determinants of candidate selection: the degree of centralization in comparative perspective

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Comparative PerspectiveDeterminants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in

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DETERMINANTS OF CANDIDATESELECTION

The Degree of Centralization in ComparativePerspective

Krister Lundell

A B S T R A C T

The purpose of this article is to examine whether party characteristicsand contextual variables explain varying degrees of centralization ofintra-partisan candidate selection methods. By means of statisticalanalyses and a larger dataset than in earlier studies, possible associationsare studied. In order to carry out the study, an index of the degree ofcentralization is constructed. Of the party characteristics, only party sizeaffects the dependent variable: large parties tend to apply more central-ized selection methods than small parties. None of the institutionalvariables determines the degree of centralization of candidate selection.For instance, earlier assertions about the importance of the electoralsystem and territorial organization are falsified. However, some distinctregional patterns emerge: Southern European parties apply centralizedselection methods, whereas candidate selection in Nordic countries isdecentralized.

KEY WORDS � candidate selection � centralization � decentralization � selectionmethods

Introduction

Recruitment to legislative office is one of the core functions of politicalsystems. A great deal of attention is paid to parliamentary elections, thepreceding election campaign and the subsequent process of governmentformation (in parliamentary democracies). The selection of candidates, onthe other hand, usually takes place far away from the glare of public scrutiny.Nevertheless, it is a crucial part of the political process with far-reaching

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consequences. According to Gallagher (1988b: 1), the quality of candidatesselected determines the quality both of the deputies elected, of the resultantlegislature, and sometimes also of a country’s politics, especially if drasticchanges in the parties’ selection procedures are in hand. Endorsing thesestatements, Bille (2001: 364) says that we can hardly classify a regime asdemocratic if the organizational structure of the parties lacks mechanismsfor civic participation and influence. The decision-making process reflectsthe internal democracy of a party and, among these processes, candidateselection is one of the most important.

The importance of candidate selection has been well acknowledged eversince democratic politics began to flourish. A hundred years ago, Ostro-gorski (1902) pointed out that the distribution of power within the party ishighly affected by the methods of candidate selection. Several authors,among them Michels (1915: 183–4), Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer(1966: 198), Jupp (1968: 58) and Ranney (1981: 103), have later stressedthe centrality of candidate selection in the life of any political party. Candi-date selection is, in Katz’s (2001: 278) words, ‘one of the central definingfunctions of a political party in a democracy’.

Much research on candidate selection has dealt with the distribution ofpower within party organizations, the selecting organs and formal rulesgoverning the process (Katz and Mair, 1992; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993;McKenzie, 1955; Panebianco, 1988; Ranney, 1965; Rush, 1969; Sjöblom,1968; Ware, 1996). Another major stream of literature has been concernedwith understanding the consequences of the composition of elites forpolitical representation and decisive criteria in selecting candidates (Esaias-son and Holmberg, 1996; Eulau and Wahlke, 1978; Narud and Johansson,2001; Norris, 1997; Pitkin, 1967; Putnam, 1976).

However, surprisingly few authors have been interested in why controlover candidate selection varies between parties and countries. Someauthors have argued that the degree of centralization is affected by the elec-toral system (Czudnowski, 1975: 221; Epstein, 1980: 225–6; Hermens,1972: 51–8; Matthews, 1985: 35–7). Candidate selection in pluralitysystems with single-member districts tends to be decentralized, whereaslarge multi-member districts require more centralized selection methods.Territorial organization is another influential factor; federalism is, accord-ing to Epstein (1980: 31–4) and Harmel (1981: 86), related to decentral-ized candidate selection. One of the most comprehensive studies ofcandidate selection is Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective(Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). In this volume, both determinants (legalprovisions, governmental organization, the electoral system, politicalculture and the nature of the party) and effects of candidate selection innine countries are studied. As to determinants, the only strong associationis found between federalism and decentralized candidate selection. Thereasons why candidate selection methods vary are, on the whole, stillwrapped in mystery. By means of statistical analyses and a larger dataset

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than in previous studies, I therefore re-examine determinants of candidateselection methods.

Purpose and Method

The purpose of this study is to examine whether party characteristics andthe political context explain differences between parties and countries onone central dimension of candidate selection methods: territorial central-ization versus decentralization. I apply a mixed strategy of both inductionand deduction, which enables an examination of a rather large set of inde-pendent variables – important factors emphasized by other scholars as wellas possible determinants not previously observed. Strengths of associationsare measured mostly by correlation and regression analysis. As for the quali-tative variables, mean values are compared. In order to carry out the study,candidate selection methods prior to parliamentary elections (the lowerchamber in bicameral assemblies) are classified according to a scale thatmeasures the degree of centralization. Another minor purpose is to observecandidate selection in some Western democracies that have, to my knowl-edge, been previously ignored, namely Switzerland, Luxembourg, Maltaand Cyprus.

