déjà vu in international law

REVIEW ARTICLE

Deja vu in International Law

Robert Cryer*

Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall ofInternational Law 1870–1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001,xiii + 569 pp, hb £65.00.

Since the publication of his first book,1 Martti Koskenniemi has establishedhimself as one of the pre-eminent international legal theorists. Most traditionalinternational lawyers, who tend to disclaim theory,2 appear to like his work.Perhaps this is because Koskenniemi has always eschewed the most egregiousexcesses of critical scholarship and shown appropriate regard for international lawdoctrine. Koskenniemi was a member of the Finnish Foreign Ministry for nearly 20years and led its international law division. His considerable experience ofproviding legal services to his country at the UN left him pleasantly surprised atthe part international law had to play in difficult circumstances. When issuesbecame more difficult, and appeared to move into the realm of ‘high politics’, thelaw developed into the voice of reason, or at least the language of debate.3

In The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, Koskenniemi moves his focus to the historyof international law. He tells us a story of the ‘rise and fall of international law1870–1960’, by the end of which we are told that ‘there has been stupidity,unwarranted ambition, careerism, and much hypocrisy. But there has also beensome political wisdom, and a little courage, times when faith was lost, but alsostubborn refusal to admit defeat’ (p 503)4 During the past two decades, much ofthe impressive work produced has been by scholars at least related to the criticallegal movement.5 Koskenniemi’s book could be seen as an addition to this

ß The Modern Law Review Limited 2002 (MLR 65:6, November). Published by Blackwell Publishers,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 931

* School of Law, University of Nottingham. Thanks to Matthew Happold, Robert McCorquodale,Thomas Poole, Karen Scott, Nigel White and Christian Witting for discussions and comments on an earlierdraft.

1 M. Koskenniemi,From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument(Helsinki:Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1989) [hereinafterfrom Apology to Utopia], xvii–xviii.

2 I. Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the 50th Anniversary ofthe United Nations(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), 11.

3 See M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’ (1996) 17Michigan Journal ofInternational Law455.

4 All page references in the text are to the book under review.5 See, for example, D. Kennedy, ‘Primitive International Scholarship’ (1986) 27Harvard International

Law Journal.1; D. Kennedy, ‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’(1997) 17Quinnipiac Law Review99; A. Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins ofInternational Law’ (1996) 5Social and Legal Studies321; A. Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’ (1999) 40HarvardInternational Law Journal1; [hereinafterPeripheries]; K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determinationin International Law(Cambridge: CUP, 2002).

canon,6 but it is more than this. In part, the book is a responseto criticisms ofFrom Apologyto Utopia. Thatbookhadbeencriticisedashavingfailed to showwhy internationallawyerschooseor havechosencertainpositionsif internationallegal discoursewasasindeterminateashe claimed(p 1). Still, his ambitionsarehigher. Koskenniemi’s road onwards, or backwards, is a surprising one:formalism. For a writer who has beencritical of rule-basedreasoningin thepast,7 this cannotbe a smoothroad.So how doesKoskenniemitravel it?

International law by gaslight

To begin,Koskenniemitakesus backto the secondhalf of the 19th century.It ishere that Koskenniemi identifies the beginningsof a new professional self-awareness,originating in Europeanliberalism, that formed the basisof moderninternationallaw to a greaterextentthan the writings of Grotiusor the PeaceofWestphalia(pp 3–4). Koskenniemiis quite specific aboutthe beginningsof thisintellectualsensibility.It is themanifestowritten by GustaveRolin-Jacquemynstoinauguratethe Revuede droit internationalet de legislation comparee in 1868(p14). As Koskennieminotes,the journal itself wasintendedasa forum for liberal-reformistideasandthemanifestowas‘a shoppinglist of liberal reform’ (p 15).Themanifestoespousedl’esprit d’internationalite, which recognisedthe existenceofcommonprinciplesandthe‘superiorunity of thegreathumansociety’ (p 13).Theesprit d’internationalitehadled to greatstepsforward in the sciences,andRolinsuggestedthatthelaw follow suit.Soanewsciencewaspostulated,the‘scienceofthe conscienceof humanity’ (p 16). This ‘science’ was basedupon the soberreflectionsof the ‘civilised conscience’and was meantto form public opinion,which, in turn, wasthe basisof internationallaw (pp 15–16).The resultwasthatinternationallawyersthentook the placeof an absentinternationallegislaturebybecoming humanity’s conscience: ‘[p]ublic opinion crystallised in a legalscholarshipthat proceededby way of introspection’(p 16).8

Thejournalreflectedtheliberal outlookof its founders,T.M.C. AsserandRolin.TheRevuepromoteda middle-of-the-roadVictorian liberalism:it wasdemocratic,but also concernedabout what may be done by ‘the masses’and, in the finalanalysisbourgeois.Thefounderswereno friendsof kings,or of socialism(pp 18–19).Theirwork soughtto breakwith previousscholarship,which in thefirst half ofthe 19th centuryhadbeendominatedby digestsof diplomaticpractice.After thecataclysmicFranco-Prussianwar of 1870–1871,thefoundersof theRevuecreatedthe Institut de Droit International in 1873.The Institut embodiedtheir conceptofthe ‘legal conscience/consciousnessof the civilized world’ (p 41). JohannBluntschli-a liberal (in the senseof the time), who had studiedunder Savignyand developedthe idea of the lawyer as author of dynamic law that reflectedmodernreality-draftedthe Institut’s foundingstatute(pp 42–47).

6 Koskenniemiis uncomfortablewith being considereda representativeof ‘critical’ scholarship,M.Koskenneimi,‘Letter to theEditors of theSymposium’(1999)93 AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw 351, 351–352.Nonetheless,The GentleCivilizer’s dust-jacketpromisesit ‘provides a uniquereflectionon the possibility of critical internationallaw today.’

7 M. Koskenniemi,‘The Pull of the Mainstream’(1990)88 Michigan Law Review1946.8 Therearetracesof this left in Art 38(1)(d)of the Statuteof the InternationalCourt of Justice,which

includesthe ‘teachingsof the mosthighly qualified publicists’ asa subsidiarymeansof determininginternationallaw.

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In chapter1, Koskenniemitells the story of the Institut, its members,andtheirconservative, aristocratic,andat times intolerant,9 liberalism.He showshow themembers’ views reflected, and reactedto, their circumstances.The historicalnarrativeendsat the turn of the century,by which time the Revuewas a moreconventionalinternational law journal and many of the early membersof theInstitut wereno longerpolitically relevant.Thechapterendswith anevaluationofthe views of the ‘men of 1873’.10 Despiteconsideringthem the ‘foundersof themodern international law profession’ (p 92), Koskenniemi is critical of theirthought.Theyusedacuriousmix of cultural,rationalist,andnaturallaw argumentsthat was ‘uselessas a quarter of defence’, as it was basedon the founders’underlying assumptionthat their good manners,liberal intuitions and amateursociologycould amountto rulesgoverningStatebehaviour(p 97).

Koskenniemi’scriticismsarefair. Despitethefounders’pretensionsto scientificrigour, their work was a hotchpotch of the naturalism and whole-heartedrationalismthey claimedto reject,held togetherby an unquestioningself-belief.He is alsoright that the institutesandsocietiesof internationallaw setup aroundthat time often reflecteda peace-seeking,internationalistagenda.The AmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw, formedin 1905,owedits birth to theAmericanpeacemovement.11 Indeed,therearemanyparallelsbetweenthestoryKoskenniemitellsof the Institut andthat of the AmericanSociety.Both wereformedasa meansofachieving world peacethrough international law. Both saw the importanceofattachinga journal to the society(the AmericanSocietypublishesthe influentialAmerican Journal of International Law).12 But their original aims now seemnaıve.13 They also shared a parochial outlook. The Institut’s memberssawthemselvesvery much as the representativesof a distinctly Europeansensibility(pp 76–88).On the other side of the Atlantic, JamesBrown Scott, father of theAmericanSociety,14 ‘tendedto project America’s traditions,democraticheritageand institutions upon other nations regardlessof their cultural backgrounds’.15

Cognatecriticismsof manyAmericaninternationallawyersaremadeto this day.16

This chapter,for all its merits,hassomegaps.British internationallawyersarelargely absentfrom his survey.Only JohnWestlake(1928–1913),holder of theWhewell chair at Cambridgefrom 1888–1908receivesextendedconsideration.Itis appropriatethatWestlakereceivessuchtreatment,beingamongthemostfamousof English internationallawyers,17 andactive in the formationof the Institut, but

9 Bluntschli’s writings, in particular,areclearly taintedby racism: ibid 96, 103–104.10 And they were uniformly men,p 9. For accountsof the role of womenin international law of the

period see H. Charlesworthand C. Chinkin, The Boundariesof International Law: A FeministAnalysis (Manchester:MUP, 2000) 14–17; K. Knop and C. Chinkin, ‘RememberingChrystalMacMillan: Women’sEquality andNationality in InternationalLaw’ (2001)22 Michigan Journal ofInternationalLaw 523.

