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NO.148

MAY/JUNE

2001

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DEFENCEForce

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier Steve Ayling, AM (Chairman)Air Commodore Ken BirrerGroup Captain Allan CroweColonel Roger DaceColonel Michael GoodyerBronwen Grey

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2001ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2001

Karen GriffithDr Ron HuiskenMr Darryl JohnstonCaptain Peter Leschen, RANColonel Paul McGraneLieutenant Colonel Ian Wing

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

Printed in Australia by National Capital Printing, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the information contained

in their articles; the Board of Management accepts no responsibility for

errors of fact. Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be

readily given by the Editor after consultation with the author. Any

reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and should not be

construed as official opinion or policy.

DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

Contributors are urged to ensure the

accuracy of the information contained in

their articles; the Board of Management

accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

Permission to reprint articles in the Journal

will generally be readily given by the

Editor after consultation with the

author. Any reproduced articles should bear

an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the

author’s own and should not be construed as

official opinion or policy.

Front Cover and page 2.

Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey, painting by Sir William Dargie.

Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT 2609

A U S T R A L I A N

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. Dedication

5. Foreword

7. Acknowledgements

9. Field Marshal Sir Thomas BlameyCentenary OrationMajor General K.G. Cooke, AO, RFD, ED

15. Sir Thomas Blamey: ChiefCommissioner of the Victoria PoliceChief Commissioner Neil Comrie, AO,APM

21. Understanding the Office of theGovernor-General of AustraliaThe Right Honourable Sir ZelmanCowen, AK, GCMG, GCVO, QC, DCL

27. Blamey and National SecurityBrigadier P.J. Greville, CBE, BE

33. Manpower Limits on the AustralianWar EffortThe Right Honourable Sir Paul Hasluck,KG, GCMG, GCVO

43. Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blameyand the Australian ArmyProfessor David Horner

53. Military LeadershipGeneral Sir Francis Hassett, AC, KBE, CB,DSO, LVO

65. Blamey and Training for WarGeneral Sir Phillip Bennett, AC, KBE,DSO

71. Anzac Values – The Path Travelledand the Road AheadMajor General P.R. Phillips AO, MC

NO. 148

MAY/JUNE

2001

3

DEDICATIONThis publication, on the 50th anniversary of his death,

is dedicated to the memory of the first Australian born military commander

to be appointed to the highest military rank of Field Marshal

in the Australian Military Forces on 8 June 1950 –

Field Marshal Sir Thomas Albert Blamey GBE KCB CMG DSO ED

Born 24 January 1884 – Died 27 May 1951

General Blamey with men of the New Guinea Force, 1942. AWM Neg 013422

5

This Special Edition, published to mark the 50th anniversary of the death of Field Marshal SirThomas Blamey, is a tribute to a great Australian. Blamey has been described by his most

recent biographer, military historian and former Army officer, Professor David Horner, Strategicand Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, as “Australia’s greatest and mostimportant soldier. Indeed he was a major figure in Australian history”.

While some may question the accolade of “greatest”, Blamey was undoubtedly a colossus interms of his achievements spanning the two great wars of the last century. He was also uniqueamong the highest level Allied commanders of the Second World War, in that he commanded atsenior levels over the six long years of war from 1939 to 1945 including three and a halfdemanding years as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces.

His importance in Australia’s history extends beyond his command appointments in the MiddleEast and subsequently from 1942 to 1945, when our security was directly threatened for the firsttime as a result of the Japanese campaign in the Pacific. A major contribution between the greatwars had been to provide the impetus to establish a well-structured Army together with aneffective organisation and complex administrative and national support systems that included anecessary industrial, manufacturing and manpower planning base. His contributions to thedevelopment of mobilisation planning for Australia’s defence capacity, national military strategy,and higher command arrangements was also both outstanding and far-sighted.

During the Second World War Blamey also displayed exceptional political acumen and a fiercedetermination in robustly defending Australia’s political and strategic interests in the face ofconsiderable military and political pressure to disperse his command in support of larger UK andUS formations.

The Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey Memorial Fund and the Department of Defence are tocommended for this timely reminder, particularly to those presently serving in the Defence Forcetoday, of the outstanding national contribution of a great Australian military leader, whoseachievements were finally recognised by his being appointed Australia’s first and only native bornField Marshal in the 100 year history of our Australian Services.

Sir William DeaneGovernor-General of the Commonwealth of AustraliaCommander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Force

FOREWORD

The Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey Square.

7

With the agreement of the Board of Management of the Australian Defence Force Journal,this Special Edition marks the 50th anniversary of the death of Field Marshal Sir Thomas

Blamey GBE KCB CMG DSO ED. The publication coincides with the 27 May 2001 renamingceremony of the original Blamey Square in the Defence complex at Russell Offices as “The FieldMarshal Sir Thomas Blamey Square.”

The idea for a Special Edition was proposed by the Field Marshal Sir Thomas BlameyMemorial Fund in Melbourne under the Chairmanship of Brigadier Ian Gilmore OBE and waspassed to a Canberra based group of members to organise. This group included a coordinator,General Sir Phillip Bennett, and Professor David Horner, Major General Michael Keating, MajorGeneral Geoff Carter, Brigadier Paul Yonge and Lieutenant Colonel Len Boswell.

Our task was to select from the available records of all Blamey Orations a number of paperswhich, collectively, would present a true and balanced insight into the wide range of Blamey’soutstanding contribution to the nation. The aim was to cover all of his major activities, interests andachievements as both a soldier and a civilian administrator, as well as a planner, leader andcommander.

That objective has been met by the editorial group who express their appreciation to allauthors and The Hon Justice Nicholas Paul Hasluck for their kind permission to incorporate theselected orations. The group is similarly indebted to the permission of the National President, AirMarshal David Evans and his Constituent Bodies of the Royal United Services Institute ofAustralia to republish those orations identified in this Special Edition as having been included invarious RUSI magazines in previous years.

Allied with this Special Edition, the Memorial Fund has also arranged with the RUSI for aseries of Blamey Orations to be given throughout Australia close to the time of the renaming ofThe Blamey Square in Canberra in May this year.

Finally, on behalf of the Chairman, Committee and Members of the Memorial Fund, I extendappreciation to Professor Horner for his considerable editorial contribution to this edition, as wellas the publication in this Special Edition of his Blamey Oration given at the RUSI in Canberra on2nd May 2001. His experience and advice has been invaluable, as has the professional assistanceand cooperation of Mr Michael Tracey previous Managing Editor of the Australian Defence ForceJournal and Mrs Irene Coombes as Editor.

This Special Edition has much to offer all military and civilian officers, senior non-commissioned officers and their equivalents on the achievements of Australia’s most successfuland influential senior military commander. Importantly, it highlights his outstanding nationalcontribution post-World War I to the organisation, command and readiness of the AustralianMilitary Forces for war in 1939.

It will also be of interest to all Australians to learn that General Douglas MacArthur, Blamey’sSupreme Commander in the South West Pacific, wrote the following words in a letter on 15December 1954 to former Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring supporting a memorial toBlamey in Melbourne:

“I have always felt that his services in the Second World War were not sufficiently recognized.What he did cannot be overestimated, and his contribution to the defeat of Japan marked him asone of the great soldiers of our time. Australia and, indeed, the whole free world owes him a debtof gratitude which would take symbolical form in this memorial.”

This is indeed a fitting assessment of Australia’s greatest and most important military commander.This Special Edition of orations is therefore published to honour his memory and to give all

Australians a greater understanding of his exceptional military and public service to our nation.

General Sir Phillip Bennett AC KBE DSO (Retd)Project Coordinator

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Major General Blamey with members of the 3rd Division Engineers Militia in camp at Wesburn, Victoria 1936.AWM Neg PO 2475.001

9

There must be something special about aman who on the centenary of his birth and

33 years after his death can still trigger agathering of so many people, including somany busy and distinguished people, in aMelbourne park on a Tuesday morning inJanuary. So let us take a few minutes to reviewbriefly the life of Thomas Albert Blamey to tryand determine just how this can be.

He was born on 24 January 1884 on theoutskirts of Wagga Wagga, the seventh of theten children of Richard and Margaret Blamey.His father had tried his luck at farming, both inQueensland and New South Wales, but as wasoften the case the ventures ended in disasterdue to the old traditional enemies of drought,bush fire and fluctuating cattle prices. He thensettled in Wagga where he earned his living asa contract drover. His was a pioneer family sotypical of the time and it exemplified thestrength of our immigrant stock both beforeand since.

Young Tom was educated in Wagga, firstat the government school and then for the lasttwo years at the Grammar School to which hewon a place on his pure ability. His upbringinggenerally was as you would expect; he had tohelp around the family property before andafter school and on vacations he worked as atar-boy in the local shearing sheds. As he grewolder he went on several droving trips to helphis father. His was a rugged but healthy life,designed to instil a familiarity with hard workand to develop a sense of self-confidence andself-reliance. Like many of our famous soldiers,he obtained his first taste of military lifethrough the Cadet Corps. During his last two

years at school he was the head cadet of hisunit and showed an aptitude for leadership andmilitary skills.

At the ripe old age of 16 he became a pupilteacher at the local school where he continuedhis interest in the cadet movement as an officerof cadets. Some people in later life may havefound it hard to believe at times that the youngTom was a Methodist Church preacher and anactive worker for church causes.

In 1903, aged 19, he decided to try his luckin distant fields and obtained a teachingappointment to Fremantle, Western Australia.He continued his association with the cadetsand also with the Church and was close toentering the Ministry as his chosen full-timecareer when in 1906 he saw an advertisementoffering entry to the Permanent CadetInstructional Staff. He decided that this was forhim and studied hard to finish third on anAustralia-wide basis. Initially, however, he wasrejected, not because of his ability but becausethe Army was reluctant to pay his cost ofremoval to Victoria and there were no postingsthen available in Western Australia. By arefusal to accept defeat combined with a goodshowing, even then, of his knowledge of staffduties, he managed to alter that decision andwas enlisted into the cadet organisation as alieutenant aged 22.

He married in 1909 on the princely salaryof £250 a year. Since his first son was born in1910 it must have been with someconsiderable relief that he was promotedcaptain in December 1910 and his payincreased to £ 375 pounds a year.

Field Marshal Sir Thomas BlameyCentenary Oration

By Major General K. G. Cooke, AO, RFD, ED

Address to the Royal United Service Institution of Victoria, 24 January 1984.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 148 MAY / JUNE 200110

In 1911 he won, again by hard work,intensive private study and by burning themidnight oil, a much-coveted place to the StaffCollege at Quetta in India. After successfullycompleting that course his family returneddirect to Australia where his second son, Tom,was born. Tom Senior went to the UnitedKingdom for further training and experience.

At the outbreak of war he was serving onthe staff of the headquarters of a territorial

division. When the first AIF was formed andsent to the Middle East it was natural that T.A.Blamey, then a major, should joinHeadquarters lst Division as a staff officer inEgypt. He was with it when it landed atGallipoli on that historic 25 April 1915. Heserved there throughout the campaign, helpingto raise Headquarters 2nd Division with whichhe served until the evacuation in December1915.

Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey. Major Blamey is seen using periscope, 3 May 1915.AWM Neg G00943

FIELD MARSHAL SIR THOMAS BLAMEY CENTENARY ORATION 11

In July 1916 he was promoted lieutenantcolonel and appointed General Staff OfficerGrade 1 of Headquarters lst Division for thecampaigns in Europe. He commanded the 2ndBattalion for a short time and the lst InfantryBrigade only briefly. It was a source ofpersonal regret to him that his skills as a staffofficer were so much in demand that he wasgiven little chance for command in the field.

When General Monash was appointed tocommand the lst Australian Corps on 1st June1918 he selected Blamey to be his chief of staffwith the rank of brigadier general. Thecombination of Monash and Blamey wasresponsible for some of the most outstandingvictories of the War. The battle of Hamel was aworld first for the successful integration ofinfantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft andprovided a model for subsequent applicationby British and other armies. The battle ofAmiens was said to be the blow which led tothe shattering of the Hindenburg Line. ABritish military historian, Major GeneralEssame, in The Battle for Europe 1918 wrote:“Monash and Blamey unquestionably outshoneall their British counterparts in ability andbattle expertise”. On Blamey, Monash wrote:“Some day the orders which he drafted for thelong series of history making militaryoperations upon which we collaborated willbecome the model for staff colleges andschools for military instruction”. They did.

After World War I Blamey continued in theRegular Army becoming what was later knownas the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In1925 he was asked to give up his militarycareer to accept appointment as the VictorianCommissioner of Police. It was considered thatthe Police Force then was in need of stability,firm control and proper direction, which werenot immediately available from within theforce itself. Blamey agreed. At the same timehe joined the militia, rising to the rank ofmajor general and Commander of the 3rdDivision in 1931, a posting he held until 1937.His term as Police Commissioner was a stormy

one, beset with personal and political incidents.He resigned from the force in 1936.

Things then looked bleak for Blamey. As aman who then lacked influence he suddenlyfound that he also lacked friends andsupporters. A number of real friends, whoknew Blamey better and were loyal to Blameythe man, stood by him in those depressingyears. During that period he refused to give into adversity. He commenced, under apseudonym, giving defence related talks onRadio 3UZ warning of the coming worldconflict and of Australia’s lack of preparedness.No doubt this helped to keep him in touch withmilitary matters.

As international tension increased theGovernment looked for a man strong enough,experienced and capable enough to help inbelated war preparations. Blamey was selectedas the first Chairman of the ManpowerCommittee and Controller General of theRecruiting Secretariat. In the six monthsbetween September 1938 and March 1939 hewas responsible for successfully effecting adoubling of the strength of the militia from35,000 to 70,000 - a feat considered by manybeforehand as an impossible achievement.

Then with the outbreak of hostilities andthe raising of the second AIF there came theneed to select a commander for the 6thDivision - the first Australian force to leave foroverseas. Blamey, who was then aged 55, wasselected, not without controversy, over allothers. Probably it was this appointment morethan any other incident that made him thecentre of jealousy and the subject of intrigue,which was to haunt him for the balance of hismilitary life.

It represented, however, the start of whatwas, no doubt, to be the finest part of his longcareer. He was promoted lieutenant general in1940 and general in 1941. He successively heldthe appointments of General OfficerCommanding 6th Division, General OfficerCommanding Australian Forces Egypt,Commander 1st Australian Corps, Commander


Anzac Corps in Greece, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Middle East, Commander-in-ChiefAustralian Military Forces and at the sametime Commander of Allied Land Forces in theSouth West Pacific Area.

There are many things that can be saidabout this period of his life but I shall selectjust four matters upon which I shall brieflycomment. First, he was the only land forcecommander in any Allied army to retaincommand throughout the war. He commandedthe first Australian force to be raised foroverseas service in September 1939 and wascommanding the whole Australian Army sixyears later. That, in itself, in the militaryhistory of any country in the world, must berated as an outstanding achievement.

Second, he fought hard throughout thisperiod to protect the integrity of the AustralianArmy from the interference of and subjugationto its allies. He continually resisted powerfulpressures in the Middle East, emanating fromChurchill himself and flowing downwards, toprevent what he saw as the misuse ofAustralian troops. Similarly, he clashed withMacArthur and refused to give in to proposalsto use Australian troops in the Pacificcampaigns in ways he considered were againstthe best interests of this country andparticularly of its soldiers.

Third, the nature of his responsibilities andspan of control was perhaps unique andunbelievably demanding. He had to organisethe Army from virtually nothing. He had toweld the volunteer AIF and the mainly-conscript militia into a single viable force.From his appointment as Commander-in-Chiefin March 1942 until the end of the war he wasobliged to retain responsibility not only foroperations in the field but at the same time forthe day-to-day organisation, administrationand training of the Army at home togetherwith the support of the total force. This breadthof responsibility did not occur in other armiesand I doubt, indeed I hope, we would never putthat load on another man again.

Fourth, it is interesting to consider just afew comments made about him by importantcontemporaries. Prime Minister Curtin, onBlamey’s appointment as Commander-in-Chiefand in answer to his detractors, said: “I want acommander of the Australian Army, not aSunday school superintendent”. Field MarshalWavell, when Commander-in-Chief in theMiddle East, said of Blamey: “He was probablythe best soldier we had in the Middle East. Notan easy man to deal with but a verysatisfactory man to deal with. His militaryknowledge was unexampled and he was apositive, firm and a very satisfactorycommander”.

In retrospect, is it not possible that the socalled “faults” of which he was often accusedmay indeed have been a very necessary step inhis development to make him just the manAustralia needed in its time of danger? Could,for example, an over-sensitive person havecarried it through? Could a man withoutsupreme confidence in his own ability and thejustice of his own cause have stuck it out?Could an individual without a resoluteness ofcharacter, strength of purpose, evenstubbornness, have been able to resist themany pressures that were put on him?