Selection methods are observed at different points in time. The earliestdata included in the study are from 1981 and the latest data concern candi-date selection prior to the last elections. Measuring all selection processesat a specific point in time is not necessary because selection procedures inpolitical parties tend to be stable over time and radical changes are rare(Bille, 2001: 365–8).

A general view of candidate selection practices reveals that selectionmethods vary considerably between countries, which suggests that contex-tual factors might determine varying degrees of centralization. Conse-quently, a mainly contextual approach, including several aspects of thepolitical system as well as other country characteristics, is applied. Calcu-lation of specific values of centralization for each country is precluded,however, given that there is substantial variation of the dependent variablewithin countries. The selection process is the unit of analysis in this study.In addition to contextual variables, some party characteristics are included.

Primary as well as secondary data are used. The former consist of corre-spondence with party officials, party statutes and other formal rules govern-ing the selection process. The most frequently used secondary sources areCandidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (Gallagher and Marsh,1988) and Party Organizations – A Data Handbook on Party Organiz-ations in Western Democracies, 1960–1990 (Katz and Mair, 1992). In somecases, several sources have been available, and they do not always corre-spond with each other. In these cases, I have given precedence to the volumesmentioned above.

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The Dataset

The dataset is determined by several factors. First, only democratic coun-tries are included. Formal rules governing the selection process cannot beregarded as important and reliable in parties operating in undemocraticsystems. There are, however, different levels of democracy. In order to avoida biased collection of parties and countries, I limit the dataset to advanceddemocracies in the developed world. The long-term democracies in Patternsof Democracy (1999) by Lijphart constitute a point of departure for select-ing countries. His study of government forms and performance consists of36 countries that in 1996 had been democratic for at least 19 years. Indeciding which countries qualify as democracies, he relies to a great extenton Freedom House’s ratings since 1972 (http://www.freedomhouse.org). Inthese surveys, all countries are rated as free, partly free or not free, andLijphart regards the ‘free’ countries as democratic countries (1999: 50).Eleven of these are developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean,Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and are consequently excluded from mydataset.1

Furthermore, parties without parliamentary representation are omitted.My ambition is to include parties that seriously struggle for parliamentarymandates. Candidate selection is not necessarily one of the core functionsin parties without realistic chances of winning any seat. In addition, partieswithout parliamentary representation are often new, and so may lackestablished selection procedures. By excluding marginal and recently formedparties, we have a good sample of the main relevant cases.

I also exclude Germany, Finland, Norway and the United States, becausecandidate selection in these countries is legally regulated (Gallagher, 1988a:257). If the constitution or other specific laws determine the selectionprocess, the political system or party characteristics cannot affect the selec-tion process. The exclusion of these countries may seem contradictory,considering that most of the independent variables included in the studyassume that parties are capable, more or less rationally, of adapting to theirenvironments. The notion of political parties as rational actors implies thatthey might pass laws according to their candidate selection preferences,which, in turn, means that the law cannot be a decisive and independentinfluence on parties’ behaviour. However, after having noticed that all thesefour countries apply decentralized selection methods, Gallagher (1988a:257) points out that:

Once a law exists, the process it prescribes may come to acquire acertain legitimacy, and the parties in each of these countries would courtunpopularity if they attempted to change the law to permit a morecentralized . . . form of candidate selection.

Hence, legal provisions affect parties’ behaviour as well as being affectedby it, and the exclusion of the countries mentioned above seems justifiable.

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Of the remaining countries, Portugal is omitted, since detailed infor-mation on candidate selection in any Portuguese party is lacking. On theother hand, Cyprus has been rated as ‘free’ by Freedom House since 1981,and is therefore included in the dataset, which thereby embodies 21 devel-oped countries with a minimum of two decades of democratic experience.The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta,The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom.

Data on every significant party in each country have not been accessible.Some countries, e.g. Australia, Luxembourg and Malta, are represented byonly one or two parties, whereas others, such as Sweden and Belgium, arerepresented by practically all parliamentary parties. In most countries, themajor parties are included, and this sample of countries and parties may toa large extent be regarded as a representative collection for the purpose ofthe study. Nevertheless, some caution is needed – interpretation of the resultsmust be carried out in a Western context. The dataset consists of a total of94 candidate selection processes in 90 parties. In New Zealand, a mixed elec-toral system is used, which implies that two separate selection processes arecarried out – one for single-member districts in the plurality (nominal) tierand the other for national party lists in the proportional (list) tier.2

Classifying Candidate Selection Methods

In the present study I am concerned with one central dimension of intra-partisan candidate selection: territorial centralization versus decentraliza-tion, i.e. the question of where selection takes place in the party hierarchy.According to Gallagher (1998b: 4), candidates might, at one extreme, beselected in primaries open for all eligible voters; at the other, they can bepicked by the party leader alone. Other possibilities are selection by all partymembers in the constituency; by delegates at local conventions; by aconstituency committee; by the regional organization; by national organsor by a few national faction leaders (1988b: 4; Norris, 1996: 202).

