NEWS, ANALYSIS & DEBATEVOL. 2, NO. 4 – 2006

IN THIS ISSUEFrom Crisis to Reform:A Historical PerspectiveBy Craig Donsanto

The Government as Shadow Donor: The Case of ArgentinaBy Delia Ferreira Rubio

IN THIS ISSUE

$4.95 USD

Political Corruption:Democracy’s Hidden Disease

by Marcin Walecki

Bonus section

Elections Today

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Vol. 2, No. 4 – 2006

Cover Story16 Political corruPtion: Democracy’s HiDDen Disease

The health of a country’s political finance regime has significant impact on the health of its political party system. Successful transitions to democracy require attention to this crucial element over the long term.by Marcin Walecki

Fieldwork12 regulation anD imPlementation: tHe lifeblooD of Political finance

Building an effective political finance system is work that never ends for the regulators on the front lines.intervieW With Michael e. toner and ellen l. Weintraub

22 Political finance reform in Post-conflict environments

Establishing good political finance practices is particularly challenging during transition from war to peace, but such practices can help build a sense of fair play, which itself can help consolidate peace.by Jeffrey carlson, bob dahl & Marcin Walecki

26 laying tHe founDation for gooD governance in liberiaA solid legal framework and strong political will allowed Liberia to achieve significant successes in regulating campaign finance in its recent elections.by susan PalMer

5 from tHe eDitor-in-cHief

In Brief6 resources for tHe Professional

7 Democracy WatcH

8 Political finance resources online

Thinking Out Loud10 from crisis to reform: a Historical PersPective Generating the political will to

improve political finance laws often requires a scandalous or shocking event. Seven such events have given shape to U.S. campaign finance law.by craig donsanto

20 tHe government as sHaDoW Donor: tHe case of argentina

Because they have access to the resources of the state, government candidates for public office require special scrutiny under any political finance regime. by delia ferreira rubio

VOL. 2, NO. 4 – 2006 NEWS, ANALYSIS & DEBATE

C o n t e n t s

Page 21

Cover: “One Size Fits All Coat” by Aurel Stefan Alexandrescu.

Bonus Section elections toDay

29 ElEctionAdministrAtors: BuildingskillsAndcrEdiBility byBelindaMusanhu

32 ProfEssionAldEvEloPmEnt forElEctionmAnAgErs byKeithArcher

34 ElEctionrEsults

Special Thanks to Marcin Walecki and Jeffrey Carlson for their collaboration on this issue

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democracy at large

DEMOCRACY AT LARGEONLINE

visit us at www.democracyatlarge.org

editor-in-chief

Dorin Tudoran

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editors

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advisory editorial board

Jermyn P. BrooksThomas Carothers

Kevin Casas ZamoraSoon Juan Chee

Pavol DemešSunanda DeshapriyaBronislaw Geremek

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Torquato JardimRafael López Pintor

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Fidaa ShehadaJohn Todd StewartShauna Sylvester

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FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

by Dorin TudoranA Utopian Dream

They say one needs only three things to be successful in politics: money, money and money. Some would reply that there are only three things one needs to be successful in business: strong political connections, strong political connections and strong political connections.

But generalizations don’t necessarily speak the truth. Actually, as Mark Twain put it, “All generalizations are false, including this one.” So, why do many see the relationship between money and politics as quite an incestuous marriage?

Legislators, political analysts, sociologists and others have tried to figure out the answer to this tantalizing question. Yet, the widespread perception is that things are not improving; on the contrary, they are worsening. This might be because the steps taken against political corruption are not firm and consistent. Or it might very well be that corruption’s borderless imagination always outsmarts any anti-corruption strategy.

The globalization of political corruption is perceived by many as substantially more successful than the globalization of more positive things. Many westerners have looked at the former Soviet bloc

countries as, among other things, paragons of corruption. However, nowadays crooks in such places are no longer feeling singled out. Scandals like those of Jack Abramoff or U.S. Reps. Cummingham, Ney and DeLay make them feel like part of a legitimate, global club. Ninety thousand dollars taking a nap in the freezer of U.S. Rep. Jefferson makes victims and profiteers of political corruption everywhere feel very much “included.”

Political finance scandals bring with them pestilential flavor and inflict serious damage on the public trust, causing the social fabric to start to fray. Left unanswered or treated with “quick fixes,” such scandals trigger challenges very few can handle or resolve. The common wisdom is that only clear, well-defined rules and strong implementation can prevent dysfunctional behavior that subverts the rules and can identify early signs that the situation might be elevated to a systemic crisis.

To some, transparency of the process and full disclosure of the means involved in the process could be enough to fight the threats political corruption poses. To others, only a draconian implementation of rules, faithful compliance with regulations and undisputed supremacy of law can do it.

However, incurable skeptics think that the sophistication of modern political finance corruption will always find ways to create loopholes

in the rules, regulations and laws; to apply discrete but efficient shades that obscure transparency; and to sweeten implementation up so as to make it a joke.

In other words, is the effort of striking the right balance between “equal influence on the political system” and “economic inequality” just a utopian dream?

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democracy at large

ifes board of directors

William J. HyblChairman

Peter G. KellyVice Chairman

Hon. Leon J. WeilSecretary

Lesley IsraelTreasurer

Hon. Howard Baker, Jr.Hon. Mary Banotti

Judy A. BlackDon V. CogmanTyrone Freeman

Frederick P. FurthJeffrey Glassman

Hon. Stuart HollidayHon. Steny Hoyer

Hon. Barbara B. KennellyMaureen Kindel

Jean-Pierre KingsleyKathleen M. Linehan

Hon. Robert L. LivingstonHon. Richard LugarJoseph Napolitan

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directors eMeriti

James M. CannonJudy G. FernaldPatricia Hutar

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honorary director

Mrs. F. Clifton White

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Randal C. Teague

executives

Richard W. SoudriettePresident/CEO

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AN IFES PUBLICATION

IFES is an international, nonprofit organiza-tion that supports the building of democratic societies. As one of the world’s premier democracy and governance assistance or-ganizations, IFES provides targeted techni-cal assistance to strengthen transitional de-mocracies. Founded in 1987, IFES has de-veloped and implemented comprehensive, collaborative democracy solutions in more than 100 countries.

Resources for the Professional

Books

dEmocrAcyAndElEctionsinAfricA

Staffan I. LindbergBaltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006

Are free and fair elections the result of strong democracy or the cause? In Democracy and Elections in Africa, Staffan Lindberg studies 232 elections held in 44 African countries be-tween 1989 and 2003. He argues that democ-ratizing nations learn to become democratic through repeated democratic behavior, even if their elections are often flawed. Therefore, he concludes that Africa’s elections over the past 20 years, however imperfect, represent significant positive progress toward democrat-ic societies.

govErnAncE for thE futurE: dEmocrAcy AnddEvEloPmEntinthElEAstdEvEloPEdcountriEsGita Welch and Zahra Nuru, eds.New York: UNDP and UN-OHRLLS, 2006

This 372-page study provides a comprehen-sive survey of the progress toward good gov-ernance in the world’s 50 least developed countries over the past 20 years. The report’s analysis is broken into five topics: democratic governance, state capacity, non-state actors, rule of law and global governance. One area of success particularly highlighted in the report is the institutional representation of women in the least developed countries, which is now higher in many cases than in developed coun-tries. For reference, the report also includes a statistical annex that supplies data on specific political and economic indicators for each of the 50 countries.

BErtElsmAnntrAnsformAtion indEx2006:towArddEmocrAcyAndAmArkEtEconomy

Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Founda-tion, 2006

Successful transition to and consolidation of democracy requires that political actors have both the will and the capacity to effect politi-cal change. The Bertels-mann Transformation Index measures coun-tries’ management of the process of political

and economic change by examining the suc-cess of reform efforts in 119 countries based on 58 different performance indicators. The

report—which last appeared in 2003—covers countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin Amer-ica, the Caribbean and the Middle East. It in-cludes a 264-page book and a CD-ROM.

online ResouRces

EnsuringsuccEssfulPArtnErshiPs:Atoolkit

InterAction’s Africa Liaison Program Initiative, 2006www.interaction.org

Partnerships are crucial to achiev-ing lasting results in the field of in-ternational devel-opment. With this in mind, InterAc-tion has created the Partnership Assessment and Monitoring Tool

(PAT) to evaluate and improve the quality of cooperation between USAID and NGOs oper-ating in Africa. The publication articulates the intangible aspects of an effective partnership and provides a three-step evaluation program to facilitate discussion and improve coopera-tion in terms of not only principles and phi-losophies, but also concrete actions.

dEmocrAcydiAloguEs:frEEAndfAirElEctions

U.S. State Departmentwww.democracy.gov

The online Democracy Dialogues initiative, launched by the U.S. State Department, has added a “Free and Fair Elections” page to its website. Available in English, Spanish, French, Russian, Chinese, Arabic and Persian, the site provides links to historical documents, teach-ing guides and webchats with various experts in the field, including representatives from IFES, the League of Women Voters, the Muslim Public Affairs Council and Democracy Interna-tional, Inc.

Researched and written by Stewart Dearing.

corrEctions

In our June issue, in the Election Results section (Elections Today, Vol. 14, No. 1), we listed the name of one of the candidates for Uganda’s presidency as “Kizza Kifeefe Besigya.” The candidate’s name is actually “Kizza Kifeefe Besigye.”

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Vol. 2, No. 4 – 2006

I N B R I E F

(Clockwise from top left): An Azerbaijani woman casts her ballot in Baku in the May election (AP Photo/Aida Sultanova). Protesters clash with police in Baku in November 2005 demanding the rerun of parliamentary elections that took place, in part, last May (AP Photo/Shakh Aivazov). Zambia’s President Levy Mwanawasa (center) arrives at a meeting of the African Union in 2006 (Reuters/Antony Njuguna). The head of Egypt’s Judges Club attends a meeting of that body in Cairo last June after the passage of the Judicial Authority Law (AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris).

Democracy Watch

the law represents a step, howev-er small, in the right direction.

ZamBiaZambia’s National Decentraliza-tion Policy (NDP)—implement-ed in 2004 to encourage grass-roots participation in political decisions—entered its final stage this June, bringing the nation one step closer to pluralistic de-mocracy. Adopted 12 years after the legalization of multiple par-ties in Zambia, the NDP was cre-ated to devolve political power and funding from central to local authorities in the hopes of main-taining political stability and improving government account-ability. Its final stage, known as the sector devolution process,

will engage each government department in a series of work-shops to discuss, formulate and execute guidelines for power transfers, which are scheduled to be completed by the end of next year. The Ministry of Education conducted the first of these devo-lution workshops for provincial education officers and depart-ment directors from June 26 to 30. Seventy-two other workshops are planned for the rest of the year, according to Decentraliza-tion Secretariat Director Alfred Sakwiya. The World Bank has pledged $44 million in support of this decentralization project.

Researched and written by Stewart Dearing.

aZeRBaijanAzerbaijan’s partial repeat parlia-mentary elections, held last May, demonstrated limited improve-ments in the country’s electoral system, but also a need for further reform, according to a report is-sued by OSCE observers. The election took place in 10 constit-uencies whose November 2005 election results were cancelled by the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the Constitutional Court due to charges of electoral fraud. OSCE observers, present in six of the 10 voting constitu-encies, praised the government’s tracking vote-canvassing cam-paigns and candidate registration processes, especially in compari-son with the suppression of op-position parties that occurred in November’s election.

However, the report criticized the administration of the election for insufficient transparency. For ex-ample, the selection process for election commissioners did not provide adequate minority party representation. While such an imbalance is prescribed by the electoral code to some extent, Parliament left vacancies on ev-ery local and federal commission that further bolstered the pro-in-cumbent government majority. These commissions, the report said, also failed to openly address complaints and appeals. The CEC considered but did not lawfully process a single complaint of the more than 1,000 filed. While the commission did post each polling station’s preliminary results on its website the day after the election, it cancelled the results of four polling stations without adequate

explanation. In the report, the OSCE voiced its hope that local authorities could forge a more democratic electoral system for the upcoming municipal elec-tions this October.

egyptEgypt’s recent changes to its ju-diciary have triggered a mix of supportive and critical responses from the country’s judges. Ex-ecutive control over judges—who supervise elections in Egypt—be-came an issue in last November’s parliamentary election, when two judges accused the government of manipulating the courts to de-fend fraudulent election results. In June, Egypt’s People’s Assem-bly approved the Judicial Author-ity Law, which was intended to address concerns about limits to judicial independence. Among other provisions, the law frees the attorney-general from the direct control of the justice minister and grants the judiciary an indepen-dent budget, limited only by the veto of the minister of finance.

Yet critics argue that, in prac-tice, these reform efforts will not guarantee judicial indepen-dence and may even weaken it. Under the new law, the attorney-general remains a presidential appointee, and the Ministry of Justice retains the right to review and censure individual judges. Most importantly, the law also fails to recognize the right of judges to form associations inde-pendent of government control, a key condition for judicial inde-pendence in the minds of many Egyptian judges. Supporters, on the other hand, emphasize that

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Resources for the Professional

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democracy at large

Political Finance Resources Online

Transparency Internationalwww.transparency.org/global_priorities/corruption_politics

As part of its anti-corruption mandate, Transparency International (TI) battles corruption in politics and works to devise practical solu-tions to facilitate transparency. Its website analyzes what makes polit-ical corruption so widespread and examines what has been done to tackle it. Among other topics, it covers campaign and political party finance and corrupt money flowing from business to politicians. Sev-eral of TI’s chapters have developed tools to monitor election spend-ing and to better understand and decrease vote buying, which are also described on the site.

