1

Democracy, Gender Quotas and Political Recruitment in Mexico

Caroline C. Beer

University of Vermont

Roderic Ai Camp

Claremont McKenna College

Abstract:

How do democratization and gender quotas affect political recruitment of men and women? Do

gendered candidate selection processes affect the types of male and female candidates that are

ultimately selected? This article attempts to explain how and why gender matters for the

background and recruitment of political elites. We use detailed data from over 500 Mexican

senators to test alternative hypotheses about the career trajectories of male and female

politicians. The data provide evidence of discrimination in that to be successful, female senators

need to have more legislative experience and more party experience than male senators. We also

find evidence that traditional gender roles lead women to follow different paths to power. The

transition to democracy and the implementation of gender quotas increased the importance of

local legislative experience, reduced discrimination against female aspirants, and brought in a

more diverse group of female senators. Our data show that women are no more likely than men

to rely on personal connections to get into power.

Prepared for presentation at the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political

Research, Montreal, QC, Canada, August 26-29, 2015.

2

Women are dramatically underrepresented in all types of political positions across the

globe, making up just over twenty percent of national legislatures worldwide (IPU 2014).

Feminist scholarship has demonstrated many ways in which gender influences the candidate

selection process (e.g. Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Norris 1997, Krook 2010, Mackay and

Krook 2011, Hinojosa 2012, Bjarnegard 2013). Do these gendered candidate selection processes

affect the types of male and female candidates that are ultimately selected? In what ways, if any,

are male and female career paths different? How have transitions to democracy and the

implementation of gender quotas changed the recruitment patterns of men and women? This

article attempts to explain how and why gender (as measured/proxied by biological sex) matters

for the background and recruitment of political elites using detailed data from over 500 Mexican

Senators since the first women took office in the 1964. This long time-series allows for a more

comprehensive analysis of change through time than any other research to date. The data come

from Roderic Camp’s Mexican Political Biographies (2011), which includes biographies of 3000

leading national politicians in Mexico from 1935 to 2012.

This article examines how informal practices, traditional gender roles, and formal rules

influence the career trajectories of male and female politicians. In Mexico the formal rules of

candidate selection changed substantially in the 1990s as electoral codes were rewritten,

gradually ending one-party rule. At the same time new mechanisms including gender quotas

were incorporated into the new electoral codes to increase the representation of women. How do

traditional gender roles and informal practices of discrimination interact with changing formal

rules to structure candidate selection processes? Since informal practices such as discrimination

are difficult to observe and often pass unnoticed (Waylen 2014), we hope to shed light on these

often unperceived informal institutions by examining their influence on patterns of political

3

recruitment. While overall, the career paths of men and women are quite similar, we find

evidence of discrimination in that women have more legislative experience than men. We also

find that women are more likely to come to politics from traditionally female dominated careers,

suggesting the effect of traditional gender roles. The transition to democracy increased the

importance of elective experience, especially local experience; and the implementation of gender

quotas reduced discrimination against female aspirants and brought in a more diverse group of

women. In contrast to much “common wisdom” about women in politics, we find that women

are no more likely than men to rely on personal connections to get into power.

Understanding the paths women take to positions of political power is essential for

understanding the role of women in politics. If women come from similar backgrounds and have

similar experience as their male colleagues, then it is less likely that the entrance of large

numbers of women into the political system will change political outcomes in profound ways.

On the other hand, if women follow different paths to power, come from different backgrounds,

and have different types of experience than their male colleagues, then we should expect to see

more meaningful consequences when women gain positions of power. Moreover, we can shed

light on the obstacles facing female politicians by comparing their backgrounds with male

politicians and analyzing changes over time.

The Recruitment of Senators in Mexico

This article focuses on the recruitment of senators in Mexico because senators are the

highest elected officials with sufficient numbers of women to analyze. There has not yet been a

female president, and only one female major party presidential candidate. There have only been

six female governors. Senators enjoy more prestige than federal deputies, and we have a near

complete set of data for senators. Mexico has a presidential system with a bicameral legislature.

4

The Senate (upper house) shares responsibilities with the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) for

making all federal laws, except budget bills, which are the sole preserve of the Chamber of

Deputies. The Senate has exclusive responsibility for ratifying international treaties, appointing

interim governors if state governments are dissolved, and approving executive appointments,

including Supreme Court justices.

There are 128 senators.i Each of the 31 states plus the Federal District elect three

senators. Two seats go to the party with the most votes, and one seat goes to the party with the

second highest vote share. Another 32 seats are elected at large and distributed through

proportional representation. Senators serve six year terms that run concurrent with the

presidential term. The formal rules in Mexico have included a prohibition on consecutive

reelection for all elected legislative offices and a complete prohibition on reelection for executive

offices. ii The ban on reelection in Mexico has led to constant turnover and circulation of elites.

As a result, a wide variety of people have served in the legislature (Langston 2001).

Women first won the right to vote in national elections in 1953. The first women were

elected to the Senate in 1964. Both María Lavalle Urbina and Alicia Arellano Tapia were

elected to the Senate in 1964. Lavalle Urbina was from the state of Campeche, where she

attended a normal school, then went on to become the first woman in the state of Campeche to

earn a law degree. She served as a judge before being elected to the Senate. Arellano Tapia was

a dentist from the state of Sonora. She was the mayor of her hometown Magdalena de Kino,

then after serving in the Senate she went on to become the mayor of Hermosillo, the capital of

Sonora (Tuñón 2002). The number of women in the Senate increased slowly until the first

gender quotas were introduced, and by 2012, 35 percent of the Senate was female. See Table 1.

