Chapter Five

DEMOBILISATION AND BRITISH POLICY AFTER THE GREAT WAR

211

T.A.Heathcote tells us that the "classical period" in the history of the Indian

Army ended in 1922. He is also right in drawing our attention to the fact that

from the 1920s onwards issues of Army policy in India were increasingly affected

by political developments within India.1 Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis which deal

with the politically important theme of demobilisation have been written with this

fact in mind. Between 1918 and 1947 there were two general demobilisations of

the Indian armed forces following the two World Wars. These two processes

present a study in contrast primarily because the social composition of the Indian

armed forces raised during the Second War was very different from those

recruited during the Great War. The preceding chapter has shown some of the

important changes which occurred in the Indian armed forces as a result of the

recruitment drives launched during the Second World War. While chapter 5 tries

to establish the political and economic nature of demobilisation after the Great

War it should be kept in mind that the armies of war raised during it were

largely an extension of the kind of army which existed in India before 1914. Even

then demobilisation and resettlement after 1918 proved not to be an easy task.

5.1. Demobilisation of the Indian Army after 1918 - A resume

The Indian Army as a creation of the 19th century performed in the Great

War on the basis of great improvisation in its organisation because normally it

was not meant to participate in global conflicts. Earlier in this thesis we have seen

1 T.A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922, London, 1974, prologue.

212

that the post 1918 reorganisation of the Indian armed forces was first

contemplated on the basis of the Esher Recommendations. But finally the effect

of the Inchcape retrenchment prevailed over the services in the mid 1920s. The

process of reorganisation in its technical and specific aspect was extremely

complicated and laborious though, we are told, under the experienced staff of

General Rawlinson, it, ''began to take a practical shape".2 The first task of the

organisers was to scale down the army to peacetime proportions without

sacrificing the gain in efficiency made during the Great War. This had to be done

when from, "the purely military point of view, of course, retrenchment was

unwelcome".3 Tremendous expansion had taken place during the Great War and

among the additions were the Royal Air Force, Mechanical Transport and Signals,

Artillery and the expansion of Staff and Commands. The work of demobilisation

was also rendered difficult and incomplete because of the Third Afghan War and

the continuing presence of Indian troops in Mesopotamia.

Among the post Great War measures taken to streamline army functioning

in India we must mention the 4 command system and the new distribution of

troops. The Indian Army was divided into 4 commands i.e. North, West, South

& East. The troops were classified into three kinds viz. Covering Troops, Field

Army and Internal Security Troops. The Covering Troops were needed to take

2 The Army in India and its Evolution, Including an Account of the Establishment of the RAF in India, GOI, Calcutta, 1924, p.35.

3 Ibid., p.36.

213

care of minor frontier outbreaks and provide a screen behind which general

mobilisation could take place. The need for these troops arose when the Border

Militias defected to the Afghan side in 1919. The Field Army of 4 Infantry

Divisions and 5 Cavalry Brigades as compared to 9 lnf.Divs. and 8 Cav.Brigs.

before 1914 would constitute the main fighting component of the Indian Army.

Officially it was stated that the provision of modern equipment and adequate

ancillary services for this Field Army was, "an obvious and paramount

necessity" .4 Troops were also extremely necessary for internal security because

of the growing nationalist movement in India. Outbreaks like the Moplah

Rebellion were also causing serious alarm to the authorities. Furthermore about

4000 miles of strategically important railways had to be guarded from violent and

subversive elements. The constant use of troops in 1920-22 in aid of civil authority

justified the retention of troops for specific internal security duties.

The Great War had shown that standards of armament possessed by an

army were most important in a modem conflict. The post 1918 army was

naturally supposed to be much smaller than the army of War so, to maintain the

increase of firepower gained during the Great War, it was decided that the Indian

Am1y would be provided with armament similar in character to the armament

of Western am1ies. However at the same time it was found "practicable" in Indian

conditions to adopt a "lower and more economical scale of provision". Probably

4 Ibid., p.42.

214

because of political reasons the scale of mechanical equipment decided for the

Indian Army was much below that accepted by the British Army. This becomes

clear by the following example pertaining to the scale of automatic weapons

(heavy and light machine guns) which had become the dominating weapons of

the infantry during the Great War. An infantry battalion on War Establishment

of the British Army had 8 machine and 34 Lewis guns. Its Indian counterpart had

4 machine and 16 Lewis guns.5

In the maintenance and reinforcement of battalions as also the number of

combatants , as the following tables show, a lowering of scale took place as a

result of the Retrenchment of 1923.6

Table 1 : Reduction of British Infantry Battalion.

Year Peace Establishment

1914

1923

5 Ibid., pp.43-44.

6 Ibid., p.44 & 47.

1003

882

War Establishment

816

810

Balance

187

42

Year

1914

1923

Reduced

Table 2 : Reduction in Combatants 1914/1923.