11 SeeF.L. Kirgis, ‘The FormativeYears of the American Society of InternationalLaw’ (1996) 90AmericanJournal of InternationalLaw 559,559–568.

12 It seemspossible that the reasonfor the large (particularly non-American)membershipof theAmericanSocietyis referableto the fact thatwith membershipcomesa subscriptionto theAmericanJournal of InternationalLaw.

13 n 11 above,568–569.14 J.S.Reeves,‘Address’ (1938)32 Proceedingsof the AmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw 1, 1.15 R.D. Nuremberger,James Brown Scott: Peace Through Justice (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,

GeorgetownUniversity, 1975),101,ascited in n 11 above,571.16 See,for example,S. Marks,TheRiddle of All Constitutions:InternationalLaw, Democracyand the

Critique of Ideology(Oxford: OUP,2000),1.17 JohnsondescribedWestlakeas ‘the most completeof our internationallawyers’, D.H.N Johnson,

‘The EnglishTraditionin InternationalLaw’ (1962)11 InternationalandComparativeLawQuarterly416,440.

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his is not the full story of internationallaw in Britain at that time andbefore.IfKoskenniemiwishesto persuadeusthattheespritd’internationalitewasreflectiveof internationallawyers’ thinking thenandnow, this needsto be shown.

Koskenniemi’sdiscussionof theUK is brief, andrestson two foundations.Thefirst of theseis thatbeforethemiddleof the19thcentury,therewaslittle universitylegal educationin EnglandandWales.This is true. Oxford’s Chichelechair wasonly establishedin 1859,and the Whewell chair in 1866.The Edinburghchair,revivedby JamesLorimer in 1862,wasof PublicLaw andtheLaw of Natureandof Nations.Thatchair,establishedin 1707,wasoriginally ‘devotedin themain tothe study of internationallaw’.18 At that time internationallaw and the law ofnaturewerenot seenasseparate.Lectureson internationallaw hadbeengiven inLincoln’s Inn asfar backas1799.19 The teachingof internationallaw at the timewas not limited to lawyers.The first edition of LassaOppenheim’smagisterialInternationalLawwasintendedprimarily asanintroductionto thesubjectfor non-lawyers.20

Thesecondfoundationis that,accordingto Koskenniemi,owing to theinfluenceof Austin, legalpositivismprevailedin Britain. This conflictedwith thenaturalismof internationallawyerssuchasLorimer or Sir RobertPhillimore,so internationallaw wasall but ignoredby the thencurrentimperial hegemon(p 34). This is notquitefair. Phillimore,a friend of Gladstone,wasappointedAdmiralty Advocatein1855,Queen’sAdvocatein 1862,21 andaJudgeof theAdmiralty Courtin 1867.Hecan hardly be consideredwithout influence. In addition, from 1565 until itsdissolution in 1857,22 Doctor’s Commons regularly dealt with questionsofinternationallaw.23 PrimeMinister Salisburymay havereportedto Parliamentin1887that internationallaw is basedon theprejudicesof text-bookwritersandnotlaw properly-so-called(p 34), but a year later, Sir Julian Pauncefote,a lawyer,negotiatedthe ConstantinopleConventionon the SuezCanal. In 1889 his legalqualifications were considered in support of his appointment as BritishAmbassadorto Washington.24 Five years after Salisbury’s declamation, theofficial publicationof British treaties,the United Kingdom TreatySeries,began.Later, Paunceforteled the British Delegationto the HaguePeaceConference.Internationallaw may not havebeenuppermostin the mindsof British decision-makersat thattime,andtheUK’s recordof compliancewith thatlaw nobetterthanmany other States’at the time, but Salisbury’sdismissalwas a little excessive.Indeed,Brownlie points to the British Digestof InternationalLaw 1860–1914asevidencethat ‘referenceto internationallaw hasbeenpartof thenormalprocessofdecisionmaking’.25

This passing-overof the UK pointstowardsa morefundamentalpoint. Despitethe subtitle of the book, the rise and fall of international law, Koskenniemiisdealingmore with the history of internationallawyers,in particular the lawyersinfluenced by esprit d’internationalite, than international law as a whole. As

18 ibid 418.19 ibid 418.20 L. Oppenheim,InternationalLaw (London:Longmans,1905–1906).21 The governmenttook adviceon internationallaw from the Queen’sadvocateuntil 1872,Johnson,

aboven 17, 434.22 Which hadnothing to do with internationallaw: ibid 433.23 Probablythemostaccessibledescriptionof Doctor’sCommonsis givenby CharlesDickens,in David

Copperfield(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1996(1850))322–323,867.24 n 17 above,436.25 n 2 above,13.



Koskenniemihimselftells us:‘[i]t maybetoo muchto saythat internationallaw isonly what internationallawyersdo or think’ (p 7). He is candidthat his work isbasedon two ‘intuitions’ (p 3) aboutthe history of internationallaw of this time.The first is that therewas a radical break in style betweenthe first and secondhalvesof the 19th century,andthe second,that the sensibility inauguratedin thesecondhalf cameto aneffectiveendin about1960(pp 3–4).The former intuitionis theonethatconcernsusfirst. It involvestheclaim that‘moderninternationallawdid not ‘‘begin’’ at Westphaliaor Vienna,andthat thewritings by Grotius,Vattel,G.F. von Martens or even Wheatonwere animatedby part of a professionalsensibility that seemsdistinctly different . . . from [that underlying internationallaw from] 1869onwards’(p 4). This is an interestingbut contestableclaim.

Koskenniemibaseshis argumenton the fact that the Rolin’s 1868 manifestosoughtto breakfrom that which went before,anddid not cite earlierscholarship.Thetraditionit soughtto breakfrom wasthedescriptivetypologiesof Martensandotherinternationallawyersof the early nineteenthcentury,suchasJohanKluber.Thismaybetrue,but themenof 1873weretappinginto anoldertradition,onepre-dating the internationallegal productfrom which they differentiatedthemselves.This wasthe work of Franciscode Vitoria, FranciscusSuarez andHugo Grotius.As Koskennieminotes,the lawyersof whomhespeakssawthemselvesascarriersof the tradition of suchpredecessors(p 78). The clashbetweenpluralismandtheimposition of European standards on others in international law, whichKoskenniemiidentifieswith theInstitut’s founders26 is anold one,well establishedby thetime of Alberico Gentili (1552–1608).27 However,thelawyermostreflectedin thesensibilityof thefoundersof the Institut wasChristianWolff (1679–1754).28

Although the founderswerenot naturalistslike Wolff, at leastsomeof themhadreadandcommentedon him. Indeed,Bluntschliwrotethathis work wasclearandconformedto thenewliberal spirit of the times.29 Thereareimportantdifferencesbetweenthem,butalsosufficientoverlapsbetweentheir ideasto querywhethertheradicalbreakmadeby thoselater menwasactuallya partial returnto themesof acenturybefore.

The first overlapbetweenthe two is an attemptto bring scientific rigour to thelaw. For Wolff, this was to bring international law into line with Leibnizianphilosophyandscientificmethod.30 His classicwork of 1749,afterall, is calledJusgentiummethodoscientificapertractatum.31 Themenof 1873,of course,alsosawthemselvesasscientists,their sciencebeingthat of the civilised conscience.Thismaymerelyhavebeenpretensionby all concerned,andsharedpretensionsarenotenoughto establisha realanaloguebetweenthem.Strongerlinks exist.Thefirst oftheseis themutualpostulatethat therewasanothersocietyaboveStates.The ideaof sucha societyencompassingall humanitywasa tenetof the Institut’s faith (pp13, 32). Yet the ideawasnot new.Wolff hadpostulatedtheexistenceof a societyof all nations,standingaboveStatesthemselves,the civitas maxima. This wasthe

26 Especiallyin ch 2.27 SeeB. Kingsbury, ‘The PuzzlingDurability of Gentili’s Combinationof PragmaticPluralism and

NormativeJudgment’(1998)92 AmericanJournal of InternationalLaw 713.28 On Wolff seeA. Verdrossand H.F. Koeck, ‘Natural Law: The Tradition of UniversalReasonand

Authority’ in R. St. John MacDonald and D.M. Johnson(eds), The Structure and ProcessofInternationalLaw (The Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 1983)17, 35–37andN.G. Onuf, ‘Civitas Maxima:Wolff, Vattel andtheFateof Republicanism’(1994)88 AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw 280.