Lithuania’s Money and Politics Databasehttp://www3.lrs.lt/pls/rink/w3_paj_isl_new.pip_e

Lithuania launched a political finance program in 2002 that demonstrated how public disclosure can lead to increased accountability on the part of poli-ticians and enhanced credibility of the democratic process. IFES helped Lith-uania’s Central Election Commission develop a database (link above) where disclosed political finance information was made public. Journalists and civil society groups use this mechanism to monitor money in the political process and, as early as 2002, they began an investigation based on information from the database that resulted in political scandal. As a result, the president was removed from office by Parliament, new elections were held and reforms were enacted to prevent future abuses. This database was the first of its kind in a transition country, and it is updated regularly.

Money and Politics www.moneyandpolitics.net

IFES’ political finance site offers archived media reports on issues of political integrity worldwide, a series of relevant reports and research, links to politi-cal finance regulators and other political finance organizations, comparative best practices in disclosure/enforcement, disclosure databases from around the world and political finance forms/manuals. It also provides a wide range of information and strategies that countries can use to more effectively regu-late money in politics. Based on its many years of research and project im-plementation, IFES offers tools designed to promote disclosure and access to information through its Money and Politics (MAP) Program and tools to enhance enforcement through its Training in Detection and Enforcement (TIDE) Program. IFES continuously updates the materials and resources available on the site.

I N B R I E F

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Vol. 2, No. 4 – 2006

I N B R I E F

ACE: Election Integritywww.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/eif/eif08/eif08c

One of the topic areas in the ACE Encyclopaedia (part of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network) is “Election Integrity,” which offers entries about trans-parency, accountability and accuracy in electoral administration. Its section on electoral campaign financing covers policy goals, components of effective regulations and enforcement, and was prepared by members of IFES and the New York City Campaign Finance Board. The section on enforcement is com-prehensive and covers 10 sub-areas. The ACE website also provides a compara-tive matrix of political finance laws in 111 countries around the world in its Election Materials section.

Common Causewww.commoncause.org

Common Cause is a nonprofit lobbying organization that seeks to increase government transparency and accountability in the United States. Its website provides a means for Americans to get involved in the struggle against cor-ruption on both the local and federal level through a list of priority advocacy issues as well as summaries of state and national political finance regulation issues. It also offers FAQs and research papers on issues in the news related to political finance. Additionally, in order to foment discussion, a section of the site’s blog focuses on the issue of money in politics, accompanied by selected news updates and documents relating to U.S. anti-corruption efforts.

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democracy at largedemocracy at large

From Crisis to Reform: A Historical Perspective

by Craig Donsanto

Generating the political will to improve political finance laws often requires a scandalous

or shocking event. Seven such events have given shape to U.S. campaign finance law.

L imiting the influence of money on politics is an ongoing proj-ect, and the United States’ his-tory of legislation designed to

check such influence is long. Like other democracies around the world, the United States has struggled to balance the prin-ciple of political equality—the idea that every voter should have equal influence on the political system—with the reality of economic inequality, the uneven distribu-tion of economic resources. In the United States, incremental legislative progress has most often been made after a scan-dal, when public anger over corruption reached a boiling point. Over the years, the depth of crisis necessary to induce re-forms has decreased as has the length of time between crisis-inspired reforms. This article describes seven crises that have shaped U.S. political finance law.

1. Presidential Assassination Produces Civil Service Reform Before the Pendleton Civil Service Act (1883), government jobs were earned through political patronage and went to party loyalists. As a result, government employees (whose jobs depended upon their party’s victory at election time) were expected to contribute to their party’s campaign efforts. Though this system had some major disadvantages—for example, it often put important government jobs in the hands of unqualified, but loyal, party supporters—the parties resisted changing it, as it also served to guarantee the rul-ing party cooperative employees and gave people incentives for active party partici-pation. But after the assassination of Presi-dent James Garfield by a disgruntled pa-tronage seeker, the public disgust with this

system could not be ignored, and Congress passed the Pendleton Civil Service Act. The new law stated that federal employees were under no obligation to contribute to political parties and created a small class of civil servants (about 10 percent of fed-eral clerks) who were to be hired on merit and fired only for cause.

2. Influx of Corporate Money in Campaigns Leads to BanUnfortunately, the Pendleton Act served to increase the parties’ need for corporate money. Around this time, some business-men (known colloquially as the “robber barons”) had been able to dominate their respective industries through anti-com-petitive or unfair business practices and had amassed huge personal fortunes. Af-ter one industrialist raised about $4 mil-lion (equivalent to $82 million today) for William McKinley (who was later elected president), Congress passed the first cam-paign finance regulation, the Tillman Act (1907), which prohibited corporate con-tributions to election campaigns. However, the law made no provisions for replacing corporate funding of campaigns with pub-lic financing or for enforcing its ban on corporate contributions.

3. Corruption Scandal Generates Transparency RequirementsIn the early 1920s, several oil developers made large contributions to the Secre-tary of the Interior, who in turn secretly granted them exclusive rights to oil re-serve lands (the Teapot Dome scandal). In response to this corruption at the highest levels of government, Congress passed the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,

which introduced financial transparency in federal elections by requiring candi-dates to file quarterly reports for all con-tributions over $100. It also set campaign contributions and expenditure limits, and criminalized vote buying and voter intimidation. However, the responsibility for enforcing the law was given to Con-gress, the very entity it was supposed to regulate, and much of the law was rou-tinely ignored.

4. New Deal Graft Produces Regulations to Clean Up PoliticsIn order to alleviate the poverty brought on by the Great Depression, massive fed-eral grants and aid programs (known as the New Deal) were introduced in the early 1930s. The 1936 elections were fol-lowed by scandal, when politicians were found misusing federal aid dollars to re-ward party loyalty, punish disloyalty, ex-tract kickbacks and buy votes. A public outcry resulted in a congressional investi-gation, an exhaustive report of gross po-litical abuses of federal funds and eventu-ally the passage of the Hatch Acts of 1939 and 1940.

These laws prohibited the use of federal funds to manipulate political activity, limited individual contributions and im-posed criminal penalties for their breach. Additionally, the Hatch Acts forbade all federal employees from actively manag-ing partisan political campaigns. Thus, it expanded the Pendleton Act and com-pleted the task of formulating a civil ser-vice where all federal employees—except a very small number of senior members—are hired on merit and barred from par-ticipating in partisan politics.

THINKING OUT LOUD

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politicians from acting with impunity. The seven crises described above reveal how scandals in the United States have resulted in incremental reforms. Many other countries—though not all—have responded in kind when faced with com-parable scandals. While reforms can be implemented at any time, a crisis can rally the political will politicians need to address and remedy weaknesses in the political finance system. If such steps are not taken, these weaknesses can become systemic and erode public confidence in the political process.

Craig Donsanto is the director of the U.S. Justice Department’s election crimes branch. This article was prepared with support from Khatuna Kalmakhelidze.

5. Watergate Scandal Prompts Comprehensive ReformThe burglary of the Democratic Nation-al Committee headquarters by political agents with ties to the Republican White House—known as the Watergate scan-dal—quickly blossomed into a full-scale public investigation of abuse of power by the U.S. president. It produced hard evi-dence that large sums of money had been raised through unscrupulous means; that the existing transparency law (Corrupt Practices Act of 1925) was an empty letter; and that the political finance system was essentially broken.

The Watergate scandal produced four sig-nificant pieces of legislation aimed at pre-venting the reoccurrence of similar abus-es. First, in 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) gave the country, for the first time, an enforceable and comprehensive campaign transparency law that incorporated provisions aimed at deterring the corrupting effects of money on politics. It set new limits on contribu-tions and expenditures, strengthened disclosure requirements and limited the amount of money campaigns could spend on media. The act also provided admin-istrative, civil and criminal sanctions for violations and created an independent agency, the Federal Election Commission, to enforce its provisions.

Second, the Ethics in Government Act required the executive branch, federal judges and members of (and candidates for) federal office to file personal finan-cial disclosure reports. Third, the Office of Government Act established a net-work of ethics counseling throughout the govern-ment to reduce conflicts of interest and inappro-priate conduct. Fourth, the Inspector General Act required every component of the federal government to establish an internal inves-tigative office in order to ferret out fraud, mismanagement, waste and abuse in the administration of public missions.

6. Revealed Loopholes Lead to Regulation of “Soft Money”Throughout the 1990s, both parties and their candidates exploited loopholes in FECA, and as a result, millions of dollars from sources prohibited by FECA influ-enced U.S. national elections. Unregulat-ed money paid for ads promoting policy positions (“issue ads”) pegged to party platforms as well as for voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, which—while

ostensibly nonpartisan—targeted friendly constituencies. Such actions revealed that FECA was outdated because political par-tisans, and those who sought to infuse otherwise illegal funds into the campaign process, could “skate around” the law’s provisions.

A scandal involving the Democratic Party, China and the 1996 U.S. elections led to three years of investigations—administra-tive, congressional and even criminal—into whether anyone broke the law. The inves-tigations revealed that FECA’s provisions were unclear about what acts they cov-

(among other crimes) is said to have bribed members of Congress to vote as he wished on pending legislation. This story is still unfolding, and the response to this crisis is yet to be seen.

Learning from CrisesHow a country responds to a political fi-nance scandal is a crucial determinant of the strength of its political finance system and democratic institutions. Such scan-dals can erode public confidence, but in the long run they contribute to greater democratic accountability by preventing

How a country responds to a political finance scandal is a crucial

determinant of the strength of its democratic institutions.

President Richard Nixon pounds his fist on the podium as he answers a question during the Watergate scandal at a press conference in 1974. (AP Photo/stf)

ered and that this lack of clarity was being abused to thwart the act’s key objective of managing the impact of money on politics.

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (best known as the McCain-Feingold Law), ad-opted in 2002, tried to close the political fi-nance system’s loopholes by regulating issue ads and “soft money” (or contributions not made directly to a candidate’s campaign). It also significantly enhanced financial and criminal penalties. For example, violations of FECA are now considered felonies.

7. The Current ScandalsThe current political finance scandals in the United States include accusa-tions against lobbyist Jack Abramoff, who

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FIELDWORK

Regulation and Implementation:The Lifeblood of Political Finance

Interview with Michael E. Toner and Ellen L. Weintraub

Building an effective political finance system is work that never

ends for the regulators on the front lines.

: What role has the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and you personally, played in supporting your colleagues around the world as they address issues related to political finance?

Michael Toner: The FEC has historically been very committed to sharing with other countries our campaign finance system—what we think is functioning well and what we think is not functioning as well. We have also learned a lot from other countries about what they are doing not only in cam-paign finance but also in election adminis-tration. These exchanges have been enor-mously valuable because the United States has a lot to learn from other countries (given, for example, what happened in the Florida recount in 2000). Other countries are deploying very sophisticated election technologies and investing resources in counting votes and determining what is a legal vote. When you compare their sys-tems to ours, it is not necessarily a favorable comparison for the United States.

In talking with international audiences, I think what comes through is the need for clear rules. Developing clear rules is always a work in progress, and I’ve enjoyed the chance to learn from other countries dur-ing that process.

Ellen Weintraub: First and foremost, I think the FEC has served as a laboratory for many electoral commissions. We were one of the earliest agencies to be up and running. That has allowed other countries, and our own states, to learn from our expe-rience and to choose what to emulate and,

just as importantly, what not to. In turn, I find it informative to watch newer agencies around the world find their own path and see what practices they deem best. The FEC continues to change so I keep an eye out for innovation across borders.

Personally, I have had the privilege of sharing the FEC’s experiences with many colleagues from around the globe. For ex-ample, last year I went to Bosnia and Her-zegovina with IFES to assist the electoral commission of the BiH as it develops its au-dit and enforcement processes. Our staffs have continued to exchange information. The FEC has also welcomed visiting foreign delegations for many years.

DAL: What are three to four major challenges facing the FEC as it seeks to regulate political finance and enforce the law?

MT: The United States faced the biggest change in campaign finance law in a gen-eration with the passage of the McCain-Feingold Law in 2002 (see sidebar). It really caused a sea change in federal elec-tion laws—new legal terms, new sets of re-strictions on the raising and spending of campaign money—and the FEC has spent the last few years implementing this law through a large number of rulings. There-fore, the biggest challenge I think we faced over the last few years was successfully im-plementing this law.

Earlier, I mentioned the need for clear rules. This is particularly true with new leg-islation, which introduced new terms, many of which were not defined by Congress. The

FEC had to provide very concrete guidance as to what these terms meant. For example, what is soft money1? What is the solicita-tion of soft money? People need to know exactly what these terms mean in practi-cal application. We have now completed all the rulemaking for implementing the McCain-Feingold Law. Two of the most important rules involved the Internet and coordinated communication: (1) the FEC will regulate paid online advertising placed on another person’s website (but not other online communication); and (2) the FEC will regulate instances of “coordinated communication,” such as when an outside group pays for an advertisement on behalf of a candidate.