Perhaps even what seemed to have beenthe most unfortunate of his experiences mayhave helped to shape him for the greatdemands the war placed on him. For example,in referring to Blamey’s police career, MajorGeneral Sir John Gellibrand, said: “It widenedhis outlook and gave him a deeper insight intothe greater problems of national life andmilitary service”. The most stringent test thatcan be applied to any person, particularly awartime commander, is that of success orfailure and there can be no argument Blameydid succeed.

I am not saying that no one else could havecommanded the Australian Army at the timeor even have done so with less controversy.What I am saying is that Blamey did commanda victorious Army from start to finish, raising

FIELD MARSHAL SIR THOMAS BLAMEY CENTENARY ORATION 13

and training it virtually from scratch, with attimes little support and against many internaland external pressures. For that he deservesgreat credit and the gratitude of the nation. Didhe get it? He did not! His services wereterminated in November 1945 on just 14 daysnotice. He received no pension, gratuity orreward (except for his old car which had alsosurvived the rigours of campaigning in theMiddle East and the Pacific) until, in 1950when, less than twelve months before hisdeath, he was promoted to the rank of FieldMarshal, the only Australian soldier before orsince to have been so honoured.

During most of its history so far Australiahas had an unfortunate tradition of notproperly acknowledging its truly great men.Deakin, Hughes, Monash, Blamey, Bruce,Curtin, Chifley, Menzies are all names thatcome to mind yet we go out of our way tomake legendary heroes of bushrangers andsportsmen. We eulogise many who display notthe slightest trace of public spiritedness orsocial conscience and who possess many moreobnoxious or damaging vices than were everexhibited by the Field Marshal.

Perhaps as a nation we are changing.Maybe Australia is growing up. I do detect inrecent times an emergence of national pride inthis country and the ability to recognise thestrength of a community leader while at thesame time acknowledging that he or she is stilla human being. In short, I believe we arestarting to learn that we can have a supermanwith every man’s weaknesses.

If so, then perhaps it can be of benefit tofuture generations to remember T.A. Blameyand learn the lessons that a study of his lifewill reveal. He should demonstrate to

Australians of the future that a public figure, aleader, can have and indeed should beexpected to have normal human attributes -weaknesses as well as strengths. Further, it willbe seen that in this country it matters not whatis one’s origin or beginnings. It should becomeapparent that study, hard work, attention todetail, perseverance, a sense of achievementand a refusal to accept defeat will win through.It will become obvious that the highestpositions in the land are open to those who tryand are prepared to keep trying. Furthermore,students of Blamey would learn that Australiaand Australians are not inferior to othercountries and races, that we can and will standon our own feet and, if necessary, pursue anindependent line. Finally, they will seedemonstrated the value of loyalty, bothpersonal loyalty and group loyalty. They willlearn that loyalty is a necessary ingredient ofsuccess and that if one expects to receive itthen one must also give it, that it is a two-wayarrangement.

In T.A. Blamey we have the embodiment ofthe real Australian character and therefore heforms an important part of our evolvinghistory. It is our responsibility to ensure thathis story is not forgotten, as has been the casewith so many others, but that it is passed on tofuture generations to help establish anddevelop our ongoing traditions. What morefitting occasion is there than this, thecentenary of his birth, to pledge that we shallensure that the Blamey legend lasts for thenext 100 years and beyond. So, in that way, hewill continue to serve his country andcontribute to the preservation of its way of lifeas he showed himself so ready and so willingto do during his lifetime.

Major General Cooke ED was Commander of the 3rd Division when he presented this paper. Hewas Chief of Army Reserves from 1985 to 1988.

Blamey as the 10th Chief Commissioner of the Victoria Police.Photograph by kind permission of the Victoria Police

15

Iam extremely honoured to have been invitedto deliver this oration because of Sir Thomas

Blamey’s very close connection with VictoriaPolice. He was the 10th Chief Commissionersince the force was formed in 1853; I am the18th.

No Chief Commissioner has had an easytask. By its very nature policing isunpredictable, crisis-driven and often impactedby media reporting. My experiences with themodern media are regularly frustrating andsometimes a little tense. But I can always getrapid solace from an examination of ThomasBlamey’s time in the chair. He was the subjectof many media leaks from disgruntledmembers and it is little surprise that he actuallydrove the press from their comfortable room atRussell Street headquarters and forced them toline up with the public and get their news fromthe Enquiry Office counter! When I joined theforce in 1967, the Press Room had alreadybeen re-established.

Blamey had come to the position highlyregarded. Chief Commissioner AlexanderNicholson had limped along after the 1923police strike. He suffered considerable ill healthand his leadership had been soundly criticisedby a 1924 Royal Commission chaired by SirJohn Monash.

The Chief Secretary, Dr Stanley Argyle, hadmet the Inspector General of the AustralianMilitary Forces, Sir Harry Chauvel, in an earlymorning stroll through the botanic gardens.Chauvel knew that Nicholson was to bereplaced and recommended his deputy ThomasBlamey to Argyle. The Chief Secretary, whowas still reeling from the fact that some of the

Melbourne police had gone on strike, alongwith the three deaths and extensive riotingwhich had occurred, welcomed this. Blamey’sappointment was also strongly supported byMonash who had a very close militaryrelationship with Blamey during the FirstWorld War. On being asked to take on theChief Commissioner’s position, Blameytransferred to the militia and rose to commandthe 3rd Division with the rank of majorgeneral.

Blamey was seen as a decisive and skilfulorganiser whose appointment was wellreceived by the business community many ofwhom had suffered financially during thestrike because several insurance companies hadavoided compensation payments by attributingdamage to civil commotion which wasexcluded from coverage.

General Blamey was appointed ChiefCommissioner on 1 September 1925 aged 41.His initial term was five years and his contractwas extended by three years in 1930. Duringhis 11-year police career, Blamey survived fivechanges of government and an unprecedentedchallenge to his tenure of office. His fortunesdepended largely upon the colour of thegovernment with his most successful yearsunder the conservatives whose values and viewof the world he shared.

Labor politicians identified Blamey as amember of the establishment with little feelingfor the working classes. Whereas in actual factBlamey was born in Wagga as one of tenchildren and could never be described as beingborn with a silver spoon in his mouth.

Sir Thomas Blamey: Chief Commissioner ofthe Victoria Police

By Chief Commissioner Neil Comrie, AO, APM

Address to the Royal United Service Institution of Victoria, 28 May 1998 by the ChiefCommissioner of the Victoria Police.


A change of government in 1930 sawBlamey forced to re-apply for his own positionwhile still under contract, no doubt quite anordeal for a person such as Blamey. The HoganLabor Government reduced the appointmentfrom the usual five years to three and cut hissalary by a third.

In 1933 with a change of government, theconservatives appointed him ChiefCommissioner for life and returned his salaryto the previous level. Ironically within threeyears he was forced to resign following theRoyal Commission into the “Brophy” Affair –more about that later.

The Blamey period was marked by crisis.He often exacerbated problems by leaping tothe defence of the men under him in a waywhich was suited to the military struggle butcame back to bite the Chief Commissionerwhen corruption and malpractice was sheetedhome.

Upon his appointment serious allegationsof corruption were being laid against threedetectives from the Licensing Branch. Oneinspired much publicity by going missing forseveral days and another turned up in amental institution. Eventually they werecharged. All were later convicted and jailedamong continuing publicity. HoweverBlamey was so highly regarded in somecircles that his appointment as ChiefCommissioner was of itself enough to endmoves for an inquiry into alleged policecorruption and maladministration.

Blamey was an extremely talentedadministrator. He could organise and deployresources with well-planned effectiveness.Unfortunately, his personal lifestyle and ethicalstandards were incompatible with his positionas the state’s top law enforcer. Seeminglynaively he expected the public and the press inparticular to distinguish between his officialposition and his private life. It was very mucha case of “do as I say rather than as I do”which posed particular problems for a personin his position.

Within the first two months ofappointment, his police identification (Badgenumber 80) was used by a male to avoid arrestin a brothel in Bell Street, Fitzroy. The matterwas raised in Parliament. This was followed byan internal inquiry in which the ChiefCommissioner claimed his badge had been lostsome days before the incident and was laterreturned anonymously to his mail point in theNaval and Military Club.

Very early in his term Blamey took on thePolice Association. He did not believe that atrade union was in keeping with the role andduties of police. He thought the PoliceAssociation was run by communists and heregarded it with a real hatred. At one stage,Blamey had the Association’s civilian secretarycharged with an obscure offence against thePolice Regulation Act – conspiring to induce amember to commit a disciplinary offence. Thesecretary received a term of imprisonment. Onappeal, this was reduced to a fine.

Blamey established an annual policeconference comprising 29 elected rep-resentatives to weaken the Police Associationposition. The Police Association supportedthe Labor Government, the Government thatrequired the Chief Commissioner to re-applyfor his position. Blamey never forgot norforgave and as a result executive memberswere summarily transferred to Siberiastations in the Mildura district. The PoliceAssociation was taken out of business as aneffective representative body for severaldecades.

In keeping with his personal values,Blamey used the police to crush theunemployed and other demonstrators duringthe depression years. In one notorious incidentin 1928, police protecting strikebreakers usedtheir firearms against a violent group ofstevedores, wounding four including oneseriously. Policing was difficult duringBlamey’s time – even the police took pay cuts.

On the positive side, Chief CommissionerBlamey was an exceptional leader of men and

SIR THOMAS BLAMEY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE VICTORIA POLICE 17

able to persuade them to follow his directionwhich was fearlessly held. Among his manyachievements were:• Established the criminal records office and

increased the usage of fingerprints andphotographs.

• Increased the number and duties ofpolicewomen.

• Sent two members to Europe to study crimeinvestigation.

• Formed a bicycle patrol section.• Formed a traffic control group of 60 men

equipped with motorcycles.• Extended the effectiveness of police

training, increased the recruit course fromone to three months and introduced a 12-month probationary period at itscompletion.

• Instrumental in having the Police TrainingDepot in St Kilda Road appointed as a StateSchool (number 4443), with full-timeeducation department teachers. (That sitehas been occupied by the Victorian Collegeof the Arts since 1973.)

• Improved accessibility to the CIB for allmembers.

• Upgraded the police hospital and RussellStreet gymnasium.

• Established a police institute and policeprovident fund.

• Tried to change the police promotions fromseniority to merit.

• Enhanced the recording of ownershipdetails at the Motor Registration Branch. Most of these achievements have continued

to operate to this day or lasted many decadesafter Blamey’s resignation. Fingerprints andtheir classification have been a major crimeinvestigation tool for many years. Blamey’semphasis on photographs was also particularlyfar-sighted.

It is a lot easier than in Blamey’s time foroverseas visits and inspections. In fact VictoriaPolice has become a centre of excellence in anumber of fields, which is attracting anincreasing number of professional visitors. As

did Blamey, our belief is that the Force and thecommunity benefit from operational police –often in the earliest stages of their careers butalways highly motivated – travellingnationally and internationally.

Bicycle patrols have been developed andexpanded to provide an urban service. I amsure he would have been impressed. Likewise,he was one of the first to recognise theimportance of the motor car in carrying outpolice duties and in road safety. His was thefirst significant Traffic Operations Group. Ifcomputers had been around I have no doubtBlamey would have introduced “red light” and“speed cameras”.

Blamey’s early years as a teacher meantthat he was horrified with the poor reading andwriting skills of his Force, and with thestandard of training provided to police recruits– a month of basic law and drill. Training wasradically overhauled and members were placedon probation for 12 months.

Blamey’s efforts are recognised as an earlybase upon which recruit training was launched.He was the first to use trained teachers and toprovide a general education to Victoria Policerecruits. The basic course still remains;however, the probationary period has beenextended to two years. And further, anymember inducted after 1 July 1997 will berequired to successfully complete the Diplomaof Police Studies conducted by DeakinUniversity, as a prerequisite for confirmation ofappointment as constable.

In relation to the CIB, he increased thestrength, and developed selection processeswhich could withstand criticism. Severalhundred men applied and the best of thesewere appointed. A very similar approachremains today.

Blamey was concerned with the welfare ofmembers. The police hospital was inadequatewith only one part-time nurse available.Blamey increased the number of nurses andappointed medicos who provided a highlyprofessional medical service. That foundation


took the police hospital into the 1990s when itwas discontinued in that form for unrelatedreasons.

Blamey developed the Police Institute toprovide quality goods and services to police atreasonable costs. I can clearly recall the late1960s with the barbers giving short back andsides at the Police Institute under theauditorium at Russell Street. The Institute waspart of the Russell Street culture until the early1980s.

In July 1927, Blamey established the PoliceProvident Fund to provide finance to membersoverwhelmed with debt through factorsbeyond their control such as family illness. TheCommonwealth Bank made an initial donation.A philanthropist, J. Alston Wallace, also madean anonymous donation leading to pressurefrom the press and the government of the dayto expose the fund. Wallace’s identity had tobe revealed and both he and Blamey were thefocus of media attention. Blamey stood firmand refused to return the gift.

The Provident Fund continues and hasbeen used on many occasions over the past 71years for the purposes for which Blameyconsidered it so necessary. It recentlypurchased two units in Carlton toaccommodate members and their families inwelfare emergencies. I think Mr Wallace andSir Thomas would be smiling.

As with many before him and since, theChief Commissioner could see the very obviousdeficiencies of a seniority-based promotionand transfer system. His attempt to modify thiswas one of the lengthiest and casualty-strewnencounters both with the Police Associationand the members. As always the difficulty wasin trying to develop a scheme which couldfairly and objectively assess members forpositions and for promotion. Blamey was nomore successful than others and there wasmuch heat generated in the process.

The increasing numbers of motor cars hadled to the establishment of the MotorRegistration Branch which was part of

Blamey’s domain. He was instrumental indeveloping ownership certificates which wereparticularly useful in the increasinglychallenging realm of car theft.

Blamey acted against police leakinginformation, especially detectives who wereoften commended at the expense of theircolleagues. In short, he was before his time inrecognising the damage that can arise from themisuse of media power. However, he alsosuffered from the close relationships whichsome police develop with the media because oftheir duties. The newspaper editors had longmemories. After ten years of antagonism, theymust have delighted in the hurdle whichBlamey ultimately created for himself.

On 22 May 1936, Superintendent JohnO’Connell Brophy, the recently-appointed headof the CIB, suffered three gunshot woundswhile in a chauffeur-driven car with twowomen in Royal Park. Initial reports from theChief Commissioner’s Office were that Brophyhad accidentally shot himself. A sceptical presswas then told that Brophy had been shot bybandits after going to the park to meet aninformer – there was no mention of thewomen.

As time went on and different officialexplanations emerged, Blamey rapidly dughimself into a hole of mammoth proportions.The newspapers were as one in calling forblood. The Government required Labor supportto govern and hence they appointed a RoyalCommission to investigate this matter. Blameywas less than truthful with his evidence,supporting Brophy when it was clear toeveryone that deception was involved.

Within a week of the Royal Commissionreport, Blamey was forced reluctantly to resign.Blamey’s position was not helped by acontemporaneous claim from the Chief Justiceof the Victorian Supreme Court denouncingimproper police investigatory methods,especially in the interviewing of suspects.

In 1936, when he resigned, Victoria Policecomprised 2281 policemen and 6 police-

SIR THOMAS BLAMEY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE VICTORIA POLICE 19

women. Today that number is 9,600 swornmembers including more than 1,400policewomen.

In conclusion, it is of value to speculatehow someone of Blamey’s personality andstyle would survive as we approach the 21stcentury. It would not be unkind to say that theyears of the total autocrat have well and trulypassed. He was the last such ChiefCommissioner. Policing is a very complexprofession and a variety of ideas andapproaches have to be considered. The Forceconsists of highly motivated and skilful staffboth sworn and unsworn. All must bepositively encouraged to do their best inserving the community.

A more formidable obstacle to Blameywould be the various tribunals and pressuregroups which must be handled diplomatically.I am sure Blamey’s first day in office wouldhave generated a swag of applications to theEqual Opportunity Commission or industrialtribunals. His first week would have provided afertile field of applications under the Freedomof Information Act. His first year would haveattracted a bevy of Auditor-Generalexaminations.

The Chief Commissioner’s summarytransfers of Association executive members,while expedient at the time, led a Laborgovernment under John Cain (senior) in 1946to legislate for protection for members whichadversely affected the ability of ChiefCommissioners properly to administer anddiscipline the Force for nearly four decades.While this has now been changed, theAssociation no doubt yearns for the timeswhen it held the whip hand. On the other handas we have seen in recent times, theAssociation is required to represent members inan increasingly difficult industrial environmentwhich I am sure Blamey would not haveenvisaged.

As far as the media is concerned, Blameywould feel under even more threat. While thenumber of daily newspapers have beenreduced from four to two, the ChiefCommissioner and the Force face theunrelenting scrutiny of the electronic mediaincluding talk-back radio which exposes policeaction to immediate public scrutiny andcomment. I wonder how Blamey would havehandled this constant pressure?

There is still a widespread expectation thatthe Chief Commissioner must be cleaner thanclean in his private and public life. Come tothink of it, there is no private life during theperiod in which one is privileged to hold theoffice.