[Table 1 here]

5

Throughout most of the twentieth century Mexico had an authoritarian one-party system

governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The PRI was ideologically diverse

and inclusive; it ruled more through cooptation than repression. Early leaders were deeply

anticlerical, and the secular nature of the regime allowed for many early advances in gender

equality (Baitenmann, Chenaut et al. 2007). During the period of PRI hegemony (1928-1988)

the PRI won every major elected office and controlled huge majorities in both houses of

congress. Senators and deputies were chosen by the incoming presidential candidate, which

provided presidents with compliant legislatures that operated as a rubber stamp for most

presidential initiatives. The PRI built a corporatist system with official sectors to represent the

peasants and the workers. This brought substantial numbers of lower class people into the

formal political system, especially the legislature where seats were traditionally reserved for

representatives from each sector (González Casanova 1970). The role of party elites in

recruiting and grooming new members is especially powerful. Political elites have traditionally

been recruited through political cliques known as camarillas in a process that starts when

potential recruits are very young, in university or even high school (Camp 2002). Given this

very early, elite driven recruitment process, the lack of women may be driven by gendered

preferences of party leaders (Langston and Aparicio 2011).

The transition to democracy in Mexico was slow and incremental. A series of electoral

reforms carried out during the 1990s ushered in a new competitive electoral regime. The

transition to democracy changed patterns of political recruitment in important ways. Political

recruitment became less centralized, and more inclusive. Local experience became more

important and primaries were used more frequently (Beer 2003, Langston 2008, Camp 2010).

6

As a part of these electoral reforms new mechanisms were gradually introduced to

increase women’s representation in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Federal

Electoral Code (COFIPE) of 1993 ordered parties to increase the participation of women. The

1996 COFIPE recommended that no more than seventy percent of candidates be of the same

gender, but included no effective sanctions. A compulsory thirty percent quota with a placement

mandate and sanctions was enacted as a part of the 2002 COFIPE. The electoral reforms of 2008

increased the quota from thirty to forty percent and also directed two percent of the public

financing of parties toward the development of female leadership (Medina Espino 2010).

Starting in the 1990s most state legislatures also began to enact gender quotas, which vary from

state to state (Cervantes, Ochoa et al. 2006, Reynoso and D'Angelo 2006, Pacheco Ladrón de

Guevara 2007). In 2014 a new constitutional amendment called for gender parity in all

legislatures (local and national).

Each new attempt to improve women’s representation was met with new strategies to

undermine the reforms. Parties were able to comply with the 1996 quota law by nominating

women as alternates rather than as the primary candidateiii and also by placing women in

unelectable positions on the proportional representation lists. To combat these attempts to

undermine the goals of the quota, the 2002 reforms included a placement mandate and specified

that the quota could not be met with alternates. The 2008 reforms were subverted by the so-

called “Juanitas.” The Juanitas were women who stood for election so that their party could

meet the gender quotas, then resigned immediately after the election so that their male alternates

could take the seat. In 2009 eight female federal deputies resigned in favor of their male

alternates (Camil 2009, Proceso 2010). Further reforms to the federal election law required

primary candidates and alternates to be the same sex.

7

Theoretical Expectations

The dominant approach to gender and political recruitment focuses on the supply and

demand for female candidates. Those who are both eligible and aspire to office make up the

“supply” of candidates. The “demand” for candidates is determined by the nomination process

in which candidates are selected and the elections in which candidates are ultimately chosen

(Lovenduski and Norris 1993). A lack of resources (Norris and Lovenduski 1995) and a lack of

ambition (Fox and Lawless 2004) contribute to a reduced pool of female candidates. Qualified

women may not aspire for public office because of gendered family responsibilities or because

they have not been socialized to seek public office (Lawless and Fox 2005). Political elites may

more actively recruit and groom young men for public office, creating a greater supply of male

candidates. Krook (2010) critiques the supply and demand framework for not paying attention to

the institutional context and the ways gender distorts the political market for candidates. She

focuses attention on how rules, practices, and norms interact to shape candidate selection and

shows that the consequences of changing formal rules such as gender quotas depend on informal

practices and norms.

Party candidate selection procedures play a central role, affecting both the supply and

demand of candidates (Kenny 2010, Hinojosa 2012). Party leaders may pass over qualified

women in favor of men due to their own prejudices or their presumption of prejudice among the

electorate (Franceschet 2005), and informal eligibility requirements are especially important at

this stage of the candidate selection process (Rahat and Hazan 2001). The informal

requirements, such as access to clientelist networks, are more likely to be gendered than formal

requirements (Bjarnegard 2013). Women benefit from clear rules for promotion (Lovenduski

and Norris 1993, Babcock and Laschever 2003), and informal rules that are not publically

8

communicated and enforced make it harder for women to break into tradition power networks

(Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012). We also know that women do better in political systems

where candidates are chosen by other elites (such as closed proportional representation) rather

than through direct elections (Norris 1985, Baldez 2007). Local power monopolies and

clientelist networks present important obstacles for women in politics (Hinojosa 2012,

Bjarnegard 2013). More exclusive and centralized candidate selection processes help women to

overcome the obstacles of self-nomination and local power monopolies (Kenny 2010, Hinojosa

2012).

How do gendered selection processes affect the types of candidates who are successful?

Previous research on the recruitment of political elites has found relatively few differences in the

career paths of men and women (Schwindt-Bayer 2011). Among legislators, men are more

likely to be married (Schwindt-Bayer 2011, Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). In some cases men

have more electoral experience (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008, Schwindt-Bayer

2011), especially in local executive positions (Murray 2010, Franceschet and Piscopo 2014).

Legislative women are more likely to come from careers in teaching (Schwindt-Bayer 2011),

have specialized educational experience, and be party loyalists (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-

Robinson 2008). Compared to women in the general population, female legislators are more

likely to be urban, well-educated, and from the middle or upper classes (Saint-Germain and

Metoyer 2008). What explains these differences in career paths? Building on the insights of

these studies and others, this article examines the interaction of rules, informal practices, and

norms to argue that discrimination and traditional gender roles influence the political and social

backgrounds of successful politicians.

Informal Practices of Discrimination

9

Discrimination may lead to different career paths for men and women. Women were

prohibited from voting and holding political positions in most countries throughout most of

history. As a result, political parties and other institutions have been historically dominated by

men. Insofar as “old boy’s networks” have functioned to recruit men into politics and exclude

women, women must either seek alternative paths to power or work harder to get into politics.

