DEFENSEOF JAPAN 2015

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

Section 1 Trends in the International CommunitySection 2 Asia Paci� c Security EnvironmentSection 3 Global Security Issues

Chapter 1 Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1 The United StatesSection 2 Korean PeninsulaSection 3 ChinaSection 4 RussiaSection 5 AustraliaSection 6 Southeast AsiaSection 7 South AsiaSection 8 Europe

Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community

Section 1 Trends in Regional Con� ict and International Terrorism (With a Focus on the Middle East and Africa)

Section 2 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass DestructionSection 3 Maritime TrendsSection 4 Outer Space and SecuritySection 5 Trends in CyberspaceSection 6 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as well as

Defense Production and Technological Bases

Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense

Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s SecuritySection 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense PolicySection 3 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security

Chapter 2 National Security Strategy and National Defense Program Guidelines, etc.

Section 1 Outline of the National Security StrategySection 2 Outline of the National Defense Program GuidelinesSection 3 Outline of the Medium Term Defense ProgramSection 4 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Chapter 3 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Section 1 Signi� cance of the Japan-U.S. Security ArrangementsSection 2 Overview of the Revision of the GuidelinesSection 3 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the AllianceSection 4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Chapter 4 Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Section 1 Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense ForcesSection 2 Background of the Reform of the Ministry of DefenseSection 3 Speci� c Ministry of Defense Reform Initiatives

Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 1 Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

Section 1 Effective Deterrence and ResponseSection 2 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2015Section 3 Defense-Related ExpendituresSection 4 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force

Chapter 2 Measures on Defense Equipment

Section 1 The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

Section 2 Initiatives For Improving the Contract System and Other Related MattersSection 3 Research and DevelopmentSection 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Chapter 3 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

Section 1 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries and RegionsSection 2 Initiatives concerning Issues in the International Community

Chapter 4 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

Section 1 Collaboration with Local CommunitiesSection 2 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

Contents

DEFENSEOF JAPAN 2015

Defense Chronology

July-December 2014 January-May 2015Jul. 1 Cabinet decision on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to

Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People”

Jul. 1 Commencement of construction of the airfield and the Futenma Replacement Facility in the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project

Jul. 7 Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Auckland)Agreement reached on studies on a possible Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Jul. 8 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Canberra)Signing of Japan-Australia Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement

Jul. 11 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Washington)Confirmation of the progress in the review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

Jul. 25 Entry into force of the partial revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (establishment of the post of Defense Councillor)

Jul. 29 Japan-France Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)Signing of a statement of intent concerning defense cooperation and exchanges

Aug. 1 Entry into force of the partial revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (the authorized number of posts for uniformed SDF personnel in internal subdivisions fixed, organization of the Tactical Fighter Training Group, etc.)

Aug. 14 Commencement of offshore work (boring survey) for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project

Aug. 20 Dispatch of disaster relief units on a lifesaving mission in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11)

Aug. 26 Completion of the relocation of KC-130 of the U.S. Armed Forces from Futenma to Iwakuni

Sep. 1 Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo)Signing of a memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchange

Sep. 27 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to the volcanic eruption of Mount Ontake (through October 16)

Sep. 30 Return of part of the land of Sagami General Depot (Approximately 17ha) The first return of land on the mainland based on the Roadmap

Oct. 7 Sixth Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Forum (Yokohama)Exchange of views on promotion of maritime defense cooperation, cooperation in equipment and technology, and capacity-building

Oct. 16 Japan-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)Agreement to continue studies enhancing Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercises

Oct. 26 Aviation inspection parade in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces

Oct. 28 Japan-Finland Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)

Oct. 29 Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul)Discussion of Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchange, and explanation of Japan’s security initiatives

Nov. 4 Japan-Spain Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)Signing of a memorandum on Japan-Spain defense cooperation and exchanges

Nov. 19 First Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable (Bagan)Exchange of views on cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and maritime security

Nov. 23 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture

Nov. 28 Transportation of supplies necessary for international disaster relief activities to respond to the Ebola hemorrhagic fever epidemic in Western Africa (Republic of Ghana, through Dec. 11)

Dec. 1 First dispatch of SDF personnel to NATOFemale SDF personnel dispatched as the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security

Dec. 6 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to heavy snow in Tokushima Prefecture (through December 11)

Dec. 19 Joint announcement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2)

Decision to deepen discussions toward completion of the review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in the first half of 2015

Dec. 26 Completion of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces TPY-2 Radar (so-called X-band Radar) at Kyogamisaki

Dec. 31 International disaster relief activities for the missing AirAsia plane (through January 11, 2015)

Jan. 12 Fourth joint working group talks between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities on “Marine and Air Communications Mechanism” (Tokyo)

Agreement to strive toward the early commencement of the operation of the “Marine and Air Communications Mechanism”

Jan. 15 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to avian influenza (Okayama Prefecture: January 15 through January 19; Saga Prefecture: January 18 through January 20)

Jan. 18 Visit by Defense Minister Nakatani to Djibouti

Jan. 19 Visit by Defense Minister Nakatani to South Sudan

Jan. 20 Release of video of Japanese nationals detained by ISIL released (subsequent release of videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals on January 24 and February 1)

Jan. 21 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministers’ Meeting, First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (London)

Shared recognition of the need to cooperate between Japan and U.K. in relation to Japanese nationals detained by ISIL in Syria and contribute to the international community’s fight against terrorism

Jan. 29 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)Signing of a memorandum of understanding on Japan-Philippines defense cooperation and exchange

Feb. 3 Acceptance of Australian Defense Ministry personnel by the Ministry of Defense

Acceptance of personnel under the agreement reached at the bilateral Defense Ministers’ Meeting in 2012 as part of Japan-Australia cooperation in the area of support for capacity-building

Feb. 10 Cabinet decision on the “revision of the Implementation Plans for International Peace Cooperation Assignments in South Sudan” (extension of the dispatch period to the end of August 2015)

Feb. 20 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo)Signing of a memorandum of understanding on Japan-Qatar defense exchange

Mar. 13 Second Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)

Signing of an agreement concerning Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology between Japan and France Agreement and confirmation that Japan and France will enhance cooperation in Africa and the Middle East and join the international community in fighting against terrorism

Mar. 19 Japan-China security dialogue (Tokyo)Renewed confirmation that both sides will strive toward the early commencement of the operation of the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism”

Mar. 20 Japan Timor-Leste Defense Ministers’ Meeting

Mar. 23 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo)Signing of a memorandum on Japan-Indonesia defense cooperation and exchange

Mar. 30 Japan-India Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) Agreement to strive toward early progress in defense equipment cooperation and continuation with periodic land and air cooperation, including bilateral naval exercises

Mar. 31 Return of West Futenma residential area (approximately 51ha)

Apr. 8 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo)

Apr. 27 International disaster relief activities in response to an earthquake in Nepal (through May 22)

Apr. 27 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (New York) Approval of new Guidelines

Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington)

Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Washington)

Apr. 30 Promulgation and enforcement of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Years of Expenditures with Treasury Obligations Related to Specified Defense Procurement (so-called the Long-Term Contract Act)

Introduction of long-term contracts enabling cost reductions and stable procurement, thereby realizing the defense buildup in a reliable and systematic manner

May 14 Cabinet decision on “Legislation for Peace and Security” and the “International Peace Cooperation Bill”

Development of a seamless system for ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the international community

May 29 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to a volcanic eruption on Kuchinoerabujima Island (through June 1)

May 30 Participation by Defense Minister Nakatani in the 14th Asia Security Summit (IISS Shangri-La Dialogue) (Singapore) (through May 31)Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore)Japan-U.S.-Korea Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore)

May 31 Appointment of MSDF personnel as the commander of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations

Commander of a multinational force since the foundation of the SDF

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

• The security environment surrounding Japan has becomeincreasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizingfactorsbecomingmoretangibleandacute.

• In theperipheryofJapan, therehasbeena tendency towardsanincrease in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations,that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory,sovereignty,andmaritimeeconomicinterests.Inaddition,therehasbeenanoticeabletrendamongneighboringcountriestomodernizeandreinforcetheirmilitarycapabilitiesandtointensifytheirmilitaryactivities.Inthisregard,securitychallengesanddestabilizingfactorsintheAsia-Pacificregionarebecomingmoreserious.

• In a global security environment, there is a growing risk thatunrestorasecurityproblem inasinglecountryor regioncould

immediately develop into a challenge or destabilizing factor fortheentire internationalcommunity.Theactivitiesof internationalterroristorganizations,includingtheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant (ISIL),aregainingmomentumandexpanding.RussiahasattemptedtochangethestatusquobyforceorcoercioninUkraine(so-called “hybrid warfare”). Cyber attacks have become moresophisticatedandcomplicated.Astheseexamplesexemplify,thesecuritychallengesanddestabilizingfactorsarecomplex,diverse,and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more difficult for asinglecountrytodealwiththemonitsown.

• Territorial disputes over the NorthernTerritories andTakeshima,bothofwhichareinherentpartsoftheterritoryofJapan,remainunresolved.

• AsthewarsinAfghanistanandIraqdrawtoaclose,thepatternsofU.S. involvement in theworldarechanging.While facedwitha severe financial situation, the United States is anticipated tocontinuetoplayaroleinthepeaceandstabilityoftheworldbydrawingonitsworld-leading,comprehensivenationalpower.

• TheNationalSecurityStrategy (NSS) released in February2015underscores that the United States would continue to play aleadingroleintacklingavarietyofchallenges,suchasthethreatof terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMDs),andcyberattacks,aswellastakecollectiveactionwithitsalliesandothers,whilepromotingarules-basedinternationalorder. Furthermore, the NSS maintains that the United Stateswouldcontinuetoadvance its rebalancetoAsiaandthePacific.FocuswillbeonhowthechangesinthesituationsintheMiddleEastandUkraineimpacttheseU.S.policies.

• Meanwhile, the government budget mandatory sequestration,including defense spending, that was initiated in 2013 broughtvariousimpactsontheU.S.Forces.TheQDRalsoemphasizesthesignificantrisksofsequestrationtotheU.S.Forces.Muchattentionwillbepaidtohowthemandatorysequestrationcutsindefensespendingwillimpactthedefensestrategiesandsecuritypolicies.

• InNovember2014, then-U.S.SecretaryofDefenseChuckHagel

announced theDefense Innovation Initiativeaimedat identifyinginnovative ways to offset potentioal adversaries’ capabilities inorder to sustain and expand U.S. military advantages, utilizinglimitedresources.Heexpressedhisexpectationthattheinitiativewoulddevelopintoathirdoffsetstrategy.

