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8/22/2019 Denninger, Asistencia Gubernamental en El Ejercicio de Los Derechos, Procedimientos y Organizacion, Dimension

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Articles

GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights

(ProcedureandOrganization)

ByErhardDenninger*

A.BasicRightsRealizationUndertheConditionsoftheDemocraticandSocialWelfare

State

I."FreedomfromtheState"and"FreedomthroughtheState"

For a brief period during the first half of the 1970s it appeared as though the

fundamental debate concerning the function of basic rights (to a certain extent an

individualoriented reprise of theRechtsstaatsocial state controversyof the 1950s and

1960s1 was coming down to the alternatives "Basic Rights: (only) Defensive Rights" or

"BasicRights:(also) Rightsto Participationand Claimsto Performance"2PeterHberles

demand (made atthe 1971 ConstitutionalLawTeachers'Conference)that thebaseline

substantivelegalstatusofbasicrightsbesupplementedbya"statusactivusprocessualis"

(inthesenseofa"governmentperformativedueprocess"),andtheFederalConstitutional

Court's (FCC's) first NumerusClausus decision (of 18 July 1972) and its Term Abortion

decision(of25February1975),withitsrecognitionofthestate's"comprehensive"dutyto

protect (and promote!)3 unborn life, all mark advancedpositionsin theory and judicial

*

born1932,Professor ofConstitutional andAdministrative Lawand ofLegal Philosophy;studiesin Tbingen,Lausanne(Switzerland)andMainz;ProfessorofLaw,Frankfurt,1967;RectoroftheUniversityofFrankfurt,197071,Deanof Law Faculty 197879; Visiting Professor, Chicago, 1983; Roma,1985. Principal research interests:

constitutionaltheory,fundamentalrights,policeandStatesecuritylaw,lawoftelecommunicationsandofdata

protection,technologicalsecuritylaw,lawofpharmaceutics.Publications:Staatsrecht,vol.I,1973,vol.II,1979;Polizeiund Strafprozeim demokratischen Rechtsstaat(withK. Lderssen),1978;ArzneimittelRichtlinien und

"Verschreibungsfhigkeit", 1981; Das Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung und Innere Sicherheit,

Kritische Justiz 1985, 215; Verfassung und Gesetz, Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fr Gesetzgebung undRechtswissenschaft,1986,291;DerPrventionsStaat,KritischeJustiz1988,1;numerousarticlesonconstitutional

andadministrativelaw.

Post1989:VistingProfessoratChicagoandRome,1993/94FellowattheWissenschaftskollegzuBerlin,1995

2000JudgeattheConstitiontionalCourtofThringen.Booksandarticlesonlegalandconstitutionaltheory,the

ruleoflawanddemocraticlegislation,fundamentalrightsundertheBasicLaw,humanrightsinEurope.Professor

Emeritussince1999.Email:[email protected]

1

SeeERNSTFORSTHOFF,RECHTSSTAATLICHKEITUNDSOZIALSTAATLICHKEIT(1968).2OutlineofthedevelopmentofbasiclawfunctioninE RHARDDENNINGER,STAATSRECHT2(1979)136e,162;alsosee,

KOMMENTARZUMGRUNDGESETZ(REIHEALTERNATIVKOMMENTARE),BeforeArt.1GG,Rn.130.

3DecisionsoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt39BV ERFGE1(42).


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2011] 431GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights decisionmaking.

4Atthesametime,newlifewasgiventothediscussionconcerning"basic

socialrights"(suchasthe"righttowork","toshelter","toeducation","tosocialsecurity",etc.), and new and expanded forms of social protection, in short: concerning the

concretizationof the social stateprinciple.5 Yet thewelfarestate, "socialliberal"reform

impulsesoonranupagainstpoliticaleconomiclimits:the"feasibilityproviso"allowedthemerely "ideal standard" character of subjective performance rights to become all too

quicklyapparent.6

Fromapoliticalstandpointlargelyafailure,thisreformdiscussionneverthelessshowedits

enduringvalueforbasicrightstheory(thankstoconstitutionaldecisionsconcernedwith

preservingrulecontinuity)duringthelate70'sandearly80'sintwomajorrespects:1)the

state'sobjectivelegalprotectiveobligationvisvisbasicrightsinterestsrestingonthe

obligationtoprotecthumandignity(Art.1,para.1,sentence2oftheBasicLaw(BL)and

thebindingofallgovernmentorganstotheBasicLaw(Art.1,para.3,BL)isextendedtoprocedural regulations of all kinds. Atthe sametime, the subjectivelegal statusof the

basic right holderin procedureswith thesecondor third governmental power (i.e.,the

executiveorthejudiciary)isexpanded.KonradHesse'srepresentativeandconcentrated

overviewoftheproblem(giveninthiscapacityasGermanStatereportertotheFourth

Conference of EuropeanConstitutional Courts in October 1978),7 the decisions on 7

AtomG(StatuteonNuclearEnergy)(Kalkar,Aug.8,1978)andoncompulsoryrealestate

auctions(27September1978)(particularlythedissentingopinionofJudgeBhmer),the

MhlheimKarlich decisionofDec.20,1979,the rightofasylumdecisionof 25February

1981,andtheeffectuationofthetenthbookonadministrativeprocedureoftheSocial

LawCodeof18August1980nowmarkthesalientpositionsoftheproblematicinlegal

theory,judicialdecisionmaking,andlegislation.8 Theairplanenoisedecisionofthe First

4 Peter Hberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, (30) VERFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHENSTRAATSRECHTSLEHRER(VVDStRL)43(1972);33BVERFGE303and39BVERFGE1

5W.Schmidt, SozialeGrundrechteim Verfassungsrechtder BundesrepublikDeutschland(1981),9.;Berichtder

Sachverstndigenkommission,Staatszielbestimmungen/Gesetzgebungsauftrge, (1983), Rn. 75; D. Posser etR.

Wassermann(ed.),FreiheitindersozialenDemokratie,(1975)

633BVERFGE303(333);Hberle,supra,note4,110,138,thesis34,nowgenerallyaccepted.

7 KonradHesse,Bestand undBedeutungderGrundrechtein derBundesrepublikDeutschland,EuGRZ427, 343

(1978)

8 Sequentially: 49 BVERFGE, 220 (228); 53 BVERFGE 30 (69) (dissenting opinion); 56 BVERFGE 216. From the

literature, see especially:H. Bethge,Grundrechtsverwirklichung und Grundrechtssicherung durchOrganisation

undVerfahren ,NJW1(1982);W.BLMEL,GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZDURCHVERFAHRENSGESTALTUNG,23(1982);H.GOERLICH,

GRUNDRECHTEALSVERFAHRENSGARANTIEN(1981);F.KOPP,VERFASSUNGSRECHTUNDVERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSRECHT(1971);H.W. Laubinger, Grundrechtsschutz durch Gestaltung des Verwaltungsverfahrens, 73 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 60

(1982); D. Lorenz,Grundrechteund Verfahrensordnungen,NJW865(1977);Der grundrechtlicheAnspruch auf

effektiven Rechtsschutz,AR 105 623 (1980);F. Ossenbhl,Kernenergieim Spiegel desVerfassungsrechts, DIEOFFENTLICHEVERWALTUNG(DV)1(1981);GrundrechtsschutzimunddurchVerfahrensrecht183,inFESTSCHRIFTFR

EICHENBERGER(1982);K.Redeker,GrundgesetzlicheRechteaufVerfahrensteilhabe ,NJW1593(1980);Ch.Starck,


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[Vol.12No.01432 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l Senate(14July1981)

9alsobelongsherethematically,becauseofthepossibleadmissionof

aconstitutionalcomplaintagainstlegislativeomission(anddespitethedecision'slargelyhypotheticalspeculations).