There are, however, other dimensions as well. Rahat and Hazan (2001:297–9) present four dimensions: candidacy, i.e. possible restrictions on theeligibility for candidacy; party selectorates, i.e. inclusiveness versusexclusiveness of the selectorate in the selection process; decentralization, i.e.the locus of control; and voting/appointment systems, i.e. how candidatesare nominated. Norris gives due attention to still another dimension: thedegree of institutionalization (formal/informal) in the selection process(1993: 321–7). In formal systems, the selection process is characterized bydetailed, explicit and standardized rules which are relatively clear to outsideobservers, whereas an informal selection process is less bureaucratic andrarely made explicit.


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Considering the four elements discussed by Rahat and Hazan, party selec-torates and decentralization are directly concerned with the distribution ofpower within the party, and may in this respect be regarded as more import-ant than the other two elements. The candidacy dimension is mainlyrelevant to those applying for candidacy rather than the selecting body. Thedistinction between voting systems and appointment systems, notwith-standing, bears some relevance to the distribution of power, since appoint-ment probably implies a higher level of party control over candidateselection than voting. However, I believe that party selectorates andappointment/voting systems to a great extent overlap – a voting system ismost likely more inclusive than an appointment system.

The dimensions of centralization versus decentralization and inclusive-ness versus exclusiveness also to some extent overlap. A more centralizedprocess often implies more exclusive candidate selection. However, this isnot always the case. For instance, a system in which 1000 party membersselect the candidates nationally is, of course, more centralized than a systemin which each candidate is selected by one local leader. At the same time,the former is probably more inclusive than the latter. On the other hand, asystem in which a few national leaders select candidates on the basis ofproposals from party members is, in my opinion, not particularly inclusive,because the decision is made by a few. In this sense, I regard these twodimensions as somewhat overlapping.

A bird’s-eye view of the literature on candidate selection indicates thatthese are the most frequently discussed and, consequently, most importantdimensions of candidate selection (e.g. Bille, 2001; Epstein, 1980; Gallagherand Marsh, 1988; Gallagher et al., 1992; Hopkin, 2001; Katz, 2001;Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1981). In this study, I prefer decen-tralization to party selectorates, because I regard the first mentioned as amore straightforward tool for classifying candidate selection methods.Moreover, I focus exclusively on the territorial dimension of decentraliza-tion. Inclusion of the functional dimension, which is concerned withensuring representation for groups such as trade unions, women andminorities, would render the classification of selection methods morecomplex.

The primary selecting agency may often be difficult to locate, becauseseveral organs are often involved in the selection process. The final selec-tion may be the result of interaction between several party agencies. Byusing an index of the degree of centralization, this task does not, however,constitute an insurmountable problem. The classification of candidate selec-tion methods presented below is based mainly on Bille’s categorization(2001: 365–7). He measures the level of final decision regarding candidateselection in 57 Western European parties around 1960 and 71 partiesaround 1990. His analysis refers to the stipulations in the formal rules forcandidate selection described in Katz and Mair (1992). He is actuallyconcerned with democratization rather than decentralization, but his

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categorization measures the level of decentralization as well. In addition, anelement of inclusiveness of the selectorate is included, since the sixthcategory notes whether a membership ballot is applied or not.3

A fundamental distinction in his classification is drawn between nationalparty organs and subnational organs. At one extreme, national organscompletely control the selection process (category 1); at the other, sub-national organs are in charge of the process and make the final decision(category 5). Different forms of interaction between national and sub-national organs constitute the intermediate categories. My classificationdiffers in some respect from that of Bille. First, I do not include his thirdcategory ‘national organs provide list, subnational organs decide’, since thiscategory consists of only one case at the latter point of time. In my classifi-cation, this selection method is placed on a level with selection by districtorgans under the influence of regional or national organs. Second, a primarydistinction is drawn here between the district level and the national level.The classification of selection controlled by regional organs depends onwhat other organs are involved in the process.4 Third, local candidate selec-tion, either at local party meetings or by membership ballot, represents thelowest degree of centralization, whereas national primaries imply a central-ized form of candidate selection. This measure is taken in order to avoidthe fusion of decentralization and inclusiveness of the selectorate. Finally,my index runs in the opposite direction, because I measure the degree ofcentralization, whereas Bille is more interested in democratization (and theextent of inclusiveness). The dependent variable of the present study is oper-ationalized on an ordinal scale and consists of five categories. The meaningsof the values are as follows:

1 Selection at local party meetings, by local selection committees or byprimaries open for all party members.

2 Selection at the district level by a selection committee, by the executivedistrict organ or at a convention (congress, conference) by delegates fromthe local parties.

