democratic rural development- leadership accountability in regional peasant organizations

7/27/2019 Democratic Rural Development- Leadership Accountability in Regional Peasant Organizations

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Democratic Rural Development: LeadershipAccountability in Regional PeasantOrganizationsJonathan Fox

ABSTRACTMany development analysts asser t the importance of democratic socialorganizations, but few either document or analyse the actual processes ofinternal demo cracy. This s tudy examines part of the broader problem of theIron Law of Oligarchy - he ebbs and f lows of leadership accountabilityover time. Drawing on the history of a Mexican regional peasant orga nizati onsince 1974. the analysis suggests tha t different kinds of organizational struc-tures encou rage or discourage m embership action, but mom ents of massdirect action in tu rn sh ape the ways in which organizational structu res actuallydistribu te power. T he case analysis shows how the interaction of internal andexternal fac tors shaped the balance of power between leaders and membersat each cr i t ical turning point . Part icipatory subgroups turn out to be thecrucial counterweight lo concentrated leadership power, mediating relationswith the membership and providing alternative sources of leadership.Whether formal or informal, multiple vertical channels and alternativehoriz ontal linkages between membership g roup s are crucial complements, a ndsom etim es substitutes, t o conventional organizational structures.

INTRODUCTIONLo cal part ic ipat ion has increasingly become an article of faith in thedevelopment community. Poor peoples organizations are scalingup as they attempt to participate in the development policy processin the many developing countries with increasingly open politicalsystems. Our frameworks for analysing the consolidation ofrepresentative organizations, however, remain weak. For those whocontend that Third World development depends on the emergence

Development and Change ( S A G E , London, Newbury Park and New Delhi). Vol. 23(1992) NO. 2, 1-36.


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2 J . Foxan d consolidation of a dense web of local developm ent institutions,organizational democracy is a problem of special concern.

W ithout representative org an iza tion s, the rural poor lack theirown voice in the development process. Their capacity to buildrepresentative organ ization s dep end s on multiple channels fo r par-ticipation, as well as relatively autonomous, diversified linkageswith external allies, as Esm an an d U pho ff (1984) have shown .2 Butwhere do these internal an d external linkages come from , an d whyexactly d o they m atter so much?T o understand th e thickening of civil society, the bu rst ofresearch interest in democratization might seem promising. Butmost analyses of national regime transit ions do not incorporatesystematic analyses of power relation s within civil society. Now t ha tresearchers are focusing more on the consolidation of politicaldemocracy, hopefully the issue of the democratization of therepresentative organizations of civil society will begin to receivem ore attention. As on e turns for guidance to the vast literature o nsocial movements an d com m unity development, however, on e findsthat they tend to assume rather than to demonstrate that theorganizations under s tudy are ac tually d e m ~ c r a t i c . ~he discourseof anti-dictatorship movements in Latin America in the 1970s and1980s generally referred to mass mobilizations as democratic bydefinition, bu t such movem ents challenged regimes to op en up w ith-out necessarily being internally democratic t hemselves.This study examines a particular aspect of the broader problemof internal democracy: accountability, analysed in terms of thechanging relations between leaders and members in a regionalpeasant o rganization in M exico. Th e case analysis suggests th at dif-ferent kinds of organizational structures encourage or discourageparticular kinds of mem bership a ctio n, but waves of active rank an dfile participation in turn shape the ways in which organizationalstructures actually distribute pow er. T o understand the complexdeterminants of organizational dem ocracy, we need to developanalytical tools which clarify the relationship between the formalmechanisms of representation and the parallel channels for par-ticipation that often distribute power in practice.

T H E IR ON L A W OF O L I G A R C H Y Som e social scientists have long contended th at an Iron Law of Oli-garchy inevitably makes large membership organizations abandon


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Leadership Accountab ility in Regional Organizations 3their democratic ideals and become bureaucratized, elitist instru-ments of the leadership. Organizations take on their own dynamics,as leaders and staff develop interests which differ from those ofthe members. Opportunities to pursue political power, to benefiteconomically or to pursue hidden agendas draw the leadership andstaff a w a y from representing membership concerns. I n this view,new elites always manage to entrench themselves.sThe emphasis on transitions from democratic to oligarchic rulewithin organizations is two-edged; it adds a dynamic element byhighlighting change over time, but it is also highly deterministic,leaving one unable to explain change in the other direction. In prac-tice, social organizations move in both directions, but analysis ofthis dynamic immediately plunges one into the murky waters of lesst ha n fully democratic forms of representation, as leadership trajec-tories travel between clearly democratic and authoritarian poles.Freely elected leaders can become authoritarian, and vice versa.Leaders may defend some member interests but not others. Cliente-listic social and political organizations have long been known todeliver concrete benefits to poor people - usually, though notalways, in ways which discourage collective action.6Leaders who act in ways which represent member interestswithout actually being democratic, challenge the maximalist appli-cation of normative democratic ideals to organizational dynamics.Wide-ranging research on co-operatives and trade unions shows thatnot very democratic leaders can find themselves under diversepressures which lead them to deliver broad benefits to members.Democratic values and rules, then, are not the only possibleexplanations for accountable leadership. One also needs to look atthe ways in which the state, formal organizations and social move-ments together structure the opportunities, risks and benefits foraction - for leaders to get away with betraying member interestson the one hand, and for members to hold leaders accountable onthe other.HThe case analysis suggests that what was posed as an all-powerfullaw turns out instead to be a strong, but far from invincibletendency. Larger grassroots groups often undergo a series of swingstowards and away from democracy, with degrees of leadershipaccountability changing at different points in their history. Theproblem for the analysis of organizational democracy is that we lackgeneral analytical frameworks to account fo r such shifts i n thebalance of power between leaders and members.This study shows that participatory subgroups are crucial


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4 J . Foxcomplements to form al representative democracy in large member-ship organizations. Th e idea that participatory sub grou ps arenecessary to keep larger groups democratic is not new. Politicaltheorists have long held that national democracy depends on thechecks an d balances in society as well as in governm ent; power mustbe decentralized am ong a uto no m ou s interest gro ups fo r democracyt o work fairly. But relatively few researchers have analysed th einner workings of these social counterweights in terms of the IronLaw of Oligarchy. Lipset et al. (1956) ar e a notable exception. Theyexplained a successful case of trad e union dem ocracy by analysingthe countervailing tendencies that offse t the otherwise pow erful andever present oligarchical pressures. This study goes further byhighlighting the rise and fall of alternative channels for mass par-ticipation a s a key de term inan t of the ebb and flow of countervailingdemocratic tendencies within large membership organizations.

HORIZONTAL AN D VERTICAL DIMENSIONS OFDEMOCRACY

T he issue is not whether organ izations should have leaders. Leader-ship is crucial f or m ass mobilization, helping t o articulate interests,to project a vision t ha t ch an ge is possible an d to bring isolated peo-ple together who d o no t s ha re free spaces within which to interacto n their own. Because the skills of public speaking, tolerance andconsensus building associated with democratic leadership arelearned forms of behaviour, the social and organizational contextwhich makes such learning possible requires special attention.Exam ination of this process is crucial for understanding the condi-tions under which direct democratic processes can actually work.Leadership and external allies can play an im po rtan t role in fo rm -ing gr ou p identities and articulating interests, but within co nst rain tsshaped by the political mo m en t and th e structurally possible, as thecase analysis will show. But leaders can also discourage or divertmobilization, weakening their members leverage. Poor peoplesmovements have leverage only during unusual historical moments,and rare opportunities may be lost if organizations put formalinstitution building ahead of mobilization (Piven and Cloward,1977: 36).There are many possible angles fro m which to ap pro ach the issueof internal dem ocracy. Dem ocracy has bot h horizontal a nd vertical


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Leadership Accountability in Regional O rganizations 5dimensions. From a horizontal approach, one would look at theconstruction of an em pow ered citizenry within an o rganizationof civil society. Discussions of grassroots participation in thedevelopm ent literature, however, ofte n co nfl ate active me mbe r-ship with passive followership. * Conventional indicators d o notnecessarily tell us much ab ou t this distinction, since large tu rn ou tsat public events or occasions calling for voluntary labour can becomposed of either active members or passive followers. Mobiliza-tion d oe s not necessarily involve participation in decision-making;it may be driven by economic incentives or coercive politicalpressures.A focus on the vertical dimension of democracy highlights therelationship between the leadership and the membership. Theprocedures for leadership selection can be important, but formalelectoral processes do not necessarily involve effective competitionfor leadership or an active or informed membership, nor d o theygu ara nte e accountability in between elections. T h e texture of inf or-mal social relations between leaders and members can be veryrevealing, as hierarchies are reproduced through ordinary dailyactivity. One could also highlight the social origins, charismaticmobilizing capacity or political ideologies of t he leaders themselves.Given the imp ortance of both the horizontal an d vertical dimensionsof democracy, i t is not surprising that Esman and Uphoff (1984.)fou nd th at representative organizations were closely associated w ithmultiple channels for voice and representation.Does the degree to w hich leaders an d mem bers value democracyin and of itself matter? In practice, it is difficult to disentangleinstrumental means from normative ends. Political cultures of par-ticipation o ffer im porta nt resources f or those who want t o open uptheir organizations, but many examples exist of movements fordem ocratization that d o not rely on fully developed ideologies ofparticipation. Similarly, movements which self-consciously culti-vate ideologies of pa rticipation an d collective identity hav e certainlybeen vulnerable to the Iron Law of Oligarchy. For those w ho seethe Iron Law as imm utable, bo th institutional an d political culturalfactors are irrelevant, but those who see oligarchy as a tendencywhich can sometimes be outweighed face the challenge of inte-grating institutional and political cultural factors.This study focuses on interactive patterns of leadership accoun-tability to the membership. The emphasis here is institutional,highlighting actions , both inform al and form al, which encourage or


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6 J . Foxdiscourage leadership accountability. This study could not answerthe empirical question of how much the members actually foughtfor democratic process as an end in itself. Whether or not they wereinspired by abstract, normative ideals - and few probably were -the rank and file certainly wanted their representatives to defendtheir interests. They repeatedly, though not consistently, calledthem to account.