Ofcourse,thecentralideabehindthisprocedureorientedbasicrightsinterpretation(oralthough this is not the same thing this basic rightsoriented procedural rule

interpretation), that is, the "relevance of procedure to basic rights" (more exactly: the

notionthateffectivefulfillmentbelongstothe"essentialcomponents"ofabasicright)10is

a much older perception. It is therefore misleading to give the impression that the

procedural relevance of basic rights was the fruit of an only recently undertaken

broadening of the basic rights' meaning, or even a matter of their "functional

transformation".11Thisviewispartlycorrect,inasmuchastheFCC,whenconfrontedwith

thequestionofeffectivefulfillmentofthelaw,usually(butnotalwaysBVerfGE39,276

(295)

12

focuses on effective protection ofthe law by the judge. The beginnings of therelevantchainoftraditionwiththeHamburgdikeregulationlawdecision(18December

1968)13 "legalexpropriation" dueto reductionofpossibilities forlegal protectiononly

allowablein exceptionalcases illustrates this. The"new"element in judicial decisions

since the MhlheimKrlich decision (1979) is the strong emphasis on basic rights

relevancealsofor"prejudicial"administrativeprocedure.14

The possibility that a substantive basic right could be affected by different modes of

procedural structuring, and the resulting demand for procedural and organizational

regulationsconformingtothebasicrights,arethereforenotpeculiartothe(inthemodern

sense) "performing", "planning", and steering administration. It is equally valid for the

"classical"interveningandorderingadministration,andthusforthedefensivefunctionof

thebasicrightasanexpressionofthe statusnegativus.Aneffectiveprotectionofthebasic

right inthisstatusdemands, asprocedural complementsof thesubstantivelegalstatus,not only a "right to a fair procedure" or the "claim to fair procedural conduct", but

effective individualgrantingoflegalprotection asis todayderivedfromArt.19para.4,

BL.15 This however is not representedas amere omission (of an interventionintothe

STAATLICHEORGANISATIONUNDSTAATLICHEFINANZIERUNGALSHILFENZUGRUNDRECHTSVERWIRKLICHUNGEN?,480(1976).

956BVERFGE54

1039BVERFGE276(294),endorsingtheconsistentpracticeofthecourts.

11Forthis,however:D.Grimm,VerfahrensfehleralsGrundrechtsverste ,NVwZ865(1985).Ontheevolutionof

basicrights,seeH.H.Rupp,AR101(1976),161;P.SALADIN,GRUNDRECHTIMWANDEL(1982).

12Thelegislatormusteffectivelyregulateuniversityadmission.

1324BVERFGE267(401),quotedin53BVERFGE30,dissentingopinion69(73).

14Blmel,supra,note8,33.Seealsoalreadyin33BVERFGE303(341);41,251(265);52BVERFGE380(390)

15Forinstance,BVERFGE46,202(210);52,380(389).


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2011] 433GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights protectedspaceofthebasicrightfreedom),butratherasapositive"performance"bythe

state. No one has more clearly formulated this than Georg Jellinek, as far back as1892/1905. The negative status (oriented toward fending off and abstaining from

disturbances) firstattains "itsjuristic status"when supplementedby thepositive status,

andthe "claims deriving from this upon thestate". "Themost significantclaimderivingfromthecenterofthispositivestatusistheclaimtoprotectionoflegalrights.Thisclaim

canbedirectlycharacterizedastheessentialcharacteristicofthepersonality".Thesource

ofthis(notprivatelegal,butpubliclegal)claimis"thepersonalityitself".16Wewillgetto

thequestion of thelegitimation,of the "source" of subjectivelegal procedural statuses

later; here we are first interested in the assertion that their concession is not only a

consequenceofthemodern,"redistributing"or"dispensing"performanceadministration,

nor of the association of theplanning and steering administrationwith legislative final

programsorindeterminatelegalconcepts.17Itisthecasethatthecomplexity,duration,

andeffectsoflargescaleplanningadministrationprocedures( e.g.,thoseinvolvedintheplanning, constructionand operationof nuclearpowerplants) andthe large number of

citizenspossiblyparticipatingoraffected,makeitnecessarythattherebelegalprotections

already preestablished in the administrative procedures themselves, if they are to be

effective at all. This makes clear that basic rights realization is proceduredependent

alreadyinthisphase.Andyet,longbeforetheMhlheimKrlichdecision,theimmediateinfluenceofthesubstantivebasicright(here:freedomofprofession,Art.12,para.1,BL)

uponanadministrative(examination)procedureinacompletely"traditional"procedureof

"administrative ordering" (namely, the first lawyers' state examination), was basically

foundtobe(andappliedas)the"bynowestablishedjudicialposition".18

II.ATypologyoftheFunctionsofProceduralandOrganizationalRegulationforBasicRights

Realization

1.FourTypesofFunctionalClassificationofBasicRightsandProceduralorOrganizational

Regulation

It would therefore be an impermissible simplification to describe the basic rights

developmentsimplyasatwophasesuccession,aphaseof"freedomfromthestate"being

replacedbyoneof"freedomthroughthestate",andtolinkthebasicrightsrelevanceof

proceduralregulationswiththegrantingofcorrespondingsubjectivelegalstatusestothe

16G.JELLINEK,SYSTEMDERSUBJEKTIVENFFENTLICHENRECHTE(1905),105,124,125.ForthesignificanceofJellinekinthis

connection:R.Breuer,GrundrechtealsAnspruchsnomen,(91)FESTGABEBUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHT(1978).

17Withadifferentemphasis:Grimm,supra,note11,865.

1852BVERFGE380(389);seealsosupra,note14.


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[Vol.12No.01434 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l second phase. The Rechtsstaat has always acknowledged its "protective duty" (Georg

Jellinek)19visvisindividualsandtheirfreedombyissuingproceduralandorganizationalrules,notleastofallwithrespecttotheshapingoftheinstitutionsofprivatelaw.Evena

cursorylookinstructsusthatthelegalinterestsprotectedbysuch"classical"basicrightsas

freedomof property,marriage, rightsof association andunion, etc.were(and stillare)subjecttoamultitudeoforganizationalandproceduralregulations,intendedtoservein

parttheirownprotection,inparttheprotectionofimportantpublicinterests,andinpart

too the resolution of collisions between basic rights. As fundamentally important

procedural regulations one should here mention first of all the "proviso of law", the

principleof proportionalityofadministration(Art.20,para.3,BL)includingtheorderof

governmental authoritiesand theestablishment ofa freedomprotecting administrative

procedure.Thejudiciallegalprotectionprocess(Art.19,para.4,92,97,BL)isinlinewith

this.

Ifoneattemptstoclassifythemultiplicityoftypicalrelationshipsbetweenbasicrightsand

proceduralororganizationalprovisionsunderfunctionalviewpoints,itbecomesapparent

that, with few exceptions (see (a) and (d) below), the classifications cannot bemade

specificallywithrespecttothebasicrights .Thismeansthatoneandthesamebasicright

can,dependingonthemodeofitsexercise,besubjecttoproceduralregulationsfortotallydifferentpurposesandincompletelydifferentways,orforitspartcanhaveanimpacton

suchregulations.

Nevertheless, the relationship of the basic rights to procedural or organizational

regulationscantypicallybeorderedintofourgroups:

(a) A particular procedure or a particular procedural structure can itself become the

subjectofabasicrightsguarantee .Herethecharacterization"proceduralbasicright"isappropriate.Goodexamplesaretheguaranteesofrecoursetothecourts(Art.19,

para. 4 BL), and, although not standardized in the basic rights section, the "basic

judicialrights"ofArt.101,para.1BL(whichassuresthatjudgesbechosen forspecific

casesviaaneutral,legalprocedure)andArt.103,para.1BL(therighttobeheardin

alllegalproceedings).Theprinciplesregulatingtheelectoralprocess(Art.38,para.1

BL)alsobelonginthiscategory.