Looking ahead to what lies between now and the mid-term election in November, we need to spend time discussing what these new regulations mean. We may have to further define some issues—for example, what is permissible in online politics? But I’m hopeful that there will be more stabil-ity in the campaign finance laws as we look towards the 2006 legislative elections and the 2008 presidential election, because the last few years have been marked by a lot of legal changes.

EW: We operate at the intersection of two very important, but sometimes compet-

Michael E. Toner is the chair of the Federal Election Commission. Ellen L. Weintraub is a commissioner at the FEC.

an independent and capable political finance regulator is the linchpin of a successful system. Democracy at large spoke separately with two commissioners of the u.s. federal election commission to find out what the fec has to teach new commissions in developing democracies and what it has yet to learn.

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ing, concerns—that is, the need to protect free, robust and uninhibited speech about politics and policy on the one hand, and the need to protect against government corruption on the other. Campaign dona-tions make it possible for candidates and parties—particularly challenger candidates who do not have the advantages of incum-bency—to make their views known. At the same time, campaign donations have been linked to influence peddling and other corruption scandals. In regulating money in politics, we tread a fine line.

It is also a challenge to regulate our increas-ingly large and complicated system without creating barriers to entry for small players. If the regulations are too complex for the average person to understand, if every new candidate must first hire a lawyer and an accountant, I am concerned that this de-ters challengers and grassroots activity.

Another challenge is agency timeliness in a very time-sensitive arena. Complaints tend to roll in right before an election, so by the time we resolve them, the election is over. I am always looking for ways to improve our efficiency in processing complaints, without sacrificing the due process rights of respondents. Such efficiency is essential to meaningful enforcement. This is an area that the FEC has long struggled with, and although we have made progress, we still have more work to do.

I am also working toward making our agency’s workings more transparent. For example, I have been trying to achieve con-sensus on making our civil penalty sched-ule public.

DAL: What does a political finance regulator (such as the FEC) need to do to address these challenges?

MT: The single most important challenge for any regulator of campaign finance is to issue clear rules. Sometimes people gloss over this issue as too obvious, but I’m se-rious about it. The fact is that it’s much easier to have broad, vague standards. For example under our statute, a contribution (or expenditure) is defined as the general provision of activity for the purpose of in-fluencing a federal election. The problem with this definition is that almost nobody has any earthly idea what that means—in practical application. If you’re going to have an effective system, you’ve got to flesh that out, and define what it means and what

it doesn’t mean. Otherwise even the people who want to comply are going to have difficulty doing so.

I think it’s a misunderstand-ing for people to argue that clear rules run contrary to vigorous enforcement. Clear rules are what make vigorous enforcement pos-sible, particularly in a sys-tem where you have con-stitutional rights like the freedom of speech. It is the civic duty of any campaign finance agency to commu-nicate very clearly what the law is.

EW: I think the decision-makers themselves need to remember that politics is not a bad thing. We want to encourage new voices and dissent. But we also want ev-eryone to play by the same fair, understandable rules. Creating a fair regulatory framework requires that the FEC have the author-ity to issue rules and other guidance. It also requires that the FEC have the abil-ity to ensure timely and easily accessible disclosure. We need a means of veri-fying the information that is disclosed, i.e., an audit capability. And we need a means to enforce our rules, efficiently and effectively.

Having a transparent agen-cy is essential. Not only must we make known our determinations, but also our rationale. We have to open ourselves up to criti-cism from the press, politi-cians and NGOs.

DAL: How does the FEC in-teract with other stakehold-ers—such as political par-ties, citizen groups and the media—to address these challenges?

MT: When stakeholders don’t like what we’re do-

The McCain-Feingold Law

Galvanized by the collapse of Enron (a U.S. energy company and major political contributor), in 2002 senators passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, known as the McCain-Feingold Law after its chief sponsors, John McCain, Republican from Arizona, and Russ Feingold, Democrat from Wisconsin. Among other provisions, the law bans all “soft money” contributions (that is, contributions not regulated by federal election law) from unions, corporations and wealthy individuals. The law also prohibited unions and corporations from producing “issue-based” advertising—defined as broadcast ads focused on a political issue that refer to a clearly identified candidate—shortly before an election. By clearly defining illegal election finance activities, the bill aimed to reduce subjective interpretations of earlier election finance laws that have led to corruption in the past.

In signing the bill into law, President Bush voiced several concerns about the law’s potential limitations on individual freedoms, particularly the First Amendment freedom of speech. However, casting the bill in terms of facilitating individual political participation, he argued that preventing unions and corporations from making “soft” money contributions benefited American democracy because it ensured that leaders of unions and corporations did not misrepresent the political opinions of individual group members.

Where he, and other politicians, found fault with the bill was in its limitations on individual financial campaign contributions and “issue-based” advertising. Politicians who oppose the bill initiated several lawsuits hoping that the Supreme Court would find the law unconstitutional. In rulings in 2003 and 2004, the Supreme Court upheld the McCain-Feingold Law and appeared to foreclose further challenges to its issue-ad provisions. However, in an opinion issued earlier this year, the court suggested that it had not meant to end challenges on issue ads. For the 2006 U.S. campaigns, the law is still in effect as originally written, but the court’s decision opens the law up to new questions about the subjective intent of each ad eligible for regulation and raises the possibility of case-by-case consideration.

Researched and written by Stewart Dearing

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ing, we certainly hear from them—all the stakeholders you mentioned. We are in-volved with them in a lot of different ca-pacities. For example, whenever the FEC wants to issue regulations or enforce a law, it makes public the proposed rules and their rationale. At that point, anyone—po-

litical parties, candidates, media, interest groups, etc.—can comment on those pro-posed rules. We then hold a hearing where people can make their views heard, and we take stock of them before voting on the final rules. That’s one instance where we have a lot of interaction with candidates, political parties, interest groups, etc.

Another example is an advisory opinion. The FEC has the authority to issue an opin-ion if someone asks about the legality of a

proposed action, and we interact with can-didates and parties in that capacity.

Of course, the press also plays a valuable role in covering what we’re doing—both what they think has gone well and what they think has not gone well. That’s a good

thing, because it keeps people on their toes at the agency. It holds people accountable for their decisions, and that’s the way it must be.

EW: In my experience, most members of our regulated community want to comply with the law. So our approach is education, education, education. The FEC hosts nu-merous informative sessions not only for the regulated community but also for re-porters and NGOs. I personally participate

in these sessions and try to be very acces-sible to those who want to understand our laws. We want everyone to know the law. We want the regulated communi-ty to know the law so that they comply with it and not find it overwhelmingly complex. We want the media and NGOs to know the law so that they can make informed critiques of what goes on. We also strive toward as much disclosure as possible. We want campaign finance information to be swiftly disclosed and easily searchable on the Internet.

The press and NGOs often criticize the FEC in a very point-ed and public way. Some of these criti-cisms are apt, others less so. But it’s im-portant that we be

a transparent agency so that these criti-cisms can be made. As a commissioner, I am constantly reviewing our operations to see if there are improvements we should be making.

DAL: How does the FEC work with other government agencies, such as the Department of Justice, to effectively enforce political finance laws?

MT: The FEC works closely with the Depart-ment of Justice at the federal level in terms of enforcing the federal campaign finance laws. We—the FEC and the Department of Justice—have worked together since the 1970s pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding that lays out the jurisdic-tion of both agencies. Basically, the core of the Department of Justice’s jurisdiction is willful violations of the law and inten-tional misconduct. The FEC handles less important cases of intentional violations as well as all cases in which the transgres-sion is not knowing and willful, which is a vast range of activity. We collaborate with the Department of Justice on a number of investigations and enforcement cases, and the need for such collaboration has increased with the passage of the McCain-Feingold Law.

Sometimes we also interact with state or lo-cal election boards. We are not responsible for enforcing state election law, but there are some matters that involve both federal and state law. We’ve had some contact with those boards over the last few years, and I expect that to increase.

EW: The FEC strives to work cooperatively with other government agencies at the na-tional and local levels. We both make and receive referrals. I would like to see more collaboration in the future on investiga-tions and global settlement agreements. We’re all working toward the same goal, and I think we could more effectively en-force the law by working together.

DAL: Given that the regulation of political finance in the United States has grown incrementally over a great deal of time, what is the biggest lesson that other countries can learn from this process?

MT: First, as I indicated earlier, the need for clear rules, because even the most ambi-tious campaign finance law isn’t going to work effectively if it doesn’t make clear what people can and cannot do under the law.

The FEC continues to change so I keep an eye out for innovation across borders.

U.S. Senator John McCain speaks to the press about campaign finance reform as Senator Russell Feingold listens in Washington, DC, in 2004 (Reuters/Jason Reed JMG/SV).

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Second, the need for outreach. The government needs to invest in teaching people—candidates, political parties, interest groups, etc.—what the law requires and that takes a real effort. The FEC has held conferences in different regions of the country geared toward reaching candidates, parties, labor unions and corpora-tions. We do our best to lay out in very practical terms what the law is, and they can ask questions. We do this as a core part of our mission to get people familiar with their legal obligations. The government needs to expend the resources to get out on the road and interact directly with political actors, teaching them what the law is.

EW: Every country is different, but for us, the linchpin of our sys-tem has been transparency: a prompt and easily accessible system for finding out where our candidates and parties get their mon-ey and how they spend it. With strong, independent media and NGOs as our allies, disclosure has been the greatest accomplish-ment of the FEC, an accomplishment that has been dramatically enhanced by technological developments, most significantly the Internet.

Another lesson would be to keep it simple. I think the biggest mistake we’ve made is making the rules too complicated. Particu-larly in emerging democracies, my advice would be to choose a few priorities and focus on them, rather than trying to regulate every aspect of political behavior.

Notes 1 Soft money is any funds that are raised outside of the limits and prohibitions

of federal law. For example, it includes corporate contributions, labor union contributions or any individual contribution beyond the federal limit ($2,100).

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Money provides access to the ba-sic tools of a modern democra-cy—for example, political com-

munication, political party operations, polling and policy-making—and for this reason, political finance affects almost ev-ery aspect of democratic politics. Not sur-prisingly, the reform of political finance regimes is high on the agenda in many new and old democracies. In fact, the de-gree of transparency and accountability a country achieves in its political finance regime determines, in part, how smoothly and quickly it moves towards democratic consolidation.

A country’s transition to democracy is a crucial time for establishing political fi-nance norms because, as Michael Pinto-Duschinsky has suggested, ”[the] impact [of political finance] is likely to be great-est in times of rapid change or crisis, for instance when new states or regimes are established” (Pinto-Duschinsky 1986, 32).

Based on extensive cross-country compari-sons, this article makes three observations

about political finance in transitional countries. First, it describes the systemic problems that give rise to unhealthy po-litical finance practices. Second, it details the impact these practices have on the consolidation of democracy (particularly with respect to political parties). Third, it argues that such illegal funding practices can no longer be addressed by single inter-ventions, such as introducing public fund-ing, spending limits or campaign finance monitoring by NGOs. Instead, a compre-hensive long-term approach is required.

Systemic Challenges to Transparent Political Finance Political finance corruption operates in the cracks between state sectors. It is of-ten linked to crimes such as (1) abuse of state resources (related to privatization or public procurement), (2) politically mo-tivated violence, (3) protection of illegal activities (narcotics production, prostitu-tion and human trafficking) and (4) ex-tortion (forcing businesses to pay protec-tion money).

No democracy is immune to the dangers of political corruption, and even the most established democracies have all recently been victims of political scan-dals. Such scandals have shown that a corrupt system of political finance not only separates the political elite from so-ciety but undermines the very concept of democratic representation (one person, one vote).1 Though any democracy is susceptible, certain conditions increase the likelihood of systemic corruption in a country’s system of political finance, such as:

1. Excessive competition between po-litical factions over state resources;

2. Severe poverty, which fuels vote-buying and makes popular fund-ing of politics more difficult;

3. Voter apathy, weak civic activism and a lack of independent media;

4. Control of the state by monied in-terests (state capture); and

5. Lack of enforcement (or partisan enforcement) of the existing po-litical finance regime.

Political

Hidden Diseaseby Marcin Walecki

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Corruption:Democracy’s

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In regimes undergoing transition to de-mocracy (which lack public awareness of the rules of the democratic game), these conditions can lead to endemic corruption in political finances.

Excessive political competition often pro-duces political finance–related corrup-tion in transitional democracies. When the stakes involved in controlling public office are high, winning the election be-comes more important than following the rules governing the funding of fair politi-cal competition. This is particularly true if those involved see the political game as one where the “winner takes all.” For exam-ple, in countries where patronage jobs are a major source of employment, where state budgets offer the only source of funding or where illicit activities are being protected from the scrutiny of law enforcement, no price is too high to pay to win elections. As a result, political competitors focus on capturing public offices, controlling state resources, repaying funders of the last elec-tion and preparing for the next political confrontation.