I t is important to recognize that membership participation is onlyone possible form of action which can influence leadership account-ability. I f members are dissatisfied wi th their leaders, they maysimply leave (or threaten to). The exit option is certainly a crucialindirect means of exercising membership power, or at least forwithdrawing power delegated to leaders. But under what circum-stances will this lead to increased accountability, rather than to thecollapse of the group? For those organizations that survive, theexit option is most likely to promote accountability i f it acts toincrease the leverage of voice. This study stresses the ways in whichvoice can be modulated and heard (Hirschman, 1981).14

One might hypothesize that most members of an organizationunder oligarchic pressure will consider putting energy into thedemocratic reform from within strategy in so far as the array ofallies, enemies and opportunities make the exercise of voice aplausibly effective approach. Otherwise the free rider problem willtempt most people to opt out and pursue other strategies in defenceof their interests, even if people share some sense of groupsolidarity. Collective action in defence of democracy, like collectiveaction more generally, *only makes sense to most people undercertain circumstances.In an effort to understand better w h y democracy defeats oligar-chy at some points and not at oihers, this study analyses the keyturning points in the conflictive history of a well-establishedregional peasant organization. This study is based on the premisethat institutional features of democracy do not guarantee account-able leadership, but it matters a great deal whether or not the con-tours of the organization are sufficiently permeable for members toexercise some power over their leaders i f and when they decide totry. The availability of opportunities for direct membership par-ticipation in decision-making can encourage people to t r y to holdtheir leaders accountable.


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Leadership Acco untab ility in Regional Organizations 7REGIONAL RURAL MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS

While the issue of leadership accountability is problematic inmembership groups of all kinds, this study focuses on regionalpeasant organizations for three principal reasons. First, regionalorganizations are crucial for democratizing the rural developmentprocess. In much of Latin America, the principal obstacle to ruraldevelopment is the entrenched power of allied public and privatesector regional elites. They often monopolize key markets, prevent-ing peasants from retaining and investing the fruits of their labour.Regional organizations are often the only actors able to open upthese markets and to push for more equitable and accountabledevelopment policy. Regional peasant organizations are also crucialfor defending freedom of assembly, creating a hospitable environ-ment for further community organizing - an important spillovereffect.The second reason for focusing on regional peasant organizationsis that they have the potential to combine the clout of a larger groupwith the responsiveness of smaller associations. Village-level groupsare easily isolated by their enemies, while national peasant organiza-tions are usually democratic only in so far as they are made up ofrepresentative regional building blocks. Regional is used here todescribe a membership organization that develops a second level ofdecision-making above the village (i.e. regional executives, delegateassemblies, etc.).The third reason for focusing on regional groups is that account-ability is especially vulnerable in larger peasant organizations.Within communities, informal means of consultation, reproach anddecision-making can help to compensate for weaknesses in publicchannels for participation (i.e. limited involvement in meetings,ethnic and gender bias, largely ceremonial assemblies, clientelisticgovernment intervention or flawed electoral processes). Groups thatbring many communities together, however, are too large to be runby village-level direct democracy alone, and informal, face-to-faceaccountability mechanisms are inherently weak. This means thatoften only the central leadership connects the many dispersedand diverse member communities. Region-wide channels for mem-ber participation are thus especially important, because withouthorizontal linkages across communities there is little to preventdomination by the central leadership. In remote rural areas,however, horizontal linkages between communities rarely develop


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8 J . Foxspontaneously, and require deliberate organizing efforts to besustained. 6

The type of organization analysed below, a Mexican union ofvillage-based agrarian reform communities, involves all three ofthese features: the broadening of the rural development processvis-u-visboth state and market, the creation of a second level ofregional leadership and the difficult problem of sustaining internaldemocracy across dispersed communities in the face of tendenciestow ard s centralization of power.

MEXI CAN UNIONS OF EJIDOSMexicos inclusionary land reform left a complex organizationallegacy which still structures peasant participation. Mexican agrari anreform communities (ejidos) re both political an d economic institu-tions, to which the governm ent cedes land use rights while retaininga tutelary role. They are classic corporatist institutions; the statestructures th e oppo rtunities fo r the articu lation and expression ofinterests. Ejidos are legally run by the decisions of regular, osten-sibly democratic mass membership assemblies, but governmentofficials also supervise internal elections and often intervene. Inpractice, effective majority rule in ejidos depends on th e balance ofpower between d emocratic forces within the com m uni ty and politi-cal and economic elites both inside and outside the ejido.Ejidos can form regional unions to collaborate on agriculturaldevelopment projects. If ejido assemblies decide to join a union,they elect delegates, who in turn choose the unions leadership andoversight committees. Rank and file members can participate inunion meetings but cannot vote. Delegates to ejido unions areusually elected from ou tside the r ank s of the existing ejido leader-ship, creating parallel auth ority structures that can serve as cou nte r-weights.In practice, most ejido unions have been created on orders fromgovernment or ruling party officials. Most th eref ore either witheraway or become tools of government bureaucracies.! For thebetter pa rt of fifteen years, however, th e Lhzaro CArdenas Un ionof Ejidos (UELC) has been among the exceptions, vigorouslydefending a wide range of member interests. Its history offers notonly relevant lessons fo r understanding the ebbs and flows of leader-ship accountability, it also illustrates key challenges facing the


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Leadership Acco untab ility in R egional Organizations 9Mexican rural development process more generally. The UELC isrepresentative of a new generation of Mexican regional producerorganizations which has united in a powerful national network tohold government rural development agencies accountable t o therural poor, the National Union of Autonomous Regional PeasantOrganizations (UNORCA).T he UE LC brings together fifteen agrar ian reform comm unitieswith over 4500 families in the sou thern p art of the state of Nayarit,in west-central Mexico. About half of the members are indigenouspeople. T he U EL C is a long-standing political and economic actorin the region, representing about half of the peasants in its area ofinfluence. Most members are subsistence maize producers, thoughsome also grow other cash crops as well. The average family allot-ment is ab ou t 4 rain-fed ha , alth oug h actu al access is unequ al, rang-ing fro m 1 ha or less, up t o 8-10 ha. A grarian law limits me mbe rshipto heads of households, leaving most women and landless youngadu lts indirectly represented at best. Landless fa rm -w orke rs w ho arenot members of ejido families represent a significant share of theregions population, and the UELC rarely directly addresses theirconcerns. M ost of th e economically active popu lation , with or with-ou t access to la nd , migrates seasonally to coastal agri-business a ndemployment in the US, greatly complicating the sustainability ofmass participation in UELC activities.Fro m its birt h, m uch o f th e UELCs history can be seen as a seriesof creative responses by a new generation of peasant leaders tochanging governm ent rural developm ent policies. Th e case study isorganized around a series of turning points in the UELCs history,defined as mom ents w hich shaped later patte rns of leadership-rankand file relations.