It is difficult to get an appropriate feelabout the late 1920s and early 1930s. It was atime of high unemployment, when police payand conditions were poor compared with otherwork. For example, police were only entitled toone day off per month; in 1946 it wasincreased to one per week. It was not until1948 that police were granted Long ServiceLeave and a 40-hour working week with twodays off every week. During the 1920s and 30sthe connection between politicians and theChief Commissioner seemed more direct.It is therefore improper to judge ChiefCommissioner Thomas Blamey’s contributionby the standards of the 1990s.

Commentators at the time felt that SirThomas Blamey did not want to resign but feltas Chief Commissioner for life he shouldbrazen it out. No doubt that would have madehim unsuitable to achieve high military honourwhich in another life was to cover him andAustralia with glory.

His subsequent brilliant career asAustralia’s senior soldier capped off aremarkable commitment to two demandingprofessions – the military and policing. FieldMarshal Thomas Blamey left his mark on both.

Neil Comrie was the Chief Commissioner of the Victoria Police from January 1993 until March 2001.

Governor-General Sir William Deane presenting the Army Banner, a gift from the Nation to the Australian Armyon its Centenary. Photograph: Sgt. W. Guthrie

21

The national debate on the future cons-titutional shape of our country, whether

as a continuing constitutional monarchy oras a republic, leads me to speak to you onthe subject “Understanding the Office of theGovernor-General of Australia” not to arguea case on one side or another, but so thatyou may have some picture of that elementin our polity, at least as perceived by onewho has occupied the Office: I was the 19thand the sixth Australian born and residentGovernor-General from 1977-1982. It maybe useful to have some appreciation andunderstanding of the Office as it hasevolved over the near-century of theCommonwealth’s existence.

First, because of the Institution’s specificinterests in defence, let me say something ofthe military aspect of the role of the Governor-General. Section 68 of the CommonwealthConstitution provides that “the Command inChief of the naval and military forces of theCommonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative”. Mysuccessor in the office, Sir Ninian Stephen,explored the meaning of that provision whenhe spoke at a graduation ceremony at the JointServices Staff College some years ago. On theface of it, he said, the Governor-General has“all the panache of a Boulanger, a general on awhite horse, at the head of his armies withstandard unfurled”. Neither my successor nor Isaw himself in such a description of thecommand-in-chief. Sir Ninian’s research ledhim to consider a variety of views ranging allthe way from the claim that as Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General was “no morethan a glorified patron”of the armed forces, to

one which rather dramatically saw him as onewho “as the ultimate possessor of thecommand function waits, finger on the button,for the report of the Senior Service officer”– orsomething like that. Sir Ninian concluded thatwith the evolution of institutions of responsiblegovernment, it was clear that a governor wasnot intended to have substantive powers ofcommand. The debates in the Australianconstitutional conventions of the 1890s inwhich the Commonwealth Constitution wasdebated and drafted show, pretty clearly, thatthe title of the Governor-General asCommander-in-Chief was intended to confertitular and not substantive command-in-chief.At the same time the role was seen as givingexpression to a special and distinctiverelationship between the Governor-Generaland the armed forces of the Commonwealth. InSir Ninian Stephen’s words it is:

a close relationship of sentiment, basedneither upon control nor command butwhich in our democratic society expresseson the one hand the nation’s pride in andrespect for its armed forces and on theother, the willing subordination of themembers of those forces to the civil power.That appears to me to express it very well. I

have many recollections of the strength andwarmth of feeling in the armed forces for theGovernor-General as Commander-in-Chief andI have many special and distinctive memoriesof it. Over the years in office there were visitsto Service institutions for a wide variety ofpurposes, and, from time to time, to take partin military exercises. My wife has a favouritepicture of me in a Leopard tank, smilinghugely and looking like a cat given unlimited

Understanding the Office of theGovernor-General of Australia

By The Right Honourable Sir Zelman Cowen, AK, GCMG, GCVO, QC, DCL

Address to the Royal United Service Institution of Victoria, 24 June 1993


cream, and somewhere among my possessionsI have a licence to operate such a tank. I doubtwhether it has any validity, and I am veryunlikely to put it to the test, but I was pleasedto receive it.

As I look back over the record of speechesand travels, there were many Serviceoccasions. There were the graduationceremonies of the various Service colleges andother military courses, there were presentationsof colours, banners and guidons, there wereawards for Service competitions like the Dukeof Gloucester’s Cup, there were attendances atService dinners and functions, as well as atvarious R.S.L. and other like occasions. It wasreally quite impressive to look back at and totally the number of speeches and functionswhich had a Service connection.

Apart from such activities and ceremonies,there were other links with the Services. In thehousehold of the Governor-General there areserving military officers: the Comptroller of theHousehold and the aides. The comptrollers inmy time were successively Army and Navyofficers of lieutenant colonel and commanderrank. The aides were of the rank of captain orequivalent, and there was one from each of thethree Services, each serving for a year with astaggered succession. They were all careerofficers, and I took the view, with which I hopethe Chiefs of Staff concurred, that these weresignificant appointments worthy of specialattention in that they gave the selected man(and it happened that in my time they were allmen) a view of the world and a distinctivesocial and educational experience which stoodhim in good stead when he returned to regularService duties, and made his way up theService ladder. The experience would serve himwell if he were likely to progress to the higherService levels. Of course it cannot be easy toidentify the “flyer” so early in a Service career,but so far as it was possible, I hope that thepost of aide to a Governor-General was seen asvaluable in this educational-social experiencerole. I do not know whether it was possible to

achieve what I hoped for, but among the aideswere men of diverse abilities who, afteraccustoming themselves to an unfamiliar andvery demanding role, derived significantbenefit, experience and even enjoyment fromthe job.

All of this tells a story of the links of theGovernor-General with the military side. Ibelieve that the association was valued by theServices who, as Sir Ninian Stephen put it,recognised the “quite special relationship thatexists between the Governor-General and thearmed forces of the Commonwealth”.

In my time, I went to sea in at least one ofalmost everything the Navy had; in doing so Ihad a day and a submerged lunch in anOBERON-class submarine. I was carried aboutthe country daily in the aircraft of the RAAF’sNo 34 Squadron. I cannot say that I flew inone of everything the RAAF had, but I fulfilledmy ambition to fly in a Canberra, one of themost beautiful aircraft to grace the skies. I havesaid something already about my manyengagements with the Army.

At another level, I had many interestingmeetings and talks with visiting senior militaryofficers. The Governor-General receives manycallers and this provides opportunity forsubstantial discussion, and some of the mostsearching and stimulating discussions werewith senior servicemen. The meeting whichremains most lasting in my memory was withMarshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Cameronwho was then Chief of the British DefenceStaff. I remember another discussion aboutterrorism with General Meyer, a US ArmyChief. There were many of these meetings andwhat remains vivid in memory is the many-sidedness of the minds of these officers whoexercised high command functions.

Let me now speak more generally of theOffice of Governor-General. The AustralianConstitution provided that the Queen should beHead of State. She was to be represented in theCommonwealth by a Governor-General whoperformed Head of State functions as her

UNDERSTANDING THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA 23

representative and in accordance with theConstitution. Over the nine decades of thiscentury both offices, the monarchy and theGovernor-Generalship, have undergonesignificant change. In 1901 Australia wasinternally self-governing, but was still in manyrespects of colonial status, acknowledgingallegiance to a monarch who was Queen of theentire Empire. Early in the century Australia incompany with a small number ofconstitutionally advanced colonies achievedspecial status as a self-governing dominion.This was reinforced by her participation in theFirst World War, and in the inter war years thestatus of Australia and her sister dominionswas redefined at a great Imperial Conference in1926 to emphasise a relationship of equalitywith one another and with the UnitedKingdom. The essential link in this newstructure was seen as common allegiance tothe Crown. Following the end of the SecondWorld War major changes took place withinthe diminishing empire and the expandingCommonwealth of Nations particularly in thepassage to independence of former colonies ledby India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Theirs was adifferent colonial history; to Indiaindependence was bound up with republicanstatus. So in 1949 the question was posedwhether India might be a member of theCommonwealth as a republic, and the answergiven at a meeting of Prime Ministers ofCommonwealth countries in that year was thatshe might do so. So it was that as othercolonies came to independence they opted in amajority of cases, either at that time or later,for republican status. So it is that in thecontemporary Commonwealth, Australia is oneof a substantial minority among some states inacknowledging the Queen as Head of State.

Further it was agreed that individualCommonwealth states retaining the monarchymight redefine the style and titles of themonarch. Australia did so in 1953 and 1973;the Queen is monarch by separate and distincttitles in all those states in which she is

constitutionally Head of State. In examiningthese arrangements, it can be said that there isspecial significance in the Queen’s role asQueen of the United Kingdom; there as part ofa long history she performs her Head of Staterole in person. It is impractical therefore for theQueen to undertake more than an occasionalvisit to each of the other states of which she ishead. To assure the adequate discharge of herconstitutional and ceremonial duties in thesestates she must have a representativepermanently in place to perform those duties.Hence the role of the Governor-Generalassumes importance.

Now that role has changed over the courseof this century. To take our case, the Governor-General was appointed by the monarch at thebeginning on the advice of the Government;he came from the United Kingdom andreturned to it at the conclusion of his term. Hesaw his responsibilities as twofold: in oneaspect performing constitutional duties onbehalf of the Queen; in another as the protectorof British and imperial interests, acting in thisaspect on behalf of the British Government.

Over time, there was increasing pressurefrom Australian governments for a voice in thechoice of a Governor-General and after the endof the First World War there were pressures toredefine the Governor-Generalship inparticular aspects. So in 1926 it was agreed atthe Imperial Conference that Governor-Generals should stand in relation to theirgovernments in the same relationship as didthe monarch in relation to the United KingdomGovernment. The clear point was that theGovernor-General should not act at all asrepresentative of the British Government; itsinterests should henceforth be the concernof a diplomatic agent, styled the HighCommissioner for the United Kingdom.

As it happened it was an Australianinitiative which established the rule for thechoice and nomination of the Governor-General. In 1930, on the retirement of a(British) Governor-General, the Australian


Government resolved to recommend anAustralian-born and resident citizen, Sir IsaacIsaacs to the King, George V, to be Governor-General. Isaacs was at the time Chief Justice ofthe High Court of Australia; he was the son ofpoor immigrants and had had a brilliant careerin the law and politics. The King was resistantto the appointment of a local man, and thestanding of the Australian (as contrasted withthe British) Government to make therecommendation was challenged. The issuewas highly controversial in London andAustralia, but the Australian Prime Minister,J.H. Scullin, stood his ground and the Kingmade the appointment, albeit reluctantly. Theentitlement of an Australian (or otherCommonwealth) Government to recommendthe appointment of a Governor-General to theKing was affirmed by an Imperial Conferencein 1930. So it was that the modern Governor-Generalship was put in place. It did not followthat all Australian Governor-Generals musthenceforth be Australian citizens, and it wasnot until the mid 1960s, with the appointmentof Lord Casey, that a continuing practice ofnominating Australian citizens was adopted. Iwas the 19th Governor-General; I wasappointed in 1977 in succession to Sir JohnKerr whose action in November 1975 indismissing the Whitlam Government provokeda constitutional crisis and brought a visibilityto the Office of Governor-General which it hadnever before had to any comparable extent. Iwas appointed on the recommendation of thePrime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser. Adistinguished Australian historian has writtenthat in practical terms Australia is a “crownedrepublic”, since in practice all the significantpowers and functions of the Queen areexercised by an Australian Governor-Generalwhose sources of appointment and authority isin fact Australian. Indeed the critical functionsare discharged by him: this was illustrated bywhat was done in 1975 in respect of thedismissal of Mr Whitlam. Sir John Kerr in hisbook Matters for Judgement made the point

that the action was his; that he did not consultwith or inform the Queen, though he advisedher immediately after he had acted. So hewrote:

I did not tell the Queen in advance that Iintended to exercise these powers onNovember 11. I did not ask her approval.The decisions I took were without theQueen’s advance knowledge. The reason forthis was that I believed, if dismissal actionwas to be taken, that it could be taken onlyby me and that it must be done on my soleresponsibility. My view was that to informHer Majesty in advance of what I intendedto do and when would be to risk involvingher in an Australian political andconstitutional crisis in relation to which shehad no legal powers and I must not takesuch a risk.The power which Sir John Kerr exercised is

styled a “reserve” power; that is to say a powerexercised by the Governor-General in hisdiscretion and not on the advice of his PrimeMinister. Such powers are comparatively rare,and in this case bitterly contested. There are afew: the power to choose a Prime Minister inthose circumstances in which theconfigurations of party do not make the choiceinevitable, and the power to refuse a PrimeMinister’s advice to dissolve the parliament.The definition of the reserve power has been amatter of debate; it was said that Sir JohnKerr’s exercise of the power of dismissal gave afillip to the republican cause. The change to arepublic would not, of itself, resolve the issue,however. With a president in place as Head ofState, the problem which gave rise to theexercise of reserve powers would still remainand have to be faced. In Sir John Kerr’s case,the problem in fact arose out of therelationships between the two Houses ofParliament.

The events of November 1975 havefocussed attention on the exercise ofconstitutional and political power by aGovernor-General; the critics of its exercise in

UNDERSTANDING THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA 25

defining the acceptable role of a Governor-General frame it in terms that it should be“purely ceremonial and divorced from theexercise of real political power”, that he has (orshould have) no real powers “but to open fairs,cut ribbons and the like”. The language of suchpeople is that of ceremony and it distractsattention from the fact that by a dueattendance of business of his office, by theexercise of functions and influence withinacceptable limits, a Governor-General can, inappropriate cases, exercise an effectiveinfluence on the processes of Government. Inthe Australian context, my own experience ofthe workings of the Federal Executive Councilillustrates this. In the Council, week by week,the Governor-General presides, advised andattended by ministers. A great deal ofgovernmental business was done, including themaking of regulations, orders, proclamationsand a wide range of appointments as well asother diverse governmental business whichwas required to be overseen and approvedthere. Sir Paul Hasluck who had wideexperience of the work of the ExecutiveCouncil from two sides – as a minister as wellas a Governor-General – has written in somedetail about its work, and much of hisexperience, which is certainly extensive,corresponds with my own. The Governor-General can and I believe does play a usefulrole in requiring clear and ample explanationfor what is proposed. In my case, having seenand studied the papers I would ask questions ofofficers in advance of Council meetings tosatisfy myself that I understood what wasbeing done and that it was being doneregularly. I would raise questions with theattending ministers in the Council so that theycould take into account the doubts, questionsand concerns of the Governor-General beforethey formally tendered advice to him. TheGovernor-General’s experience in questioningproposed actions and procedures and in raisingpoints, as that experience grew, was intendedand I think was calculated to serve the interests

of regularity which in the press of big, busyand complex government, may not always beassured. As I said in a speech to the NationalPress Club in Canberra shortly before I left theoffice in July 1982, such activity and conducton the part of the Governor-General allow himto play a useful and, it may be, an importantrole in government which is consistent with ameticulous respect for the principle that theGovernor-General acts on the advice ofministers. A vigilant and inquiring Governor-General comes to be recognised as such in thedepartments which have the responsibility forpreparing and conducting substantialgovernment business. This is specially true inthe busy work of the Executive Council; it istrue also of other areas of business in whichthe Governor-General plays a part. Approval ofa document or of a course of action which fallswithin his purview is not to be regardedas a mindless, unenquiring, mechanicalendorsement.

Further let me say that the description ofthe ceremonial role of the Governor-General as“chief ribbon bestower and chief ribbon cutter”tends to diminish the significance and often toobscure the character of what is done in thisdemanding area of the Governor-General’sactivity. Questions are sometimes raised as towhether an appointee is “too well qualified”, asif to say that the office calls for no substantialqualities of mind. Once again, my experiencecorresponds with that of Sir Paul Hasluck.What was asked of me in a wide range ofactivities made a full call upon my physicaland intellectual capacities. In my speech at thePress Club I said that it appeared to me tocharacterise the Office of Governor-General astrivial and empty. As with the monarchy so toowith the Governor-General – much time andenergy and care go into the performance of awide range of non-constitutional, non-politicaland in this sense ceremonial duties andactivities. This is what the famous 19th centurywriter, Walter Bagehot, spoke of as the“dignified” role of the monarch. If observers


are pleased to call this “ribbon bestowing” and“ribbon cutting”, let it be recognised that thebestowing of ribbons is a recognition ofsignificant and diverse community service byindividuals and that is no poor thing, while themany ceremonies and openings (the ribboncutting) are associated with events in the life ofthe nation from the broadly national to thelocal. They take the Governor-General to manyplaces in a vast nation continent; they leadhim in speech to an interpretation andidentification of many significant activities,issues and occasions. The openings, themeetings in which the Governors-Generalparticipated were not infrequently those ofnational and international bodies, ofprofessions, industries, of specialists, ofacademic bodies, of learned societies.