Overview

The United States

TheRecentTrendoftheU.S.ForcesintheAsia-PacificRegion

RecentSecurityRelatedIssuesaroundJapan

North Korea’s progress with the developmentof nuclear weapons and missiles

Sea lanes leading to Japan

China’s advancements intothe Pacific Ocean routinely conducted

Extensive and rapidstrengthening of China’s

military power

North Korea’s militaryprovocations and rhetoric

Rapid expansion/intensificationof China’s activities in

the East China Sea

Rapid expansion/intensification ofChina’s activities in the South China Sea

Changes in the China-Taiwanmilitary balance (increasinglyfavorable to the Chinese side)

Russian militaryactivities intensifying

Gray zone situations tendto be increased and prolonged

Using GTOP030(USGS) and ETOP01(NOAA)

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2014), etc. 2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

Army: approx. 29,000 personnelNavy: approx. 7,000 personnelAir Force: approx. 29,000 personnelMarines: approx. 1,000 personnel

Total: approx. 66,000 personnel(Total in 1987: approx. 354,000 personnel)

European Region

Army: approx. 44,000 personnelNavy: approx. 40,000 personnelAir Force: approx. 28,000 personnelMarines: approx. 24,000 personnel

Total: approx. 136,000 personnel(Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel)

Asia-Pacific Region

Army: approx. 495,000 personnelNavy: approx. 320,000 personnelAir Force: approx. 309,000 personnelMarines: approx. 185,000 personnel

Total: approx. 1,310,000 personnel(Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel)

U.S. Forces

U.S. Central Command

U.S. European Command

U.S. NorthernCommand

U.S. SouthernCommand

U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command

Australia

Canberra

JapanROK

Indonesia

Philippines

Singapore

Seoul

Manila

Jakarta

Hawaii

Guam

Okinawa

Darwin

[Indonesia]• Transfer of 24 F-16s

(announced in November 2011)

[Philippines]• Transfer of U.S. Coast Guard cutters

(August 2011, May 2012)• Signing of the Enhanced Defense

Cooperation Agreement with the purpose of enhancing the presence of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014)

[Guam]• Rotational deployment of submarines• Rotational deployment of bombers• Establishment of a facility for aircraft

carrier’s temporary port of call• Deployment of unmanned

reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4)

In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a plan to deploy 60% of the assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as proceeding with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment.

[Republic of Korea]• Maintaining around 28,500 U.S. troops

stationed in the Republic of Korea

• Relocation of home port for a carrier from the Atlantic Ocean side to the Pacific Ocean side (in San Diego) (April 2010)

[Taiwan]• A plan to upgrade the F-16s Taiwan

currently owns, etc. (announced in September 2011)

[Australia]At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives:

• Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia• Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia

[Singapore]• Rotational deployment of Littoral

Combat Ships (LCS) (announced in June 2011; a broad agreement reached with the government of Singapore in June 2012; the first ship started rotation in April 2013 and the second ship in December 2014)

[Japan]• Deployment of F-22, MV-22 Ospreys (deployment of CV-22 to Yokota in 2017), P-8,

and of Global Hawk• Deployment of second TPY-2 radar • Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and ground troops from

Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, etc.• Additional one missile cruiser has been deployed (June 2015)• Additional two Aegis BMD destroyers will be deployed (scheduled for summer 2015

and 2017)* Deployment of F-35 in Iwakuni in 2017 (the Marines’ plan)

* A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used

(Reference) Number of Marine Corps troops in the Asia-Pacific Region

Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2014) and the Military Balance 2015

Total: Approx. 24,049

Hawaii: 7,677 Australia: 12Guam: 15 Republic of Korea: 250Japan: 15,870 Thailand: 215 etc.

The U.S. Navy’s Aegis destroyer USS Benfold to be deployed to Yokosuka in summer 2015 (U.S. Navy website)

General Situation• North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-calledasymmetric military capabilities and repeatedly uses militarilyprovocativewordsandactions.SuchmilitarytrendinNorthKoreaheightenstensionintheKoreanPeninsulaandconstitutesaseriousdestabilizingfactortothesecuritynotonlyofJapanbutalsooftheentire region and the international community.Accordingly, it isnecessaryforJapantopayutmostattentiontothem.

Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles• InMarch2013,NorthKoreaadoptedtheso-called“newstrategicline”policyofsimultaneouseconomicandnucleardevelopment.

• With regard to North Korea’s nuclear development, some haveargued that it is a so-called brinkmanship policy designed toreceivearewardofsomesort.However,NorthKoreaisdeemedtobedevelopingnuclearweaponsasanindispensabledeterrentformaintainingtheexistingregime.

• North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests since 2006 andhasrepeatedlyhintedatfurthernucleartestssinceMarch2014,raisinginternationalconcerns.

• TakingintoaccountthatNorthKoreahasnotchangeditsstanceofcontinuingitsnuclearweaponsprogram,itisbelievedthatwiththepassageoftime,therewouldbeagreaterriskofNorthKoreadeployingaballisticmissilemountedwithanuclearwarheadthatincludesJapanin itsrange. Inthisregard,relateddevelopmentsneedtobemonitoredcarefully.

• IthasbeensuggestedthatNorthKoreaisdevelopingaSubmarine-LaunchedBallisticMissile(SLBM)andanSLBM-carryingsubmarine.InMay2015,NorthKoreaannouncedthatitconductedasuccessfultest launch of theSLBM. It is deemed thatNorthKorea intends todiversifyitsattackcapabilitiesandimprovesurvivability.Furthermore,ithasbeensuggestedthatNorthKoreaiscarryingoutsignificantmodificationofitsrocketlaunchtowerinTongch’ang-ridistrict.Inthefuture,NorthKoreacouldlaunchlong-rangeballisticmissileswhicharelargercomparedtothepast.

• ShouldNorthKoreaacquirelonger-rangeballisticmissilecapabilityandachievetheminiaturizationofnuclearweaponsandacquirednuclearwarheads,and in turnhavea falsesenseofconfidenceand recognition that it secured strategic deterrence against theUnitedStates,thiscouldleadtoincreasesinandtheescalationofmilitaryprovocationsbyNorthKoreaintheregionandcouldcreatesituationsthataredeeplyworryingalsoforJapan.

• The ballistic missile launches since 2014 have demonstratedimprovements in the operational capabilities of North Korea’sballisticmissileunits, includingsurpriseattackcapabilities,withseveralballisticmissiles launched from locationsandat timingsasNorthKoreachooses.TheNorthKoreanballisticmissilethreatisincreasingfurther.

• ThedevelopmentofWMDsandmissilesbyNorthKoreaconstitutes,coupledwithitsprovocativewordsandactions,includingmissileattacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to thesecurityofJapan.Additionally,suchdevelopmentposesaseriouschallengetotheentireinternationalcommunitywithregardtothenon-proliferationofweapons,includingWMDs.

General Situation• TherearehighexpectationsforChinatorecognizeitsresponsibilityin the international community, accept and comply withinternationalnorms,andplayanactiveroleinamorecooperativemanneronregionalandglobalissues.

• Whileadvocating“peacefuldevelopment,”China,particullarlyovermaritimeissueswhereitsinterestsconflictwithothers’,basedonits own assertions incompatible with the existing internationallegal order, continues to act in an assertive manner, includingcoercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised tofulfillitsunilateraldemandswithoutcompromise.China’sactionsincludedangerousactsthatmayinviteunintendedconsequences,raisingconcernsoverChina’sfuturedirection.

• Chinahasattemptedtoadvanceitsowninitiativesinthesecurityfield. At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-BuildingMeasures in Asia (CICA), for example, China criticized militaryalliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people ofAsia.” In thefieldof internationalfinance,Chinaestablished theNewDevelopment BankBRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, andSouthAfrica)andispreparingtoestablishtheAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank(AIIB).

• InChina,underthepolicyofcrackingdownonboth“tigers”and“flies,”“corruption”hasbeensubjecttoseverecharges,includingformer prominent leaders of the party and military. During thefourth plenary session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party(CCP)CentralCommitteeinOctober2014,adecisionthatmakesreferencetoadvancingthe“ruleoflaw”undertheguidanceoftheCCPwasadopted.Accordingly,itispossiblethatfurtherstepswillbetakentoaddresscorruptionwithinthepartyandmilitary.

• China is believed to be enhancing its asymmetric militarycapabilities to deter military forces of other countries fromapproachingandadvancingtoChina’ssurroundingregion,andtoinhibittheirmilitaryactivitiesintheregion(so-called“Anti-Access/Area-Denial”[“A2/AD”]capabilities).

Domestic Affairs• KimJong-un,FirstChairmanoftheNationalDefenseCommission,has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, and individualsselectedbyFirstChairmanKimJong-unhavebeenassigned tothekeyparty,military,andcabinetposts.ItisbelievedthattheFirstChairmanendeavorstostrengthenandconsolidatehisregimeasitssoleleader.

• In2014,theNorthKoreanmediastoppedreportingtheactivitiesofKimKyong-hui,SecretaryoftheKoreanWorkers’PartyandFirstChairmanKimJong-un’saunt.Meanwhile,theNorthKoreanmediabegantoreporttheactivitiesoftheFirstChairman’syoungersister,KimYo-jong,asaseniormemberoftheKoreanWorkers’Party.ItissuggestedthatagenerationalchangeintheleadershipmaybetakingplaceamongtheKimfamily.

• The Kim Jong-un regime appears to be moving on track to acertain degree. However, the chilling effect resulting from thefrequentpersonnel reshuffles, includingdismissals, couldpropelNorthKoreatoturntomilitaryprovocativeactionswithoutmakingsufficient diplomatic considerations. In addition, some point totheconcernoversocialcontrolsuchastheincreasinginequalitybetween the rich and the poor and the inflow of informationfromabroad–aconcernwhichneedstobemonitoredfromtheperspectiveofregimestability.

Relations with Other Countries• ChinaisavitalpoliticalandeconomicpartnerforNorthKoreaandmaintainsadegreeof influenceonNorthKorea.However,NorthKoreadoesnotnecessarily adoptactionswhichare in linewiththe position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues,andmutualvisitsofseniorofficialshavedecreased.Inthislight,relationsbetweenChinaandNorthKoreamaybecoolingonthepoliticalanddiplomaticdomains.Givensuchcircumstances,NorthKorea-Chinarelationswillcontinuetobefollowed.

• Ontheotherhand,in2014,NorthKoreaintensifieditsdiplomacywithRussia.Theyearsawmutualvisitsbymanyseniorofficialsaswellasadvancesineconomiccooperation.

Military Affairs• China has strengthened its military forces broadly and rapidly.Furthermore, China has rapidly expanded and intensified itsactivitiesatseaandinairspace,includingtheEastChinaSeaandSouth China Sea. Japan has great concerns over such Chinesemilitaryactivities,etc., togetherwith the lackof transparency initsmilitaryaffairsandsecurity issues,andneeds topayutmostattentiontothem.Theseactivitiesalsoraisesecurityconcernsfortheregionandtheinternationalcommunity.

• China has not disclosed specific information on possession ofweapons,procurementgoalsandpastprocurements,organizationand locationsofmajorunits, recordsofmainmilitaryoperationsandexercises,andadetailedbreakdownofthenationaldefensebudget.ItishopedthatChinawillincreasetransparencyconcerningitsmilitaryaffairsbysucheffortsasdisclosingspecificinformationpertainingtoitsdefensepoliciesandmilitarycapabilities.