Discrimination takes place when women are passed over in favor of men with similar

qualifications. Discrimination can also take place if women are not actively recruited and

encouraged to participate in politics when men are. There is evidence that party leaders

discriminate against female candidates by disproportionately placing them in losing districts

(Langston and Aparicio 2011).

Following Norris and Lovenduski’s (1995) logic of a “political market,” if party elites or

the electorate prefer to nominate men, then we would expect the women who are successful to be

either “higher quality” candidates than their male counterparts or have access to more personal

power networks to support their candidacies and overcome the discrimination they face.

Catalano and Baldez (2015) define the quality of candidates in terms of political experience,

education, and high occupational status. The most relevant experience for a Senate seat is prior

legislative experience in either the lower house or a local legislature. Since women may only be

considered “qualified” if they exceed the qualifications of their male colleagues (Kenney 1996),

women may be more highly educated and have more specialized degrees or more experience

directly related to their political work than men. In fact, women themselves may be less likely to

consider themselves qualified (Fox and Lawless 2004, Saint-Germain and Metoyer 2008). And

women who are facing discrimination from traditional power monopolies that prefer to recruit

their male peers may choose to invest further in their educations. Women who face

10

discrimination may have to put in more years of service as party activists before being nominated

to a powerful position (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008). If successful women

have more education and experience than their male counterparts, this suggests that equally

qualified women were passed over in favor of less qualified men, thus providing evidence of

discrimination.iv

In addition to being more qualified, women facing discrimination may need greater

access to power networks through personal connections or kinship ties to the political elite

(Saint-Germain and Metoyer 2008). Family connections can help to eliminate obstacles faced by

female candidates. Wives and other relatives of popular politicians have name recognition and

greater access to media attention. People with close connections to political elites are more

likely to be socialized into politics and are able to build on the political capital of their families

(Hinojosa 2012, 118-120). In fact, most of the early women to win presidential elections in

Latin America were widows of popular political leaders (Perón, Chamorro, Moscoso), and some

women get involved in politics when politically active husbands or children are jailed or killed

(Bouvard 1994, Tula and Stephen 1994). While research has focused overwhelmingly on

women’s personal connections (Saint-Germain and Metoyer 2008, Jalalzai 2013), Hinojosa

(2012) points out that male politicians also have personal connections. Are women more likely

to have personal connections than their male counterparts? If women are more likely to have a

relative in political life, then that may indicate that they need personal connections to overcome

discrimination against them.

Traditional Gender Roles

Traditional gender roles in most societies call on women to take on the majority of the

responsibilities for childcare and housework while men pursue public life. These differences

11

create obstacles for women in the traditional male paths to power (Franceschet and Piscopo

2012). Women might make different choices about work-family conflicts, making family a

greater priority than men do. Women with young children may be more likely than men with

young children to scale back careers if they live far from their jobs and require long hours to

commute (Slaughter 2012) (Murray 2010). Women who live in or near the capital city may be

able to maintain national political careers and manage household obligations more easily. Thus,

women who live in rural areas and far from the capital city may face more obstacles to a political

career. Traditional gender roles enforced by conservative religious ideas about gender may also

be stronger and more pervasive in rural areas (Chaney 1979).

Social class also intersects with traditional gender roles in important ways. Middle and

upper class women are more able to hire others to help with their domestic responsibilities, thus

allowing them to more fully participate in public life. Working class women are likely to have to

work as domestic servants for wealthier women in addition to taking care of their own families

(Blofield 2009). Whereas working class men may gain political power through activism in labor

unions, working class women are more likely to do domestic or other informal work with little

chance for union organizing and the political opportunities that come with it. Teaching is one

avenue that has historically been open to women, including women from rural and working class

backgrounds. Among the earlier generations of women, especially those from modest socio-

economic backgrounds, normal school (teaching training college) was a common path for

upward social mobility. Most graduates of these schools, men and women alike, were from

humble, rural families. Teachers’ unions have been an important mechanism for recruiting

women into politics especially in Mexico where the teachers’ union is large and influential

(Foweraker 1993, Cook 1996).

12

Where traditional gender roles are prominent, we would likely see important differences

in men’s and women’s career paths and social backgrounds. In order to overcome the obstacles

created by traditional gender roles, women may be more likely to come from wealthy, urban

backgrounds and live in the capital city. We may also see differences in men’s and women’s

professional experience with women more likely to follow traditional female careers such as

teaching, while men follow the classic path from law school to politics.

Change through Time: Transition to Democracy and Gender Quotas

How has the transition to democracy and the implementation of gender quotas affected

the career paths of men and women? Because the transition to democracy in Mexico took place

through a series of electoral reforms that included a gradual implementation of gender quotas, it

is impossible to disentangle the consequences of democratization and gender quotas. Therefore,

we examine them together and conceive of gender quotas as part of the transition to democracy.

Some research has been pessimistic about the ability of democratic transitions to empower

women (Jaquette 1994, Waylen 2007). And some scholars have posited a tension between

gender equality and democratizing and decentralizing reforms (Baldez 2007, Kenny 2010,

Hinojosa 2012). But other studies have found that women’s activism together with a favorable

political opportunity structure can lead to important gains in gender equality (Waylen 2006,

Waylen 2007, Waylen 2008).

Proponents of gender quotas have suggested that quotas will bring more diverse women

into politics, while opponents have worried that unqualified women will gain power

(Franceschet, Krook et al. 2012). Some research has found that elite women and women with

ties to powerful men are be the main beneficiaries of gender quotas (Bird 2003, Pupavac 2005,

Rai, Bari et al. 2006), but Murray (2012) finds that after quotas were introduced in France,

13

women come from somewhat more diverse backgrounds, and Franceschet and Piscopo (2012)

find that women elected with gender quotas in Argentina come from more diverse professional

backgrounds, but have similar levels of education and political experience. Catalano and Baldez

(2015) find that in Italy, gender quotas increased the quality of legislators, in that women elected

via quotas had more local government experience and lower absenteeism than their male

counterparts.