From the earliest days of theCommonwealth’s existence the Governors-General have recognised the importance oftravelling through the nation and have beenclear about the reasons. Lord Hopetoun, thefirst Governor-General, saw this as providing aneeded national focus in the early days ofAustralian federation. In an early speech hepromised to demonstrate “to the many thatthey are living under one central government”.Right up to the present day his successors havefollowed this course and for the same reasons.At an earlier time it was done, often arduously,by slower means of transport. In our day, jetaircraft annihilate distance. While this mayrelieve the rigour, it makes possible an ever-expanding opportunity for travel all over thecountry.

Much time and energy go into thedischarge and into the preparation for thedischarge of such duties and I believe that it isthe case that the Governor-General, like the

monarch, makes his major contributionthrough the continuing and, I hope I may say,the committed performance of these duties. Ibelieve that through this work, the Governor-General offers encouragement and recognitionto Australians many of whom may not be verypowerful or visible in the course of daily life,and to the efforts of individuals and groupswho work constructively to improve life in thenation and community. Sir Paul Hasluck hassaid that Australians both expect andappreciate statements by a Governor-Generalon matters of current concern at a leveldifferent from that of party politicalcontroversy, and I shaped what I said in accordwith that. Knowledge, experience and capacitywere constantly tested and called upon inresponding to what was asked and expected ofme. As well I saw, as did Hopetoun in thebeginning, that a major role was performed bythe Governor-General in the discharge of alarge number of functions all over Australia.The responses were often quite remarkable andwere certainly moving. It cannot easily bebetter put than in Hasluck’s words, that theOffice of Governor-General is the highestsingle expression in the AustralianGovernmental structure of the idea thatAustralians of all parties and walks of lifebelong to the same nation. Recognition of thisplaces heavy burdens and responsibilities onthe Australian who holds the office.

In the discussion of the republic, I haveoften wondered what I – an Australian andAustralian nominated Governor-General –would have done which would have beensignificantly different had I been aconstitutional president of an Australianrepublic. Not much, I think, in substance.

Sir Zelman Cowen was Governor-General of Australia from 1977 to 1982.

27

In the euphoria following the successfulmounting of the XXVII Olympiad,

Australians would do well to ponder a fewwords from the speech prepared by Sir ThomasBlamey in the days before he was to receive hisField Marshal’s baton from the Governor-General:

A few words on our future. The spirit andhard work of our pioneers made it possiblefor us to enjoy life in our Australia, andtheir young, generous, and bravedescendants volunteered twice in thiscentury to serve their country in its need.Our nation’s future is, unfortunately, notyet secured, and its sons must consent toaccept whatever responsibilities fall onthem, and draw strength for their dischargefrom the traditions of their predecessors.Blamey was too ill to deliver this speech,

but it was not an idle thought. According toJohn Hetherington, he had spoken widelyabout our nation’s future to many communitygroups, giving a wider expression through anarticle in the Melbourne Herald on 4 June1947. In it he stated his ideas about preparinga nation for an uncertain future.

No system of military defence can beconsidered adequate under modernconditions which does not lay thefoundations for the preparation, not only ofthe armed forces but of the whole nation.In such a scheme every class of thecommunity must be considered and the partthey must play – first, in the armed forceswhich will take the first shock of war;second, in the organisation of the nation tosupply those armed forces; and, third, inthe organisation of the whole community to

ensure the maintenance and welfare of thecountry.It is not essential at this stage that a hugeproportion of the national income should bediverted to the purpose. But it is essential,if we are to be realistic at all in the matter,that the foundations should be laid and theessential framework of the machinery beprovided.Unless this conception is accepted andapplied, the money expended will be largelywasted, and the nation will be no moreprepared to meet the position than it was in1939.Last year, 2000, the Australian Government

issued a public discussion paper, DefenceReview 2000 – Our Future Defence Force. It isobvious that the Government considersdefence begins and ends with the armed forcesand sought answers to the following questions:• What do we want our armed forces to be

able to do?• Where do we want our armed forces to be

able to operate?• What is the best way to structure the

Defence Force?• What is the best way to spend the Defence

budget?Compare this restricted outlook to that of

our great wartime Commander-in-Chief, whospoke of the need to prepare not just the armedforces but of the whole nation; the need toplan not just for the fighting but for the supplyof the armed forces and for the maintenanceand welfare of the community. Furthermore, ifwe were not to waste money, the essentialframework of the machinery to conduct a warmust be in place.

Blamey and National SecurityBy Brigadier P.J. Greville, CBE, BE

A revised paper based on an address to the United Service Institute of Queensland, Brisbane,15 May 1996.


Defence under Modern ConditionsSince Napoleon, war has been conducted in

four dimensions, which can be defined asoperational power, logistic capability,technology and social power. No successfulstrategies for the long-term security ofAustralia can be formulated without takinginto account all four of them.

All four will be looked at, but spaceprevents the full spectrum to be covered. Underoperational power, we will look briefly at thedirection of the armed forces and thelegislative environment in which they mayhave to operate. Under logistic capability wewill examine our potential for armsproduction. We will examine briefly ourtechnological base and finally the Australiancommunity.

Operational PowerBlamey’s appointment as Commander-in-

Chief was unceremoniously terminated inNovember 1945 by Prime Minister Chifley.However, in re-establishing the Military Board,the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, soughtBlamey’s advice. Blamey responded with abalanced proposal for the direction of thearmed forces in peace, which centred about theneed for the minister to preside over an ArmyCouncil. This council was to consist of theminister as President, the Chief of the GeneralStaff as Deputy President, the Commanders ofEastern and Southern Commands (one ofwhom was to be a member of the CitizenMilitary Forces) and the Secretary, Departmentof Army.

There was much merit in Blamey’sproposal, particularly his insistence that theminister preside over the council, which wastasked with the preparation of the Army forwar. He believed that the pre-war MilitaryBoard had failed abysmally in preparing theAustralian Army for the 1939-45 war. Hisadvice was not accepted; however Forde didestablish two types of Military Board meetings,namely general and ordinary meetings. A

general meeting was one presided over by theminister, to be held at least every two months,at which the more important policy andadministrative aspects would be consideredand resolved. Ordinary meetings would bepresided over by the Chief of the General Staffand deal with the details of Armyadministration. During the first meeting of theMilitary Board after its restitution, partly inanswer to Blamey’s concerns, Forde declaredthat:

Peace-time for an army department canhave only one meaning – preparation time,planning for war. If the whole armyadministration, both civil and military, canbecome indoctrinated with the idea then Ithink the most dangerous aspects ofunpreparedness will be avoided. If the armyadministration, both civil and military,concentrate on appreciating what it will becalled upon to do in war, visualising itsrequirements in war and planningaccordingly, then I think that whatever maybe the condition of our materialpreparations, vital time will be savedbecause the departmental outlook and planswill be tuned to war needs. This is a far cry from the ideas behind the

reorganisation of the Defence departments of1974, which forms the basis for theexisting organisation. The architect of thatreorganisation, Sir Arthur Tange, in justifyinghis proposals, stated:

I am talking about peacetime and I amtalking about advice and accountability tothe government in peacetime. There is ofcourse some tendency, and I imagine it isnatural, to assume that at all times weshould be organised for total war and intotal war the organisation I am talkingabout, and the place that I am talking aboutof civilians, would be substantially changed,but one is bound to say “for how manyyears in the past 73 has Australia beeninvolved in total war?”

BLAMEY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 29

If Australia had not been involved in totalwar since 1945, the Australian Army hadtroops on active service for almost every yearbetween 1945 and 1972. Blamey would haveobjected in no uncertain terms. The higherdefence machinery since 1974 has been fatallyflawed and the constant fiddling with it overthe subsequent 27 years has done little toclarify the command and administrativestructure.

According to section 30 of the Defence Act,“the Defence Force consists of three arms,namely the Naval, Military and Air Forces ofthe Commonwealth”. The Defence Departmentis responsible for the administration of theDefence Force. The mobilisation of a nation forwar is the responsibility of the Government,involving the coordination of military,strategic, economic, financial, external andinternal affairs. In war, Cabinet is responsiblefor the overall prosecution of the war, which iswhy in the 1939-45 war, Churchill as PrimeMinister became the Minister for War and why,in Australia, Prime Minister Curtin assumedthe role of Minister for Defence. In peace, theGovernment, not the Department of Defencenor the Defence Force, is responsible for theformulation of Defence policy.

Blamey would doubt that either theGovernment or the Department of Defence isorganised efficiently to play their part in theevolution of Defence policy. The recentpassage of legislation to enable the DefenceForce to operate in certain circumstances onthe mainland of Australia, is a prime exampleof how slothful government can be in carryingout its part. In 1925, my father, a corporal ofthe Queenscliff garrison, was deployed toprotect Commonwealth property in Melbourneduring the police strike. The moral dilemmafacing the soldier in military aid to the civilpower in a federation such as Australia hasbeen known since then. When Malcolm Frasercalled out the military to secure a route fromSydney to Bowral in 1978 there was no legalframework in which the soldiers could operate.

During the 1980-90s the ADF carried outnumerous exercises in the northern regions ofAustralia against small bands of “enemy” whowere carrying out raids against isolatedcommunities and vital assets. The Army hadno legal framework to enable it to employroadblocks, search property, arrest suspiciouspersons and carry out other aspects of suchoperations. It took an improbable terroristthreat to the Olympic Games to jolt theGovernment into providing legislation.Regrettably the public are none the wiser aboutthe need for such legislation. At no time didthe Government take the trouble properly toexplain its legislation or the need for it. For allits pretensions, the media coverage was woeful.

There is much more legislation needed tocover a number of situations that could occurin Australia. Each State and the NorthernTerritory has quite different emergencylegislation, leaving a legal minefield for policeforces and the ADF to operate within. A fewlawyers are needed to provide a basic systemand then political will at state and Federal levelto produce legislation. It is the least theGovernment can do.

Logistic CapabilityDuring the 1939-45 war, from a very weak

industrial base, Australia manufactured manyitems of war required by our Army and theforces of the USA. After the war, successivegovernments supported the expansion of theindustrial base and in some respects thosegains are still extant. More recently, the thrustfor “free trade” and a global economy has seenmuch of our light manufacturing industrydestroyed. A case can be made for preservingvital parts of it.

Blamey was interested in the practical sideof military input into our armaments industry.In a letter to the Minister for the Army on 22September 1944, he urged the selection ofsuitably qualified Army officers to attend theMilitary College of Science in the UnitedKingdom. He wrote:


The proper development of equipment foruse under active service conditions requiresa considerable number of specialistpersonnel within the Army. Apart fromthose directly needed in actual manufacture,there is a need for officers who have bothexperience in the use of the equipmentconcerned, and have adequate scientific ortechnical knowledge to be able to deal withthe research, design and inspection aspectsof the warlike stores required for the Armyand to improve the link with productionauthorities. The Military College of Sciencein the UK conducts courses for the trainingof officers for this special purpose, that isthe study of the problems relating to design,development, manufacture and inspectionof equipment.Blamey urged that two officers be selected

annually to attend the Military College ofScience. Forde accepted this proposal and the

Army has continued the practice until recently,when it created its own courses. Graduatesfrom that establishment staff our presentequipment development staff and inspectionservice, or quality assurance service as it isnow called.

Blamey, as C-in-C, supervised theestablishment of lines of communications fromsouth-eastern Australia to the north. We hadnever had this responsibility before; theprocess was slow, painful, manpower intensiveand involved many processes and skillspreviously not part of the Army’s scope. Heand his successors were determined to retainthat capability. As part of the “rationalisation”processes, to which the Army has beensubjected repeatedly for over a quarter of acentury, this capability has been lost ordissipated. Events in East Timor exposed a gapin our logistic capability; perhaps a properexamination will overcome these shortfalls.

The Opening of the John Curtin School of Medical Research (JCSMR) at the Australian National University.Among those in attendance were Robert Menzies and Howard Florey.

Photograph by kind permission of Photography JCSMR

BLAMEY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 31

TechnologyConcerned about the difficulties in treating

wounded and sick soldiers in New GuineaBlamey sought the advice of Howard Florey,the noted Australian pathologist who did muchto make penicillin and other antibioticsavailable to patients. With the agreement ofPrime Minister Curtin, he invited him toAustralia. Florey wrote to Blamey on his returnto the UK in January 1945, thanking him “forthe extraordinarily efficient and kindly way Iwas treated by all the Army under yourcommand”.

Before that, on 24 October 1944, Blameyhad written to the Prime Minister confirmingthe recommendations he had made in informaldiscussions with Curtin relating to Sir HowardFlorey. Blamey stressed that the importance ofcontemporary science both from a wartimeand reconstruction point of view was such inBritain and elsewhere, that Australia could nothope to attract the best men to work hereunless the facilities offered for work werebetter than in the old countries. He went on torecommend that a National University befounded with a National Medical ResearchInstitute. As he stated:

I am more and more impressed with thenecessity for putting a stop to the drainageof outstanding Australians to posts in othercountries. There will be very little future forAustralian science if the drainagecontinues, and it can be said withassurance that adequate provision for theemployment of Australians of world rank inAustralian laboratories would have theeffect of energising and enhancing thequality of Australian contributions in nearlyevery field of intellectual endeavour.John Hetherington claimed that the very

first letter on the ANU’s registry is the onefrom General Blamey to the Prime Minister.There is no doubt if he was with us today, theField Marshal would be urging our presentPrime Minister to heed the request of our ChiefScientist, Dr R.J. Batterham, to provide the

necessary funding to enable Australianresearch to be effective. A further brain drain isnot in our best interests for peace or war.

The PeopleAfter the fall of Singapore, Curtin

addressed the nation and stated:The organisation of a non-military peoplefor the purposes of complete war mustnecessarily effect a revolution in the lives ofthe people. A transformation so great asthat, which the government regards asimperative, is inevitably beset with manydifficulties, and must create manyproblems. It may be marked by some degreeof confusion.Blamey recognised this, as his Melbourne

Herald article demonstrated: “That every classof the community must be considered and thepart they must play.”

Since Blamey and Curtin, the population ofAustralia has undertaken great changes innumbers and ethnic profile. From apredominantly British population of aboutseven million in 1945, the population is nowclose to 19 million, made up of the mostdiverse pattern of peoples of any nation in theworld. Our society has absorbed these changespeacefully and generally with tolerance. Howwould it cope with war?

Writing in a different context, April Cartermakes the point:

The difficulties and dangers of racial,religious or class divisions do not howevernecessarily lead to the conclusion that onlya homogenous, religiously united andclassless society can conduct resistance.These barriers may be largely overcome by aunifying purpose arising from the struggleagainst a common evil, by nationalism, bymutual tolerance or by political unity andpolitical skill.The Aborigines are the element of

Australian society genuinely isolated andalienated. Aborigines who have served in thearmed services have performed well. There


have been few, if any reports aboutdiscrimination or prejudice in the Army –which means that if it did occur, it was rare.On the other hand, at the very first MilitaryBoard meeting after the 1939-45 war, the Chiefof the General Staff ordered an investigationinto reports that Aboriginal ex-servicemenwere being stripped of their savings includingtheir deferred pay by State and Territoryadministrations.

In 1965, two Army officers, Jol Langtryand Colin East, published an article in theArmy Journal, suggesting the formation of alargely Aboriginal-manned unit to guard ourvacant north. This imaginative but otherwiseunexceptional article caused a political storm.By 1981 the Army had formed Norforce, alargely Aboriginal-manned unit, designed topatrol our still largely unoccupied north. It isnow a prestige unit.

Shortly after the election of the HowardGovernment, the Army was invited to assistisolated Aboriginal communities with housingand services. This program has been verysuccessful, many communities receiving muchneeded facilities and in the process, many inthe communities have been trained in the skillsnecessary to maintain those facilities. Aboveall, both the communities and soldiers havegained mutual confidence and respect for eachother, the building bricks for “reconciliation”.

The present Government is correct ingiving priority to improving the health,education and economic prospects ofAborigines. But until Australian Aboriginesfind their individual and corporate place inAustralian society, we shall not be a cohesivenation. Until the Aborigines develop their fullpotential, the nation will be below its optimalstrength. The numerous outstanding

Aborigines in arts, politics, law and sport areliving proof of their innate talents. The widercommunity must ensure that those who fail toreach their potential do not fail from want ofopportunity or encouragement.

As a nation, we have difficulty inidentifying a likely enemy or a probable threat.No one can be certain about the future. In themeantime we should follow our mostdistinguished soldier’s advice and lay thefoundation for mobilising “every class in thecommunity”.

ConclusionBlamey was recognised by his admirers and

detractors alike for his strategic grasp and hisstaff abilities. In this short paper, attention hasbeen given to wider and less known aspects ofhis knowledge. Despite his onerous wartimeduties, he was not content to simply fight thebattle, but was looking to the future of hiscountry.

Blamey, the professional soldier, recognisedthe place of the citizen army. The regularDefence Force, particularly the Army, is but thevanguard of the national defence force.

Blamey, the soldier, emphasised the needfor the civil branches of government to be ablequickly to change to a war economy andmobilise the technical, supply, transportationand manpower resources for war.