29 J.C.Bluntschli,GeschichtedesallgemeinenStaatsrechtsund der Politik (Cotta:Munich, 1864)216.30 Onuf, n 28 above,294–297.31 C. Wolff (J.H. DrakeTranslator),JusGentiumMethodoScientificaPertractatum(Oxford: Carnegie

Foundationfor InternationalPeace,1934).



greatrepublicof all States,overwhichstooda rector, who ‘definesby theright useof reasonwhat nationsought to considerlaw among themselves’.32 As Wolffadmitted,therewasno suchperson.However,Wolff’s view wasthat internationallawyerssuchashimselfwerethe rector’s ‘corporateequivalent’.33 As with Wolff,sowith themembersof the Institut.34 Internationallawyersstood,in theabsenceofan internationallegislator,as the civilised authorsof what was good for all ofinternationalsociety.Neither Wolff nor the men of consciencewerepreparedtowork fully from rationalistbases.Both alsosoughtto provideconcreteexamplesfrom the practiceof their own, civilised, States.35 All sawEuropeas the naturalmodel.Thefinal analogybetweentheInstitutmenandWolff is thatboth,albeitfordifferent reasons,sawit asthe missionof EuropeanStatesandpeopleto civilise,and perfect,other ‘less advanced’peoples.36 It is to the ‘advancement’of otherpeoplesthat Chapter2 turns.

The road to Africa, paved with good intentions

Comingfrom AristotelianandThomistroots,Wolff sawa duty on moreadvancedStatesto work towardsperfectionnot only of themselves,butalsotheperfectionofthe less advanced.37 The version of this createdby the Institut men was thenecessityof exportingwhattheysawto bethebenefitsof Europeancivilisation. Inotherwords,colonialism.The role of internationallaw, andinternationallawyers,in theconstructionandjustificationof colonialismhasrecentlybeenthesubjectofconsiderabledebate.38 Koskenniemi’ssecondchapter, ‘Sovereignty: A Gift ofCivilization-InternationalLawyersandImperialism1870–1914’is, simply speak-ing, the bestdiscussioncurrentlyavailable.

This chaptercarefully chartsthe waysin which the lawyersof the Institut werechallengedby Europeanexpansion.Some,for exampleGastonJeze andCharlesSaloman,took a critical line, seeingavariceand hypocrisywheremany saw thecivilising mission (pp 106–107).However,many internationallawyers,suchasAugust von Blumerincq, who saw international law as progressivehistoricalevolution towardsan essentiallyEuropeanideal, consideredcolonialism as thefulfillment of anhistoricalinevitability (p 105).Nevertheless,andin aninterestingcontrast to much recent scholarshipthat focuseson international lawyers andcolonialism, Koskenniemi shows how, although the men of 1873 may haveprovided legitimation for colonial injustice, they did not do so intentionally (p110). Positivism, in particular, has recently been indicted for ‘complicity’ incolonialism.39 Koskenniemi’swork hereshouldleadto a considerablerefinementof these damning judgments.Not least, as Koskenniemi notes, the critiqueclassifiesa numberof lawyersaspositivistswho cannotbe describedassuch(pp130–131).Anghie’sclassificationof Westlakeasa paradigmaticpositivist springs

32 ibid prolegomena,para21.33 Onuf, n 28 above,298.34 On the latter as legislators,seeTheGentleCivilizer, 50.35 On Wolff seeVerdrossandKoeck,n 28 above,36; for theothers,seeTheGentleCivilizer, 94, 140–

144.36 SeeVerdrossandKoeck, ibid 36–37,TheGentle Civilizer, Chapter2.37 n 31 above,prolegomena,para8, Onuf, n 28 above,285.38 See,for example,the articlesby Anghie,n 5 above.39 See Anghie, Peripheriesn 5 above 6–7. The critique was first made in C.H. Alendrowitz, The

European-AfricanConfrontation(Leyden:Sitjhoff, 1973).



to mind as an example.40 The Gentle Civilizer convincingly shows how theattitudesof most of the internationallawyersof the agewere groundedin theirunderstanding of conscience,ratherthanin a positivist methodology.

Eurocentrismandassumptionsof thesuperiorityof Europeancivilisation partlyconditionedthereactionof themenof 1873to thecolonialencounter,andinspiredtheir recommendation of the expansionof Europeansovereignty. But theirenthusiasmfor sovereigntywasalsoa reactionto their realisationthatthepre-1870development of colonialism by private (chartered) companies had led toexploitation.Thiswasencouragedby theBritish andGermanpracticesof allowingcharteredcompaniesto rule in Africa informally, which allowedthe metropolitanStatethe benefitsof influence,without the burdensof sovereignty.This practiceonly increasedafter1870,whenBritish pre-eminencewaned.However,theactionsof the charteredcompaniesthemselvesmadethe maintenanceof this informalsystemof dominanceimpossible(pp 118–120).TheBerlin Conference1884–1885wasan attemptto changethis by formalisingthe scramblefor Africa.

Koskenniemiconvincingly recountsthesedevelopments.He demonstrateshowtheBerlin conference,andtheAct it produced,disappointedinternationallawyersandallowedEuropeanStatesto presenttheir evasionof sovereigndutiesasbeingin thepublic interest(pp126,149–152).Also, heshowshowdifferentinternationallawyers, often portrayedas speakingwith one voice on colonialism, actuallyendorseda number of different positions on matterssuch as colonial treatiesbetweenEuropeanpowers(or their agents)and local leaders(pp 136–143).Still,Koskenniemidoesnot lose sight of their commonground.Despitetheir sincerehumanitarianconcernfor the colonised,the lawyersstill madeuseof the logic ofinclusion/exclusion,emphasisingthe differenceof non-Europeansbut temperingthe refusal to apply international law in full by a naturalistic universalisminrelation to human rights (pp 127–132).Consistentwith their consciences,thelawyerssawcolonialismthroughthelensof ‘civilised’ and‘non-civilised’ peoples,themselvesbeing,naturally,on thecivilised side.That is not to saythattheycouldfind a standardof civilisation, which remainedas much a function of their self-imageasof anthropology(pp 132–136).

The ‘civilised’ lawyers’ concernabout the possibility of the violation of therightsof local populationswasborneout by thecontinuedviolation of suchrightsby informal emperorssuchasCecil Rhodes.Thefact thattheir fearshadcometrueled many of the lawyers discussedto move towards recommendingformalsovereigntyfor theEuropeanpowers,asa meansof ensuringtheprofit motivedidnot eclipsethecivilising mission(pp 144–145).Therewas,of course,a flip sidetothis. Unsurprisingly,the local populationshad not welcomed‘civilisation’ withopenarms,andtheproposalsfor Statesto stepin formally werealsorelatedto thefeeling of the lawyersthat the indigenouspopulationshadto be forceddown therouteto civilisation by Statecoercionif necessary(pp 146–148).

Often though, the intentions of the ‘civilised’ lawyers were honourable,ifpaternalist.This is why, when they got their wish, an independentStatein theCongo,theyweredisappointedwhenexploitationreachednewheights.LeopoldII,having gainedinternationalrecognitionof his rule, and promisingto uphold therightsanddignity of his newsubjects,proceededto institutea systemof rule thatshockeda none-too-sensitive setof Europeannations.Thefirst work on thematterwasa pieceof ‘clumsypropaganda’by Felicien Cattier,professorof PublicLaw at

40 Peripheries, n 5 above,13, 17, 21.



Brussels(pp 159–160).Yet mostinternationallawyersremainedsilentuntil 1908,when Belgium assertedformal sovereigntyover the IndependentState of theCongo.Why?Koskenniemi’sansweris aninterestingone.Hesuggeststhatin theirview thecivilising projectwasstill viable,but that theCongoexperimenthadnotworked as it had not followed the plan. Therehad beenno public law limits tosovereigntythere(p 165).

