deterrence and conflict - university of michigan press

CHAPTER 3

Deterrence and Conflict

In the past two decades, the rapid growth in quantitative research oninternational con›icts has expanded into the area of deterrence stud-ies. The attempts at quantitative testing of deterrence have quicklycome under criticism on the grounds that many elements of deter-rence, such as threat credibility and deterrence success or failure, aredif‹cult to establish, let alone quantify. This chapter addresses sev-eral key conceptual and measurement problems that have oftenweakened the validity of empirical research in this area. The discus-sion starts with the issue of the difference between deterrence andcompellence, then clari‹es the problems resulting from previousambiguities in distinguishing between general and immediate deter-rence. This distinction, in turn, facilitates a better delineation of thegeneric decision structure and stages in deterrence encounters. Thechapter also examines the issue of what can be tested logically indeterrence theory and what has been claimed to have been tested (i.e.,deterrence success), but fails to meet the logical criteria of testabilityin the ‹rst place.

The conceptual discussion should then lead to a re-formula-tion of several analytical elements in deterrence theory, whichallows for a more valid and reliable quantitative analysis of deter-rence encounters. Yet the analysis remains consistent with thesemantics and lexicography of traditional deterrence literature,which has been persistently skeptical about systematic large-Nresearch in this area. The chapter also introduces a new data set ofdeterrence cases between major powers from 1895 to 1985, whichresulted from thorough historical research and guided by the rigor-ous conceptual and operational rules discussed here. This newcomprehensive set of deterrence cases will accordingly provide theempirical grounds for testing the theoretical framework outlined inthe introduction.

47

Conceptual Issues and Deterrence

In general, deterrence refers to a situation in which one side (i.e., thedeterrer) threatens to retaliate if the other side (i.e., the potentialattacker) takes some unacceptable action. Both the unacceptableaction and the threatened retaliation may be undertaken through theuse of military, economic, diplomatic, or other means. This generalde‹nition of deterrence also indicates that the main function of deter-rence is to prevent some action from happening. In the military con-text, its most common purpose is to prevent an adversary from usingforce. In the strategic literature, therefore, deterrence theory stipulatesthe conditions for preventing wars.

The Notions of Deterrence

Although there is a general agreement on what constitutes deterrence,there are variations in understanding of the speci‹c properties of deter-rence as a relational concept. First, some specify that deterrence is dif-ferent from compellence (Schelling 1960, 1966; Snyder 1961). The prob-lem is that it is dif‹cult sometimes to distinguish compellence fromdeterrence, as states often use both strategies simultaneously. AsLebow and Stein conclude from their extensive case studies, “Deter-rence may be used to reinforce compellence, and compellence to deter”(1990, 352). In other words, although they are distinct analytical con-cepts, the difference between them may be blurred in reality. For thisreason, some even de‹ne deterrence in terms of compellence, that is, asa “theory about the ways in which an actor manipulates threats toharm others in order to coerce them into doing what he desires” (Jervis1979, 292). Generally, however, deterrence is rather understood as dis-suasion of an adversary from a speci‹c action rather than as coercioninto an action. The latter situation is more often identi‹ed as “compel-lence,” at least for analytical purposes. In its most elemental form,therefore, “strictly speaking, the word ‘deterrence’ means dissuasionby terror” (Kahn 1965, 280).

It is also typical to think of deterrence as an action that involvesthe threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards (Kaufmann 1956;Snyder 1961; George and Smoke 1974). The latter form is character-ized as deterrence by positive inducements, while the former (which ismore often practiced) is characterized as deterrence by negative sanc-tions. Another common approach to deterrence speci‹es that thedeterrer threatens by convincing the adversary that the costs and risks

48 When the Stakes Are High

of the undesired action would outweigh its potential bene‹ts (Snyder1961), as well as the bene‹ts of inaction (Kaufmann 1956). Conse-quently, it is typical for this approach to imply the classical de‹nitionof deterrence as “simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that thecosts and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh itsbene‹ts” (George and Smoke 1974, 11). In this respect, Snyder (1961,14–16) distinguishes between deterrence by denial (which threatens todecrease the bene‹ts from an undesired action) and deterrence by pun-ishment (which threatens to increase the costs of such an action). Thisis an important distinction since, under the in›uence of Schelling’sclassic statement of the theory of commitments in the nuclear age(1960, 1966), much of the literature has focused on strategies thatmight enhance deterrence success by punishment, i.e., by “manipulat-ing” the adversary’s costs and risks from an undesired action. Boththeoretical and empirical works on “deterrence by denial” throughinducements and via positive incentives are rather scarce in the strate-gic literature and, arguably, are often neglected in the of‹cial foreignpolicies as well (for a similar criticism, see George and Smoke 1974,chap. 21; 1989, 182).

These different de‹nitional angles have greater consequences fortesting a theory of deterrence. As will be seen later, disagreements overidentifying particular historical cases as examples of deterrence orsomething else (e.g., compellence) often result from different concep-tual approaches to deterrence and only secondarily from differentempirical interpretations of historical facts.

Deterrence Success and Failure

Scholars are divided over how to approach deterrence success and fail-ure. According to some, deterrence failed if the threatener had to useforce (e.g., Karsten, Howell, and Allen 1984), while the others considerdeterrence to fail if the threatener either had to use substantial force ordid not attain its policy goals (e.g., Huth and Russett 1988, 1990).Deterrence theorists are sometimes criticized for speaking of deter-rence failure when war breaks out, but the criticism is misplaced. Bothcritics and deterrence proponents sometimes confuse conceptualde‹nitions with causal inference. Quester makes a critical observationthat de‹ning deterrence failure in terms of the outbreak of war is “tau-tological” and furthermore incorrect because “many wars may eruptsimply because of inadequate retaliatory threats” (1989; emphasisadded). This remark is relevant as it points to the perplexing nature of

Deterrence and Con›ict 49

what constitutes deterrence failure. It can also be argued, however, thatde‹ning deterrence failure in terms of the outbreak of war is not neces-sarily tautological unless it implies an exclusive causal linkage betweenthe strategy of deterrence and its failure. Deterrence may fail for manyreasons and not necessarily for those related to the effectiveness ofdeterrent threats. It may fail because of inadequate threats, but it mayalso fail despite threats, because it may be that some other factors havea stronger impact on the attacker’s decision than the deterrer’s behav-ior. Hence, the de‹nition of what constitutes deterrence failure shouldbe treated separately from the question of what caused this failure. Ifthe threat is intended to prevent the use of force, then the use of forcemarks the deterrence failure notwithstanding the reasons for it. Mostrecent empirical research is thus quite correct in identifying deterrencefailure in terms of the use of force as long as no causal inference isimplied.

