraft bus (kilobytes/second) Overruns would lead to de-scoping (i.e., instruments cut)
Problem:How would you manage the reserves to increase the likelihood that all instruments would fly on the spacecraft?
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Challenge Solved
Solution:
Electronic trading exchange for Principal Investigators to trade reserves in cost, mass, power, and data rate.
• Governed by project management team (incl. veto power)
• Created win-win incentive for all• Gave PIs ownership / assured buy-in
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II. Learning from Failure
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Learning from Failure pt. 1
“NASA's current organization…has not demonstrated the characteristics of alearning organization.”Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
Challenger accident
Mars failures
Columbia accident
1986
1999
2003
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Why Projects Fail
Factors that Drive Program Costs and Technical Risks(1992 Jack Lee Study)
• Inadequate Phase B definition (i.e., before Preliminary Design Review)
• Unrealistic dependence on unproven technology• Annual funding instability• Complex organizational structure, including multiple unclear
interfaces• Cost estimates that are often misused• Scope additions due to “requirements creep”• Schedule slips• Acquisition strategy that does not promote cost containment
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“7 Deadly Sins”
1. Vague roles, accountability, and delegated authority.
2. Team leaders in over their heads / ineffective.
3. Poor acquisition planning with poorly incentivized /
structured contracts. (Or contractors doing the wrong work.)
4. The defined scope is not doable within available resources.
5. Structures don’t support efficient systems engineering.
6. Ineffective risk management process.7. Broken project team context.
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Review Boards and ExpertsChallenger “… signals of potential danger … were repeatedly normalized … at the intersection of the social and technical …. “Normalization of Deviance.” (Diane Vaughn)
Hubble “A leadership failure was the root cause.” (Lew Allen)
Mars Climate Orbiter “Communications failure was the root cause.” (Noel Hinners)
Columbia “In our view, the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with this accident as the foam. Organizational culture refers to the basic values, norms, beliefs, and practices that characterize the functioning of an institution.” (Doug Osheroff)
PMI “… ultimately projects fail or succeed on the basis of the individuals assigned to the project team, the culture and the leadership.” (Eleanor Haupt)
Technical expertise and process excellence are necessary but not sufficient for success.
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Responses to Failures Examples
Standards and policies Revised procedures and requirements for project management; revised governance model
Communications Procedures to encourage dissenting opinions; case studies on lessons learned; senior leadership focus on communications
Training and development NASA Academy (individual training, team support, organizational learning)
Technical excellence NASA Engineering and Safety Center; NASA Safety Center; technical authority
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A New Way of Thinking and Learning
To cope with a challenging world, any entity must develop the capacity ofshifting and changing—of developing new skills and attitudes; in short the capacity of learning.
Arie De Geus, The Living Company
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Qualities of an Adaptive Organization
1. Elephants in the room are named.
2. Responsibility for the future is shared.
3. Independent judgment is expected.
4. Leadership capacity is developed.
5. Reflection and continuous learning are
institutionalized.
Source: Grashow, Heifetz, & Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership
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Learning from Failure pt. 2
Challenger accident
Mars failures
Columbia accident
Individual PMCompetence
TeamPerformance
Knowledge /Communication
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Integrated Competency Model
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Role of the Office of the Chief Engineer
Policy Governance
Learning
Alignment with organizational strategy; codified knowledge of best practices
Checks + balancesamong projects,engineering, andsafety communities
Capability-building atindividual, team andorganizational levels
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IV. Knowledge at NASA
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NASA requires many different kinds of knowledge, including: Codified knowledge- Scientific knowledge- Engineering and technical knowledge - Business processesKnow-how- Techniques and craftsmanship- Social knowledge (e.g., political savvy)
All are critical to mission success.
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Managing knowledge is critical for:
• Sustaining and expanding the use of the Agency’s intellectual capital across NASA’s enterprises and generations
• Increasing collaboration across barriers
• Supporting our people in executing NASA's missions efficiently and effectively.
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EFFECTIVENESS
PEOPLE
SYSTEMS
Culture ofopennessand sharing
Networks,alliances, andcommunitiesof practice
Accessibleinformation,user-friendlyservices
Infusion oflessons learned,mishaps, andbest practices
Knowledge Effectiveness = People + Systems
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CKOs outside NASA have tried to “manage” all the knowledge in their organizations…and failed.Given the complex nature of knowledge at NASA, the agency has adopted a federated model for coordination and collaboration of knowledge activities. The NASA CKO functions as a facilitator and champion for knowledge.Each NASA center and mission directorate has a CKO to address knowledge needs at the local level.
What Does the CKO Do?
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Tools for Managing Knowledge
Map Network
Policy
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Knowledge Categories
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Knowledge Networks
NASA
Government Industry/ NGO
• Federal KM Working Group• CIA• FBI
• APQC• IPMC• World Bank
• Agency CKO• Local CKOs/POCs • Communities of
practice
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Knowledge Policy
1. Governance model: federated approach to knowledge2. Roles and responsibilities3. Common vocabulary and definitions – six categories of
knowledge services
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V. Closing Thoughts
– The practitioner knows best
– Reflection is a critical part of learning
– Sharing is learned through culture
– Learning happens through motivation