demarketing minorities, and national attachment

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Journal of Marketing

Vol. 73 (March 2009), 105122

2009, American Marketing Association

ISSN: 0022-2429 (print), 1547-7185 (electronic)

Amir Grinstein & Udi Nisan

Demarketing, Minorities, andNational Attachment

This study addresses two important global trends: protection of public goods, specifically the environment, and the

emergence of multiethnic societies with influential minority groups. The study tests the effect of a governmentproenvironmental demarketing campaign on the deconsumption behavior of minority groups and the majoritypopulation. It suggests that minority consumers use consumption or deconsumption to manifest their social identity,beliefs, and goals as minorities in relation to the majority and that their motivation to respond positively to agovernments demarketing campaign is shaped by their national attachment levels. The study was conducted inJerusalem, Israel, and involved a large data set (N = 66,272) containing household-level data on actual behaviorof consumers. The studied groups involved the majority of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews and three minority groups:Israeli Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Jewish Russian immigrants. The findings show that in a proenvironmentalcontext, government demarketing is more effective on the majority group than on any of the three minority groups.In addition, minority groups with lower national attachment levels respond more negatively to the demarketingeffort. However, higher education levels lead to a more positive response across the majority and minority groups.A central implication of the findings is related to the benefits derived from demarketing for different consumergroups (majorities versus minorities based on religion, ethnicity, and immigration status). The findings also providea benchmark for demarketing efforts in an environmental context. Finally, they suggest that policy makers and

marketers should consider using demarketing more to complement regulatory and economic tools.

Keywords: demarketing, minority groups, national attachment, public goods, public policy, environmental behavior

Amir Grinstein is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Guilford Glazer Schoolof Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-

Sheva (e-mail: [email protected]). Udi Nisan is Director General, IsraelGovernment Companies Authority, and a lecturer, School of Public Policy,The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (e-mail: [email protected]). Theauthors acknowledge Liza Teper and Ori Sharf for their excellent researchassistance. They are grateful to Gal Hershkovitz, Hagichon, and theMunicipality of Jerusalem for providing the data for this research. Theyalso express thanks to Rohit Deshpand, William Baker, Danit Ein-Gar,and three anonymous JMreviewers for their helpful and constructive com-ments. The research was conducted while the authors were visiting schol-ars at Harvard University: the first author at the Harvard Business Schooland the second author at Kennedy School of Government.

In recent years, two global trends have dramatically

changed cultures, consumption patterns, and marketers

behaviors. The first, the protection and development of

public goods, especially the environment, has become a

major concern for societies (e.g., Baker and Sinkula 2005;

Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap 2003). Second, global popula-

tions have become increasingly diverse and multiethnic,

leading to an increase in conflict between different ethnicgroups (e.g., Grier and Deshpand 2001; Penaloza and

Gilly 1999). In the wake of the first trend, public policy

makers in many countries have tried to discourage people

from consuming products or following behaviors that may

have a negative effect on the environment, using economic,

legal, technological, and demarketing approaches. However,

the effectiveness of these efforts, particularly demarketing,

which is of special interest to marketers and marketing

scholars, is not clear (Pechmann et al. 2003; Wall 2005).

Furthermore, the use of proenvironmental demarketing is

more complex in highly heterogeneous societies with influ-

ential minority groups and increased interethnic conflict.

Although there have been calls to account for cultural diver-

sity through minority targeting in marketing efforts (e.g.,

Deshpand and Stayman 1994), an important open question

is whether and under what conditions minority groups con-

form to the general norm of provisioning public goods and,specifically, how these groups react to government demar-

keting efforts in an environmental context. Knowledge of

the ways minority groups behave in this context would help

policy makers better cater to the heterogeneous needs of

different ethnic groups, minimize tension and conflict

among these groups, and implement policy more effec-

tively, while developing and protecting the environment.

We contend that minority consumers motivation to

respond positively to a governments demarketing cam-

paign is often shaped by the tension between national and

minority group attachment. National attachment reflects a

persons feelings of loyalty and patriotism to and sense of

identification with a country (Sidanius et al. 1997). Minor-ity group attachment reflects a persons respect for the main

symbols of the group, its rules, and leadership and the belief

that the group is superior to others (Roccas, Klar, and Livi-

atan 2006). There is often a conflict between attachment to

a minority group and attachment to the country because

minorities and the majority may possess a different set of

goals and priorities (Berger and Heath 2007; Triandis

1995). In turn, this may result in severe ethnic conflict and

substantial economic losses to a country (Penaloza and

Gilly 1999; Triandis 1995). Furthermore, because con-


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106 / Journal of Marketing, March 2009

sumers often use consumption as a way to express them-selves (Aaker 1999; Belk 1988), particularly in productdomains that are symbolic of identity (Berger and Heath2007; Levy 1959), minority consumers may use consump-tion or deconsumption to manifest their social identity,beliefs, and goals as minorities, demonstrating their posi-tion in relation to the majority group and the governmentthat represents it (Deshpand and Stayman 1994; Ustunerand Holt 2007). This suggests that the greater the tensionbetween national and group attachment, the less is minority

consumers motivation to respond positively to nationaldemarketing efforts.

Our conceptual framework combines research ondemarketing and environmental protection with literatureon group attachment and consumption as self-expression.Drawing on this, we develop a set of hypotheses aimed atunderstanding the effect of a government proenvironmentaldemarketing campaign on minority groups versus themajority population, its effect on minority groups with dif-ferent national attachment levels, and the moderating effectof a key consumer characteristicnamely, educationonthe consumption pattern of the minority and majoritygroups. Specifically, we use household-level data on actual

consumers behavior to understand the implications of agovernment campaign aimed at reducing water consump-tion. The depletion of water resources is a major concern tosocieties and constitutes a frequently studied research areain environmental studies (Potter 2001; Talukdar, Gulyani,and Salmen 2005). Furthermore, household water consump-tion provides an interesting case because of its extremelylow demand elasticity (Deutsch and Liebermann 1985).Finally, water and the meaning of water play an importantrole in shaping national attachment and conflicts amonggroups (Alatout 2006; Menahem 1998; Morag 2001). Westudied a government demarketing campaign that tookplace in Israel in the 19992001 period, following a few

years of drought that, in turn, led to a crisis in the Israeliwater sector. We draw our large and heterogeneous sample(N = 66,272) from Jerusalem, Israels capital and a highlyheterogeneous metropolis. Jerusalem includes three mainminority groupsIsraeli Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, andJewish Russian immigrantswho live alongside the major-ity of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews. The Israeli case is alsounique because it enables us to jointly study and comparethree facets of minorities: religion (Jews versus Muslimsand Christians), ethnic background (ultra-Orthodox Jewsversus Jewish Russian immigrants), and immigration status(immigrants versus nonimmigrants).

This article contributes to the marketing literature inseveral ways. First, it addresses and jointly studies two

important global trends: environmental protection and theemergence of multiethnic societies composed of influentialminority groups. It tests the effect of a government proenvi-ronmental demarketing campaign on minority groups, thuscontributing to research on ethnic and minority groupscon-sumption patterns and reactions to marketers efforts (e.g.,Deshpand and Stayman 1994; Grier and Deshpand 2001;Penaloza 1994) and to research on environmental marketing(e.g., Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap 2003; Pieters et al. 1998;Schlegelmilch, Bohlen, and Diamantopoulos 1996).

Specifically, we find that the three minority groups studiedwere less responsive than the majority population in reduc-ing their water consumption and that the less the nationalattachment of the minority group, the less responsive wasthe group. The findings suggest that higher education levelswere related to a more positive response across both minor-ity and majority consumers.

Second, the study contributes to the debate in marketingabout the effectiveness of demarketing (Pechmann et al.2003), providing evidence of a general positive effect in the

population. The validity of our results is enhanced becausethe product examined is household water consumption,an item with extremely low demand elasticity. To beregarded successful in such a product category, a demarket-ing campaign must overcome relatively strong consumerresistance (Deutsch and Liebermann 1985).

Third, the study is one of the few available empiricaldemarketing and environmental marketing studies based onactual consumer behavior, not self-reported attitudes(Deutsch and Liebermann 1985). This has several advan-tages over previous research, which has typically examinedconsumer attitudes using self-reported measures (Schlegel-milch, Bohlen, and Diamantopoulos 1996). Although self-

reports can provide valuable insights into consumer motiva-tions and attitudes, they might be biased because of theirsubjective nature. In addition, previous research has demon-strated a weak linkage between consumer attitudes andactual behavior (Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg 1996;Schlegelmilch, Bohlen, and Diamantopoulos 1996). Finally,the sample we used is especially large and at the householdlevel rather than the aggregate level.