On the other hand, the same argument is not applicable forde‹ning deterrence success. Namely, a potential attacker’s restraintfrom using force because of the deterrer’s threats indicates that deter-rence has succeeded. Analysts of deterrence are therefore correct whenthey de‹ne deterrence success as “a situation in which a state’s leaderswant to resort to force, prepare to do so, but ultimately decide torefrain because of the military capability and demonstrated resolve oftheir adversary” (Lebow and Stein 1987, 24; also Huth and Russett1984, 497). In other words, the term deterrence success implies that theabsence of war should be attributed to the effectiveness of threats. Onthe other hand, nonviolent outcomes of international crises may resultfrom many conditions despite the deterrent threat, rendering theidenti‹cation of cases of deterrence success dif‹cult. Moreover, theabsence of a challenge to a deterrer’s threat against upsetting the statusquo should not necessarily be interpreted as a deterrence success; apotential challenger may restrain itself from upsetting the status quofor many reasons, not all of which are attributable to a deterrent threat(George and Smoke 1989, 178). For instance, the putative Challengermay already be satis‹ed with the status quo.

The following Kissinger quote astutely acknowledges how it canbe misleading to attribute the absence of war to the deployment of aparticular deterrent strategy.

The Nuclear Age turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrenceinto an esoteric intellectual exercise. Since deterrence can only betested negatively, by events that do not take place, and since it isnever possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred, it


became especially dif‹cult to assess whether the existing policywas the best possible policy or a just barely effective one. Perhapsdeterrence was even unnecessary because it was impossible toprove whether the adversary ever intended to attack in the ‹rstplace. (1994, 608)

Only if an analyst controls for all possible conditions except for thedeterrer’s threats, a quite impossible endeavor, may we say that apotential attacker abstained from using force because of the deterrer’sthreats. In addition, the analyst must demonstrate that the attackerindeed intended to use force in the ‹rst place. Since the ‹rst require-ment is impossible to achieve and the second is mostly speculative, it isquestionable whether deterrence success can ever be validly tested.1

On the other hand, Kissinger’s implication that deterrence canonly be tested negatively, that is, via those cases where deterrence didnot fail, does not seem to offer a satisfactory resolution to the method-ological problem. If we are interested in the conditions promotingdeterrence success, then focusing only on cases with a “successful”deterrent outcome would yield results on necessary conditions at best.Furthermore, these same conditions may also precede deterrence fail-ures (Jervis 1989, 193–94). The impossibility of interpreting the nonvi-olent outcome of dispute as a deterrence success does not necessarilyleave us with just the option of considering only those cases wheredeterrence fails. It is, in fact, vital to consider both cases of deterrencefailure and nonfailure, but it is essential not to automatically interpretthe latter as a deterrence success. Some empirical analysts acknowledgethis important analytical issue (e.g., Huth and Russett 1984, 497),though many others, despite its methodological relevance, continue tolabel peaceful resolutions as deterrence success.

Major Types of Deterrence

Several criteria can be used for distinguishing various forms of deter-rence. First, deterrence can be exercised in different areas of foreignpolicy, though the primary concern of scholars and practitioners isoverwhelmingly in the domain of national security, especially nuclearstrategy. In the context of military deterrence, we can further differen-tiate between strategic (nuclear) and substrategic (conventional) levelsof deterrence, and, within the latter category, we can separate thedeterrence of local and limited wars from the deterrence of less violentcon›icts (George and Smoke 1989, 172).

Second, we can make a typology of deterrence cases based on the


question of what constitutes a deterrent threat. It is conventional torecognize deterrent threats through public verbal statements issued byof‹cial governments, but deterrent threats have been interpreted, bothby analysts and policymakers, in many other ways. They can also bemanifested through behavioral forms that imply a threat, such as themovement of troops into particular areas, partial or complete mobi-lization, putting forces (nuclear or conventional) on the highest alert,and so forth. Though not accompanied by explicit verbal warnings,these actions constitute unspoken signals of a deterrer’s intent to takeaction unless the other side changes its behavior. That deterrence canbe manifested in diverse ways is important, because it can signi‹cantlyaffect the identi‹cation of deterrence cases in empirical analysis.

Third, most quantitative studies of deterrence follow Morgan’s(1983) distinction between general and immediate deterrence:

Immediate deterrence concerns the relationship between opposingstates where at least one side is seriously considering an attackwhile the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to pre-vent it. General deterrence relates to opponents who maintainarmed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither isanywhere near mounting an attack. (Morgan 1983, 30; emphasisin the original)

The distinction is quite intuitive, though it is apparent that it can bedif‹cult, according to this de‹nition, to distinguish an arms race, forinstance, from “cases” of general deterrence.

Finally, another widely used classi‹cation, relevant especially formajor power relations, makes a distinction between direct and extendeddeterrence. Basic or direct deterrence refers to the prevention of attackon the deterrer’s home territory. In extended deterrence, a stateattempts to deter an attack on a third party, such as an ally (e.g., Weede1983, 234 ; Huth and Russett 1988, 30), a protégé (Stein 1987, 326; Wu1990), a “pawn” (Russett 1963; Zagare and Kilgour 2000), or any otherstate (George and Smoke 1974, 58; Lebow and Stein 1990, 336).

Extended Deterrence as the Prevalent Deterrence Form

Extended deterrence is a common and precarious element of majorpower relationships, but it was not directly addressed in the literatureuntil very recently. In particular, a series of works by Huth and Russettlaid the grounds for quantitative research in this area (Russett 1963;


Huth 1988, 1994; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988, 1990; Huth, Gelpi, andBennett 1993), while formal models of extended deterrence alsoexpanded (Wu, 1990; Kilgour and Zagare 1994; Zagare and Kilgour2000). The relevance of extended deterrence for major power relationsis indicated by the recent attempt to record all deterrence encountersamong great powers from 1816 through 1984: 65 percent of theseencounters were cases of extended deterrence, while only 35 percentrepresented direct deterrence (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993, table A-1). The list of major power deterrence cases in this book (see tables3.1, 3.2, 3.3) indicates a similar pattern despite slightly different criteriafor their identi‹cation.