3 The same as 1 or 2 but regional or national organs exercise influence overthe selection process, e.g. add names to the lists or have veto power. Thedecision, however, is taken at the district level. Formal approval byregional or national organs without actual involvement in the processbelongs to the second category.

4 The same as 5, but local, district or regional organs exercise influenceover the selection process, e.g. party members, the local parties orcommittees at the constituency or the regional level propose candidates.The decision, however, is taken at the national level.

5 Selection by the party leader, by the national executive organ, by anational selection committee, or by primaries at the national level.

The indices of all parties are given in the appendix.


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The Independent Variables

In this section, the independent variables and their operationalizations arepresented. Altogether nine variables are included. Three of them are partycharacteristics: ideology, size and age. The effective number of partiesrepresents varying degrees of party system fragmentation. Two variablescharacterize the electoral system: district magnitude and preferential voting.Another three variables at the macro-level are included: territorial organiz-ation (federalism versus unitarism), area and region.

Ideology

First, I distinguish between right, centre and left parties, according tofollowing categories: far right, conservative, Christian-democratic, centre/liberal/agrarian, green, social-democratic, socialist and communist parties.One may assume that extreme parties are more ‘authoritarian’ and there-fore apply more centralized selection methods than other parties.

Party Size

Vote share in the preceding parliamentary elections determines the size of aparty. I consider vote share a better measure of size than seat share, becausethe former reflects the relative party size according to the opinion of theelectorate. Small parties may apply more decentralized selection methodsthan large parties, because the appeal of a small party is so limited that ithas to rely on the drawing power of local notables. Consequently, local anddistrict organs are probably best placed to select candidates. The complex-ity of large party organizations might have a centralizing effect on candi-date selection.

Party Age

The age of a party is measured at the time of elections following the candi-date selection observed. For each party, I try to determine the birth of theparty organization. A renovation of the ‘old’ party organization or a changeof party name is not considered a birth of a new party. Secessionist partiesfrom larger party organizations, on the other hand, are regarded as newparties, because the party of origin is still in existence. Concerning theassociation between age and centralization, contrary assumptions can befound. Younger parties might respect internal democracy to a greater extentthan older ones, and might thus apply more decentralized selectionmethods. However, one can also expect old parties to be more ready to openup to member participation, on the one hand, and decentralization, on theother, as they have a more solid support base, and might therefore be lessafraid of losing control of the party organization.

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The Effective Number of Parties

The most widely used measure of party system fragmentation is the effec-tive number of parties, created by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera(1979). The index is calculated according to the following formula:

1N = ——

∑si2

where si refers to the seat proportion of the ith party.Political parties may be in need of different strategies in different party

systems. Stiff competition for the power positions among the parties mayhave a decentralizing effect on candidate selection, because every single‘surplus’ vote is needed. A party system with only a few parties and fairlystable positions might, on the other hand, mean that there is little need forthe national party organization to worry too much about the district andlocal branches in selecting candidates. The effective number of parties iscalculated on the basis of the results of the preceding elections.

District Magnitude

The electoral system is often held to exert great influence on many featuresof a country’s politics – candidate selection is one of them. In this respect,the common distinction between majoritarian, proportional and inter-mediate forms of electoral systems is not necessarily the crucial point, butrather the number of candidates running for election and the number ofrepresentatives in a constituency. Besides, most countries in the datasetapply proportional electoral systems. We may assume that candidate selec-tion is decentralized in electoral systems with small constituencies becauseof the local knowledge of potential winners needed. According to the samelogic, the central party organization can be expected to have a greater influ-ence on the selection process in large multi-member constituencies – partlydue to the coordination needed in compiling party lists, partly becausevoters are not expected to have as good a personal knowledge of the candi-dates as in small constituencies. I use the same index of district magnitudeas Lijphart (1994), i.e. the average district magnitude calculated by dividingthe total number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts.

Preferential Voting

Concerning the ballot structure, the crucial point is whether the voters canchoose between several candidates of the same party or not, i.e. preferen-tial or non-preferential voting. There are, however, different kinds of pref-erential voting, and I apply an ordinal scale with three categories: (1)non-preferential voting, (2) preferential voting without rank-ordering andcumulation, and (3) preferential voting with rank-ordering or cumulation.