We organize the rest of this article as follows: We beginwith a review of the relevant literature and present ourhypotheses. Then, we describe the methods used and ourmain findings. We conclude with a discussion of the find-ings, a discussion of the studys limitations, and suggestions

for further research.

Conceptual Development

Environmental Protection:The ConsumerPerspective

The conservation and protection of the natural environmentis an area of growing interest for policy makers, marketers,consumers, and society as a whole (Baker and Sinkula2005; Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap 2003; Granzin andOlsen 1991; Menon and Menon 1997). Research in this areadiscusses the ways governments, companies, and con-sumers can develop and protect the environment. It specifi-

cally suggests that 30%40% of environmental degradationhas been brought about by the consumption activities of pri-vate households (Grunert 1993). Thus, changing consumerbehavior can have a substantial impact on the environment(McDougall et al. 1981; Stern 1999).

Societys growing awareness of the environment has ledto consumers who demonstrate concern through their pur-chasing decisions, preferring environmentally friendly,green products (Menon and Menon 1997; Newell, Gold-smith, and Banzhaf 1998; Zinkhan and Carlson 1995). The


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Demarketing, Minorities, and National Attachment / 107

number of proenvironmental consumers is constantly rising,increasing the targeted population for proenvironmentalmarketing and demarketing efforts (Granzin and Olsen1991; Menon and Menon 1997; Pieters et al. 1998).

Nonetheless, this behavioral change is not easy for mostconsumers. There are many products and behaviors whosedeconsumption would benefit the environment but whosepersonal benefits to consumers are only secondary; further-more, such environmental benefits are often associated withthe distant future (Kasulis, Huettner, and Dikeman 1981;

Osterhus 1997). Although the secondary personal benefits(e.g., social) should not be ignored, they are likely to be lessvalued when deconsumption is considered in the context ofenvironmental protection (Frederick, Loewenstein, andODonoghue 2002; Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg 1996). Inaddition, such behavioral changes are costly, involving, forexample, switching and transportation costs (Osterhus1997; Pieters et al. 1998). Overall, this suggests that theintangible, costly, indirect future benefits of deconsumingnon-environmentally-friendly products raise concerns aboutthe ability to elicit desired consumer behavior (Pechmann etal. 2003; Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg 1996; Zinkhan andCarlson 1995).

Demarketing

The need to change consumer behavior in the context of theenvironment leads public policy makers to employ a rangeof economic, legal, technological, and demarketing treat-ments (e.g., Andrews et al. 2004; Stern 1999; Wall 2005).Of special interest to marketers and marketing scholars isthe effectiveness of demarketing. The concept of demarket-ing can be traced back to the 1970s. It was first defined byKotler and Levy (1971, p. 75): Demarketing is the aspectof marketing that deals with discouraging customers in gen-eral or a certain class of customers in particular on either atemporary or a permanent basis. Demarketing campaigns

typically involve traditional marketing efforts, such asadvertising, public relations, and sponsorships (Deutsch andLiebermann 1985; Pechmann et al. 2003; Wall 2005).Empirical research on demarketing is scarce. Marketingscholars have studied demarketing primarily in the contextof smoking (e.g., Andrews et al. 2004; Pechmann et al.2003), drug use (e.g., Kelly, Swaim, and Wayman 1996),and energy conservation (e.g., Deutsch and Liebermann1985; Kasulis, Huettner, and Dikeman 1981), often focus-ing on government, not business, demarketing (Gerstner,Hess, and Chu 1993).

Although demarketing is viewed as more expensivethan regulatory and economic tools, it is increasingly being

employed (Andrews et al. 2004). Still, there is disagreementin the literature as to the effectiveness of these campaignsand whether they work better than alternative methods(Pechmann et al. 2003; Wall 2005). In the specific case ofproenvironmental deconsumption, evidence is also incon-clusive (e.g., Deutsch and Liebermann 1985; Newell, Gold-smith, and Banzhaf 1998; Osterhus 1997; Rangan, Karim,and Sandberg 1996). Overall, therefore, it is unclearwhether demarketing works well in general and, in particu-lar, for proenvironmental issues.

Group Attachment

The growth of heterogeneous societies involving influentialminorities may have significant consequences for consumerbehavior in an environmental context. Specifically, thedegree of tension between majority and minority groupsmay be important in explaining minority consumers will-ingness to protect the environment. Next, we introduce theconcept of group attachment and discuss how tensionbetween national attachment and minority group attachmentmay evolve.

Across many disciplines, there is interest in examiningthe links people have to their groups. For example, socialpsychologists are interested in the way people identify witha group (e.g., Gaertner and Insko 2000), cross-culturalpsychologists examine the tendency to extend the self toinclude groups (e.g., Triandis 1995), political scientistsexamine identification with political parties and the nation(e.g., Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), and marketing schol-ars study the impact of identification with a country on con-sumer behavior (e.g., Balabanis et al. 2001).

Group attachment is evident when there is the emer-gence of a social pattern consisting of closely linked peoplewho consider themselves a part of one or more collectives

(family, coworkers, tribe, country). People who are highlyattached to their social groups are primarily motivated bythe norms of and duties imposed by those collectives, andthey are willing to give priority to the goals of these collec-tives over their own personal goals and to emphasize theirconnectedness to the members of these collectives (Triandis1995). In the specific case of national attachment, peopledefine themselves in terms of their country membership.They extend their self-concept to include the country,respect the central symbols of the country (e.g., its flag,national anthem, rules, leadership), and believe that theircountry is better and more worthy than other countries(Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006). National attachment is

associated with patriotism, which is defined as the positiveidentification with the values of ones country or simply aslove for ones country (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989;Schatz and Staub 1997).

In the case of minorities, these groups often face thedilemma of balancing their in-group attachment with theirattachment to their country (Sidanius et al. 1997). Indeed,the recent and dramatic increase in interethnic conflict andtension within multiethnic states (for examples, seePenaloza and Gilly 1999) raises the question whether it ispossible to foster loyalty and identification with ones ownethnic group and, at the same time, maintain shared nationalvalues and a sense of common national identification (Sida-

nius et al. 1997). There is an underlying assumption thatnational identity, or a sense of belongingness to thenation, is more strongly associated with membership in adominant ethnic group (i.e., the majority) and less stronglyassociated with membership in subordinate groups (i.e., theminorities) (Sidanius et al. 1997). Furthermore, this state ofnational attachment is stable, not sensitive to contextualcues (Roccas et al. 2008).

The tension between majority and minority groups andthe associated differences in national attachment are driven


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by several forces. First, the groups often possess differentsets of priorities and goals, and the tension increases whenminority groups are not willing to sacrifice their goals forthe sake of the majority (Triandis 1995). Second, dominantgroups (i.e., the majority) often regard themselves as havinga preeminent right to and ownership of the country, itsresources, and its symbols, sometimes placing restrictionson the legal and social rights of subordinate groups (i.e., theminorities) (Sidanius et al. 1997). Indeed, in many coun-tries, minorities lack political access and power and often

experience discrimination, inequality, and alienation (e.g.,Askegaard, Arnould, and Kjeldgaard 2005; Kretzmer 1990;Ling 2004; Ustuner and Holt 2007). Third, minorities oftendissociate themselves from the majority to strengthen theirsocial identity (Deshpand and Stayman 1994; Ustuner andHolt 2007). Finally, tension is often apparent when peoplewith affective attachment to the country show intolerancetoward people and groups that do not conform to the coun-trys norms, such as minorities (Duckitt 1989).

Consumption as Self-Expression

The degree of national attachment can be manifestedthrough consumers consumption patterns. Consumers often

use consumption as a way to express their identity andbeliefs, and products are often consumed because of whatthey symbolize (Levy 1959). Objects, such as brands, andconsumption patterns, such as eating out, can be associatedwith personality traits that provide self-expressive or sym-bolic benefits for the consumer (Aaker 1999; Berger andHeath 2007). These behaviors are important drivers of con-sumer preference and choice (Belk 1988).