British Ranks

75,366

57,080

18,286

Indian Ranks

158,908

140,052

18,856

215

Total

234,274

197,132

37,142

Table 2 clearly shows the effect of retrenchment on the Army in India and it must

be noted that retrenchment depressed the figures much below those which would

have resulted from only demobilisation. Consequently the Army of 1923 was

smaller than the Am1y of 1914. Rawlinson accepted these reductions as an

expedient measure to balance the post- Great War budget and announced as

much in the Legislative Assembly in 1923. The official history of the services

justifies these reductions on economic grounds saying that they were necessary

to obtain improvements in the general organisation of the Indian armed· forces.

This reduction of troops appears even more striking when we compare the

combatant levels of the Indian Army in 1914 and 1918 in the following tables?

7 /11id., Appendix VII, p.219.

216

Table 3 : Actual strength of combatant troops of the Indian Army, 1st August, 1914.

British Indian ranks Grand total officers I other ranks

Cav 560 Nil 24,476 25,036 Art. 67 Nil 4,093. 4,160 S&M 67 159 4,792 5,018 Sigs. 22 207 375 604 lnf. 1.845 Nil 118,760 120,605

Total 2,561 366 152,496 155,423

* Excludes Indian combatants of British Artillery.

Table 4: Actual Strength of Combatant Troops of the Indian Army, 11 November 1918.

Brit.officers/ 0. ranks Indian ranks Grand total

Cav. 975 Nil 52,277 53,252

Art. 166 Nil 10,469 10,635

S&M 342 365 22,556 23,263

Signals 193 2,930 7,120 10,243

In f.

Total

*

5,422 Nil 470,669 476,091

7,098 3,295 563,091 573,484.

Exclusive of Indian Combatants in British Artillery and British Machine gun companies.

Compared with this the Grand Total of the Army in India on 1 Sept. 1923

was 204,825 comprising 66,106 British Ranks and 138,719 Indian Ranks. While

217

giving us these figures the official version fails to mention any discontent

associated with the process of demobilisation after the Great War. But it is diffcult

to believe in a demobilisation scenario shorn of discontent in the early 1920s

especially when the number of combatants registered in 1923 was even below that

of 1914.

5.2 Demobilisation : Politics and economy

The official attitude towards discontent in the Indian services after the

Great War was influenced to a great degree by the nationalist movement which

began with the anti- Rowlatt agitation and went on till 1922. From the point of

view of this thesis it is important to remember that this was also the time when

men in their thousands were being released from the armed forces. During the

war the Congress had supported recruitment but soon after it as the British failed

to keep several of their wartime promises Gandhi and the Non-Cooperators

turned against recruitment. The momentum oflndian opposition to the British Raj

gathered rapidly after the Amritsar massacre of April 1919 and regarding the

Indian Army probably reached a peak in October 1921 when Gandhi and some

Non-Cooperators signed a manifesto which said that it was sinful for Indians to

join the Army.8 This was alarming from the official point of view though it is

8 Young India, 6 October, 1921: The Manifesto was signed among other people by GandhL Abul Kalam Agad, Ajmal Khan, Lajpatrai, Motilal Nehru, Sarojini Naidu, N.C. Kelkar, V.J. Patet M.R. Jayakar, D.V. Gokhale, Jawaharlal Nehru and Jamnalal Bajaj and ran as follows. "We, the undersigned, state it as our opinion, that it is contrary to national dignity for any Indian to serve as a civilian, and more especially as a soldier, under a system of Government, which has brought about India's economic, moral and political degradation and which has used the soldiery and the

218

difficult to say how many Indian soldiers really read the manifesto or were

particularly influenced by it. Simultaneously reports poured in of sporadic

nationalist attempts being made to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army.

In the "Young India" of 29th Sept. 1921 Gandhi openly, and rather idealistically,

appealed to the jawans to become weavers. Indian soldiers were expressly asked

not to participate in the wrongdoings of the government. The language referring

to military service now changed completely as the government was accused of

using Indian jawans as "hired assassins" to subjugate the peoples of Asia. Gandhi

asked the Indian soldiers to "le~ve at once" if they could support themselves.9

We cannot determine what the actual result of such advise to Indian

soldiers was but given the differentiated Indian response to military service it can

be said with some confidence that the Non-Cooperators' brief and largely

unorganised attempts to arouse the Indian soldiers generally failed to produce

spectacular results. In contrast to 1945-46 no major loss of control occurred during

the popular protest of 1919-1922 and Indian troops remained loyal during their

deployment on the Frontier in 1919-20 and against the Moplah rebellion of 1921-

police for repressing national aspirations, as, for instance, at the time of the Rawlatt Act agitation, and which has used the soldiers for crushing the liberty of the Arabs, the Egyptians, the Turks and other nations who have done no harm to India".