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Non-preferential voting takes place in electoral systems with closed partylists (e.g. Iceland, Israel and Spain); in most systems with single-memberdistricts (Canada and the United Kingdom); and in mixed systems (whichin the only relevant case, New Zealand, implies a mixture of closed lists andsingle-member districts). The second category consists of list systems wherepreference votes are the sole basis on which candidates are elected (e.g.Cyprus, Greece and Finland) and list systems where the election of candi-dates is determined by both list order and preference voting (e.g. Belgium,Denmark and The Netherlands). The single non-transferable system inJapan until 1995 also belongs here. I regard list systems that, in addition topreferential voting, allow cumulation, i.e. to cumulate two personal voteson one candidate, as a stronger kind of preferential voting. These systems(Luxembourg and Switzerland), along with the alternative vote (Australia)and the single transferable vote (Ireland and Malta), constitute the thirdcategory.

Preferential voting is assumed to have a decentralizing effect on candi-date selection. In picking candidates, local knowledge of potential winnersmay be needed. Local agencies can argue that the party ticket must beassembled carefully, with sensitivity to the voters’ opinions, and that onlythe local organization is in a position to know what ticket will be of mostappeal to voters in the constituency. In electoral systems without preferen-tial voting, the national party organization may want to exert influence onthe compilation of party lists and perhaps guarantee some candidatesrepresentation by placing them at the top of the list. There is also a contraryhypothesis. Parties in non-preferential systems might actually be more opento decentralization and participation as ‘compensation’ for the lack ofvoters’ influence in the elections.

Territorial Organization

Several authors have argued that general party decentralization, and conse-quently decentralized candidate selection, is quite strongly related to decen-tralization of power within the polities where the parties operate. In federalsystems, the national party organization often plays an insignificant role inthe selection process, compared to parties in unitary systems. In this study,the territorial organization variable is trichotomized on an ordinal scale: (1)federal states, (2) unitary states with decentralized features, and (3) unitarystates.

Area

The importance of physical size in explaining political phenomena is wellknown (e.g. Anckar, 1998; Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Lijphart, 1977: 68). Botharea and population are indicators of size. A high degree of multicollinear-ity between them implies that only one of them should be chosen. As for

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population, any realistic assumption of possible effects on selection methodsis hard to think of. Concerning area, on the other hand, two oppositeassumptions are made. First, a large territory requires an extensive partyorganization, often characterized by hierarchy, complexity and bureaucracy,which might have a centralizing effect on candidate selection. Second, candi-date selection at the local or district level might be a simpler solution forthe national party organization rather than centralized selection methods,which in large territories require extensive arrangements and knowledge ofpotential winners in a large number of districts.

Region

Since 16 of 21 countries in the dataset are European countries, and the other5 belong to 4 different continents, I deal primarily with Europe. ThreeEuropean regions are distinguished: Nordic countries (Denmark, Icelandand Sweden), Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxem-bourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), andSouthern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain). The secondcategory is, nevertheless, miscellaneous in terms of tradition, diffusion andpolitical culture. In Vesteuropeisk politikk (1998), Heidar and Berntzenregard the United Kingdom and Ireland as a distinct region, broughttogether by the Westminster model. The Westminster category can here beenlarged with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, not on grounds ofregional affiliation but of political culture and imitation, which are the mainreasons for classifying countries on the basis of regional division. I there-fore analyse two slightly different models of regional division.

Empirical Findings

By way of introduction, I examine the dispersion of all parties along thescale of centralization of selection methods. The results are given in Table 1.The value 5 denotes the highest degree of centralization, whereas 1 denotesextreme decentralization. As we can see, a normal distribution is formed,and the arithmetical average is close to the centre of the scale.

Bivariate Patterns

We are now ready to proceed with the empirical analysis of the associationsbetween the independent and the dependent variables. In Table 2, partiesare classified according to ideology. No substantial differences exist betweenright, centre and left parties. A detailed classification, on the other hand,indicates that parties at both extremes of the ideological scale apply central-ized selection methods. The differences between other ideologies are small,however, and the model is not statistically significant.


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In Table 3, effects of party size and age as well as institutional determi-nants are studied. Of all seven independent variables, only party size affectsthe degree of centralization. Large parties tend to apply more centralizedselection methods than small parties. Furthermore, the degree of central-ization seems to be slightly higher in younger parties, in party systems withfew parties and in small countries. However, these associations are not

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Table 1. The degree of centralization of 94 candidate selection processes

Index of Selection processes Dispersioncentralization (N) (%)

1 10 10.62 19 20.23 36 38.34 22 23.45 7 7.4

Note: Arithmetical average: 2.97. Standard deviation: 1.08.Sources: Bille (2001); Gallagher and Marsh (1988); Gallagher et al. (1992); Katz and Mair

(1992); Norris (1996); Norris (1997); Rahat and Hazan (2001).

Table 2. Ideology and average degree of centralization

Average degree of Ideology centralization N Std. dev.