Turning PoinIs in the Lazar0 Cardenas Unionof Ejidos

Southern Nayarit had experienced four previous waves of peasantmobilization before the U E L C emerged: the unsuccessful 1857-8 1indigenous insurrection, the stalemated cristero uprising of the late1920s, the victorious 1933-9 land reform movement a nd th e largelysuccessful 1960s comunero movement by indigenous communitiesfor the restitution of lands that had been usurped by private farmersand ranchers. This historical legacy left a strong imprint on the


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10 J . Foxlocal political culture, but no t in the sense of a widely shared collec-tive identity. Even though th e class issue of l an d was ofte n th e keypoint of con tentio n, peasants of the region remained deeply divided,with historic battles between villages over the relationship betweenchu rch and state, stro ng ethnic differences a nd competing verticalpatronage networks with the state. Even the broadest movementwithin memory, the land reform mobilization of the 1930s, waslargely induced by conflict between political entrepreneurs with inthe stat e, leading t o inequalities in th e redistribution process whichcont inue to interfere with peasant unity decades later.2 Po pu larpolitical memories were prob ab ly quite ambivalent, highlighting theimportance of tactical alliances with elites at least as much as hori-zontal collective action in defence of class interests.Th e UEL C emerged in a period of growing social effervescenceall over Mexico. After decades of neglect of peasant agriculture,the national government renewed its rural development efforts,including occasional su ppo rt for increasingly au ton om ou s peasantmovemen ts.** In 1974, under the auspices of the federal govern-ments new Rural Development Investment Programme (PIDER),a dynamic team of community organizers brought leaders fromseveral ag rari an com mu nities together for the first time.23 Th egovernm ent also opened up a new bran ch of the official agriculturalbank in the region; p roducers from isolated villages met on e an oth erfor the first time in its waiting room.Sm allholders lacked bargaining power in the three markets whichtogether shaped their terms of trade: credit, inputs and marketingof their harvests. A sm all gr ou p of interme diaries, ope rati ng region-wide, took advantage of peasants lack of capital, transportation,storage facilities and market information. Monopoly control overinputs meant that producers were obliged t o barter co rn for fertilizeron highly u nfav oura ble terms, una w are of the existence of officialprices, while less than 5 per cent of the ej idatar ios had access togovernment credit. G ove rnm ent agricultural bank officials collabo-rated with private fertilizer distributors, ignoring official price ceil-ings (Hernandez, 1990b).Until the arrival of the PIDER Brigade, local peasant leadersreported that they were largely unaware of the loss of their surplusthrough tied markets and rent-seeking bureaucrat^.^^ One reasonwas that local agents of the broa de r chain of intermediation leadingup to large agro-industries an d s tate enterprises were not so differentfrom the smallholders themselves, and they were bound together in


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Leadership Accoun tability in R egional Organizations 1 1fictive kinsh ip a n d patron-client relations. O ne peasan t recalled thestor y of a cat w hich lived in a village of mice. T h e cat was disguisedas a mouse , so the mice did not realize that he was eating them o neby one unt i l another mouse came from afar to tell them dont bestupid, thats no mouse - ts a cat and hes eating you up. Thispeasant told the PIDER team that they had come to unmask thecats (H erna nde z, 1990b:2 2 ) .Th e an n u a l ejido evaluat ion and planning assemblies providedo n e of the f i rst oppo rtuni t ies to apply pressure for more access tothe governments rural development programmes. The peasantsrejected the official banks corrupt practices. When the bank cutthem off in response, producers mobilized themselves to visit thebranch manager and the governor. Upon arrival , they started byhelping themselves to the soft drink s in the governors office. W henofficials asked them who the leaders of the rabble were, theyanswe red were people, not rabble. T h e credit involved was n otlarge, but their first victory showed that pressure can bring results(Hern andez, 1990b).

W hen plant ing t ime c ame, ferti lizer grew scarce. This was no acci-dent ; the bank was man mu vring because the ejidos had escaped itscon trol . A fter meet ing in the PIDER offices to analyse the situ ationan d decide what to d o , a delegation of 150 peasants went to meetwith the governor again. When they arrived in the capital , theyfound moral support among the s tudent movement , which hadoccupied the main square. Dividing into two groups, they simul-taneo usly met w ith the gove rnor an d occupied the managers off icein the gov ernm ent fertil izer co m pa ny . They refused to leave un til thefertil izer w as distributed. T he governo rs term was almost o ve r,leaving him too weak to respond to the ferti lizer com pan y managerspleas for help. Ferti l izer was promised to the seventeen ejidosrepresented . The grou p then decided to take advantage of the t r ipto the ci ty to resolve othe r long-standing problems of red tape a ndland rights. They visi ted the Agrarian Reform Ministry offices,leading to their second victory of the day (Hernandez, 1990b: 29).

T h e PIDER team actively en cou raged these mass prote sts, whichwere led by new you ng p easant leaders. Th e first generation of o lderejido leaders had presided over an unequal dist r ibut ion of landwithin th e reform s ector, inheriting pow er fro m the overseers of theold haciendas afte r the redistribution in the 1930s, but a new r ou ndof ej ido elect ions began to bring a younger, more representat ivegenerat ion of community leaders to the fore. They won support


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12 J . Foxf rom the older ejidutarios who had gained lit t le from the originalland redistr ibution.

These first mo bilizations were facilitated by the weakn ess of thegovernments Nation al Peas ant Co nfed eratio n (CN C) , which left aconvenient vacuum in the region. O n the other h and , the CNCs pasttrack record also left peasants wary of joining organizat ions thatseemed political. T h e C N C h ad long neglected peasan t con cerns infavour of electoral p atro nag e a n d c o r r u p t i ~ n . ~ ~oint teams of newejido leaders and P ID E R promo ters convinced sceptica l cumpesinosthat the main purpose of the organizat ion was economic develop-ment ra ther t han party polit ics . Th e opinion of Doiia Cu ca, an indi-genous comuneru, was decisive in at least o n e com mu nity assembly:Were going to show the government tha t we can work hard andhonorably ( interview, Jom ulco, Nayari t , 1989). T he quick successesof th e credit and fert il izer movem ents showed that unity could meanstrength, an d the comm unit ies joined together to foun d a un ion in1975. Fifteen hun dred cumpesinos a t tended the fou nding ceremony.T h e UE LC combined mass protest a t the s ta te level with lobbyingof federal reformists, winning the rights to the governmentsregional fertil izer distribution. The arrival of the first forty-onewagon-loads of fertilizer unleashed a wave of optimism and self-confidence. Broad part ic ipat ion continued, as the UELC buil t ahuge new fertil izer wareh ouse with vo luntary labo ur. At first , localspecula tors manag ed t o tak e adv antage of the fertil izer operation,buying up t he supplies indirectly for resale , but the U E L C assemblysoo n decided to limit sales to heads of households, a t amo un ts suff i-cient for only 20 ha per sale.Fro m the very beginning, th e UELCs bargaining power depen dedon new local and regional waves of participation. First, the ejidosthemselves were rev italized, a s partic ipatio n b y previously excludedrank and file brought new, more representative community-levelleadership to power. Second, their first ad hoc meetings of localleaders laid the fou nd ation fo r the fo rm al delegate assemblies thatwould com e t o lead the first peasan t-mana ged regional developmentorganizat ion in the are a.

Government InterventionTh e involvement of some comm uni ty leaders and PIDE R promote rsin the popular opp osit ion movem ent t o the governor in 1976, led the


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Leadership Accountability in Regional O rganizations 13UELC to be identified with the challengers in spite of its officiallynon-par t i san posi t ion . The popular opposi t ion movement waswidely seen t o have been den ied the go vern orship because of f raud .Re form ists then lost power a t the na tional level when the presidencychanged h and s in late 1976. T h e UELC had grown into a regionalpolit ical force, but the new leadership failed to call the regularmo nthly assemblies durin g th e key pol it ical t ransi tion period of late1976. The resulting gap between the regional and village-levelleaders left the UELC highly vulnerable to the change in polit icalclimate. The new governor then expelled the PIDER organizersfrom the state. As one leader put i t , we were left orphans(H erna nde z, 1990b: 46). The UELCs loss of federa l allies op en ed i tu p to intervent ion by the s tate governm ent . T his vulnerabi li ty washeightened by the leaderships overtly con fro nta tion al stance , whichwas not backed up by a consol idated base. The UELCs presidenteven publicly refused to shake the new governors out-stretchedh an d .T he t ide turned against the UELC when a n official au dit w as usedto charge the leadership with fraud . H alf the ejido delegates alignedwith the official CNC and upheld the charges, while the restdefended the imprisoned president , largely as a p oint of principleagainst governm ent intervent ion. T he leaderships fai lure to accoun tadequately for i ts management of UELC finances facil i tated thegovernments divide-and-conqu er st rategy. T h e rank an d file mem-bers were never able to co m e to their own conclusions about thecharges, since the government confiscated the relevant records. Inexchange for th e release of the leaders, the government managed touse elections to impose i ts cand idate on the union. A lthough fi fty-seven delegates participated in the election, the Agrarian ReformMinistry official somehow declared a t ied vote, followed by hisdeciding ballot.T h e official winner, a pl iable CNC supp orter l it tle know n o utsidehis community, promptly turned the UELCs principal asset, thefertilizer outlet, over to the government agricul tural bank. At thesam e time, authori t ies cracked dow n on the two largest , poorest an dmost act ive com mu nit ies in th e UELC, reportedly imprisoning overf i f t y people a nd put ting out arres t warrants f o r many more (mainlvindigenous people), ostensibly because of confl icts ab ou t land bou n-daries with private farmers and ranchers.Man y of the ejido members and authorit ies were unwilling tofollow the unio n leaderships risky pat h of militant con fron tat ion in


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14 J . Foxan unfavourable political climate. The defeat of the independentUELC leadership resulted from its inability to build sufficientmember support to compensate for the loss of federal allies. Thegovernments ability t o divide a nd con que r suggests that the leader-ship ha d lost tou ch with th e base, in par t because of th e weaknessesof countervailing po wers, especially t he ejido delegate assembly. Inother words, the leaders loss of accountability to the memberscontr ibuted to the UELCs loss of au tonomy vis-ri-vis thegovernment.