Thetalehetells is a compellingone.But initially it is not clearwhy it is told. Itis only in the final dozenpagesof the (eighty-page)chapterthat its purposesbecomesapparent.It is includedto showhow the ‘civilised conscience’tendedtosupportthepoliciesof thelawyers’ownStates(p 166)As Koskenniemipointsout,this shouldhaveled themto realisethat therewasno singlecivilisation of whichthey were the impartial mouthpiece(p 168). The other reasonfor this lengthyexcursusis moregeneral.It providesanexampleof howtheconceptof sovereigntywasneithera definednor a unitarywhole,andby theendof theFirst World War,was considered a failure in Europe (pp 169–173). Thus the sovereigntyinternational lawyers had so forcefully argued for in Africa was criticised athome.Thereactionto thiswasanattemptto ‘internationalise’ thematter,by meansof theLeagueof Nationsmandatesystem.However,asthemandatesystemhadnomoredefinedlegal contentthansovereigntydid, it alsofailed.

This leads Koskenniemi to his final and most insightful points. Throughvaguenessand, in particular,informality, dominationproceedsunlimited by law.Also theproblemof dominationis not necessarilyoneof bad-faithapologyfor thepowerful,but the connectionbetweenprogress,civilisation anda setof particularideasor institutions(pp 175–178).Institutionsand forms ‘do not carry the goodsocietywith themselves’(p 176). It is what they do that matters.In one of theeminentlyquotablesentencesof the bookKoskenniemitells us that ‘[i]nstitutionsdo not replacepolitics,but enactthem’ (p 177)This leadsusto his final comment,which deservesquotationin full: ‘whateverthechoiceof institution,it shouldbeamatterof debateandevidence,andnot of the applicationof universalprinciplesabout‘‘civilization’ ’, ‘‘democracy’’ or ‘‘rule of law’’ ’ (p 178).Koskenniemithusrecommendsempiricism, and a pronouncedsuspicion of reliance on broad,undefinedconceptssuch as civilisation to provide concreteanswers.It appearsfrom this chapterthat what Koskenniemiis doing is readyinghis readersfor hisclaim that we should return to formalism. After all, sovereignequality andscepticismof value judgmentssuch as assessmentsof ‘civilisation’ tend to beassociatednow with formalistic approachesto law. Unfortunately,Koskenniemidoes not really expandon his insights to any great extent. For example,hiscommentthat the term ‘neo-colonialism’which involves,‘informal economicallydriven domination’, is in fact a return to ‘the mainstreamof Empire since thesixteenth century’ (p 175) is not discussedfurther. Such an interesting ideadeserveselaboration.

Deviating spirits: Germany and France

The next two chaptersof this work relateto two nationaltraditionsthat deviatedfrom the esprit d’internationalite. Theseare (chapter3) ‘International law asphilosophy:Germany1871–1933’and(chapter4) ‘Internationallaw associology:French Solidarism 1871–1950’.They representa pair, and can be dealt withtogether.



GermanyKoskenniemidescribes,in the caseof Germany,the ‘recurrentattemptsto squarethecircle of statehoodandaninternationallegalorderby lawyerstrainedin publiclaw, oftenphilosophicallyinclined,andcomingfrom thewidestrangeof politicalconviction’ (p 181).Many of theearlyattempts,suchasthatof Erich Kaufmann’s,camefrom a Hegelianperspective,seeingthe Stateas the ultimate locus of thehumanpersonality.Cosmopolitanismdid not find fertile intellectualgroundin themindsof suchlawyers.DespitethedifferencesbetweenlawyerssuchasKaufmann(andothers)andcosmopolitanlawyerssuchasHansKelsen(who, of course,wasAustrian),Koskenniemiseesthem as historically and politically close(p 182).41

All were debating,from variousphilosophicalpositions,the issuesof ‘concretereality’ andsocial ideals(p 182).

This chapter,despitebeing the most forbidding part of the book,42 remainsanexcellentstudyof internationallaw in Germanyat thetime.Koskenniemireadstheauthorscloselyandcarefully,unfoldingthedevelopmentof internationallaw there,bringing out the influenceof Hegel,aswell asKantianidealsof the rationalwilland cosmopolitanism.He links the shifts in ideasto political developmentsthatinfluencedthevariouslawyers,startingwith theinsecurebasisof theGermanStatein the 19th century.Coverageof the period from 1914onwards(pp 228–238)isespeciallygood. It endswith a discussionof two possible‘escapes’from thequandaryGermaninternationallawyersfound themselvesin, unableto embraceinternationalism,but no longerin a Statestrongenoughto takeconceptualcontrolof international legal ideas (p 238). These are representedby Kaufmann’sconservative reaction,mixing naturalismandpathos(pp 249–261),andby Kelsen.KoskenniemidiscussesKelsenwell andwith somesympathy(pp 238–149).Thisshouldnot be a surprise;the discussionof Kelsenis anotherstonein the bridgeback to formalism. The sectionof Kelsen explainshis rejection of the earlierGermanlawyers’useof sociologyasbeingvaluedependentandpolitical (pp 242–243). This links in with Koskenniemi’slater rejection (on similar grounds)ofMcDougalism(pp474–489).Themostimportantaspectof this discussion,though,is how heshowsthat Kelsen’smonismandformalismwerenot, in fact, apolitical(pp 245–246).43 DespiteKelsen’sdisavowalof any political aspectto his ‘pure’theoryof law, it revealedthe fact that legalorderscannotbepurelyvalueneutral.Kelsen’schoiceof theinternationaloverthenationalwasclearlyin accordwith hisliberal-cosmopolitan preferences(pp 244–246).Thusformalismcanbea politicalmatter and can be used for political purposes.Indeed, Koskenniemi’s majorcriticism of thepuretheoryof law is not its internalconsistency,but that it did notaccepta clear role for itself in the ‘real world’. Whenlegal interpretation(whichKelsenacceptedwas a political act) occurredin the Weimar republic, Kelsen’sformalismhadno expresspolitics to use.It providedno bulwark againstfascism,which endedthephilosophicalapproachto internationallaw in Germany(pp 249–250).

41 Theseparticular internationallawyers also shareda similar professionalfate in Germany,seeD.Vagts,‘InternationalLaw in theThird Reich’ (1990)84 AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw 661.

42 Sentencessuchas ‘Kelsen’s epistemological-scientificoutlook and his transcendentaldeductionofthe basic norm were firmly embeddedin his philosophical neo-Kantianism’, (p 241) may beinsightful, but hardly invite engagementfrom thosenot alreadyversedin Kelsen’swork.

43 SeealsoD. Dyzenhaus,Legality and Legitimacy, (Oxford: OUP,1999)Chapter3.



FranceFrance,for Koskenniemi,providesthe counterpoint.Again, the narrativeis of anationaltradition that rejectedthe esprit d’internationalite. In contradistinctiontothe Germanquestionof the possibility of co-existencebetweensovereignStatesand internationallaw, the French internationallawyers of the period turned tosolidarism:theideathatindividualsareboundto societies,whichdictatestheir trueintereststo them(pp 268–269).This downgradedthe role of the Stateto that of ameans to the ends of particular collectivities. The structure of this chapterreplicatesthatof thepreviousone,explainingtheviewsof thevariouslawyers,andplacingthemin their historicalcontext;emphasisingtheir differences,but alsothesimilarities that underlay their positions.The primary similarity here was thenebulousconceptof solidarism.This postulated,ratherthanproved,theidentity ofinternationalinterestsandthoseof France.ThusFrancewasalwaysacting in thebestinterestsof internationalsociety(pp 288–291).Being undefined,solidarismcould also muster a high degreeof acceptancebecausecould support manypolitical positions(pp 338–342).

