derbycon 5 - tactical diversion-driven defense
TRANSCRIPT
Tactical Diversion-Driven Defense
Thomas Hegel Incident Response and Security
Analytics Engineer GCFE, CISSP, PIE ETR
Greg Foss SecOps Lead / Sr. Researcher OSCP, GAWN, GPEN, GWAPT, GCIH,
CEH, CYBER APT
Diversion & Deception in Warfare
Draw Attention Away From True Attack Point
Mislead With False Appearance
Gain Advantage Over Enemy
“All war is based on deception” -Sun Tzu
Success From Diversion/Deception
Operation Mincemeat - 1943
Operation Zeppelin - 1944
Battle of Megiddo - 1918
Operation Bodyguard - 1942
Operation Anadyr - 1962
..and many more
Operation Mincemeat - 1943
Germans find British corpse from sunken enemy warship
1.
Operation Mincemeat - 1943
Corpse holds Plans to upcoming attack in Greece
2.
Operation Mincemeat - 1943
Germans move defenses from Sicily to Greece
3.
Apply this to InfoSec?
The Rules:
Sound Techniques
Adequate Secrecy
Feedback on Execution
Sufficient Time For Execution
Control All Information Chanels
Follows strategic and operational objectives
In Practice
Network
Data HumanOffense
Network Defense
HoneypotsEasy to configure, deploy, and maintain
Fly traps for anomalous activity
You will learn a ton about your adversaries. Information that will help in the future…
Subtle Traps
Catch Internal Attackers
Observe Attack Trends
Decoy From Real Data
Waste Attackers Time
Honeypot Use Cases
Fake Web Applications
github.com/gfoss/phpmyadmin_honeypot
$any-web-app
Custom + Believable, with a Hidden Motive
Data Defense
Honey Tokens and Web Bugs
Zip BombsAdobeFlash.zip
42 bytes 4.5 petabytes
www.unforgettable.dk
Human Defense
Keys to Success
Real World Awareness Training
Use a Blended Approach to Exercises
Gather Metrics for Program Improvements
Note: Never Punish or Embarrass Users!
Scope Social Habits
Public Information
Username Correlation
Connection Capability
“Private” Information
Examine Network Usage
“Free” Coupons!QR Destination as training or
phishing site
Print > Place on Cars in Lot
Rate of Connections
Rate Reported to Security
Spear Phishing
Open Attachment Rate
Open Message Rate
Martin Bos & Eric Milam SkyDogCon 2012 - Advanced Phishing Tactics
Beyond User Awareness
Defense Success/Failures
Rogue Wi-Fi
Setup Wi-Fi Access Provide Fake Landing Page
Get Credentials!
Connection Rate Credential Submission Rate
Report to Security Rate
www.slideshare.net/heinzarelli/wifi-hotspot-attacks
https://youtu.be/v36gYY2Pt70
Red Teaming
Not Penetration Testing!
Not Limited in Scope
Outsider's Perspective
Intelligence on Weaknesses
Diversion and Deception Based Offense
Offensive Honeypots
All of these tools have something in common…
● Configuration Management Systems
● Vulnerability Scanners
● System Health Checks
They tend to log in to remote hosts!
Simulate SSH service
Stand this up during internal penetration test
Catch Credentials...
#!/bin/bash
attempts=$(cat /opt/kippo/log/kippo.log | grep 'login attempt' | wc -l);
echo ""
echo $attempts" => login attempts"
echo "--------------------"
cat /opt/kippo/log/kippo.log | \
grep 'login attempt' | \
cut -d "," -f 3,4,5 | \
awk '{print "["$1" "$4}'
echo "--------------------"
echo ""
Social Engineering
Social Engineering
WYSINWYC
http://thejh.net/misc/website-terminal-copy-paste
DEMO
Post-Exploitation Tricks
Use Deception to:
Elevate Privileges
Access Protected Resources
Pivot and Move Laterally
Etc.
OS X - AppleScript
fuzzynop.blogspot.com/2014/10/osascript-for-local-phishing.html
DEMO
Windows - PowerShell
github.com/gfoss/misc/blob/master/PowerShell/popuppwn.ps1
DEMO
Attack Security Tools
● Generate False and/or Malformed Logs
● Spoof Port Scanning Origins
$ sudo nmap -sS -P0 -D sucker target(s)
● Block UDP Port 514 or disable logging service
● Capture Service Account Credentials
● Wear AV like a hat and backdoor legitimate programs on the shares…
https://www.shellterproject.com/
Target IT Staff…
It’s broken. :-(
I don’t know what
happened…
Can you fix it?
github.com/clymb3r/PowerShell/tree/master/Invoke-Mimikatz
In Conclusion
Network
Data HumanOffense
Recommended Resources
Offensive Countermeasures: The Art of Active Defense Paul Asadoorian and John Strand
Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-exploitation. Sean Bodmer
Second World War Deception: Lessons Learned from Today’s Joint Planner
Major Donald J. Bacon, USAF
Thank you! Questions?
Thomas Hegel @Thomas_Hegel
Greg Foss @Heinzarelli
@LogRhythmLabs blog.logrhythm.com