The historical record shows that almost all major wars haveoccurred after the failure of extended deterrence, that is, when at leastone major power tried to prevent the other power’s attack on a thirdparty. Since the Congress of Vienna, almost all major power con›ictsresulted from the failure of extended deterrence between powers. Nev-ertheless, there have been some notable and dramatic exceptions, suchas the Franco-Prussian War or the Soviet and U.S. entries into WorldWar II, which were triggered by direct attacks by Germany and Japanrespectively. Notwithstanding these few exceptions, it may be arguedthat major power wars tend to develop from disputes over issuesrelated to minor power(s). Typically, an initial con›ict between amajor power and some minor power(s) would trigger a militaryresponse by another major power in support of its protégé (the minorpower). This dynamic, in turn, highlights the problem of maintainingstable extended deterrence in order to prevent major wars.

In addition, many intricacies of the stability of deterrence primar-ily relate to the credibility problems of extended deterrence. In fact, theentire theory of commitments developed by Schelling (1960, 1966),which dominated most of the strategic literature throughout the ColdWar, was designed to strengthen the effectiveness of extended threats,especially when the “inherent” credibility of defending the third partywas weak. Quester (1989, 63), for instance, argues that “in truth, basicdeterrence is very easy to accomplish, where there is much more doubtcomes in ‘extended deterrence’” (see also George and Smoke 1974;Betts 1987). Like the traditional strategic literature, almost all recentquantitative research in this area primarily examines extended deter-rence between states (Russett 1963; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988,1990; Huth 1988, 1990; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993).

In the evolution of the idea of extended deterrence, Snyder (1961,17) was one of the ‹rst to introduce the distinction between “primary”


and “secondary” deterrence, the latter being the “deterrence of enemyattack not against oneself, but against a third party.” Kahn later (1965,281) distinguished between three types of deterrence, depending onwhether the goal of deterrence was to prevent “attacks directed at theUnited States” (i.e., the threatener—Type I), “extreme provocations,such as nuclear or even conventional attack on Europe” (i.e., animportant ally—Type II), or “relatively minor or moderate provoca-tions” (i.e., any third party other than allies—Type III). While Kahn’sType II and Type III deterrence are both incorporated under Snyder’s“secondary” deterrence, later analysts tended to specify extendeddeterrence primarily in terms of Kahn’s Type II deterrence (for anexception, see George and Smoke 1974; Lebow and Stein 1990). Thisrestriction is problematic, however, because it does not differentiatethe issue of a possible condition for successful extended deterrence (i.e.,that the third party is a close protégé or an ally to the deterrer) from thevery de‹nition of extended deterrence. For this reason, it would bemore appropriate to retain the original meaning of Snyder’s “sec-ondary” deterrence. Extended deterrence can then be de‹ned simply asan attempt to deter an attack on a third party, be it an ally, a protégé,or any other state.

The Conceptual and Operational Refinements

Basic Deterrence Stages and Decision Structure

The previous discussion demonstrates that any attempt to identifycases of deterrence success can be only speculative, and any list of suchcases would be spurious at least. This is true for all types of deterrencesituations, whether general (i.e., when there is no challenge to a deter-rer’s threat) or immediate (i.e., the challenger is dissuaded from usingthe force). With this caveat in mind, we can provide a working distinc-tion in both general and immediate types of deterrence between thosesituations that can be perceived as deterrence successes and those ofdeterrence failure. This working distinction is a necessary step towarda more rigorous selection of cases of immediate deterrence. Figure 3.1delineates such situations and also outlines the sequence of events thatdistinguish general from immediate deterrence.

Figure 3.1 is helpful in clarifying which decision choices precedegeneral or immediate deterrence and which decisions indicate the fail-ure of either type of deterrence. Most scholars subscribe to the viewthat any overt or less explicit form of competition for in›uence


between two or more powers, such as maintaining armed forces, canbe interpreted as a case of general deterrence (Morgan 1983, 30). Fig-ure 3.1, however, points to a more restrictive and reliable approach toidentifying general deterrence cases. It indicates that general deter-rence is triggered only if at least one side makes a certain threat, eitherthrough direct of‹cial statements or through any other behavior com-monly understood to imply a threat, such as a substantial troop move-ment or putting armed forces on high alert. If there is no such verbalor behavioral form of threat, then actions such as the intensi‹ed main-tenance of armed forces would be more correctly interpreted as anarms race, which might have different underlying dynamics thandeterrence.

Figure 3.1 identi‹es deterrence successes only in order to draw ananalytical distinction between “successes” and failures, though empiri-cal identi‹cation of deterrence success can be very problematic for thereasons already discussed. Deterrence failure occurs when any other


Fig. 3.1. General and immediate deterrence

party challenges the deterrer’s original threat. As a simple genericde‹nition, it applies to both general and immediate deterrence. As‹gure 3.1 shows, the failure of general deterrence does not necessarilylead to immediate deterrence, a point that has been often overlooked inprevious empirical studies. In large part, this oversight is related to therequirement for a Challenger’s intention to attack as a trigger for theonset of immediate deterrence, and the Defender’s commitment toreact. Though widespread, this requirement is problematic.

The obvious empirical problem is in establishing a Challenger’sintention to retaliate. As with any other motivational or cognitive con-struct, intentions escape a replicable empirical identi‹cation.2 Further-more, it is important to specify whether the Defender’s commitment todefend the Protégé precedes or follows the Challenger’s threat ofattack. As indicated in ‹gure 3.1, it is important to recognize that oncegeneral deterrence fails, immediate deterrence does not automaticallystart unless the Defender reacts to the challenge to its general deterringthreat. Any prior Defender’s threat against such a challenge belongs tothe dynamics of general deterrence. If this prior threat is also consid-ered as a de‹nitional requirement for immediate deterrence, then theline between general and immediate dynamics of deterrence is blurred.To remove any possible confusion in this respect, a revised and moreprecise delineation of immediate deterrence is accordingly illustrated in‹gure 3.1. This clari‹cation should provide better conceptual guidancefor a more robust and replicable identi‹cation of historical cases ofdeterrence encounters.