Reform fr o m A bo ve P romotes RedemocratizationTh e state government tried to reinforce its con trol over the U EL Cwith huge infusions of resources fo r development projects, b utwithout grassroots participation in their design or implementation,they quickly failed. After a wave of de m ora liza tion , suspendedassemblies and the government takeover of the UELCs fertilizeroutlet, a new federal fo od distribution prog ram m e brou ght freshexternal allies to the region in 1980. Reformists had regainedinfluence over food policy at the national level.Community organizers came to form democratic , autonomousvillage-store management committees, which would in turn form anew, region-wide Community Food Council to oversee the go vern-ments rural food distribution efforts. Organizers also inspired fif-teen ejido leaders by bringing the m to visit the m ost d ram atic successstory of peasant-managed regional development in Mexico at thattime, the Coalition of Collective Ejidos of the Yaqui and MayoValleys of Sonora (CECVYM).28Th e new national foo d distribution pro gra m m e gave dissentersaccess to trucks, organizers and political legitimacy. Inchoatedissatisfaction crystallized in to discreetly organized o pp osi tion , ascommunities regrouped and prepared to redemocratize the union.Representative leadership regained lost ground in t h e next roundof community-level ejido elections, waging a non-ideologicalcam paign to revitalize the UELCs peasant -man aged econom icdevelopment efforts. The key issue was to recover the fertilizerdistributorship. The rising parallel leadership was able to usethe Food Council as a springboard from which to confront thegovernment-installed au tho ritie s, informally relieve them of pow er,ratify th e change thro ug h elections an d begin the process of reviving


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Leadership Acco untab ility in R egional Organizations 15the UELCs autonomous economic development project . Thisleadership transition was a key turning point for the UE LC , set tinga pattern i t would follow for years to com e. T he r is ing comm unity-based network that gained power included both new and moreexperienced leaders. They achieved a high level of unity andco-ordination in the process of organizing the food stores , theCommuni ty Food Counci l and recover ing control of the UELCi tself 29The U EL C seemed back o n t rack by 1981, but the al ternativeleadership had not agreed in advance on who should lead theorganizat ion. T w o candidates emerged: one from U zeta , a small ,relatively well-endowed ejido tha t had always played a key role inthe UELC leadership, and the other , a venerable leader of themuch p oorer , indigenous comm unity of Jomulco (which by itselfaccounted for the majori ty of the unions membership). Uniondelegate voting power is by ag rarian reform com mu nity (ej ido orindigenous comm unity) , n ot weighted by p opu lat ion. Jomulcosleader still won by a small margin, ushering in an extended periodof broad ened participation in decision-making. Th e new presidentsmoral authority and low-key, consensus-building style created anopen a n d accessible a tm osph ere. For him, the union was impor tantbey on d its materia l con trib uti on . Besides [the low fertilizer prices]the Union has helped a lot because weve share d ex periences withfolks we didnt even know . W hen we used t o g o to other ejidos webarely said hel lo to each other , a t best . Through the organizat ionweve all become brothers now; whenever we dro p in o n any ejidowe know that were with our own comparieros (El Dia, 22September 1984). After a long and diff icult period, the UELCrevived the un even p rocess of creatin g a collective peasa nt iden tityin the region.

In sum, the Food Council programme created new cornmunity-level and region-wide instances of part ic ipat ion from above thatwere effectively appropriated from below. The opportunity toorganize around one issue unleashed social energy which spilledover into other development efforts . After the new roun d of ejidoelect ions, the vi llage-store comm ittees an d the regional C om mu nityFood Council created autonomous free spaces which al lowedpeasants to com e together in a dem ocratic coun terweigh t that servedas the springboard from whicb to launch the revitalization of theUE LC . The autono mo us peasant movement won an impo r tant warof position.


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J . FoxNational Networking: Independent or Autonomo us?

In 1984, the U EL C hosted the Sixth N ational Meeting of R egionalPeasant Organizations, a network which then represented severalhundred thousand peasants, with more than twenty-five groupsfro m nineteen states. They campaigned for greater peasant co ntrolover the governments top-down rural development programmes,higher crop prices and greater access to inputs, marketing andprocessing. The network had emerged in the early 1980s. inspiredin part by the CECVYM experience, to form a new political greyarea in Mexico, distinct from both the traditional official groupsan d the vertical, political opposition-oriented organizations. Th enew network pushed for winnable demands, combining auto-nomous mobilization with pragmatic bargaining and concretepolicy alternatives.T he U EL C played a central role in this new network, proposingits formalization as th e National Network of Independent RegionalPeasant Organizations at the 1984 meeting. For the president,the unions independence meant that it doesnt get involved inpolitics. . . .Here in the Union were united as one single ma n. O ut-side ou r do ors each o ne follows their ow n p ath , w hether its the PR I[the government party ], the PSU M [the Unified Socialist Pa rty ofMexico], whatever party they want. But we dont deal with tha t herebecause this is campesino struggle, and as campesinos we should beunited (El Dia, 22 September 1984). Th e whole gro up agreed withthis spirit, b ut some activists were concerned ab ou t the conf ronta -tional associations of the word independent, and did not want toforeclose possible alliances with regional groups which might benominally official but relatively autonomous in practice. Somepointed o ut th e existence of peasant gro up s which were independ entof the government but vertically controlled by opposition politicalparties.

The network was formally constituted six months later as theNational Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations(UN OR CA ). Profou nd differences in interests and outlook am ongthe member gro ups posed potential problems fo r the UN O R CA , butsince the UE LC included both mestizo surplus corn producers a ndland-poor indigenous net consumers, then under indigenous leader-ship, it played a key role in weaving th e UN O R C A in to a decentral-ized but cohesive network. UN O RC A soon gained national statu re,increasing the opportunities for co-ordinated regional actions,


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Leadership Accountability in Regional Organizations 17national lobbying, an d exchanging lessohs am on g diverse develop-ment group^.'^

The UELCs mobilization for the meeting certainly involved ahigh level of member participation; hundreds of participants fromall over M exico were housed and fed, exchanging experiences withrank and file members. For the president, one of the importantreasons for th e event was th at the Union is going t o get stronger,and get more organized in the ejidos. Its not just the ejidos fromthe Union who are participating, were inviting folks from otherejidos arou nd here so that they see what goes on in these meetings,because there are folks who dont even know what a worksho p is,o r why its im po rtan t. . . .Lo ts of folks should be here so tha t theycan learn m ore ab ou t how the Unions been working fo r the peasantclass (El Dia, 22 September 1984).Th e meeting was a turning point fo r the UN OR CA as a nationalprocess, involving the scaling up of its own regional m embers. TheU EL C , along with o the r leading mem ber gro up s, was very wary ofcreating yet an oth er traditional national organization w ith a verticalpyramidal structure and centralized leadership. Instead, they choseto form a decentralized network, reinforcing accountability bykeeping national au tho rity an d leadership in the han ds of theregional organizations.

Village-managed HousingU EL C launched its rural comm unity housing project in 1985, withgovernment loans and the lessons learned from the CECVYMsprior experience. Two of the UELCs team of four advisers wereveterans of the CECV YM . T he advisers had settled in the region an dco-managed the housing project with peasant leadership. The closeworking relations between the advisers and the UELC deepened,reinforcing a power relationship in which the advisers were clearlyworking for the organization, rather than vice versa. The peasantleadership was quite open to the advisers non-partisan politicalviews, however, supporting b oth direct an d representative form s ofdemocratic management of development projects.Ejido assemblies decided who would receive construction loansand, together with the individual participants, decided how tomanage the construction process.32 T he design of the housingproject encouraged direct beneficiary participation and trained


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18 J . Foxintermediate level campesino activists to forge stronger linksbetween the communities and the UELC leadership. Most priorUELC activities had been production oriented, helping landedheads of households, but the housing programme, like the FoodCouncil, benefited landless members of the com m unity , especiallygrown children of ej idafar ios. Equitable and efficient projectimplem entation was reinforced by th e systematic decentralization ofdecision-making. Activists who had played key roles in the housingproject won unanimous election to the UELC leadership in 1986.W hen J ua n Fra nqu es stepped do w n in 1986 he had served since1981 - an unusually long period. First he had completed the timeremaining from his predecessors term, and then the delegateassembly extended his own term of o ffice by a year t o ensure con-tinuity in the implemen tation of the housing project. His leadershipsaw the UELC through the transition from political opposition toeconomic project m ana gem ent, which required the decentralizationof power to a mo re technically oriented, younger generation of com -mu nity leaders and advisers. His leadership was unusual because ofhis capacity t o delegate econom ic m anagem ent decisions effectivelywithout provoking any questioning of his political authority.