Blamey took an active interest in the post-war immigration program knowing thatwe would no longer be a homogeneous,religiously united society. Today he would beworking for a nation whose citizens possess aunifying purpose, based on a good humoured,mellow nationalism, which can only benurtured through mutual tolerance.

Brigadier Greville’s last appointment was Commander 4th Field Force Group and 4th Military District, from 1977until 1980.

33

Iam not a military historian and have noqualifications to write about Blamey the

soldier or to make any assessment of him as amilitary commander. In this paper I will tryonly to make some contribution to anunderstanding of the conditions in whichBlamey worked during the last phase of hiscareer when he was Commander Allied LandForces in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).I will draw on my research and writing as oneof the authors of the civil series of the OfficialHistory of Australia in the War of 1939-45,supplemented by knowledge gained inpersonal experience in wartime administration.

You will recall that early in the war, underthe Menzies Government, Blamey was chosenfor high command and, in sequence, wasappointed GOC 6th Division, Second AIF, GOC1st Australian Corps and Deputy Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East. After war began inthe Pacific, he was recalled to Australia and inMarch 1942 was appointed by the CurtinGovernment as Commander-in-Chief of theAustralian Military Forces (C-in-C AMF).

One preliminary question concerns theextent to which a military commander has anyresponsibility or opportunity for formingpolicy regarding the conduct of a war. Does hesimply carry out a directive given to him bythe rulers of a nation or does he share in thedecisions or try to influence the decisionsabout the best way to win the war, the choiceof military objectives and the size of forces tobe used? I leave those questions floating in theair and draw your attention to certaincircumstances that, in the case of Blamey,

limited what he could do in his office of C-in-CAMF.

One limitation was set by a change in thenature of the Australian war effort. After thefall of Singapore, and in the face of a risingthreat from Japan, the nation was organisedfor “total war” (to use a phrase current at thetime). The whole resources of the nation werenow engaged in war. There was a greatdiversion of manpower. Many new controlsand restrictions on production, supply andconsumption of commodities were imposed.Successive decisions were made on whatactivities should have priority. Many aspects ofthe daily life of the community were broughtunder official direction. All these changes werenecessarily accompanied by the organisationof new instrumentalities and new admin-istrative arrangements.

Total war means that the conduct of thewar is inseparable from the leadership of thewhole nation. In practical terms, the PrimeMinister and War Cabinet take command andthe politician supersedes the militarycommander.

In theory winning the war means defeatingthe enemy. The military answer to the questionof how to do it is simple and direct. Thepolitical answer is more complex.

The political leader still has to govern thenation as well as direct the war effort. Let meillustrate the point by taking an extremeexample. At a time when peril still seemedgreat, Prime Minister John Curtin decided thatthere had to be a limit to any furtherrestrictions on horse racing. A militarycommander might fail to see how the Japanese

Manpower Limits on the AustralianWar Effort

By The Right Honourable Sir Paul Hasluck, KG, GCMG, GCVO

Address to the United Service Institution of Western Australia, Perth, 24 May 1990


Army is brought nearer to defeat by a decisionto allow the continued production of feed forrace horses, the continued employment ofstable hands and the regular diversion of largecrowds from the job of winning the war toattempts to back winners. The political leaderapparently sees the connection or accepts thenecessity.

In spite of the commitment of the nation tototal war, the Prime Minister and War Cabinetfaced limitations on their power even firmerthan those set by domestic politicalconsiderations. Australia was in alliance withpowers stronger than herself and could not actindependently from the alliance.

After Japan and the United States hadentered the war, decisions were made, at thelevel of Churchill and Roosevelt, for aworldwide division of strategic responsibilitybetween Great Britain and the US. As part ofthese decisions, the US became responsible forthe Pacific Area. Subsequently, with thedisappearance of Wavell’s command in theABDA area, decisions were made by the US inMarch 1942 to divide the Pacific area, ongrounds of strategy, into the SWPA and thePacific Ocean Area. General MacArthur wasdesignated Supreme Commander of the SWPAand Admiral Nimitz was designated SupremeCommander of the Pacific Ocean Area. TheAustralian Government had no part in any ofthese decisions and was told about them afterthey had been made.

After MacArthur had arrived in Australiafrom the Philippines, it was suggested to Curtinby President Roosevelt that the AustralianGovernment might nominate MacArthur asSupreme Commander of all Allied forces in theSWPA and assign Australian forces to hiscommand. This was a courteous way ofobtaining Australian endorsement of a decisionalready made.

MacArthur was hailed by the AustralianGovernment as a deliverer. In committingAustralian forces to his command, Curtin madethe limitation that any power to move

Australian troops out of Australian territoryshould be subject to prior consultation andagreement with the Australian Governmentand an understanding that Australia retainedthe right to refuse the use of forces for anyproject which it considered inadvisable. Ineffect, Australia might be able to withhold itsforces but it was narrowly limited in the waysin which it might employ them.

Then MacArthur obtained Australianagreement to detailed working arrangementsunder which the Allied forces in the SWPAwere organised into five subordinatecommands namely, Allied Naval Forces, AlliedLand Forces, Allied Air Forces, United StatesArmy Forces in Australia responsible foradministration and supply, and United StatesForces in the Philippines. Blamey was namedCommander Allied Land Forces.

At the time these arrangements were made,the ground forces in Australia numbered38,000 Americans, 104,000 of the AIF and265,000 of the Australian militia. Thus, at thebeginning, the preponderance of troops in theAllied Land Forces under Blamey’s commandwere Australian. The situation would change asthe US war effort gathered strength.

At that stage of the war, Curtin andMacArthur shared a primary purpose of haltingthe Japanese southward thrust and drivingthem back. The first military task was to makeAustralia secure. Then the Allied forces couldprepare for the counter-stroke.

From the outset, the Australian Govern-ment pressed both Washington and London toassign more troops, more aircraft, more shipsand more weapons to the SWPA. Although inthis quest for additional forces the AustralianGovernment sometimes used the argumentabout launching an offensive from Australia,and occasionally Curtin also used the sameflourish in speech-making, it is apparent fromthe decisions made and the official documentsthat during 1942, the Australian Government’soutlook on the war was influenced more bythe need to defend Australia from attack than

MANPOWER LIMITS ON THE AUSTRALIAN WAR EFFORT 35

by any planning for an offensive. There wasan over-riding fear, probably not fullyjustified, that Japan intended to invadeAustralia.

In the middle of 1942 the AustralianGovernment learnt that a great deal of high-level planning between Roosevelt andChurchill and by the Combined Chiefs of Staffin Washington had already resulted indecisions to concentrate first on the war effortagainst Germany and to fight a holding war inthe Pacific. There had been no consultationwith Australia before those decisions weremade. It is apparent that the UK, US andAustralian governments saw the war againstJapan from different standpoints. Curtin fearedan invasion of Australia. Churchill andRoosevelt thought a large-scale invasion wasunlikely. They saw the greatest immediatedanger was the threat from Germany. Australiaexperienced its own anxieties about theJapanese threat more sharply than the GreatPowers saw them and conversely the GreatPowers saw the shape of a worldwide conflictmore broadly than Australia did. The GreatPowers made the decisions on high policy.

In keeping with the defensive view of theAustralian Government, Blamey’s organisationand deployment of Australian ground forces in1942 concentrated on the protection ofAustralia. The reorganisation between Marchand May 1942, resulted in June in thefollowing distribution of Australian infantrybrigades and American infantry regiments: twoin New Guinea, eight in Queensland, 15 in thesouth-eastern States, three in the NorthernTerritory and three in Western Australia.

In September 1942, after furtherreorganisation, Blamey still found “thesituation in regard to the defence of Australia aground for serious misgiving”. He wanted 25divisions. At the time he had 12, made up asfollows: seven Australian divisions, threeAustralian armoured divisions being organisedand two American divisions. They weredistributed as follows: two in New Guinea, one

in the Northern Territory, two in WesternAustralia, four in Queensland and the otherthree in New South Wales and Victoria. Hesupported the Government’s pressure for thereturn of the 9th Division from the MiddleEast.

The main military events in the SWPA inthe 15 months after the fall of Singapore andJava were the checking of the Japanese Armyat Kokoda and Milne Bay; operations on thenorthern coast of Papua, and Navalengagements in the Coral Sea, the BismarckSea and Midway. In June 1943, Curtin saidthat the “Battle of Australia” had been wonand that the security of Australia had beenassured. He spoke of the “Battle of Australia”as though it were analogous to the Battle forBritain in the German air attacks of 1940 but,of course Australia had not been subjected toanything comparable to the German assault onBritain. In the view of some war historians, hisrecognition that Australia was now safe mayhave been rather belated but neverthelessCurtin’s announcement marks June 1943 as asignificant point in the history of Australianpolicy on the conduct of the war in the Pacific.Up to that time, the uppermost thought in themind of Curtin and the War Cabinet had beento make Australia safe. After that date itbecame necessary for them to make decisionson the Australian war effort as part of a widercontribution to victory. What was clear is thatup to that stage Curtin had chosen a limitedoperational role for Australian troops and thesafety of Australia was a clearer purpose thanaggression against the enemy. Blamey, both asC-in-C AMF and as Commander Allied LandForces planned and organised within thatpolicy. He accepted the limits on hisgeneralship.

Another circumstance that limited Blamey’sinfluence on shaping policy was the closerelationship established between Curtin andMacArthur, with the Secretary of the DefenceDepartment, Shedden, acting as theintermediary. MacArthur’s influence on Curtin


and on Australian policy was more direct andmore immediate than any influence thatBlamey had. Curtin was Defence Minister aswell as Prime Minister and the functioning ofthe War Cabinet was centred on the DefenceDepartment. The three Service ministers weremembers of the War Cabinet but theirdepartments functioned in close liaison with -in many respects one might say insubordination to - the Defence Department.The Chiefs of Staff of the three Servicesdirected their advice on policy to theGovernment either through a Chiefs of StaffCommittee, which was serviced by the DefenceDepartment, or through the Defence Committeeon which they sat alongside the Secretary ofthe Defence Department. The Chief of theGeneral Staff was responsible for presentingthe views of the C-in-C AMF in the WarCabinet. Thus the Defence Department and,under its tutelage, these two committees were ascreen between the C-in-C and the WarCabinet.

These circumstances are directly relevant tothe way in which decisions on Australianmilitary operations were made after June 1943.Broadly speaking, from that point onwards theC-in-C had a steadily decreasing influence ondecisions about the conduct of the Australianwar effort. In April 1943 he had proposed a

reorganisation of the forces and this wasreferred to the Defence Committee forexamination so that the demands of theServices could be correlated with other aspectsof manpower requirements. In effect the Armybecame a claimant alongside munitions, civilindustry and production either for export or fordomestic consumption.

A general election was held in July andAugust 1943. In that campaign Curtin said ineffect that the defensive phase of the war wasover. The nation had been saved. For the futurethe aim of the Government would be abalanced war effort. He said that Churchill andRoosevelt had given assurances on thevigorous prosecution of the war in the Pacifictheatre and Australia could look to them forassistance in those things for which hercapacity was insufficient and concentrate onthose for which Australia was particularlyfitted such as the production of food. Theelection campaign statements were in keepingwith War Cabinet decisions. At a meeting on13 July 1943, War Cabinet had accepted astatement presented by Curtin setting out theprinciples which should govern what Australiadid in the future. The statement commenced bypointing out that the danger of invasion haddecreased; Australian defences had beenstrengthened and aid had come from abroad.

General Sir Thomas Blamey with General MacArthur and the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin.AWM Neg 042766


Thus the broad strategic situation whichgoverned the nature and scope of the nation’swar effort had changed.

The guiding principles adopted by WarCabinet in July 1943 were generally designedto keep the war effort within Australia’sphysical capacity. As regards the Army, therewould be three infantry divisions for offensiveoperations and “adequate forces for thedefence of Australia and New Guinea and forthe relief of units in New Guinea”. The strengthof the forces would be governed by “theavailable manpower, the capacity to maintainwastage and the coordination of manpowerrequired for other needs”. From that dateonwards the Army had no priority in theallotment of manpower and the flow ofrecruits to the Army was limited by successivedecisions on manpower in general.

At this point, I will make a digression toconsider two other factors that had a bearingon the deployment of Australian troops. One ofthese factors was the distinction made betweenthe AIF and the CMF regarding serviceoverseas. The AIF was a volunteer force forservice anywhere and the CMF was raised bycompulsory service for home defence. Early inthe war an amendment of the Defence Act hadplaced beyond doubt the liability of the CMF toserve in Papua and New Guinea as well as inthe Australian continent so while the fightingwas in Australian territory, the AIF and CMFwere engaged on common tasks of homedefence. Difficulty would arise, however, if achange from the defensive to the offensivecarried the war beyond the Australianmainland and the external territories.

I shall not enlarge on this topic, which is astory of political manoeuvres rather than ofmilitary planning, but draw attention to thefact that until the passage of the Defence(Citizen Military Forces) Bill in February 1943,this distinction between AIF and CMFremained. Even after the Bill became law, theoperational role of Australian land forces wasstill a limited one.

Curtin faced and overcame the argumentsof the anti-conscriptionists in his own partybut he won the argument by limiting the areain which the combined forces could serve. Thelegislation confined the conscripted forces toan enlarged South West Pacific zone. Curtinhimself still envisaged a limited role forAustralian troops. Various statements revealedthat he expected the Australian troops torelieve American troops in bases and re-occupied territory when the Americans movedforward.

Another factor to be noted in passing isthat when the Allied Land Forces in the SWPAgained added strength from the arrival of moreAmerican divisions, there was a naturalambition among American divisionalcommanders to live up to the responsibilitiesand opportunities of high rank rather than tosubordinate themselves and their Americantroops to an Australian C-in-C. In February1943, MacArthur partly solved this problem bynaming the American Sixth Army as a taskforce directly responsible to him and not toBlamey. Progressively, as American troopstook over the main task, the effective meaningof Blamey’s title as Commander Allied LandForces was reduced. It was MacArthur, notBlamey, who made decisions on thedeployment of forces. Blamey’s role in theplanning and command of any offensive wasreduced by force of circumstances and theincreased American presence as well as byAustralian policy.

On returning from this digression to theWar Cabinet decisions of July 1943, we willrecognise that the three Australian infantrydivisions being maintained for offensiveoperations would necessarily be allotted tasksdistinct from those to be undertaken by theAmerican component of Allied Land Forces inany northward advance. Their role for theremainder of the war was further affected bythe fact that from July 1943 onwards,Australia’s contribution towards winning thewar became more and more that of a provider


of goods and services rather than that of afighter, and consequently the flow of newrecruits to the Army was limited.

I submit for your consideration thequestion whether the Curtin Government hadfull mastery in the conduct of the war effort inthe last two years of hostilities. Early in 1943 ithad become apparent that Australia’s wareffort was getting out of hand. Immediatelyafter the Japanese attack in December 1941and the succession of military disasters, majordiversions of manpower were made. Whilethere was fear of invasion, the claims of thearmed services were paramount. Thenprogressively it was realised that a total wareffort brought additional requirements ofmanpower in munitions, shipbuilding, aircraftproduction and works. The increases inthe American forces based in Australia broughtdemands for buildings and otherestablishments, transport, auxiliary servicesand a wide range of supplies. During 1942 adrastic reduction in the production of goodsand services for the civilian population and astrict rationing system, coupled with a greatincrease in the employment of women, helpedin releasing more manpower both for thearmed services and for war industries.

There is room for some criticism of theGovernment over its handling of manpowerproblems but in making any criticism oneshould recognise that control of manpower is amatter of political judgments on priorities andnot simply a matter of doing arithmetic aboutsupply and demand. Furthermore, theallocation of manpower is not simply a matterof responding to the demands which are mosturgent. The response to one demand usuallycreates a new demand. As a simple illustration,a decision to put more men into the armedservices because of fear of invasionimmediately creates a demand for manpowerto provide the soldiers with uniforms, weapons,transport, munitions and other supplies. Thewelcome increase in Allied strength creatednew demands on Australian manpower for the

production of food and the construction ofworks for the non-Australian component ofAllied forces. Even the extension of manpowercontrols created a demand for more clerks togive effect to manpower decisions. Each newlycreated authority became a claimant formanpower.

I shall not elaborate on the difficulties ofmanpower administration or enter into adiscussion of manpower priorities. It is enoughfor the purpose of this paper to record thatconditions at the end of 1942 and theincomplete mastery of the Australian wareffort forced the Government in the secondhalf of 1943 into a reconsideration of the roleof the Australian armed forces. When itsthinking was dominated by fear of invasionand when there were few Allied troops inAustralia, the Services had been given firstplace in the calls on manpower. Now that thedanger had lessened and the demands onmanpower had become more complex and thecumulative decisions on allotment ofmanpower had produced a tangle ofconflicting claims, policy had to be reviewed.Broadly speaking, from this time onwards theArmy had to struggle for recruits and then, forlack of recruits, it had to reduce theestablishment and eventually dischargesoldiers for the sake of industry.