(b) Theexerciseofthebasicrightina concretecasedependsonsuccessfullyfollowinga

procedure.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthebasicrightinotherobjectivesituationscould

notinfactalsobeexercisedwithoutsucha procedure.Yetthe legislatureincertain

cases(orperhapsalways)makestheallowableclaimtothebasicrightdependentona

proceduralcontrol(a"test")orotherproceduralconditions.

(c) AprocedureservesneithertherealizationofacertainbasicrightXnorthe controlof

its exercise, but rather other purposes, whether it be the legal and basic rights

19Jellinek,supra,note16,125


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2011] 435GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights realizationofthirdparties,or alegally determinedpublicinterest.ThebasicrightX

whichisnegativelyaffectedtherebymustbeprotectedbyconcedingcorrespondingproceduralstatusestotheholderoftheright.

(c) A basic right can de facto be exercised only by making claim to particular

(governmental or nongovernmental, "social") performances or institutionalarrangements.Thecompetitionorcooperationsofseveralholdersofthesamebasic

rights demands distributive and opinionformation (Willensbildung) procedures or

otherorganizationalperformanceswhichmakepossibleabalancingofinterestsand

performancesandapartlycollective,partlyindividualbasicrightsrealizationforeach

oftherespectiveholdersofthebasicright.

2.IsaProcedural/OrganizationalStructureRequiredbytheBasicRights?Statementsfrom

ConstitutionalDecisions

"Substantive"protectionofbasicrightsandthestructuringofprocedureintheRechtsstaat

reciprocally condition one another.20 If it is acknowledged (alongwith the FCC)

21 that

"effectivelegalprotection"whateverthatmightbeis"anessentialelementofthebasic

rightitself",thenonecannotconceiveofthetherebyrequired(administrativeorjudicial)legalprotectionprocedures asregulationswhichsotospeakareaddedtothesubstantive

basicrightfromtheoutside,asregulationswhichare"neutralvisvisthebasicrights".On

thecontrary,the procedural ororganization structuringmust serve tofurtherthe basic

rights.Neithertheproceduralaspectnorthesubstantivelegalcontentcanunconditionally

predominateinthisreciprocalrelationship.Inthefirstcase,thebasicrightwouldcollapse

intoabundleofproceduralpositionswhichweretobetiedtogetherbythelegislature;the

newlawregardingrefusaltoperformmilitaryservice(passed28February1983)22offersan

example for this which hopefully will not be imitated. The second casewould in factultimatelyleadtoadissolutionofallgeneralstructuresofjudicialprocedureintoa"legal

actionsproceduralnet"andtoa"special,basicrightsspecificprocedurallaw"andthe

Second Senate of the FCC has correctlywarned us about the disadvantages of such a

development.23 The consequences of an imbalance in this reciprocity, of a disharmony

(withrespecttocontent)ofsubstantivelawandlegalprocedure,wereclearlyexpressedby

theFCC:"Shouldthelegalprocedureestablishedbythelegislaturefailtofulfillitsjob,or

shoulditimposesuchhighbarriersontheexerciseofa rightthatthedangerarisesofa

devaluation of the substantivelegal status,then it isirreconcilable with thebasic right

20Onthisalso,Lorenz,supra,note8,865,866,868.

2124BVERFGE367(401)

22BGBl.I,203;confirmingthis69BVERFGE1;seehoweverdissentingopinionsbyBckenfrdeandMahrenholz,

57;also,Mahrenholz,87.

2360BVERFGE253(297)


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[Vol.12No.01436 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l whichitisintendedtoprotect".

24

However,itismuchmoredifficulttodotheoppositeandmakeapositivestatementabout

whattheprocedural rulesmustlooklike, soastoaffordthenecessarydegreeof"basic

rights protection via procedure". In other words: the difficulty consists in developingcriteria(whichwillalsobeapplicableinjudicialadministration)fordemarcatingthebasic

rightsprotectingproceduralandorganizationalrulesnotonlyallowedbutindeedrequired

by the Basic Law. For constitutional review of procedural regulations (above all in

procedures for constitutional complaints) such a demarcation within the totality of

(technicallyhighlydifferentiated)procedurallawsisofdecisiveimportance.Thefirstaid

which the FCC attempted to providewith its MhleimKarlich decision proved a shaky

support:Ifthecourttakesabasicrightviolation"intoconsideration"whenpresentedwith

aviolationofaproceduralregulation"whichthestatehasissuedinfulfillmentofitsduty

toprotect"thelegalinterestscoveredbythesubstantivebasicright,thenthisleadseithertothelimitlessnessofsubjectivehistoricalmotivationresearchoflegislativeintent,orback

to theunsolvedquestion aboutobjectifiable criteria.25Asecondindicationgivenbythe

Court,intherightofasylumdecisionof1981,26maybesomewhatricherin"content",yet

itremainstoogeneralandinneedofconcretization;moreover,thatdecisionprompteda

stormofcriticismfrombothconstitutionaltheoreticalandmethodologicalpointsofview.Accordingtothatdecision,violationsofproceduralregulationswouldbeof"constitutional

relevance" or, differently expressed: such regulations would be "constitutionally

required" if, "according to the legislature, those regulations were fundamental in

assuringthemaintenanceoftherightofasylum".

3.CritiqueandCounterCritique

Theprinciplecritiqueofthisconceptcanbereducedtotheformula:"Fromconformityof

procedurallawwiththebasicrights,toconformityofbasicrightswiththeprocedurallaw"

thusvarying Leisner'soldformula.27Whiletheproblemmaybeanoldone,itssolution

requiresnewandconcreteefforts.Canonereallysaythaton thebasic ofthose judicial

guidelines the basic rights protective area orients itself according to the will of the

legislature,thatitisnolongertheBasicLaw,butthelegislativeproposalsandprotocolsof

Parliamentwhichdeterminethescopeofbasicrightsprotection?28Doesthesignificanceof

2463BVERFGE131(143)

2553BVERFGE30(65)

26

56BVERFGE216(242)

27 W. LEISNER, VON DER VERFASSUNGSMIGKEIT DER GESETZE ZUR GESETZMIGKEIT DER VERFASSUNG (1964); ID., DIE

GESETZMIGKEITDERVERFASSUNG(1964),201

28ThusK.P.Dolde, Grundrechtsschutzdurch einfachesVerfahrensrecht?,NeueZeitschriftfur Verwaltungsrecht


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2011] 437GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights thesubstantivebasicright(justlikeduringtheWeimarRepublic)sinktothelevelof"a

modifiedprincipleoflegalityofadministrationandjudicialdecisionmaking"?Ontheotherhand,isitreallycorrecttosaythatprocedurallaw"requiredbythebasicrights"iselevated

tothestatusofconstitutionallawandthat,afterconstitutionaldecisionshaveprovenitto

be a "substantive aspect of the Constitution",29 it thereby not only gives the FCC (in

comparisontothe"specialtycourts")anadditional(andperhapsdubious)powerofcontrol

(for nowof courseit isa matterofthe violationof"specificconstitutional rights"), but

aboveallblocksthedemocraticlegislature'sintentionsofchangingthelaw?

Itisinitiallyimportanttopointoutthestrange,Janusfacedqualityofthiscriticism:onthe

onehanditdisplaysconcernthatthesubstantivecontentofthebasicrightcouldalltoo

easilyfallsubjecttothearbitrarywillofthelegislature;butontheotherhanditseesthe

playingroomofthelegislatureendangeredbytheassertedelevationoftheprocedurallaw

required(oratleastsanctioned)bythebasicright,andtheconcomitantrestrictionsuponchange.30

Yetaproperunderstandingofthedecisionsonprocedurallaw,readinthetotalcontextof

basic rights decisions, reveals that the legislature is neither so powerful visvis basic

rightsnor,afterpassingthejudicialtestofconstitutionality,soimpotentasmanycriticsfear.