Regimes with high levels of poverty are particularly vulnerable to systemic politi-cal finance corruption, which is a relatively common problem for many post-conflict societies and transitional democracies. Pa-tronage politics target the poor, the unem-ployed, the dispossessed and the socially dependent. Vote-buying schemes would

presumably be less successful (or more ex-pensive) if aimed at the rich or educated. If politicians can secure votes (and win elec-tions) by giving voters small gifts, they will have absolutely no reason to be account-able—after the elections are over—to those whose votes they bought. Thus, vote-buying and poverty reinforce each other. Given the costs of mounting political campaigns, high levels of poverty also mean that only wealthy citizens—or those able to “work the system”—can afford to run for office.

As voter apathy limits a source of legitimate funding (the voters), it thereby makes ille-gitimate sources more appealing. In transi-tional democracies (particularly those with significant poverty), a troubling tendency is the rapid decrease of volunteer labor and popular funding (e.g., small donations and party membership subscriptions) as im-portant sources of campaign resources. In many countries, voters ask why they should contribute their time or money to politi-cians who—once in office—enrich them-selves and do nothing for the average per-son. Furthermore, they ask why they should give money to politicians who are willing to pay them for their vote. Such views result in part from the popular perception that par-ties will survive with or without small dona-tions by availing themselves of illegal funds. In many established democracies (such as the United Kingdom or Germany), vot-ers’ financial responsibility for politics is decreasing drastically while, in many tran-

sitional regimes, it never became an im-portant factor (e.g., Albania or Ukraine). Furthermore, in Asia, West Africa, Central Eastern Europe and Latin America, many party organizations—at both the local and national level—contribute very little to pay for constituency campaigns, and individual candidates are expected to generate the bulk of funds themselves. In reality, politi-cal organizations can be as business-orient-ed as commercial organizations, with elec-tions serving as a “marketplace” for com-peting investors.

As a result of the limited availability of popular funding for campaigns (among other factors), politicians’ need for new sources of money has increased. In many transitional countries, political parties and candidates turn to illegitimate funding from state enterprises or governmental agencies. For example, they demand con-tributions before granting public contracts or sector employment. These politicians/parties have captured the state and use its resources for their own advantage. They might also look for campaign funds from rich individuals, large corporations, labor unions or even organized crime. Under such circumstances, the absence of broad-based sources of popular financial support leads to a lack of party autonomy and to the risk of external party control.

Finally, in addition to the above problems, there is the universal challenge of weak (or

The health of a country’s polit ical f inance regime has signif icant impact

on the health of its polit ical party system. Successful transit ions to

democracy require attention to this crucial element over the long term.

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biased) enforcement.2 Even established democracies are struggling with effective enforcement of political finance laws. In many less developed countries, basic po-litical finance regulations often exist but

lack implementation, which may be due to the nature of the regulations or to the re-sources available to the regulatory body. In the last decade, many countries have intro-duced over-ambitious regulations, usually in response to scandal or external pressure. As a result of such a normative approach, money in the politics of many transitional countries is subject to greater regulation than in established democracies. As a re-cent IFES study of 18 Central and Eastern European countries argued, “The Central and Eastern European experience con-firms a general point: ‘Too many rules. Too little enforcement’” (Ikstens, Smilov and Walecki 2002, 10).

On the other hand, feeble enforcement of political finance regulations may be due to inadequate funding that does not enable the responsible regulatory body to admin-ister the country’s ambitious regulatory framework. As scandals pass and new pri-orities emerge, countries can lose their en-thusiasm for political finance reform, and for providing the financial and human re-sources needed to carry out the fight against political corruption. In some instances, the loss of interest in political finance reform can result from concerns that may indeed appear more pressing. As a senior politi-cian in Afghanistan recently pointed out, “When it comes to enforcement, Afghan politicians—many of them warlords, war criminals and drug traffickers—and the law enforcement agencies have more serious problems to worry about than campaign fi-nance violations.” Regardless of the reason, blatant disregard of political finance laws is among the most common problems for transitional democracies.

In another category of cases, weak enforce-ment arises from a lack of political will. Where parties and candidates have suffi-

cient political influence (for example, the ability to determine the staff and budget of a political finance regulator) and a sense of political impunity, they will often de-velop strategies to sidestep reporting and

disclosure obligations. Thus, many political finance regulators face a major challenge: should they just administer the political finance system—allowing politicians and rich contributors to interpret the rules as they see fit—or should they enforce it vigorously, undertaking thorough inves-tigations if necessary. Unfortunately, the latter choice is rarely made in transitional democracies.

Impact of Unhealthy Political Finances: Crisis of Political PartiesWhen political candidates do not compete on a level playing field because some of them have access to money from illegiti-mate sources, voters can become cynical about the democratic political process and the role of their representatives—the polit-ical parties—in it. Under such circumstanc-es, citizens view political parties as corrupt organizations that do not effectively repre-sent their interests. As a result, people hesi-tate to join, finance or associate with them. The associated decline in the legitimacy of political parties helps produce problems like political apathy, antiparty rhetoric and attacks on democratic institutions.

According to the 2004 Transparency Inter-national (TI) Global Corruption Barom-eter, political parties were rated by the gen-eral public as the institution most affected by corruption in 36 out of 62 countries sur-veyed. Corruption scandals, abuse of state resources and nepotism appear to have tak-en their toll on the public’s trust of political parties and leaders. In TI’s 2003 Corruption Barometer, respondents from 33 countries indicated that if they could remove corrup-tion from a single institution, they would choose to clean up political parties.

Parties are caught up in a damaging cycle. Too often, a weak party base means that

party memberships and small donations generate limited income. In addition, newly emerged parties (or independent candidates) are often new to fundraising and badly organized to manage their re-

sources efficiently. As a result, what money parties collect does not meet their needs (which might be large due to the requirements of old fashioned patronage politics). Given this situ-ation, and the fact that it is easier to rely on a few large individual

(oligarchs/godfathers) or corporate do-nors (including foreign companies) than to appeal to large numbers of supporters in order to gather many small contribu-tions, politicians turn to monied interests. Their resulting lack of responsiveness to the average voter breeds cynicism and fur-ther decreases citizens’ willingness to con-tribute to party campaign funds.

The low legitimacy of parties (and thereby of elections that bring them to office) is a serious obstacle to democratic consolida-tion. In fact, the decline of political parties may directly threaten the process of democ-ratization itself because it opens the door to political control by populist politicians and narrow interest groups. Citizens stop seeing political parties as desirable institu-tions and fundamental elements of a dem-ocratic polity. Already, antiparty feeling is common in transitional countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. In Poland and Ukraine, voters who do not trust political parties constitute a significant majority.3

Successful Reform Requires Comprehensive ApproachThe history of democratic transition dem-onstrates that transparency and account-ability in political finance result from de-cades of reform rather than from a few short-term interventions. In the early nine-teenth and twentieth centuries, electoral corruption was rampant in the majority of Western political regimes. More than a century passed before the publics in those democracies reacted to serious scandals by demanding better standards in the con-duct of elections.

In France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Poland, corrupt practices have only recently begun to shift from systemic abuses to more indi-

The history of democratic transit ion demonstrates

that transparency and accountabi l i ty in pol it ical

f inance result from decades of reform rather than

from a few short-term interventions.

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vidual ones. Major political scandals, an in-creasingly sophisticated electorate and me-dia, better transparency in public life and public pressure to reform legal frameworks all played a fundamental role in causing this change. Equally important was the de-velopment of a new understanding on the part of the public and enforcement agen-cies about what is—and what is not—ac-ceptable behavior. Finally, political actors have had to recognize the new standards, change their behavior to secure re-election or depart from politics (as did former Ital-ian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi or former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl).

Overall, combating political finance–re-lated corruption purely by means of im-ported regulations is doomed to failure. This is not to say that successful practices cannot be borrowed and applied in a way that takes into account the political culture of a country. Rather, it might be the case that some transition countries need to go through financial scandals similar to those seen in Western democracies. Scandals can increase public awareness of political finance and galvanize coalitions among dif-ferent anti-corruption agents to introduce preventive measures. Reformers must take

a holistic approach to cleaning up politi-cal society because illegal political finance flourishes in a wider context of corrupt procedures tied to the allocation of state resources, public procurement and con-tacts as well as to the lack of financial disci-pline and an accountable civil service.

However, despite the fact that experience indicates reform will be achieved over the long term, many politicians—especially those in new and transitional democra-cies—promise to end corruption in politics quickly. To achieve this unrealistic goal, they introduce ambitious regulations (such as low spending and contribution limits) and try to take shortcuts to establishing transparency and accountability in their political systems. Many legislators assume that amending a few laws (for example, introducing generous public funding or prohibiting corporate funding) will auto-matically clean up their elections and re-store public confidence. The same illusion can be held by anti-corruption activists, who advocate one-off campaign finance monitoring by NGOs. It took established democracies decades to build the capacity to detect political finance irregularities, move from systemic electoral fraud to indi-

vidual acts of cor-ruption, educate and train enforce-ment agencies and introduce some preventive measures. Given this fact, why would it take less time in a regime with limited gov-ernance capabili-ties? It will not.

In addition, lim-i t ing po l i t i ca l f inance regula-tions to disclosure is not an option. The overall goal of a political fi-nance system is to build public trust in democratic pol-itics. Therefore, disclosure must be paired with e n f o r c e m e n t , and the system as a whole must be adjusted over

time to produce the best performance. Transparency in political finance does not automatically increase good governance, but it can expose poor governance practic-es. Disclosure identifies problems—likely long in existence—that must be addressed through reform. The public needs to trust the agency charged with enforcing any new rules. As a result, it is more important to create an independent enforcement agen-cy with committed staff than to produce a large quantity of restrictions and bans. It is also important not to use political finance regulations for partisan purposes.

As transition democracies continue to search for a better system of controlling political finance, they should understand that success will come over the long term (at least two election cycles, in the best case scenario). First, realistic reforms emphasiz-ing disclosure and effective enforcement need to be proposed. Then, the reforms must be implemented and evaluated. Fi-nally, enforcement mechanisms must be enhanced.

1 As Diamond and Gunther (2001) suggest, “The combination of a more or less corrupt system of party and campaign finance with a stream of blatant scandals and a backlog of public aspirations for more responsive government that go unmet (while being amplified by a cynical media) generates growing public disillusionment with democratic politics and government” (p. XIII).

2 For more details on enforcement of political finance regulations, see Enforcing Political Finance Laws: TIDE Training Handbook.

3 For Poland, see CBOS (2003). For Ukraine, see IFES (2003).

References

CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center). 2003. The Attitude to the Political Parties. CBOS BS/38/2003. Warsaw, Poland: CBOS. Available from www.cbos.org.pl.

Diamond, Larry and Richard Gunther (eds.). 2001. Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

IFES. 2003 Attitudes and Expectations: Public Opinion in Ukraine (2002). Washington, DC: IFES. Available from www.ifes.org.

IFES. 2005. Enforcing Political Finance Laws: TIDE Training Handbook. Washington, D.C.: IFES.

Ikstens, Janis, Daniel Smilov and Marcin Walecki. 2002. Campaign Finance in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead. Washington D.C.: IFES.

Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. 1986. Political Money in an International Context. Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center.

Walecki, Marcin. 2004. “Political finance and political corruption.” In Global Corruption Report. London: Transparency International.

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The Government as Shadow Donor: The Case of Argentina

by Delia Ferreira Rubio

Because they have access to the resources of the state, government candidates for public

office require special scrutiny under any political finance regime.

O ne of the purposes of cam-paign finance regulation is to create a level playing field for candidates and political

parties vying for public office. Regulatory mechanisms—such as limits on donations/expenditures, the obligation to disclose finances and a system of public funding for campaigns—are designed to prevent a candidate’s economic resources from de-termining whether he or she wins office. In consolidated democracies with strong insti-tutions and respect for the rule of law, such measures might be sufficient to accomplish this goal. However, in weak democracies with feeble institutions and little respect for the rule of law, they are not. In such cir-cumstances, the government can exert deci-

sive influence on the campaign—as a shad-ow donor—by diverting public resources to benefit an official candidate.

When government resources are used to fund an official candidate’s campaign, it is useless to limit his or her campaign expenditures or regulate how he or she spends public financing for campaigns since the government’s support for the candidate has already unfairly tilted the playing field in his or her favor. Such gov-ernmental action not only violates the principles of good campaign finance, it also distorts the purpose of public re-sources by “privatizing” them, i.e., us-ing them as the property of a political party. Elections do not determine who owns public resources; on the contrary, through elections a society decides who

will manage those resources for the good of the society as a whole.

The abuse of public or state resources during elections is not new in Argentina. During Menem’s administration, for in-stance, the opposition argued that the government was misusing ATN (aportes del Tesoro de la Nación)—funds from the National Treasury—as shadow campaign financing. However, this was not a main concern of Argentina’s reform of party fi-nance and campaign rules in 2002. In this article, I will examine five arenas in which the government is most likely to act as a shadow donor—and the possible ways to prevent this—while considering the case of Argentina.

1. Publicity. The government may use pub-licity as political propaganda to benefit of-ficial candidates who do not register the use of these public resources as campaign expenditures. In many countries, laws re-strict—or simply ban—this illegitimate use of public resources (known as “institutional publicity”) during campaigns, unless an emergency justifies the use of governmen-tal publicity or promotional activity.