9 SECRET.SIMLA RECORDS 1 F.No.303, Se.Nos.1-48, 1921, GOI, Home Department Political1921, No. 303 of 1921, Hom/Pol, NAI.

219

22.10 Official attempts at establishing a Territorial Force in the same period also

achieved a modicum of success and in the Madras Presidency applications so

"largely" exceeded the proposed establishment that the formation of a second

battalion was being considered.11

Nevertheless it is quite clear that in 1921 Non-Cooperation and Khilafat

tried hard to influence Indian troops in the major military zones. Nationalist and

Khilafat literature appeared to have permeated the lines in most areas and it was

well reported that this was having an undesirable effect on the troops. There were

various organisations and "agitators" attempting actively to prevent the men from

joining the army. In Peshawar even the Mullahs were issuing "fatwas" against

enlistment and in the Punjab and the NWFP several areas reported declining

recruitment for the post-war army as a result of active and effective

Non-Cooperation. The agitation against army service was becoming serious and

organised with anti-enlistment committees appearing in the villages around

Jalandhar in Novemeber 1920. In Ferozpur in April 1921 a Subedar reportedly

told an SP that the Indian troops would fire on Indians only in the event of being

fired upon. As the news and influence of the nationalist movement spread

rumours of British excesses against disobedient jawans became rife and in several

areas of the Punjab there was disturbing news of the Sikhs becoming influenced

10 India in 1921-22, A Statement Jlrepared for presentation to the Parliament ... , pp.19-20.

II Ibid., p.17.

220

by nationalist propaganda in addition to the Akali Movement. In the summer of

1921 in and around Amritsar ex-subedars and Sikh jawans were sometimes found

openly expressing their desire to move against the government in the event of a

major crisis.U The position of the Sikhs who thought the GOI had not done

enought for them in and out of India has been summed up in the best possible

terms by Cohen:13

There was reason for the alarm all this was causing the British because the .

maximum was being done for the demobilised soldiers in the Punjab and its

surrounding areas but more often than not official fears were exaggerated. This

becomes clear when we place the above mentioned disturbances in context. It is

true that recruitment in the Punjab was declining because both the favoured Sikhs

and Punjabi Muslims were disaffected during 1919-1922 but this was only a

qualified fact because, and according to an important official source, if

recruitment was poor in some districts it was satisfactory in others. As the same

12 Ibid ; Appendix I SECRET Tabulated statement of attempts to tamper with Indian troops, 11 Oct. 1921 from General Staff Branch to Home Department.

13 Cohen, The Indian Army ... , p.95: "Upon their return to the Punjab many Sikh soldiers found a place in the growing Akali movement, and swelled its ranks with disciplined, trained fighters. The Aka lis took special care to press their propaganda on Sikh soldiers on active duty. According to several British officers, there was much trouble with infiltrators and sympathisers. After the Nankana massacre in February 1921, black Akali safas (headbands) appeared in Sikh units. The massacre was followed later in the same year by the affair of the 'Keys of the Golden Temple', and for the first time in the history of this agitation recruiting officers reported difficulty in obtaining )at Sikhs for the Army". Cohen is also right in asserting that except the Akalis, "apparently no other nationalist group made a sustained effort to infiltrate or subvert the army". Unrest among the Sikh soldiers has also ben studied with the same perspective by Pradhan in Ellinwood & Pradhan (eds.), India and World War!, op.cit. and T.A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Gan·ison of British lmpt:rial India, 1822-1922, op.cit., p.103.

221

source tells us there were other causes behind the temporary decline in

recruitment for the post-war army : "Not many old soldiers are rejoining, but,

although the demobilised sepoys allege many grievances, they are largely

imaginary and it is more reasonable to suppose that they find village life more

comfortable and often more profitable than drilling"14. In 1919 rumours about

the Afghan War which were unfavourable to the British were current in the

Punjab where a general belief that there would be no peace had gained ground

in popular mentality. Even the government officers felt that the truth had to be

made public if the "wholesale distrust of Government communiques" had to be

countered.15

In the beginning of 1920 Punjab seemed to have slipped out of control at

least temporarily as reports received from different placed in the provice showed

that "racial passions" had been "inflamed". This had given rise to a, "good deal fo

excitment of an undesirbale character in several places".16 Matters were not

being made easy for the British by the Ali Brothers who were found, "determined

to approach the Muhammadan Police and the Army and ask them to refuse to

fire on Muhammadans in any case or to fight any Muslim enemies of the

14 DELHI RECORDS 1919 GoVt:rnment of India Home Department Political Deposit, Proceedings, july 1919, No. 51 : Report on the Political Situation in the Punjab for the second half of july 1919, in connection with the recent disturlmnces, Index of Fortnightly Reports (N AI).

15 Ibid.

16 SIMLA RECORDS 1920 Govenment of India Home Dt:partment Poltical Deposit Proceedings, February 1920, No.52 Weekly RqJOrts of the Director, Central Intelligence, for the month of January 1920 (NAI).