Consumers self-conception and the associated self-expressive behaviors depend on the particular social role theconsumer is playing, the degree of salience of this role, andthe product domain (Aaker 1999; Belk 1988). Affiliationwith a minority group is a salient social role, much more

than belonging to a majority group (Deshpand and Stay-man 1994). Previous research in marketing has exploredhow affinity to a minority group affects consumption pat-terns and responsiveness to advertising. For example,Crockett and Wallendorf (2004) study how the political ide-ology of African American consumers structures their con-sumer choice as minorities, and Deshpand and colleagues(e.g., Deshpand and Stayman 1994; Grier and Deshpand2001) examine how marketers can leverage salient ethnicityamong the Mexican American minority in the United Statesto gain positive responses from this group of consumers.

Regarding the effect of product domains, previousresearch in anthropology, psychology, and marketing hassuggested that consumption is used to express desired iden-tities, especially when products are more symbolic (e.g.,Belk 1988; Berger and Heath 2007; Cialdini et al. 1976;Levy 1959; Strang 2005; Ustuner and Holt 2007). Identity-relevant products involve, for example, a flag, a universitysweatshirt, a national monument, or natural resources (Belk1988; Berger and Heath 2007; Strang 2005). Naturalresources, such as water and land, have often been studiedas identity-relevant symbolic products (Alatout 2006;Strang 2005). Of special interest to this study is the linkbetween water consumption and a persons national iden-

tity. The rich literature on water in anthropology, geogra-phy, policy, and environmental studies suggests that water,an essential resource to all human beings, can be viewed asa symbolic material that creates different national identitiesand boundaries (e.g., Alatout 2006; Blatter, Ingram, andLevesque 2001; Menahem 1998; Morag 2001; Strang2005). In the Middle East, the context of this study, water isa component of economic development and national secu-rity and a source of regional conflict (Blatter, Ingram, andLevesque 2001; Le Billon 2001). Indeed, water often stands

at the heart of national conflicts and disputes over bordersand resources, which in turn emphasizes its centrality to themeaning of national identity (Blatter, Ingram, and Levesque2001; Le Billon 2001; Morag 2001).

Identity-relevant products, such as water, are highlyrelevant in the case of minorities who want to establish andcommunicate effectively their social identity (Deshpandand Stayman 1994). Thus, minority consumers are likely touse consumption as a means to manifest their social iden-tity, beliefs, and goals as minorities, demonstrating theirposition in relation to the majority group and the govern-ment that represents it. Indeed, as we discuss in detail in thenext section, minority and majority groups in the Israeli

case we study possess different meanings of water andwater consumption that are likely to reflect on their nationalidentity and attachment. Furthermore, because self-expression should be congruent with the groups beliefs andgoals (Berger and Heath 2007; Sirgy 1982), in the case ofan identity-relevant marketing effort, such as a governmentdemarketing campaign, and the associated identity-relevantproductnamely, the protection of national waterresourcesthe self-expressed consumption pattern is mostlikely to reflect the groups attitudes toward the governmentand the country.

Synthesis and Hypotheses

We develop a set of hypotheses aimed at understanding theeffect of a government proenvironmental demarketing cam-paign on minority groups versus the majority population, aswell as its effect on minority groups with different nationalattachment levels. In addition, we study the effect of educa-tion levels on majority and minority consumers responsesto demarketing efforts. Education is a central sociodemo-graphic factor, important for understanding and characteriz-ing different minority and proenvironmental consumers(Ergil 2000; Schlegelmilch, Bohlen, and Diamantopoulos1996).

Although our preceding discussion of demarketing andconsumers proenvironmental behavior offers mixed evi-dence regarding the merit of demarketing campaigns, takentogether with the trend toward environmentalism and thegrowing number of proenvironmental consumers, wehypothesize that, overall, a government proenvironmentaldemarketing campaign can positively affect the majoritypopulation. First, increasing concerns for the environmentand the growing awareness of environmental issues suggestthat consumers exposed to a proenvironmental campaignare more motivated than before to adopt the desirable con-sumption behavior (Pieters et al. 1998). Second, previousresearch has found that consumers are now more willing to


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pay a premium for environmentally friendly products(Menon and Menon 1997; Newell, Goldsmith, and Banzhaf1998). This implies that consumers may also be willing topay the costs of sacrificing favored or customary behaviorsfor a common public goal by deconsuming products thathave a negative environmental effect (Pieters et al. 1998;Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg 1996). In the specific case ofgovernment demarketing, the motivation underlying thebehavior of the majority group can be altruistic and patri-otic, involving a true sense of concern about the environ-

ment and the public good. Although the motivation mayalso be egoistic, involving a search for psychological out-comes, such as recognition or a sense of pride, these toorepresent a strong identification with the idea of contribut-ing to the country (Belk 1988; Luo 2005). These motiva-tions are less likely to be shared by minority groups.Minorities sense of national attachment is likely to belower than that of the majority group, they often hold lesspositive attitudes toward the government, the countrysgoals as reflected by the government campaign are often notcongruent with the goals of the minority group, and minori-ties often dissociate themselves from the majority tostrengthen their social identity (Deshpand and Stayman

1994; Sidanius et al. 1997; Triandis 1995). Thus, we sug-gest that minorities are likely to manifest their consumptionpatterns to reflect a less positive response to the governmentcampaign.

This conclusion seems especially true in the case ofwater deconsumption in the Israeli context we studybecause water takes on different meanings by the majorityand minority groups, causing it to be differently associatedwith the groups national attachment. For the majoritygroup of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews, the meaning of water isclosely associated with national attachment because it islinked to the process of nation building and establishmentof its Jewish identity (Alatout 2006; Azaryahu 2001).

Specifically, water symbolizes the ethos of the Halutzim,the Zionist pioneers who established agricultural settle-ments in Palestine during the nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies and who are considered the founders of the Jewishstate (Azaryahu 2001; Menahem 1998; Morag 2001). It alsosymbolizes the countrys economic and demographic devel-opment because water and water management played amajor role in allowing the absorption of large-scale Jewishimmigration and the creation of Jewish demographic pres-ence in arid regions of the state (Menahem 1998; Morag2001). Finally, water is associated with the countrys tech-nological advancements that have led Israel to be a leader inmodern agriculture, water research and management, anddesert development (Morag 2001). Conversely, for the

largest minority in Israel, the Israeli Arabs, though currentlyan equal partner for water consumption, water symbolizesthe historic, ongoing conflict over water supply and sourcesbetween Israel and the surrounding Arab entities, as well assome inequalities in the allocation of water rations for agri-culture (Beeri, Carmon, and Shamir 2005; Blatter, Ingram,and Levesque 2001; Ichilov 2003). The Jewish Russianimmigrants also do not share the majoritys view of waterbecause they all come from a country that is rich in thisresource and are not as strongly attached to the ethos of the

1Although we contend that, in general, there are significant dif-ferences between national attachment levels of the three minoritygroups and that each group is relatively homogeneous, it is impor-tant to note that within each minority group there is a range ofopinions and behaviors and that exceptions can be found.

Halutzim and nation building (Carmeli and Fadlon 1997;Leshem and Sicron 1998). Finally, for ultra-Orthodox Jews,some of which are hostile toward the secularist Zionistmovement and state, water may take on religious symbol-ism, but its role in the foundation and development of mod-ern Israel is less meaningful (Stadler 2002; Toft 2002).Thus:

H1: Government demarketing of proenvironmental products ismore positively related to the deconsumption behavior ofmajority group consumers than to the deconsumption

behavior of minority group consumers.

Different minority groups may possess differentnational attachment levels because each ethnic group main-tains its own particular goals and priorities, cultural charac-teristics, and attitudes toward the notion of full participationin the dominant society (Sidanius et al. 1997). A centralstream of research on the emergence of minority groups andtheir national attachment discusses different motivations forimmigrating. Specifically, immigration motivated by thedesire to assimilate in a new country (e.g., immigration dri-ven by political ideology) is expected to lead to highernational attachment than immigration motivated by otherreasons (e.g., searching for economic opportunities, joiningother family members, escaping economic recession)(Leshem and Sicron 1998; Penaloza 1994). It has also beensuggested that some minority groups put more effort thanothers into increasing involvement in the society throughpolitical, economic, cultural, and educational activity. Inturn, this is likely to increase national attachment. Forexample, De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia (1996) find thatMexican Americans use ethnicity to create resources, suchas group solidarity and political organizations, to facilitatetheir full participation in American society. Finally, differ-ent minority groups express their culture and beliefs invarying consumption patterns. For example, while Indianimmigrants to the United States often consume products

and items that are brought from India, Mexican Americanconsumption patterns tend to be similar on many dimen-sions to those of Anglo-Americans in the southwesternUnited States (Penaloza 1994). In turn, consuming localbrands and following local consumption patterns are likelyto increase the sense of national attachment.