To address this issue, Argentina’s elector-al code was amended in 2002 to state that “during the campaign period, publicity of government activity shall not include any element that directly promotes or fosters the vote for any of the candidates nomi-nated for national elective positions” (Na-tional Electoral Code of Argentina, art. 64 quater).

On the one hand, if such restrictions are too general, they might impede the right and duty of the administration to inform the public about its activities, which—in turn—would hinder freedom of speech and public access to information. On the other hand, a narrow description of the prohibit-ed activity—like the one used by Argentina above—is not useful as a limit because it al-lows almost all publicity except that using the formula “Vote for Candidate X.”

2. Activities intended to recruit voters (proselytism). The delivery of public goods to party clients is one of the most common activities of governments as shadow donors. During campaigns, the government usually increases the number of public meetings,

the distribution of subsidies, the announcement of new initia-tives or the inauguration of pub-lic works. Such activities recruit votes for the official candidates, who often take part in these

publicly funded events and do not register them as campaign expenditures.

In an attempt to limit such activity, Argen-tina’s electoral code bans, during the last week before the election, “the inaugura-tion of public works, the announcement of plans or programs and all acts of the Ad-ministration that might promote the vote for any of the candidates to national elec-tive positions” (National Electoral Code of Argentina, art. 64 quater). However, in spite of these legal restrictions, during the 2005 congressional campaign, there were many claims of such vote-recruitment activities both on the part of President Kirchner and other highly ranked members of the admin-istration. In particular, there were several complaints of activities that favored the can-didacy of Mrs. Kirchner for the Senate.

During campaigns, the government usually increases the number of public

meetings, the distribution of subsidies or the announcement of new initiatives.

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3. Unfair management of public campaign funds. In most countries where campaigns are publicly funded, an independent agen-cy is placed in charge of the administration and distribution of these funds, and this agency enforces the law equally for all can-didates and political parties. In some coun-tries, the government is in charge of the distribution of these public resources, and in such cases, it can use this power to ben-efit official candidates to the detriment of competing candidates.

For example, in Argentina, the home sec-retary (minister of the interior) distributes the public campaign funds by depositing the correct amount in the bank account of each party. However, though the rules determine how and when the deposits are to be made, sometimes opposition party deposits are delayed or accidentally placed in the wrong account. Curiously, the offi-cial party and its allies never face similar problems.

4. Purchase of campaign items with public resources. Unless there are specific restric-tions, governments often use public re-sources to pay for opinion polls, political marketing advice, transportation services or communications. Sometimes they even use public employees in party-oriented cam-paign activities. Despite the fact that these are in-kind donations, official candidates usually do not register such expenditures as campaign expenses.

In Argentina, there are no specific restric-tions on this kind of use of public resourc-es, which is contrary to the most elementary principles of public resource management. During the 2005 congressional campaign, the opposition parties severely criticized Kirchner’s ad-ministration for its use of presi-dential airplanes and helicopters as transportation to campaign events. The government respond-ed that it had acted to safeguard the president and his wife (who was a Senate candidate). Com-plaints were also raised over of-ficial candidates’ use of public employees (press aides, photog-raphers, speakers, administrative personnel, etc.) in the course of their campaign activities.

According to a report by the NGO Poder Ciudadano, the cam-paign balance sheets of the Fr-ente para la Victoria (President Kirchner’s political party) show debts to publicity companies for nearly US$400,000. Not surpris-ingly, these companies are state

contractors. As the party has not reported how the debts will be paid, it is suspected it will be done through governmental con-tracts and other deals.

5. Use of discretionary or secret resources. The use of public funds for the campaigns of government party candidates is propor-tional to the size of any discretionary or se-cret resources that the government can use without accounting for them. In Argentina, there is a broad margin for governmental discretion in the use of public resources, including the so called fondos reservados (used at the president’s discretion), which can easily be devoted to campaign purposes without leaving tracks.

Preventing Government Shadow Donations

To prevent the government from playing a role as a shadow campaign donor, it is nec-essary to employ a strategy that combines:

• reducing/eliminating discretionary or secret resources;

• specifying the activities the govern-ment cannot undertake during the campaign period;

• creating efficient control mecha-nisms that have the power to halt any illegitimate campaign activity under-taken by the government;

• disclosing fully the use of public re-sources during the campaign period; and

• making citizens aware of the impor-tance of distinguishing between the government and the official political party.

The use of public resources to favor some candidates or political parties cannot be avoided just by passing rules, regardless of how strict they are. In addition, it is necessary to create an independent body that has sufficient power and resources to detect any illegitimate activity of the gov-ernment as a shadow campaign donor in a timely manner. If infractions are noted, the body should apply appropriate penal-ties, though in most cases such penalties would not be levied until after the elec-tion. Since this is too late to redress any unbalancing of the playing field, proce-dures should be established that allow the restoration of the neutrality of govern-ment as administrator of public resources within the campaign period. Campaign fi-nance monitoring by NGOs can also help to detect abuse of public resources and to create significant pressure on regimes to limit this form of illegal funding.

Delia Ferreira Rubio is a professor of government and comparative politics at UCEMA University in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

References

Poder Ciudadano, www.poderciudadano.org

Articles in La Nación (newspaper) that ran September 6-11, 2005 and April 16, 2006. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar.

Lanata, J. “Kuánto nos Kuesta la Kampaña,” Perfil (newspaper), September 25, 2005.

Ferreira Rubio, D. “El control del financiamiento de los partidos políticos en Argentina. ¿Qué cambió con la nueva ley.” Serie Documentos de Trabajo N° 292 (2005). Available at www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/.

THINKING OUT LOUD

In this cartoon, which ran in La Nación on Sept. 9, 2005, President Kirchner fuels his wife’s car from a gas pump carrying the official symbol of the Argentinian state. Cristina Fernández, the president’s wife, ran successfully for a Senate seat in the 2005 elections.

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Political Finance Reform in Post-Conflict Environments

by Jeffrey Carlson, Bob Dahl & Marcin Walecki

Establishing good political finance practices is particularly challenging during transition from

war to peace, but such practices can help build a sense of fair play, which itself can help

consolidate peace.

T he problem of political finance is quite distinctive in states so severely disrupted by conflict that their domestic institutions

have collapsed. In such post-conflict states, political finance problems are often relat-ed to funding from undesirable sources, electoral violence and unequal participa-tion (which can reduce electoral competi-tion and may lead to one-party or populist government). Such a situation demands a clear set of rules and strict control over political funds, with special attention to controlling fraud and corruption; promot-ing healthy political parties; and ensuring openness and transparency.

Including political finance regulation within the legal framework for a post-conflict political process may seem like a luxury, but it is not. Rather, post-conflict elections are precisely where disparities in resources and lack of transparency in funding are most damaging to politi-cal competition among electoral partici-pants. Post-conflict elections set the tone for a country’s democratic development, and bad habits are hard to break. Politi-cal finance regulations and transparency requirements should be an accepted part of the new democratic system in post-con-flict societies, and post-conflict elections often present an opportunity for intro-ducing these important values.

IFES recently commissioned a set of case studies to identify steps that can be taken in post-conflict societies to ameliorate political finance disparities while laying the foundation for more far-reaching democratic reforms in the future. The case studies sought answers to the follow-ing question: for purposes of advancing democracy and building peace—and dis-

couraging violence, intimidation or the influence of political funding from unde-sirable sources—what are the fundamen-tal steps or minimum requirements for creating a viable political finance system in post-conflict societies?

Societies such as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Her-zegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia and Mozambique faced significant and unique challenges presented by recent legacies of violence and, in most cases, authoritarian or one-party rule. These cases show that, in ad-dition to the challenges specific to post-conflict environments, typical problems confronted by all democracies in regulat-ing political finance—particularly enforce-ment—are more clearly exposed in post-conflict situations.

Not surprisingly, these cases do not offer many success stories if we apply standards used in established democracies. But they do suggest a set of fundamental steps nec-essary for creating a viable political finance system in post-conflict societies.

Eleven Fundamental Steps1. Map the movement of money. Gather and assess information about direct and indirect financial flows among political and business elites, international investors, international aid programs, neighboring regimes, diaspora groups and organized crime/terrorist networks. Information should also be gathered about assets held inside/outside of the country by political parties or by individuals that formerly con-trolled that country’s regime. Such infor-mation should be collected during the con-flict so that the international community is prepared for the post-conflict situation.

Whatever in-formation ex-ists will most likely be only the tip of the iceberg. Yet even imper-f e c t i n f o r -mation wil l enhance the international community’s ability to un-derstand the under l y ing features of the conflict, relations among stakeholders (including their financial in-terests) and challenges to democratizing a post-conflict society. This information should be analyzed and made available pri-or to the negotiation of a peace agreement and post-conflict political framework.

2. Make political finance a priority. De-fine the role of a political finance system in elections early in the post-conflict plan-ning. Recognizing that every context is unique, serious consideration should be given to including three fundamental pro-visions in any peace agreement.

• Make a commitment to transparency and accountability: Sample language: “the parties agree that transparent and accountable funding of the political process should be secured.”

• Identify the actors responsible for draft-ing political finance regulations: Such actors could include a transitional authority, election management body, political finance regulator, in-ternational actors, etc. Sample lan-guage: “the parties agree that regu-lations for securing transparent and

Political finance in Post-conflict societies (which includes all case studies) i s a va i l a b l e a t www.moneyandpo l i t i c s . ne t or www.ifes.org.

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accountable funding of the political process should be drafted by [name of body].”

• Identify the political finance regulator (PFR): The PFR should have suf-ficient independence, impartiality and operational integrity. Such a PFR could be a stand-alone entity or exist as a department within an existing independent election management body. Sample language: “the parties agree that an impartial, indepen-dent body with operational integrity should be established to regulate the funding of the political process.”

3. Educate all stakeholders. Inform all po-litical groups, the media, civil society and the general public about the elements of the political finance system and about standards and principles that apply to democratic political processes.

4. Establish control of state assets. When appropriate and possible, seize the assets of political parties or individuals that for-merly controlled a country’s illegitimate regime and systematically abused state re-sources. These resources should then be returned to public control. There should be wide participation of all major politi-cal players in controlling these assets and, where there is international supervision, the international community should have veto power as to how those resources are utilized for public purposes.

5. Establish open dialogue. During the development of the basic framework for elections and political processes, engage political entities, the media, civil society and the general public in an open dia-logue about the nature and need for a political finance system. Efforts should be made to establish a consensus concerning basic political finance standards within the post-conflict society.

6. Create a fair system. Introduce a po-litical finance system that is clear, realistic, transparent and fair. Achieving this goal requires: (1) drafting key regulations and procedures that take into account inter-national experience; (2) initiating the de-velopment of a nonpartisan, independent institution that is responsible for enforc-ing political finance regulations; and (3) providing that institution with sufficient authority, training and resources to per-form detection and enforcement responsi-bilities effectively.

7. Give party subsidies. Provide political parties with limited direct and/or in-kind subsidies, which can both galvanize their development and create critical incentives

to ensure that they comply with reporting requirements. Subsidies may also be con-sidered to ensure participation by major players in the process. As for in-kind sub-sidies, the international community can help provide needed resources. It could help provide political party resource cen-ters (which have shown success), or it might help establish print and broadcast media (through grants and other means), which could provide all political groups with valuable media coverage.

8. Monitor the system. Encourage the me-dia, civil society and the international com-munity to monitor the political finance sys-tem. Such activity can be promoted by: (1) providing grants to local CSOs for moni-toring political finance during the elec-tion cycle; (2) providing training to inves-tigative journalists in political finance and in how to cover the issues in a comprehen-sive, balanced manner; and (3) incorporat-ing campaign finance monitoring into the overall long- and short-term international election observation efforts. In addition, efforts should be made to guarantee the security of civil society actors and journal-ists performing monitoring roles.

9. Enforce the law. Within the constraints set by the post-conflict environment, doc-umenting and penalizing violations of the law is critical to providing incentives for compliance. (Such actions also allow evaluation, and appropriate modification, of the political finance system.) The inter-national community can assist the political finance regulator to conduct audits and

document possible cases of abuse, and this effort should be linked with the monitor-ing of the political finance system.

Any plans to penalize violators of the law should emphasize dialogue and conflict resolution and should take into account the limited resources of the enforcement body. Cost-effective innovations from es-tablished democracies—such as alterna-tive dispute resolution and administrative fine programs—should be considered. Before the election campaign, prosecu-tion of violations should occur only for those cases that can undermine the cred-ibility of the process (as not all cases can be prosecuted). Investigations leading to sanctions should be undertaken for the most serious cases based on a clear priori-tization system.

10. Evaluate system efficacy. Evaluating the effectiveness of the political finance system during the first election cycle is cru-cial for later modification of the system. It also helps planning for the second genera-tion of regulations—for example, subsidies designed to support political party devel-opment and parliamentary groups, more sophisticated reporting requirements, higher detection standards, enhanced en-forcement mechanisms and sanctions, and possibly expenditure and/or contribution limits. The evaluation effort should rely on (1) documented alleged abuses (whether investigated or not) collected by the in-ternational community and the political finance regulator; and (2) an analysis of monitoring reports and news articles.