(a)Theproblematic,asitshowsupintherelationshipbetweensubstantivebasiclawand

"structuring"or"ordering"organizational/proceduralregulations,isidenticaltothewayit

appears (for example) in the relationship between the constitutionallyguaranteed

institutionof"property"(Art.14,para.1,sentence1,BL)andthelawswhichdetermineits

content and limitations (Art. 14, para. 1, sentence 2). The FCC's statement31 that in

determiningthe constitutionallegalstatusof thepropertyowner,theCivil Lawand thepublic laws are to be taken equally into account, and that the concrete powers over

property at a given point in time could be discovered only after a "comprehensive

examination" of all valid legal regulations controlling the propertyowner's status,

provoked a wave of scholarly legal critique,32 the concerned tenor of which was

concentrated in the question: Was property to be protected only according to the

NVwZ65,69(1982);alsocriticalJ.Held,DerGrundrechtsbezugdesVerwaltungsverfahrens(1984),106,253.

29ThusOssenbhl,supra,note8,192;similarlyconcernedisGrimmsupra,note11,868.

30SeeOssenbhl,supra,note29;notthusconcernedDolde,supra,note28,69.

31

58BVERFGE300(336)

32 Goodoverview ofproblemin J.Ipsen,NuereEntwicklungender Eigentumsdogmatik, RechtundWirtschaft,

OsnabrckerRechtswissenschaftlicheAbhandlungenBand1,Cologne etal.129(1985).Ipsenlists27publications

adhocwithoutclaimingexhaustiveness,130.


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[Vol.12No.01438 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l standardssetbylegislation"?

33Thepracticaleffectofthisdecisionisabovealla procedural

one:primarylegalprotectionagainstillegalorunconstitutionalseeminginterferenceswithpropertyistobesoughtfromtheadministrativecourts,nottheordinarycourts.Giventhe

still solid and consistent position of the FCCwith respect to a genuinely constitutional

conceptofproperty(whichischaracterizedbyanattributiontoaholderofrights,bythisholder's fundamental power of control, by private usefulness, but also by the socially

boundednatureofproperty)34andgiventoothecalmreactionoftheBundesgerichtshof's

compensationdecisions35tothe(afterallnotreallysonew)propertyandexpropriation

doctrinesofthe FCC, apocalyptic visionsofthe declineand fallof"bourgeois"property

seemmisplaced.

(b) Characteristically, the reaction in the scholarly journals to the accentuation of the

"constitutional relevance" of procedural law36 followed a somewhat different path.

Attemptsweremade to channel the feared legislative dynamic (which others howevergreetedwarmly of even encouraged)37 through a new table of categories of the basic

rights.Forexample,Ossenbhl38hasproposed,besidesthealreadymentionedcategoryof

"basicproceduralrights"which,remarkablyenough,hetakestoincludetheabolitionof

thedeathpenalty(Art.102BL),athreewaydivisionofthebasicrightsinto1.procedure

dependent,2.procedureaffectedand3.procedureimprintedrights.Itischaracteristicofthefirst groupofrightsthatthesubstantivebasicrightguaranteecannotbeeffectively

claimedand exercisedpossessionofthe basicright ina particularlyordered procedure.

The structuring of the procedure is "therefore so to speak a basic rightsexistential

question". One could distinguishbetween "essential"proceduredependent basic rights

(e.g.therightofasylum(Art.16,para.2, sentence2) andtherightto refusetoperform

militaryservice(Art.14,para.3)and"potentially"proceduredependentbasicrights,such

asthatoffreedomofprofessioninthedistributionofuniversitystudylocations(Art.12,

para. 1 BL). The common denominator for proceduredependency is the necessity ofgovernmental"distribution";inthecasesmentioned,itisamatterofbasic performance

rights,throughwhich"specialentitlements(exceptionalrights)aresoughtandgranted".

While this interpretiveschememaybe adequate asa description of the legal situation

confirmed by the FCC, it raises all the more doubts with respect to its basic rights

33 SeeH.J.Papier,Maunz/Drig, Kommentar zumGrundgesetz, Art.14, Rn.35. Onthis alsoE. Denninger,Die

ZweitanmelderproblematikimArzneimittelrecht,GRUR627,633(1984).

34See58BVERFGE300(335,338);50,290(339);52,1(29).

35BGHDVBl,391

3653BVERFGE30(71)(dissentingopinion)

37Inthissense,seeBlmel,supra,note8,78,83.

38Ossenbhl,supra,note8,1981,1982


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2011] 439GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights theoreticalstartingpoint.Thesedoubtsarefirstofallaimedattheassumptionofthe"so

tospeak"basicrightsexistentialsignificanceofthe(recognitionordistribution)procedure.Theright,forexample,torefusetoperformwarserviceinvolvingtheuseofarmsisneither

a "basic performance right" withwhich the objector seeks an "exceptional right" or a

"specialentitlement",nordoesitcorrespondtoarequirement"inthenatureofthecase",that this right could only be effectively exercised on the basis of a governmental

recognitionprocedure.Foritisnotthecasethatthemilitaryserviceobjectorseeksasit

were"forthesakeofmercy"aparticulargovernmentalperformance("distribution"or

"granting"),butquitethereverse:thestateisdemandingaperformancefromhim,namely

militaryserviceinvolvinguseofarms.InthissensetherightfromArt.4,para.3BLismore

accuratelydescribedasaperformanceduty defensive basicright.Assuch,aclaimcould

effectivelybelaidtoitpurelydefacto,withoutanyproceduralintervention,ifthedraftee

simplyfailedtofollowhisinductionorders.Theprocedureofofficialrecognitiontowhich

theobjectorissubjectedisconsequentlynotrequiredbecausethebasicrightotherwisewould not exist or could not bemeaningfully exercised, but because the state wishes

successfully to achieve its "public interest" (here: the performanceofmilitary service),

whichhappenstoruncountertotherightoftheindividual,andthestatecanonlydothis

(giventheconstitutionaldecisionofArt.4,para.3BL)inalegalmanneragainstthewillof

theobjector if theobjector has "lost" in a fair procedure. Thedetailedanalysis of theproceduralstructuringin thenewwarservicerefusal lawalsoshows that theprocedure

was at least as much designed for the certain fulfillment of the "basic constitutional

decisioninfavorofmilitarydefenseofthenation"39asitwasfortherealizationofthe

individual'srighttorefuse.AstheCourthasconsistentlyrecognized,thisis"abasicright;it

isnotjustamatterof'principle'whichfirstneedsactualizationthroughthelegislature.The

Constitutiondirectlyguaranteesthecitizentheright,forreasonofconscience,torefuseto

renderwarserviceinvolvingarms".And"insofarastheobjectivescopeofabasicrightcan

be directly established through interpretation, there remains no room for constitutiveregulationbythelegislature".

40Thisisamatterofabasicrightforeverymanitwouldbe

validforwomenorresidentaliens,providedtheytoowerecalledupontoperformmilitary

serviceinvolvinguseofarms.Butthismeansthatitisnotamere"exceptionalright",but

ratheraccordingtotheConstitutiona"regularbasicright",justlikeeveryotherbasicright,

regardlessofwhetherthelegislatureproceededintheexpectationthatitsvalidexercise

would(statistically)remaintheexceptionratherthantherule.