The three minority groups in our studyIsraeli Arabs,ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Russian immigrantspossess dif-ferent national attachment levels.1 Israeli Arabs possess thelowest attachment level. First, they differ from both themajority and other minority groups in their religion (theyare mostly Muslims and Christians, not Jews). This estab-lishes their position as a subordinate group in Israel, a coun-

try that is defined as the Jewish state in its declaration ofindependence, national anthem, and laws (Kretzmer 1990;Toft 2002). Second, many Israeli Arabs have family rela-tions with Palestinians, citizens of the Palestinian Authorityin the West Bank and Gaza. Some even affiliate themselves


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with the Palestinian Authority. This leads to conflictingfeelings of commitment to and identification with Israelbecause of the long-term violent territorial conflict betweenPalestinians and Israelis (Gordon and Arian 2001; Ichilov2003). Third, fighting for ones country is considered ameasure of patriotism, and soldiers who fight and sacrificethemselves for the country are an example of the lengths towhich people are willing to go in the name of the countryand national attachment (Gibson and Abell 2004). In thisrespect, the vast majority of Israeli Arabs do not join the

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), though Israeli Jews mustcomplete a mandatory military service of two to three years(Toft 2002). Military service is especially important inIsrael, where it is perceived as a symbol of good citizenship,shapes civic identities, and reflects differential modes ofparticipation in and belonging to the Israeli state (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999; Sasson-Levy 2002). Finally,Israeli Arabs reside in their own separate neighborhoodsand have developed an education system that is independentof the state (Cohen 2004; Kop 2005).

Ultra-Orthodox Jews are second to Israeli Arabs in theirlow national attachment levels. Although they belong to theJewish majority and are better institutionalized and linked

to the Israeli country and its resources than the Arab minor-ity (Gordon and Arian 2001), this religious group is highlysegregated and follows a different agenda than that of thesecular Israeli state. Its main goal is the establishment of areligious Jewish state that will have religious education andlifestyle, regulated by this groups interpretation of the HolyScripture (Stadler 2002; Toft 2002). The fundamental con-flict between secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews sometimesleads to violent acts by ultra-Orthodox extremists, which inturn increases the tension and animosity between thesegroups (Gordon and Arian 2001; Toft 2002). Many ultra-Orthodox Jews do not support the existence of the secularIsraeli state and do not fully participate in daily life.

Specifically, a large share of ultra-Orthodox men do notwork, opting to attend religious school (yeshiva) fulltime, and they typically do not serve in the IDF, despite themandatory military service imposed on Israeli Jews (Ichilov2003; Toft 2002). In addition, ultra-Orthodox Jews reside intheir own discrete neighborhoods and have developed aneducation system that is independent of the state (Cohen2004; Kop 2005).

Russian immigrants possess the highest national attach-ment level among the three minority groups. First, althoughmany of these immigrants migrated to Israel because of fearand economic reasons, escaping waves of anti-Semitismand economic recession in the former Soviet Union, sub-stantial numbers over the years were Zionists and came out

of a sense of identification with the Jewish state (Leshemand Sicron 1998). Second, this group has made efforts toparticipate fully in and assimilate into the Israeli society inthe years since their immigration; they contribute to scien-tific work, entrepreneurial and business activities, the arts,sports, and political life, and they typically serve in the IDF(Carmeli and Fadlon 1997; Lerner and Menahem 2003;Leshem and Sicron 1998). Unlike ultra-Orthodox Jews andIsraeli Arabs, they live in mixed neighborhoods and sendtheir children to the state education system (Cohen 2004;

Kop 2005). Third, compared with the other minoritygroups, this group of immigrants is relatively new to thecountry, the majority of whom arrived in the early 1990s.Thus, they have had less time to make negative inferencesabout the government and the country. In turn, this is likelyto lead to less negative national attachment levels, asreflected through their consumption experiences (Belk1988; Proshansky 1978). Still, throughout its assimilationprocess, this group has retained many of its traditions andsocial arrangements, including its language, establishing a

social identity that is different from that of native Israelis(Leshem and Sicron 1998). In addition, compared with themajority of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews, Russian immigrantshave more negative attitudes toward the IDF and thus areless willing to join it (Ben-Shalom and Horenczyk 2002;Carmeli and Fadlon 1997).

In the context of water, this national resource is equallydistributed among all Israeli households, and there are noconflicts over water among the different groups or evidenceof significant difference in usage patterns (Beeri, Carmon,and Shamir 2005). However, there is a historic, ongoingconflict regarding water supply and sources between Israeland the surrounding Arab entities (Blatter, Ingram, and

Levesque 2001), as well as some inequalities in allocationof water rations for agriculture among Israeli Arabs (Ichilov2003). This may have an impact only on the Israeli Arabs,contributing to their low national attachment levels andincreasing their antagonism toward the notion of protectingIsraels water resources. Thus:

H2: National attachment of the minority group moderates therelationship between government demarketing of proenvi-ronmental products and deconsumption behavior ofminority group consumers, such that the higher thenational attachment, the stronger is the relationshipbetween government demarketing and deconsumptionbehavior.

The relationship between minority group associationand the response to a government proenvironmental cam-paign may be moderated by consumers level of education.There is evidence that more educated consumers are morelikely to be aware of environmental problems and act in anenvironmentally friendly manner (Schlegelmilch, Bohlen,and Diamantopoulos 1996; Torras and Boyce 1998). Theseconsumers are likely to seek knowledge, are capable ofinterpreting it and its implications, often critically assessgovernment actions, and are more politically involved(Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap 2003; Schlegelmilch, Bohlen,and Diamantopoulos 1996; Torras and Boyce 1998). Educa-tional levels have been linked to greater participation inenvironmental protection activities, energy conservation,and willingness to pay more for environmental cleanup(Granzin and Olsen 1991).

This suggests that both majority and minority con-sumers with high education levels will be knowledgeableabout environmental problems and solutions. Still, it is notclear whether both will be motivated to act in anenvironmentally friendly manner. Highly educated con-sumers belonging to the majority group will likely be moti-vated to contribute to the public good and respond posi-tively to the government proenvironmental demarketing


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campaign, but minority consumers are likely to face adilemma. It has been suggested that the more educated theminority person, the more likely he or she is to be consciousand active in using consumption to manifest self- and socialidentity (Belk 1988; Sirgy 1982). Thus, these people aremore knowledgeable not only about environmental issuesbut also about their social identity and social, economical,and political goals as a minority group, and they are oftenthe leading activists (Pick and Dayaram 2006). This knowl-edge might make them the greatest opponents of the gov-

ernment, leading them not to follow the general norm ofprovisioning public goods. Still, in an environmental con-text, more educated minority consumers are likely to beaware of the long-term, negative, and sometimes irre-versible consequences of a non-environmentally-friendlybehavior and of its potential effect on the minority group. Inturn, this is expected to lead to responsible behavior. Thus,we suggest that higher education levels, whether amongmajority or minority consumers, lead to more positive reac-tions to the demarketing effort:

H3: Consumer education moderates the relationship betweengovernment demarketing of proenvironmental productsand deconsumption behavior among consumer groups

with different attachment levels, such that the higher theeducation, the stronger is the relationship between govern-ment demarketing and deconsumption behavior for allgroups.

Methods

Study Context

The study was conducted in Jerusalem, Israel. Israels waterresources depend mainly on two large equippers and on theSea of Galilee, which are all interconnected. Natural waterresource usage reached its maximum potential in the mid-

1990s. Both 1999 and 2000 were drought years, and toavoid supply difficulties, the Israeli government needed tofind ways to reduce water usage. As the drought developed,the government decided to raise water prices and limit thewater supply quotas for agricultural use only. Because ofthe low price elasticity of household water demand and theregressive effect of a potential rise in household waterprices, the government decided to undertake a water savingscampaign instead of using the price tool. As we report ingreater detail subsequently, the price for household waterusage was fixed for the period of interest (19992001), andthere were no quotas for household water consumption.