May I quote a passage I wrote as one of theauthors of the Official War History about theposition in the middle of 1943. The AustralianGovernment was faced with the necessity ofmaking a major decision on the nature of theAustralian war effort. The problem came tothem as one of a shortage of manpower,mingled with numerous other considerations.

The War Cabinet usually sent themanpower question back to their officialswith directions to examine the best possibleuse of resources, to re-examine theirprogrammes and to tighten controls. Theproblem was returned to them very much inthe shape of an argument between variousauthorities and interests as to who should


have the most human bodies. The politicalquestion became one of allocation. Thismeant restrictions of some activities,curtailment of services and renewed rakingthrough the oft-raked heap to try todiscover more manpower. Yet never does itappear to have led to the attempt at asynthesis. Gradually and of necessity, andthrough the course of successive andsometimes conflicting decisions on variousminor questions the nature of theAustralian war effort began to change, butat no time does it appear that at the highestlevel the over-all question was considered:“in the present situation and having regardto our present resources and obligationswhat can Australia best do to win thewar?” … The successive decisions of WarCabinet were neither comprehensive norconstant. They answered a number of littlequestions as they arose and never faced thebig question. They revealed no over-all view. . . the political historian, writing after theevent, however, finds as the central featureof the whole manpower situation a constantuncertainty in the Prime Minister and theWar Cabinet regarding the exact nature ofthe Australian war effort. The adjustment ofconflicting claims was attended with a largemeasure of administrative efficiency. Thereason why there were so many conflictingclaims, persisting over so long a period oftime, was due to the absence of clear, firm,exact and prompt determinations on policyby those responsible for the higher directionof the war in Australia. It was the oldproblem of deciding the nature and extent ofthe Australian war effort, of shaping andimposing on the nation a conscious purposein the conduct of the war … The onlyconclusion which is justified by the politicalstudy of the manpower administration of1942 and 1943 is that Australia foundherself in a new role not because Curtin oranyone else had planned it that way butbecause of Curtin’s acceptance of events.

The course of the war and the pressure ofaffairs were determining what Australiawould do.1

The outcome of successive decisions on thebids for manpower was a progressiveadjustment of the war effort. From October1943, the Army was required to release menfor other war purposes. Later decisionsrestricted the monthly intake of new recruits.The re-organisation of the Army continued. Asa result of the manpower decisions and ofother causes of wastage, it was reported at theend of April 1944 that the Army had a net loss,since October 1943, of over 44,000. A total of47,000 had been discharged, 1802 had diedand the monthly intake had been little morethan half of the manpower allocation of 1500a month. Incidentally this allocation of 1500comprised 550 men and 950 women a month.A considerable number of units on themainland had been disbanded in order to makeup the strength of the offensive force. I wouldremind you of the difficulties of maintaining acombat force in tropical conditions. As anexample, during its campaign on the northerncoast of New Guinea leading to the surrenderof the Japanese the 6th Division lost 442officers and men killed in action or dying ofwounds. Another 1141 were wounded.Admissions to hospital because of sicknesswere 16,203.

In May 1944, the Minister for the Army putthe position bluntly that the Governmentshould inform MacArthur that the AMF would“have to be relieved of a substantial portion ofits present task in providing garrisons in NewGuinea and elsewhere, and the operations ofthe offensive force must be delayed in orderthat the provision of the necessary manpowercan be arranged”. He wrote further that theGovernment should decide whether the Army’sdirect contribution to operations in the SWPAshould be reduced and the “food front”maintained and increased.2 Some indication ofthis part of the manpower problem additionalto the demands of Australian industry is given


by an estimate at this time that in June 1944,100,000 Australians would be employed tomeet the needs of the US forces.

The diversion of manpower to productionof supplies continued and at the same time thepresent and prospective demands on Australiafor supplies increased still further as the resultof decisions on high policy by Churchill andRoosevelt. For example, one prospectiveadditional demand was that which wouldfollow the basing of some British forces onAustralia for the final phase of operations inthe Pacific.

At the end of June 1944 Curtin, on hisreturn from a visit to London for a PrimeMinisters’ Conference and discussions withChurchill and with the Combined Chiefsof Staff in Washington, had a conferencewith MacArthur in Brisbane. The outcomewas agreement that Australia’s servicecommitments were to be limited to sixdivisions, plus naval and air forces. During thelast three years of hostilities, the decisions ofthe Australian Government on the Australianwar effort were dominated by the problems ofmanpower. In this paper we are concernedonly with the effect of these decisions onBlamey’s role as C-in-C AMF and asCommander Allied Land Forces. My impressionfrom research among the documents is thatBlamey had a declining influence on suchdecisions. One factor was that in thepreparation of documents for consideration byWar Cabinet and Production Executive and theAdvisory War Council, the Service claims weresubmitted through the Chiefs of Staff and theService Ministers and the documentation aboutthe Army’s needs was not as effective as themore strongly argued presentation on themanpower situation by the civilian adviserssuch as the Ministers in Production Executive,and the officials on the Manpower Directorate,the Department of War Organisation ofIndustry and other functionaries. The civilianadvisers had more facts and more expertnessthan the soldiers and were closer to the scene

where decisions were made. In practice theManpower Directorate, through the WarCommitments Committee, exercised moreauthority over defence uses as well as non-defence uses of manpower than did thedefence services.

Gradually, too, the clerks were taking overfrom the soldiers. I do not mean this in a waydisparaging to the civilian functionaries. Theywere all doing their appointed jobs. More andmore, however, one sees that in any discussionrelated to the shaping of the Australian wareffort there were new arguments, clearlypresented, that did not give priority to thefighting man. For example, under the Lend-Lease arrangements for obtaining militarysupplies it was envisaged that there wouldeventually be a balancing of the monetaryvalue of what Australia had received againstwhat Australia had given. The appropriateclerks produced arguments about increasingsupplies from Australian production. When itwas clear that eventually we were going to winthe war, more and more attention was given topost-war reconstruction at home, theprocedures of demobilisation and the practicalproblems of giving effect to the politicallyattractive slogan of full employment after thewar. What the Government did aboutmanpower now was seen in relation not onlyto defeating the Japanese but to ensuring asmooth transition to peacetime Australia. Thediligent clerks and advisers and suchinfluential ministers as Chifley and Dedmanensured that such particular problems wereplaced before the Government more clearlyand strongly than any proposals about theOrder of Battle for Australia’s armed forces.

Another element was the view held by themembers of the War Cabinet about the wareffort in general. They were not single-mindedon the subject of fighting. I do not think itwould be unfair to say that ministers in theCurtin Government thought that Australianforces should do enough fighting to deserverespect and to earn a place in the peace


settlement and post-war discussions but thattheir primary task - and perhaps for some itwas the sufficient task - was to keep Australiasafe with the help of Allies. Let strongernations do the rest.

Furthermore, if this was the bent of Curtin’sown mind - and my own view is that it was -he was confirmed in this limited view aboutthe war effort by the fact that the principalallies and co-defenders of Australia, the USand the UK, also allotted to Australia the taskof provider once the first phase of extremedanger had passed.

Furthermore, the influence of MacArthuron Curtin also tended to reduce the need forAustralian forces. MacArthur clearly wantedan American victory and the reconquest of thePhilippines by forces wholly or predominantlyAmerican. As I have previously indicated, therapport that had developed between Curtin andMacArthur may have had its advantages in theearlier phases of the danger from Japan andthe cooperation between the US and Australianforces but, as the war progressed and thesituation changed, it also had the consequencethat Blamey and the Australian DefenceCommittee were not always immediately andfully aware of their discussions and theimplications for Australian defence policy.

All in all, the Australian Governmentdepended on London and Washington forbroad military and economic strategy and onGeneral MacArthur for tactical initiative in theSWPA. Blamey had a reduced role to play asCommander Allied Land Forces and adeclining influence and limited opportunity ondecisions affecting the strength and the role ofthe AMF.

One might take a lofty geopolitical view ofthe situation and say that this was theunavoidable outcome of the fact that the majorAllied supply base in this remote segment of a

world war had to be in a continent with a largearea and a relatively small population. Keepingcloser to the records of the War Cabinet,however, the verdict would be that there wasan incomplete mastery by the CurtinGovernment of the Australian war effort. Theyresponded to pressures but were not in fullcommand of their own policy.

Just in case I have been rather too dismalin presenting such a story, perhaps I shouldend on a lighter note. As a senior officerof the Department of External Affairs Isaw something of wartime policy-making.At one stage I had a personal glimpseof the manpower procedures when aninterdepartmental committee was formed toassist the Department of Supply in screeningthe great number of requests for supplies beingmade from various Allied authorities. Most ofthe work of the committee was to make apreliminary judgment on priorities and on thecapacity of Australia to provide the goods. Myrole on the committee was simply to giveadvice on any considerations or obligations offoreign policy that might place one requestahead of another. Mostly I listened toarguments and facts presented by otherdepartmental representatives about capacity tosupply. I recall that at the end of a meeting inSydney one morning one of my colleagues onthe committee remarked cynically: “When mychildren ask me: What did you do in the GreatWar daddy? I will say: I sat in a back room inSydney, doing all the arithmetic to make surethat American sailors in the South Pacificcould get ice-cream, pork and turkeys when allof the rest of us went without them.”

NOTES1 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People,

1942-1945, Australian War Memorial,Canberra, 1972, p. 296.

2 ibid, p. 421.

Sir Paul Hasluck was Governor-General of Australia from 1969 to 1974.

Informal portrait of Brigadier General Sir T. Blamey, on horseback, entering the Chateau at Ham-sur-Heure, Belgium,14 April 1919. AWM Neg E005060

43

It is fitting that the 50th anniversary of thedeath of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey

coincides with the centenary of the formationof the Australian Army. For Blamey dominatedthe first half of the history of the AustralianArmy and his great gift to the Australiannation was the creation, for the first time, of atruly national army. It was an army that hadincluded one in ten Australians and had foughtsuccessfully to defend the nation againstoutside attack in the greatest war in ourhistory.1 When Blamey had joined the Army in1906 it had consisted of disparate militia unitsand a tiny permanent force. By the time hebecame a field marshal in 1951 the Army hadfought two world wars and was engaged in theKorean War. And Australia now, for the firsttime, had a regular army that drew its officersand non-commissioned officers from Blamey’swartime army.

Blamey’s elevation to field marshal wasmore than a tribute to Australia’s part in twoworld wars. It was recognition that Australiahad become an independent country. It wouldmake its own decisions about its security, itwould have a standing army of its own thatcould implement those decisions, and it couldproduce commanders who understoodAustralia’s own particular strategic situation.Blamey had played a major role in bringingabout these developments. In that sense hisappointment as field marshal signified acoming of age of the nation and its Army. Nosingle person can claim to have brought aboutall these outcomes, but Blamey’s role had beenmore important than that of any other.

This paper is not intended to provide ashort biography or outline of Blamey’s career.

Rather, by examining the milestones in thedevelopment of the Australian Army, and bydrawing attention to Blamey’s role in each ofthem, it seeks to demonstrate his influenceover that development.

Let us look at the period before the FirstWorld War. At first glance it might seem thatBlamey joined the Army in an unusual way. In1906 the new federal government decided toestablish cadet units in all schools of theCommonwealth. Blamey was successful in anexamination to appoint officers to a smallcadre of training and administrative staff. Butin the context of Defence policy at the timethis method of joining the Army was notunusual. The Defence Act 1903, passed byparliament in 1904, had set the new nation’sdefence policy, which stated that Australia wasto base its defence on a part-time voluntarilyenlisted militia. Apart from training andadministrative staff, and the staff for thecoastal forts, there were to be no permanentsoldiers. The raising of cadet units – to providebasic training and to feed into the militia – wasin tune with this philosophy. Already thePrime Minister, Alfred Deakin, was consideringthe introduction of compulsory service in themilitia. Eventually, in April 1910 Blamey wastransferred from supervising cadets to anappointment on the headquarters of the 2ndInfantry Brigade in which he supervised militiatraining. Due to changes of Government thecompulsory scheme for cadets and militia wasnot introduced until January 1911. Blameythen became brigade major of the 12th AreaBrigade, responsible for administering part ofthe compulsory scheme. A critic might havecommented that none of this was real

Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey and theAustralian Army

By Professor David Horner

Address to the United Service Institution of the Australian Capital Territory, 2 May 2001


soldiering as we would understand it. But itwas all that soldiering consisted of during thisperiod.

In 1912 and 1913 Blamey attended theStaff College at Quetta in present-day Pakistan.His attendance represented severaldevelopments in the Australian Army. First, in1908 the British War Office had issued amemorandum seeking to get each self-governing dominion to send officers to theBritish Staff College to improve cooperationbetween the British and dominions armies. Thisrelationship was to last for 50 years and was tofigure prominently in Blamey’s career. Second,with an eye to the future, the Australian Armywanted to establish a professional officer corpsof its own. Third, at Quetta Blamey wrote amajor essay on defence problems in thePacific, arguing that an attack upon the Empirein the Pacific was “unlikely except in the caseof complication in Europe”, in which case“naval assistance in the Pacific may not beavailable. It is essential therefore, that theEmpire should possess sufficient naval strengthin the Pacific at all times to guarantee itsecurity”.2 These crucial issues were todominate the defence debate in Australia forthe next 30 years, and Blamey was right. In1941 Japan attacked when there were“complications” in Europe. But in 1913 Blameyfound that few were interested in the problemsof the Pacific; as he wrote bitterly, there wasnot “a blighter who cares two figs for thestrategical problems of Australia or thepeople”.3 It alerted him to the reality that onmatters of defence Australia had to look afterits own interests.

In general terms, then, before the FirstWorld War Blamey was closely involved withthe development of the Army as a militia force,but also played his role in establishing aprofessional officer corps. And already he wasshowing interest in broad defence policy. Hewas not present in Australia when, after theoutbreak of the First World War, the AustralianImperial Force (AIF) was formed in August

1914, but he joined it in Egypt in December1914.

The Gallipoli landing and the subsequentcampaign is a defining point in the history ofthe Australian Army, and Blamey was closelyinvolved in it. As the intelligence officer on theheadquarters of the 1st Australian Division hehelped plan the operation and went ashoreseveral hours after the first landing,accompanying the divisional commander,Major General William Bridges, and the chiefof staff, Colonel Brudenell White. Because ofthe nature of operations at Gallipoli, he oftenvisited the front line and saw exciting actionduring a night reconnaissance patrol. Blameyleft Gallipoli late in July and returned late inOctober as AA&QMG of the 2nd Division,remaining there until early December. He wastherefore well placed to observe the qualities ofAustralian soldiers and also to see the outcomeof poor planning decisions

The Gallipoli campaign did not fully bringout the problems of modern technologicalwarfare, but these were revealed in tragicfashion on the Western Front the followingyear. During the attack at Pozières in July1916 Blamey was chief operations officer ofthe 1st Division, although the extent of hisrole is not fully clear. He supervised theplanning and the preparation of the operationorder, but the divisional commander, MajorGeneral Harold Walker, also had firm viewsabout how the attack was to be conducted.4 Inthe official history Charles Bean refers toWalker, “in conjunction with ColonelBlamey,” drawing up plans for the secondphase of the attack – the one which actuallytook the shattered remnants of Pozières.5

Blamey’s own account, written in earlyAugust 1916, is a remarkable mixture of pridein the men, but boastfulness about his ownperformance. Despite acknowledging thecasualties he is optimistic of the outcome, andappears not fully to appreciate the horrors ofthe battle. Perhaps he was already showing a

FIELD MARSHAL SIR THOMAS BLAMEY AND THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 45

capacity to put aside his feelings to ensure heapproached his task with a clear head.

Displaying great ability as a staff officer, inMay 1918 Blamey, was promoted to brigadiergeneral and appointed chief of staff of theAustralian Corps, commanded by LieutenantGeneral Sir John Monash. The AustralianArmy had come a long way from the chaos ofthe first day at Gallipoli and the slaughter onthe Somme in 1916. Two years of fighting inFrance and Belgium had resulted in terriblelosses, but the Australians had gainedknowledge and experience. Able leaders hadcome to the fore, and they had learned toscrutinise the plans of their British superiors.They saw that artillery was the dominant forceon the battlefield and that an infantry assaultmust closely follow the creeping barrage.

Under Monash the Australian Corps had itsfinest hour. After the brilliant small set-pieceattack at Hamel on 4 July 1918, it took part inthe major British offensive of 8 August. Withthe Canadians, the Australian Corps becamethe spearhead of the British offensive. For thefirst time an Australian general had tomanoeuvre five divisions, maintaining artillerysupport, deploying tanks, bringing forwardsupplies, changing the point of attack,applying relentless pressure. Both at Hameland in the latter stages of the advance, theAustralians fought side-by-side withAmericans – a foretaste of future cooperation.