Investigative journalists who have received training in how to cover political finance stories can help monitor the compliance of politicians with political finance regulations. Below, journalists in Montenegro receive training in reporting (OSCE/Radka Betcheva).

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11. Facilitate local ownership. Support the transfer of ownership of the political finance system to local authorities. All of the actions taken by the international com-munity should aim at establishing strong national ownership of any political finance system. The challenge for post-conflict so-cieties with international supervision will be this transfer of ownership to local au-thorities. Without such a transition, even the best systems created by international agencies could be lost.

A Few CaveatsWhile the cases examined suggested these fundamental steps towards a viable po-litical finance system in post-conflict elec-tions, they also raised several caveats. First, a key lesson learned is that there are no iron-clad rules for the design of politi-cal finance systems in post-conflict situa-tions. The proper approach in a specific circumstance will depend on the level of international involvement, the political sophistication of local partners and the timing of elections (among other things). Furthermore, widely accepted internation-al standards and best practices will have to be redefined to reflect the political reality of the post-conflict situation. The interna-tional community should not assume that political actors in post-conflict situations will immediately accept its rules of the game and fund their activities in a trans-parent and accountable manner.

Second, the lessons from these cases sug-gest that situation analysis should be con-ducted concurrently with peace nego-tiations (where applicable). In successful cases, like El Salvador and Mozambique, detailed political finance arrangements were made at that stage. However, such ne-gotiations may only involve the armed fac-tions, and it is difficult to ensure the par-ticipation of civilian parties whose involve-ment will be necessary in the long road to democratization.

Third, the cases also show that it is gener-ally impossible to achieve an optimum re-sult in which all participants benefit from financial arrangements for the first post-conflict election. The political system can be improved over time if all relevant elec-toral participants are included in the revi-sions to political finance policies. Howev-er, international standards of fairness can only be achieved over time as the political finance system evolves.

Fourth, proper timing is crucial, particu-larly where conflict has devastated a coun-try and where the political, social and eco-nomic conditions are underdeveloped and

unstable. Given the usually large expendi-tures sustained by the international com-munity in post-conflict societies, there is pressure to conduct elections as quickly as possible as part of an exit strategy. The de-sire to hold quick elections is understand-able, both on the part of the international community as well as the local electorate. However, some post-conflict elections have failed specifically because they were held before conditions were “ripe” for real po-litical competition. In addition, setting up a political finance system usually requires more time than other aspects of electoral administration and can be a casualty of a compressed schedule. Thus, taking the time needed to lay the groundwork for a fair system is critical to success.

Despite these caveats, the cases examined suggest that a political finance system can advance democracy and peace-building efforts in post-conflict societies. They also suggest that a good system—if it promotes political participation, supports competi-tion and encourages respect for the rule of law—can discourage electoral violence and intimidation. However, the 11 steps outlined above are achievable only if there is sufficient political will within the inter-national community and the post-conflict society itself.

Enforcement and International FundingAs is true in political finance systems ev-erywhere, the effectiveness of the core structure will depend on the “teeth” giv-en to enforcement mechanisms. In our case studies, it is evident that the enforce-ment of political finance rules is the most challenging issue. (After all, it is difficult even in societies with an uninterrupted rule-of-law tradition.) Establishing rules that cannot be enforced does not make sense, no matter how appealing they might look on paper. If they cannot be enforced, they run the risk of discredit-ing the political finance system and the entire election process.

The enforcement challenge will likely re-quire an investment in strengthening po-lice, prosecutors, court operations and financial auditing capacity. This outcome can best be achieved through an inten-sive focus on short-term, election-specific mechanisms for enforcement of all elec-toral rules, including those involving po-litical finance regulation and financial ac-countability. Ultimately, before it can oper-ate at all, a political finance system needs sufficient integration and heft to break past the obvious obstacles of post-conflict societies and achieve a “critical mass” of

legitimacy and effectiveness. The obvious (if perhaps too convenient) solution is for international donors that generally admin-ister such elections to include the political finance element as a key funding priority.

A political finance system that starts off re-lying on international funding can eventu-ally be weaned off the subsidies and also become less reliant on special enforcement mechanisms. Once the atmosphere of vio-lence and intimidation that accompanies the transition from conflict dissipates, fair competition in the political process can be achieved through regulations, reporting of private funding and conventional means of enforcement. However, the extraordi-nary circumstances of post-conflict situa-tions will require extraordinary solutions in order to advance democracy and peace-building efforts and discourage political violence and intimidation.

ConclusionExamining one critical and often over-looked aspect of post-conflict reconciliation and democratization, Political Finance in Post-Conflict Societies (including all case studies) should be viewed as a first step designed to provide guidance to the international com-munity and in-country actors seeking to end violent conflict in a meaningful and lasting way. However, our case studies raise as many questions as they answer, and these issues should be addressed in future work.

For example, issues critical to the success of interventions that provide incentives for compliance (such as subsidies to political parties and parliamentary groups) need to be examined in greater detail. They should not be created as ad hoc arrange-ments designed to be implemented solely under international supervision. Rather, institutional choices—such as the creation of a political finance regulator and intro-duction of public subsidies—will require careful planning and implementation if they are going to be transferred to nation-al ownership in a sustainable manner.

However, immediate steps are required to establish an effective political finance system in countries ranging from Afghani-stan and Iraq to Liberia and Haiti. While the variety of situations explored in our case studies reveals the unique challenges of each post-conflict society, interventions that have demonstrated success in other societies can be tailored and applied to post-conflict environments.

Jeffrey Carlson is a senior program specialist at IFES, Bob Dahl is an elections expert and Marcin Walecki is a senior political finance advisor at IFES.

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Laying the Foundation for Good Governance in Liberia

by Susan Palmer

A solid legal framework and strong political will allowed Liberia to achieve significant

successes in regulating campaign finance in its recent elections.

L iberia’s successful 2005 elections demonstrated that even in devas-tated, post-conflict environments the will exists to tackle political

finance issues early in a nation’s struggle for peace and democratization. The need clearly exists because post-conflict nations, with their collapsed institutions, are most vulnerable to the corrupting influences of money in politics. Liberia’s 2003 peace agreement, which ended five years of civil war, established a transitional government and called for elections by October 2005. Presidential and legislative elections were held on October 11, 2005. In the lead-up to these elections, Liberians’ concerns about money in politics included the con-tinuing influence of ousted leader Charles Taylor, the problem of vote buying and the use of state resources in electioneering.

Remembering the experience of the 1997 elections, which brought Charles Taylor to power, Liberians advocated for a level play-ing field that could diminish the threat of continued war. They established rules that restricted the use of money in campaigns and encouraged financial transparency, thereby promoting the credibility of the 2005 electoral process and enabling vot-ers to make more informed choices at the ballot box. By establishing a campaign finance reporting regime for the 2005 elections, Liberians—in particular the Na-tional Elections Commission (NEC) and civil society groups—sought to enhance the transparency of their elections and to assist in the fight against corruption, en-couraging good governance and econom-ic development in the longer term. Three factors—the existing legal framework, the commitment of the NEC and the political will of key stakeholders—enabled Libe-rians to build a solid framework for regu-

lating campaign finance in the 2005 elec-tions, even during a fragile and challeng-ing post-conflict period.

Legal FrameworkThe 1986 constitution and election law laid the foundation for Liberia’s campaign finance reporting regime. Between them, these two documents (1) require political parties and candidates to report sources of funding and campaign expenditures to the NEC before and after the elections; (2) limit the amount of money each candidate can spend on campaigns; (3) give the elec-tions commission the power to order cer-tified audits of the financial transactions of political parties and candidates; (4) ban corporations and labor unions from contributing to political parties and candi-dates; (5) prohibit political contributions from outside the country, unless from Li-berians residing abroad; and (6) make bribery in elections an illegal offense.

Until the 2005 elections, there were no mechanisms in place to implement these campaign finance provisions and, hence, there was no compliance with the law. It was only under the NEC, established in 2004, that serious discussions on campaign finance in Liberia were held among politi-cal stakeholders. As an outcome of these discussions, the NEC issued the Campaign Finance Regulations in July 2005, which enabled it to implement the existing law and gave the political parties and candi-dates specific guidance on financial report-ing requirements, including deadlines, reporting periods, details to be reported and reporting forms. The Campaign Fi-nance Regulations also specified both the penalties for non-compliance and which infractions could be referred to the Min-

istry of Justice for investigation. Including all of the various supporting guidelines, procedural manuals and reporting forms, Liberia’s legal, regulatory and procedural framework is among the most compre-hensive in all of Africa. The actions of the NEC in 2005 marked the first time that the campaign finance provisions of the 1986 constitution were implemented in Liberia.

Commitment of the NECOf course, Liberia’s regulatory framework would not have existed without the work of the NEC, which has the responsibility of promulgating rules and guidelines for the administration of elections. Unlike previ-ous commissions, the NEC of 2004-2005—and now the current Elections Commis-sion (ECOM), named in early 2006 by the new government—has shown a serious and continued commitment to implementing the constitution and increasing the trans-parency of political funding.

At the policy level, the chair and the com-missioners of the NEC were instrumental in eliciting support for its campaign fi-nance initiatives from Liberia’s political actors and civil society. Beginning in early 2005, they held workshops with political parties to discuss campaign finance. Later, the NEC established the Inter-Party Con-sultative Committee, a forum for regular consultations between the commission and the parties on all aspects of the electoral process. The NEC’s campaign finance ef-forts were not welcomed by all political ac-tors. While some larger, more established and better financed political parties saw the financial reporting requirements as at-tempts to control their operations, some smaller parties were concerned about their capacity to comply. However, at one

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of the consultative meetings at which party objections were voiced, NEC Chair Fran-ces Johnson-Morris seemed to help turn the tide of the discussion by stating: “We have perhaps gotten into this mess [the civil war] by not respecting the constitu-tion. We need a new Liberia in which we will respect the constitution.” Following that meeting, the political parties agreed to form a working group to study the draft campaign finance regulations and provide feedback to the NEC. Ultimately, the polit-ical parties accepted the final regulations.

Of the many initiatives undertaken by the NEC to regulate campaign financing, one of the most critical was the require-ment that all aspiring candidates disclose their assets and liabilities in order to be eligible to run. Of the 762 candidates who contested the elections for president, vice-president and seats in the legislature, all disclosed their assets and liabilities to the NEC, as required by the constitution. In turn, and according to its Campaign Fi-nance Regulations, the NEC made these disclosures public on its website, among other places. As a result, information on all 94 winning candidates—as well as on the unsuccessful candidates, some of whom have since been appointed senior officials in government—is available for scrutiny. As one Liberian civic activist and campaign finance monitor noted, “Now we can see who goes into government with one small house and comes out with five mansions.”

Enforcing candidates’ disclosure of as-sets and liabilities was only one NEC ac-tion designed to increase the transpar-ency of political funding. NEC staff also trained political parties and candi-dates in the can-didate nomina-tion process and the campaign fi-nance reporting requirements. Its two-person Audit Sec-tion—in addition to its auditing duties—reviewed all reports submitted by politi-cal parties and candidates and prepared the financial summaries and the candi-date financial disclosure forms for pub-lication in newspapers and online. The NEC’s Legal Section, Audit Section and the Department of External Relations were crucial in developing and imple-menting the campaign finance regime, each playing their appropriate role. As the daily liaison between parties/candi-dates and the NEC, External Relations was particularly effective in encourag-ing compliance. In conducting these ac-tivities, the NEC was supported by IFES,

with funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

While international support for the NEC’s efforts to promote transparency of cam-paign finance was important, it was in no way the driving force for these initia-tives—particularly as the NEC was not the only actor in Liberia concerned about the influence of money in these important post-war elections. As early as 2004, when

the NEC began its first stakeholder consul-tations to prepare for the 2005 elections, political parties (established and new), the media and civil society all expressed con-cern about elected offices being for sale and about the use of state resources in campaigning.

Political Will of Key StakeholdersWhile some political parties were hesitant to see the establishment of a campaign fi-nance reporting regime, for the most part, political actors did want increased trans-parency in campaign finance. Some were concerned about the potential influence

of former President Charles Taylor, who was rumored to be looking to control the elections from Nigeria, where he was living at the time. Others were concerned about the influence of local/foreign businesses or vote buying on election outcomes. Fi-nally, there was an overwhelming feeling that everyone needed to work toward a “new Liberia.” Many were tired of war and felt that this election marked Liberia’s last chance to move toward normalcy. This at-

titude prevailed throughout the elections, which were the most credible and partici-patory in the country’s history.

Liberia’s civil society organizations led the charge to support transparent elec-tions. With the media, they urged people to “vote wisely” in an attempt to counter the common practice of voting for “rice not rights”—meaning that bags of rice proffered by candidates do more to gar-ner votes than a reasoned and relevant platform. In addition to conducting voter education campaigns, civil society groups advocated for campaign finance reform, supported the NEC’s development of reg-ulations and pushed political parties/can-

“Now we can see who goes into government with

one small house and comes out with five mansions.”

The NEC and IFES conducted several training sessions in Monrovia in 2005 to educate the political parties about campaign finance regulations (IFES/Susan Palmer).