C o r n Producers MobilizeSqueezed between rising inflation a nd falling governm ent input sub-sidies, corn production became less aild less profitable. Across thecountry, coalitions of small and medium-sized grain producers,many led by UNORCA groups, took peaceful protest actions toencourage agricultural policy-makers t o give more a ttentio n to th esoaring costs of production. Th e U EL C was on e of the first,leading three dramatic waves of mass mobilization for higher cornprices beginning in 1982. Producers repeatedly took over dozensof government warehouses, especially in the 1986 mobilization.Originally called by the CNC, t h e UELC ended up participatingactively in the protest. Broadly representative delegations travelledto m eet with Mexico City policy-mak ers, who steered them tow ard spromises of local development projects instead of price increases.T he actual implementation of the projects turned o ut to depend o nthe governors consent. Promises were broken and the UELCresponded by suspending payments on its housing loans.The Corn Strike movement peaked in a massive ten-day


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Leadership Accoun tability in Regional Organizations 19blockade of the international highway in 1987. Organizers con-vinced th e local radio station t o broadcast the call to action. Pa r-ticipants closed bars, to prevent possible disorder. The decision totake over the highway was made in spontaneous mass ejidoassemblies, and the one-hour-on, one-hour-off blockade involvedover 3000 peasants. Th is UELC-led movement broadened into theProducers Association of Sou thern Nayarit, including much of thebase of the CNC. Vehicles with tourists, children and chemicalswere allowed through, while organizers explained their cause andraised funds am on g th e mo torists. W ith the unionized truck drivers,they explained tha t the c rop sup port price was like their m inimumwage. Th e mo vem ent was protected f ro m repression by a combina-tion of its peaceful a nd m ode rate tone, its brea dth an d the suppo rtof the off ic ia l partys candidate for g~ v e r n o r . ~ The UELC then organized ejido assemblies alongside the high-way, followed by union delegate assemblies. While this form oforganization probably limited input from the many no nm em be rspresent, it also blocked reported government e fforts to in filtrate an ddisrupt the action, guaranteeing an autonomous decision-makingprocess. The ejido assemblies were the crucial arenas of participa-tion in the cr op price mo bilization. These dem ocratic spaces kept theleadership in touch w ith th e base an d m aintained discipline, therebyprotecting against possible external provocation.Thr oug h negotiations with th e Planning a nd B udget Ministry, th emovement won an 8000 peso per ton price increase - a symbolicvictory at best. T o add t o the symbolism, however, the governmenthanded the distribution of this bonus to the CNC, effectivelyexcluding the UELC . T he corn price movement was remarkablybroa d, but resulted in the appeara nce of political clout rather thanactual economic concessions fo r the UELC .

Peasant Women and the Self-defence Econom yMost peasant organizations in Latin America exclude women, for-mally or informally, especially w here agra rian laws exclude womenfrom access to land. Mexican ejidos specifically exclude womenfro m land rights, except fo r widows and some single m oth ers . In th eUELC, however, ejido women managed to gain representation atthe regional level for the first time in Mexico.

T o qualify fo r low-interest loans, the governmen t housing agency


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J . Foxhad obl iged the UELC to car ry out an extens ive survey of itsmembers economic situations. This participatory experience hadhighlighted the im po rtanc e of the previously invisible, info rm alsector of the loca l econom y. As corn product ion prospec ts d imm ed,the UELCs advisers elaborated a development s tra tegy known asthe Self-defence Econ om y,36 designed to increase regional self-suffic iency throug h household and co mm unity production of basicgoods, especially food, in order to buffer the impact of inflationimported from the rest of the economy.Peasant wo men were m ajor actors in the local informal economy,but they lacked organizing experience. At the urging of wives ofactive ejido mem bers, wom en met in their comm unit ies to analysethe cost of living as par t of th e campaign for higher c rop suppor tprices. Together with two female UELC advisers, the womendeveloped a series of community-based projects that revived thetraditionally diversified backyard economy, thereby becoming partof the regional economic development effort 3 7Creating space for womens representation in a ma le-dom inatedorganizat ion proved easier said than done. The organizers of tendepended on the wives of ejido officials for their initial support.The y integrated themselves by prep aring f oo d for the ejido festivals,a t the same t ime as they moved into the more ambit ious income-generating projects. Rathe r than welcoming this participation,however, som e union m en pu t obstacles in their pa th. Som e leadersblocked the womens access to development agency funds assignedto th eir projects, feeling threatened by the success of autonomousgrou ps within the union . Offic ia l polit ic ians from outside the UE LCalso at tempted to co-opt the movement. With the help of tw oveteran advisers, the women stil l managed to form a regional net-work of their fifteen community-based groups, known in officialparlance as Womens Agro-Industrial Units (UAIMs).In spite of their t rad it ional m ale dis trust of womens empower-ment, the U E L C leadership soon realized that they could gain botheconomic resources and valuable political capital from the move-ment. The Womens Network of UAIMs was granted off ic ia lrepresentat ion at the assembly of un ion delegates, th e first case everin Mexico. As federal funds then became available, the UELCleadership allied with past rivals fro m the C N C to win over most ofthe UAlM leadership from their or iginal , more independently-minded organ izers. T he resulting politicization of the UAlM s con-strained the progress of their economic projects . In sum, formal


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Leadership Accountability in Regional Organizations 21represen tation did not translate autom atically into increased powervis-u-vis the central leadership, but the more active UAIMs con-t inued t o defend their auton om y within the UELC.

Electoral Politics: Citizenship or Clientelism?While gender constraints to a ccou ntability were primarily internal,the UELCs next turning point highlights the impact of n ational poli-tics o n leadership-base relations. T he UELCs dem ands had alwaysbeen more economic than political. Electoral politics were widelyseen as corrup ting. But the rise of the centre-left nationalist opp osi-tion m ade the 1988 presidential race genuinely com petitive in m anyregions f or th e first time. Previously unseen differences between theU EL C leadership and rank a nd file membership emerged.The official presidential candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari,made important concessions to peasant demands in his politicalcanvassing, a nd personally visited th e U ELC t o show his sup po rtfor the UELCs approach to rural development. He even calledon the president of the UELC to speak in a public campaignevent.T he UELCs leaders were greatly im pressed, an d m oved totake ad van tage of this o pp ortu nity to bypass their conservative localrivals in the official C N C . T h e UELCs leaders suppo rted Salinasspolicy propo sals, but m any m embers sympathized with the principalopposit ion candidate, Cu auh tem oc Ca rden as, son of the UELCsnamesake, Lazar0 Cardenas, who as Mexicos president had redis-tributed most of the land in the region in the 1930s.As a development organization, the UELC was committed todefen ding its members co m m on economic interests, b ut leadershipinvolvement in party politics tended to divide the mem bership, ashad happened in 1976. The leadership put more energy into con-solidating their alliances with politicians than into building a con-sensus am ong the mem bership. As on e put i t , the t ime has com e tobecome politicians - we have to look for godfathers higher up(interview, Ah ua catla n, N ayarit, 1989). Did the leaderships su pp or tfor Salinas imply a loss of autonomy for the organizat ion? Somereal concessions to peasant organ izations seemed in the o ffin g, butpersonal ambition undo ubtedly played a role as well. UE LC leadersappeared to have chosen their political strategy autonomously,without significant external intervention, but they hardly consultedthe mem bership either.


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22 J . FoxBy election time in 1988, membership dissatisfaction with thispolitical decision w as still too dispersed to be expressed throu gh the

regional part icipat ion c hannels, such as the delegate assembly. Inthe short run, members combined exit with voice, participatingless in the union while electing new ejido commissioners whoopposed the central UELC leadership. In the 1990 municipal elec-t ions, the former president of th e U E L C , Ignacio Garcia Buneo,became mayor of the regional centre, Ahuacat lan. Prel iminaryrepo rts indica te that he did not relinquish d e f a c t o con trol over theU E L C , leaving it greatly weakened. By late 1990, according toest imates, total regular at ten dan ce at ejido an d union meetings wasoutstripped by the revived participation of women in the U A I M s .

Leaders, Advisers and M emb ership InfluenceT h e UELC leadership represented m any key mem ber interests dur-ing muc h of i ts history, whe ther as a resistance movement chal leng-ing the state, a product ive econom ic enterprise, lobbying gro up ora cit izenship training centre. But why? Most of the leaders werecommit ted to regular elect ions, an d their on going com peti t ion withthe off ic ia l peasant federa t ion made them care about memberinterests and opinions. Yet when leaders st rayed, the formalmechanisms of accountabi l i ty did not ope rate automatical ly, an dmembers dealt unevenly with their discontent. These lags may bedu e in part to the decentral ized a nd seasonal rhythms of agricul turalan d m igratory l ife - a fact of ten reiterated by local observers. Butthe inconsistent developm ent of opportuni t ies for direct member-ship part icipat ion in the UELCs ong oing activities is also p art ofthe answer. In retrospect , muc h of what initially looked like activepart icipat ion to outsid e observers may in fact have been moreinduced or instrumental mobil izat ion than act ive involvement indecision-making .T h e UELCs leaders and advisers shared many goals, but theytended to differ over the relative importance of membershipem pow erm ent . Th e leadership did not prom ote systematic poli ticaleducation in favour of part icipat ion for i ts own sake, but theleaders non-ideological pragmatism did lead them to offer prac-tical, instr um enta l incentives for collective ac tio n. I t wa s the unionstwo generat ions of advisers, covering the periods 1974-6 and1980-7, who consistently injected democratic principles into the


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Leadership Accountability in Regional Organizalions 23organizing process. They played crucial roles in most of the demo-cratizing turning poin ts, which involved repeated cycles of mass par-ticipation in campaigns for key member demands. For the leaders,direct demo cracy was sometimes a n efficient m eans of mo bilization,while fo r most of the advisers it was an end in itself. Th e advisersroom for manoeuvre was limited, however, by their overridingrespect for the elected leaderships authority.