While not as obvious as at Gallipoli, thelegacy of the Australians Corps’ final campaignhas perhaps been equally profound. Australia’smilitary leaders learned that battles are won bytraining and careful planning. Monash provedto be an outstanding commander and abrilliant planner, while his chief of staff,Blamey, was highly efficient. Later his orderswould become a model for use at the BritishArmy’s staff college. Thereafter carefulplanning, attention to detail and a concern topreserve Australian lives generally would markAustralian military operations. The First WorldWar set a firm foundation for the further

development of the Australian Army andBlamey was heavily involved in setting thatfoundation.

After the First World War the developmentof the Australian Army was determined, to alarge degree, by a conference of senior officers,chaired by Lieutenant General Sir HarryChauvel, in January 1920. The officersconcluded that Australia’s security rested ontwo factors: its membership of the BritishEmpire, and “Australia’s own ability to preventan invading enemy from obtaining decisivevictories pending the arrival of help from otherparts of the Empire”.6 The conference thereforerecommended a citizen army of five infantryand two cavalry divisions, in a force totallingabout 180,000 all ranks. For the first timeAustralia would form divisional headquartersand staffs in peacetime. Other recom-mendations covered resources, organisation,mobilisation, training and finance. On 1 May1921 the Army introduced its new divisionalstructure, but faced by financial constraints theGovernment failed to approve any of theproposals for new equipment and the force wasalways under strength. Successive Army chiefswere to use the report as a guide for buildingthe Army over the next ten years. It is notgenerally appreciated that as Director ofMilitary Operations Brigadier General Blamey“was charged with the staff work of theconference and was responsible for thepreparatory studies and drafting”.7 Later in theyear, as Deputy Chief of the General Staff,Blamey was responsible for introducing someof the proposals from the senior officers’conference.

The central feature of Australian defencepolicy between the wars was the Singaporestrategy, by which, in time of threat, Britainwould send its main fleet to the Far East, to bebased at a new naval base to be constructed atSingapore. Australia therefore did not need toform a large Army, but rather should have aNavy that could work with the Royal Navy –indeed become part of it. As the Australian


Army’s representative in London betweenDecember 1922 and January 1925, Blameywas closely involved with the earlydevelopment of the Singapore strategy. He wasparticularly interested in the size of theproposed military garrison at Singapore. InMay 1923 he wrote to the Chief of the GeneralStaff, Lieutenant General Sir Brudenell White,in Australia, that a British Staff Collegeexercise dealing with the possibility of a hostileforce landing at Singapore had concluded “thatthe Japanese could land a force of 100,000plus supplies for three months within a periodof seven weeks which would transpire beforethe main fleet could arrive from Europeanwaters”. Blamey observed that the strength andlocation of the garrison was “a very bigquestion and one which may interest us verygreatly”. White replied that this was also hisview and the matter was “very serious”.8

In August 1923 Blamey reported that whenSingapore had been developed sufficiently totake capital ships Britain planned to build upits China fleet. He commented, however, that“a Pacific power” (Japan), which might operateagainst Australian ports would have a “fleetlarge enough to ensure the defeat of thisBritish fleet”, and the Australian Governmentneeded to keep this in mind when consideringthe need for coast defences. Blamey thoughtBritain had not taken this possibility intoaccount.9

In October 1923 the Australian PrimeMinister, Stanley Bruce, attended an ImperialConference in London. It established theparameters for cooperative empire defence thatbecame fundamental to Australia’s defencepolicy for the rest of the inter-war years. Fromthe Army’s perspective, the key issue was thedefence of Singapore. The new CGS,Lieutenant General Chauvel, informed Blamey,who was Bruce’s military adviser, that planshad been made to send a special force overseasbut, if the militia were mobilised, equipmentwould not be available for the force. Referringto the possibility that Blamey might be

questioned about whether Australia couldsupply a portion of the Singapore garrison,Chauvel advised that this could be provided byvoluntary enlistment, if the Governmentagreed, but troops would be “largely untrainedand would require intensive training afterarrival”.10 In view of Australia’s efforts toreinforce Singapore in the Second World Warand the fate of the untrained troops sent therein January 1942, these comments made in1923 are of particular interest. Advised byBlamey, Bruce questioned the British officialsabout the problem of defending Singapore, buteventually conceded that, “while I am not quiteas clear as I should like to be as to how theprotection of Singapore is to be assured, I amclear on this point, that apparently it can bedone”.11 Based on his letters to White andChauvel, it is doubtful whether Blamey wouldhave supported this view.

In September 1925 Blamey transferredfrom the Regular Army to the Citizen MilitaryForces (CMF) and took up the appointment asChief Commissioner of the Victoria Police. InMay 1926 Blamey, as a CMF officer, tookcommand of the 10th Infantry Brigade, and inMarch 1931 assumed command of the 3rdDivision. He retained command until May1937. As the Australian Army was based oncitizen forces, Blamey was therefore in a keyposition to influence its development. In aperiod of 11 years as a senior CMF commanderhe trained many officers who would later fillsenior command appointments in the SecondAIF. He helped keep alive units that wouldboth contribute men to the Second AIF andlater serve in their own right in New Guinea.

It is less well known that in the late 1930sBlamey was a member of the Council ofDefence. Following the First World War theCouncil had been re-established with the PrimeMinister as chairman and several seniorministers and the Service chiefs as members. Ithad also been the practice to summon threeformer senior AIF officers who happened to belocated in Melbourne – Monash, Chauvel and


White – to attend the Council meetings. WhenMonash died in 1931 Blamey was added, butinitially this meant nothing because theCouncil did not meet at all from November1929 to June 1935.12 In 1935 the Governmentrevived the Council of Defence, with Blamey asone of its coopted members, thereby exposinghim to the key policy issues affecting thedefence of Australia. At its second meeting, inAugust 1936, for example, during a discussionof the expansion of the militia, Blamey saidthat the recent expansion had enabledcommanding officers to “clear out a lot of‘dead wood’ in their units”.13

In the first few years after the Council ofDefence was reconstituted Blamey did not playa central role in its discussions. As the CGS,Major General John Lavarack, was the Army’schief spokesman and as Blamey was not yet onthe retired list he had to be careful not toundermine his chief. Nevertheless, by 1938clearly he had different views from Lavarack.He was more inclined to support theGovernment’s policy of relying on navaldefence, but was quick to point outshortcomings in the training and readiness ofthe militia. As the Council meetings becamemore frequent, Blamey became more involvedin high-level defence issues.

If the First World War set the foundation ofthe Australian Army, the Second World War,after the inter-war interregnum, continued thebuilding process. Initially of course, thedevelopment mirrored that of the First WorldWar. Soon after the outbreak of the warBlamey was appointed Commander of theSecond AIF and he raised the 1st Corps and the6th and 7th Divisions before he joined them inthe Middle East in June 1940 and becamecommander of the AIF there. The 9th Divisionlater joined the AIF in the Middle East, whilethe 8th Division went to Malaya and theislands.

In the Middle East the Australian Army, inthe form of the Second AIF, reconfirmed itsearlier reputation for first class battlefield

performance. There were some notabledifferences from the First World War in whichthe First AIF had a British commander,(Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood) forthe duration, a British corps commander (alsoBirdwood) until the last six months of the war,and half a dozen British divisionalcommanders. In the Second World War itwould have been unthinkable to appoint aBritish officer to command an Australiandivision. As commander of both the AIF and ofthe 1st Australian Corps, Blamey had aheightened sense of responsibility to theAustralian Government, and was much morewilling to challenge the British high commandthan his First World War predecessors. In thissense the Australian Army started to come ofage as the army of an independent nation.Admittedly, this was still within an imperialframework, and it was within this frameworkthat Blamey was appointed DeputyCommander-in-Chief in the Middle East,Lieutenant General John Lavarack commandedBritish and Indian forces in Syria, and MajorGeneral Leslie Morshead commanded Britishforces in Tobruk.

There were also differences operationally.For the first time the Australian Army had todeal with withdrawal and defeat. (Gallipoli isexcluded from that description as the troopsthere did not feel that they had been defeated.)In the Middle East the Australians were chasedout of Greece, forced back into Tobruk andscattered in Crete. But they recovered fromthese setbacks – brilliantly in Tobruk, leadingto greater success at El Alamein. As on theWestern Front in the First World War, theAustralians played a crucial role in what wasthen the main theatre. The Australians weregenerally self-contained, but did not have theirown armoured units, except for the divisionalcavalry regiments, and they still relied partlyon the British for logistic support.

While Blamey was serving with the AIF inthe Middle East, and Major General GordonBennett was commanding a small AIF force in


Malaya, there was another Army in Australia.This included AIF units in training, permanentunits and the Citizen Military Forces (CMF).The outbreak of war with Japan in December1941 led to the bringing together of all theseforces as one Australian Army, known as theAustralian Military Forces (AMF). WhenBlamey arrived back in Australia in March1942 he was appointed Commander-in-Chiefof the Australian Military Forces.

Much has been made of the shameful two-army policy – the split, even antagonism,between the volunteers of the AIF with theiroperational experience and the conscriptedmilitiamen who preferred to remain at home.This portrayal is an exaggeration. By 1942 notall the AIF had served in the Middle East oreven overseas, and not all of the militia werenational servicemen. The CMF includedvolunteers, such as those who were too youngto serve in the AIF, but nonetheless still foughton the Kokoda Trail. In practical terms, by midto late 1942 there was one army. It is true thatmilitia units could not serve beyond NewGuinea, but that restriction was largelyovercome in February 1943 with changes tolegislation. Where sufficient membersvolunteered, militia units changed theirdesignation and became AIF units. For thepurpose of officer promotion and seniority theAMF was considered as one army; theseniority of officers in the AIF and the CMFwere rationalised. All the officers of the StaffCorps – the regulars – who had not alreadybeen seconded to the AIF or the CMF wereappointed or posted to appropriate positions onthe war establishments of the AIF or the CMF.

Organisationally Australia had one nationalarmy with Blamey commanding all of it,including the 9th Division that had remainedin the Middle East. It was a very substantialarmy. It included two armies, three corps, 14divisions and seven lines of communicationareas. While Australia still relied on overseassuppliers for some weapons and vehicles, theAustralian Army was largely responsible for its

own logistic support. At its peak, more than500,000 Australians were serving in the Armyat one time.

It is true that Blamey and the Army had tooperate within the Allied command structure,by which General Douglas MacArthurcommanded the South West Pacific Area, andhence commanded all the Army’s operationalunits except those in the Middle East. Withinthat structure, however, the Australian Armyformed the bulk of the land forces. In mid1942 Australia provided MacArthur with 13divisions while he had only two US infantrydivisions. The Australian Army carried outmost of MacArthur’s land operations in NewGuinea in 1942 and 1943. By early 1944 theAustralian Army had been reduced to eightinfantry divisions, while the US Army in theSouth West Pacific consisted of seven infantrydivisions, three separate regimental combatteams and three engineer special brigades.When MacArthur assumed responsibility forthe forces in the Solomons in the third quarterof 1944 he had 18 American divisions. In thelast year of the war Australia had six divisions,all of them engaged on operations. Althoughthis was now considerably fewer divisions thanthe Americans had in the South West PacificArea it was still a very large army. Australiawas the only country to have more army unitsin action in May 1945, after Germanysurrendered in Europe, than before.

During the Pacific War Blamey and hissenior commanders had to learn how to workwithin an alliance with the Americans. Lessonswere learned about coalition warfare that wereto guide Australian strategic planners andmilitary commanders for the next 50 years. Atlower levels commanders learned about alliedcooperation in the field.

Operationally, the Australian Army came ofage in the Pacific War. In 1942, on the KokodaTrail and at Milne Bay, it fought battles inwhich the direct security of Australia was atstake. In 1943, in the Salamaua, Lae,Finschhafen campaign, it conducted a series of


amphibious and airborne operations involvingthe coordination of sea, land and air resources.Up to five Australian divisions took part. TheArmy had to develop concepts for junglewarfare, particularly concepts for logisticsupport in a difficult environment. To meetoperational requirements the Army changedthe establishment of its divisions to jungleformations, and raised new units such ascommando regiments. In 1945 it conductedseveral large-scale amphibious operations.

One of the great changes in Australia’sstrategic policy took place after October 1943.Before then, in the First World War, in theMiddle East in 1940-1942, and in the SouthWest Pacific in 1941-1943 Australia deployedforces overseas to assist its allies to win thewar or, in the case of 1942, directly to protectAustralia. But in 1944-45 Australia deployedits forces on operations that did not contributedirectly to the winning of the war. Theoperations included the landings in Borneo bythe 7th and 9th Divisions in 1945 and theoperations in New Guinea, New Britain andBougainville by the 6th, 5th, 3rd and 11thDivisions in late 1944 and 1945. Thesecampaigns were fought for political or strategicreasons – to give Australia a seat at the peacetable, to meet the demands of an alliancepartner, to show that we could liberate ourown territory, or to release troops for furthercampaigns. The campaigns were a forerunnerof Australian operations in Korea, Malaya,Borneo and Vietnam in the following 20 years.They were to be conducted by regular armyunits that could be sent overseas at shortnotice without raising a volunteerexpeditionary force as in the past. Blameyunderstood the new strategic environment thatwas emerging in late 1943 and 1944, and inJanuary 1944 he wrote several papers aboutAustralia’s long-term strategic problems.

Although Blamey resigned as Commander-in-Chief in November 1945, the army that hedeveloped and commanded between 1942 and1945 provided the backbone of the army that

appeared after the Government delivered itsfirst post-war defence policy in 1947. After theFirst World War regular officers had had torevert to their substantive ranks. After theSecond World War every effort was made torecognise the contribution and experience ofthe regular officers who had carried heavyresponsibility during the war. Initially the post-war army was based on a revived CMFsupported by a newly raised Australian RegularArmy, but by 1958 the Regular Army hadsupplanted the CMF as the main component

It is unlikely that Australia will ever againhave an Army as large as the one Blameycommanded in the Second World War. Nor isit likely that the Army will ever again conductas many operations, or deploy forces on solarge a scale. But just as the First World Warlaid the foundations for the Australian Army,the experiences of the Second World Warprovide the benchmark of what Australia couldachieve in raising and sustaining a world-classarmy.

It is worth pondering whether there wereany other Australians who came close tomatching Blamey in the way he played amajor role in the development of the Armyover a period of almost 40 years. There is nodoubt that General Sir Brudenell White was thedominant figure in the Army’s first 20 years,but his influence waned after he relinquishedthe appointment of CGS in 1923. Onecontender is Lieutenant General Sir JohnLavarack, described by his biographer, BrettLodge, as the “Rival General”. Like Blamey, heattended Staff College before the First WorldWar and although he did not serve at Gallipolihe held senior staff appointments during thatwar. Between the wars he was more influentialthan Blamey, particularly during his tenure asCGS from 1935 to 1939. But during the SecondWorld War his commands – the 7th Division,the 1st Australian Corps and the First Army –were always overshadowed by Blamey. In1944 he became the Australian Armyrepresentative in Washington.


Another contender is Lieutenant GeneralSir Vernon Sturdee. He served at Gallipoli andlater became a senior staff officer on FieldMarshal Haig’s headquarters in France. A staffcollege graduate with service in London, hewas a senior staff officer in Army headquartersduring the 1930s. As CGS from 1940 to 1942he was responsible for the defence of Australiaduring the grim days before Blamey returnedfrom the Middle East. In 1942 he went toWashington, and in 1944-45 he commandedthe First Army in New Guinea. As ActingCommander-in-Chief and then CGS from late1945 to April 1950 he set the course for theArmy’s development in the post-war period.Neither Lavarack nor Sturdee carried thebreadth of responsibilities borne by Blameyover a long period, and both were subordinateto Blamey at key times.

I began my 1998 biography of Blamey withthis statement: “Field Marshal Sir ThomasBlamey was Australia’s greatest and mostimportant soldier.” I went on to add that hewas a major figure in Australian history. Inoted that he was probably not Australia’smost accomplished battlefield commander, nora great innovator or reformer. He did notreshape the Australian Army and leave a neworganisation as his legacy. He was not loved oreven admired as an effective leader of men.For that matter, he was not respected for hishonesty and upright character. Why then, Iasked, is he the only Australian to become afield marshal?

A few reviewers challenged my statementabout Blamey being Australia’s greatest soldier.They thought that that accolade belonged toSir John Monash for his battlefield commandin the First World War. It is not the purpose ofthis paper to argue in detail the case forBlamey being the greatest soldier. To do so Iwould need to analyse his commandperformance in a series of operations andcampaigns, although I hope that I did sosuccessfully in my biography. Moreimportantly, I would need to analyse his

performance at the strategic level, advising theGovernment, administering and training theArmy, and allocating resources. Theseachievements would have to be balancedagainst his weaknesses – his jealousy of rivalsand his ruthless concern to maintain his ownposition. I believe that, on balance, Blameycomes out in front on this scorecard. As PeterHastings has argued, Blamey’s gift, that madehim “tower over contemporaries and rivals”and made him “the very model of a modernmajor general,” was “his capacity tounderstand and play politics”.