To avoid all these problems, I de‹ne deterrence as a situation inwhich one side threatens the other side with some punitive retaliation ifthe other side takes a certain action. In direct deterrence, this undesiredaction is aimed at the territory of the deterrer, while in extended deter-rence it is aimed against a third party. I focus on the immediate type ofextended deterrence, which occurs when general deterrence fails and aDefender threatens to retaliate against the challenge (see ‹g. 3.1). Inthe extended form of immediate deterrence, the Challenger’s threat andDefender’s responses are related to a third party, which does not haveto be the Defender’s of‹cial ally.

Deterrence Outcomes

If a general deterrence failure enters the immediate crisis stage—that is,if the Defender demands the Challenger back away from its threatenedor actual attack on a third party—then there are four possible out-


comes: either Challenger or Defender can acquiesce to the other’sdemands, they can reach some sort of compromise, or, if neither is will-ing to concede, the crisis escalates into war (see ‹g. 3.2).

It should be noted that these outcomes are only partially compa-rable to the deterrence success and failure outcomes typically used inquantitative deterrence analyses. A Challenger’s acquiescence is com-parable to a “deterrence success” for the Defender (i.e., deterrer).However, “deterrence failure,” as commonly used, can refer to either asituation where the Defender acquiesces, or war breaks out. Compro-mise outcomes have been routinely neglected in previous quantitativeworks. Unlike “compromise” as de‹ned in the MID data set, whichallows for a substantial use of force as long as disputants agree toaccept or rede‹ne the status quo (see Mousseau 1998), compromisehere simply refers to the absence of an exchange of serious threats, orthe reciprocated use of force between a Challenger and Defender. Inthis regard, it is similar to the “negotiation” outcome in Bueno deMesquita and Lalman’s international interaction game (1992) and“peaceful settlements” in Dixon (1994).

The advantage of this treatment of deterrence outcomes over thesimple dichotomy of success or failure is twofold. First, though some


Fig. 3.2. Extended-immediate deterrence (EID)

might argue that the outcomes of Defender’s acquiescence or war canbe viewed as deterrence failure and the outcome of Challenger’s acqui-escence as deterrence success, compromise, as a midpoint between suc-cess and failure, escapes this dichotomy. Consequently, it is importantto include the possibility for an outcome that does not present a clear-cut success or failure for either side.3

Second, it is common for the dichotomized approach to deter-rence outcomes to identify deterrence failure with the use of force anddeterrence success with a peaceful outcome. The classi‹cation of fouroutcomes reveals why such an approach can be misleading. While warundoubtedly represents deterrence failure, peaceful outcomes implythree possibilities in terms of perceived successes: a deterrer’s perceivedsuccess if the Challenger peacefully acquiesces (AcqCh), the Chal-lenger’s success if the deterrer acquiesces without ‹ghting (AcqDef), orcompromise by both. These three peaceful outcomes carry differentpolitical implications for either side in terms of winning or losing thecon›ict, which are all con›ated in the single notion of deterrence suc-cess as a peaceful outcome.

The Historical Cases of Major Power Deterrence,1895–1985

In their search for more robust and rigorous ways to measure and testdeterrence arguments, a number of analysts have made remarkablecontributions. Theoretical arguments on deterrence have been tested inboth qualitative and quantitative research. Among those who use qual-itative methods, comparative case studies ‹gure prominently (Georgeand Smoke 1974; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Organski and Kugler 1980;Lebow 1981; Mearsheimer 1983; Betts 1987), though there were sometheoretically signi‹cant single case studies as well (Russett 1967; Stein1987). On the quantitative side, the pioneering work by Russett (1963)was followed by a series of studies on extended deterrence in the 1980sand later (Weede 1983; Huth 1988, 1995; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988,1990; Wu 1990). In contrast to the empirical studies, attempts toaddress issues of extended deterrence in formal theory have been lesswidespread. In this respect, a series of formal modeling works byZagare and Kilgour (Zagare 1992; Kilgour and Zagare 1994; Zagareand Kilgour 2000) can be singled out for their signi‹cant contributionto our better understanding of theoretical rami‹cations and the logic of


extended deterrence. Regardless of the adopted method, it is clear thatextended-immediate deterrence has received much scholarly attention.

The Operational Rules for Identifying Deterrence Cases

Partly to address several conceptual weaknesses and partly to guide amore robust and replicable empirical analysis, the operational criteriafor selecting the cases of deterrence will be consistent with the rules setout in the previous conceptual section.

The cases of general deterrence failure include all instances inwhich (1) at least one major power (Challenger) upsets the status quoin general deterrence vis-à-vis another major power (Defender) by get-ting into a con›ict with a third state (Protégé), and (2) the Defenderdemands the Challenger pull out from the con›ict against the Protégé.The ‹rst stage constitutes general deterrence failure as a necessary butnot suf‹cient condition for immediate deterrence. The second stagemarks the onset of immediate deterrence between the powers in theirextended deterrent encounter. The focus here is on those types of crisesand deterrence in which military means are used by either power. Theessential moves marking general deterrence failure and the beginningof immediate deterrence, therefore, are operationally de‹ned in termsof military moves. As deterrent threats can be manifested both verballyand behaviorally, as discussed previously, the range of such movesincludes:4 (1) a threat of force (including the threat to blockade, occupyterritory, declare war, or use force); (2) a display of force (alert, mobi-lization, or show of force); and (3) the use of force (blockade, occupa-tion, seizure, limited use of force, or war).5