MAPPING LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITYThe UELCs history shows that it is difficult to paint leadershipaccountability in dichotomous, black and white terms. Shades ofgrey are mo re appro priate fo r analysing change over time, but weare limited by the lack of graduated indicators of degrees ofaccountability. The following map of leadership accountabilityboth describes its variation and suggests possible explanations.Accountability has both internal and external dimensions.Leadership accountability refers to members capacity to holdleaders responsible for their actions, but it also requires som e degreeof auton om y from external dom inatio n. Autonomy refers here to agroups cont rol over setting its own goals an d m aking its own d eci-sions without external intervention, whether by governments,political parties, religious groups or development agencies. Auto-nomy is no guarantee of accountability, however; i t is essential ifleaders are to fend off external threats and remain responsive tomembership concerns, but leaders can also build up their ownsources of bureaucratic, econom ic, political or charismatic power,becoming autonomous from the membership as well - n otherwords, less accountable and more oligarchic. With these two dis-tinct dimension s of accountability in mind, one can begin to mapthe power relations of social orga nization leaders. How m uch powerd o they exert over the mem bership, an d vice versa, an d how muchpower do external actors, in this case the government, exert overthem?4

On e can fram e degrees of leadership auton om y from the govern-ment along a continuum that ranges from high to low. Similarly,on e can plot leadership accountability to the mem bership in termsthat range from high to low (conversely, low accountability tomembers can be seen as high leadership a uto no m y from the base).Along each dimension, on e can see changes over time. Pu ttin g the


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24 J . Foxtwo dimensions together, one can chart the history of the leaderschanging internal and external power relations.

Figure 1 illustrates the political trajectory of the UELC leader-ship, from its fou nd ing in 1975 through the 1988 presidential elec-tions. The UELCs trajectory began at point A, in 1974-5, asreform-minde d rural development pro m ote rs began organizing w ithlocal leaders around pressing felt needs. Mass participation andaccountab ility were high in the fo und ing fertilizer an d credit accessmovements. The mobilization was not independent of the govern-ment, however, even though important agencies were its maintargets; one can not un ders tand the course of Mexican social move-ments with a mon olithic view of the state. T h e whole process wasunleashed in large measure because of the strength of reformistswithin certain parts of the state app aratu s at that time.42 By the

high

autonomyfrom thegovernment

low

1degrees low high+

leadership accountability(converse of autonomy from membership)

Figure 1. Map of Pow er Relations of Social Organization Leader-ship (Case: Trajectory of the Union de Ejidos Lazar0 Cardenas)


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Leadership Accountability in Regional Organizations 25late 1980s this type of post-populist government reform effortcam e to be know n as social dialogue (concertacion s 0 c ia 1 ). ~ ~

After the fraudulent 1976 state elections, with the change inpresidency and the resulting expulsion of the UELCs reformistallies, the leadership began to confront the government moredirectly. Th e union leadership moved up o n th e auton om y scale, butas it lost touch with much of the base, it also moved down on theaccountability scale, to point B. The government then moved in todivide and conquer and imposed its own leaders on the union,pushing the UEL C fa r down on both the autonom y and account-ability scales t o po int C. Trad itional co rpora tists within the Mexicangovernment frequently combine co-optation with repression ofsocial movements.W ith the beginning of the redemocratization process, encouragedby the arrival of new external allies, the union began t he long climbup to point D, high o n bo th the a uton om y and accountability scales.This shift inaugurated the most extended participatory phase in theunions history, beginning with the Com mu nity Fo od C ouncil - akey parallel political counterweight - an d con tinuing with the self-managed housing pro jec t, the campaigns for higher cro p prices andthe womens projects. All of these eff orts decentralized the decision-making process, creating or reinforcing broadened opportunitiesfor rank and file participation in addition t o the regular union andejido assemblies.With the con troversies generated by the 1988 presidential elec-tions, however, the leadership began to make political allianceswithout full consultation of the base. Since the housing pro ject, thenew UELC leadership had devolved relatively little power tomembers and comniunity leaders. They were very cautious, forexample, about sharing crucial financial information, to preventpossible manipulation by political rivals. This fear may have beenwell fo un de d, but also reflected limited com munica tion between theleadership and th e mem bership, which in t u r n was both cause andeffect of the emergence of oligarchic tendencies. The regular ope ra-tions of the union began t o be affected. For example, the fertilizersales office only opened at 9 a.m . - rather late in the day for m ostpeasant producers.The growing distanc e between the leaders and the rank an d file isshown by the slide down both the autonomy and accountabilityscales to point E. This movemen t is not definitive, no r is it asdramatic as the earlier period of direct government intervention.


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26 J . FoxThe union had built up a rich internal political life, and multiplepossibilities for future changes in leadership relations with the rankand file remained. One is reminded, however, of the repeatedtendency for electoral politics to spill over into the attempt to builda non-partisan organization to represent broader class interests.The figure shows that accountability and autonomy are distinctbut also related. For accountability to be high, autonomy must alsogo up (i.e. point D). But accountability can drop while autonomyeither rises or falls (i.e. points B and E). Given the importance ofdemocratically-minded outside allies, increased accountability ismore consistently associated with an empowered, active member-ship than with very high degrees of autonomy from external actors.

CONCLUSIONSSocial science has yet to offer a general framework for explainingthe ebbs and flows of organizational democracy. But one can takea genre of cases and work on particular dimensions of the problem.This study charted the process of leadership accountability andmember participation in a regional organization typical of a grow-ing trend in the Mexican peasant movement. The account showedhow the interaction of internal and external factors shaped each tur-ning point in its history. Leadership autonomy and accountabilitywere then disentangled and mapped over time. But can one begin todraw more general conclusions about the process of democraticinstitution building?Perhaps the most important conclusion is that organizations donot build internal democracy through a linear process. Rather, thedevelopment of internal democracy is inherently an uneven andvulnerable process which depends on the presence of countervailingforces capable of offsetting the ever present dangers posed by theIron Law of Oligarchy. But what do these countervailing forceslook like? They reveal themselves with greatest clarity during drama-tic turning points in an organizations history. But to understand theorigins of these determinants of the rise or fall of leadership accoun-tability, one needs to analyse how power relations are expressed inbetween those moments when they are expressed through overtconflict. In this context, the most important counterweights forpromoting leadership accountability were participatory subgroupswithin the peasant organization, often led by middle-level leaders.


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Leadership Accountability in Regional Organizations 27The case analysis reinforces a point which is quite familiar to mostanthropologists: only rarely d o peasant organizations actually make

major decisions in mass meetings or through voting. More often,such formal procedures ratify decisions made previously, throughsubtle informal debates and pressures, as shown by the way in whichthe Community Food Council created the space from which theUELC could be redemocratized - first de facto, and only then for-mally. The relations between regional leaders and the rank and filewere largely mediated by community-level leaders. The single mostimportant kind of subgroup within the union was the memberejidos. but their formal operation alone was insufficient to ensurethe democratization of the UELC - perhaps because they were sodiverse, and were rarely all vibrant and participatory at the sametime.Ejido commissioners, union delegates, local and regional assem-blies and project-specific committees created alternative channelsfor the direct expression of membership power within the union.The village-store committees, the housing project task forces andthe ejido assemblies that met while occupying the highway are allimportant examples of both formal and informal counterweights tocentralized leadership power.Alternative channels consist of the effective linkages between thebase of a large membership organization and its formal pinnaclewhich add to the conventional pyramidal election of union delegatesand leaders. Such parallel linkages include informal as well as for-mal opportunities for members to make, carry out or oversee impor-tant group decisions." As in the case of the housing project, whenactive rank and file members and community-level leaders were ableto 'scale up' and play regional leadership roles, the boundariesbetween central leaders and the rank and file began to blur. TheCommunity Food Council was formally a parallel regional groupmade up of village representatives, which in turn became the spring-board for reopening political space w i t h i n the UELC.Participatory subgroups are crucial for leadership accountability.In their absence, leaders of large organiLations only need to dealwith atomized individuals w h o lack systematic opportunities toshare information and to generate alternative opinions, counter-proposals and contenders for leadership. In contrast, subgroupsincrease member bargaining power because they can broker leaders'access to resources they want, such as votes, mobilization capacity,money and information." But the existence of subgroups alone


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J . Foxdoes not necessarily imply that mem bers will gain pow er. Subg roupsmay also only represent small minorities, and are therefore neces-sary but not sufficient to encourage leadership accountability tothe majority. Furthermore, the lags which separate the waves ofmembership pressure for accountable leadership show that ifmembers are disconnected or divided a m on g themselves, leaders canmaintain con trol by appearing to mediate, t o represent the generalinterest, or through conventional divide and conquer tactics.It is important to recognize th at scaling up grassro ots develop-ment organizations puts internal democracy at risk, but cycles ofparticipation can offset tendencies towa rds cen tralization. In largeorganizations, form al an d info rm al opportunities for participationmediate these cycles because they encou rage or discourage differentkinds of action. Inherited institution s thus condition mass participa-tion, yet collective action (or inaction) can in turn open or closefutu re opportunities for participation. Regular elections ar e notenough: organizational democracy depends o n the emergence andconsolidation of internal checks and balances as well. Multiple,alternative channels for both direct and representative democracyshape the balance of power between central leaders and the base.