Inprinciple,thesamethingistrueforthebasicrightofpoliticalasylum.Justaswiththe

right torefusemilitaryservice,onemust takeintoaccountthe significanceofthe "pre

procedural", substantivelegal content of the basic right, a significance which is closely

connected to the inviolability of human dignity.41 Otherwise one runs the danger of

3948BVERFGE127(159);69,1(21)4012BVERFGE45(53)

41Thisisemphasizedin54BVERFGE341(357);56,216(235);R.Marx,EinemenschenrechtlicheBegrndungdes


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[Vol.12No.01440 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l acknowledging the basic right only according to the standard of some procedural

regulationswhichservecompletelydifferentpublicinterestgoals.Theseregulationsareofcourse supposed to further the realization, not thehindrance, of the substantivebasic

right. TheFirst Senateof theFCCemphasizedthis,simultaneouslywith thelegislature's

broad freedom to structure the procedures, when the Court acknowledged thelegislature'spowertocreateanyregulation"whichrecognizesthemeaningoftherightof

asylumandmakespossibleadependableandjustexaminationofasylumpetitions".42On

thisbasisitisthenconstitutionallyunobjectionabletocharacterizetherightofasylumas

"placed under a procedural proviso",43 so long as one takes into account the rule

(developedfortheparallelcaseofArt.4,para.3BL),thatthelegislaturemay"notrestrict

this basicrightin itsobjectivecontent, butonlymakeclear thelimitswhichalreadyare

inherentintheconcepts"ofthebasicrightnormitself.44

Evenfromanormativetheoreticalpointofviewitisunjustifiedtoformaspecialcategoryof"procedure dependent"basic rightsandto verifyitwith thebasic rightsfromArt.4,

para. 3, Art. 165, para. 2, sentence 2 BL, as well as other basic rights in distribution

procedures(Art.12,para.1BL,studylocationdistributions).Togivemerelyafewsimple

counterexamples:therighttopracticeasalawyer(likewiseArt.12,para.1BL)isgranted

onlytothosewhohavesuccessfullypassedthetwostatelawyer'sexaminationsandgonethroughtheadmissionsprocedurespecifiedbythefederalattorneyscode,i.e.thosewho

have beenofficially "recognized" as "full jurists", 4,6 BRAO, 5 DRiG.Or:whoever

wishestousehispropertyinconstructingahouse,mustfirstsubmittotheconstruction

supervision procedure (e.g. 87 HessBauO with 29 BBauG); whoever wishes to

exercisehisbasicrighttofreedomofphysicalmovement(Art.2,para.2,sentence2BL)or

tofreedomoftravel(Art.11BL)withthehelpofamotorvehiclemaydothisonlyafter

passingtheprocedurescontrollingissuanceofdrivers'licensesandtheadmissionofmotor

vehicles,1,2,StVG,etc.Alloftheseandotherbasicrightscouldbelabeled"proceduredependentrights"justasreasonablyastheabovenamedrights(seeabove,sectionII.1.,

at(b));fundamentaldistinctionsbetweenthemwithrespecttoproceduredependencyare

notevident.45

Asylrechts, BadenBaden (1983). Against the assumption of constitutive effect of declaratory act, also F.

Rottmann,DasAsylrechtdesArt.16GGalsliberalrechtsstaatlichesAbwehrrecht,22DERSTAAT337,357(1984).

4256BVERFGE216(236);seealsodissentingopinionbyJudgeW.BhmerBV ERFGE49,220,228;243:"Procedural

lawservesnotonlytheaimofensuringorderlyproceedingsbutalsointhesphereofrelevantbasiclawisthemedium enabling the holder of basic rights to obtain his constitutional rights. Accordingly, where several

interpretationsofprocedurallawarepossible,thatoneshouldbechosenwhichempowersthecourttomake

basiclaweffective".

4360BVERFGE253(295)

4448BVERFGE127(163);69,1(23)

45Similarly,Held,supra,note28,255:"Thereisnobasiclawdependentperseonprocedure".


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2011] 441GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights

"Procedureaffectedness"islikewisenotaspecifyingcharacteristicofcertainbasicrights.Every basic right (independentofwhether and towhatdegree it requiresgovernment

protection or prior government recognition for its exercise) can become a procedure

affectedrightifitisattackedbythesovereignorbyprivateparties.ThesameistrueforthecasesaboveinsectionII.1.,at(c)).

Finally,thedividinglinebetweenthesocalled"proceduredependent"(abovesectionII.

3.,at (b)) andthesocalled"procedureimprinted"basic rights(freedomofreportingby

means of broadcasts, Art. 5, para. 1, sentence 2 BL, and the freedom of scientific

endeavors,Art.5,para.3,BL,46arenamedasexamples)isatbestafluidonecertainlyit

cannotbecategorical.Thusitisnotclearwhythebasicrighttothefreechoiceofatraining

location(ina numerusclaususfieldof study)shouldbelongtothegroupof"procedure

dependent"rights,whilethebasicrighttofreedomofscientificendeavorbelongstothegroup of "procedureimpressed rights"; both share the quality that their exercise is

"necessarily tied inwith participation in governmentalperformances",47 both therefore

presupposeacertaindegreeoflegalorganization(oronerestingonalegalbasis)andan

apportioningordistributionprocedurewhichcorrespondstothepurpose.Botharecases

ofthetypementionedaboveinsectionII.1.,at(d)).

B.ConstitutionalStandardsforStructuringProceduralandOrganizationalRegulationsto

ProtectandPromotetheBasicRights

I.TypeandScopeoftheLegislature'sObligationofProtection

Thiscritiqueoftheattempttocreateaprocedurerelatedtableofcategoriesforthebasic

rightsisintendedtomakeclearthatonecanspeakonlyinaverylimitedsenseofabasic

rightsspecific proximity (or distance) to governmental procedural and organizational

regulations. Such analysis makes sense only for the "basic procedural rights" (above

sectionII.1.,group(a))and(toalesserdegree)forthe"procedureimpressed"basicrights

requiringapportioningordistribution(above,sectionII.1.group(d)).Fortherest,itisthe

respectivelegalsituation(themannerinwhichclaimislaidtothebasicright,itsencounter

with: (a) competing or cooperating exercises of similar basic rights, (b) exercises of

different constitutional or legal rights, (c) objectivelegally protected public interests)

whichdeterminesinwhatwayandtowhatdegreeaspecifictypeofrealizationofabasic

right should be either protected and promoted, or "channelized" (and perhaps even

"braked"),throughproceduralandorganizationalprovisions.46Ossenbhl,supra,note8,187

47ForArt.5Abs.3:35BVERFGE79(115);forArt.12Abs.1:33BVERFGE303(332).


13/21

[Vol.12No.01442 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l ThedraftofaConstitutionproposedin1977bytheSwissCommissionofExpertsforthe

preparationofatotalrevisionoftheSwissFederalConstitution,oneofthemostmatureproductsofthemodern,free,anddemocraticartofconstitutionmaking,specifiesinArt.

24: "Basic rights must be given effect in the whole of legislation, and particularly in

organizational and procedural provisions".48 This formulation neatly expresses the

reciprocitybetweenbasicrightsprotectionandsuchregulations(seeabove,sectionII.2.):

theorganizationalandproceduralprovisionsmustbe impressedbythebasicrights,sothat

fortheirownparttheycanbeusefulinfurthering thebasicrights.Yetthisdetermination

leavesopentheissueofhow"stringently"theconstitutionconfrontsthelegislature.And

thisquestionhasbynomeansbeenansweredforGermany'sBasicLaw,either.

In principle, there are three conceivable positions here: (a) One can derive from the

Constitution an organizationalprocedural basic rightsoptimization requirement.49 The

legislaturewouldaccordinglysatisfyitsobligationofprotectiononlywhenithadpassedand ordered application of procedural and organizational regulations for the optimal

protectionofbasicrightsinterests.(b)Onecaninitiallyconsiderthetasksofadministration

separatefromanybasicrightsrealization.Theadministrativeprocedurewouldthusbeper

se"basicrightsneutral".Atthosepointswhereindividualbasicrightsfreedomscouldbe

endangered,the structuringofproceduremust beachieved ina "basicrightsprotectivemanner".Accordingly,whatwouldbedemanded"forthesakeofthebasicrightwouldbe

(only)aminimalstandardoftheabsolutelynecessaryproceduralprotection".50(c)Finally,

renouncingallgeneralizingstatements,onecouldattempttodeterminecasebycasethe

weightoftherespectivebasicrightineachrespectiveprocedure.