Although this chapter is an accomplishedpiece of scholarship,importantconceptsarenot alwaysdealtwith sufficiently.GeorgeScelle’sfamousconceptofthe dedoublementfonctionelle44 receivesshort shrift (pp 333, 338). It is animportant idea, and further elaborationwould havehelpedmakeKoskenniemi’scase.As it postulatednational officials acting both as agentsof domesticandinternationalsociety,the theoryneedsto explainthe interrelationshipbetweentheroles, particularly when they conflict. Scelle noticed this problem but did notdiscussit in any depth.45 This may be explicableby the fact that underlyingtheconceptlay his feelingthattherecouldbenosuchconflict of rolesin France.Also,although the French lawyers are taken as a deviation from the espritd’internationalite, if it is acceptedthattheespritd’internationalite hada precursorin Wolff’s work, there is also a link to Scelle. His views on the multitude ofascendingcommunities,althoughdrawnfrom Leon Duguit (pp 297–301),overlapwith Wolff’s.46

More generally,nationaltraditionsin scholarshiparenot hermeticallysealed.In1931, Hersch Lauterpachtcriticised the tendencyto over-statethe differencesbetweenAnglo-American and Continental conceptionsof international law.47

Where, for example,should we considerCharlesde Visscher(1884–1973)?deVisscherwas born in Ghent (as was the Institut), and succeededAlberic Rolin(vice-Presidentof the Institut, editor of the Revue and brother of Rolin-Jaequemyns)there as a teacherof criminal law and private internationallaw.48

Yet his work was heavily influenced not only by the French sociologicalapproachesandFrenchnaturallawyersbut alsoby Alfred Verdross.49 Internationallaw naturally tendsto ignorebordersmorethanotherareasof law.

44 SeeA. Cassese,‘Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dedoublementfonctionelle) inInternationalLaw’ (1990)1 EuropeanJournal of InternationalLaw 210.

45 ibid 219.46 OnWollf’s conceptsof ascendingsocieties,leadingto thecivitasmaxima, seeOnuf,n 28above,292–

296.On Scelle’s,seen 44 above,211.47 H. Lauterpacht,‘The So-CalledAnglo-AmericanandContinentalSchoolsof Thoughtin International

Law’ (1931)12 British Yearbookof InternationalLaw 31.48 See F. Rigaux, ‘An Exemplary Lawyer’s Life (1884–1973)’ (2001) 11 European Journal of

InternationalLaw 877.49 P-M. Dupuy, ‘The EuropeanTradition in International Law: Charles de Visscher: By Way of

Introduction’ (2000)11 EuropeanJournal of InternationalLaw 871, 874.



We neednot go so far as Brian Leiter, and claim that ‘[d]efining intellectualmovements by nationality or geography is probably as common as it ismisleading’50 in order to assertthat, having taken a geographicalapproachtoscholarship,Koskenniemishouldexplainhis reasonsfor inclusionandexclusionofparticular scholars.Koskenniemidoesnot, and at times he makesinconsistentjudgmentsas to relevance.For example,if he is taking a purely geographicalapproach,internationallawyersin Germanyareto be dealtwith in chapter3. ButhediscussesKelsen,whoonly taughtin Colognefrom 1930until his reprehensibleremovalin 1933,along with Alfred Verdross(who nevertaughtin Germany)inthis chapter(pp 246–247).So, perhapsit is the matterof intellectual trendsthatforms the criterion of relevance.If so, it would be necessaryfor KoskenniemitoincludeLassaOppenheimin his discussionof the Germantradition. Oppenheim,authorof ‘the outstandingand most frequentlyemployedsystematictreatiseon[international law]’ 51 was born in Frankfurt and beganhis careerin Germany,studying,inter alia underRudolf JheringandBluntschli,thenteachingin Freiburg.There are demonstrablelinks betweenOppenheim’sthought and that of PaulLaband(1838–1918)andGeorgJellineck(1851–1911),who arebothdiscussedinthe chapter on Germany (at pp 184–198 and 198–208 respectively).52 YetOppenheimonly receivespassingmention(andnot in this chapter).

The omission of de Visscher and Oppenheimis an exampleof one of theproblems with the book. Although it is an exemplary history of aspectsofinternational law in the periods he choosesto study, it remains somewhatfragmentary.We are afforded erudite discussionsof the men of 1873 (whichamounts to the history of an intellectual tradition) and German and Frenchinternational law (which are primarily geographical)and, later on one (trulyoutstanding) internationallawyer (Lauterpacht).But this doesnot amount to ahistoryof internationallaw or lawyersasawhole.TheUK is basicallyabsent,asisItaly.53 Thesetwo countriesare not irrelevant.Nor have they failed to producenotable international lawyers. It is simply impossibleto considera history ofinternationallaw in the period Koskenniemichoosesto be completewithout adiscussion of Dionisio Anzilotti, whose life (1867–1950) almost directlycorrespondswith Koskenniemi’s time-frame.54 Both countries, if nationaltraditionscan be said to exist, havetendedtowardspositivism.Anzilotti wasanavowedpositivist.55 In Britain, the traditional approachto internationallaw hasalso been pragmatic and positivist,56 although there has been a consistentundercurrentof anti-StatistinternationallawyerssuchasBrierly andLauterpacht.

50 B. Leiter, ‘Is Therean ‘American’ Jurisprudence?’(1997)19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies367,367.

51 A. Nussbaum,A ConciseHistory of the Law of Nations(New York: Macmillan, 1952)247.52 On theselinks seeM. Schmoeckel,‘LassaOppenheim:The InternationalistasScientistandHerald’

(2000)11 EuropeanJournal of InternationalLaw 699,702,705–709.53 On internationallaw in Italy seeA.P.Sereni,TheItalian Conceptionof InternationalLaw (NewYork:

ColumbiaUniversity Press,1943).54 See A. Tanca, ‘Dionisio Anzilotti (1867–1950):Biographical Note with Bibliography’ (1992) 3

EuropeanJournal of InternationalLaw 156.55 See G. Gaja, ‘Positivism and Dualism in Dinonisio Anzilotti’ (1992) 2 European Journal of

InternationalLaw 123.56 On the ‘British approach’asprimarily pragmaticand positivist seeI. Brownlie, The Calling of the

International Lawyer: Sir Humphrey Waldock and his Work’ (1983) 54 British Yearbook ofInternationalLaw 7, 73; R.Y. Jennings,‘Clive Parry’ Memorial Addressdeliveredat the UniversityChurch of Great St. Mary’s, Cambridge,16 October1982, reprinted in R.Y. Jennings,CollectedWritings of Sir RobertJennings(The Hague:Kluwer, 1998)vol. 2, 1400,1400.



LawyerssuchasW.E. Hall (1835–1894),who only missedout on the Whewellchair to Sir HenryMaine,57 andT.E. Holland(1835–1926),holderof theChichelechairfrom 1874–1910,werebothpositivists.KoskenniemiconsidersHall to bethe‘paradigmaticlatenineteenthcenturylegalpositivist’ (p 82),yet hefails to discusshim in depth.Oppenheimonly merits two mentions(pp 8, 92). This is perhapsausefulcorrectiveto the traditionalhistory of internationallaw in the 19th centurywhich seesit asthecenturyof positivism,thathasbeendenouncedasthe ‘historyof an illusion’.58 Still, it cannotbe deniedthat by the latter part of that century,therewerelawyerswho workedin thepositivist tradition,carryingon thetraditionof lawyers from RichardZouche(1590–1660)and Corneliusvan Bynkershoeck(1643–1743)to the presentday. Lawyers throughout the period Koskenniemidescribesproducedwork stylisticallyandintellectuallyfar closerto thatof MartensthanRolin. Lord McNair’s highly influential TheLawof Treaties,59 for example,isprimarily a catalogueof diplomatic practice and advice of governmentlegaladvisers.Such a focus is reminiscentmore of Henry Wheaton’sElementsofInternational Law60 and Kluber’s Droit des gensmodernede l’Europe,61 bothworksfrom overa centurybefore,thanthewritings of thefoundersof the Institut.Again, we seethat the story of positivist and formalist internationallawyers isignoredin this book.A surprisingomission,given thatKoskenniemiis attemptingto reinvigoratethe formalist tradition.

It shouldbe admittedthat it may not be Koskenniemi’sintentionto provideuswith a comprehensivehistory of internationallaw in the period,but merely withthose lawyers who espousedthe esprit d’internationalite. Nevertheless,heconsidersthoselawyersto be the ‘founders’ of moderninternationallaw (p 92),whosesensibilitylater internationallawyersreturnedto in ‘a secondary,or defaultmodesometime in the immediatepost-warera’ (p 3). Unlesshe definesmodernintentional law is presumedto be the sensibility of the foundersof the Institut,Koskenniemineedsto provethat this sensibilitywasindeedthe dominantone intheperiodhe identifies.Theexistenceandinfluenceof suchinternationallawyersas McNair and others like him must stand as at least a qualification onKoskenniemi’sthesis,eventhoughthat thesisaccuratelydescribesthe work andidealsof manyinternationallawyersthenandnow.