222

Government".17 It was in these circumstances that the rumours pertinent to the

Frontier campaign against the Afghans gained strength and helped forge the

context of the short-lived anti-British "fatwas" mentioned earlier:

Reports from various places in the Punjab- more especially in cities and towns north of Rawalpindi and in close proximity to Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan show that statements are curent to the effect that the troops of the Sirkar are fairing badly in their fighting against the Mahsuds; that the Waziris have not been cowed down at all; that they are putting up a stubborn fight and that our losses are very heavy. These statements are coupled with others to the effect that the Bolsheviks have won victories all over the world; that they have gathered round their banner Muslim hordes of Central Asia; and that before long $e Bolsheviks, the Afghans, the Turkomans, Tartars and the Persians will combine and attack India. The extremists maintain that the British forces will find it hard to cope with the invaders and that Indian troops when they see the immense odds against themselves will refuse to fight. 18

While Non-Cooperation and Khilafat flirted with the idea of producing

insurbodination in the Indian Army their mood was also reflected in sections of

the Press. Khilafat hartal notices dearly forbade Muslims from lending money

to the Government or enlisting as soldiers and sailors meant for service in Basra,

Mesopotamia or other places.19 Appeals to soldiers were published alongwith

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 SIMLA RECORDS 1920 Government of India Home Department Political Deposit, Proceedings, August 1920, No.110, Weekly reports of the Director, Central Intelligence, for the month of August 1920 (N AI): Reports were also received from the U.P. of Indian soldiers "fraternising" with Gandhi and Shaukat Ali abroad a troop train while the two leaders travelled to Punjab. In the same period Khilafat activists were selecting those areas of the Punjab which had provided large numbers of troops during the Great War for spreading their propaganda which was, "full of rank sedition and undiluted disloyalty". These areas comprised particular tehsils of the Rawalpindi Division and Ludhiana District.

223

alleged interference with the Sikh religion in the Army. The "Akali" of Amritsar

of 9 Sept. 1921, referred to the Officers of the Sikh regiments and their devotees

(i.e. subedars), "raising obstacles in the ways of the Sikhs in the unrestricted

performance of their religious duties". "The Independent" of Allahbad, 13 Sept.

1921, referred to a "concentrated plan" of the Non-Cooperators which was being

carried out against recruiting in the main centres. According to this paper the

nationalists were preparing grounds for a direct appeal to the soldiers to leave the

army. "If the Government would not bend to the popular will, the Congress

would surely and unhesitatingly call upon the soldiers to withdraw from the

service of the Government". The "Hindu" of Madras, 22 Sept. 1921, published an

article reporting the speech made by Gandhi at Trichinopoly after the arrest of the

Ali brothers supporting the attempts made by them to tamper with the loyalty of

the Indian troops. In the speech Gandhi mentioned that he had himself tampered

several times with the loyalty of the jawans and intended to do so in future.

Soldiers were once again asked not to serve the British Govemment.20

Against this assault on the jawans' loyalty the GOI launched its own

propaganda campaign to retain the Indian troops. During 1921-22 moderate

20 Ibid. With reference to this speech Gandhi wrote an article 'Tampering with loyalty' in the Young India, 29 September, 1921 in which he admitted that the Congress had tried to tamper with the loyalty of the sepoys since September 1920 and it was his duty to "spread disaffection openly and systematically" because the government had used the sepoy "more often as a hired assassin than as a soldier defending the liberty or the honour of the weak and the helpless". Gandhi had not appealed to individuals to come out because of his own reasons: "And if I have not asked individual sepoys to come out, it has not been due to want of will but of ability to support them. I have not hesitated to tell the sepoy, that if he could leave the service and support himself without the Congress or the Khilafat aid, he should leave at once".

224

Against this assault on the jawans' loyalty the GOI launched its own

propaganda campaign to retain the Indian troops. During 1921-22 moderate

success was reported in ambivalent terms to the GOI. "The military propaganda

campaign during 1921-22 in recruiting areas though inadequate to the needs of

the moment has not been unsuccessful. It is difficult to obtain any definite

evidence of results but such evidence as is available is sufficient to justify the

extension of our programme for another year".21 Official propaganda to counter

the nationalists had become very important and the following schemes were

pursued by an insecure government in this regard. Twenty four Indian Officers'

Associations were organised and selected British officers were sent out to tour

major recruitment areas with an allowance of Rs.12,000 ! A collection of

pensioners was planned for the Prince of Wales' visit and the expenditure on this

was to be met from a special grant. A touring cinema was run by the Recruiting

Officer of the Bangalore region with a monthly expenditure of Rs.300. Though the

Associations were financed by subscriptions to make their propaganda more

effective it was suggested that a donation for them could be favourably

considered. The emphasis was on the established props of the Raj. It was stated

with confidence that, "The vast majority of old soldiers and the Zemindar element

are loyal and only need organising, for their loyal sentiments to be made

effective". The suggested donation was Rs.100/year for 1922-23 per Association

while the Army was asking for Rs.31,200 for propaganda work. The government

21 Home Department Political 1922 Part B Deposit Proceedings file no. 225/11 Subject Expenditure on military propaganda, Hom/Pol, NAI.