The large-scale government campaign included mass-media advertisements, an educational program for schools

and youth movements, and campaigns aimed at both themajority population and the three central minority groups(i.e., Israeli Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Russian immi-grants). The government budget invested in the campaignwas 11.25 million Israeli shekels ($2.5 million). The maintheme was, Think a drop (in Hebrew, drop is also asmall amount). The campaign was instructional (Rangan,Karim, and Sandberg 1996), involving instructions abouteasy things people could do at home to reduce water con-sumption and frequent reminders to them. The same theme

2Prices included two tariffs: water and sewage charges.Jerusalem used a three-block IBT (increasing block tariff) pricingstructure set by the Israeli parliament. In 19992001, the averageprice in the first block, applying to the first 96 cubic meters (m 3),was $1.2/m3 including a sewage surcharge. The price in the secondblock, for additional consumption up to 84m3, was $1.5/m3. Thecharge for all extra consumption was $1.9/m3. Water prices were

not adjusted to inflation automatically. Thus, until it was adjustedin August 2001, the real price of water in Jerusalem actually hadbeen moderately declining.

and spokesperson (a young boy) were used across the dif-ferent consumer groups, and customization was mostly lan-guage based: The campaign aimed at the majority popula-tion was in Hebrew, the one aimed at Israeli Arabs was inArabic, the one aimed at ultra-Orthodox Jews was inHebrew, and the one aimed at Russian immigrants was inRussian. The campaign involved three intensive efforts,each lasting a month between 1999 and 2001 (winter 19992000, summer 2000, and winter 20002001) (Beeri, Car-mon, and Shamir 2005).

In the natural-experiment setting we examined, it is dif-ficult to conclude that changes in household water con-sumption are entirely the result of the demarketing cam-paign. Still, we present several arguments in support of thisnotion. First, the price of water in Jerusalem was fixed forthe entire relevant period (January 1999December 2001).2

Second, the campaign was widespread and reached theentire Israeli population. Specifically, demarketing effortswere distributed according to the relative size of the tar-geted groups; the majority of non-ultra-Orthodox Jewsreceived most of the attention, followed by the IsraeliArabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Russian immigrants(Beeri, Carmon, and Shamir 2005). Six exposure surveys of

the entire population were undertaken during and after thecampaign, confirming high pubic exposure rates (75% onaverage) (Beeri, Carmon, and Shamir 2005). Third, beforethe campaign, household water consumption was in a con-tinuous upswing for a decade (Figure 1). Finally, the aver-age temperatures in 19992001 were similar (Figure 2).

FIGURE 1Yearly per Capita Household Water Consumption

in Israel: 19922002

Source: Israel state budget for 2004.


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FIGURE 2

Average Temperatures in Israel: 19992001

Source: The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2005).

Sample and Data Collection

This study uses disaggregate actual behavior data. The datainclude information on household-level water consumptionand on several other household characteristics in Jerusalem.The citys diversified household structure makes this dataset attractive. It contains enough households to test theeffect of demarketing on different minority groups (IsraeliArabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, Russian immigrants) and onthe majority of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews. Data came fromthree sources: Hagichon (the only water supply company in

Jerusalem), the Municipality of Jerusalem, and the Ministryof the Interior.The original data cover water consumption for most

households in Jerusalem for the 19992001 period. Becauseof data limitations and to facilitate a longitudinal assess-

ment of the same households during the entire period, wefocused only on households that remained in the sameapartment for the entire period and retained their householdsize. In addition, we conducted an outlier analysis andremoved from the sample observations with a deviation of40% or more in water consumption (both down and up)between 1999 and 2001 because these can substantiallyinflate the samples standard deviation and affect overallresults (Hadi 1992). To demonstrate the robustness of ourresults, we subsequently conducted an analysis that

includes outliers and found that our results do not change.Thus, the original sample, which involves data on waterconsumption, is labeled Sample 1 and involves 66,272observations. We then merged Sample 1 with data onhousehold schooling to create Sample 2. The latter data setoriginates in the municipalitys education department andinvolves data on the schooling years of parents and theirchildren. Unfortunately, this data set does not contain edu-cation data for all households. Rather, it includes only dataon households with children in the school system in the lastdecade (19952004). Thus, Sample 2 involves 30,543observations. Table 1 details the original data, the mergingprocess, and the two samples we use.

Measures

We measured household water savings by water savingsrate. We measured the decline in household water consump-tion following the demarketing campaign (in 2001) as a per-centage of household water consumption before the cam-paign (in 1999). We also conducted all the analyses usingan alternative dependent variablenamely, water quantitysaved between 1999 and 2001 in cubic meters (m3); ourresults do not change.

For minority status, our sample captures Jerusalemsfour main groups of population: the majority of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews and the three minority groups: Israeli Arabs,

ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Russian immigrants. Thoseminority groups have their own commercial centers andadvertisement channels. Furthermore, the ultra-OrthodoxJewish and Israeli Arab communities have their own neigh-borhoods. An ultra-Orthodox Jewish household is defined

TABLE 1

The Data Sets

All Populations With Schooling Data

The Majority The Majorityof Non-Ultra- of Non-Ultra-

All Orthodox Jews All Orthodox Jews

Data set for 1999a 103,381 71,854 44,519 29,851

Data set for 2000a 107,973 75,374 46,543 31,367

Data set for 2001a 109,729 76,697 47,277 31,892

Merged data set for 19992001 79,323 57,752 34,350 24,754Merged data set without deviation of 20% or more 45,168 32,851 21,704 15,404Merged data set without deviation of 40% or more 66,272 48,674 30,543 22,034

aWe excluded observations for several reasons: households with shared meters, households larger than 12 people, and households thatmetered only part of the year.


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as such if it is located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood,as classified by the Jerusalem master plan (Cohen 2004).Similarly, a household is defined as Israeli Arab if it islocated in an Arab neighborhood, as classified by theJerusalem master plan. The Jerusalem master plan charac-terizes 200 neighborhoods in the city. This increases theaccuracy of this measure. A new immigrant is entitled toreduced property tax for one year during his or her first fiveyears in the country. We define a household as a new immi-grant if it received this tax reduction for any year between

1999 and 2001. Most new immigrants in Israel come fromthe former Soviet Union and speak Russian (Leshem andSicron 1998). Therefore, we define them as Russian immi-grants. As we noted previously, the three minority groupspossess different national attachment levels. Russian immi-grants are expected to have the highest national attachmentlevels, followed by ultra-Orthodox Jews and then IsraeliArabs. To validate this ranking, we use data on level ofpatriotism. Patriotism reflects an important emotional bondwith a country and is often used to measure national attach-ment and identification (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989;Schatz and Staub 1997). Specifically, we use secondarydata obtained from a survey of a representative sample of

Israeli citizens that was conducted by the Institute for Pol-icy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya(Institute for Policy and Strategy 2007). The survey, titledPatriotism and National Strength in Israel, was conductedfor the first time in 2005 and then again in 2006. The mea-sure of patriotism involved the question, Do you consideryourself very much patriotic, very patriotic, somewhatpatriotic, or not very patriotic? This measure has beenwidely used in both academic and applied research (e.g.,American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research2007; Bennet and Resnick 1990). The findings are consis-tent across 2005/2006 and suggest that the majority (72%)of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews possess the highest levels of

patriotism (i.e., very much patriotic and very patriotic),followed by the Russian immigrants (64%), the ultra-Orthodox Jews (49%), and finally the Israeli Arabs (28%).

We measured education as the schooling years of theheads of the household. When there were two adults in thehousehold, we took the maximum figure. In the analysis,we follow previous research in economics (e.g., Lahiri andXing 2004) and use the dichotomous variableacademicversus nonacademic educationwith 13 schooling years asthe cutoff point. An alternative measureaverage schoolingyears of the householdyields similar results.

In addition, we control for wealth, household size, andlawn ownership. Previous research in marketing and envi-ronmental economics has suggested that wealthier con-

sumers are more concerned about the environment and aremore active about its preservation (McConnell 1997;Newell, Goldsmith, and Banzhaf 1998). We measuredwealth as apartment size. This is a good proxy of householdpermanent income (Dahan and Nisan 2007). The use of analternative measureapartment size per personyieldssimilar results. We also control for household size as itappears in the Ministry of the Interior data. Finally, wecontrol for lawn ownership because 12% of households in

Jerusalem have irrigated lawns. Lawn size can represent awealth effect or irrigation decision following the campaign.We introduce two parameters in the regression: a dummyvariable for having a lawn and a continuous lawn sizevariable.

Analysis and Results

Descriptive Data

Average per-capita water consumption in Jerusalem is56m3/year, 7% lower than the average (60m3 /year) in coun-tries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Coopera-tion and Development (OECD) (see Figure 3). Table 2reports descriptive statistics of water savings rates andquantities by different household characteristics for thesample without schooling data (Sample 1). Because thesample with schooling data (Sample 2) shows similardescriptive findings, we discuss only Sample 1 data indetail.