Right 2.86 28 1.05Centre 2.57 23 1.08Left 3.17 35 1.12Eta2 0.042Sign. 0.112

Far-right 4.00 1Conservative 2.88 17 1.22Christian-democratic 2.70 10 0.48Centre (liberal, agrarian) 2.59 17 1.18Green 2.50 6 0.84Social-democratic 2.86 21 1.11Socialist 3.33 9 1.00Communist 4.20 5 0.84Eta2 0.142Sign. 0.090

Sources: Heidar and Berntzen (1998); Political Resources on the Net [http://www.politicalresources.net/].




LU

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Table 3. Associations between party size, party age, party system (effective number of parties), district magnitude, preferential voting,territorial organization, area and the degree of centralization

Party Party Party District Preferential Territorial size age system magnitude voting (a) organization (a) Area

Degree of centralization 0.214* –0.147 –0.192 0.057 0.063 0.022 –0.121Party size 0.357** –0.310** 0.006 –0.162 –0.104 0.128Party age 0.083 –0.221* 0.061 0.082 0.231*Party system 0.044 0.092 0.166 –0.283**District magnitude 0.096 0.083 –0.159Preferential voting 0.173 –0.137Territorial organization 0.481**

Note: Pearson’s r except for (a): Spearman’s rho. * Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.Sources: Anckar (2002); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections; CIA World Factbook 2002 [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html];

Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1999); Inter-Parliamentary Union [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp]; Karvonen (2000).

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statistically significant.5 With reference to earlier statements concerning theeffects of federalism and the electoral system, the lack of correlation issurprising.

The last variable, region, is qualitative and needs to be treated in the sameway as ideology. As can be seen in Table 4, there are large differencesbetween different parts of Europe. Southern European parties apply central-ized selection methods, in Nordic countries the selection process isdecentralized, and the Central European parties are found in the middle ofthe centralization scale. The Eta2 value is as high as 0.348 and the modelis significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, the Nordic and the SouthernEuropean regions are distinguished by small standard deviations, i.e. vari-ations within these groups are small in comparison to Central Europeanparties. In the alternative model with four regions (Nordic countries,Central Europe, Southern Europe and Westminster countries), the explainedvariance (Eta2) is smaller (27 percent compared with 35 percent in theformer model) and the average degree of centralization in Westminstercountries is 2.88. This group is fairly heterogeneous – both decentralizedand centralized selection methods are frequently represented. The model isnonetheless significant at the 0.01 level.

When all regions are transformed into dummy variables, Nordic partiescorrelate negatively (–0.396), and Southern European parties positively(0.378), with the degree of centralization. Both associations are significantat the 0.01 level. In this respect, Central European parties and ‘Westmin-ster’ parties are of no importance.

Multivariate Patterns

The correlation analyses suggested that only party size and region (Nordicparties and Southern European parties) affect the dependent variable. Noother significant interactions between determinants and the degree of central-ization of candidate selection methods were found. These three variables areconsequently included in the regression. The results are given in Table 5.

The model indicates that the importance of party size is considerably

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Table 4. Region and average degree of centralization

Average degree of Region centralization N Std. dev.

Nordic countries 2.12 17 0.70Central Europe 2.87 38 0.91Southern Europe 3.81 16 0.66Eta2 0.348Sign. 0.000




smaller than that of the Nordic and Southern European regions in explain-ing different candidate selection methods. If we exclude party size, theexplained variance decreases by only 1 percent, from 21.1 to 20.1, and theF-value increases from 9.28 to 12.67. The importance of party size is, onthe other hand, strengthened when several variables are included in theregression analysis, but the general picture is not altered. Accordingly,region is the most important determinant of the degree of centralization ofcandidate selection. However, in statistical analysis, region is marred by aserious problem. I return to this matter in the discussion below.

Conclusions

In this study, I have examined determinants of candidate selection methodsput forward by other authors as well as some variables not recently studiedin this context. According to the statistical analyses, region is the mostimportant determinant of candidate selection in the developed world. Tworegions distinguish themselves: Nordic parties apply decentralized selectionmethods, whereas candidate selection in Southern Europe is centralized.

The Nordic countries have to a great extent a similar historical develop-ment; they introduced parliamentarianism and universal suffrage about thesame time, and they have all been democratic for almost a century. Theyhave a long tradition of participation, and local government is regarded asa fundamental part of democracy. Although the Nordic countries areunitary states, the principle that decisions should be made at the lowestpossible level has often been the practice (Petersson, 1995: 13–15).6

The Southern European countries also have a number of importantcultural, social and historical characteristics in common, and their politicalsystems are often regarded as a ‘Mediterranean model of democracy’(Heidar and Berntzen, 1998: 245). Contrary to the Nordic countries, theyhave experienced serious setbacks on their road to stable democracy. Italyhas been democratic since World War II, but the transition from dictatorship


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Table 5. Party size, two regions and the degree of centralization. Multipleregression analysis

Independent variables Degree of centralization

Party size 0.138 (1.475)Nordic countries –0.290** (–3.047)Southern Europe 0.278** (2.945)Adjusted R2 0.211Sign. 0.000

Note: Standardized beta-coefficients. T-values in parentheses. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.




to democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece did not occur until the 1970s.7

Compared to Scandinavia, politics in Southern Europe is characterized bystrong and charismatic leadership, centralization and authority.