A more re‹ned distinction among several possible outcomesshould help us overcome the problematic nature of identifying deter-rence outcomes as a success or failure. Speci‹cally, we need to ‹rstidentify whether general deterrence failed or not. Once general deter-rence between major powers fails, i.e., con›ict breaks out between atleast one major power (Challenger) and a third nation (Protégé), it caneither escalate into immediate deterrence between the Challenger andanother major power (Defender), or not. If there is at least one othermajor power willing to aid the Protégé as its Defender, then the analy-sis differentiates four possible outcomes of extended-immediate deter-rence: (1) the Challenger’s acquiescence to the Defender’s demands topull out from the con›ict against the third party (AcqCh); (2) theDefender’s acquiescence to the Challenger’s perseverance in its con›ict


against the Defender’s Protégé (AcqDef); (3) a compromise betweenChallenger and Defender in which each side achieves some goals whileyielding on some other issues without any use of force (compromise);(4) a war in which Challenger and Defender use force against eachother as a means of resolving the dispute (war). The operational rulesfor identifying deterrence outcomes are evidently based on a combina-tion of two factors: the extent to which each side’s demands are metand the degree of escalation in the use of force.6

An Empirical Survey of Major Power Deterrence Cases,1895–1985

Following these operational rules, we can determine the universe ofdeterrence cases between major powers from 1895 to 1985. Table 3.1lists all cases of general deterrence failures that did not escalate intoimmediate deterrence crises (a total of 105 cases), while the cases ofescalation to extended-immediate deterrence (EID) between majorpowers are presented in table 3.2 (a total of 44 cases).7 Five of thesecases contained 2 distinct subcrises, as the threats issued by each sidewere for different targets. Finally, there were only 4 cases of directdeterrence between major powers (see table 3.3), which once againjusti‹es the focus on issues of extended threats. Each table identi‹esmajor actors (Challenger, Defender, Protégé) and lists conventionalnames for con›icts as commonly used in historical surveys. The list ofgeneral deterrence failures that escalated into extended-immediatedeterrence (table 3.2) also identi‹es the outcomes according to theoperational de‹nitions for EID outcomes.8 Brief historical summariesof all listed cases of extended-immediate deterrence are given in appen-dix A along with the sources of information used for developing theentire set of all three types of deterrence cases.

While this is the ‹rst attempt to develop a set of all cases of generaldeterrence failures between major powers, there have been a few simi-lar attempts to collect information on the universe of extended-imme-diate deterrence cases (see Huth and Russett 1990; Huth, Gelpi, andBennett 1993). Despite some degree of overlap between these lists ofcases, there are some signi‹cant differences among all three studies.First, the earlier set developed by Huth and Russett (1990) includedfewer cases of deterrence encounters than the data set introduced hereor that of Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993). About 20 cases included inthis study are not found in Huth and Russett’s list, while 4 cases fromtheir set are ruled out as cases of extended-immediate deterrence here.


On the other hand, Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) list 17 cases ofextended deterrence that are not found in the present analysis, but theyomit 13 cases that can be found here. The difference in determining theDefenders and the Challengers is relatively small: out of 26 commonlyidenti‹ed cases in my list and that developed by Huth and Russett(1990), only 20 percent have reversed roles for Defenders and Chal-lengers; the difference is even smaller in comparison to the list providedby Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993).

Major differences between this list of extended-immediate deter-rence cases and the previous ones result from several factors, both con-ceptual and empirical. The operational rules for identifying the casesare guided here by the conceptual distinction between general deter-rence failure and the onset of immediate deterrence as presented in‹gure 3.1. This clari‹cation resulted in identifying several cases as gen-eral deterrence failures, but not as immediate deterrence cases as well.Furthermore, at the conceptual level, I do not specify deterrence interms of actors’ intentions, but strictly behaviorally, to avoid (amongother things) the problem of reliability in identifying intentions.Finally, an attempt was made to consult more comprehensive numberof historical sources than those reported in previous studies of deter-rence (e.g., Huth 1988, 26–27; Huth and Russett 1984, 504–5). Thisreanalysis of historical materials explains many differences in the cod-ing of some historical cases.9

There are a few general patterns that can be observed in tables 3.1through 3.3. First, strategic thinkers’ primary interest in issues ofextended deterrence is fully justi‹ed given that there were only 4 casesof direct-immediate deterrence between major powers compared to 44cases of extended-immediate deterrence. Second, the argumentadvanced in the previous conceptual discussion that general deterrencefailure should not be confused with the onset of immediate deterrenceis also proven valid. Out of 153 cases of general deterrence failuresbetween major powers, 105 cases (68.63 percent) never escalated intocrises of immediate deterrence, whether extended or direct (see table3.1). Third, regarding the outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence(see table 3.2), half of the cases (50.0 percent) resulted in the Chal-lenger’s acquiescence to the Defender’s demands without ‹ghting, but32.87 percent led to deterrence failure (i.e., either war or Defender’sacquiescence without ‹ghting), while the remaining 17.1 percent wereresolved through compromise. Almost half of the deterrence failuresescalated to war.

The data set presented here will provide the empirical material for


TAB

LE 3

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Gen

eral

Det

erre

nce

Fai

lure

/No

Imm

edia

te D

eter

ren

ce,M

ajo

r Po

wer

s,18

95–1

985

No.

Yea

rM

ajor

Pow

erM

inor

Pow

erC

risi

s N

ame

(1)

1895

–96

Fra

nce

(Mad

agas

car)

Fre

nch

Ann

exat

ion

of M

adag

asca

r(2

)18

95U

KT

urke

yA

rmen

ian

Mas

sacr

es(3

)18

95–9

6It

aly

Eth

iopi

aIt

alo-

Eth

iopi

an W

ar(4

)18

99–1

900

Fra

nce

Mor

occo

Fre

nch

Occ

upat

ion

of T

uat

(5)

1899

–190

2U

KSo

uth

Afr

ica

Boe

r W

ar(6

)19

00R

ussi

aA

fgha

nist

anR

usso

-Afg

han

Fro

ntie

r D

ispu

te(7

)19

00R

ussi

a(M

anch

uria

)R

ussi

an I

nter

vent

ion

in M

anch

uria

(8)

1903

UK

Iran

Per

sian

Gul

f N

aval

Dem

onst

rati

on(9

)19

03U

.S.

Col

ombi

aP

anam

a In

depe

nden

ce(1

0)19

03U

.S.