England’s finest: Sir Hersch Lauterpacht62

Chapter5 dealswith one of the most talentedinternationallawyersof the 20thcentury, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. Koskenniemi does not, however, discussLauterpachtas a part of a ‘British’ tradition in international law, but as arepresentativeof manyinternationallawyersup to andincluding today.As in theearlier chapters,sensitive reading, along with a feel for his subject allows

57 n 17 above,440.58 Kennedy,n 5 above.59 A.D. McNair, TheLaw of Treaties(Oxford: Clarendon,1938,2nd ed, 1961).60 H. Wheaton,Elementsof InternationalLaw (London:Fellowes,1836).61 J.L. Kluber,Droit desgensmodernde l’Europe (Stuttgart:Cotta,1819).62 It is, of coursetrue thatLauterpachtwasborn in (what is now) Polandandonly movedto Englandat

the ageof 26. Nonetheless,Lauterpachtsettledin England,becamea naturalisedcitizen in 1931.Hewas the British judge at the InternationalCourt of Justiceand servedon the UK War CrimesExecutiveduring,andafter,World War II. SeeLord McNair, ‘HerschLauterpacht’(1960)Annalsofthe British Academy 371.



Koskenniemito bring somethingnew to the debate,evenwith someonewho hasbeen as heavily analysedas Lauterpacht.63 Koskenniemi sees two particularaspectsto Lauterpacht’s life and work that require analysis. These are his‘Victorian’ nature,andhis later moveto an institutionalpragmatismasa resultofdisappointment (pp 356–358).

Like the Institut lawyersthat pre-datedhim by half a century,Lauterpachtsawlaw and society as inevitably moving towardsa liberal ideal (p 360). In this,Koskenniemiseeselementsof thought presentin many international lawyerstoday: ‘[t]oday internationallaw remainsone of the few bastionsof Victorianobjectivism, liberalismandoptimism’ (p 360). Internationallawyers,we aretold,mix this with a considerablescepticismof interpretationasanobjectiveenterprise(pp 404–406).There is much truth in this. Despitesomejudgmentsthat can bequestioned,64 this chapter is likely to have considerable resonancewithinternational lawyers. Koskenniemi accurately describes how Lauterpachtevidencesa morepervasivepost-warinternationalismin which thereis a call forinstitutionalsolutionsto moralandpolitical problems.65 In themoderncontext,wecan seeanaloguesto this. One exampleis in the argumentsthat haveled to thesettingup of the InternationalCriminal Court.The relationshipof that organto aduty to prosecuteinternationalcrimesanda possiblediscretionto decide,asSouthAfrica did, to grant amnestyto suchcrimes in the aftermathof apartheid is anexampleof whereaninternationalinstitutionis consideredasolutionto ethicalandpractical problems.66 It is notable, though, that Lauterpachtwas not the firstinternationallawyer to suggestinstitutionalsolutionsto problemsof interpretationof international law. Two centuriesearlier, Wolff’s acolyte, Emer de Vattel,suggestedproceduralsolutionsto the problemsof internationalorder basedonsovereignStates.67

To returnto a concernof this review,Koskenniemidoesnot situateLauterpachtin the broaderframe of internationallawyers,suchas McNair or Sir HumphreyWaldock. Lauterpacht,even though he may remind many of us of how weapproachinternationallaw, wasneveranexemplarof themainstreamapproachtointernationallaw in Englandand Wales. Lauterpacht,notwithstandinghis highstanding and many official appointments,68 was the representativeof anunderstudied but importanttrendin British internationallaw thatstandsin contrastto the mainstreamapproachto internationallaw in the UK. The groupof lawyerswho may be seenas part of this are of high renownand include JamesBrierly,

63 For literatureon LauterpachtseeC.W. Jenks,‘HerschLauterpach:TheScholarasProphet’(1960)36British Yearbookof InternationalLaw 1; S. Rosenne,‘Sir HerschLauterpacht’sConceptof theTaskof the InternationalJudge’(1961) 55 AmericanJournal of International Law 825; G. Fitzmaurice,‘HerschLauterpacht– TheScholarasJudge:PartI’ (1961)37 British Yearbookof InternationalLaw1; Ibid ‘Part II’ (1962)38 British Yearbookof InternationalLaw 1.

64 Oneexampleis his assertionthat Lauterpacht’sargumentfor thecompletenessandunity of law mayhavehelpedLauterpachtovercomeany possiblesuspicionsBritish internationallawyersmay havehadabouthim (p 372).He identifiesno internationallawyersthathadsuchsuspicions,andit is clearthat his supervisorat theLSE, andbastionof British internationallawyers,Lord Arnold McNair wasimpressedby his personalandintellectualqualitiesby the time of their secondsupervisionmeeting.McNair n 62 above,374.

65 ibid 397.66 SeeK. Asmal, ‘Truth, Reconciliationand Justice:The South African Experiencein Perspective’

(2000)63 ModernLaw Review1.67 E. deVattel (C.G.Fenwicktrans.),TheLawof Nationsor thePrinciplesof Natural Law (Washington:

CarnegieInstituteof InternationalPeace,1916)chapter18, From Apologyto Utopia, 95–96.68 An exampleof the former is his editorshipof the British Yearbookof International Law, the latter

includeshis tragically short tenureasthe British judgeat the InternationalCourt of Justice.



Wilfred Jenks,and Philip Allott. As Koskeniemidoesnot explain the relationsbetweenthethoughtof Lauterpachtandotherinternationallawyersof thetime,hiscaseis somewhatweakened,althoughit is still a strongone.If Lauterpachtcannotbesaidto berepresentativeof internationallawyersin his lifetime, moreevidenceof how he reflectsthe approachof internationallawyersnow is needed.

The caseof the prodigal postmodernist?

In thesixth chapterwe find Koskenniemihitting his chosentargetsquarely.Muchis explainedby the title of this chapter: ‘Out of Europe: Carl Schmitt, HansMorgenthauand the turn to ‘‘InternationalRelations’’’. Koskenniemitells us thestoryof SchmittandMorgenthauat somelength,andwith greatinsight.But this isnot donefor its own sake.It is doneasKoskenniemifeelsthat thecurrentcalls forinterdisciplinarycollaborationgivehim asenseof deja vu. Whenhefirst madethislink (in 1998)hewasexplicit aboutthis.69 In this chapterKoskenniemiprobesthelinks betweenthethoughtof Schmitt,who critiquedinformal liberal empire,70 andthatof Morgenthau,who,from averydifferentpolitical startingpoint,alsocametoassertthe primacyof power.

Morgenthau’srouteto assertingtheindeterminacyof law waslong anddifficult.WhereasSchmitt’sviewscanbe takenasrelatedto his sycophanticrelationswiththe Nazi regime,71 Morgenthauhadno sympathyfor that regime,andhis relativeantinomialism72 and adoptionof Schmittiandecisionismcamefrom a seriesofdisillusioning experiencesas an international lawyer. Having begunhis careerstudying international law, Morgenthauincreasingly found himself, through alifelong engagementwith Nietzsche,moving towardsconcentrationon the desirefor power as an all-encompassingnotion (p 448). Koskenniemi traces thedevelopment of Morgenthau’s understandingof law up to, and throughMorgenthau’s ‘legal swan song’ (p 455), ‘Positivism, Functionalism andInternationalLaw’.73 He then chartsMorgenthau’smove, followed by many intheAmericanpost-warAcademy,from internationallaw to internationalrelations.Morgenthaudominatedthe latter discipline in the US.

Again, this chapteris well researchedandinsightful. KoskenniemidevelopstheideathatInternationalRelationsin thepost-warUSwasbasedon thecontradictorybasesof realism and idealism that existedin Morgenthau’swork after 1940 (p465). For although he espousedrealism, he also extolled the virtues of wise,conscience-basedstatemanship.Koskenniemibringsthesethemesout in a usefulcritiqueof Morgenthau(pp459–470).His realenemyis notMorgenthau,however,but the imageof law receivedin US political sciencedepartments.74 The view oflaw suchdepartmentsinheritedfrom Weimarrefugeeslike Morgenthauwasthat itwas ‘formalist, moralist and unable to influence reality’ (p 471). Having

69 M. Koskenniemi,‘Carl Schmitt,HansMorgenthauandthe Imageof Law in InternationalRelations’in M. Byers(ed), TheRole of Law in InternationalPolitics (Oxford: OUP,1999)17, 17.

70 SeeA. Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’sCritique of Liberal InternationalLegal OrderBetween1933and1945’(2001)14 LeidenJournal of InternationalLaw 25 especially37, 56–75,especiallyat 75.