• China’sannouncednationaldefensebudgetcontinuestoincreaseatarapidpace,recordingdouble-digitannualgrowthnearlyconsistentlyfromFY1989tothepresent.ThenominalsizeofChina’sannouncednationaldefensebudgethasgrownapproximately41-foldin27yearssinceFY1988andnearly3.6-foldin10yearssinceFY2005.

• In order to acquire striking force thatwill enable penetration ofthemissiledefenseshield,China isconsideredtobedevelopinga hypersonic glide vehicle which is launched bymounting to aballisticmissile.SomeanalystspointoutthatChinamayalsobeconstructing its first domestic aircraft carrier.Additionally,ChinaisdevelopingtheJ-20andJ-31,whicharesaidtobecomenext-generationfighters.

• China is deemed to have established the“EastChinaSea JointOperational Command Center” to jointly operate the Navy andAir Force. In addition, some analysts have stated that the CCPestablished the “Central Military Commission Joint OperationsCommand Center” to carry out decision-making at the higheststrategic level. Furthermore,Chinahas recently conducteddrillsaimedatthedevelopmentofajointoperationalposture.

North Korea China

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

14 1510 1289 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08(FY)

(%)

0500

1,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0004,5005,0005,5006,0006,5007,0007,5008,000

(100 million yuan)

8,5009,000

Defense Budget (in 100 million yuan)Year-on-year growth rate (%)

ChangeinChina’sAnnouncedDefenseBudget

Note: The total defense budget for FY2002 was not disclosed. Discrepancies arise if the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. Therefore, for FY2002, 168.4 billion yuan was used based on a calculation conducted on the assumption that the disclosed rate and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001.

Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace• In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build upcapabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters andairspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its maritimeactivities based on sea power and air power, both qualitativelyandquantitatively.SuchactivitiesbyChinaincludedangerousactsthat could cause unintended consequences and are extremelyregrettable.Chinaisurgedtoactonthebasisoftheprincipleofthe“ruleoflaw”.

• TheChinesegovernmentannouncedthatitestablishedthe“EastChina Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands which Chinadescribed as if theywere a part of China’s“territory,” and thatthe Chinese Armed Forces would take “defensive emergencymeasures”inthecasewhereaircraftdoesnotfollowtherelevantrulessetforthbytheChineseMinistryofNationalDefense.Thesemeasuresundulyinfringethefreedomofoverflightoverthehighseas, which is the general principle of international law. JapanisdemandingChinatorevokeanymeasuresthatgoagainsttheprincipleofthefreedomofoverflightoverthehighseas.

• The number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing tothe Pacific Ocean has increased in recent years, and suchadvancementsarecurrentlyconductedroutinely.Itisunderstoodthat China seeks to improve its deployment capabilities to theopenocean.

• WithregardtotheactivitiesofChinesegovernmentvessels,sinceOctober 2013, the operations of government vessels intendedto intrude into terrirotial waters near the Senkaku Islands havebecome routinized. In this light, an operations manual or othercodesmayhavebeendeveloped.Furthermore,Chinahasstriventodeveloplargergovernmentvesselsandisproceedingwiththeconstructionoftheworld’slargest10,000-tonclasspatrolvessel.

• RussiahasmadeclearitsadversarialstanceagainsttheWestandother countriesoverUkraine,whichRussia considers is under itssphereofinfluence.Eveninthefaceofasevereeconomicsituation,Russiahascontinuedtoincreaseitsdefensebudgetandmodernizethe Russian Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensified theactivitiesoftheRussianArmedForcesnotonlyintheAsia-Pacific,butalsointheArctic,Europe,andareasneartheU.S.mainland,andtherehasbeenatrendtoexpandtheirareaofactivity.

• IntheEasternMilitaryDistrict,includingtheFarEast,thelarge-scaleexercise“Vostok 2014” participated by over 155,000 personnel

• In theSouthChinaSea, thereare territorialdisputeswithChina,and recently, there has been growing frictionwith China. SinceMay 2014, the Philippines and Vietnam have lodged protestsover China’s alleged activities, including land reclamation andconstructionofrunwaysatthereefsoftheSpratlyIslands.

• ChinahasbeenengagedinoilandgasdrillingaswellasbuildingfacilitiesandsurveyingforthedrillingintheEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSea.TheJapanesegovernmenthasconfirmed thatinadditiontoitsexistingplatforms,Chinahasbeenbuildingnew

• Anarrayofproblemsisattherootofconflictsoccurringinrecentyears in various parts of the world, including ethnicity, religion,territory,andresources.Inmanycases,areaswherecivilwarsorregionalconflictshavecreatedorexpandedagovernancevacuumhavebecomeahotbedoftheactivitiesofterroristorganizations.Among them are organizations which operate across nationalborders and regions,which continue to pose imminent securitychallengestotheinternationalcommunity.Thepresenceofstateswithweakgovernancehasmadeitdifficulttotackleriskssuchasthepandemicandspreadofinfectiousdiseases.

• As a general trend, with the advancement of globalization,transnational terrorist organizations are using social media andothercyberspacetoolstoshareinformationandconspirewithintheirownorganizationsorwithothergroups,aswellastoacquire

• ItisthoughtthatoneoftheobjectivesofChina’smaritimeactivitiesistoweakenthecontrolofothercountriesovertheislandstowhichChinaclaimsterritorialsovereignty,whilestrengtheningtheclaimofitsterritorialsovereignty,throughvarioussurveillanceactivitiesanduseofforceatseaandinairspacesurroundingtheislands.

• In recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps toavoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea. In April 2014,China, together with other countries such as Japan and theUnited States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned Encounters atSea(CUES).Additionally,inJanuary2015,JapaneseandChinesedefense authorities resumed the consultations to swiftly beginthe implementation of the Maritime and Air CommunicationMechanism. In November 2014, the United States and Chinaannouncedtheiragreementontwoconfidence-buildingmeasures.

Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean• InAugust2014,aChinesefighterallegedlyflewabnormallyclosetoandinterceptedaU.S.NavyaircraftintheSouthChinaSea.

• China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale landreclamation work in seven features in the Spratly Islands. Onsomeofthem,itisconsideredthatChinaisbuildinginfrastructureincluding runwaysandports,whichhas raisedconcernsamongtheinternationalcommunity,includingtheUnitedStates.

• ASong-classsubmarineconductedactivitiesintheIndianOceanfromSeptember toOctober2014,and isdeemedtohavecalledataportinColombo,SriLanka,twiceinthesameyear.Assuchexamples demonstrate, the Chinese Navy has improved itscapacity toexecuteoperations inmoredistantwaters, includingtheIndianOcean.

wasconductedinSeptember2014,inwhichthecombatreadinessofunitswasassessed.Inaddition,anexercisewasconductedinthe“KurilIslands”thatincludetheNorthernTerritories.

• InUkrainianterritory,Russiahasattemptedtochangethestatusquobyforceorcoercionbyengagingin“hybridwarfare,”inwhichactsof aggressionarecarriedout throughmethods that cannotbeclearlylabeledan“armedattack”basedontheiroutwardform.Russia’sactionisrecognizedasaglobalissuethatcouldimpacttheentireinternationalcommunity,includingAsia.

• In recent years, SoutheastAsian countries have increased theirdefensespendingagainstthebackdropofeconomicdevelopmentand other reasons, and are modernizing their military forcesfocusingoninductingmajorequipmentoftheirnavalandairforces,suchasfourth-generationmodernfightersandsubmarines.

offshoreplatformsandotherfacilitiesontheChinesesideoftheJapan-ChinamedianlineoftheEastChinaSeasinceJune2013.Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateraldevelopmentanddemandedtheterminationofsuchworksetc.

weaponsandfundsandrecruitfighters.Theseorganizationscarryoutpropagandausingtacticalpublicrelationsstrategies.ISILhasgainedstrengthbyseizingtheopportunityoftheconfusioninSyriaand Iraq. ISILhasanexceptionallysubstantial fundingsource,apowerfulmilitaryforcewhichcanstandface-to-facewithanation,anddefactocontrolofsometerritory,making ISILaparticularlystrikingpresence.Underthesecircumstances,organizationsthatpledgeallegiancetoISILhaveemergedworldwide.

• Indevelopedcountries,suchas theUnitedStatesandEuropeancountries,therehasbeenariseinyoungpeoplewhosympathizewith the extremism of international terrorist organizations,including ISIL, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towardsestrangementfromsociety,discrimination,poverty,anddisparities.Inan increasingnumberofcases, thesepeoplehave joined the

Russia

Southeast Asia

Trends in Regional Confl ict and International Terrorism

Qingdao

Ningbo

Taipei

Okinawa

Tokyo

Guam

East China Sea

The United States National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration: ETOPO1

The following aircraft flew:• a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, November 2013)• a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft ) & a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (November 2013)• a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (February 2014)• a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (March 2014)

Flew to the Pacific Ocean through airspace between themain island of Okinawa and Miyako Island• a “Y-8” (airborne early warning) (July 2013)• two “H-6” (bomber) (September 2013)• two “Y-8” (airborne early warning) & two “H-6” (bomber) (three

consecutive days, October 2013)• a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber)

(March 2014)• two “Y-8” (airborne early warning), a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering

aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) (December 6, 7, 10, and 11, 2014)• a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days,

February 2015) • two “H-6” (bomber) (May 2015)

“Su-30” (fighter), “J-11” (fighter) & “KJ-2000” (airborne early warning) etc., flew within the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (announcement by the Chinese side)

November 2013, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” was announced

December 2012, fixed wing aircraft, which belongs to the State Oceanic Administration, violated the airspace for the first time

May and June 2014, over the East China Sea, two “Su-27” (fighter) came near collision with MSDF’s and ASDF’s aircraft

RecentChineseActivitiesinAirspacenearJapan

The situation of China’s land reclamation work in the Spratly Islands. The top row, from left to right, shows the before and after photos of the reclamation at Johnson South Reef, as well as a close-up of the reclaimed area (photos taken in January 2012 and March 2015). The bottom row shows the situation in Subi Reef (January and March 2015).

(CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe)

activities of international terrorist organizations as fighters andconduct “home-grown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism activities intheir countries. Such developments have heightened the risk ofterrorism in developed countries, and Japan is not in any wayimmunefromit.

• Theproliferationofthethreatofterrorismhasgainedmomentum.The diversification of its perpetrators, coupledwith the growingcomplexityofregionalconflicts,hasmadeitfurthermoredifficulttopreventtheiroccurrence.Forthisreason,internationalcooperationoncounter-terrorismmeasureshasbecomeevenmoreimportant.

• In the East China Sea and the South China Sea, it has becomeincreasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert theirrightsortakeactions,basedontheiruniqueassertionswhichareincompatiblewiththeexistinginternationallawandorder.Thishascaused situations of undue infringement upon the principles of“freedomofnavigationinthehighseas”and“freedomofoverflightoverthehighseas.”