NOTESThis research was m ade possible by a grant from the Inter-American Fou nda tion. Iam especially grateful to Luis Hernhndez, the fie ld research co-ordinator, for hisinvaluable col laborat ion throughout the process. The research methodology usedextensive part ic ipant observat ion and oral history involving a wide range of par-t ic ipants inside and outsid e the organ izat ion, including regional and local leaders,advisers, base members, local, state and federal officials, as well as independentdeve lopment ana lys ts . Ignac io Garc ia Bueno and Juan Franques Jacobo, formerpresidents of the UE LC , were especial ly generous with their t ime an d su pp ort . Th efie ld research team included Milagros Camarena, Pi lar Ldpez, Rolando Loubet ,Ruth P inedo and Teodoro Torres . Encouragement f rom Pa t Bres l in . ManuelFernandez. Susan Pezzullo and Charles Rei l ly was great ly appreciated. I am a lsograteful for useful comm ents on earlier versions from Helga Baitenmann. PaulHaber, Roger Karapin, Anthony Levitas, Richard Locke, Gerry Munck. StephenPage, Frances Fox Piven. Jennie Purnel l , Jeffrey Rubin, Richard Samuels andMargaret Shcrraden. Any unconvinc ing in te rpre ta t ions or e r ro rs a re my own .

I . On g rassro ots development and local ini t ia t ive, see , am on g others, A nnis(1988), Annis and Hakim (1988). Durning (1989). Korten (1990). Leona rd (1982).Nash et al. (1976). Ralston et al. (1982) a n d U p h o f f (1986).

2. Esman and U phof f (1984) highlight these organizat ional features based on avery convincing comparison of I50 different local org anizat io ns, but they d o not


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Leadership Accoun tability in Regional Organizations 29account for where these charac ter is t ics come f ro m , nor d o they focus o n change overtime.

3. As OD on nk ll (1988: 283) put i t , if polit ical democracy is to b e consol ida ted,dem ocrat ic practice needs to be sp read throu gho ut society, creat ing a r ich fab ric ofdem ocrat ic inst itut ions an d authori t ies .

4. See Boschi (1984) for a provocat ive discussion of th i s point , based on theBrazilian experience. For suggestive discussions of leadership-community relationsduring the ant i-Pinochet mobil izat ions in Chile , see Oxhorn (1991) and Schneider(1991).

5. Sum ma rizing Ro berto Michelss c lassic form ulat ion , democracy is inconceiv-able wi thout organiza t ion, . . . the weapon of the weak in their s t ruggle with thes t rong. . . . From a means , organ iza t ion becomes an end. . . . W ho says organiza-tion, says oligarchy (Michels, 1959: 21, 373, 401). Zald and Ash (1966) discuss theintellectual history of this appro ach , a nd suggest possible countertendencies.

6. T h e l i terature on cl ientelism is rich and nuan ced. See Sch mid t e t a l . (1977) forone of th e most comprehcnsive surveys. Ostensibly t radi t ion al pat tern s of dependen tvert ical l inkages manage to find many modern guises within which to reproducethemselves, yet few analysts focus on the countertendency - he transi t ion fromclientel ism t o c i tizenship am on g th e peasan try. See Fox (1990a) for fu rther discussionof this problem.7. See, for example, the innovat ive work on co-operat ives by Attwood andBaviskar (1988) an d Tendler e t a l . (1983), as well a s Sabe l(l9 81 ) on c orpo rat is t t rad eunions. T he tension between contro l and representat ion is especial ly prono unce d inautho ri tarian c orp orat is t systems. Officia l union leaders, in Mexico or Brazil, mustrepresent som e member interests som e of the time, or they will lose their legitimacyan d ev entually fail in their task of controll ing the workfo rce and blocking com pet ingal ternat ives. S uch systems are characterized by complex and variable com binat io nsof carrots and st icks - bu t for one to work, the other is usual ly needed.

8. T h e pol it ical opp ortun i ty st ructure approa ch has been increasingly applied tothe analysis of the rise and fall of social movements. Tarrow (1989) offers a veryuseful survey; see, especially, Piven an d Clow ard (1977). T o my knowledge,however, this approach has not been applied to leadership-base relations w i t h i nsocial organizat ions.

9. See, for example, Dahl (1982)10. De m oc ratic mob ilization is facilitated in tho se free spaces where distinct fo rm s

of self-ident if icat ion over lap and can therefo re re inforce one an other ( i .e . interestsof class, gender, e thnicity, neigh bou rhoo d, re l igious fa i th, locali ty, w orkp lace, e tc . ) .See Ev ans and Boyte (1986).

I I . Advocates of direct democracy as a dichotomous al ternat ive to the oligar-chical tendencies of delegated. represen tative fo rm s generally fail to acknowledgethe faci li ty with which m ass assemblies can be m anipu lated. Th e larger the org ani-zat ion, the more difficul t i t is for di rec t democra t ic forms to live up to theirpromise.

12. Th is problem w as part icularly p rono unce d i n much of the li terature on theissue of po pu lar par ticip atio n in the Nicaraguan revolution (i .e. Ruchw arger, 1987).Fo r especially sensitive exceptions, see C ou ld (199Oa, 1990b).

13 . I f the groups problems are beyond repair, i ts collapse may be quiteapp rop riate , especially i f the social energy unleashed by the fru stra ted m obilizationeffort were to re-emerge and find greater success at a different t ime and place (see


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30 J. FoxHir schm an, 1984). This s tu dy does not focus o n these lose-lose scenarios , frequenta s they may be in practice.

14. For a careful analysis of village-level protest which highlights hidden voices,see Scott (1986).

1 5 . O n the dynamics specif ic to rural democrat izat ion, see Fox (1990a).16. Regional peasant orga niza t ions face inherent contradictions. Since rural eli tes

often central ize power at the regional level , rural membership organizat ions mustalso con cen trate power regional ly in order to becom e effective counterweights . Yetto remain in ternal ly dem ocra t i c an d to reduce vulnerabi l ity to external intervent ion,regional org anizations must d ecentra lize powe r internally as well. These twin chal-lenges theref ore pose a di lem ma : how can a grassroots organizat ion both central izeand d ecentral ize po wer at the same t im e?

17. Until 1983, run ne r-u p slates in elections becam e official oversight co mm ittees,charged with mo ni tor ing the activit ies of the winning leadership team (consejos devigi lancia). For further discussion of ej ido politics. see Esteva (1983) nd G ord i l lo(l988a. 1988b).18 . A national survey found that 237 UEs were actually functioning by 1981,represen t ing m ore th an 4700 ej ido and ag ra r i an com m un i t i e s , ove r 20 per cent o f thetotal (Ferni indez an d Rel lo , 1984: 12).

19. Since i ts founding in the mid-1980s. the UNORCA and i ts various membershave won im porta nt victories in a wide range of policy are as , pursuing the co mm ongoal of increasing organized peasant part icipat ion in the form ulat io n and implemen-tation of rural development pol icy. For analyses of t he UN OR CA, s ee Fox an d Gor -dil lo (1989). Bartra (1989a, 19X9h). Fernandez (1991). Garcia (1989). Hernandez(1989a, 1989b. 1990a. 1991). Harvey (1990)and Mar t inez Borrego (1991).

20. Distinct from ej idatar ios , comuneros a re m em bers of the less well-knownofficially recognized ind igenou s form o f land tenure. the agrarian commu nity ( c o m -un idad ug ra r ra ) .

21. For detailed historical analysis of peasant movements in the region, seeHernandez (1988).

22. For mo re on the government s con t rad ic tory refo rm ef for t s dur ing thi s period ,see Esteva (1983), Grindle (1977) a n d S a n d e rs o n (1981). am ong o t he r s .2 3 . For ba ckgroun d on PID ER . see Cernea (1979 , 1983). L indheim (1986) an dPage (1989).

24. Local leaders called the PIDER team a brigade. Not only did the organizerst ravel in a jeep, hut som e arm ed themselves because of thr eats of violence fro m localelites.