71 ibid 29, 42, 59–65.72 Morgenthaudid retaina small role for internationallaw, H. Morgenthau,‘Positivism,Functionalism

andInternationalLaw’ (1940)34 AmericanJournal of InternationalLaw 261,277.73 Ibid.74 As Koskenneimipointsout, (p 473), UK internationalrelationsscholarssuchasHedleyBull hada

different approach.



internalisedsucha negativestereotypeof internationallaw, internationallawyersin the US have often adoptedanti-formalist positions,such as McDougal andLaswell’spolicy schoolthatarosein Yale in the1950s(pp 474–477).Internationallawyers such as McDougal reimaginedthemselvesas participantsin a policy-makingprocessto attemptto salvagerelevanceonetheyhadlost a formal conceptof law that would enablethem to adopt an external,critical stanceon foreignpolicy (p 475). Regaining relevance had a cost. To complete their shift,internationallawyershad to lose their senseof cosmopolitanprogressivismandpreferencefor the universal,thus ‘internali[sing] the self-imageof the politicaldecisionmaker’slittle helper’ (p 495).

Not all internationallawyers in the United Statesdid this, and Koskenniemiemphasisesthe role playedby the ‘Columbia school’ of scholarssuchas LouisHenkin, OscarSchachterand Wolfgang Friedmannin working towardsa law ofco-operationacrossideological divides (pp 477–479).Although Koskenniemiunderstatesthe contactsbetweenthe Yale andColumbiaschools,75 he is attentiveto the informal conceptof law that bothsetsof scholarswereattachedto (p 479).This is theconceptof law passeddownto today’sAmericaninternationallawyers,manyof whomarenow,aswasMorgenthauin 1940,76 calling for interdisciplinarycollaboration.Hereinlies the rub. Koskenniemiexplainsthe problemwell:

the interdisciplinary agendaitself, together with a deformalized concept of law, andenthusiasmaboutthespreadof ‘liberalism,’ constitutesan academicprojectthat cannotbutbuttress the justification of American empire, as both Schmitt and McDougal wellunderstood.This is not becauseof badfaith or conspiracyon anyone’spart.It is the logic ofan argumentthat hopesto salvagethe law by making it an instrumentfor the values(orbetter‘decisions’)of the powerful that compelsthe conclusion.(pp 483–484)

Koskenniemicritiques modern calls for the use of ethics and sociology ininternationallaw. Law, for Koskenneimiis not merelya meansto anend(p 484).Thesimplefocuson making‘regimes’effective,for Koskenniemi,is a traditionalproblemof sociology,which,whenaddedto a deformalisedconceptof law hastheperniciouseffectof turning law into an instrumentof thepowerful (p 486).Ethicsfareno better.Naturalismsold, like Grotius’s,andnew,like McDougal’s concernwith ‘human dignity’, haveyet to show how their foundationsare objective (p487).

Given this, it is no surprisethat Koskenniemidislikes the ‘normatively tingedsociology’ of US-basedliberal internationalrelationstheory (pp 488–489).Thattheory inevitably mandatesdistinctions betweenStatesbasedon the level ofdemocracyat the domesticlevel and‘[n]otwithstandingnormativedisclaimers. . .[its] . . . sympathiesfor the law makingregimesandthepolitical institutionsof theWest are never in doubt.’77 The distinctionsdrawn by the liberal internationalrelationstheoristsalwayspresupposethat ‘we’ areon theliberal sideof thedivide,andhavethe right to determinethe positionof others.The links to ‘civilisation’discussedin Chapters1 and2 needno elaboration.

As a concomitant to his critique of instrumental interdisciplinary studies,Koskenniemi aligns himself with that most criticised of approachesto law,

75 OscarSchachterwas, for examplerather more influenced,in his early career,by McDougal thanKoskenniemiseemsto think, seeKnop, n 5 above,33. He was also visiting lecturerat Yale from1955–1970.

76 To which, for thereasonsKoskenniemigivesagainstdoingsotoday,Morgenthaudecidednot to heed,(p 482).

77 SeeJ.E.Alvarez,‘Do Liberal StatesBehaveBetter?A Critiqueof Slaughter’sLiberal Theory’ (2001)12 EuropeanJournal of InternationalLaw 183,189.



formalism.78 Recently,wehaveseenthebeginningsof a revival of interestin moreformal approachesto law. This return to formalism and positivism is notapolitical.79 It tendsto involveacommitmentto theprotectionof theweak.80 Thereare links here to the useof formalism in pre-World War II Italy, where it wasadopted as an anti-fascist tactic by lawyers.81 Formalism is adopted byKoskenniemito fight, not fascism,but the increasedglobal dominanceof the USandotherpowerfulactorswho seekto encouragean informal economicempireofthe kind Schmittexcoriatedin the 1930s.

Formal law is not consideredperfect,far from it. But power expressingitselfthrough law is better than power ruling unmoderated.In Koskenneimi’swords,‘[n]othing hasunderminedformalismasa cultureof resistanceto power,a socialpractice of accountability, opennessand equality’ (p 500) Koskenniemi’s‘message’of formalism is ‘there must be somelimits to the exerciseof power. . . whenprofessionalmenandwomenengagein argumentsaboutwhat is lawfulandwhat is not, they are engagedin a politics that imaginesthe possibility of acommunity overriding particular alliances and preferencesand allowing ameaningful distinction betweenlawful constraintand the application of actualpower’ (p 502).Despitetheir differences,it is difficult to readthesecommentsandnot rememberEdwardThompson’s apostaticalavowalof the rule of law.82 LikeThompson,Koskenniemimakesaninspiringcase.‘[B]etweentheScyllaof EmpireandtheCharybdisof fragmentation, thecultureof formalismresistsreductionintosubstantivepolicy’ (p 504).Talking abouttreatiesneversoundedso good.

Can the Koskenniemiof 1989, who ridiculed internationallaw as ‘singularlyuselessasa meansfor justifying or criticizing internationalbehaviour’83 really beadvocatinga returnto theruleof rules?It seemsunlikely. As bothhe(pp495,498)and othersaccept,if the postmoderncritique of rules is correct, that bridge isburnt.84 Thereare many typesof formalism.85 That of Langdell is hardly that ofWeinrib. So, what is Koskenniemi’s formalism? It is not always easy to pinKoskenniemidown on this, not leastashe claimshis form of formalism ‘has noessence,and its techniquesare constantlyredefinedin the context of politicalstruggle’(p 507).

78 As Martin Stoneputsit, ‘‘formalism’ is almostalwaysa termof opprobrium,so its positivedoctrine,if thereis one,mustlargely be gleanedfrom its critics’ M. Stone,‘Formalism’ in J. ColemanandS.Shapiro(eds.),TheOxfordHandbookof JurisprudenceandPhilosophyof Law (Oxford: OUP,2002)166,167.

79 SeeB. Kingsbury,‘Legal PositivismasNormativePolitics: InternationalSociety,Balanceof PowerandLassaOppenheim’sPositiveInternationalLaw’ (2002)13EuropeanJournalof InternationalLaw401.

80 Admittedly, it could be arguedthat this is the basisof all law, thusnot ‘political’ in a strongsense.The powerful do not needlaw, they havepower to protect them. However,againsta backgroundwheresomeareclaiming thatmorepowerfulStatesshouldenjoymorerightsunderinternationallawon political grounds,the argumentfor sovereignequality takeson a political mantle.

81 G. Calabresi,‘Two Functionsof Formalism’(2000)67 Universityof ChicagoLaw Review479,482–483.

82 E.P. Thompson,Whigs and Hunters (Harmondsworth:Penguin,1990 (1975) 258–269,especially,262–263.On Thompsonand the rule of law see R. Fine, ‘The Rule of Law and MuggletonianMarxism: The Perpelexitiesof EdwardThompson’(1994)21 Journal of Law and Society192; D.H.Cole,‘‘An UnqualifiedHumanGood’: E.P.ThompsonandtheRuleof Law’ (2001)28Journalof Lawand Society177; M.J. Horwitz, ‘The Rule of Law: An Unqualified HumanGood?’ (1977) 86 YaleLaw Journal 561.

83 From Apologyto Utopia, 48.84 Seealso J.E. Alvarez, ‘Positivism Regained,Nihilism Postponed’(1994) 15 Michigan Journal of

InternationalLaw 747, 781–784.85 Stone,aboven 78, 170–171identifiessevenattributes.