• TheArcticstateshavebeenmoreproactivelypromotingeffortsto acquire their interest in resource development and use of

• Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of avarietyofsatellitesandlaunchthemforthepurposeofenhancingC4ISR* functions. Such satellites include image reconnaissancesatellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, satellitesgathering radio wave information for military communications,communication satellites for military communication, andpositioningsatellitesfornavigatingnavalvesselsandaircraftand

• For armed forces, information and communications form thefoundation of command and control,which extend from centralcommand to ground-level forces. In this regard, informationand communications technology (ICT) advancements arefurther enhancing the dependence of units on information andcommunicationnetworks.

• For this reason, cyber attacks are regardedas an asymmetricalstrategy capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries byexploitingtheweaknessesofanadversary’sforces.Itisbelievedthat many foreign military forces are developing offensivecapabilitiesincyberspace.

• Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against theinformation and communication networks of government

Currently,theinternationalcommunityasawholeistakingvarioussteps,includingmilitaryactionsaswellascuttingoffthefundingsourcesofterroristorganizationsandpreventingtheinternationalmovementofterroristfighters.

• The rapid and vast outbreak of the Ebola virus disease inWestAfricathreatensthestabilityoftheaffectedcountries,whichhaveweakgovernanceandpoor crisismanagement capabilities, andspreadthediseasetoothercountriesintheWest,sheddinglightontheriskposedbythespreadofinfectiousdiseasesseriously.

thesearoute.ThestrategicimportanceoftheArcticRegionisthusincreasing.

• “Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace andprosperity of the international community as a whole. In thisregard, each state has been tackling on its own orwith othersvarious issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegaldumping,contraband,humansmuggling,maritimedisasters,andtheremovalofhazardoussubstances,formaintainingthestabilityofsealanesofcommunication.

enhancingtheprecisionofweaponssystems.• Meanwhile, as illustrated by China’s Anti-Satellite Test, thedevelopment of anti-satelliteweapons and the spread of spacedebris have been noted as a threat against space assets suchas satellites owned by countries. In this regard, the risk to thestableuseofouterspacehasbecomeoneofthecriticalsecuritychallengescountriesface.

organizationsandmilitaryforcesofvariouscountries.IthasbeensuggestedthatgovernmentorganizationsofChina,Russia,NorthKorea,andothercountrieshavebeeninvolved.Inaddition,cyberattackshavebeengrowingmoresophisticatedandcomplicatedbytheday.Cybersecurityhasbecomeoneofthemostimportantsecurityissuesforcountries.

• There has been a movement to establish codes of conductin cyberspace. It has been suggested, however, that there isdisagreement between the countries’ assertions, with countriessuchastheUnitedStates,Europeancountries,andJapancallingfor maintaining free and unrestricted cyberspace, while manycountriessuchasRussia,China,andemergingcountriescall forstrengtheningthenationalcontrolofcyberspace.

Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Outline of the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security

RevisionoftheSelf-DefenseForcesLaw(MeasurestoRescueJapaneseNationalsOverseas)

RevisionoftheSelf-DefenseForcesLaw(UseofWeaponstoProtectWeapons,etc.ofUnitsoftheU.S.Forces,etc.)

Maritime Trends

Outer Space and Security

Trends concerning Cyberspace

KeyPointsregardingtheLegislationforPeaceandSecurity

Images of Situations and Conditions

Concerning Japan and Japanese NationalsConcerning International Cooperation

Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council]

(Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation)

International Peace Cooperation Activities[International Peace Cooperation Law]

The “Three New Conditions”(1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack

against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness

(2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people

(3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessaryShip Inspection Operations (Expansion)

[Ship Inspection Operations Law]

・ Enable operations for peace and security of the international community

Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (Existing) [Self-Defense Forces Law]

Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New)

Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment (Existing) [Self-Defense Forces Law]

Protection of weapons/other equipment of the U.S. and other countries’ armed forces (New)

Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Expansion)・ Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such

as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan

U.N. PKO (Addition)

・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. security of specified areas including protection of local population)  

・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) to better align with current U.N. standard

Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework)

Support activities (including logistics support) in situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security (Expansion)

[Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important

Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security](Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and

Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

・ Clarification of the purpose of the revision（Revision of the purpose of the Law）

・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries (not only the U.S.)

・ Expansion of the scope of support activities

Support activities (including logistics support) to armed forces of foreign countries in situations that the international community is collectively addressing for international peace and security (New) [International Peace Support Law (New)]

Response to armed attack situations, etc[Legislation for Responses to Situations]Responses to “situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival” (New)

・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions”

� Enable the units of the SDF to take measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations (Article 84-3).

Rescue measures: Guarding, rescue and other measures to protect the lives or bodies of those Japanese nationals, including transportation.

[Procedure] Order by the Minister of Defense� Request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs� Consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the

Minister of Defense� Approval by the Prime Minister

[Authority to Use Weapons]� So-called “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” are

permitted� SDF personnel shall not inflict injury upon any person except

in a case of self-defense or overting of present danger.

[Requirements for Implementation] When all of the following are met:(1) It is recognized that in places where rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are

currently maintaining public safety and order, and no act of combat is being conducted;

(2) The country concerned consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures; and (3) It is anticipated that coordination and cooperation can be

ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to expected dangers.

* It is possible to also rescue non-Japanese nationals under certain conditions.

� Enable uniformed SDF personnel to use weapons to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (Article 95-2)

[Coverage]� Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other

countries and similar organizations’ units � That are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in

activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (*)(*) Including joint exercises but excluding activities where the act of

combat is currently being conducted.

[Authority to Use Weapons]� When there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use

weapons to protect people or weapons, etc., the use of weapons is permitted to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation.

� Causing harm to persons is only allowed for self-defense and aversion of present danger.

[Procedures, etc.]� When the request is made by the U.S. Forces, etc.� Only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary� Uniformed SDF personnel provide guarding(*) Apart from procedures prescribed in SDF Law provisions, the

National Security Council plans to deliberate on the operational approach.

* C4ISR: Stands for Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

LawConcerningMeasurestoEnsurePeaceandSecurityofJapaninSituationsthatwillHaveanImportantInfluenceonJapan’sPeaceandSecurity(RevisionoftheLawConcerningMeasurestoEnsurePeaceandSecurityofJapaninSituationsinAreasSurroundingJapan)

InternationalPeaceSupportLaw

RevisionofArmedAttackSituationsResponseAct

RevisionoftheInternationalPeaceCooperationAct

Outline of the International Peace Support Bill

The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty at its core, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. Forces, etc.

Purpose

The following armed forces etc. responding to the situations(1) The U.S. Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement

of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty(2) Armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities

contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the U.N. Charter(3) Other similar organizations

Support Targets

� Prior Diet approval, in principle� Ex-post facto approval allowed in emergency

(*) The same as the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Diet Approval

(1) Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF)

Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, and base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services(*) Provision of weapons is not included. Provision of ammunition and

refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations are now allowed.

(2) Search and rescue activities(3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection

Operations Act)(4) Other measures necessary to respond to the situations

Response Measures

� SDF does not conduct acrivities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted.”(*) When the personnel having been lost already been found and rescue

operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured.

� The commanding officers etc. of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities etc. if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.

� The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

Avoidance of “Ittaika”

Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security [(Example) Situations that could lead to a direct armed attack against Japan if left unattended] (*) Deleted “in areas surrounding Japan” from the definition

* Implementation of operations in foreign territories is allowed (only when the foreign country consents) (Not allowed before the revision)* The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type

� In order to ensure the peace and independence of Japan and the security of Japan and its people, develop the readiness to respond to armed attack situations, etc. by setting such basic matters as basic principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, and procedures.

[Reference] Armed attack situations, etc.�Armed attack situation .....................A situation where an armed attack occurred, or an imminent danger of an armed attack occurring is clearly

acknowledged�Anticipated armed attack situation....A situation where an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an

armed attack is anticipated�Armed attack situations, etc..............Armed attack situation and anticipated armed attack situation

(Purpose) * “Situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival” added� Develop the readiness to respond to armed attack situations, etc. and survival-threatening situations by setting basic principles, the responsibilities

of national and local governments, the cooperation of Japanese people and other basic matters concerning responses to armed attack situations, etc. and survival-threatening situations, and also set matters related to the development of legislation necessary to respond to armed attack situations, etc. to contribute to the ensuring of the peace and independence of Japan and the security of Japan and its people.

[Outline of the Revision]� Responses to “situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival” added

[Diet Approval]� When an order is given to the SDF for defense operations to respond to a “survival-threatening situation,” prior Diet approval is required under current

provisions (Article 9 of the Armed Attack Situation Response Act).

(Basic Response Plan) *When an armed attack situation or a situation of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is recognized, reasons why the use of force is necessary should also be described.� The Basic Response Plan should describe matters concerning the following:

• Developments in the situation, the confirmation of the situation as an armed attack situation, an anticipated armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, and the facts that serve as the premises supporting the confirmation.

• When the situation is confirmed as an armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, reasons why there is no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and use of force is necessary to respond to the situation

• An overall plan to respond to pertinent armed attack situations or survival-threatening situations, and important matters related to the response measures

*deleted

� Other revised matters(1) Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations (2) Waiver of right to claim (3) Provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces, etc. for their operation to cope with large-scale disasters (4) Expansion of the scope for cooperation with international election observation operations

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations(Addition)

Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security(Not under the control of the U.N.)

� Five Principles for Participation (underlined portions added)

� Addition of Tasks Security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc., protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request and tasks at Mission Headquarters have been added, in addition to ceasefire monitoring and relief activities for afflicted people; tasks assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of systems of governance have been expanded.

� Review of the authority to use weaponsIn implementing protection of local population, etc. as well as security of specified areas and protection of individuals related to operations in response to their urgent request, the use of weapons for the defense of mandate is allowed.

� Diet approvalPrior Diet approval is necessary for ceasefire monitoring and security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc. conducted by SDF units, in principle (Ex-post facto approval permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved).

� Ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Cooperation Corps of JapanProvide for the development of operational guidelines that set forth provisions for the consideration of safety, the cessation of operations, the temporary suspension of operations to avoid danger and other measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps

� Requirement: When any of the following is met, in addition to the satisfaction of the Five Principles for Participation

(1) Based on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

(2) At the request by:• The United Nations• Organizations established by the U.N. Generally Assembly or U.N.

specialized agencies, such as the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order

• Regional organizations as prescribed in Article 52 of the U.N. Charter or organizations established by multilateral treaties, having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally coordinated operation for peace and security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order

(3) At the requests of countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs (limited to only those supported by any of principal U.N. organizations as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the U.N. Charter

(1) Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.

(2) Consent for the undertaking of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.

(3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.

(4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments.

(5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary for the protection of the lives of the personnel dispatched, in principle. When the consent of acceptance is deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons for the defense of mandate missions is allowed.