Overall,theFCC'sdecisionsinthismatteroffernoclearcutpicture.Inthedecisionsofthe

First Senate (particularly in the dissents of Judges Heuner and Simon) one finds

expression of a tendency towards measuring the constitutional demands upon thelegislaturebytheoptimizationofthebasicrightsprotection.Asearlyasthejudgmenton

Lower Saxony's university law (1973), one finds in the dissenting opinion of Rupp v.

Brunneck and Simon talk of the "most effective realization possible" of the values

embodiedinthe basicrightsasoneofthemosteminenttasksofthe legislature issuing

organizational norms; yet restraint is recommended when a court scrutinizes the

legislature'sdecisionsforconstitutionality.51Indiscussingtheimpactoftherightofasylum

(Art.16,para.2,sentence2BL)onextraditionprocedure,theentireFirstSenatein1979

48InthedraftforanewFederalconstitutionof16May1984,byA.KlzandJ.P.Mller, Mnsingen(1984).There

isnoequivalentrequirement.MllerhadbeenamemberoftheSwissexpertcommission.

49 See R. ALEXY, THEORIE DERGRUNDRECHTE (1985), 75.: Other than rules, principles are the requirements for

optimisation;122.Basiclawprovisionsoftenhaveadoublecharacter;theyarebothrulesandprinciples.

50Held,supra,note28,255;Breuer,supra,note16,89,94

51W.Ruppv.Brnneck&H.Simon,dissentingopinion,BVERFGE35,79,148(153)


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2011] 443GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights emphasized "the constitutional duty which the specialty court had in structuring the

proceduretoaimforthebestpossibleprotectionofthecomplainant'sbasicright".52Thisformula of the best possible protection of a basic right through the structuring of

procedureandprocedurallawappearstwiceinthedissentingopiniontotheMhlheim

Krlichdecision.53In1983theSenatelaiddownthestandardof" effectiveprotectionofthe

basicright"throughprocedurallaw.54

The Second Senate stresses, above all in itsdecisions on asylumprocedure, thebroad

structuring freedom possessed by the legislature; its regulations must be "objective,

suitable, and reasonable. "Only" elementary procedural requirements that are

indispensabletotheRechtsstaatcanbederivedfromthesubstantivebasicrights".55Yetit

wouldbeprematuretoconcludefromthesestatementsthatthereisageneraltendency

towardsminimizingthebasicrightsprotectionthroughprocedureororganization.Itwas,

afterall,theSecondSenatewhichintheKalkardecision(1978)notonlydeveloped(whiledealingwithlegislativeprovisionsofthelawonatomicenergy)thenotionofdynamicbasic

rightsprotection,withthedutyofthelegislaturetoprovide"subsequentimprovements",

butalsoconstitutionallyactivatedtheprinciple(whichdominatestechnologicalsafetylaw)

of the "best possible defense against dangers andprevention of risks"as a protection

againstmere("notinconsiderable")endangeringsofbasicrights.Anexpressionofthisfactintherealmsofadministrativelaw(anexpressionwhichwithrespecttotheRechtsstaat

mustbeseenasanexception)istheconcessionofanadditional"refusaljudgment"tothe

atomicenergyapprovalauthority.56Thattheverygenerallyexpressedcriteriacouldleadto

remarkabledivergenceswithinoneandthe same Senateevenin thematterof"timely"

grantingofrightsprotection(inthesenseofArt.19,para.4 BL),isdemonstratedbythe

twopreliminaryexamination committeedecisionsof12May1980and1August1980.57

Bothdecisionsdealtwithagrantingofrightsprotectionatanearlystageintheairtraffic

law'sapprovalprocedure(accordingto6LuftVG)andnotmerelyinthesubsequentplanconfirmationprocedure(accordingto9,10LuftVG).Whereasone3personcommittee

couldseeintheplanningobligationeffectuatedbytheapprovalaccordingto6LuftVGno

legally relevant, butonlya de facto,burdenon communal planning, a burdenwhich as

such still gave no rise to legal recourse, a second 3personcommittee from the same

Senate spoke out a little later on behalf of also taking into account the "de facto

5252BVERFGE391(408)

5353BVERFGE30(70,75)

5463BVERFGE131(143)

55

60BVERFGE253(295);continuedforArt.4Abs.3GGin69BVERFGE1(50).5649BVERFGE89,inthesequenceofquotations:(137,130,139,146).

57BVERFGEof12.5.1980andof1.8.1980,bothinDVBl.1981,374;seealsoE.SchmidtAmann, Konzentrierter

oderphasenspezifischerRechtsschutz?,DEUTSCHESVERWALTUNGSBLATT334(1981);Blmel,supra,note8,82.


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[Vol.12No.01444 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l compulsory (or highly likely) effects of a decision upon the citizen". Limitation of

contestabilitytotheconcludingplanconfirmationdecisionforreasonsofefficiencywouldmeananimpermissiblecontractionofrightsprotection.

On thebasic of similar considerations only early rights protection canbe effective BlmelandRedeker

58demandcitizenparticipationatanearlystageofstreetplanning( e.g.

during highway alignment determinations, according to 16 BFStrG) as a basic rights

requirement.Bycontrast,criticsoftheMhlheimKrlichlinesuchasDoldeorGoerlich59

warnofaconstitutionalovervaluationofthesimpleprocedurallaw,inpartoutofconcern

aboutapossiblerefashioningoftheproceduralguaranteesintoparticipationobligations,

tothedisadvantageofthecitizen.Infact,Redeker60hadalreadydrawntheconsequences

ofelevatedproceduralparticipationinthesenseofcorresponding"participationburdens"

ofthecitizenuptothepointofpreclusionandfrom"burden"("obligation")to"duty"is

onlyasmallstep.

"Optimization","minimization",limitationtothe"appropriate"ofthe"necessary"ofthe

"effective":such"standards"canonlydescriberoughtendencies;advocacyofoneorthe

otherseemstobemoreamatteroftastethanofstringentreasoning.Ifonewishesto

avoideitherfallingintoanunprincipledandaconceptualcasuistry(abovesectionBIat,c),or abstractly and generally calling upon "the alreadyestablished valuations, principles,

norms and fundamental decisions in the Constitution",61 if one wishes therefore to

attempt to bring thediscussiononto terrain theoretically suitable to basic rights, then

claritymustruleintworespects:inthelegitimation questionandinthefunctionquestion.

Thefirstfocusesontheunifiedbasisof justification,whichprovidesafundamentforthe

completelydifferentphenomenaofbasicrightsrelevanceofprocedureandorganization.

Concretely expressed: the type andextent of the legislative protectionobligationsvary

accordingtowhetheroneseesthemfoundedprimarilyintheprincipleofhumandignityand in the individual caserelated, concretizedRechtsstaat principle, or primarily in the

publicgoodanddemocracyprinciples(onthis,seebelowsectionII).Thesecondquestion

aimsatthe(ineachcaseareaspecific)teleologicalbasis,atthecausafinalisforaspecific

procedures or a specific organization and attempts from there to determine what is

"requiredby thebasicright",andwhatisnot.Organizationandprocedureareofcourse

not goals in themselves, rather they serve to further rational communication given a

specificobjectiveinview,whetheritbetheadvancementofthesciences,thesecuringof

freedevelopmentofpublicopinionviathemassmedia,protectionofconscience,national

defense,thecertaintyofthelaw,oranyotherpublic interest.Thusonlysuchstructures58Blmel,supra,note8;Redeker,supra,note8,1597

59Dolde,supra,note28,H.Goerlich,SchutzpflichtGrundrechteVerfahrensschutz,NJW2616(1981)

60S.Redeker,supra,note8,1597;onthisalsoGrlich,supra,note59

6162BVERFGE1(39)


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2011] 445GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights could be "required by the basic rights" which are procedurally or organizationally

indispensablefortheproductionofthespecificcommunicationstructureswhoseabsencewouldleadtothecollapseofrationallyconductedcommunication.