Because legislative gender quotas increase demand for female candidates and

democratization opens up the candidate selection process to more actors, we suspect that

democratization and gender quotas will lead to decreasing discrimination against women. In

fact, many opponents of quotas have argued that quotas will increase the demand for female

candidates so much that parties will be unable to find qualified candidates. As we argued above,

when women face discrimination we expect to find that women will have more education and

political experience than men. After the implementation of quotas, we expect to find that women

will have the same or perhaps less education and political experience because there will be

greater demand for female candidates and more competition among men for fewer positions. We

also expect to find that over time conservative gender roles will decline, and thus male and

female career paths will look more similar.

During the transition to democracy in Mexico, candidate selection became more inclusive

and decentralized (Camp 2010). During one party rule candidate selection was highly

centralized in the hands of the president. The incoming president essentially handpicked the

senators. National government experience was typically more important than local experience.

Democratization invigorated local politics, making local experience much more important for an

elected position such as senator (Langston 2008). Thus, after democracy we expect that senators

14

will be more likely to have experience as mayor and local deputy. Local political experience

may be even more important for women because local power monopolies may be especially

resistant to female candidates imposed from above (Langston and Aparicio 2011, Hinojosa

2012).

As the transition to multiparty democracy leads to a more inclusive process to select

candidates, the influence of traditional power brokers will likely decline. As a result we expect

to find that senators will be less likely to have a relative in politics. In other contexts we might

expect that a transition to democracy would bring in more politicians with lower class

backgrounds. In Mexico, however, the one party system incorporated peasants and unionized

workers through government sanctioned peak organizations. Government positions, especially

legislative seats, were informally reserved for loyal leaders of the peasant and worker

confederations. The main beneficiary of the transition to democracy was the rightist Partido

Acción Nacional (PAN), which draws its support mainly from the middle and business classes.

Thus we expect to see fewer representatives from lower class backgrounds after the breakdown

of the corporatist system and the transition to democracy.

We present three hypotheses to explain gender differences in political recruitment

patterns: 1) discrimination decreases the demand for female political leaders, so that the women

who are successful must be more qualified than their male counterparts or have access to greater

personal connections, and 2) traditional gender roles create greater obstacles for women from

lower class and rural backgrounds and increase the likelihood that women come from traditional

female careers such as teaching, and 3) changes in the formal rules entailed by the transition to

democracy and implementation of gender quotas will reduce the influence of discrimination on

careers paths of men and women, and traditional gender roles will decline through time.

15

In sum, in circumstances where women are explicitly discriminated against, we expect to

find that women have more education, more legislative experience and more party experience

before being nominated for a Senate seat. Women who face discrimination are also more likely

to need personal and family connections in order to be successful. When traditional gender roles

are strong, women will be more likely to come from careers in teaching rather than law. Also

women will be more able to overcome the obstacles of traditional gender roles if they come from

wealthy, urban backgrounds (especially the capital city). After the implementation of gender

quotas, we expect to see less evidence of discrimination against women. We expect to see a

decline in traditional gender roles over time. After the transition to democracy we expect to see

more local electoral experience, less influence of political families, but given the nature of

Mexico’s inclusive authoritarian regime, more people from upper and middle class backgrounds.

Data and Results

This research compares the career paths and backgrounds of male and female senators in

Mexico. We compare family ties, social background, education, and political experience of men

and women in the political elite, using data from the Mexican Political Biographies project,

which includes detailed information on nearly 3,000 influential politicians from 1935 to 2012.

Political elites were chosen for inclusion in the dataset because they held the most influential

political posts in Mexico from all three branches of government, including supreme court

justices, cabinet-level secretaries and assistant secretaries, repeating members of the congress,

top party leaders, and state governors (Camp 2011). We created a dataset from the Mexican

Political Biographies project with senators from 1964 (when the first women won seats) to 2012.

The dataset includes 541 individuals, 53 of whom are women.

16

To compare the career paths of male and female senators we use a variety of indicators: a

relative in public life, educational attainment, elective experience, and party activism. We also

use a variety of indicators of social background: class, urban versus rural birthplace, region of

birth (Mexico City versus elsewhere), and the type of degree earned (law versus normal school).

Class is measured by the occupation of the politician’s parents (peasant or urban working class

versus middle or upper class occupation). To test the discrimination hypothesis and the

traditional gender roles hypothesis, we compare the career paths of men and women in the entire

dataset, 1964-2012. To test the democratization and gender quota hypothesis we compare the

pre-democratic era (1964-1994) with the democratizing era (1994-2006) and the democratic era

with compulsory gender quotas (2006-2012). The transition to democracy in Mexico was a slow

and incremental process that took place over many years. The year 2000 is most commonly used

as the date for the transition to democracy, but important electoral reforms began after the

contested presidential election of 1988. The new federal electoral code of 1993 made important

advances towards competitive democracy and also included the first mandates for greater

representation of women. Thus the Senate elections of 1994 were an important first test of the

newly reformed electoral laws. The 2000 Senate elections took place in an even more

democratic context, but legally enforceable gender quotas were not adopted until 2002, so the

2006 Senate elections were the first using compulsory gender quotas. Because of the gradual

nature of the democratic transition and the gradual implementation of gender quotas, there is no

one moment when Mexico achieved democracy or implemented quotas. The approach used here

compares three key time periods to allow us to examine change through time.

17

Discrimination

As we can see from the data presented in Table 2, there is evidence to support the

discrimination hypothesis in terms of legislative experience. The differences in personal

connections of male and female senators are very small. And the data on education are mixed.