Dom

inic

an R

epub

licD

omin

ican

Tur

moi

ls(1

1)19

03–4

UK

(Tib

et)

Bri

tish

Inv

asio

n of

Tib

et(1

2)19

06U

KT

urke

y (i

.e.,

Pal

esti

ne/E

gypt

)A

kaba

Aff

air

(13)

1906

–8F

ranc

e(A

lger

ia)/

Mor

occo

Fre

nch

Occ

upat

ion

of S

ahar

a an

d M

aure

tani

a(1

4)19

06–9

U.S

.(C

uba)

Cub

an R

evol

utio

n(1

5)19

09–1

2R

ussi

aIr

anR

ussi

an I

nvas

ion

of N

orth

ern

Per

sia

(16)

1910

–12

U.S

.N

icar

agua

Nic

arag

uan

Rev

olut

ion

(17)

1911

U.S

.H

ondu

ras

Hon

dura

n R

evol

utio

n(1

8)19

11–1

2It

aly

Tur

key

(Lib

ya)

Tri

poli

War

(19)

1911

–14

U.S

.D

omin

ican

Rep

ublic

Occ

upat

ion

of t

he D

omin

ican

Rep

ublic

(20)

1912

U.S

.C

uba

“Neg

ro R

evol

t” in

Cub

a(2

1)19

12It

aly

Tur

key

Ital

ian

Occ

upat

ion

of D

odec

anes

e Is

land

s(2

2)19

12R

ussi

aB

ulga

ria

Con

stan

tino

ple

Issu

e (F

irst

Bal

kan

War

)(2

3)19

13It

aly,

A-H

Gre

ece

Alb

ania

n B

ound

arie

s Is

sue

(Sec

ond

Bal

kan

War

)(2

4)19

13–1

4U

.S.

Mex

ico

Mex

ican

Rev

olut

ion

(25)

1914

U.S

.H

aiti

Am

eric

an I

nter

vent

ion

in H

aiti

(26)

1919

Ital

yG

reec

eSm

yrna

(27)

1919

–21

Fra

nce

Tur

key

Cili

cian

War

(28)

1920

Fra

nce

(Syr

ia)

Fre

nch

Col

oniz

atio

n of

Syr

ia(2

9)19

21U

.S.

Pan

ama

Pan

ama–

Cos

ta R

ica

Bor

der

Dis

pute

(30)

1921

Fra

nce,

UK

Ger

man

yR

epar

atio

ns P

robl

em(3

1)19

22U

KT

urke

yC

hana

k A

ffai

r(3

2)19

22–3

2It

aly

(Lib

ya)

Ital

ian

Rec

olon

izat

ion

of L

ibya

(33)

1923

Ital

yG

reec

eC

orfu

Cri

sis

(34)

1923

–24

U.S

.H

ondu

ras

Hon

dura

n R

evol

utio

n(3

5)19

23–2

5F

ranc

eG

erm

any

Ruh

r O

ccup

atio

n(3

6)19

24U

KE

gypt

Bri

tish

Ult

imat

um t

o E

gypt

(37)

1924

UK

Tur

key

(i.e

., Ir

aq)

Mos

ul L

and

Dis

pute

(38)

1925

–26

Fra

nce

(Mor

occo

)R

iffi

ans

Reb

ellio

n(3

9)19

25U

KC

hina

Shan

ghai

Inc

iden

t(4

0)19

25–2

7U

.S.

Nic

arag

uaSe

cond

U.S

. Int

erve

ntio

n in

Nic

arag

ua(4

1)19

27–2

8Ja

pan

Chi

naSh

antu

ng(4

2)19

28U

KE

gypt

Sina

i Ult

imat

um(4

3)19

29U

SSR

Chi

naC

hine

se E

aste

rn R

ailw

ay(4

4)19

29–3

4U

.S.

(Hai

ti)

U.S

. Wit

hdra

wal

fro

m H

aiti

(45)

1931

–32

Japa

nC

hina

Man

chur

ian

War

(M

ukde

n In

cide

nt)

(46)

1932

–33

Japa

nC

hina

Jeho

l Cam

paig

n(4

7)19

33–3

4U

.S.

Cub

a“S

erge

ants

Rev

olt”

in C

uba

(48)

1934

Ital

yA

lban

iaIt

alo-

Alb

ania

n F

rict

ions

(D

uraz

zo N

aval

Dem

onst

rati

on)

(49)

1934

Ital

yA

ustr

iaD

olfu

ss A

ffai

r (N

azi P

utsc

h in

Aus

tria

)(5

0)19

34It

aly

Eth

iopi

aW

al-W

al(5

1)19

36–3

9G

erm

any,

Ita

lySp

ain

Span

ish

Civ

il W

ar(5

2)19

37F

ranc

eT

urke

y (i

.e.,

Syri

a)A

lexe

ndre

tta

Cri

sis

(53)

1937

–41

Japa

nC

hina

Sino

-Jap

anes

e W

ar(5

4)19

38G

erm

any

Aus

tria

Ans

chlu

ss(5

5)19

39It

aly

Alb

ania

Ital

y’s

Inva

sion

of

Alb

ania

(56)

1939

Ger

man

yC

zech

oslo

vaki

aG

erm

an A

nnex

atio

n of

Cze

chos

lova

kia

(57)

1939

Ger

man

yL

ithu

ania

Mem

el A

nnex

atio

n(5

8)19

39U

SSR

Est

onia

, Lat

via,

Lit

huan

iaSo

viet

Occ

upat

ion

of t

he B

alti

cs

(con

tinu

es)

TAB

LE 3

.1.—

Co

nti

nu

ed

No.

Yea

rM

ajor

Pow

erM

inor

Pow

erC

risi

s N

ame

(59)

1940

USS

RF

inla

ndR

usso

-Fin

nish

War

(60)

1948

–51

USS

RY

ugos

lavi

aSo

viet

-Yug

osla

v R

ift

(61)

1950

–51

Chi

na(T

ibet

)C

hine

se I

nvas

ion

of T

ibet

(62)

1951

–52

UK

Egy

ptC

anal

Zon

e(6

3)19

52C

hina

Por

tuga

lM

acao

(64)

1953

USS

RE

ast

Ger

man

yE

ast

Ber

lin U

pris

ing

(65)

1954

U.S

.G

uate

mal

aU

.S. I

nter

vent

ion

in G

uate

mal

a(6

6)19

55U

.S.