His call is for a ‘culture’ of formalism(p 494).It is a pleafor opendebateaboutvalues,interestsandpassions(p 496)anda requestthatwe avoidarguingin termsof law towardspre-determinedconclusions(p 500).And who could argueagainstthat?Of course,Koskennemineedsto explain how his culture of formalism canassistin ‘trying to accountfor thepossibilityof democraticpolitics in aneradeeplysuspiciousboth of universalistideologiesand the bureaucraticmanagementofsocial conflict (p 504). After all, Koskenniemihimself tells us formalism ‘mayfrequentlyhavefailed to live up to its promisesandit hascertainlysometimesbeenenlistedto supportdubiousor outright abominablecauses’(p 502).

The crux of his argumentis the work of ErnestoLaclau (pp 504–505),86 inparticularLaclau’sideathat for theclaim of any individual, group(or State)to becognisableby any other, it cannotbe in the terms of that individual, group orState’sown value-system,but somethinguniversal.However, the universalismLaclau suggestsis not one of a positive moral or political program, but ofarticulation of a particular lack (of resources,or of self-determination) in alanguagethat is shared.For Koskenniemithe valueof his cultureof formalismisthat formal legal argumentcan provide the universal languagewith which toarticulatetheseclaims (p 506). Thereforewe mustdiscussor claims in termsofformal rules,ratherthanasclashesof valuesto bedecidedby power(p 500).Thisis intended to create an argumentativelevel playing field. It requires thediscussantsto stepoutsidepresupposedpreferences,andthink aboutthepossibilityof the rule being applied againstthem as well as applying to others(p 501). Icannotseekto apply againstyou a rule I would not be willing to haveappliedagainstme.Thereis an attractiveKantiantinge to this.

However,therearecertainmatersthatstill needto beclarified. Oneof themostimportantis that, formalist argumentationcanneverbe usedto assertall differenttypesof claim. Koskenniemiseemsto acceptthis (p 502). Even if we acceptthecontroversialassertionthat all argumentativeclaimscanbe framedin termsof alackof something,sometypesof claim simplycannotbeframedin termsof formallaw. Socertainargumentswill not getheardin this debate.Evenof thosethatcanbeframedin legaltermsfrequentlylosemuchof theirargumentativestrengthwhenphrasedin legal language.Koskenniemihas himself criticised the tendencytoarguehumanrights in legal terms,on the groundthat they lose their moral andpolitical force in the translationinto legal terms.87 A largerproblemis thatoneofthemajor reasonsformalismhasbeensocriticisedin thepastis that its argumentsare in fact exclusionary.Only thosetrainedin its arcanetermsandgrantedlocusstandicanenterinto discussion.Within internationallegalargumentation,asKarenKnop hasshown,whether,for example,self-determinationis conceptualisedasarule or a principlehasanaffecton not only thetypesof argumentthatarepossibleabout its interpretation, but also who may participatein discussionsabout thatinterpretation.88 Koskenniemi is aware of this problem, and again, turning toLaclau,retortsthat‘everydecisionprocesswith anaspirationto inclusivenessmustconstantlynegotiateits own boundariesas it is challengedby new claims orsurroundedby new silences’(p 508). This may well be the case,unfortunatelyKoskenniemidoesnot explainhow or wherethis is to occur,andwhat languagemustbe usedin that debate.

86 In particularE. Laclau,Emancipation(s) (London:Verso,1996)87 n 7 above.88 Knop, n 5 above,pp 41–44.



Evenif theseproblemscanbe overcome,thequestionstill hasto beasked:canKoskenniemi’ssuggestionsit well with his rule scepticism?Doesformalism notrequiresomesort of faith – ‘faith in the autonomyof law, faith in the ability ofreasonand languageto guide humanaffairs, and faith in rule by rules’?89 Theanswerto thefirst questionis a qualifiedyes.Koskenniemi’sview of law asbeingthe languagefor political contestationcan be consistentwith his (previous)assertionthat law andpolitics areinextricablyentwinedasheis basinghimselfonLaclau, who asserts‘[s]ociety generatesa whole vocabularyof empty signifierswhose temporarysignified are the result of political competition’.90 Thus thelanguageof debateneednot beobjectively‘right’, but merelysharedbetweenthepartcipants.Following on from his rule scepticismthough,Koskenniemidoesnotbelieve that the culture of formalism will necessarily lead to substantiveagreement.Indeed,it may not get us much further than debatethat proceedsonanti-formalistlines(p 507).Thepoint is thatthecultureof formalismwill give riseto a debatingcommunity involving all relevantparties,rather than defining theconditionsof thedebateasbeingthat‘we’ areright, and‘they’ arenot.91 Soweareleft with the importanceof the virtuesof debateper se. To adoptKoskenniemi’sinterestingargumentwholeheartedly would requireusto havefaith in theideathattheconversationwill, in andof itself, haveusein bringingpeopleto at leastacceptthe legitimacyof the claimsof others,if they arephrasedin termsof universals.This is anattractivethought,but wemustquestionhowpeoplecanbemotivatedtoenterinto this debateif this is its only purpose.We all know thefateof Esperanto.

It is notablethat more recently,Koskenniemihas shownmore sympathyforrulesthanhis previouswork, includingTheGentleCivilizer, would imply. Despitehisprotestationsto thecontrary,Koskenniemiseemsto havesteppedbackfrom theradical indeterminacyargumentthat he previously espoused.Elsewherehe haswritten:

[c]learly, in that professionalcontext, only some arguments-andsome conclusions-areplausible,others are not. A clausein a formally valid treaty is an extremely powerfulpracticallegal argumenthoweverproblematicin theory the conceptsof ‘treaty’ or ‘formalvalidity’ might be and however much opposing lawyers are able to draw differingconclusionsfrom the wordsof that clause.92

We arenot in a free-for-all.Although subjectivity is ineradicable,lawyersmayconvinceother lawyers.The talk canend.So althoughKoskenniemiacceptsthatthe idea of formal internationallaw is theoreticallyproblematic,this neednotundermineinternationallegal practice.This is because,for Koskenniemi,theorywill nevergiveusanswersto practicalproblems(p 504).Forpracticalinternationallawyering,this situateshim surprisinglycloseto Brownlie, who haslittle time forjurisprudence:‘with one exception,theory providesno benefitsand frequentlyobscuresthemoreinterestingquestions.Theexceptionis producedby thefact thatit is often practically useful to understandthe theorieswhich have influencedaparticularindividual or groupof decision-makers’.93 Many formalist international

89 L. Barnett-Lidsky,‘DefensorFidei: The Travailsof a PostRealist-Formalist’(1995)47 Florida LawReview815,815.

90 n 87 above,p 35.91 Again, the problemwe haveis identifying who all the relevantpartiesare,andhow to validateany

criteria for makingsuchdecisions.92 M. Koskenniemi,‘Introduction’ in M. Koskenniemi(ed), Sourcesof International Law (Aldershot:

Ashgate,2002)xi, xxiv.93 n 2 above,11.



lawyers will be delighted to hear this, and welcome Koskenniemi ‘home’ toformalism,albeit,rememberingsomeof his earlierwork,94 thinking to themselves,‘someof us neverleft’.

This is a book that demandsengagementof its readers,and repaysrepeatedreadings.It is a work that managesto makesomeof the most well establishedliteraturein thearealook prosaicandsimplisticby comparison.Nonetheless,aftera time spentstaringinto theabyss,oneof internationallaw’s mosttrenchant,albeitsympatheticcritics, by the endof this extraordinarilythought-provoking andwellwritten work, appearsto have acceptedthat there is, after all, utility in whatinternationallawyersdo. By doing this, Koskenniemiseemsto havepulled theteeth of his own theoretical critique. He denies its relevance to practicalinternationallaw andacceptsthat an approachto internationalaffairs integratinginternationallegal discourseis, like democracyfor Churchill, ‘the worst form ofgovernmentexceptall thoseotherformsthathavebeentried from time to time.’95

Most internationallawyerscanbe expectedto agree.

94 At times, for example,M. Koskenniemi,‘Faith, Identity and the Killing of Innocents:InternationalLawyersandNuclearWeapons’(1997)10LeidenJournalof InternationalLaw137,Koskenniemihasbeenratherimpolite aboutrule-basedinternationallawyers.

95 HC Hansard, vol. 444, col. 202 (11 November1947).



déjà vu in international law

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