These characteristics may explain the differences between candidate selec-tion methods in Nordic parties, on the one hand, and Southern Europeanparties, on the other. The influence of religion on political culture might alsobe of some importance in this respect. The Catholic Church, which ispredominant in Southern Europe (with the exception of Greece), is said tobe more dogmatic, hierarchical and powerful than Protestantism.

Perhaps the foremost reason for studying region is to bring closely locatedcountries with common political traditions and political culture together.However, classification on the basis of region also implies the inclusion ofother elements that these countries have in common. The problem instudying region as a separate variable is, accordingly, that it consists ofseveral values that together explain more than variables representingseparate characteristics. Hence, the importance of region must not be over-emphasized at the expense of other determinants.

In the following, I briefly discuss some of the other independent variables.Concerning party ideology, far-left and far-right parties apply, as expected,centralized selection methods, but the model is not significant. Thecategories at both extremes of the ideological scale consist of only a fewparties; a more even distribution of parties might have reinforced theimportance of ideology. There are several dimensions of party type as well.One could consider a distinction between ‘catch-all’ parties (see Kirch-heimer, 1966), ‘horizontal’ parties (Seiler, 1986), ‘programmatic’ parties(Wolinetz, 1991), ‘modern cadre’ parties (Koole, 1994), ‘cartel’ parties(Katz, 2001), and so on. However, such a classification would require neatdescriptions of how they differ from each other and to what extent theyoverlap.

Party size appears to be a variable of some significance for the degree ofcentralization of selection methods. In general, large parties apply morecentralized methods than small parties. One reason for the decentralizedpattern among small parties might, as already mentioned, be that becauseof their smaller popularity, they have to rely on the drawing power of well-known aspirants at the local level, which, in turn, calls for local knowledge.Moreover, small party organizations are often characterized by open andflexible political processes, which offer better opportunities for partici-pation. Large organizations, on the other hand, are often marked bycomplexity, hierarchy and bureaucracy, which is associated with a higherdegree of centralization.

Perhaps the most frequently mentioned determinant of candidate selec-tion is the electoral system. The statistical analysis suggests, however, thatthe electoral system in terms of district magnitude does not affect the degreeof centralization. Nor does preferential voting have a decentralizing effect

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on candidate selection. Several authors have emphasized territorial organiz-ation as a decisive factor – federalism is said to coincide with a low degreeof centralization. Again, the assumption is proven wrong. The degree ofcentralization in federal states is practically the same as in unitary states.

The party system seems to affect selection processes to some extent.Candidate selection is more centralized in party systems with few partiesthan in countries with a fragmented party system. However, the associationis not statistically guaranteed. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mindthat party size correlates positively with the degree of centralization, andthat there is naturally always a positive association between large partiesand a small number of effective parties. The higher degree of centralizationin systems with few parties might thus be explained by the presence of largeparties.

By way of conclusion, there are no really strong associations betweenexplanatory variables and the degree of centralization. The regional factoris of some importance but it is only relevant in those regions where selec-tion methods are noticeably centralized or decentralized, that is, the Nordiccountries and Southern Europe, respectively. As a determinant, region doesnot explain different selection processes in general. On the basis of thisstudy, there are no contextual determinants or party characteristics thatwould, to any great extent, explain varying degrees of centralization. Onecould argue that the theoretical basis for examining the effects of insti-tutional determinants on candidate selection is weak. Notwithstanding,some of the theoretical assumptions are rather far-fetched. On the otherhand, several of these variables have been discussed before, and one inter-esting finding is that the earlier assertions concerning the impact of federal-ism and the electoral system on the degree of centralization are, in the lightof statistical evidence, not true.

Considering the use of statistical analyses, it would have been desirableto operate with a larger number of cases than has been available. A datasetof, for instance, all significant parties at a given point of time in alladvanced democracies in the developed world would perhaps haveproduced different, and more reliable, results but I do not think that theoverall pattern would have changed much. A contextual approach does notseem fruitful in explaining why candidate selection methods vary betweenparties and countries. While the regional factor offers some explanation atthe macro-level, a different approach, mainly based on party character-istics, might shed some more light on relevant determinants of candidateselection methods.