The general demarketing effect we find is relativelyhighan average of 5.78% household water savings for theentire population. Large differences are evident among thedifferent groups we study: The water savings rate amongthe Israeli Arab population is very low (.7%), and the watersavings rate among ultra-Orthodox Jews (4.4%) and Russ-ian immigrants (5.2%) is less than the majority populationof non ultra-Orthodox Jews (6.6%).

There is a strong positive correlation between wealthand water savings; households with large apartments savemore than households with small apartments (7% and 4.9%,respectively). It is also evident that household size has anegative effect: Large households save less than smallhouseholds (4.1% and 6.9%, respectively). Lawn ownershipand lawn size show a positive influence (2.3% more than anaverage household and 8.3% savings on average, respec-tively). An additional relevant finding, based on the descrip-

tive analysis of Sample 2 (with schooling data), suggeststhat the water savings rate for households with academiceducation (6%) is higher than for households without acad-emic education (4.8%). Additional descriptive data on thestudys constructs, including the correlation matrix, means,and standard deviations, appear in Table 3.

Estimated Model

To estimate the effect of the demarketing campaign, wecompared household water consumption before and afterthe campaign. We ran a model using ordinary least squaresregression for the dependent variablerate of householdwater consumption decline between the years 1999 and

2001. The model is as follows:

where yi is the difference in household is water consump-tion between 1999 and 2001 and xi denotes a vector ofhousehold characteristics as documented in 1999, which isconstant until 2001. There are four groups of variables:minority status, education level, wealth indicators (apart-

( ) ,199

y

yi

i i= + + x


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FIGURE 3

Average per Capita Water Consumption in Israel and Other OECD Countries

Source: OECD (1999).

TABLE 2

Descriptive Statistics:Water Savings by Household Characteristics (Data Set Without Schooling Data:Sample 1)

Water WaterConsumption Consumption Decrease in Rate of Number of

1999 2001 Consumption Decrease Observations

All populations 227.94 212.34 15.61 5.78% 66,271

Consumer GroupsNon-ultra-Orthodox Jews 212.39 195.40 16.99 6.60% 48,674Israeli Arabs 322.81 317.03 5.78 .70% 4,242Ultra-Orthodox Jews 254.48 240.79 13.69 4.40% 13,355Russian immigrants 164.82 153.86 10.96 5.20% 299

Wealth (Apartment Size)a

Large apartment size 274.96 253.40 21.57 7.00% 28,622Small apartment size 183.76 173.26 10.49 4.94% 28,886Apartment size: missing data 220.02 207.02 13.00 4.58% 8,763

Control VariablesLarge householdsb 296.39 280.12 16.28 4.12% 26,595Small households 182.06 166.90 15.16 6.89% 39,676

Lawn owners 341.46 310.98 30.47 8.06% 9,588Large lawnsc 378.08 344.02 34.07 8.29% 5,504Small lawns 292.10 266.46 25.63 7.75% 4,084

aLarge is defined as more than the median (78 square meters).bLarge is defined as four members or more.cLarge is defined as more than the median (100 square meters).

ment size, lawn ownership), and household size. Regardingminority status, the regression includes three dummyvariables to represent the difference in the campaign effec-

tiveness on the majority population (non-ultra-OrthodoxJews only) compared with the minority groups: IsraeliArabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Russian immigrants.


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TABLE 3

Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics of the Studys Constructs

Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Water savings rate 1Household size .12** 1Wealth (apartment size) .07** .19** 1Apartment size: missing data .01* .13** .62** 1Lawn owners .07** .07** .28** .03** 1Lawn size .06** .03** .26** .01** .72** 1

Academic education .04** .05** .14** .01** .06** .03** 1Ultra-Orthodox Jews .05** .34** .06** .06** .10** .11** .19** 1Israeli Arabs .06** .13** .05** .01* .02** .08** .14** .11** 1Russian immigrants .01 .03** .03** .04** .01* .01 .02** .01 .01 1

M .05 4.43 81.40 .07 .18 23.97 .55 .24 .04 .00SD .17 2.09 36.89 .26 .39 70.27 .50 .43 .19 .05

*p< .05.**p< .01.

TABLE 4

Campaign Effectiveness

Dependent Variable:Water Savings Rate

Intercept

Household size

Wealth (apartment size)

Apartment size: missing data

Lawn owners

Lawn size

Academic education

Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Ultra-Orthodox Jews academiceducation

Israeli Arabs

Israeli Arabs academic

educationRussian immigrants

Russian immigrants academiceducation

F-valueAdjusted R2

Number of observations

Sample 1

.054**(.0001).008**(.0001).0004**

(.0001)

.022**(.0001).026**

(.0001).00003*(.0500)

.010**(.0001)

.047**(.0001)

.014(.1831)

175.9**.02

66,271

Sample 2

.056**(.0001).010**(.0001).0004**

(.0001)

.019**(.0001).026**

(.0001).00002(.4347).010**

(.0001).002

(.6954).009(.0534).034**(.0001).001

(.9339).021

(.5961).061(.1901)

76.5**.0330,543

*p< .05.**p< .01.Notes: p-values are in parentheses.

3To calculate the demarketing effect for the typical non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish household, we undertake the following proce-dure: Our point of departure is the regression intercept, which rep-resents the baseline effect on the average household in the entirepopulation. We then add to the intercept two multiplicative termsthat refer to the nondummy variables included in the regression:household and apartment size (specifically, for non-ultra-OrthodoxJewish households, we multiply their average household size[three family members] and average apartment size [80 squaremeters] by their estimates and add these terms to the intercept).Overall, the calculation (see Table 4) yields a demarketing effect

slightly above 6%: .054 + 3 (.008) + 80 (.0004) 6%. To cal-culate the demarketing effect for all other populations (IsraeliArabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, Russian immigrants), it is necessaryto add to the intercept (5.4%) the two multiplicative terms thatrefer to household and apartment size (multiplying the relevantregression coefficients by the specific groups average householdsize and average apartment size). To calculate the demarketingeffect for households with lawns, whether related to the majorityor minority groups, it is necessary to add to the overall demarket-ing effect of the group (e.g., approximately 6% in the case of non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish households) the lawn size dummy coeffi-cient (2.6%).

Results

The effect of demarketing on majority and minority

groups. Table 4 reports the coefficients andp-values for the

estimated model. We present the estimates for the model forboth samples (Samples 1 and 2).

Based on the analysis of Sample 1 (the data set withoutschooling data), the demarketing effect for an average non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish household, with average householdsize and wealth and without a lawn, is approximately 6% ofthe yearly household water consumption.3 All the minoritygroups responded less positively to the campaign: IsraeliArabs were less likely to save water (4.7%,p = .0001), fol-lowed by ultra-Orthodox Jews (1%, p = .0001). Althoughthe coefficient for Russian immigrants is also negative(1.4%,p = .1831), it is not significant, suggesting that thisgroup responded more positively to the campaign than the

other minority groups. We also conduct a series of t-tests toconfirm the differences between the estimators and find that

non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish households reacted significantlymore positively to the campaign than the ultra-OrthodoxJews (t-value = 5.47,p < .0001), who responded more posi-


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tively than the Israeli Arabs (t-value = 12.02, p < .0001).Still, the Russian immigrants responded more positively tothe campaign than the other minority groups because theestimator of this group is not significantly different fromthat of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews (t-value = 1.33,p > .1). Ingeneral, these findings support H1 and H2.

Education. From our analysis of Sample 2, which incor-porates schooling data, we conclude that households withacademic education save an average of 1% more thanhouseholds without academic education (p = .0001). This

implies approximately 10% more water saving quantities orcampaign effectiveness than households with lower educa-tion levels.

In the case of the interaction of education with differentminority groups, we find that the effects among IsraeliArabs (.1%, p = .9339) and Russian immigrants (6.1%,p = .1901) are nonsignificant, suggesting, as we expected,that the effect of education on these groups is similar to thatof the entire population. That is, these minority groups andthe majority population are affected similarly by education.The interaction effect of education with the ultra-OrthodoxJews was significant and negative (.09%, p = .0534). Thenegative sign estimator implies that the education effect on

a non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish household does not affect theultra-Orthodox group. As we explain in greater detail in theDiscussion section, this is likely the result of the unique,highly focused nature of education in this group (religiousstudies). This negative interaction effect, which contributesto the insignificant main effect of association with thispopulation on the campaign effectiveness, demonstrateshow this group differs from the entire population. Overall,therefore, these findings partially support H3.