Implement cooperation and support activities, etc. for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in the activities above

Purpose

The following U.N. resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council) are required:(1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize foreign

countries subject to Japan’s support conduct operations to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community

(2) In addition to (1), resolutions that regoid the situations as a threat peace or a breach of the peace and call on U.N. member states to respond to the situations concerned

Conditions

� Prior Diet approval required without exception� Each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts toward

decisions within 7 days� Re-approval required in the case of a lapse of more than two years

since the commencement of the response measures. In the case of re-approval, ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved

Diet Approval

(1) Cooperation and support activities　 Provision of goods and services to armed forces of foreign countries Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities,

communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction (*) Provision of weapons is not included

(2) Search and rescue activities(3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection

Operations Law)

Response Measures

� Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted.(*) When the personnel having been lost have already been found

and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured.

� The commanding officers of the SDF units order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.

� The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

Avoidance of “Ittaika”

Situations threatening international peace and security that international community is collectively addressing:(1) Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and(2) The international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the

threat, and (3) Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities.

* The Minister of Defense must give consideration ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc.* The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type

Contribute to ensuring the peace and security of the international community

Outline of the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security

• TheNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS)clearlydefinesthefollowingas Japan’s national interests and national security objectives toachieve its fundamental principle of continuing the path it hasfollowed as a peace-loving nation, and proactive contributionto peace based on the principle of international cooperation:maintaining sovereignty and independence; defending territorialintegrity; ensuring the lives, property and safety of citizens;economic development; and maintaining and protecting theinternationalorderbasedonrulesanduniversalvalues.

• The NSS clearly defines the security environment surroundingJapanandnationalsecuritychallengesonagloballevelaswellasintheAsia-Pacificregion.

• TheNSSspecifiesthestrategicapproachcenteringondiplomaticpolicyanddefensepolicy thatJapanshould implement,suchasthe establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture toprotectJapan.

• Based on the NSS, the National Defense Program Guidelines(NDPG)specifybasicpoliciesforJapan’sfuturedefense,theroleofitsdefensecapabilities,andobjectivesforspecificSDFequipment.

TheMediumTermDefenseProgram(MTDP)specifiesamaximumbudget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to beacquiredoverthesubsequentfive-yearperiodinordertoachievethedefensecapabilitytargetsdefinedintheNDPG.

• The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) stipulates thefollowing points: reorganization of theMajor SDF Units; majorprograms regarding the SDF’s capabilities; measures for thestrengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; quantities of majorprocurement;andexpenditures.

• ReorganizationoftheMajorSDFUnits• Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF): establishing the GroundCentralCommand;transformingtwodivisionsandtwobrigadesintotworapiddeploymentdivisionsandtworapiddeploymentbrigades;establishingacoastobservationunitandareasecurity

• (1) Clarification of cases where transfersareprohibited;(2)limitationtocaseswheretransfersmaybepermittedaswellasstrictexaminationandinformationdisclosure;and(3) ensuring appropriate control regardingextra-purposeuseortransfertothirdparties.

• TheThreePrinciplesonTransferofDefenseEquipment and Technology clarify theconcretestandards,proceduresandlimitationbetter thaneverandstate themclearlyandtransparentlybothinternallyandexternally.

• Japan will actively cooperate with theUnitedStatesandothercountriesintheareaof defense equipment and technologies,andmoreproactivelyadvancetherequiredmeasures.

• Based on the NSS, the basic policy consists of the following:(1)  Japan’s own efforts; (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S.Alliance;and(3)activepromotionofsecuritycooperation.

• The NDPG states that Japan will build up a Dynamic JointDefense Force by conducting capability assessments based onjointoperationstoenhancedeterrenceandresponsecapabilitiesby pursuing further joint operations, improving the operationalstandardsofdefenseequipment,and further increasingdefenseactivities,aswellasensuringthenecessaryandsufficientqualityandquantityofdefensecapabilitiesunderpinningvariousactivities.

• As an effective means of deterrence and response to varioussituations, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority throughpersistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)activitiesoveranextensiveareaaroundJapan.Inaddition,Japanwill ensure a posture that emphasizes the following points:(1)  ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surroundingJapan;(2)responsetoanattackonremoteislands;(3)responseto ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space andcyberspace;and(5)responsestomajordisasters.

• As part of Japan’s efforts towards the stabilization of theAsia-Pacificregionandimprovementoftheglobalsecurityenvironment,JapanwillconductpersistentISRintheareasurroundingJapan,andimplementactivitiessuchastrainingandexercisesinatimelyandappropriatemanner.Moreover,Japanwillpromotemulti-tieredinitiatives,includingbilateralandmultilateraldefensecooperationandexchange,jointtrainingandexercises,andcapacitybuildingassistance. Japan will actively promote international peacecooperationactivities,anti-piracymeasures,andcapacitybuildingassistance,amongotheractivities.

• To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively aspossible,Japanwillstrengthenthefoundationsunderpinningthedefenseforce.

units;andestablishinganamphibiousrapiddeploymentbrigade.• Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF): retaining four escortflotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH)and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and five escortdivisionsconsistingofotherdestroyers;increasingthenumberofsubmarines.

• AirSelf-DefenseForce(ASDF):relocatingonefightersquadrontoNahaAirBase;newlyorganizingoneairborneearlywarningsquadron; integrating ASDF units equipped with trainingsupportfunctions.

Outline of the National Security Strategy Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program

AnnexTablefromtheMediumTermDefenseProgram

RelationsamongNSS,NDPG,MTDPandAnnualBudget

NationalDefenseProgramGuidelinesAnnexTable

Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines

Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Four ministers signing the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

NSS

NDPG

MTDP

annual budget

based on NSS

achieve target levels of defense force

appropriate budget, develop specific projects

Basic policy for national security centeredaround diplomatic and defense policies(approx. 10-year time frame)

Prescribe future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve(approx. 10-year time frame)

Indicate (limits of) five-year total expendituresand quantity of major equipment

Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary

Service Equipment Quantity

GSDF

MobileCombatVehiclesArmoredVehiclesAmphibiousVehiclesTilt-RotorAircraftTransportHelicopters(CH-47JA)Surface-to-ShipGuidedMissilesMid-RangeSurface-to-AirGuidedMissilesTanksHowitzers(excludingmortars)

992452176

9companies5companies

4431

MSDF

Destroyers(Aegis-EquippedDestroyers)SubmarinesOtherShipsTotal(Tonnage)Fixed-WingPatrolAircraft(P-1)PatrolHelicopters(SH-60K)MultipurposeHelicopters(Ship-Based)

5(2)55

15(approx.52,000t)23239

ASDF

NewAirborneEarlyWarning(Control)AircraftFighters(F-35A)FighterModernization(F-15)NewAerialRefueling/TransportAircraftTransportAircraft(C-2)UpgradeofPATRIOTSurface-to-AirGuidedMissiles(PAC-3MSE)

42826310

2groups&education

Jointunits UnmannedAerialVehicles 3

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.

Category Present(asoftheendofFY2013) Future

GSDF

AuthorizedNumberofpersonnelActive-DutyPersonnelReserve-ReadyPersonnel

approx.159,000approx.151,000

8,000

159,000151,0008,000

Majorunits

RapidDeploymentUnits CentralReadinessForce1armoreddivision

3rapiddeploymentdivisions4rapiddeploymentbrigades

1armoreddivision1airbornebrigade1amphibiousrapiddeploymentbrigade1helicopterbrigade

RegionalDeploymentUnits

8divisions6brigades

5divisions2brigades

Surface-to-ShipGuidedMissileUnits

5surface-to-shipguidedmissileregiments

5surface-to-shipguidedmissileregiments

Surface-to-AirGuidedMissileUnits

8anti-aircraftartillerygroups/regiments

7anti-aircraftartillerygroups/regiments

MSD

F Majorunits DestroyerUnits

SubmarineUnitsMinesweeperUnitsPatrolaircraftUnits

4flotillas(8divisions)5divisions5divisions1flotilla

9squadrons

4flotillas(8divisions)6divisions6divisions1flotilla

9squadrons

Major

equipm

ent Destroyers

(Aegis-EquippedDestroyers)SubmarinesCombatAircraft

47(6)

16approx.170

54(8)

22approx.170

ASDF

Majorunits

AirWarning&ControlUnits

FighterAircraftUnitsAirReconnaissanceUnitsAerialRefueling/TransportUnitsAirTransportUnitsSurface-to-AirGuidedMissileUnits

8warninggroups20warningsquadrons

1AEWgroup(2squadrons)12squadrons1squadron

1squadron3squadrons

6groups

28warningsquadrons

1AEWgroup(3squadrons)13squadrons

—

2squadrons3squadrons

6groups

Majorequipment

CombataircraftFighters

approx.340approx.260

approx.360approx.280

Notes: 1. The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

2. Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above.

• “2+2”Meeting(April27,2015)(1)TheMinistersannouncedtheapprovalof“thenewGuidelines,”

whichupdate thegeneral frameworkandpolicydirection forthe roles andmissions of the two countries, andmanifest astrategicvisionforamorerobustAllianceandgreatersharedresponsibilitiesbymodernizingtheAllianceandenhancingitsdeterrenceandresponsecapabilitiesinallphases,frompeacetimetocontingencies.

(2)BothMinistersnotedwithsatisfactiontheongoingprogresstostrengthentheAlliance’sdeterrenceandresponsecapabilities.

(3)TheMinistershighlightedtherecentprogress inregionalandinternationalcooperation.

(4) TheMinisters underscored their commitment tomaintaininga robustandflexible forceposture thatenhancesdeterrencebystrengtheningthecapabilitytorespondeffectivelytofuture

• BasedontheJapan–U.S.SecurityTreaty,theJapan-U.S.SecurityArrangements, togetherwith Japan’s own efforts, constitute thecornerstoneforJapan’ssecurity.

• TheJapan-U.S.Alliancecenteredonbilateralsecurityarrangementsfunctions as public goods that contribute to the stability andprosperity,notonlyofJapanbutalsooftheAsia-Pacificregionand

Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines• The new Guidelines specify the matters to be emphasized insecurity and defense cooperation. The objectives of the newGuidelinesareretainedinlinewiththoseofthe1997Guidelines.

Strengthened Alliance Coordination• ThetwogovernmentswillestablishastandingAllianceCoordinationMechanism,anddevelopandupdatebilateralplans.

Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security• Thissectionpresentsthedirectiontoachieveseamlesscooperation,frompeacetimetocontingencies,inordertoensureJapan’speaceandsecurity,thecoreoftheGuidelines.(A)CooperativeMeasuresfromPeacetime This section specifies ways of cooperation from peacetime

tostrengthenthedeterrenceandresponsecapabilitiesoftheJapan-U.S.Alliance.

(B)ResponsestoEmergingThreatstoJapan’sPeaceandSecurity This section describes measures to respond to emerging

threatstoJapan’speaceandsecurity.(C)ActionsinResponsetoanArmedAttackagainstJapan The new Guidelines maintain the basic idea on roles of

Japan and U.S. in of responses to an armed attack againstJapandescribed in the1997Guidelineswhileenhancing thecontentinviewoftheexpansionanddiversificationofdefensecooperationbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStates.

theworldatlarge.• AsthesecurityenvironmentsurroundingJapanbecomesincreasinglysevere, and the United States, at the same time, maintains andstrengthensitsengagementandpresenceintheAsia-Pacificregion,ithasbecomemoreimportantthanevertostrengthentheJapan-U.S.AllianceforthesecurityofJapan.