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Appendix. Countries, parties, election year and index of the degree ofcentralization

Country Party Election year Index

Australia Labor Party* 2001 4Liberal Party* 2001 3

Austria SPÖ* 1999 4ÖVP 1990 3FPÖ 1990 3Grüne 1990 3

Belgium CVP 1991 3PSC 1991 3PS 1985 1SP 1985 1PRL 1991 2PVV 1991 2PCB 1981 5Agalev 1991 4VU 1991 3Ecolo 1991 2

Canada LPC* 2000 3NDP 1993 3PC* 2000 1Reform Party 1993 1

Cyprus AKEL* 2001 4DISI* 2001 3

Denmark SF 1990 3SD 1990 3RV 1990 1Venstre 1990 2CD 1990 3KF* 1998 1KrF* 1998 3FrP* 1998 3

France RPR 1986 4UDF 1986 4PS 1986 3PCF 1986 4

Greece ND 1985 5PASOK 1985 5

Iceland SDP 1991 1FSF* 1999 2

Ireland FF 1989 3FG 1989 3PD 1989 3WP 1989 2Lab 1989 3





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Appendix continued


Israel Meretz 1999 5Likud 1999 5Labour 1999 1

Italy DC 1987 3PCI 1987 3PSI 1987 4MSI 1987 4PR 1987 4DP 1987 4PSDI 1987 4PRI 1987 3PLI 1987 3

Japan LDP 1993 3SDPJ 1986 3DSP 1986 3Komei-to 1986 5JCP 1986 5

Luxembourg DP* 1999 3CSV* 1999 3

Malta MLP* 1998 4Netherlands CDA 1989 3

PvdA 1989 3VVD 1989 4D66 1989 1GL 1994 2

New Zealand NP, nom. tier* 1999 2NP, list tier* 1999 4NZLP, nom. tier* 1999 4NZLP, list tier* 1999 4ACT, nom. tier* 1999 1ACT, list tier* 1999 4NZFP, nom. tier* 1999 3NZFP, list tier* 1999 4Alliance 1993 2

Spain PSOE* 2000 4CDC* 2000 4

Sweden Vp* 1998 2S* 1998 2C* 1998 2M* 1998 2FpL 1988 2MP 1988 2KD 1988 2




Notes

I thank David M. Farrell and two anonymous referees for their helpful commentson an earlier draft of this article. They are not responsible for any faults that remain.

1 A practical reason for limiting the dataset to the developed world is the relativeinaccessibility of data on candidate selection in other parts of the world. AmongThird World countries, my correspondence with party officials resulted in data oncandidate selection in PRI, PAN and PRD from Mexico, DP from Ecuador, NEfrom Uruguay, RN from Chile, PL and PCC from Colombia, ANC from SouthAfrica, NNP from Grenada and PNM from Trinidad and Tobago.

2 Nowadays, Italy and Japan also use mixed systems, but data on candidateselection in these countries belong to the period prior to the electoral reforms.

3 Bille does not, however, mix the elements of decentralization and inclusiveness,since all parties that apply membership ballots are also found in one of thecategories (1–5) that determine the level of decentralization.

4 In none of my units of analysis is the selection process completely controlled byregional party organs.

5 The negative relationship (–0.283) between area and the effective number ofparties suggests that this dataset is, as far as these variables are concerned, notrepresentative of the entire democratic world. Anckar (1998: 292) has proved thatthe larger the size of a country, the higher the number of parties. Some possibleeffects of the party system and/or area on candidate selection methods may thusbe blurred by these conditions.

6 Candidate selection in Norway and Finland, which are not included in the study,is also decentralized.

7 According to Gallagher et al. (1992: 131), the national executive is the mostimportant selecting body in Portuguese parties, which are not included in thestudy.

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Appendix continued


Switzerland CVP* 1999 2SPS* 1999 4GPS* 1999 2EVP* 1999 2

United Kingdom Conservative Party 1987 3Labour Party 1987 3Liberal Party 1987 3SDP 1987 3

Note: *Analysis of candidate selection methods is based on party statutes and/or correspon-dence with party officials. The abbreviations are similar to those in Political Resources onthe Net [http://www.politicalresources.net/], Katz and Mair (1992) and/or Gallagher andMarsh (1988).

Sources: Bille (2001); Gallagher and Marsh (1988); Gallagher et al. (1992); Katz and Mair(1992); Norris (1996); Norris (1997); Rahat and Hazan (2001).




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KRISTER LUNDELL is a doctoral candidate at Åbo Akademi University in Finland.His research interests include democratization, candidate selection and electoralsystems. His forthcoming doctoral dissertation deals with determinants of electoralsystems.ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Biskopsgatan15, FIN-20500 Åbo, Finland. [email: [email protected]]

Paper submitted 27 September 2002; accepted for publication 29 April 2003.


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determinants of candidate selection: the degree of centralization in comparative perspective

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