II. LegitimationofBasicRightsProtectionviaProcedureandOrganization

"Attheheartoftheconstitutionalorderstandthevalueandthedignityoftheperson,who

in free selfdetermination acts as a member of a free society".62 Independence, self

responsibility, and freedomof decision of the person63 form not only the basis of the

institutionsofsubstantivelaw,theyalsorequiretheconsistentrealizationofthecitizen's

"subjectstatus"inprocedurallaw.Theyestablishthe"necessityofconversationbetween

administrationandcitizen",64theyprohibitallowingthehumanbeingtobemadeintoa

"mereobjectofgovernmentaction",forbidthegovernmenttowieldcontroloverhimasthough over an object, whether with "good" or "bad" intent.65 True, the individual is

"subject"toallvalidlawsandowesobediencetothem,yettheselawsfindtheirownlimits

inthebasicrightsofthecitizen(Art.1,para.3,BL).Toestablishinagivencaseprecisely

where this limit lies, a particular (discovery)procedure or even a process of opinion

formationwithinanorganizationmaybenecessary:Itisatthispointthatthefundamentalsubjectstatus of the person demands that each individual in this procedure or in this

organizationbeabletoplayhisownpartintheopinionformationprocess.Theresultmay

completely or partially fall against him, but he must have had a fair chance to have

influencedit.

Situationally concrete procedural or organizational participation may have a direct

protectiveorpromotiveeffectonbasicrights.Inmanyareastoday,individualbasicrights

freedomcanonlybemeaningfullyrealizedin cooperationwithotherbasicrightsholders,infactsometimesonlyviacomplementaryactivityofboththesovereignrightholderand

basic rights holder.66 Such a cooperative exercise of basic rights presupposes that the

individual is tied into complicateddecision processes and transindividualorganizational

forms.Examplesoftencitedarethefreedomtobroadcastandthefreedomofscience(as

organizedinpubliclyfundedinstitutions);yetthesameistrueinthewholly"profane"area

of the corporatelaw bound, e.g. stock property. In such organizational structures,

62BVERFGE65,1(40)

63OnthisE.DENNINGER,RECHTSPERSONUNDSOLIDARITT(1967),80,229

6445BVERFGE297(335)

6530BVERFGE1(33,40)

66P. SALADIN,VERANTWORTUNGALSSTAATSPRINZIP(1984),161;seealsoP.HBERLE,DIEWESENSGEHALTGARANTIEDESART.

19ABS.2GRUNDGESETZ(1983),376;D.Suhr,FreiheitdurchGeselligkeit,EuGRZ529(1984).


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[Vol.12No.01446 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l individual selfdetermination and thus basic rights freedom realizes itself as co

determination.Sentencessuchas"Asmuchfreedomaspossible,aslittleorganizationandproceduresasnecessary"andthelike,becauseoftheirabstractness,failtobeadequateto

reality,whichcannotbecapturedintheabstractoppositionofselfandcodetermination.

Theonesidedandexclusiveattributionof selfdeterminationtothebasicrights/freedomprinciple of theRechtsstaat, and the attributionof codetermination tothe democratic

majority principle is a harmful abstraction, far from the realityof basic rights.67 In the

conceptualunderstandingdevelopedhere,proceduralandorganizationalparticipationare

requiredandlegitimatedbybasicrightsandthereforearetobeunderstoodprimarilyas

theappropriatecontemporaryexpressionoftheRechtsstaatprinciple.That,beyondthis,

theexerciseofbasicrightsis"anelementaryfunctionalconditionofafreeanddemocratic

communitybasedon theactingandcodetermining capabilitiesof its citizens",and that

consequently a fundamental connection exists between the substantive Rechtsstaat

principleandthedemocracyprinciple,arepointswhichtheFCChasrecentlyemphasized,usingtheexampleoftherighttoinformationalselfdetermination.68

C.Conclusions

I.ProceduralandOrganizationalStructuresRequiredbytheBasicRightstoGuarantee

PurposiveRationalCommunication

TheanswertothelegitimationquestionsectionBIIstillgivesnoinformationaboutthe

problematicthathasherebeenlabeledthe functionquestion:Howmustaprocedureoran

organization be (minimally) constituted, so that its purpose rational communicative

decisionmakingcanbeattainedwhilefullyguaranteeingthesubjectstatusofthebasic

rights holder? An exhausting, methodically tested answer could only be reached bycomprehensivelydrawinguponthelatestresultsofcommunicationstheoryresearch.This

cannot be done here. Yet as a first approximation, I will attempt to describe four

indispensable factorsforpurposiverationallyconductedcommunication,asthebasisfor

corresponding(proceduralandorganizational)legalstructures.

67However,inthisdirection:J.Isensee GrundrechteundDemokratie ,DerStaat20(1981),161;Rupp, supra,note

11,180,187.IncontrastseeRupp,186:"Theconstitutionalstatusprocessualiscanthereforebeconceivedonlyas

thepersonalresponsibilityunderaconstitutionalstateturnedroundintotheproceduralaspect,nothoweveras

anelementofdemocraticparticipationinrulingcontrol".SeealsoE.Denninger,in:K OMMENTARZUMGRUNDGESETZ

(REIHEALTERNATIVKOMMENTARE), BeforeArt.1, annotation 29; ForArt.14 GG(property):70 BVERFGE191 (209)wherethetransformationoffishingrightsintocodeterminationaboutthefishingresourcesisheldconsistent

withtheconstitutionalprotectionofprivateproperty.

6865BVERFGE1(43)


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2011] 447GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights 1.TheSubjectStatusoftheProcedureParticipant

Theprotectionof the subjectstatus presupposes that theprocedureparticipating basic

rights holder is physically and intellectually in a position to look after his rights and

interestsin theprocedure,evenif this takesplacethrougha representative.Thiswouldforbid procedures against "someone incapable of negotiating"

69 or someone absent

withoutfault,oraparticipantlackingcommandofthenegotiatinglanguage,insofarasan

interpreterisnotcalledupon.

2.ReciprocalInformationFlow

Rationallyconductedcommunicationpresupposesa reciprocalinformationflowwhichisas

complete and open as possible, and which extends to bringing facts, values, andmanifestationsofthewillintothedecisionprocess.Whatisimportantisthereciprocityof

informationonlythisassures"equalityofweapons".Theaffectedcitizenmustbeableto

presenthisinformation,buthemustbeabletoreceiveallthenecessaryinformationfrom

thegovernment'sside.Fromthisresultthefollowingproceduralpositions:

(a)therighttoahearing(a"legalhearing",butnotonlyinthecourtroom,seeArt.103,

para.1,BL);

(b) the right to information and to inspection of files, 25, 29 VwVfG (Statute of

administrativeprocedure);

(c)rightstosufficientinstructionandnecessaryadvice70;

(d)therighttoacompetentrepresentativeoranassistant;

(e) the right to adequate reasons for a decision, so that the party affected can make

meaningfulluseoftheavailablelegalexpedients. 71

Correspondingto theserightsaredutiesoftheauthorities.Violationoftheseduties are

alsoviolationsofthebasicrights.

3.TheTimeFactor

Thetimefactoralsohasrelevancevisvisthebasicrights.Itplaysanimportantroleinthe

structuringofvariouscases.Thustheadministrativeproceduremustprovideforsuitable

69 Withreferencetocriminalproceedings,see51BVERFGE324,further42BVERFGE64(76),dissentingopinion

85.

70 52BVERFGE380;onthenecessityofcooperation(ref.Art.8GG),see69BVERFGE315(355).