Men are somewhat more likely to have a university degree, whereas women are more likely to

have attended graduate school. In neither case are the differences statistically significant. It is

important to note that women are more likely to attend normal schools, which were not

university level institutions, but were more comparable to obtaining a high school teaching

diploma. Striking evidence of discrimination is seen in legislative experience. Women are

significantly more likely to have legislative experience in both local legislatures and in the

Chamber of Deputies. In contrast, men are more likely to have served as mayors, though the

difference does not reach statistical significance. Women are slightly more likely to have

experience as party activists and party leaders, but again the differences are not statistically

significant.

[Table 2 here]

Traditional Gender Roles

There is also evidence to support our hypothesis that traditional gender roles influence

career paths. We argued that traditional gender roles create obstacles that middle and upper

class, urban women are more likely to be able to overcome. Both men and women are

overwhelmingly from the middle or upper class and from urban areas. While none of the

differences are large enough to be statistically significant, women are slightly more likely than

men to be from middle or upper class families and from urban areas, especially Mexico City,

suggesting that women with more economic resources and who are geographically closer to

18

centers of power are more able to overcome obstacles to their political careers. Men are

significantly more likely than women to have a law degree, whereas women are significantly

more likely to have a degree from a normal school (teacher training college). This supports our

hypothesis that traditional gender roles will lead women to follow different paths to power,

rather than follow the classic path of law school.

Change through time: Transition to Democracy and Gender Quotas

Among all the senators there are quite substantial differences between those senators who

served before the transition to democracy and the introduction of gender quotas and those who

served after. The data in Table 3 compare all senators in three different time periods, before

democracy (1964-1994), during the transition to democracy (1994-2006) and during the period

of multiparty democracy and compulsory gender quotas (2006-2012). After the transition to

democracy senators were less likely to have a relative in public life. Over time Senators were

more likely to have a university degree and graduate education. Prior electoral experience

became more important. More recent Senators were more likely to have been a mayor, and

served in a local legislature or the Chamber of Deputies. Party activism increased during the

transition to democracy, and then decreased later. During democratization and afterwards,

Senators were more likely to be from middle or upper class backgrounds and from urban areas.

Over time the number of Senators with normal school degrees declined significantly.

[Table 3 here]

Hypothesis 3 predicts that evidence of discrimination will decline after democratic

reforms and gender quotas are implemented. We also suspect that traditional gender roles will

decline gradually over time so a comparison of before and after the transition to democracy will

also pick up these trends. The data in Table 4 provide some evidence to support the hypothesis

19

that democratization reduces discrimination. There is also some evidence of a decline in

traditional gender roles over time. The data in Table 4 compare the differences between male

and female senators in three different time periods, before democracy (1964-1994), during the

transition to democracy (1994-2006) and during the period of multiparty democracy and

compulsory gender quotas (2006-2012). Most of the indicators show steady change through

time, without a distinct break. Because the transition to democracy and the implementation of

gender quotas took place incrementally, it is not surprising that there is no clear moment of

change.

There are no significant differences in personal contacts between men and women in any

of the three periods. We predicted that women would be more likely to have personal contacts

before democracy and gender quotas in order to overcome discrimination. In fact, women had

fewer personal connections before democratization than men did. During the transition to

democracy women were more likely to have a relative in public life, and then after the

implementation of compulsory gender quotas, the percentage of women with a relative in public

life declined to levels similar to the pre-democracy level. The percentage of men with a relative

in public life declined through time.

The data on candidate quality provide evidence consistent with our discrimination

hypothesis. In the pre-democratic era women were slightly more likely to have a university

degree, but during the transition to democracy, women were significantly less likely to have

university degree. Interestingly the dip in educational attainment for women happened before

the compulsory gender quotas were introduced. Once there were enforceable quotas, the

percentage of women with a university education increased above pre-democracy levels. In

terms of graduate education, women were slightly more likely than men to have graduate

20

education in each of the three time periods, though the differences are not significant. The

percentages of both men and women with graduate degrees increased through time.

According to our hypothesis, we expected to find that women had more political

experience than men before democratization and gender quotas, and similar or less experience as

men after democratization. That was the case for most of our indicators. Women were slightly

more likely to have been mayors before 1994. After 2006 women were significantly (with 90%

confidence) less likely to have been a mayor. Women were significantly more likely to have

served as a federal deputy before 1994, but only slightly more likely after 1994. Both men and

women were more likely to have served as local deputy after 1994, reflecting the greater

importance of local politics after the transition to democracy, though women were dramatically

more likely to have been local deputies after the implementation of compulsory gender quotas in

2006. While less than forty percent of men had served in local legislatures, over seventy percent

of women had. This suggests that local experience is especially important for women.

Also consistent with our hypothesis, women were more likely than men to have

experience as party activists and leaders before 1994, and less likely after 1994. Party

experience became less important for women during democratization and more important for

men, but after 2006 very similar percentages of men and women had party experience.

[Table 4 here]

The data in Table 4 provide evidence to support the hypothesis that the obstacles of

traditional gender roles have declined through time. Whereas female senators were more likely

than men to come from middle or upper class families before 1994, they were significantly less

likely than men to come from middle or upper class families after democracy and quotas. Forty

percent of female senators after 2006 came from working class families. This suggests that the

21

democratic reforms and the gender quotas resulted in the recruitment of substantially different

types of women and that after 2006 women with few economic resources could more readily

overcome obstacles created by domestic responsibilities. Men were more likely to come from

middle and upper class families over time whereas women were less likely, suggesting that

democratization made it more difficult for working class men to enter the political elite, while

simultaneously providing new opportunities for working class women. Though the differences

are not statistically significant, before 1994, women were more likely than men to be from urban

backgrounds, and after 1994 women were less likely than men to be from urban backgrounds.

Women continue to be more likely to come from Mexico City, even after 2006, suggesting that

proximity to the capital continues to facilitate women’s national political careers. The

importance of normal school degrees declined dramatically, with no Senators earning a normal

school degree after 2006. In contrast, the gap between men and women with law degrees

increased over time.