(D)ActionsinResponsetoanArmedAttackagainstaCountryotherthanJapan

NewlyincorporatedinthenewGuidelines(E)CooperationinResponsetoaLarge-scaleDisasterinJapan InlightoftheexperienceoftheGreatEastJapanEarthquake,

thenewGuidelinesaddedthissection.

Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security• ThenewGuidelinesstipulatespecificwaysofbilateralcooperationforregionalandglobalpeaceandsecurity,basedonexperiencesfrompreviousactivitiesinthisarea.

Space and Cyberspace Cooperation• The newGuidelines added bilateral cooperation in new strategicdomains,suchasspaceandcyberspace.

Bilateral Enterprise • The new Guidelines added the following areas as a foundationfor defense cooperation to further improve the effectiveness ofbilateralcooperation:A. DefenseEquipmentandTechnologyCooperationB. IntelligenceCooperationandInformationSecurityC. EducationalandResearchExchanges

Processes for Review• The newGuidelines added regular evaluationwhilemaintainingtheapproachofthe1997Guidelines.

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

DeploymentMapoftheU.S.ForcesinJapan

Outline of the New Guidelines

Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance

U.S. Army: 1st Corps (Forward)

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan

Zama

Misawa

YokotaAtsugi

YokosukaIwakuni

Kyogamisaki

Sasebo

Shariki

U.S. Air Force:Headquarters, Fifth Air Force374th Airlift WingC-130 transport aircraftC-12 transport aircraftUH-1 helicopters and othersPlan to deploy CV22 Osprey

Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan

Yokota

U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Yokosuka

Aircraft carrierCruisersDestroyersAmphibious command ship

Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan

Yokosuka

U.S. Marine Corps:Marine Aircraft Group 36CH-53 helicoptersAH-1 helicoptersUH-1 helicoptersMV-22 Osprey and others

Futenma

U.S. Navy:Port facility, POL depot

White Beach Area

U.S. Army: 1st Battalion, 1st SpecialForces Group (Airborne)/10th Support Group

Torii

U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Sasebo

Amphibious assault shipsMinesweeping shipsTransport ships

Sasebo

U.S. Navy:F/A-18 strike fighters and others(Carrier-based aircraft)

Atsugi

U.S. Air Force: 35th Fighter Wing, F-16 fightersU.S. Navy: P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and others

Misawa

U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Aircraft Group 12F/A-18 strike fighterAV-8 attackersEA-6 electronic warfare aircraftC-12 transport aircraft KC-130 tankers and others

Iwakuni

U.S. Marine Corps: 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force HQ

U.S. Marine Corps facilities and areas such as Camp Courtney

U.S. Marine Corps:12th Marine Regiment (artillery)31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

Hansen

U.S. Marine Corps: 4th Marine Regiment (infantry)

Schwab

U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called X-Band Radar System)

Shariki

U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called X-Band Radar System)

Kyogamisaki

Kadena

U.S. Air Force: 18th WingF-15 fightersKC-135 tankersHH-60 helicoptersE-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraftU.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and othersU.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense ArtilleryPatriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)

Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama at the Japan-U.S. Summit in Washington in April 2015 (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

The Japanese and U.S. Defense and Foreign Ministers at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) in New York in April 2015

Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in Singapore on the occasion of the 14th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

(May 2015)

challengesandthreats,whilealsomitigatingtheimpactoftheU.S.Forcesonlocalcommunities.

Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (May 30, 2015)• The Ministers agreed to oppose any attempts to change thestatus quo by force in the East ChinaSea and theSouthChinaSea.Theyalso confirmed that Japan’s legislation for peaceandsecuritywillhelpensuretheeffectivenessofthenewGuidelinesfor Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and welcomed that thediscussionat theCyberDefensePolicyWorkingGroup (CDPWG)thus farwasput together.Furthermore, theMinisters reaffirmedcooperationtomitigatetheimpactoftheU.S.ForcesonOkinawa,andU.S.SecretaryofDefenseCarterstatedthattheUnitedStateswouldprovideJapanwithnecessaryinformationontheaccidentinvolving an Osprey transport aircraft in Hawaii and reiteratedeffortstothoroughlyensurethesafeoperationoftheOsprey.

Direction of Strengthening the Alliance• Japanand theUnitedStateswillbuild theposture forseamlesscooperation, including peacetime and various other situations,including cooperation in gray zone situations, while enhancingthe Japanese and U.S. presence in theWestern Pacific. JapanandtheUnitedStateswillcontinuetopromote jointtrainingandexercises,andtheexpansionofjointintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR)activities,aswellastheexpansionofjoint/shareduseofJapaneseandU.S.facilitiesandareasthatserveasthebasesfortheseactivities.

• TheUnitedStatesisproceedingwiththeforceposturerealignmentoftheU.S.ForcesinJapaninordertomitigatetheimpactonlocalcommunities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining thedeterrencecapabilitiesoftheU.S.Forces.InOkinawa,theUnitedStatesistakingsuchmeasuresastherelocationofMCASFutenma,thetransferofMarinesinOkinawatoGuamandthereturnoflandsouthofKadena.

• TheGovernmentofJapanbelievesthatitisimperativenottoallowMCASFutenmatoremainindefinitelyatitscurrentlocation,whichisinthevicinityofhousesandschoolsinthecenterofGinowanCity,OkinawaPrefecture.ThisisbelievedtobeafundamentalideasharedbetweentheGovernmentofJapanandthepeopleofOkinawa.AsfortherelocationofMCASFutenma,theGovernmentofJapanhasnotchangeditsstancethatthecurrentplantoconstructtheFutenmaReplacement facility in the Camp-Schwab Henokosaki area andadjacentwaters is theonlysolutiontoavoidthecontinueduseof

• Conduct the following reorganization based on the“Direction of theMinistryofDefenseReform”(August2013)forthepurposeofoveralloptimization of defense capability, strengthening of functions forintegratedoperations,policyplanning,etc.incontinuationfromFY2014.

• Strengtheningintegratedoperationalfunctions<UnificationofworkrelatingtoactualoperationsintotheJointStaffOffice>

• UnifyworkrelatingtoactualoperationsoftheSDFintotheJointStaff• DiscontinuetheOperationalPolicyBureau,andnewlyestablishtheDirectorGeneralforOperationalPolicy(DeputyChiefofJointStaff-level) and the Director for Operation Policy (departmentdirectorgeneral /divisiondirector-level) forcivilianofficials toconductcoordinationwithrelatedministriesandagencies,andexternalcommunication.

• ReorganizationoftheInternalBureau<Strengthen the policy planning function and defense capabilitybuild-upfunction>• Transferfunctionssuchastheplanninganddraftingoflawsand

MCASFutenma.JapanplanstomakefurthereffortstoachievetherelocationandreturnofMCASFutenmaasearlyaspossibleandtomitigatetheburdenonOkinawainatimelymanner.

• The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance thanmerelymovingthefacilityfromonelocationtoanother.Rather,italsocontributesgreatly tomitigatingthe impactonOkinawa.Assuch,thegovernmentwillworkasonetoimplementthisinitiative.

• Regarding theFutenmaReplacementFacilityconstructionproject,in addition to complying with the relevant laws and regulations,includingcompletingtheenvironmentalimpactassessmentandtheapplicationforapprovalofthereclamationofpublicly-ownedwaters,theGovernmentofJapanhasdevotedampletimetocompletingallnecessaryprocedures,includingsolicitingtheopinionsofthepeopleof Okinawa Prefecture. On that basis, the Government of JapancommencedoffshoreboringsurveyworkonAugust14,2014.

regulationsrelatingtooperationsandthetrainingofunitstotheBureauofDefensePolicy.

• NewlyestablishtheStrategicPlanningDivisionintheBureauofDefensePolicyinordertostrengthenthepolicyplanningfunction.

• Newly establish the Bureau of Build-up Planning in order tostrengthenthedefensecapabilitybuild-upfunction.

• The new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology andLogisticsAgency

<Establishanewextra-ministerialorganizationthatbringstogetherandconsolidatesdepartmentsinMODrelatedtotheprocurementof equipment (namely the Internal Bureau, the respective StaffOffices,theTechnicalResearchandDevelopmentInstitute,andtheEquipmentProcurementandConstructionOffice)>

<MainfunctionsoftheAcquisition,TechnologyandLogisticsAgency>Projectmanagementfunction,internationalequipmentandtechnologycooperation,weapons technology control function, research anddevelopmentfunctionandequipmentacquisitionfunction

Stationing of the U.S. Forces Specific Ministry of Defense Reform Initiatives

TheGeopoliticalPositioningofOkinawaandtheSignificanceoftheU.S.MarineCorpsStationedinOkinawa

2000km 1000km

* The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations.

Beijing Seoul

Shanghai

TaipeiHong Kong

Manila

Guam

Saipan

Tokyo

Izu Islands

Okinotorishima

Okinawa holds a position of greatstrategic importance

Ogasawara Islands

Japan’s sea lanes

Sea lanesMarine transportation routes.Japan is dependent upon marinetransportation for at least 99% ofthe total volume of its trade.

Center ofthe Southwest Islands

Adjacent to sea lanesOkinawa

Access from continental Asia to the Pacific→ Expected that passage would be through waters surrounding Okinawa

2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa

With their high level of mobility and readiness,* the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006⇒ The stationing of USFJ in Okinawa, an area with unique geographic characteristics, including the Marine corps, which has high-level mobility and readiness to carry out a wide range of duties and to deal with various types of emergencies, makes a significant contribution to the security of Japan, and to peace and stability in the Asia- Pacific region.

1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in OkinawaCompared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia.⇒ In the event where urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly.

Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with certain distance from Japan’s neighbors.

Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of the access to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan’s sea lanes.

VisionoftheorganizationofthenewJointStaffOffice

VisionoftheorganizationafterthereorganizationoftheInternalBureau

VisionoftheorganizationoftheAcquisition,TechnologyandLogisticsAgency

FY2014

FY2015

ViceChiefofStaff,JointStaffOffice

DeputyChiefofStaff,OperationPolicy

Minister’sSecretariat

Minister’sSecretariat

BureauofDefensePolicy

BureauofDefensePolicy

BureauofOperationalPolicy

BureauofPersonnelandEducation

BureauofPersonnelandEducation

BureauofFinanceandEquipment

BureauofCapabilityandFacilitiesPlanning

BureauofLocalCooperation

BureauofLocalCooperation

MinisterofDefense

CommissionerofAcquisition,TechnologyandLogisticsAgency

DirectorGeneralforDefenceTechnology,ResearchandDevelopment

DirectorGeneralforEquipment

ChiefofStaff,JointStaffOffice

OperationsDepartment

DefensePlansandPolicyDepartment

C4SystemDepartment Director,Logistics Director,Public

AffairsDirector,

OperationPolicyGeneralAffairsDepartment

LegalAffairsGeneral

DefenseEquipmentPolicyDepartment

ProjectManagementDepartment

DefenseTechnologyStrategyDepartment

ProcurementManagementDepartment

Commissioner’sSecretariat

DirectorforInspectionandAudit

ProcurementOperationDepartment

DirectorGeneral

MinisterofDefense

Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan• TheSDFpersistentlyengagesinwarningandsurveillanceactivitiesin the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime sothat it can respond to various contingencies immediately andseamlessly.