Nic

arag

uaN

icar

agua

-Cos

ta R

ican

Dis

pute

(67)

1956

USS

RP

olan

dP

olis

h O

ctob

er(6

8)19

56U

SSR

Hun

gary

Hun

gari

an I

nter

vent

ion

(69)

1957

U.S

., U

KJo

rdan

Jord

ania

n C

ivil

War

(70)

1958

U.S

.L

eban

onL

eban

on U

phea

val

(71)

1958

–61

Fra

nce

Tun

isia

Tun

isia

n M

ilita

ry B

ases

and

Biz

erta

Con

flic

t(7

2)19

59–6

0C

hina

Nep

alSi

no-N

epal

ese

Bor

der

Dis

pute

(73)

1959

–62

Chi

naIn

dia

Sino

-Ind

ian

War

(74)

1961

U.S

.C

uba

Bay

of

Pig

s(7

5)19

61–6

2U

.S.

Lao

s/T

haila

ndL

aos

(76)

1962

Chi

naT

aiw

anT

aiw

an S

trai

t(7

7)19

62U

.S.

Yem

enY

emen

i Civ

il W

ar (

1962

–cur

rent

)(7

8)19

63–6

5U

KIn

done

sia

Bor

neo

(79)

1964

U.S

.P

anam

aP

anam

a C

anal

(80)

1964

Fra

nce

Gab

onM

ilita

ry P

utsc

h in

Gab

on(8

1)19

64–6

6U

KN

orth

Yem

enY

emen

i Civ

il W

ar (

1962

–cur

rent

)(8

2)19

64–7

5U

.S.

Vie

tnam

Vie

tnam

War

(83)

1964

U.S

.C

ongo

Con

go(8

4)19

65C

hina

Indi

aIn

do-P

akis

tani

War

196

4-65

(85)

1965

U.S

.D

omin

ican

Rep

ublic

Dom

inic

an I

nter

vent

ion

(86)

1968

U.S

.N

orth

Kor

eaP

uebl

oSe

izur

e(8

7)19

68U

SSR

Cze

chos

lova

kia

Pra

gue

Spri

ng(8

8)19

69–7

2F

ranc

eC

had

Fir

st C

hadi

an C

ivil

War

(19

65–7

2)(8

9)19

70U

.S.

Cam

bodi

aIn

vasi

on o

f C

ambo

dia

(Vie

tnam

War

)(9

0)19

75U

.S.

Cam

bodi

aM

ayag

uez

Cri

sis

(91)

1978

Fra

nce

Zai

reSh

aba

(92)

1978

–79

Chi

naV

ietn

amSi

no-V

ietn

am W

ar(9

3)19

78–8

2F

ranc

eC

had

Seco

nd C

hadi

an C

ivil

War

(19

78–8

2)(9

4)19

79U

.S.

Yem

enY

emen

i Civ

il W

ar (

1962

–cur

rent

)(9

5)19

79–8

9U

SSR

Afg

hani

stan

Sovi

et I

nvas

ion

of A

fgha

nist

an(9

6)19

79U

SSR

Pak

ista

nSo

viet

Thr

eat

to P

akis

tan

(97)

1979

–80

U.S

.Ir

anU

.S. H

osta

ges

in I

ran

(98)

1980

UK

, Fra

nce

Van

uatu

Esp

irit

u Sa

nto

Sece

ssio

nist

Fig

htin

g(9

9)19

80–8

1U

SSR

Pol

and

Sol

idar

ity

Mov

emen

t in

Pol

and

(100

)19

81U

.S.

Lib

yaG

ulf

of S

yrte

(101

)19

82U

KA

rgen

tina

Fal

klan

ds (

Mal

vina

s) W

ar(1

02)

1983

U.S

.N

icar

agua

Con

tras

(1

03)

1983

U.S

.G

rena

daU

.S. I

nvas

ion

of G

rena

da(1

04)

1983

–84

Fra

nce

Cha

dT

hird

Cha

dian

Civ

il W

ar (

1983

–cur

rent

)(1

05)

1983

–84

Chi

naV

ietn

amSi

no-V

ietn

ames

e C

lash

es

Not

e:P

aren

thes

es a

re u

sed

for

thos

e th

ird

part

ies

that

wer

e no

t cl

assi

fied

as

inde

pend

ent

stat

es in

the

Cor

rela

tes

of W

ar

proj

ect

(Sin

ger

and

Smal

l 198

2).

TAB

LE 3

.2.

Th

e C

ases

of

Ext

end

ed-I

mm

edia

te D

eter

ren

ce a

mo

ng

Maj

or

Pow

ers,

1895

-198

5

No.

Yea

rC

halle

nger

Def

ende

rT

hird

Par

tyO

utco

me

Cri

sis

Nam

e

(1)

1895

–96

Ger

man

yU

K(S

outh

Afr

ica)

Acq

Ger

man

yD

elag

oa B

ay a

nd J

ames

on R

aids

(2)

1897

Ger

man

yR

ussi

aC

hina

Com

prom

ise

Kia

o-C

how

(G

erm

an o

ccup

atio

n)(3

)18

97–9

8F

ranc

eU

K(N

iger

ia)

Com

prom

ise

Nig

er D

ispu

te(4

)18

98–9

9R

ussi

aU

KC

hina

Com

prom

ise

Ang

lo-R

ussi

an c

risi

s(5

)18

98–9

9U

K, U

.S.

Ger

man

y(S

amoa

)C

ompr

omis

eSa

moa

n Is

land

s D

ispu

te(6

)F

ranc

eU

K(S

udan

)A

cqF

ranc

eF

asho

da(7

)18

99–1

900

Rus

sia

Japa

nK

orea

Acq

Rus

sia

Mas

ampo

Epi

sode

(8)

1901

–03

Rus

sia

Japa

n(M

anch

uria

)A

cqJa

pan

Man

chur

ian

Eva

cuat

ion

(9)

1902

UK

, Ger

man

yU

.S.