225

found this propaganda extremely useful and wanted it to be continued but

expenditure on propaganda too was to be supplemented with savings in the

Am1y after the Great War. The government position however remained uncertain

because estimates always faced the danger of revision in case events took a

different tum.22 Anyway the grant of Rs.31,200 for military propaganda was

sanctioned for the Army for the year 1922-23.23

The seriousness with which the GOI pursued its goal of countering the

potentially dangerous Nationalist propaganda was also underlined by the steps

taken during the Prince of Wales' visit to India in 1921-22. Throughout 1921-22

attention was carefully paid to the well being of troops in India and this was also

one of the important recommendations made by the Esher Committee. To begin

with, to placate Indian opinion, the Prince of Wales opened a Military College at

Dehradun meant to prepare candidates for admission to Sandhurst "on the lines

of an English public school". The foundation of a Kitchener College were also

laid in Delhi with the intention of providing education of "a High School type for

sons of Indian officers". Foundation stones were also laid for two King George's

Royal Indian Military Schools, one at Aurangabad Serai and another at Jalandhar,

to impart future education to the sons of Indian soldiers. Furthermore during 1921

the formation of an Indian Army Educational Corps was also sanctioned to

22 Ibid.

23 File No.225 V- Poll Hom-Poll. 1922: Grant for Military propaganda, Hom/Pol, NAI.

226

supervise and develop educational standards in the Indian Army.24

As far as military propaganda was concerned the expenditure demanded

was not very high and could even be sanctioned in the teeth of retrenchment. But

when it came to doing something materially important for the disgruntled

soldiery the Finance Department put its foot down. It was one thing to place

Rs.200,000 at the disposal of the Punjab Government meant for the war widows

of Punjab and quite another to announce substantial remissions of revenue.25

After the Great War the demand for a "general boon" had grown specially

in those districts of India which had supplied the maximum number of wartime

recruits. Punjab naturally led the field even though expectations ran high in other

provinces as well. Discontent in the returning soldiers as well as their families

was a potent political factor in the disturbed times which soon followed the Great

War. "The one idea among the masses is that we have been grossly ungrateful"

was the feeling reported by J.Mackeig Jones to the Home Member Sir. William

Vincent from Punjab. In the Punjab among the "heaps" of lambardars and the

soldiers great discontent was visible and some urgent measure was needed to

allay this. In some ways the government was responsible for all this:

Our praise of their help in war time has occasionally, perhaps, been immoderate, but it has got home, and

24 India in 1921-22, A Statement prqmred for presentation to the Parliament ... , p.21.

2s Delhi Records 1919 GOI Home Dept Pol -Deposit, Proceedings May 1919, No.47, Hom/Pol, NAI.

the general feeling everywhere was that Government was about to give some just reward. The present feeling among the people is of resentment and disap­pointment. 26

227

In the words of the official concerned an act of an "Oriental Monarch" appealing

to an "Oriental imagination" was necessary to win back the masses. Nothing less

than a proclamation remitting one month's land revenue all over India was called

for even though the government was considering, on the basis of such reports, a

remission of land revenue for 3 months in those parts of India from where

recruits had come in large numbers. 27

However the Finance Department was opposed to any general remission

and offered valid arguments to support its case. In the Punjab, for instance, after

the War several districts, villages and individuals had already been rewarded by

remissions of revenue, extension of settlement and land grants to ex-soldiers.

Furthermore there was no precedent of announcing a general boon for the

supporters of the Raj for at the pre-Great War Delhi Durbar the boons given did

not include any general remission of land revenue. Doing so in 1919 would create

26 SIMLA RECORDS 1919 GOI Home Dept. Political Deposit Proceedings, July 1919, No.37 : Suggestions for allaying the feelings of disappointment prevalent among the rural population of the Punjab and elsewhere at the absence of any announcement of some general boon as a reward for their services during the war, Hom/Pol, NAI.

27 Ibid.

228

a dangerous precedent by setting up the GOI for political blackmail in future. The

practice had been to make special grants of land or assignments or remissions of

revenue in the case of certain native officers with long and distinguished service

careers. Despite the weight of tradition behind these arguments many sections of

the GOI, perhaps aware of the fact that times had significantly changed after 1918,

felt that a general remission had a strong case because information from various

quarters was making it clear that the feeling against the government was

spreading fast in those very regions which had done enough for the British cause

during the Great War.28

The tension between the urgent need to satisfy the aspirations of a

demobilised and grumbling soldiery and the economic limitations of the Raj

surfaced quite clearly in the objections raised to a general boon by the Finance

Department. The Finance Department compared the proposed remission of land

revenue with the measures taken by the rulers during the days of Roman deca-

' dence to win over the plebs. With regard to a substantial increase in expenditure

related to satisfactory demobilisation the Finance Department raised two

important points. Firstly it was asked whether such large expenditures were

worth the advantages they promised to bring. Secondly even before the

contradiction between the Esher recommendations and retrenchment developed

it was asked whether the finances of the country were in a position to meet such

28 Ibid.

229

additional expenditures. The Home Department said a general boon would assist

the "rural classes" i.e. landlords, tenants and the agricultural labourers. The

Finance Department retorted that the labourers as buyers of grains would in no

way gain by a remission of land revenue. On the other hand experience indicated

that the tenants had fared much better due to the war time rise in grain prices.