Conclusions

The transition to democracy and gender quotas have changed patterns of political

recruitment for Mexico’s Senators in important ways. Democratization increased the importance

of electoral experience for all Senators, especially local electoral experience. Democratization

and gender quotas also seem to have reduced discrimination against women and brought more

diverse women into the Senate. Whereas women were significantly more likely than men to

have federal legislative experience and party experience before democracy, after the transition to

democracy the gap between male and female federal legislative experience narrowed and the gap

for party experienced reversed. We have argued that this was the result of increased demand for

female candidates and increased competition among men after the introduction of gender quotas.

22

The transition to democracy also brought more women from lower class and rural backgrounds

into the Senate, but had the opposite effect on men. We have argued that the shift in class and

geographic background is evidence that the obstacles to female participation created by women’s

traditional domestic responsibilities have declined over time.

While we do see the quality gap between men and women narrow after democratization

and gender quotas, our data provide no evidence to support the fear of quota opponents that

unqualified women will gain Senate seats. Even after the implementation of compulsory gender

quotas, women still have more graduate education and more legislative experience than men.

The finding that women have more legislative experience and more party experience than men

suggests that women have to log in more hours in lower prestige positions than their male

counterparts in order to be considered equally qualified. While women consistently have more

legislative experience than men, they have had less executive experience since 1994.

Comparative research has found that women are more likely to serve in legislatures than

executive positions, especially when legislative seats are allocated through proportional

representation (Norris 1985, Lovenduski 1986). Hinojosa and Franceschet (2012, 766) found

more discrimination against women in mayoral elections than in legislative elections in Chile.

Female candidates were equally likely to win legislative races, but less likely to win mayoral

races. They argue this is because executive offices are more powerful and prestigious and

because voters tend to associate executive positions with traditional masculine traits. Men may

also dominate executive positions because these positions are valuable for clientelism

(Bjarnegard 2013, Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). Because executive positions are highly

sought after, women may face more obstacles in getting nominations for those positions and

compete instead for legislative seats. It is also important to note that in Mexico gender quotas

23

have been in place for legislative seats in local legislatures and the lower house, creating a new

pool of women with legislative experience; but there are no quotas for executive positions and

there have not been comparable increases in women in executive positions. While we

hypothesized that when women face discrimination they would have more experience than men,

this seems to be more true for legislative experience than elective executive positions.

The data on personal connections is very interesting, given the overwhelming assumption

that women are more likely than men to depend on personal connections. The differences

between the numbers of male and female Senators with personal connections is small, and in

some cases men are actually more likely to have personal connections than women. While

common wisdom suggests that wives of politicians frequently enter politics, in Mexico political

wives have not been as visible as in other Latin American countries. Rodríguez (2003, 232-36)

notes that in Mexico most political wives have been “seen but not heard,” and only a relatively

small number of political wives have gone on to political careers. Media coverage of the quota

law in Mexico has been dominated by the “Juanitas,” women who run for office to meet quota

requirements, but then give up their seat, often to a male relative. The data here demonstrate that

after the implementation of compulsory quotas in 2002, female Senators were less likely to have

a relative in public life than during the previous electoral cycles. Thus the quota law does not

appear to be increasing nepotism in Mexican politics. Moreover, our data provide no evidence

that women politicians are significantly more likely than men to have family connections.

Recent research on women in politics has been concerned with the impact of growing

numbers of women in positions of power. We shed new light on this issue by comparing the

career paths of men and women in political office in Mexico. If women have similar

backgrounds and experience as men, then we may not see meaningful changes when women

24

enter politics. However, if women are following different paths to power, their growing numbers

may lead to important transformation in the way political institutions function. We find that

contrary to common wisdom, family connections are not significantly more important for

women. This provides evidence that women are likely to get to power because of their own

abilities, rather than serving as “proxies” for their husbands or other powerful family members.

In fact, women are more likely than men to have local and federal legislative experience, and the

transition to democracy and introduction of gender quotas has brought in more women from rural

and lower class backgrounds. Rather than overcoming discrimination by relying on personal

connections, it appears that women gain access to powerful political positions by working harder

and logging more hours in less prestigious positions than their male colleagues.

25

Table 1. Females Senators, 1964-2018

Presidential

Term

Number of

Women

Total Number

of Sentors

Women as

Percentage of

Total

1964-1970 2 58 3.4

1970-1976 2 60 3.3

1976-1982 5 64 7.8

1982-1988 6 64 9.4

1988-1991 10 64 15.6

1991-1994 4 64 6.3

1994-1997 16 128 12.5

1997-2000 19 128 14.8

2000-06 22 128 17.2

2006-12 35 128 27.3

2012-18 45 128 35.2

(Source Rodriguez 2003, 142-43 and http://www.senado.gob.mx)

26

Table 2. Male and Female Senators Career Paths, 1964-2012

Percentage of

Men

Percentage of

Women

Personal Connections

Relative in public life 38.97 41.51

Candidate Quality

University education 81.33+ 71.70+

Some graduate education 33.61 43.40

Mayor 18.07 11.32

Local Deputy 25.26** 43.40**

Federal Deputy 74.59** 90.57**

Party militant 71.93 75.47

Party leader 70.29 73.58

Social Background

Middle or Upper Class Parents 74.09 76.47

Urban birthplace 73.15 76

Born in Mexico City 10.25 16.98

Law degree 35.32*** 13.21***

Normal school degree 3.94* 11.32*

Chi-squared significance + p<0.10 *p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

27

Table 3. Senators before and after Democracy and Quotas

Chi-squared significance + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p>0.001

Percentage of all senators

Pre-democracy Democratization Democracy +

Quotas

1964- 1994 1994-2006 2006-2012

Personal Connections

Relative in public life 41.22 41.32 29.35

Candidate Quality

University Education 73.55*** 88.02*** 86.96***

Graduate Education 26.45*** 37.52*** 50.00***

Mayor 12.46** 20.36** 27.17**

Local Deputy 17.79*** 33.53*** 43.48***

Federal Deputy 63.12*** 90.42*** 90.22***

Party Militant 66.67** 80.84** 73.91**

Party Leader 65.96** 79.64** 68.48**

Social Background

Middle or Upper Class Parents 66.84** 81.30** 86.96**

Urban Birthplace 69.14+ 79.64+ 74.71

Born in Mexico City 4.96*** 17.96*** 16.30***

Law Degree 35.59 29.34 32.61

Normal School 7.61** 2.40** 0.00**

28

Table 4. Male and Female Senators before and after Democracy and Quotas.