71 ThefivepositionsarealsoquotedbyLaubinger,supra,note8,73,withoutclaimingexhaustiveness


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[Vol.12No.01448 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l deadlines fortheallegationof facts,rights,andobjectionsofallkinds.Thesetimelimits

mustguaranteethatthepartyaffectedisnot"bowledover"bythedecision,thatheisnotpresentedwith"completedfacts"withoutbeingabletoseekredress.If thedeadlinefor

the statement of a legal claim is so short "that presentation of the claim is rendered

substantiallymoredifficultandnotmerelyexceptionalcasesarethreatenedwithfailurebecauseofit",thentherecanatthesametimeexistaviolationofthe"substantive"basic

right.72 Following the samebasic idea, it is constitutionally required that in principle a

procedureofpreliminaryrightsprotection(see80,123VwGO,32BVerfGG)beavailable

foruseinemergencycases.Itmustalsobeassuredthatthepossibilityofprovisionalrights

protection thereby opened up cannot be undercut except in compelling cases of

overwhelmingpublicinterestbyofficialmeasuresofimmediateexecution.Thishaslong

beenanacuteproblemforforeignersseekingprotectionoftheirrightsorpetitioningfor

asylum,since expulsionanddeportationthreaten themwithan irreparableloss ofbasic

rights.

73

4.TheTendencyTowardsObjectiveCorrectness(Sachrichtigkeit)

The communicative procedures as administrative or judicial decision processes, orproceduresofinternalorganizational(corporations,associations,etc.)opinionformation

are not exhausted in the production of formal, lawful decisions without further

consideration of their content. Procedural law conforming to basic rights serves much

moretofurthertheproductionof"justdecision".74Moreprecisely(andlesspretentiously)

one should speak in this connection of the requirement that procedures further the

achievementofobjectivelycorrectdecisions.Thesameistruefororganizationalstructures.

Out of this broad requirement for a tendency towards objectivity are derived specific

procedurallegal requirements. Amongthem is theobservance of the legallyestablishedjurisdictional order, when this is an expression of the attempt to guarantee objectively,

whetherthroughtheconcentrationofspecialexpertknowledge,orthroughtheguarantee

ofuniformadministrativepracticebyunificationunderasinglebureaucraticauthority,or

through the monopolization of specific decisions, on account of their great political

significance,byaconstitutionalorgan.Examplesforthesethreevariantsofthetendency

towardsobjectivecorrectnessarethefederalexaminationoffice(inaccordwiththelaw

againstthedisseminationofpublicationsdangeroustominors),75thefederalofficewhich

handlestherecognitionprocedure(inaccordwiththe asylumprocedurelaw),76andthe

7253BVERFGE131(144)

7335BVERFGE35,382(401);56,216(241)

7442BVERFGE42,64(73)

75See39BVERFGE39,197(204).

76See56BVERFGE56,216(238);appliessimilarlytocommitteesandcourtsaccordingtotherevisedconscientious


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2011] 449GovernmentAssistanceintheExerciseofBasicRights FederalConstitutionalCourt,forproceduresaccordingtoArt.18andArt.21,para.2BL,

36,43BVerfGG.

The requirement of an orientation towards objective correctness acquires particular

significancefortheissuanceoforganizationalnorms,whentheorganizationistoservethefunctionalfulfillmentandtheprotectionofanareaoflifeparticularlyconnectedwithbasic

rights.Examplesareprovidedbythefreedomofscientificendeavorsasorganizedinthe

universities on the one hand, and the internally and externally pluralistic freedom of

broadcasting on the other (but also other forms of basic rights realization tied to the

collectivity).

Here, consideration for the basic rights exercise of every individual rights holder may

demandthattheareaofcompetencytowhichthecollectivedecisionproceduresapplybe

objectivelyrestricted:acoreareaofbasicrightsfreedomformsthe domainofthe"nondeterminable", form which all outside determination is excluded and in which the

concededcodeterminationisalsonottobeconceivedofasaformofselfdetermination

(see above section 22).77 To this degree, organizational provisions have the negatory

functionofdefensesagainstintervention.78 Yetontheotherhand,organizational norms

receive the positive task of allowing the multiplicity of possible involved basic rightscontents,andanypublicinterestgoalswhichshouldperhapsalsobetakenintoaccount,to

influencethedecisionprocess79.TheFCChasrepeatedlyspokenoutforapositivelawful

structuringofbroadcastingfreedom.80

Thus, considered from a purposiverational standpoint, the basic rights require

organizationalstructureswhich:

(a)promotepluralismthroughsecuringchancestoestablishcountervailingpowerandtopublishcontrastinginformation,

(b) protect minorities, insofar as this is not already sufficiently realized through the

guaranteeofadomainofthenondeterminable,

(c)secureneutrality,i.e.,insofarasthestateparticipatesinprocedure,itmaynotactina

partisan fashion nor exercise a dominating influence on the procedure; in certain

circumstances,asufficient"distancingofthestate"mustbeorganizationallyassured,objectionlaw.

7735BVERFGE79,(151)(dissentingopinion)

78EmphasizedbyB.Schlink, FreiheitdurchEingriffsabwehrRekonstruktionderklassischenGrundrechtsfunktion ,

EuGRZ457(1984).

79 J . Pietzcker, Das Verwaltungsverfahren zwischen Verwaltungseffizienz und Rechtsschutzauftrag, 41

VERFFENTLICHUNGENDERVEREINIGUNGDERDEUTSCHENSTRAATSRECHTSLEHRER(VVDStRL)193,209(1983)

8057BVERFGE295(320);60,53(64)


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[Vol.12No.01450 G e rman L aw J ou r n a l (d) guarantee the "openness" of the procedures in the sense of allowing for possible

innovations.

Theconstitutionitselfallowsnoexactstatements tobemadeabstractlyconcerningthe

methodandextentoftherealizationofthesestructuresintheconcreteorganizationofabasicrightsrelevantdecisionprocedure.Thelegislatureretainsconsiderableplayingroom

fororganizationalstructuring.Thus,italsocannotbedefinitivelysaidthattheabsenceof

one or the other of these structures whichin effect can partially substitute for one

another would in itself always give rise to a basic rights violation. To this degree,

normativetheoretically considered, the structures receive (only an axiomatic character.

Whena concrete organizationalform(as expressed forexample ina state universityor

broadcasting law) is constitutionally reviewed, the important thing is whether

comprehensiveconsiderationandevaluationofallthe individualprovisionsdemonstrates

thatthelegislaturehassufficientlytakenthediscussedprinciplesintoaccountornot.

II.TheRighttoInformationalSelfDeterminationasaSpecialCase

The right to informationalselfdetermination,conceivedasanexpressionofthegeneralright ofpersonality (Art. 2,para. 1 in connectionwith Art.1, para. 1,BL), represents a

specialcaseoforganizationallegalrelevancetobasicrights.Forthesecuringofthisbasic

right, the FCC demands "effective informational blackout regulations" between the

governmentagencieswhichhandlepersonaldataonlyforstatisticalpurposes,andthose

which actually execute administrative policies. The Court bases itself here upon the

"principleofseparationofstatisticsandexecutiveactivities".81Theparticularnatureofthe

basicrightleadstotheresultthat,even withintheadministrativeorganizationofthestate,

thebasicrightdirectlyandnormativelydemandsorganizationalconsequencespreciselybecausetherighttoinformationalselfdeterminationcanalreadybeinfringeduponwhen

dataarepassedaroundwithinthestateapparatusforpurposesotherthanthatforwhich

theywereoriginallygathered.

8165BVERFGE1(49,61);seealsoR.SCHOLZ&R.PITSCHAS, INFORMATIONSQUELLESELBSTBESTIMMUNGUND STAATLICHE

INFORMATIONSVERANTWORTUNG (1984); critical with regard to consequences forstate security E. DENNINGER, DAS

RECHTAUFINFORMATIONELLESELBSTBESTIMMUNGUNDINNERESICHERHEIT(1985),215.

denninger, asistencia gubernamental en el ejercicio de los derechos, procedimientos y organizacion,...

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