• InFY2014, theASDFaircraft scrambled943 times,asignificantincreaseby133incomparisonwiththepreviousfiscalyear.Thisisthesecondlargestnumbersince1958whentheASDFstartedtakingstrictanti-territoryintrusionmeasures.

• In 2014, there were seven incidents of activity by Chinese Navyvesselsinvolvingthepassagethroughthesouthwesternislands,andalsoanotherincidentofsuchactivitiesconfirmedinwaterssouthofOkinawa.

• In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese

State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorialairspace inthevicinityofUotsuri-jima,which ispartofSenkakuIslands. Inaddition,onAugust22,2013,aTU-95bomberof theRussianAirForce intruded intoJapaneseairspace in thevicinityofOkinoshima,FukuokaPrefecture.Moreover,September9ofthesameyear,anincidentwhereapresumablyunmannedaircraftofunidentified nationality flew over the East China Sea.TheASDFurgentlyscrambledfightersinresponsetotheseincidents.

• Evenafter theestablishmentof the“EastChinaSeaAirDefenseIdentificationZone”byChinainNovember2013,theMODandtheSDFhavebeenimplementingwarningandsurveillanceactivities,inadditiontootherexistingactivities,intheEastChinaSea.TheMODandtheSDFhavealsodecidedtocontinueengaginginstrictairspaceanti-intrusionmeasures.

Effective Deterrence and Response

NumberofScramblessincethePeriodoftheColdWarandItsBreakdown

ConceptualImageofDefendingJapan’sRemoteIslands

(Times)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

(FY)1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

124

158

311

220

944

812

193 197264 247 248

35931

23738

29996

386

156

425

306

567415

810Russia China Taiwan Other countries total

943

464

473

Landing by boat

Landing by amphibious

vehicle

Landing by aircraft

In cases where islands are occupied, operations will be conducted to recapture them.

Secure and maintain marinesuperiority and air superiority

SDF troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units and they will try to intercept and defeat any invasions.

Anti-submarine warfareAnti-submarine warfare

Response in the waterResponse in the water

Maritime air supportMaritime air support

Overall air defenseOverall air defense

Close Air SupportClose Air Support

Aerial refuelingAerial refueling

Enemy submarines Submarine

SurfacevesselsSurfacevessels

Anti-surfacewarfare

Anti-surfacewarfare

GSDF personnel conducting a landing exercise during the Iron Fist 15, a fi eld training exercise

LCAC entering into the MSDF transport vessel “Shimokita”

Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands• Japanpossessesanumberofremoteislands.Inordertorespondto attacks on these islands, the SDF will position units and soforth inthearea,andwilldetectsignsatanearlystagethroughIntelligence,Surveillance,andReconnaissance(ISR)conductedbytheSDFinpeacetime.ByconductingajointoperationinvolvingtheGSDF,ASDF,andMSDF,troopswillbeexpeditiouslydeployedandconcentrated inanareaexpected tobeattacked,andwilldeterandremoveenemyattacks.If,byanychance,islandsarecapturedwithoutanysignsdetectedinadvance,theenemywillbebroughtundercontrolbygroundfire fromaircraftandvessels,and thentacticaloperationswillbeimplementedtoregaintheislandsbythelandingofSDFforcesandtakingotherinitiatives.

• TheMODandSDFwillstrengthenthecountry’sdefensefoundationfrom peacetime, by newly forming a coast observation unit inYonaguniIslandandestablishan“AmphibiousRapidDeployment

Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function foramphibiousoperations,andwillestablishthe9thAirWingatNahaAirBase.

• ForthepurposeofdevelopingapersistentIntelligence,Surveillance,and Reconnaissance (ISR) posture and an immediate responsesystem, acquisition of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and aegisequippeddestroyers(DDG)willbeimplemented.

• Inordertosecurecapabilitiesforswiftandlarge-scaletransportationanddeploymentofunits,theimprovementofOsumiclasstransportLST(LandingShip,Tank)andoverseasresearchtoreviewtheroleofmultipurposevesselswillbeconducted,andatthesametime,V-22Ospreyswillbeintroducedtoenhancerapiddeploymentcapabilities.

• In January through March of 2015, the GSDF and US MarineCorpsconductedafieldtrainingexercise(IronFist)inCaliforniatoimproveamphibiousoperationalcapabilities.

Note: The peak of the cold war

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks• Japan’sBMDisbasedonaneffectivemulti-tierdefensesystemusingAegis-equippeddestroyersandPatriotPAC-3,interconnectedandcoordinatedbytheJapanAerospaceDefenseGroundEnvironment(JADGE).

• TheadditionalTPY-2radarwasdeployedtotheU.S.KyogamisakiCommunicationSiteinDecember2014.

• NorthKorearepeatedlyengagedinavarietyofprovocativeacts,including an implication of missile launches in both 2014 and2015.Undersuchcircumstances,theMODandtheSDFcontinuetobereadytotakeeverynecessarymeasuretoprotectthelivesandpropertiesofthenationinanypotentialsituation.

Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security• Inordertoensurethesafetyofmaritimetransport,theMODandtheSDFpromotevariouskindsofinitiativessuchasimplementingcounter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistancetocoastalcountries,andenhancingjointexercisesandpracticesusingavarietyofopportunities.

Responses in space • Fromtheperspectiveoffurtherpromotingcooperationinthespacefieldbetween thedefenseauthorities inJapanand theU.S., the“Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” was establishedbasedontheinstructiongivenintheJapan-U.S.DefenseMinisterialTalkinApril2015.Makinguseofthisworkinggroup,reviewswillbe further promoted in broader fields such as: 1.  promotion ofpolicy-relatedconsultationregardingspace,2. closerinformationsharing, 3.  cooperation for nurturing and securing experts,4. implementationoftabletopexercises.

The Whole-of-Government approach• InMarch2014,a“CyberDefenseGroup”wasestablishedundertheSDFC4(Command,Control,Communication&Computers)SystemsCommand.

• The“CyberDefensePolicyWorkingGroup”(CDPWG)hasbeensetup as a framework between the defense authorities of theU.S.andJapan,underwhichopinionexchangeisconductedbyexpertsregarding various cooperation fields on Japan-U.S. information-

• JapanwillsteadilybuildupitsdefensecapabilityduringFY2015,whichservesasthesecondfiscalyearundertheNDPGandnewMTDP,toestablishaDynamicJointDefenseForce,basedontheseprograms.

• Japanwillimproveitsdefensecapabilitiesinordertoseamlessly

• InFY2015,inlightoftheincreasinglyharshsecurityenvironment,defense-related expenditures were increased for the secondconsecutiveyearinarowinordertoreinforcepreparednessaimed

The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases• In light of the current severe financial situation and thereorganization of European and American enterprises, as wellas progress in international joint development, the“Strategy onDefense Production and Technological Bases” was formulatedin June 2014. The Strategy included various measures formaintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production andtechnologicalbases,andindicatedthecurrentsituationandfuturedirectionofeachdefenseequipmentfield.

• In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximumeffectiveness,itisnecessarythattheMODandtheSDFenhanceandreinforcetheirhumanfoundation.Sincethevariousactivitiesof theMODand theSDFare only feasible if understanding andcooperation is received from the Japanese people, as well aslocalauthorities,itisnecessarytofurtherdeepenthemutualtrustbetweentheSDF,andlocalcommunitiesandthepeople.

• InJanuary2015,theMODformulatedthe“ActionPlanforpromoting

anddynamically fulfill itsdefense responsibilities,which includeproviding an effective deterrence and response to a variety ofsecurity situations, and supporting stability in the Asia-Pacificregion,aswellasimprovingtheglobalsecurityenvironment.

atprotectingthelivesandpropertyofthepeopleandthenation’sland,sea,andairspace.

Improvement of the contract system• Following the enactment of the “Bill concerning special measureson the upper limit of acts that incur national debtwith respect tospecificdefenseprocurement,”theMODwillrealizethereductionofprocurementcosts forequipmentandservicesassociatedwith theintroductionofa“long-termcontract”aswellasstableprocurement.

• Across-functionalIntegratedProjectTeam(IPT)headedbyaProjectManager (PM) has been established for the acquisition of primarydefense equipment, and the development of a system in whichprojectscanbemanagedinaunifiedwayfromconceptiontodisposalisinprogress.

theActive Participation of the Female Employees andWork-LifeBalance,” which incorporated three reforms – “Working stylereform,”“Reform to realizeasuccessfulcareerwithabalancedlife between child-rearing and nursing, etc.,” and “Reform forpromoting successful female personnel” – in order to promotethework-lifebalanceofthepersonnelinaunifiedmannerwhilstpromotingfurtherrecruitmentandpromotionoffemalepersonnel.

Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2015

Defense-Related Expenditures

Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force

Measures on Defense Equipment

Trendindefense-relatedexpendituresforthepast15years

49,385 49,39249,262

48,760

48,297

47,903 47,815

47,426

47,028

46,826

46,625

46,453

46,804

47,838

48,221

46,000

47,000

48,000

49,000

50,000

2015(FY)

20142013201220112010200920082007200620052004200320022001

Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S.forces realignment expenses, and expenses associated with the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,955.0 billion yen for FY2001, 4,955.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004, 4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005,

4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, 4,848.8 billion yen for FY2014, and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015.

PAC-3 missile test launch

sharing,humanresourcesexchanges,andother themes. InMay2015,theJapan-U.S.jointdeclarationwasissued,indicatingthespecificdirectionforfutureJapan-U.S.cooperation.

• In2013, the“CyberDefenseCouncil” (CDC)was setup,havingaroundtencompaniesinthedefenseindustryasitscoremembers,andeffortsarebeingmadetoimprovecapacitiestocountercyberattacksthroughjointexerciseandotherinitiatives.

Response to Large-Scale Disasters• When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDFworksincollaborationwithmunicipalgovernments,engaginginvariousactivities such as the search for and rescue of disaster victimsor missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medicaltreatment,preventingepidemics,supplyingwater,andtransportingpersonnelandgoods.

• InAugust2014,alandslideoccurredinHiroshimaCityinHiroshimaPrefectureduetoheavyrain.TheSDFconductedlifesavingoperationsand searches for missing persons deploying approximately14,970 personnel. In September of the same year, a volcaniceruption occurred on Mount Ontake. In order for the SDF toconduct lifesaving operations and searches formissing personsincooperationwiththemunicipality,police,firedepartment,andotherrelevantorganizations,approximately7,150personnelweredispatchedfordisasterrelief.

Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.• TheSDFwillprotecttheJapanesenationalsandotherpartiesinthedestinationcountryofadispatchoperation,andsafelyguideandtransportthemtoaircraft,shipsorvehicles.Tothisend,theSDFmaintainsoperational readiness,with theGSDFdesignatinghelicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDFdesignating vessels such as transport ships (including boardedaircraft),andtheASDFdesignatingairliftunitsandpersonnelfordispatch.

• TheMODandtheSDFparticipatedintheexerciseforthetransportof Japanesenationalsoverseas in theannualmultinational jointexercise “Cobra Gold” and conducted the first ever overseasgroundtransportexercises.

GSDF personnel conducting disaster relief mission related to Mount Ontake Eruption

Research and Development• Aspartof these initiatives, theMOD’sown fundingprogramcalled“InnovativeScience&TechnologyInitiativeforSecurity”(competitivefunding)wasnewlyestablishedinFY2015todiscovercreativeresearchconducted by the universities, research institutes and companiesetc.thatarenotedfortheirapplicationofdefenseequipment,andtonurtureemergingresearchthatisdeemedpromising.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation• BasedontheThreePrinciplesonTransferofDefenseEquipmentandTechnology,Japanpromotescooperationindefenseequipmentand technology with other countries in order to contributeto promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defenseproductionandtechnologicalbases,aswellascontributingtothepromotionofpeaceandinternationalcooperation.

• Since1992,Japanhasimplemented19jointresearchprojectsand1jointdevelopmentprojectwiththeU.S.Inaddition,theJapanesegovernment has been working to enable the involvement ofJapanese companies in the manufacturing process of theproductionofF-35Aandtoestablishupgradingfacilities.

• InJuly2013,JapanlaunchedajointresearchprojectwiththeU.K.,thefirstcountryotherthantheUnitedStatesinthisregard.

• JapanandFrancesignedtheJapan-FranceAgreementconcerningtheTransferofDefenseEquipmentandTechnologyinMarch2015.

• India:InSeptember2014,JapanandIndiasignedthememorandumofdefensecooperationandexchanges,andagreedtocooperatein service-to-service exchanges such as high level exchanges,bilateralmaritimetraining,andconsultationbetweenthechiefsofstaff,aswellasinnon-traditionalsecurityareas.

• China: Consultation between defense authorities to realize thecommencement of the early operation of the“Maritime andAirCommunicationMechanism”hasbeenrestarted.

• Russia:TakingtheUkrainiansituationintoaccount,theGovernmentofJapanistakinganappropriateresponsewhilstemphasizingthesolidarityoftheG7(GroupofSeven).

• Southeast Asian Countries: A memorandum regarding defensecooperationandexchangewassignedwiththePhilippinesinJanuary2015andwithIndonesiainMarch.Atthesametime,Japanisworkingto furtherstrengthenanddeepen its relationswithSoutheastAsiancountriesthroughcapacitybuildingassistance.

• UnitedKingdom: InJanuary2015, thefirstForeignandDefenseMinisterialMeetingwasheld.Opinionswereexchangedregardingthe strengthening of bilateral cooperation in dealing with theissuesrelatedtoglobalsecurity.

• In May 2015, Japan decided to commence consultations withAustralia, togetherwith the participation of companies from theprivate sector to examine what kind of cooperation Japan canprovidefortheAustralianFutureSubmarineProgram.

• WithIndia,threeJointWorkingGroup(JWG)meetingshavebeenheldtofacilitatebilateralcooperationfortheUS-2aircraft.

• BetweentheAssociationofSouth-EastAsiaNations(ASEAN)andJapan,exchangesofviewsaretakingplaceregardingdefenseequipmentandtechnologycooperationinnon-traditionalsecuritysectors.

Ensuring maritime security• ForJapan,amajormaritimestate,strengtheningorderontheseasbasedonsuchfundamentalprinciplesastheruleoflawandthefreedomofnavigation,aswellasensuringsafemaritimetransport,isthefoundationfor itspeaceandprosperity.Forthisreason, incooperationwith the relevantcountries,Japanwillsupportanti-piracyoperations,aswellaspromotingvariousinitiativesincludingassistanceforcapacitybuildinginthisfieldforcoastalstates,andmakingthemostofvariousopportunitiestoenhancejointtrainingandexercisesinwatersotherthanthoseintheimmediatevicinity

The internationalcommunity today is facingan increasingnumberofchallenges,whichareextremelydifficult foronecountry todealwith on its own. Therefore, it is important to strengthen bilateralandmultilateralsecuritycooperation,aswellasproactivelyengagein international peace cooperation activities, from the perspectiveof “proactive contribution to peace” based on the principle ofinternationalcooperation.

Initiatives under Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue• BasedontheproposalbyPrimeMinisterAbeattheASEAN-JapanCommemorative Summit in December 2013, the Japan-ASEANDefenseMinisters’RoundtableMeetingtookplaceinMyanmarinNovember 2014.At the Shangri-La Dialogue held inMay 2015,Minister of Defense Nakatani delivered a speech at the secondplenarysession.

• Inordertoenthusiasticallyandactivelycreatestabilitywithintheregionand improve theglobalsecurityenvironment, theMOD isactivelyworkingoncapacitybuildingassistance.

Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries• Australia:At the Japan-Australia SummitMeeting in July 2014,PrimeMinisterAbe described the relationship between the twocountriesasa“SpecialStrategicPartnershipforthe21stCentury”andsignedtheAgreementontheTransferofDefenceEquipmentandTechnologybetweenJapanandAustralia.

• SouthKorea:InDecember2014,thedefenseauthoritiesofJapan,the U.S., and the ROK signed the “Japan-U.S.-ROK InformationSharingAgreement among the DefenseAuthorities,” which hasenabledthedefenseauthoritiesfromthethreecountriestosharesecuritysecretsregardingthethreatoftheNorthKorea’snuclearweaponandmissiles.

ofJapan,includingparticipationintheinternationalminesweepingtraininghostedbytheUnitedStates.

• With regard to counter-piracy measures, from December 2013,for the purpose of conducting more flexible and effective unitoperations,theSDFsurfaceforcehasbeenparticipatinginCTF151andhascarriedoutzonedefense,inadditiontotheescortmissionsthatithadalreadybeenconductinginthepast.TheASDFhasalsobeenparticipating inCTF151 since February2014. Furthermore,in July 2014, Japan decided on a policy of dispatching CTF 151commandersandCTF151HQofficersfromtheSDF.

Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries

Initiatives concerning Issues in the International Community

SDF’sCounter-PiracyOperations

●

Point C

Point A

Point B

Djibouti

* Conducting escort between point A and point B during the monsoon season (June-August, December-February)

Deploy one forDefense Zone

Deploy onefor escort

About 1,100 KmAbout 200 Km

Merchant ship

Suspicious vessel

GatheringInformation

Sharing Information

Escorted ships

Deployed MaritimeForce for Anti-Piracy Operations

Conducting warning and surveillance operations, and Information collection and provision

CTF 151• Established in January 2009 for counter-piracy

operations. The United States, Australia, United Kingsom, Turkey, ROK, Pakistan, etc. participated

• Participants are to be engaged in operations upon liaison coordination on deployment dates, etc. with the Command.

Activities with deployment of one for escort and one for defense zone as a basis.Japan’s original framework is used for escort, while for defense it is implemented by participating in the CTF 151.

*The relationship between the CTF 151 Headquarters and participating units is a relationship of coordination.

Japan and India are discussing how to engage in bilateral cooperation in relation to the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft

Japan-ASEAN Round Table Meeting (inaugural)

Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting [Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce]

Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2” meeting)

• France: In July 2014, a Statement of Intent regarding defensecooperation and exchanges was signed. In March 2015, thesecondForeignandDefenseMinisterialMeetingwasheld.

Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities• UnitedNationsMissionintheRepublicofSouthSudan(UNMISS) DeployedEngineerUnit(approx.350personnel)andHeadquarterStaff (four personnel) are conducting various activities in theRepublicofSouthSudan.

• InternationalDisasterReliefOperationsfortheOutbreakofEbolaHemorrhagicFeverinWestAfrica

AttherequestfromtheUNMissionforEbolaEmergencyResponse(UNMEER), the SDF transported 20,000 pieces of personalprotectiveequipmentbyKC-767aerialrefueling/transportaircraft.

• TheMOD/SDFconductsactivitiestosupportthelivesofcitizensinarangeoffields.SuchactivitieshelptofurtherdeepenthemutualtrustbetweentheSDF,andlocalcommunitiesandthepeople,andcontributesignificantlytothemaintenanceandrevitalizationofthelocalcommunity.

• The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals ofthecurrentcircumstancesoftheSDF.Forexample,aspartofthecommemorationoftheSDFanniversary,theSDFMarchingFestivalis held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In FY2014, an airreviewcommemoratingthe60thanniversaryoftheMOD/SDFwasalsoheldatHyakuriBase.

Collaboration with Local Communities

GSDF personnel conducting ditch construction in South Sudan

ASDF personnel who airlifted personnel protection equipment

The SDF Marching Festival held at the Nippon Budokan in FY2014

MSDF personnel conducting search and rescue operation for the missing Air Asia airplane

GSDF personnel conducting medical service assistance in Nepal

The Air Review Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the MOD/SDF

• TheInternationalDisasterReliefOperationsfortheMissingAirAsiaAirplane

Deployment Surface Force Counter Piracy Enforcement, whichwas returning to Japan following a counter-piracy activity,was dispatched to conduct search and rescue activities forapproximatelyoneweek.

• InternationalDisasterReliefActivitiesinNepal(Earthquake) At the request of the Government of Nepal, the MOD swiftlydispatched a medical assistance unit that conducted medicalactivitiesforapproximatelythreeweeks.

The Gateways Connecting You and the MOD/SDF— Introduction to the MOD/SDF Websites —

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/

http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/engindex.html http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/

http://www.mod.go.jp/js/english_top.htm

http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/English_page/ http://www.nids.go.jp/english/

The website provides information on the policies and activities of the MOD and SDF. It also gives you access to a range of other resources, including the English-language public relations pamphlet JDF (Japan Defense Focus) and transcripts of the press conference of the Minister of Defense.

The website introduces the functions, the status of the domestic and international activities of the MSDF, as well as its equipment. It also features a collection of many related photographs.

The Joint Staff website provides an introduction to the SDF units that are playing an active role in Japan and overseas through various activities, including surveillance, disaster relief, joint exercise, peacekeeping operation, counter-piracy operation, and international disaster relief operation.

An introduction is provided on the duties, organization, and equipment of the ASDF. The website also offers a feature on the Blue Impulse as well as a range of wallpapers, videos, photos, a smartphone app, and more.

This website posts information on the status of the domestic and international activities of the GSDF, its equipment, and events across Japan. An array of information is also provided through various SNS tools.

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) is the MOD’s think tank, conducting research and studies with a policy orientation primarily on security and military history, while also training senior SDF officers and others.

Ministry of Defense

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Joint Staff

Air Self-Defense Force

Ground Self-Defense Force

The National Institute for Defense Studies