Ven

ezue

laA

cqU

K, G

erm

any

Ven

ezue

lan

Cri

sis

(10)

1904

–5R

ussi

aJa

pan

Kor

ea, (

Man

chur

ia)

War

Rus

so-J

apan

ese

War

(11)

1905

–6G

erm

any

Fra

nce

Mor

occo

Acq

Ger

man

yF

irst

Mor

occa

n (T

angi

er)

Cri

sis

(12)

1908

A-H

, Ger

man

yR

ussi

aSe

rbia

Acq

Rus

sia

Ann

exat

ion

of B

osni

a an

d H

erze

govi

na(1

3)19

11G

erm

any

Fra

nce

Mor

occo

Acq

Ger

man

ySe

cond

Mor

occa

n (A

gadi

r) C

risi

s(1

4)19

12A

-H, G

erm

any

Rus

sia

Serb

iaA

cqR

ussi

aF

irst

Bal

kan

War

(15a

)19

14–1

7A

-H, G

erm

any

Rus

sia

Serb

iaW

arW

orld

War

I(1

5b)

1914

–18

Ger

man

yU

K, F

ranc

eB

elgi

um, F

ranc

eW

arW

orld

War

I(1

6)19

20–2

3U

SSR

UK

Iran

, Afg

hani

stan

Com

prom

ise

Ang

lo-R

ussi

an F

rict

ions

in

Cen

tral

Asi

a(1

7)19

32Ja

pan

UK

, U.S

.C

hina

Acq

Japa

nSh

angh

ai I

ncid

ent

(18)

1935

–36

Ital

yU

KE

thio

pia

Acq

UK

Ital

o-E

thio

pian

(A

byss

inia

n) W

ar(1

9)19

35–3

6Ja

pan

USS

R(O

uter

Mon

golia

)A

cqJa

pan

Out

er M

ongo

lian

Fro

ntie

r D

ispu

te(2

0)19

37U

SSR

Japa

n(M

anch

uria

)A

cqU

SSR

Am

ur R

iver

Inc

iden

t(2

1)19

38U

SSR

Japa

n(M

anch

uria

)A

cqJa

pan

Cha

ngku

feng

(22)

1938

Ital

yF

ranc

e(T

unis

ia)

Acq

Ital

yIt

alia

n C

olon

ial C

laim

s(2

3)19

38G

erm

any

UK

, Fra

nce

Cze

chos

lova

kia

Acq

UK

, Fra

nce

Sude

tenl

and

Pro

blem

and

Mun

ich

Cri

sis

(24)

1939

Ital

yU

K, F

ranc

eG

reec

eA

cqIt

aly

Ital

y’s

Inva

sion

of

Alb

ania

(25)

1939

Japa

nU

SSR

Mon

golia

War

Nom

onha

n In

cide

nt(2

6)19

39–4

5G

erm

any

UK

, Fra

nce

Pol

and

War

Wor

ld W

ar I

I(2

7)19

45U

SSR

U.S

., U

KIr

anA

cqU

SSR

Aze

rbai

jan

Issu

e(2

8)19

45–4

6F

ranc

eU

KSy

ria

Acq

Fra

nce

Lev

ant

(29)

1946

USS

RU

.S.

Tur

key

Acq

USS

RT

urki

sh S

trai

ts(3

0)19

48–4

9U

SSR

U.S

., U

K, F

ra.

Wes

t G

erm

any

Acq

USS

RB

erlin

Blo

ckad

e(3

1)19

50C

hina

U.S

.T

aiw

anA

cqC

hina

Tai

wan

Str

ait

(32)

1950

–53

U.S

.C

hina

Nor

th K

orea

War

Kor

ean

War

(33)

1954

–55

Chi

naU

.S.

Tai

wan

Acq

Chi

naC

hine

se O

ffsh

ore

Isla

nds

(34a

)19

56U

K, F

ranc

eU

SSR

Egy

ptA

cqU

K, F

ranc

eSu

ez C

anal

(34b

)19

56U

SSR

U.S

.F

ranc

e, U

KA

cqU

SSR

Suez

Can

al (

Sovi

et r

etal

iato

ry

thre

at)

(35a

)19

57U

.S.

USS

RSy

ria

Acq

U.S

.T

urki

sh-S

yria

n F

ront

ier

Dis

pute

(35b

)19

57U

SSR

U.S

.T

urke

yA

cqU

SSR

Tur

kish

-Syr

ian

Fro

ntie

r D

ispu

te(3

6)19

58C

hina

U.S

.T

aiw

anA

cqC

hina

Que

moy

-Mat

su(3

7)19

58–5

9U

SSR

U.S

.W

est

Ger

man

yA

cqU

SSR

Ber

lin D

eadl

ine

(38)

1961

USS

RU

.S.,

UK

, Fra

.W

est

Ger

man

yC

ompr

omis

eB

erlin

Wal

l(3

9)19

62U

SSR

U.S

.C

uba

Acq

USS

RC

uban

Mis

sile

Cri

sis

(40a

)19

67U

.S.

USS

RE

gypt

, Syr

iaA

cqU

SSR

Six

Day

War

(40b

)19

67U

SSR

U.S

.Is

rael

Acq

USS

RSi

x D

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testing the role of the explanatory factors (see chap. 1) in accountingfor variations in deterrence outcomes. In cases of immediate deter-rence, where at least one major power acted as the Defender of its Pro-tégé (extended-immediate deterrence), the test will use deterrencedyads as the unit of analysis. Some of the cases had more than oneChallenger, Defender, or Protégé, which results in a total of 70 cases ofEID dyads as the unit of analysis of this empirical test. In next part ofthe book, each chapter examines the individual effect of a speci‹cexplanatory factor on deterrence outcomes. This includes the key vari-ables of relative capabilities (chap. 4) and inherent credibility, the lat-ter being examined in terms of the interests at stake, either external(chap. 5) or internal (chap. 6). Chapter 7 tests their joint interactiveeffect and, most important, compares the explanatory power of twobasic models of deterrence—inherent credibility and interdependentcommitments—as outlined in the introduction.

TABLE 3.3. The Cases of Direct-Immediate Deterrence between Major Powers,1895–1985

No. Year Challenger Defender Outcome Crisis Name

(1) 1936 Germany France AcqFrance Remilitarization of Rhineland(2) 1941 Germany USSR War World War II (Barbarossa)(3) 1941 Japan U.S. War World War II (Pearl Harbor)(4) 1969 China USSR Compromise Sino-Soviet Border Dispute

(Ussuri River)

deterrence and conflict - university of michigan press

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