Chi-squared significance + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Pre-Democracy

1964-1994

Democratization

1994-2006

Democracy + Quotas

2006-2012

Percentages Percentages Percentages

Men Women Men Women Men Women

Personal Connections

Relative in public

life

41.86 33.33

39.60 55.56 28.21 35.71

Candidate Quality

University

Education

73.33 76.19

91.28*** 61.11*** 88.46 78.57

Graduate Education 25.88 33.33 38.93 44.44 48.72 57.14

Mayor 12.31 14.29 21.48 11.11 30.77+ 7.14+

Local Deputy 17.31 23.81 32.21 44.44 38.46* 71.43*

Federal Deputy 61.69+ 80.95+ 89.26 100.00 89.74 92.86

Party Militant 65.13+ 85.71+ 82.55 66.67 74.36 71.43

Party Leader 64.75 80.95 81.21 66.67 67.95 71.43

Social Background

Middle or Upper

Class Parents 65.17+ 86.67+ 82.57 71.43 90.24+ 60.00+

Urban Birthplace 67.87 85.00 80.54 72.22 76.00 66.67

Born in DF 4.98 4.76 17.45 22.22 14.10 28.57

Law Degree 36.92 19.05 31.54* 11.11* 37.18* 7.14*

Normal School 6.67* 19.05* 1.34** 11.11** 0 0

29

Works Cited

Babcock, L. and S. Laschever (2003). Women don't ask : negotiation and the gender divide.

Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

Baitenmann, H., V. Chenaut and A. Varley, Eds. (2007). Decoding gender : law and practice in

contemporary Mexico. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press.

Baldez, L. (2007). "Primaries vs. Quotas: Gender and Candidate Nominations in Mexico, 2003."

Latin American Politics & Society 49(3): 69-96.

Beer, C. C. (2003). Electoral competition and institutional change in Mexico. Notre Dame, In.,

University of Notre Dame Press.

Bird, K. (2003). "Who are the Women? Where are the Women? And What Difference Can They

Make? Effects of Gender Parity in French Municipal Elections." French Politics 1(1): 5-

38.

Bjarnegard, E. (2013). Gender and politics : explaining male dominance in parliamentary

representation. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.

Blofield, M. (2009). "Feudal Enclaves and Political Reforms." Latin American Research Review

44(1): 158-190.

Bouvard, M. G. (1994). Revolutionizing motherhood : the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.

Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources Inc.

Camil, J. (2009). Las Juanitas de San Lázaro. La Jornada. México D.F.

Camp, R. A. (2002). Mexico's mandarins : crafting a power elite for the twenty-first century.

Berkeley, University of California Press.

Camp, R. A. (2010). The metamorphosis of leadership in a democratic Mexico. New York,

Oxford University Press.

Camp, R. A. (2011). Mexican political biographies, 1935-2009. Austin, University of Texas

Press.

Catalano, A. and L. Baldez (2015). "Quotas and qualifications: the impact of gender quota laws

on the qualifications of legislators in the Italian parliament." European Political Science

Review 7(1): 119-144.

Cervantes, C., M. C. Ochoa, L. C. Pacheco, B. O. Peña, E. S. Pont and M. d. R. Verela (2006).

La cuota de género en México y su impacto en los congresos estatales : Baja California

Sur, Colima, Coahuila, Durango, Jalisco, Guerrero y Nayarit. Nayarit, Universidad

Autónoma de Nayarit.

Chaney, E. (1979). Supermadre : women in politics in Latin America. Austin, Published for

Institute of Latin American Studies by University of Texas Press.

Cook, M. L. (1996). Organizing Dissent: Unions, the State, and the Democratic Teacher's

Movement in Mexico. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press.

Escobar-Lemmon, M. C. and M. M. Taylor-Robinson (2008). How do Candidate Recruitment

and Selection Processes Affect Representation of Women? Pathways to Power: Political

Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America. P. M. Siavelis and S.

Morgenstern. University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press: 345-368.

Foweraker, J. (1993). Popular mobilization in Mexico : the teachers' movement, 1977-87.

Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

Fox, R. L. and J. L. Lawless (2004). "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for

Office." American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 264-280.

30

Franceschet, S. (2005). Women and politics in Chile. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers,

Inc.

Franceschet, S., M. L. Krook and J. M. Piscopo (2012). The impact of gender quotas. New York,

Oxford University Press.

Franceschet, S. and J. M. Piscopo (2012). Gender and Political Backgrounds in Argentina. The

impact of gender quotas. S. Franceschet, M. L. Krook and J. M. Piscopo. New York,

Oxford University Press: x, 256 p.

Franceschet, S. and J. M. Piscopo (2014). "Sustaining Gendered Practices? Power, Parties, and

Elite Political Networks in Argentina." Comparative Political Studies 47(1): 85-110.

González Casanova, P. (1970). Democracy in Mexico. New York,, Oxford University Press.

Hinojosa, M. (2012). Selecting women, electing women : political representation and candidate

selection in Latin America. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

Hinojosa, M. and S. Franceschet (2012). "Separate but Not Equal: The Effects of Municipal

Electoral Reform on Female Representation in Chile." Political Research Quarterly 65(4):

758-770.

Jalalzai, F. (2013). Shattered, cracked or firmly intact? : women and the executive glass ceiling

worldwide. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

Jaquette, J. S. (1994). The women's movement in Latin America : participation and democracy.

Boulder, Westview Press.

Kenney, S. J. (1996). "New research on gendered political institutions." Political Research

Quarterly 49(2): 445.