A remission in fact would assist only those zamindars who cultivated their own

holdings and this was possible in some parts of Punjab. Elsewhere the zamindars

were mostly absentees thriving on rents and a remission would only help them

and not their tenants who paid the rent. Indeed there were strong grounds in

favour of objecting to a remission of revenue in the case of "notoriously

oppressive landlords". Since the structure of landholding and tenancy was

different in Punjab and the United Provinces and the other provinces a policy of

general remission, despite all its attraction in 1919, in reality did not make good

sense. The Finance Department rounded off its argument by asking the GOI not

to overlook these considerations while, "estimating the advantages which may be

considered likely to accrue from the expenditure in question".29

The Finance Department calculated the remission cost of 1/12th of land

revenue in the Punjab and the U.P. to the tune of 8.5lakh rupees. This was clearly

unacceptable at a time when the GOI was facing a great problem of balancing the

budget. The receipts from the railways and customs were not as high as expected

29 Ibid ; Notes in the Finance Department, June 1919.

230

and the Afghan War, likely to cost 12.5 million rupees per month, was already

pushing military spending beyond the budgetary grant. Even on the assumption

that the Afghan War would not last very long at least 60 million rupees over and

above the budgetary allowance had to be urgently found. Furthermore the

agricultural situation was far from satisfactory and already additional takavi

grants of 7.5 million rupees had been santioned in Bombay. On top of all this the

GOI had to repay its "floating and unproductive debt" incurred during the Great

War. In such conditions it was highly probable that the burden of a "general

boon" would fall upon the the Imperial revenues because neither of the local

governments in question had expressed any desire in favour of a general

remission. 30

The Finance Department was asking whether there was any point in giving

more to regions which had already gained a lot from the Great War? Large areas

of the Punjab and the U.P. had done economically very well due to rising

agricultural prices. This was reflected in the voluminous absorption of currency

and precious metals by these provinces in recent years (340 million rupees ending

31 March, 1919). In the towns the traders had prospered though the working

groups had suffered as a result of high prices. At a time when the government

and quasi-government servants had been refused relief it was improper to give

more doles to Punjab and the U.P. Furthermore the government had to guard

30 Ibid.

231

against the appetite for largesses which was in most cases insatiable. The GOI also

had to see that the economic position of India in 1919 was "extremely unstable

and precarious" and the order of the day was "rigid economy" as regards non

essentials. After this warning the Finance Department summed up its point of

view by quoting a passage from the Economist of lOth May 1919:

The system of handing doles and grants to anyone who threatens to make himself sufficiently troublesome without them is radically bad and the Government ought to be prepared to face unpopularity rather than squander more of the public funds. 31

The point was not lost upon the Home Department which nonetheless underlined

the importance of a concession to the sections of rural classes which had sent

large number of recruits to the army. The matter was not merely concerned with

the economics of the moment. Above all these concessions were of paramount

importance in view of the fact that exaggerated promises had been made to the

recruits during 'the recruitment drives of the Great War. Almost anticipating some

of the sentiment voiced by the Esher Committee W.H.Vincent, the Home

Member, pointed out:

31 Ibid.

My point is that a very large number of men have been recruited for the army and military service generally from the Punjab and the United Provinces. There is reason to believe that many of these men were induced to enlist by extravagant promises,

although such promises were not authorised, and it is certain that they all expected that they would be rewarded after the war ; and not having received any such reward they are very sore and disappointed for they feel that their services have not been adequately compensated. 32

232

Despite the objections of the Finance Department Vincent desired the cooperation

of the local governments in the case of remission. He also believed that with the

help of the Revenue and Agricultural departments the government could see to

it that the concessions reached the right kind of people within the rural classes.

The Home Department's plea was backed up by the fact that in 1919 the Punjab

government already enjoyed the discretion to reward good recruiting services by

the remission of land revenue.33

The Finance Department's position on the matter appeared sound because,

and according to it, a lot had already been done to satisfy the returning recruits.

It is a different matter that the Home Department and the largely disgruntled

soldi,ery even in the Punjab felt other wise. Our survey of the demobilisation and

resettlement schemes suggests that the process greatly favoured Punjab over the

other regions of India and this was naturally so. In the Punjab the scheme was

to cost Rs. 2 million. In case of villages and sub-divisions of a village, remissions

of land revenue to an aggregate extent of Rs.l50 thousand per annum for a term

:J:t Ibid ; response of the Home Department.