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didates to abide by the law. For the first time, civil society organizations and the media worked to expose campaign finance violations and inform the public (as well as the candidates) of the reporting require-ments and the prohibition of certain types of spending. For example, the Campaign Monitoring Coalition (CMC), an alliance of several Liberian civil society organiza-tions, issued reports that documented acts of vote buying and the misuse of state re-sources and tracked campaign spending. CMC’s reports were covered by the Libe-rian media, which also conducted some in-dependent investigations of the campaign practices of the parties and candidates.

Liberia’s SuccessesBy building on its existing legal framework, and led by the commitment of the NEC and enhanced political will, Liberians were able to develop a clear and comprehensive campaign finance regime. They established a coalition of agents of change—the NEC, political parties, civil society organizations and the media—interested in working for more transparent campaign finance, and they encouraged the monitoring of cam-paign finance issues by civil society and the media. As a result, 100 percent of can-didates disclosed assets and liabilities, 100 percent of successful candidates submitted pre- and post-election campaign finance reports and 100 percent of the submitted disclosure forms were made public by the NEC. In addition, more than 50 percent of the political parties submitted annual finan-cial reports.

These are significant achievements, but of course there is also room for improvement. Among unsuccessful candidates, the dis-

closure rates were less impressive, with 35 percent submitting pre-election campaign finance reports and only 23 percent submit-ting post-election reports. Disclosure also needs to increase among the political par-ties. However, overall, Liberia’s campaign finance system performed well in the coun-try’s first post-conflict elections, and the de-cision to make disclosure a requirement for candidate nomination likely enabled such complete disclosure. Most importantly, Li-berians have begun to build a solid regula-tory framework for future elections.

Next Steps for LiberiaOn January 16, 2006, the country’s new government took office, led by Africa’s first female president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. In her inaugural speech, President Johnson-Sirleaf committed her government to the fight against corruption:

The first testament of how my Admin-istration will tackle public service cor-ruption will be that everyone appoint-ed to high positions of public trust, such as the Cabinet and heads of pub-lic corporations, will be required to declare their assets. I will be the first to comply, and I call upon the Honor-able Speaker and the President Pro-Temp to say that they comply.

President Johnson-Sirleaf’s resolve to limit the unfair influence of money in politics bodes well for Liberia’s continued com-mitment to improve its campaign finance system. For the system to become a re-spected and institutionalized component of the electoral and governance processes, Liberians must address the following four challenges.

Legal framework. Reports of wide-spread vote buying during the 2005 elec-tions have led some to call for clearer definition of this act in the election law and campaign finance regulations. Now that the framework has been tested in practice, it should be reviewed for other ways to facilitate the implementation of its provisions.

Enforcement. Some political parties and candidates failed to comply with the campaign finance reporting require-ments, and some flaunted other aspects of the regulations, particularly those ban-ning the use of state resources in the con-duct of political activities. For the cam-paign finance regulations to have “teeth,” enforcement will need to be strengthened through closer cooperation between the NEC and the Ministry of Justice.

Civic education. Vote buying and the use of illegal funds in political campaigns will continue in Liberia if the public is not better informed about the negative impact that these actions have on Libe-ria’s democracy. Civic education cam-paigns with strong anti-corruption mes-sages need to make clear the ways that practices like vote buying or undisclosed contributions from businesses keep citi-zens focused on special interests rather than on the common good. Political par-ties need to make their voices heard in this campaign as well.

Anti-corruption initiatives. Campaign finance reform needs to be linked to a general anti-corruption strategy for Libe-ria. During the 2005 elections, the abuse of state resources by political contestants was shown to be a significant problem. Control of state resources needs to be addressed in conjunction with a comprehensive nation-al strategy to combat corruption.

Given Liberia’s history of conflict, lack of democratic governance and general im-poverishment, these challenges are not surprising, and Liberia faces similar chal-lenges related to capacity building, edu-cation and empowerment in other areas. However, the successes that Liberia was able to achieve in campaign finance show that combating corruption and develop-ing a strong system of good governance is possible. In its achievements, Liberia can serve as an example not only to other post-conflict nations but also to develop-ing democracies, many of which have not tackled the issue of campaign finance with such commitment and concern.

Susan Palmer is a senior advisor at IFES.

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia’s current president, receives her candidate nomination credentials in Monrovia in 2005 (IFES/Susan Palmer).

29 ElEctionAdministrAtors: BuildingskillsAndcrEdiBility byBelindaMusanhu

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Vol. 14, No. 2 – 2006

election calendaR

pResidentialYemen – September 20, 2006The Gambia – September 24, 2006Bosnia and Herzegovina – October 1, 2006Brazil (1st Round) – October 1, 2006Ecuador (1st Round) – October 15, 2006Brazil (2nd Round) – October 29, 2006DR Congo (2nd Round) – October 29, 2006Côte d’Ivoire – October 31, 2006Nicaragua – November 5, 2006Ecuador (2nd Round) – November 26, 2006Madagascar – December 3, 2006Venezuela – December 3, 2006

paRliamentaRy/legislativeGuyana – August 28, 2006Montenegro – September 10, 2006Sweden – September 17, 2006Austria – October 1, 2006Bosnia and Herzegovina – October 1, 2006Brazil – October 1, 2006Latvia – October 7, 2006Thailand – October 15, 2006Ecuador – October 15, 2006Côte d’Ivoire – October 31, 2006Nicaragua – November 5, 2006United States – November 7, 2006Mauritania – November 19, 2006Netherlands – November 22, 2006

RefeRendumsPanama – October 22, 2006

Launched in 1998, ACE (Administration and Cost of Elections) has proven to be an invaluable resource to election administrators seeking information about best practices and electoral solutions applicable to

their specific environments. Using case studies, articles and sample materials, the well-structured and vibrant ACE Project covers the entire election process and strives to build the business of elections and election management into a credible and professional platform.

New Challenges for Election ManagersDespite the significant expertise needed to conduct successful elections, the field of election administration is still not regarded as a profession in many quarters. Yet, it is a technically and politically demanding enterprise, requir-ing sound management and specialized skills. The outcome of an election can literally become a life-or-death issue. There are many instances where lives have been lost in the outcry that follows a contested electoral process when candi-dates or parties refuse to accept the election results.

Given these stakes, election administrators are on the firing line. Electoral management bodies (EMBs) are increasingly expected to conduct elections that are credible and acceptable to all stakeholders. To achieve these goals, EMBs must ensure that elections are not only technically sound but also po-litically acceptable and legitimate. As a result, there is little room for errors that may call into question the integrity of the electoral process.

A further challenge for EMBs is that a negative public perception of elections often leads to a rise in voter apathy, which impacts EMBs’ ability to deliver a credible and transparent election. This responsibility of EMBs is huge, and the pressure is compounded by the fact that there are few resources that election managers can access to improve their performance and ensure that elections meet the high expectations. However, ACE has now provided an interactive so-lution for EMBs worldwide in search of electoral knowledge and experience.

Election Administrators:Building Skills and Credibility

by Belinda Musanhu

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The ACE Electoral Knowledge NetworkThe ACE project, recently re-launched as the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (www.aceproject.org), seeks to address EMBs’ emerging challenges by facilitating information sharing, peer review, peer support and peer learning, particularly be-tween election administrators who face the same challenges in different locations. The Electoral Knowledge Network has three components: (1) Knowledge Services, (2) the Practitioners’ Network and (3) Capacity Development. Knowledge Services features dynamic information services covering ACE’s themes as well as sample materials, case studies and articles. The Practitio-ners’ Network is an online network of election practitioners and is hosted on the Electoral Advice section of the ACE website.

The third component—Capacity Development—aims to en-hance election management by building key competencies in election management bodies. Through this component, ACE will test methodologies of technical advisory services and train-ing and will promote peer partnerships for information sharing and improved performance.

ACE’s Capacity Development component includes the fol-lowing elements:

• Long-term capacity development projects, which help EMBs reach higher levels of professionalism through institution-building;

• Regional training programs to strengthen the professional capacity of EMB staff;

• Targeted assistance activities that help EMBs develop or strengthen policies and legislation frameworks; and

• Capacity development tools and formal educational programs on electoral administration based on the ACE texts and leading to formal certificates/diplomas awarded by academic institutions.

This component will be implemented as a pilot over three years in the 14 member countries of the Southern African Develop-ment Community (SADC). The pilot will be spearheaded by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. EISA was selected to lead the pilot because of its location, experience working in the SADC region and partnerships with SADC EMBs over the past 10 years.

The Southern African Development CommunityThe southern Africa region was selected for the pilot for a num-ber of reasons, including its recent experience of democratiza-tion and its varying levels of political development. In all the countries in the region, elections are regarded as the first step towards a democratic system of government, and compromised elections are considered a serious problem because they can cast doubt on governance structures as a whole.

In addition, election practitioners in the region have shown an interest in and commitment to the professionalization of election administration through the establishment of several interregional election bodies, such as the Electoral Commis-sions Forum of SADC Countries (SADC-ECF), a grouping of all national EMBs in the region, and the SADC Election Support

Network (SADC-ESN), a grouping of civil society organizations established in 1997.

Enhancing Election Management CapacityACE’s third component seeks to build the capacity of the bodies managing elections by improving the capacity of election staff. Several countries in the SADC region have very good election administrators, though the plans of these administrators are of-ten compromised by political decision-makers, who can hamper their ability to organize credible elections. Component Three will therefore provide practitioners with the opportunity to share not only their skills but also their experiences in negotiating the po-litical demands that emerge during an election cycle.

There are several vital elements of election management where SADC countries have recorded remarkable successes and others where SADC countries face great challenges. This latter group includes civic/voter education, voter registration, vote counting, the use of technology (particularly information and communica-tion technology) in elections and stakeholder management.

ACE’s capacity development pilot will test a range of approach-es and methodologies to developing the capacity of EMBs to manage these processes. For example, the ACE project will:

• Offer assistance, knowledge and expertise to the regional training center currently being developed by regional EMBs;

• Use the BRIDGE1 course to train personnel from regional EMBs;

• Promote staff exchange, staff placement and peer review to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, practical experi-ence and skills across EMBs;

• Encourage EMBs to conduct an election audit and evalu-ation after every election; and

• Work with universities and other tertiary institutions to develop courses and degree programs in election man-agement topics (see next article).

The Benefit to Election AdministratorsACE’s capacity development work will greatly benefit election practitioners and election administrators as it gives them access to people with experience in responding to the practical challenges of election management, a task often fraught with political risks.

Further codification of the best practices in the field and fur-ther training in elections for EMB staff will increase public respect for election administration as a profession. It will also give election managers the opportunity for “career pathing” (or identifying how to reach their career goals). This, in turn, will increase staff loyalty to their work and reduce the high turnover rate within election management bodies, which often struggle to retain experienced staff from one election to the next. Thus, election administrators will have a more reliable pool of human resources to draw from, and EMBs can develop a longer and more reliable institutional memory.

Professionalization of election administration will also enhance the autonomy of EMBs, making them less susceptible to political manipulation. EMBs are often under pressure from an incum-

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bent government, and their independence can be compromised. Through ACE’s capacity development pilot, EMBs’ ability to with-stand political pressure from political parties (or other stakehold-ers) will be enhanced, leading to increased credibility.

Following the pilot, capacity development methodologies that have proven to be successful will be exported to other regions of the world and will be spearheaded by the ACE Regional Re-source Centers.

The Role of Donors in Capacity DevelopmentMany developing countries moving towards democracy or consolidating democracy often rely heavily on external fund-ing for their elections. Thus, donor agencies have a stake in ensuring that such resources are used well and not wasted by inadvertent administrative errors or mistakes made by poorly trained voting station staff. The support of the donors for ACE’s capacity development work will be essential, particu-larly at this early stage, when most governments emphasize the creation of the ballot paper more than staff training. In-vesting in capacity building of EMBs contributes to the goals of election funders as such investment will reduce the misuse of funds and enhance cost-effective elections. When elec-tions are conducted cost effectively, they will be more afford-able for home governments, which will reduce the financial burden on external donors.

Belinda Musanhu is senior programme officer for elections and political processes at EISA.

Notes1 BRIDGE is a training programme developed by the International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Australian Electoral Com-mission. The curriculum covers electoral administration.

The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is a joint effort of:

Elections Canada: a nonpartisan organization responsible for the conduct of federal elections, by-elections and referendums. The organization’s primary goal is to give all Canadian citizens the op-portunity to participate in transparent and impartial elections and referendums.

Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA): a nonprofit com-pany based in Johannesburg, South Africa, that promotes credible elections and democratic governance in Africa through research, capacity building, advocacy and other targeted interventions.

Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico (IFE): a public, independent institution responsible for organizing and conducting federal elec-tions in Mexico, ensuring the authenticity and effectiveness of the vote, strengthening the political parties regime and contributing to the development of democratic life.

IFES: an international, nongovernmental organization that sup-ports the building of democratic societies. IFES has developed and implemented comprehensive, collaborative democracy solutions in more than 100 countries.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA): an intergovernmental organization that promotes sustainable democracy worldwide.

United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA): a body that organizes UN conferences on global policy issues and serves as the Secretariat to the Economic and Social Council. UN-DESA carries out research and policy analysis on pub-lic administration, population, social development, sustainable de-velopment and environmental issues.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): the United Nations’ global development network, which advocates for change and connects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life.