Controls. The estimate for apartment size, whichreflects wealth, is .04% per square meter. This reflects apositive correlation between demarketing effects and levelof wealth. Each 25 square meters adds 1% more campaign

effectiveness, which implies 16% more than an averagehousehold. We also find that household size is significantand negative in all models, implying a negative effect onwater savings, most likely because of the limited impact onchildren. Finally, the lawn ownership dummy variable issignificant and positive in both models, reflecting a 2.6%additional demarketing wealth effect. Lawn size is signifi-cant only in the first model and can reflect either an addi-tional wealth effect or irrigation needs in 2001 comparedwith 1999.

Sensitivity analysis. We conducted several sensitivityanalyses to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. Wefirst attempted to rule out a main alternative explanation to

our findingsnamely, that the different responses to thedemarketing effort were the result of variation in exposureto the campaign by different groups rather than the result ofthe groups different national attachment levels. Thus, wedifferentiated between two subgroups belonging to thesame minority population on the basis of association withthe education systemstate versus independent. Becausethe two subgroups were likely to be similarly exposed to thedemarketing campaign in terms of language and mediaexposure, we examined whether the different education

associations affected their deconsumption patterns. We useassociation with the state education system (relative to anindependent system) because this can explain highernational attachment levels following institutionalization andindoctrination of national values, traditions, and admiration(Ergil 2000). Because we have relevant and detailed school-ing data only for Israeli Arabs, we added to our model adummy representing whether Israeli Arabs send their chil-dren to the state education system or to an independent sys-tem. Our findings (Table 5) suggest that households with

children in the Israeli education system were more likely todeconsume water following the campaign (2.4%, p =.0047) than households with children in the independenteducation system (4.3%, p = .0001), in support of thenotion that national attachment plays an important role in

TABLE 5

Ruling out Variations in Exposure to theCampaign as an Alternative Explanation

Dependent Variable:Water Saving Rates

(Sample 2)

Intercept

Household size

Wealth (apartment size)

Apartment size: missing data

Lawn owners

Lawn size

Academic education

Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Ultra-Orthodox Jews academiceducation

Israeli Arabs

Israeli Arabs academiceducation

Israeli Arabs in the Israelieducation system

Israeli Arabs in the Israeli educationsystem academic education

Israeli Arabs not in the Israelieducation system

Israeli Arabs not in the Israelieducation system academic

educationRussian immigrants

Russian immigrants academiceducation

F-valueAdjusted R2

Number of observations

.056*(.0001).010*(.0001).0004*

(.0001).019*

(.0001).026*

(.0001).00002(.4347).010*

(.0001).002

(.6954).009(.0534).034*(.0001).001(.9339)

.021(.5961).061(.1901)

76.5*.0330,543

.056*(.0001).010*(.0001).0004*

(.0001).019*

(.0001).026*

(.0001).00002(.4076).010*

(.0001).002

(.6909).009(.0534)

.024*(.0047).017(.3333).043*(.0001).015

(.4241)

.021

(.5964).061(.1901)

65.8*.03

30,543

*p< .01.Notes: p-values are in parentheses.


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4The difference between the two Israeli Arab groups is signifi-cant at the 10% level (t-value = 1.73).

5Frequency of communication with friends and family involved

the measures I talk/meet with my friends/family every day/almostevery day. In the case of talking with friends, first in line wereultra-Orthodox Jews (49.8%), then non-ultra-Orthodox Jews(41.4%), and finally Israeli Arabs (28.6%). In the case of meetingwith family, first in line were Israeli Arabs (36.8%), then ultra-Orthodox Jews (24.8%), and finally non-ultra-Orthodox Jews(24.5%).

explaining minority groups reaction to governmentdemarketing.4

We also want to confirm that the different groups stud-ied do not possess social networks that systematically differin their structure and strength, because this may alsoexplain variability in reception of the campaign. Thus, wecollected data on utilization of social networks (i.e., fre-quency of communication with friends and family) of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and IsraeliArabs from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2002).

Overall, the data do not indicate any systematic differenceamong the groups. For example, while the ultra-OrthodoxJews talk more frequently with friends than do the othergroups, the Israeli Arabs more frequently meet with familymembers.5 Furthermore, the data suggest that the majorityof non-ultra-Orthodox Jews utilization of social networksis not stronger than those of ultra-Orthodox Jews and IsraeliArabs. Because the former reacted more positively to the

campaign than the latter two groups, this provides someindication that the variability in reception of the campaignis not driven by social networks.

Because our measure of wealth (i.e., apartment size)might not be satisfactory as a result of differences in house-hold size, we also measured it using apartment size per per-son. In addition, we ran an ordinary least squares regressionusing the original measure, this time for households of fourpeople only. In general, the estimates remain significant andsimilar (Table 6).

Finally, in the early analysis, we excluded outlier obser-vations (i.e., households that showed more than 40%change in water consumption in 2001 compared with 1999).Because this was an ad hoc cutoff point, we also ran themodel after omitting outlier observations using a 20% cut-off point. Again, this analysis does not change the nature ofour results (Table 6).

Conclusions and ImplicationsThis study addresses two important trends: protection ofpublic goods and the emergence of multiethnic societiesthat involve influential minority groups. We were able to

accurately assess the effect of government demarketing ondifferent minority groups because of our use of actual waterconsumption data instead of self-reported attitudes andbecause no other policy tool was employed during theexamined period. The study offers implications for market-ing scholars, policy makers, and marketers.

Dependent Variable: Water Savings Rate

Apartment Sizeper Person

Apartment Size(Four People per Household)

Population After Removing20% Deviation or Less

Intercept .076**(.0001)

.013*(.0302)

.024**(.0001)

Household size .006**(.0009)

.003**(.0001)

Wealth (apartment size) .000123**(.0013)

.000069**(.0001)

.00020**(.0001)

Apartment size: missing data .006*(.0189)

.023**(.0039)

.011**(.0001)

Lawn owners .032**(.0001)

.029**(.0001)

.011**(.0001)

Lawn size .000(.5437)

.000(.0515)

.000(.4057)

Ultra-Orthodox Jews .011**(.0001)

.009(.0950)

.007**(.0001)

Israeli Arabs .052**(.0001) .040**(.0001) .027**(.0001)Russian immigrants .013

(.2195).050(.1429)

.01(.1431)

F value 147.4** 25.0** 68.0**Adjusted R2 .02 .02 .01Number of observations 66,271 8968 45,168

*p< .05.**p< .01.Notes: p-values are in parentheses.

TABLE 6Sensitivity Analysis


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The notion that minority consumers respond favorablyto marketing efforts targeted at their minority status usingethnically congruent stimuli is intuitive and has been sup-ported empirically (e.g., Deshpand and Stayman 1994;Grier and Deshpand 2001). However, we find that whenthe marketer is the government and the product is a publicgood, this notion does not apply. Specifically, we find thatmajority and minority consumers behave differently with apublic good, especially one that is more symbolic. In thisrespect, the tension between national and group identifica-

tion is likely to be an important force explaining behavior.Thus, policy makers and marketers should make an effort toidentify the reference group of the different minorities: thecountry or their in-group (Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006;Triandis 1995). When the reference group is not the countryand minorities may believe that what is good for their coun-try is not necessarily good for their group, it might proveuseful to reconfigure a demarketing campaign so that it isnot linked to the benefits of the country but rather to thepersonal benefits of the minority consumer.

The finding that the reaction among Israeli Arabs to thecampaign was more negative than the other two minoritygroups we studied emphasizes their divergence from the

core Israeli society and its central goals. Although there aremany differences between this group and the majority of theJewish population, there are many common goals as well,including regional peace, economic prosperity, and protec-tion of the natural environment. Policy makers and mar-keters should identify and then emphasize such similaritiesand mutual goals among different ethnic groups as a meansto help decrease interethnic tension and improve the effec-tiveness of government marketing efforts.