3:l Ibid.

233

of ten years was sanctioned. In the case of particular families or individuals,

remissions or assignments of land revenue ranging between Rs.lO and 250 a year

upto a total of Rs.25,000 per annum had been granted. Furthermore these

remissions or assignments were to continue for the entire life of the grantees. In

recognition of the signal services of the rural population of the Rawalpindi and

Jhelum districts with a recruiting record far ahead of other districts of the Punjab

and India, the current settlement was extended from 20 to 30 years. This measure

was justified on economic grounds and was alone estimated to cost Rs.3 million.

In addition to all this there was also a scheme for colonising an area of 178,000

acres in the Lower Bari Doab Canal with ex-soldiers. Till1919 unfortunately there

had been a great delay in selecting colonists from the several Punjab regiments

but the GOI was hopeful that eventually the scheme would confer material wealth

on "many thousand soldiers". In the NWFP the term of settlement of the

Peshawar district was extended by 5 years. The concession was estimated to cost

about Rs.700 thousand was granted among other reasons as a reward for the good

behaviour of the inhabitants during the war. In and around Delhi remissions of

land revenue amounting to Rs.26,891 had been sanctioned in favour of villages

which had distinguished themselves in the supply of recruits. In the United

Provinces land holders of districts under settlement in the Meerut division who

were on active service during the war, or who had granted rental remissions in

order to encourage their tenants to enlist, were to a proportionate extent

exempted from enhancement of revenue during the period of the next settlement.

234

In Bihar and Orissa a remission of rent in the case of tenants on Govt. Estates

upto a maximum of Rs.10 for a period of 10 years with effect from 1 April 1917

had been sanctioned but the concession was withdrawn from 1 April1919. In the

Bombay Presidency a scheme for granting war remissions not exceeding Rs.25 per

annum in respect of one individual and special rewards for certain villages which

had rendered conspicuous service during the War in furnishing recruits was in

operation.34

Besides the measures listed above the Provincial Governments had also

sanctioned certain specific concessions. For example the U.P. government had

postponed the inception of settlement operations in the Garwhal district till the

end of the War because of its good recruiting record. In the Gujarat district of the

Punjab the new revenue demand after the war was pitched low on the ground

of its excellent recruiting record. For the same reason the term was fixed at 30

years for most of the district. Besides these measures land grants, jagirs and jangi

pensions were given to Indian officers (VCOs) and soldiers who had

distinguished themselves in the War or even to their heirs. On the basis this

information the Finance Department claimed that the recruits and their villages

had been liberally rewarded and nothing more was necessary.35

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid; Reward schemes sanctioned upto the summer of 1919. Figures provided by the Revenue and Agriculture Department.

235

5.3 Demobilisation: A summarised comparison of the two world wars

In sum at the end of the Great War 420,000 acres of land were distributed

among 5,902 VCOs and Indian Other Ranks (IORs). In the Punjab the scale of

allotment was 2 squares [unspecified measure of land] to a VCO, 1 square to an

lOR and 1 I 2 a square to a follower. In the provinces where land was less fertile

than in Punjab proportionately a larger unit of land, with the same annual

income, was granted to the demobilised soldiers. Another kind of reward called

the jangi inaam was also given.36 It was granted to 14,100 men for two lives with

the following details. The VCOs received Rs.10/month, IORs got Rs.5/month and

the followers were given Rs.2-Annas 8/ month. Two hundred jagirs were awared

to specially selected VCOs for distinguished services. These jagirs comprised

grants of land with full proprietary rights yielding a net annual income of Rs.400

or an assignment of land revenue for 3 lives in the following order. For the first

life Rs.600/month, second life Rs.300/month and third life Rs.150/month. Two

hundred honorary commissions as King's Commissioned Officers were granted

to selected VCOs the majority of whom were Risaldar/Subedar Majors about to

be discharged from service ! These men carried the pay of the rank of KCOs

while still on the active list and double the normal pension of the VCOs on

retirement.37 By all means, and compared to the number of men enlisted during

36 Ibid.

37 Bisheshwar Prasad (cd.), Adjutant General's Branch, Monographs, Vol.lll, War System of Accounting & Honours and Awards, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section ( India & Pakistan ), HS, New Delhi.

236

the Great War and the promises made to them, these rewards were at best

extremely modest in scale and almost certainly gave rise to resentment in the

thousands who felt left out of the process. The same story was repeated after the

Second World War but with graver repercussions.

During the Second World War, to begin with, a proposal that central land

grants should be made had to be dropped due to the large amount of land

required for colonising the demobilised soldiers. So it was decided that the main

rewards were to be jangi inaams and honorary commissions and the total cost of

both was estimated to be Rs.2.5 crores most probably in 1945. ]angi inaams

sanctioned for the RIN, Indian Army and the RIAF totalled 12,500 only when

more than 100,000 men were enrolled in the RIN and the RIAF alone.