A Zimbabwean election official gives instructions to vote counters, as ballots sit on a table for verification and vote counting following the 2002 presidential elections. Zimbabwe is a SADC member (AP Photo/Jerome Delay).

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In February 2005, at a signing ceremony held on our campus in association with a meeting of lead writers of ACE resource materials, the University of Calgary became the

first associate member of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. That ceremony was the culmination of discussions held over several years, and the partnership provides an opportunity for ACE partners and the University to work for mutual benefit. This article describes the background of the University’s decision to become an ACE Electoral Knowledge Network associate member, outlines a number of factors that led the University to pursue associate membership and discusses some factors that will lead to a successful partnership.

Writing for the ACE EncyclopaediaThe involvement of the University of Calgary in the Administra-tion and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project began in 1997, when an ACE partner invited me to serve as the lead writer for the Voter Registration materials for the first version of the ACE Encyclopae-dia. Although I had written extensively in my role as a university professor, serving as a lead writer for the ACE Project was a very different experience. For one thing, the material was to be made available electronically rather than in hard copy, a factor which changed the style of writing and altered the amount of materials that could be made available. For example, rather than writing in traditional chapters, the material had to be presented in rela-tively short (1,500 words) self-contained files that could easily be

accessed and read. The format also allowed the insertion of hy-perlinks within the text, so that the files could be interconnected in thematic ways. In addition, the use of electronic text allowed the introduction of sample materials. In the voter registration section, items such as examples of voter registration cards, voter registration forms, voter lists, notices of voter registration proce-dures and voter education materials were included to provide easy reference for ACE users.

Another feature of this project that differed from my academic writing is that much of the information I needed to write resided among the many practitioners who work in national, state/pro-vincial, regional or municipal organizations responsible for con-ducting elections in their jurisdictions. There was a very limited amount of scholarship available on the topic of voter registration, and much of the available information was specific to its author’s locale. Given this fact, the ACE Project aimed to expand the avail-able knowledge about voter registration largely by induction, by beginning with knowledge of local settings and elaborating a more general and comparative context with the introduction of additional cases and models.

Prior to publication online, the materials developed by the lead writers were reviewed and critiqued by experienced practitioners. Many of these reviewers were highly knowledgeable about the vot-er registration process used in their jurisdictions but often had less direct experience with systems elsewhere. Therefore, the review process provided both an initial “reality check” of the materials being produced and also provided an important learning oppor-tunity for the election officials who were serving as reviewers.

Partnering with ACEFrom the time of the initial ACE project launch in the fall of 1998, it was clear that this initiative was responding to a real need in the election administration environment. It offered election administration practitioners around the world a resource that was relatively easy to access and provided useful information without being prescriptive. Shortly after the launch, ACE members began to discuss the idea of transforming ACE from an information re-pository to a more formal educational and accrediting system.

While the idea seemed intriguing, it was not developed very fully until the expansion of the ACE partnership in 2004 to include all seven partners (see previous page). The result was the ACE Elec-toral Knowledge Network, which includes three elements: (1) a knowledge repository, (2) a network for election administration professionals and (3) opportunities for practitioners to develop

The University of Calgary is partnering with the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network to develop continuing education programming for election administrators (University of Calgary).

Professional Development for Election Managers

by Keith Archer

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ACE THEMES

Electoral Systems

Legislative Framework

Electoral Management

Boundary Delimitation

Voter Education

Voter Registration

Voting Operations

Parties and Candidates

Vote Counting

Media and Elections

Election Integrity

Elections and Technology

Direct Democracy

HIV/AIDS

Elections & Disabilities

e-Voting

Cost of Registration in Elections

among universities interested in engaging in this area of professional training will be important.

Quality is the hallmark of university pro-gramming generally, and it is in recognition of universities’ mandate to provide qual-ity educational programming that the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network has sought to engage university partners in delivering on this aspect of its goals. The curriculum must be relevant and timely, and the instructors must bring a combination of practitioner know-how, scholarly objectivity and teach-ing strength. Our ability to recruit partners who bring such qualities to the educational programming will lead to a successful initia-tive.

From the outset, we expect such a profes-sional development/accreditation program in election administration to enroll both participants from countries with extensive electoral experience and others from coun-tries with less experience. We also expect that some participants will come from insti-

tutions with little capacity to pay for the professional development of their senior staff. Therefore, sources of funding must be se-cured to ensure that, when the curriculum is ready, those who are interested will have the ability to actually attend the program.

Lastly, a successful program must respond to the needs of the election administration community. The programming should be intensive and offered in modules of short duration—perhaps in blocks of 7 to 10 days—so that officials can attend while con-tinuing to serve in their positions. It will be styled on an executive development program, in which small groups focus on case study analysis, which enables learning across cultures and across vari-ous electoral design options.

At this stage of the evolution of this program, we do not have all of the answers. But we see in this initiative a number of elements that contribute to our mission and mandate, and real opportuni-ties to serve a professional community. I would be very pleased to hear from readers who share these interests and who may wish to discuss opportunities for partnership.

Keith Archer is a professor of political science at the University of Calgary and director of

research at the Banff Centre in Banff, Alberta, Canada (kaarcher@ucalgary.ca).

their knowledge and receive accreditation. It is on this third element of the ACE Elec-toral Knowledge Network mandate that the University of Calgary has focused.

From the University’s perspective, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network provided a number of important advantages. Like many universities worldwide, the University of Calgary (a relatively large institution with approximately 28,000 full-time students and a full complement of degree offerings, including the PhD) has identified a set of strategic goals that include the desire to in-crease its international presence and grow its international partnerships. The Uni-versity also wants to diversify and expand its student base to enable a greater variety of program offerings, including a greater range of programs called “post-degree con-tinuous learning.” Such initiatives include professional development programs that may provide “laddering credentials” rang-ing from certificates to diplomas to de-grees. The fact that the University sought these institutional changes in academic programming meant that it was more open to developing initia-tives that respond to the needs of professional communities.

The Department of Political Science at the University proposed the development of a training program for professionals in elec-tion administration, tied to the ACE Electoral Knowledge Net-work. It was evident that the proposal met a number of key Uni-versity strategic priorities, and it was endorsed by the University’s senior officials. We are now at the important stage of taking this initiative from idea to reality. Its success will be dependent upon four key factors: partnerships, quality, funding and needs.

Keys to SuccessWhether such a training program is developed at the University of Calgary or elsewhere, its success will be critically affected by the character of the partnerships that are developed. The ACE Elec-toral Knowledge Network partnership brings a number of impor-tant organizations on board, but there is also the need to ensure a diversity of faculty who can offer actual programming. While the University of Calgary has significant strength in areas relat-ing to election studies, no single university department will have the requisite breadth of expertise to cover all themes included in the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. Therefore, partnerships

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ELECTION RESULTS

The Election Calendar (p. 29) and Results are

providedbyIFES’F.CliftonWhiteAppliedResearch

CenterforDemocracy&Elections,whichmaintains

timely,worldwideelectionresultsavailableonlineat

www.ElectionGuide.org.

Colombia

Presidential May 28, 2006 Registered Voters: 26,731,700 May 2006

Votes Cast: 12,041,737 45.05% of registered voters

Valid Votes:* 11,864,410 98.53% of votes cast

Invalid Votes:** 177,327 1.47% of votes cast

Candidate Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes

Álvaro URIBE Vélez Colombia First (Primero Colombia) 7,397,835 62.35%

Carlos GAVIRIA Diaz Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo)

2,613,157 22.03%

Horacio SERPA Uribe Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano)

1,404,235 11.84%

Antanas MOCKUS Šivickas Indigenous Social Alliance Movement (Movimiento Alianza Social Indígena)

146,583 1.24%

Enrique PAREJO González National Democratic Reconstruction Movement (Movimiento Reconstrucción Democrática Nacional)

42,652 0.36%

Álvaro LEYVA Durán*** National Reconciliation Movement (Movimiento Nacional de Reconciliación)

18,263 0.15%

Carlos Arturo RINCON Barreto Communal and Communitarian Movement of Colombia (Movimiento Político Comunal y Comunitario de Colombia)

15,388 0.13%

montenegro

Referendum on Independence from Union with Serbia May 21, 2006 Registered Voters: 484,718 May 2006

Votes Cast: 419,240 86.49% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 415,663 99.15% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 3,577 0.85% of votes cast

TypeofVote ValidVotes %ValidVotes

“Yes” Votes 230,661 55.49%

“No” Votes 185,002 44.51%

* Valid votes include 226,297 blank votes.** Invalid votes include 132,332 void votes and 44,995 unmarked votes.*** Álvaro Leyva Durán quit the race on May 14, two weeks before the election.

Note: The results below have been released by government officials of the country involved. Such official results are usually released well after the conclusion of voting.

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Slovakia

Parliamentary June 17, 2006 Registered Voters: 4,272,517 June 2006

Votes Cast: 2,335,917 54.67% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 2,303,139 98.60% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 32,778 1.40% of votes cast

Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes Seats

Direction (SMER) 671,185 29.14% 50

Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU-DS) 422,815 18.36% 31

Slovak National Party (SNS) 270,230 11.73% 20

Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK-MKP) 269,111 11.68% 20

People’s Party–Movement for Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) 202,540 8.79% 15

Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 191,443 8.31% 14

Slovak Communist Party (KSS) 89,418 3.88% 0

Free Forum (SF) 79,963 3.47% 0

New Citizen’s Alliance (ANO) 32,775 1.42% 0

Other Parties 73,659 3.20% 0

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Peru

Presidential (2nd Round) June 4, 2006 Registered Voters: 16,494,906 April 2006

Votes Cast: 14,468,049 87.71% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 13,235,097 91.48% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 1,075,089 7.43% of votes cast

Blank Votes: 157,863 1.09% of votes cast

Candidate Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes

Alan GARCIA Pérez Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano, PAP) 6,965,017 52.63%

Ollanta HUMALA Tasso* Union for Peru (Unión por el Perú) 6,270,080 47.37%

* Ollanta Humala is the leader of the Peruvian Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Peruano, PNP), but he ran under the Union for Peru banner.

Peru

Legislative April 9, 2006 Registered Voters: 16,494,906 April 2006

Votes Cast: 14,624,880 88.66% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 10,753,323 73.53% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 2,188,789 14.97% of votes cast

Blank Votes: 1,682,768 11.51% of votes cast

Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes Seats

Union for Peru (Unión por el Perú, UPP) 2,274,797 21.15% 45

Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano, PAP) 2,213,623 20.59% 36

National Unity (Unidad Nacional, UN) 1,648,717 15.33% 17

Alliance for the Future (Alianza por el Futuro, AF 2006) 1,408,069 13.09% 13

Center Front (Frente de Centro, AFC) 760,261 7.07% 5

Peru Possible (Perú Posible, PP) 441,462 4.11% 2

National Restoration (Restauración Nacional, RN) 432,209 4.02% 2

Other Parties 1,574,185 14.64% 0

mauritania

Constitutional Referendum June 25, 2006 Registered Voters: 989,664 June 2006

Votes Cast: 756,643 76.45% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 734,729* 97.10% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 21,914 2.90% of votes cast

TypeofVote ValidVotes %ValidVotes

“Yes” Votes 712,214 96.94%

“No” Votes 10,482 1.43%

Neutral Votes 11,951 1.63%

* Official results announced by the Constitutional Council of Mauritania on June 30, 2006, indicate 734,729 valid votes, but the reported yes, no and neutral votes total 734,647 (a difference of 82 votes).

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CyPruS

Legislative (House of Representatives) May 21, 2006 Registered Voters: 501,024 May 2006

Votes Cast: 445,989 89.02% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 421,148 94.43% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 14,737 3.30% of votes cast

Blank Votes: 10,104 2.27% of votes cast

Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes Seats

Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) 131,237 31.16% 18

Democratic Rally (DISY) 127,734 30.33% 18

Democratic Party (DIKO) 75,429 17.91% 11

Movement of Social-Democrats - Center Union (EDEK) 37,531 8.91% 5

European Party (EK) 24,152 5.73% 3

Ecologist and Environmentalist Movement-Green Party (KEP) 8,192 1.95% 1

Other Parties 16,873 4.01% 0

CzeCh rePubliC

Parliamentary (Chamber of Deputies) June 2-3, 2006 Registered Voters: 8,333,305 June 2006

Votes Cast: 5,368,495 64.42% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 5,348,976 99.64% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 19,519 0.36% of votes cast

Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes Seats

Civic Democratic Party (ODS) 1,892,475 35.38% 81

Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) 1,728,827 32.32% 74

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) 685,328 12.81% 26

Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL) 386,706 7.23% 13

Green Party (SZ) 336,487 6.29% 6

Other Parties 319,153 5.97% 0

ComoroS

Presidential May 14, 2006 Registered Voters: 310,177 May 2006

Votes Cast: 177,601 57.26% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 170,812 96.18% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 6,789 3.82% of votes cast

Candidate Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes

Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi Independent Candidate 99,112 58.02%

Ibrahim Abderemane Halidi Independent Candidate 48,378 28.32%

Mohammed Djaanffari Independent Candidate 23,322 13.65%