An important issue is that of generalizability. AlthoughIsrael represents a unique case in which ethnicity and reli-gion are interrelated to some extent, we believe that ourfindings can be generalized to other countries in which

minority groups play an important role. Note that thoughreligion is central in shaping Israelis identity, the differentminority groups in Israel are not classified only on the basisof their religion. Specifically, in our study we capture threeimportant facets of minoritiesreligion, ethnicity, andimmigration statusand compare Muslims (and someChristians) and Jews, groups of Jews with different ethnicbackgrounds (Russian immigrants and ultra-OrthodoxJews), and immigrants and nonimmigrants. Our findingsshow that different minority characteristics affect demarket-ing effectiveness through national attachment. Thus, thefindings can be related to minorities in different countries inwhich minority status is dictated by these forces and issuesof national identity and attachment significantly influence

minorities behavior in general and their consumption inparticular. This would be the case for religious and ethnic-based minority immigrants, such as the North African Mus-lims in France and Mexican Americans in the United States,as well as for religious and ethnic-based minority nonimmi-grants, such as the Basques in Spain and African Americansin the United States. Indeed, recent research on AfricanAmericans and their consumption patterns suggests thatpolitical ideology, in which issues of national attachmentplay an important role, is central to understanding shopping

and consumption as an expression of social and politicalidentities of different consumer groups (Crockett and Wal-lendorf 2004).

The general demarketing effect we find is relativelyhighan average of 5.78% household water savings for theentire population. This finding contributes to the debate inmarketing regarding the effectiveness of demarketingefforts, at least in the context of proenvironmental products(Deutsch and Liebermann 1985; Pechmann et al. 2003).The validity of our results is enhanced because the prod-

uct examined is household water consumption, an itemwith extremely low demand elasticity (Deutsch and Lieber-mann 1985). Furthermore, in an additional analysis, weexamine the unique contribution of demarketing on the dif-ferent studied groups beyond the various control variables.Similar to previous demarketing studies (e.g., Andrews etal. 2004), we find that demarketing has a significant butincremental contribution, explaining an additional 4.2% ofthe variance in household consumption.

The effect of education on different groupsresponses tothe campaign is noteworthy. First, it suggests that highereducation levels positively affect environmentally friendlybehavior. Second, it suggests that education can reduce the

negative response of minority groups. In the case of ultra-Orthodox Jews, we find a negative interaction effect. Thereason is that high education levels in this group are associ-ated with religious studies that are likely to limit thisgroups exposure to other types of knowledge, specificallyknowledge about environmental and ecological issues.

We find that the less wealthy households reacted morenegatively to the campaign. Although we cannot rule outthat the special features of the proenvironmental campaigncaused this difference, it may be a more general result of theresponse to the demarketing efforts. This is an additionalindication of both the benefits and the limitations of demar-keting on different sectors of the population. Another exam-

ple is the finding that household size has a negative effect inall models, reflecting the difficulties in using demarketingto influence childrens behavior.

Our results indicate that several groups, classifiedaccording to minority and socioeconomic status, reactedless positively to a national demarketing campaign. Thisraises important questions for policy makers and socialmarketers: How much investment, if any, should be directedtoward customizing campaigns to these groups? What is theimportance of targeting audiences on the basis of socioeco-nomic criteria (e.g., wealth, education) versus minority sta-tus? Our results emphasize the importance of minority tar-geting. For example, in the case of Israeli Arabs, more than50% of their nonresponsive reaction to the campaign can be

attributed to their minority status. Although some mayargue that, based on our results, a viable option for cam-paign strategists is to ignore audiences that are less likely torespond to the marketing effort, we believe that from bothsociopolitical and economic standpoints, a more appropriateapproach would be to focus attention also on minorities andinvest, at least to some degree, in campaign customization.

Although demarketing campaigns are costly, the use ofalternative approaches to reduce water consumption seemscostlier. For example, employing the water price tool to


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obtain the same water savings rate would have caused a sig-nificant regressive effect. To reduce water consumption bynearly 6%, water prices would have had to be raised bymore than 35%, if we assume that the elasticity of demandin Jerusalem is .17 (Dahan and Nisan 2007). Furthermore,investments in new desalination plants are high. Thus, thewater savings potential from a demarketing effort should betaken into account when planning the water supply systemand designing investment plans.

The general picture that emerges from this research

should encourage policy designers and regulators to makemore use of demarketing, combining it with other policytools. Although the relatively clear approach of forecastingeconomic effects would seem to encourage the use of directeconomic tools (e.g., price), the demarketing effect weshow herein can shed light on the potential contribution ofdemarketing to policy makers. Furthermore, a better under-standing of the way different consumer groups are willingto participate in environmental protection activities willmake it possible to develop and target appropriate policiesand demarketing efforts at specific consumer segments toelicit behavioral change (Granzin and Olsen 1991). Finally,the results we report might provide a benchmark for demar-

keting effects in other environmental contexts and for otherproducts.

Limitations and Future ResearchDirections

Our findings elicit several possible alternative explanationsthat should be addressed. First, we need to rule out theexplanation that the different responses to the demarketingeffort were due to variation in exposure to the campaign bydifferent groups rather than to the groups different nationalattachment levels. We first show that this is not the case bycontrolling for several factors that might create variability

in reception of the campaign (e.g., household size). We thenrule out this alternative explanation by studying one of theminority groupsIsraeli Arabsfor which we had relevantand detailed education data. Specifically, although allIsraeli Arabs were likely to be similarly exposed to the cam-paign, their reactions varied according to association withthe education system. Indeed, Israeli Arabs who send theirchildren to the state education system, and therefore arelikely to have higher national attachment levels, respondedmore positively to the government campaign than thosewho send their children to the independent system. Finally,we collected data on utilization of social networks by thedifferent minority groups and ensured that there was no sig-

nificant systematic difference among the groups that mighthave affected reception of the campaign.

Second, it is important to rule out the alternative expla-nation that minorities respond negatively to proenvironmen-tal campaigns because they typically have lower levels ofenvironmental beliefs and values than majority populations.After reviewing prior research on environmentalism andethnicity, we contend that this may not be the case. Specifi-cally, a review of this issue concludes that minority andmajority populations have similar environmental beliefs and 6See http://www.heschel.org.il/Media/seker06.pdf.

values (Johnson, Bowker, and Cordell 2004). Furthermore,a 2006 survey on Israelis concerns about environmentalissues conducted by the Pratt Foundation and Heschel Cen-ter for Environmental Learning and Leadership shows thatJews and Israeli Arabs share similar concerns about variousenvironmental topics, such as air pollution, global warming,depletion of natural resources, noise, and water pollution.6

Overall, this provides some indication that national attach-ment may play a more important role than consumersenvi-ronmental beliefs and values.

This study suffers from additional limitations that mightsuggest future research opportunities. First, we studiedactual consumers behavior, not their motivations and atti-tudes. Although there are substantial benefits to the use ofbehavioral data and though a growing number of researchersin marketing recommend studying actual behavior of con-sumers (e.g., Rangan, Karim, and Sandberg 1996;Schlegelmilch, Bohlen, and Diamantopoulos 1996), thisapproach also has its weaknesses in our context. Our behav-ioral data can inform us about what different consumergroups are actually doing but may be limited in explainingthe reasons for such behavior. Indeed, we cannot firmlyconclude that majority and minority consumers think differ-

ently about public goods, such as water, or that differentconsumers identify similarly with their minority or majorityin-group. Some prior research on ethnic groups has indi-cated that there may be variation within minority groupsregarding identification and attachment of individuals totheir group (e.g., Deshpand and Stayman 1994; Penaloza1994) and that some minority individuals may simultane-ously identify with their in-group and with the majoritygroup (Sidanius et al. 1997). Further research might bevaluable here, complementing behavioral data with databased on survey and ethnographic research that will gener-ate deeper insights into the mechanism that drives thebehavior of majority and minority consumers. For example,

research efforts in these directions may benefit from priorethnographic work on the underlying motivations of ethnicconsumer groups (e.g., Penaloza 1994, 1995) and from sur-vey research on the motivations driving environmental con-sumers (e.g., Pieters et al. 1998). Still, note that thoughthese research methods can provide insights into the moti-vations and attitudes of consumers and consumer groups,their main weakness is that they may not be able to predictactual behavior. Second, the study was conducted in a spe-cific country and product context. Although Israel is similarto many other developed countries and though waterscarcity is a global environmental concern, the specificnature of the case might limit the general applicability ofthe findings. It might be useful to conduct cross-country

research on demarketing for different environmental prod-ucts and additional cultural groups. Third, we did not studythe specific characteristics of the demarketing campaign indepth. Because different themes and framings can differ-ently affect a demarketing campaigns effectiveness (Pech-mann et al. 2003), further research should also control for


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these factors. Finally, the effect of demarketing over time isnot clear. In this study, it was difficult to test for the long-term effect of the demarketing campaign because substan-tial price changes in late 2001 made it impossible to isolate

the campaigns effect. Further research is warranted in thisdirection (Deutsch and Liebermann 1985)for example,whether the less positive response among minority groupsis stable over time.

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