Furthermore the distribution of these rewards was heavily skewed naturally in

favour of the Army. Of these inaams 12,024 were alloted to the Indian Am1y, 191

to the RIN and 285 to the RIAF. It is surprising that 275 jangi inaams were also

granted to Indian States Forces personnel who had served under the Crown when

the Indian services like the RIAF and the RIN could have been better rewared.

The distribution of inaams worked out to a scale of one award per 144 troops, the

ratio between VCOs, IORs and Non Combatants being in the proportion of 4:10:1.

The Indian Commissioned Officers were ineligible for these rewards. The jangi

inaam was worth Rs.20/month for the VCOs and Rs. 10/month for IORs and the

Non Combatants and was this time granted for only one life. The heirs of

237

deceased personnel were also eligible to receive a jangi inaam which became

admissible from 1 April 1946 onwards. Two hundred honorary commissions as

Lieutenants were granted to senior VCOs with effect from 1 April 1946 for

specially distinguished service with a pay of Rs.400/month and a double the

normal pension on retirement. Furthermore the gallantry decorations also carried

modest monetary payments with them. As far as land grants were concerned only

the Punjab Government formulated an extremely modest scheme in 1943

according to which gifts of land at the scale of 2 squares each were earmarked for

Victoria Cross and George Cross winners. One square each was to be given to

those who won the Distinguished Service Order, Indian Order of Merit, Military

Cross, Distinguished Service Cross and Distinguished Flying Cross. These were

described as "Punjab gifts to Punjabi servicemen who had gained distinction in

the field". But these grants left out the winners of the Indian Distinguished

Service Medal owing to the limited amount of land available for the purpose. All

other provinces decided to give monetary awards.38

CONCLUSION

The official statement regarding the demobilisation and resettlement of

Indian troops after the Great War overlooks the question of discontent arising in

the soldiers as a result of the Raj giving them inadequate compensation for their

38 Ibid.

238

services in the Great War. However some authors have briefly mentioned the fact

that there was noticeable discontent in the Indian Army after the Great War and

this was so largely because the returning soldiers felt that the British had cheated

them. 39 Our survey of the discussion between the Home and Finance

Departments of the GOI reveals that sections in the GOI actually took a serious

view of the discontent which prevailed in the Indian Army in the disturbed early

1920s. There was every reason to believe that a significant number of soldiers

were influenced by Non-Cooperation and Khilafat in the short term. Furthermore

surveys of the Press indicated that attempts were also being made to "tamper"

with the loyalty of the Indian Army. But these attempts were tentative, short-lived

and not central to the Nationalist movement and in the event the Indian Army

remained largely steadfast in the British cause despite the considerable alarm of

1919-22.40

39 S.D.Pradhan, 'The Sikh Soldier in the First World War', in Ellinwood and Pradhan (eds.), India and World War I, New Delhi, 1978 ; Heathcote, The Indian Army ... , p.103 writes of Sikh unrest in the Indian Army which surfaced as early as 1914 when restrictions were imposed on Indian immigration to Canada. Cohen, The Indian Army ... , pp.76-77, mentions post 1918 retrenchment briefly while speaking of the demobilisation of the Mahars and Mazbhi Sikhs. He also notes that Punjab, "was also no longer politically quiet", after the Great War.

40 M.K. Gandhi, An Autol1iography, Ahmedabad, 1927, p.372, tells us that he supported recruiting during the Great War because he saw the war as "a golden opportunity" for Indians "to learn the use of arms" and get the Arms Act repealed. Gandhi's views changed drastically after 1919 as we have seen. They remained consistent after that and as Rajesh Kadian, India and its Army, New Delhi, 1990, p.44, tells us, Gandhi in 1946 wanted the Army to become an instrument of peace when he wrote the following in the Harijan: "Today they (the army) must plough the land, dig wells, clean latrines and do every other constructive work that they can, and thus turn the people's hatred of them into love". Gandhi's views were never very popular in the Army as Cohen, The Indi11n Army, pp.l02-4, shows.

239

In this context the objections raised by the Finance Department to the

scheme of a "general boon" suggested by the Home Department, whose task it

was to control the widespread unrest in India at the time, underlined once again

the limitations of the Indian Raj in the 1920s. Such limitations have also been

studied in the earlier chapters of this thesis. The last section of this chapter, also

as a prelude to chapter 6, compared certain aspects of demobilsation after the two

world wars with the conclusion that compared to the number of men recruited

during the two wars the number of men who actually received substantial 0

benefits after the conflicts was small. Furthermore the accent on land in the first

demobilisation could not be maintained in the 1940s. On the whole the degree to

which the promises of 1914-18 stood betrayed after the War was reflected in the

grant of a limited number of honorary commissions to old men who were due for

retirement.