2 5 . O n t he C N C i n the 1970s, see Hardy (1984).26. A nat ional s tudy of newspaper reports of hum an r ights violat ions fou nd that

Nayari t suffered to a degree far out of propor t ion to i t s share of the populat iondu r i ng 1978 an d 1979, with 20 per cent of the arbi t rary detent ions in the country( C o n c h a , 19x8).

2 7 . ( I O P L A M A R . a special ant i -poverty agency, launched the rural food pro-gram me in 1979, and the Mexican F ood System st rategy for revitalizing pea sant g rainprodu ction was an no un ce d in 1980 (see Fo x, 1986. 1990b. 1991. 1992).

2 8 . Founded after a series of massive land invasions in 1975-6. the C E C V Y Mgrew to nat ional poli tical an d econ om ic imp orta nce , showing that the ej ido sectorcould pro du ce efficiently i f orga nired dem ocrat ical ly . T he coal i tion was also unusualin Mexico bccausc i t was the only large second-level or ga niz ati on to have direct


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Leadership Accoun tability in Regional Organizations 3 1membership elect ions for regional leadership (ra ther than indirect ly through ejidodelegates). On the formation and consol idat ion of the CECVYM, see Gordi l lo(1988a, 1988b) and Ote ro (1989).

29. After the 1981 elect ions, the new governo r, an old-t ime populist , turned mostof the com mu nity stores in the region over to his pol it ical operat ives. Only those inth e unions ejidos remained communi ty managed (Hernandez , 1990b) .

30. For detai led regional case studies and oral histories of U N O R C A m e m b e rgrou ps dur ing this key grow th phase, see the weekly page in El Dia, Del Ca m po ydel Campesino, published fro m 1984 to 1986. For furthe r discussion of U N O R C A ,see Fox an d G ordi l lo (1989) an d H ernan dez (1989a, 1989b. 1990a, 1991).

3 1 . T h e leaders unders tood tha t the process of bui ld ing autonomous na t iona lf o r m s of representation independent of polit ical part ies was going to be a grad ualone. As the president of the UELC put i t , these gatherings are part of a strugglewhich has begun . Th ese struggles d o not get resolved right awa y, in one push , theyco m e with t ime, as the wheel goes aro un d, as they say (ElDia, 22 September 1984).

32. New com mu ni ty-manag ed cons t ruc t ion ente rpri ses genera ted four mo nths ofemployment fo r approx ima te ly 1700 people , saving them fro m having to migrate fora season. Th e project was also the fi rs t to convince the government low -income hous-ing agency to ad apt i ts procedures to rural real it ies . For further detai ls . see UELC(1985).

33. On the cris is of Mexicos corn eco nom y in th e 1980s. see Hewitt d e Alcanta ra(1992).

34. U EL C representatives insisted o n travelling to the capita l separately fro m theC N C offic ia ls because of the flies (cited in Hernandez, 1990b).35. As M exicos rul ing offic ia l party con tinued to lose grou nd in the c i ties in th e

1980s. rur al votes became increasingly contested. Electoral dynam ics ar e crucial forde te rmining the outcom e of regional produ cer price movements, part icularly i f o n ecompares the partial victories won in Nayarit with two other 1986 corn pricemovem ents. D uring Chihuahuas most contested election ever, a bro ad, non -part isa npeasant movement won significant price increases, while in Chiapas, where opposi-tion has long been stifled, the governor (a general) responded with repression (Foxand Gordi l lo , 1989) .36. A mo re literal translation of the economia d e t r incheras would be the t rencheconomy.

37. Ironically, the trad ition al backyard eco nom y had been greatly underm ined bygovernment agricul tural offic ia ls . Corrupt funct ionaries, especial ly the notoriouscrop insurance agents, grew accustomed to taking their bribes in kind, by loadingtheir t ruck s up with family barnyar d anim als (He rnan dez, 1990b).

38. For mo re on U AIM s. see Arizpe an d Botey (1987). For further discussion ofthe womens organizing experience in the UELC in a comparat ive context , seeStephen (1991).

39. T he governments new rural development pol icy promised to offer substant ivereforms without requiring trad ition al corporatist political subo rdin atio n, in a policyknow n as social dialogue (concerruc idn socia/).Fo r the Mexican p residents earlieracademic analyses of the politics of rural development , see Salinas de Gorta ri (1982.1984). For furthe r analysis o f the first two years of Salinass actual implem entationof concerracrdn, see Bartra (1990). Dresser (1992), Hernan dez (1989a) and Moguel( I99 1).

40. As on e local observer q uipp ed, s ince Sal ina s said Lets hear N acho speak ,


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32 J . Foxhis feet havent touched t he groun d (interview with Pilar L6pez. A hua catl an,Nayarit, 1989).

41 . Th e ro le of external a cto rs is not n ecessarily negative, since they ca n ally withconcerned members t o increase leadership accou ntab ility, a s they did in 1980. Exter-nal funding o f mass membership o rganization s , for example, necessari ly affects thebalance of pow er between leaders and members; the actual impact dep ends on thenature of the aid and how it is delivered.42. More generally, the prospects for internal democracy in Mexican peasantorganiza tions also dep end s ignif icantly on the role of the s tate. The s tate has of tenblocked th e consolidation of de moc ratic challenges through mult iple comb inationsof repression and divide and conquer tactics, yet it is not monolithic. Preciselybecause the Mexican state plays such a m ajor role in structuri ng the limits an dpossibilities for organ izatio n, the role of reformists within the s ta te turns out to bea crucial determinant o f g rassroots mobil izat ion. Not only does their r ise and fallwithin the s tate c ondit ion degrees of f reedom of organiza tion, but both th e UELCsfoun ding and its later redemocratization indicate tha t the availability of s tateall ies wil l ing and able to support autonomy and internal democracy within socialorganizations can be decisive. For a m ore theoretical discussion of this point, see Fox(1986, 1992).

43. By 199 0, th e policy of social dialogue appea red t o create new , mo re pluralisticrelations with au ton om ou s social orga niza tion s in some cases, while in othe rs, i tsimply modernized the Mexican governments trad ition al corpo ratist politicalcontrols .44.This concept was introduced in Fox a nd H erna nde z (1989) as intermediateinstances of participation. Th e term intermediate referred to the sp ace in between

the central leadership and the rank and file. Instance referred to the varied rangeof opportun it ies for al ternative fo rm s of participation. T he result of com bining theseterms. however, was overly vague, and alternative channels is m ore precise.

45. Moe (1980) off ers a useful discussion of leadership-subgroup interaction inthe context of a sophisticated analysis of the determinants of participation ineconomic interest groups.

REFERENCESAnnis, S. (1988) Can Small-Scale Dev elopm ent Be Large-Scale Policy?, in S. Annisand P. Hakim (eds ) Direct to rhe Poor. Grassroors Development i n La t i n

Amer i ca , pp. 209-22. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Annis , S. and Hak im. P. eds) (1988) Direct to the Poor. Grassroots Development

i n La t in Amer i ca . Boulder , CO: Lynne Rienner .Arizpe, L. and Botey, C. (1987) Mexican Agricultural D evelopment Policy and itsImpact on R ural Women, in C. D . Deere and M. Leon (eds) Rura l Wom en and

State Pol icy. Femin ist Perspectives on L at in A merican Ag r ic ul t ur al Develop-m en t , pp . 67-83. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Attwood. D. and Baviskar, B.S. (eds) (1988) Wh o Shares? Cooperal ives and Rura lDevelopment. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bar t ra , A . ( l989 a) La aprop riaci6n del proceso prod uctivo co m o form a d e lucha.Pueblo 12(143): 30-4.


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Leadership Accountability in Regional Organizations 33Bartra , A. (1989b) Pr6logo a1 libro de Gu stavo G ordillo: Estado, mercados y movi-

miento campesino, Pueblo 12 (144-5): 25-30.Bartra , A. (1990) Modernidad, miseria extrema y productores organizados.

El Cotidiano 36: 28-33.Boschi, R . (1984) On Social Movements a nd Democratization: So me TheoreticalIssues, Stanford-Berkeley Occasional Pa pers in Latin A merican Studies, N o. 9.University of California.Cernea, M. (1979) Measuring Project Impact: Mo nitoring and Evaluation in thePIDER Rural Development Project - Mexico, World Bank Staff WorkingPaper , No. 332. Washington, DC : World Bank.

Cernea, M. (1983) A Social Methodology for Community Partic ipation in LocalInvestment: The Experience of Mexicos PIDER Program, World Bank StaffWorking Paper , No. 598. Washington, DC: W orld Bank.Co nch a, M . (1988) Las violaciones d e 10s derechos h um ano s individuales en Mexico(periodo: 1971-1986), in Pabl o G o n d le z Casanova and Jorg e Cadena R oa (eds)Primer informe sobre la democracia: Mexico 1988, pp. 115-81. Mexico: SigloX X I /C I I H /U N A M .Dahl, R. (1982) Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Autonomy vs. Control. NewHaven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dresser, D. (1992) Policy and Politics in th e Fa ce of Economic

democratic rural development- leadership accountability in regional peasant organizations

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