Kenny, M. (2010). Gender and Institutions of Political Recruitment: Candidate Selection in Post-

Devolution Scotland. Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist

Institutionalism. M. L. Krook and F. Mackay. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 21-40.

Krook, M. L. (2010). "Beyond Supply and Demand: A Feminist-institutionalist Theory of

Candidate Selection." Political Research Quarterly 63(4): 707-720.

Langston, J. (2001). "Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988-

2000." Journal of Latin American Studies 33(485-511).

Langston, J. (2008). "La competencia electoral y la descentralización partidista en México."

Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 70(3): 457-486.

Langston, J. and F. J. Aparicio (2011). Gender Quotas are not Enough: How Background

Experience and Campaigning Affect Electoral Outcomes. C. d. I. y. D. Económicas.

Mexico D.F.

Lawless, J. L. and R. L. Fox (2005). It takes a candidate : why women don't run for office.

Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Lovenduski, J. (1986). Women and European politics : contemporary feminism and public

policy. Brighton, Sussex, Wheatsheaf Books.

Lovenduski, J. and P. Norris (1993). Gender and party politics. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.,

Sage Publications.

Mackay, F. and M. L. Krook (2011). Gender, politics and institutions : towards a feminist

institutionalism. Basingstoke ; New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Medina Espino, A. (2010). La participación política de las mujeres: De las cuotas de género a la

paridad. México D.F., CEAMAG Centro de Estudios para el Adelanto de las Mujeres y la

Equidad de Género, and H. Congreso de la Unión Cámara de Diputados. LXI Legislatura.

31

Murray, R. (2010). "Linear Trajectories or Vicious Circles? The Causes and Consequences of

Gendered Career Paths in the National Assembly." Modern & Contemporary France

18(4): 445-459.

Murray, R. (2012). Parity and Legislative Competence in France. The impact of gender quotas.

S. Franceschet, M. L. Krook and J. M. Piscopo. New York, Oxford University Press: x,

256 p.

Norris, P. (1985). Women's Legislative Participation in Western Europe. Women and Politics in

Western Europe. S. Bashevkin. London, Frank Cass.

Norris, P. (1997). Passages to power : legislative recruitment in advanced democracies.

Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. and J. Lovenduski (1995). Political recruitment : gender, race, and class in the British

Parliament. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Pacheco Ladrón de Guevara, L. C. (2007). Cuando la democracia nos alcance : sistemas de

cuotas y agendas de género en Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Colima, Durango,

Guerrero, Jalisco y Nayarit. Tepic, Nayarit and México, D.F., Universidad Autónoma de

Nayarit and Casa Juan Pablos.

Proceso (2010). Las Juanitas de San Lazaro. Proceso. México D.F.

Pupavac, V. (2005). "Empowering Women? An Assessment of International Gender Politicies in

Bosnia." International Peacekeeping 12(3): 391-405.

Rai, S., F. Bari, N. Mahtab and B. Mohanty (2006). South Asia: Gender Quotas and the Politics

of Empowerment. Women, Quotas, and Politics. D. Dahlerup. New York, Routledge:

222-245.

Reynoso, D. and N. D'Angelo (2006). "Las leyes de cuota y su impacto en la elección de mujeres

en México." Política y Gobierno XIII(2): 279-313.

Rodríguez, V. E. (2003). Women in contemporary Mexican politics. Austin, University of Texas

Press.

Saint-Germain, M. A. and C. C. Metoyer (2008). Women legislators in Central America :

politics, democracy, and policy. Austin, University of Texas Press.

Schwindt-Bayer, L. (2011). "Women Who Win: Social Backgrounds, Paths to Power, and

Political Ambition in Latin American Legislatures." Politics and Gender 7(1): 1-33.

Slaughter, A.-M. (2012). Why Women Still Can't Have it All. The Atlantic.

Tula, M. T. and L. Stephen (1994). Hear my testimony : María Teresa Tula, human rights activist

of El Salvador. Boston, Mass., South End Press.

Tuñón, E. (2002). Por fin-- ya podemos elegir y ser electas! : el sufragio femenino en México,

1935-1953. México, D.F., Plaza y Valdés : CONACULTA INAH.

Waylen, G. (2006). "Constitutional engineering: what opportunities for the enhancement of

gender rights?" Third World Quarterly 27(7): 1209-1221.

Waylen, G. (2007). Engendering transitions : women's mobilization, institutions, and gender

outcomes. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

Waylen, G. (2007). "Women's Mobilization and Gender Outcomes in Transitions to

Democracy." Comparative Political Studies 40(5): 521-546.

Waylen, G. (2008). "Enhancing the Substantive Representation of Women: Lessons from

Transitions to Democracy." Parliamentary Affairs 61(3): 518-534.

Waylen, G. (2014). "Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality." Political

Research Quarterly 67(1): 212-223.

32

i The number of senators increased from 64 to 128 in 1994. ii In 2014 the ban on reelection for members of congress was removed. Senators elected in 2018 will be eligible for

reelection. iii Every legislative seat in Mexico has a propietario (owner) and a suplente (alternate). Both are elected on the same

ticket. The alternate takes over if the owner has to abandon the seat either temporarily or permanently. iv Some might argue that there are fewer women in positions of power because women have less ambition than men,

not because of discrimination. There is substantial evidence that women have less political ambition than men and

that women have to be more qualified than men before they believe themselves to be qualified (Lawless and Fox

2005). Thus we would expect a candidate pool with fewer women (if women have lower ambition overall) and

more qualified women (if women only put themselves forward if they are highly qualified). Faced with such a pool

(with fewer, more highly qualified women) party leaders choosing solely on the basis of qualifications would

presumably choose a higher proportion of the women than the men, and thus we would find men and women equally

qualified. If instead party leaders chose men with less experience and education over women with greater

experience and education, that presumably reflects discrimination against the women in the pool. Moreover, it is

important to remember that ambition is always changing and almost certainly endogenous to the candidate selection

process.