Who else at that time could haveassumed the enormous burdens of C-in-Cwhich require that the incumbent not onlyknew a great deal about running an army,had a fundamental grasp of strategy andtactics and could oversee the cumbrousadministrative machine, but could also dealwith a wartime Labor government,frightened politicians, an uncertain civilpopulation, and a principal ally representedby a US general who was not only devotedto denigrating Australia’s role andachievements but had the willing ear ofAustralia’s government? Rowell was a farbetter staff officer, Lavarack a cleverorganiser, Robertson a more daring soldier,Morshead a sounder. But there wasn’t oneof them from Berryman to Herring whocould have come within striking distance oftaking on the job. Not even Sturdee.But those very capabilities Blamey

possessed depended for their effectivenessquite often upon a relentless, destructive sideof him ...14

This leads to another dimension of Blameyas commander where I believe he failed theAustralian Army. A military commander doesnot just have to make the right decisions, planhis campaigns carefully and fight for hissoldiers’ and nation’s interests. He also has tofoster the Army’s ethos. While the JapaneseArmy, by its conduct towards Allied prisoners,might seem to have relinquished any right to


respect and correct treatment, it wasnonetheless important that the AustralianArmy continue to fight and treat the Japaneseaccording to the laws of war. Furthermore, theAustralian Army had to treat the civilians inre-occupied areas with dignity and care. It isnot suggested here that the Australian Armyfailed in this regard, but its conduct in theoccupation of Japan was not always blameless.

With these considerations in mind anArmy’s leader must set an example withrespect to values, and it is this area the Blameyfailed as a leader. While the stories of Blamey’swomanising and drinking grew with thetelling, they demeaned him in the eyes ofmany soldiers. Perhaps after the Badge 80incident as Police Commissioner Blamey wasalways going to carry that burden. But theincident over Lady Olga Blamey’s defiance ofthe Government in early 1941 when sherefused to return to Australia from the MiddleEast, and the evacuation of his son fromGreece, created the impression that Blameywould always look out for himself. At the rootof Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell’sargument with Blamey in 1942 when he wasdismissed from command in New Guinea washis perception of Blamey’s personal conduct.On the other hand upstanding officers such asLieutenant Generals Sir Edmund Herring andSir Iven Mackay and Major General Sir IvanDougherty retained their high regard forBlamey – perhaps a little naively. ProfessorRobert O’Neill has commented: “Perhaps themost poignant reflection on his military careeris the unlikelihood of his ever being held up toyoung soldiers as an example on which tomodel themselves”.15

It would be humbug and hypocrisy tosuggest that all top military leaders should liveblameless lives. Even MacArthur, while beingmoralistic and apparently religious, kept ayoung Eurasian mistress when he was Chief ofStaff of the US Army and secretly acceptedUS$500,000 as “recompense and reward” fromthe Filipino people during the last days on

Corregidor.16 But Blamey seemed to believethat his private conduct would have no impacton the effectiveness of his command; as onewriter put it: “The cynical may say thatBlamey’s heaviest handicap was not his privatelife, but the fact that it fell so far short of beingprivate”.17

For all that, Blamey created andcommanded an army that fought with skill andbravery in a score of campaigns. Many soldiersmight not have liked him, but they followedOld Tom’s orders, confident of the outcome. AsJo Gullett, a distinguished junior officer of wideexperience, put it, “It was Blamey’s gift that hewas able to provide the Australian citizensoldier with the leadership, training anddiscipline to see this bitter task through to theend. It was his nature too that, devoted as hewas to the soldier, he was never a loved or evenvery popular figure ... But he was trusted andobeyed”.18 Blamey’s importance rests on twopillars - a very long period of service in crucialappointments, and high command when, forthe only time, Australia was under direct threat.

Blamey lived in the era of greatcommanders and great wars. He was acontemporary of MacArthur, Eisenhower,Nimitz, Patton, Montgomery, Slim, Wavell andAlanbrooke. It was a time of revolutionarychange in warfare. Born in the horse era,Blamey’s military career covered theintroduction of indirect artillery fire, motorvehicles, tanks, planes, telephones, radios,chemical warfare, signals intelligence, radar,submarines, aircraft carriers and finally nuclearweapons. He was born when New South Waleswas a British colony and was old enough to beaware of Federation in 1901; when he diedAustralian independence was unchallengedand all three Australian Services had proudheritages of their own.

That era has now passed. It is unlikely thatAustralia will again have a commander ofBlamey’s stature and influence. He was one ofthe major figures in establishing Australia’s first50 years as an independent nation. The


Australia that we know today was shapedlargely by the experiences of the Second WorldWar. Post-war policy-makers were concernedto establish an independent capacity to makeassessments about international affairs, to seeksecurity within a wider framework of allianceswhile retaining an independent defencecapability, and to build up a larger populationand industrial base. They knew that it wasnecessary to have an army that could bedeployed overseas at short notice to meet theGovernment’s political and strategic aims. TheAustralian Army that evolved in the 1950s and1960s and which led to the present-day Armywas shaped by these influences and played itsrole in them. These were issues that concernedBlamey and which guided his conduct in theSecond World War. They have also continuedto concern policy-makers through to this day.In this respect, Blamey’s legacy has persistedwell past his death half a century ago.

NOTES1. During the Second World War 735,781

Australians served in the Army from apopulation of about seven million. Official YearBook of the Commonwealth of Australia, No37, 1946 and 1947, CommonwealthGovernment Printer, Canberra, 1949, p. 1150.

2. “The British Empire and the Pacific Problem”,Australian War Memorial (AWM), 3DRL6643,item 5/33.

3. Blamey to James Blamey, 3 January 1914,AWM, PR85/355, item 2.

4. Report on the Operations of First AustralianDivision at Pozieres, AWM, War Diary, HQ 1stAustralian Division.

5. C. E. W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force inFrance, 1916, Angus & Robertson, Sydney,1934, p. 532.

6. Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 6February 1920, AWM 1, item 20/7.

7. Blamey to Acting Minister for Defence, 4January 1945, AWM 54, item 721/12/39.

8. Blamey to White, 31 May 1923, AWM 113,item 1/21.

9. Blamey to Chauvel, 22 August 1923, AWM113, item 1/21.

10. Chauvel to Blamey, 31 August 1923, AWM113, item 1/21.

11. Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notesof Meeting, 22 October 1923, Public RecordOffice, CAB 32/9.

12. Street to Prime Minister, 29 June 1939,National Archives of Australia (NAA), CRSA1608/1, item C15/1/10; Shedden to Secretary,Department of Defence, 21 November 1934,NAA, CRS B197, item 1851/2/260.

13. Summary of Proceedings of Council of DefenceMeeting – 24th August 1936, NAA, CRSA5954, item 762/3.

14. Peter Hastings, “Blamey Without Warts”,Overland, No. 60, 1975.

15. R. J. O’Neill, Review of Hetherington, Blamey,in Canberra Historical Journal, March 1976.

16. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die: the lifeof Douglas MacArthur, Random House, NewYork, 1996, pp. 147-8, 167-170, 271.

17. Quoted in Bernard Campbell, “You either likedhim or hated him”, West Australian, 27 April1974, p. 27.

18. H. B. Gullett, Review of Hetherington, Blamey,in Sydney Morning Herald, 20 April 1974.

David Horner is professor of Australian defence history, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian NationalUniversity. He is the author of Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998.

53

No man reaches the rank of field marshal,as Sir Thomas Blamey did, without

displaying leadership qualities. While thisaddress is not specifically about Blamey’sleadership – although I have some commentson it – I am sure that, of all subjects, he wouldhave approved my concentrating on militaryleadership. Military leadership is at the heart ofmilitary service and in his career Blameyepitomised military service. My talk is aboutmilitary leadership not as an abstract thesis butas a result of practical observations from over40 years of service. I have held appointmentsat most of the command levels the size of ourServices permit, and have also observed othersat levels of command from unit to army.

My opinions of some senior commandersare, like most people’s, based on what I havebeen told or have read. I had only limitedpersonal contact with men like Blamey andnone with others such as MacArthur. Hencemy comments are qualified. Very few peopleare privy to the pressures imposed on seniorcommanders in war, and it should berecognised that commentators and historiansare usually only partly informed. Further,hindsight is usually the clearest sight, but evenif the facts are later fully known and correct,commanders must be judged on what at thetime they believed to be the facts, not on whathistory later shows to have been the facts.

I have had experience as a platooncommander and acting company commanderin peace. Later, as an adjutant, brigade major,battalion commander and divisional chief ofoperations, I have closely observed the extrademands imposed on commanders in war.During my service, I commanded the 28thCommonwealth Brigade in Malaya. This was a

semi-war type of command. We were chasingthe remaining Communist terrorists in Malaya,and at the same time preparing for our SEATOrole in Laos. I held other senior appointments,but without doubt the most exciting andenjoyable appointments were commanding3RAR in Korea, with the command of theCommonwealth Brigade running a closesecond.

Qualities of LeadershipMost courses on military leadership

deal with about 11 desirable leadershipqualities: motivation, courage, decisiveness,responsibility, initiative, integrity, judgement,knowledge, loyalty, selflessness and ability tocommunicate. But there is an infinite variety ofinterpretation and emphasis that can be placedon each of these qualities. The challenge for amilitary leader is that he has not only topossess these qualities himself, but also to instilthem in others.

I want to comment very briefly on just fourqualities because I believe they have a specialapplication to the Australian soldier, and makehim the outstanding soldier that he can be.Well-trained and well-led Australian soldiers,with the New Zealanders and the Germans,were, in past conflicts, the best soldiers inthe world. The qualities are: courage,commonsense, initiative and mateship.

Courage is usually held to be the mostimportant leadership quality, on the premisethat without it other soldierly virtues do notreally matter. There is no place for a cowardlyleader in any army. Further, Australian troopsexpect to be led from the front. As FieldMarshal Slim once said, it is not a case of “goon“ but “come on“. I have always thought thatphysical courage is much to the fore in the

Military LeadershipBy General Sir Francis Hassett, AC, KBE, CB, DSO, LVO

Address to the Royal United Services Institution of New South Wales, 22 April 1993.


Australian soldier. I have seen much bravery,but little cowardice. If an Australian soldierknows what he has to do and why, then hewill do it. He respects courage as soldiers dothe world over.

The biggest problems arise when troops arevery tired, exhausted by the strain, noise andsights of battle. Inertia and lethargy set in,even though all are aware that inaction couldbe highly dangerous. That is when a goodleader is effective, not by oratory or histrionics,but by quiet reasoning and example. Oneshould not forget as a commander that toomuch battle stress for too long will rendersoldiers incapable of efficient performance.That is why troops must be rested or relievedperiodically. The signs are there when goodofficers and men begin to do the wrong thing,or fail to react effectively. Sometimes troopshave to be driven beyond this point, but thecommander must realise that there is a price topay.

One can condense a lot of leadershipqualities under the heading of commonsense –judgement, responsibility, intelligence,knowledge. There is not much to say about thisbasic and well known quality, except toemphasise that most Australian soldiers I haveknown were down to earth, sensible, men andpossessed commonsense to a large degree.

Initiative is an area where the Australiansoldier scores heavily, and it helps lift him tothe top of the worldwide soldiering tree. Howmany armies of the world would you ratehighly, but put down the list because of aknown lack of initiative? The Japanese soldierfor example, no matter how much we dislikedhim, was well trained, brave, hardy andprepared to die, but less effective because oflack of initiative or restraints imposed at thevarious levels of command. The Australiansoldier has in all our wars been highly rated forhis initiative – and rightly so.

The fourth quality is mateship. TheAustralian soldier fights better because he ispart of a team of mates, a team he knows will

not let him down, a team which will come tohelp him, whenever it is practicable, when he isin trouble. He gains strength from them andthey from him.

Command at the Various LevelsIn dealing with command at the various

levels, I shall be talking about infantry,because most of my regimental experience hasbeen with infantry, but any points I make haverelevance to leaders in any arm of any of theServices.

Platoon Commander

It is very important for a young officer notto miss this experience. It is surprisingly easyto do this. In peacetime, officers are usually notlong in lieutenant rank, currently it is fouryears, and in war often an even shorter time.There are other jobs in lieutenant rank, some ofthem very attractive. Once a captain, theopportunity for platoon commanderexperience has gone for good. Service as aplatoon commander is part of learning one’strade or profession. A senior officer withoutthis type of experience is a bit like a masterbuilder inexperienced in any of the skills suchas bricklaying, or plumbing, or carpentry. Somy advice to young officers is to try to gainthis experience, even though some other jobmay seem more attractive at the time.

Senior commanders need more than purelymilitary skills. Those who aspire to seniorcommand must be well educated in order tohold their place with leaders in other fields.The Defence Academy is now a well-accepteddegree granting body. It must never beforgotten, however, that the purpose of aDefence Force is to fight, to defeat an enemy inwars that are becoming increasingly technicaland complex. The Academy’s role is to produceyoung Service leaders, not an army ofacademics. It is well aware of this.

There were some good soldiers on the RMCStaff in my cadet days including LieutenantGeneral Sir Horace Robertson, then alieutenant colonel and the senior military

MILITARY LEADERSHIP 55

instructor. But as far as we were concerned inthe very early days of the first year at RMC,the dominating power was WO1 “Dusty”Mortimer, ex-British Army. He took us fordrill, which took up most of our time when wewere not doing physical training. As a young,half-developed 16-year-old I found all this atouch strenuous. The first remark ever directedat me from the RSM was when he bellowed“Staff Cadet ‘Assett, your rifle seems too ‘eavyfor you”.

On graduation, I spent a year in Darwinwith the Darwin Mobile Force (DFM) – the bestsmall force I have ever seen. Following theDepression years a lot of young men werejobless or in dead-end jobs, and some of themore adventurous opted for service in theDMF. There were some 3000 applicants forthe 250-strong force, hence the degreeof selectivity was very high. During the warabout half of the DMF other ranks werecommissioned and the other half were WOs orsenior NCOs. From those commissioned, onebecame a brigadier, one a colonel and therewere several lieutenant colonels.

Among the many things I learned with theDMF was that it is important for young officersto appreciate that Australian soldiers are notrobots or automatons. Most are thinking andcreative people with much commonsense andinitiative. I have always respected Australiansoldiers and the views they hold. This does notmean management by consensus. Battle, forexample, frequently requires instant and totalobedience. The platoon commander mustcommand and, using a somewhat hackneyedphrase, must be seen by the soldiers to be incommand.

When we are young leaders I think we allwonder just how we will perform if we have tolead troops in battle. Most of us fear pain,death or mutilation. We know that it can behard to be brave in the dark, or when no onecan see, that it is hard to go that extra yard,hard to screw up one’s courage yet again. Allthis is true, but the spark has to come from

someone and that someone is usually theleader.

I think most young leaders can bereasonably confident about their own likelyperformance. To begin with, the troops will belooking to them, expecting them to do theright thing. This is a great incentive. We gaincourage from each other. That is why the team,the unit, can be very strong. I think youngleaders find that when in action they have tothink quickly about what has to be done, andthen have to see that it is done. The mind takesover as the leader concentrates on the task inhand, and he can dissociate himself fromwhatever unpleasantness is happening aroundhim. Concern, shock and perhaps grief comelater.

Company Commander

Company commander is about the highestlevel of close direct personal contact withsoldiers. It is a big job for a young manresponsible at times for the lives of a largegroup of soldiers. It is a very enjoyable andresponsible job, worth striving for. Thecompany commander has to care for some 120soldiers, usually a mix of the good, averageand indifferent, each soldier an individual inhis own right, who should be treated as such.The company commander should aim to knowmost of his soldiers by name, and something oftheir background. Some will have had a poorearly life and few opportunities. By patienceand guidance a company commander, orindeed any commander, can help shape theirfuture.

In war it is an exacting job. Not only is acompany commander responsible for directinghis company, but he is usually dangerouslyinvolved personally. His battalion commanderfrequently depends on him for objective,reasoned judgements, which may have to bemade in stressful, hazardous circumstances. Abattalion commander might have to carry oneor two weak officers somewhere but never, inmy view, as a rifle company commander. If I


had to nominate the five key appointments ina battalion in action, I would say the CO andthe four rifle company commanders.

I once talked to Field Marshal Cassels aboutthis when he was commanding theCommonwealth Division in Korea. We have allheard that if you want to get a quick view ofthe quality of a unit, go first to the Sergeants’Mess and gauge the standard there. Casselstook the line that if he wanted to assess thequality of a unit, brigade, or division, helooked at the standard of the companycommanders. As a divisional commander inaction, he considered he could reach down andsort out the battalion commanders, if it werenecessary, but the 40-odd companycommanders were really beyond his reach andhe had to get them right in the periods out ofaction.

Battalion Commander

Command of a battalion in action isgenerally regarded as a pinnacle of Armyleadership. I remember that Major General“Jacky” Stevens used to say that if an officercould command a battalion well in action thenhe could command anything. A battalioncommander should know well his officers andsenior NCOs. He is closely involved in action,and can have an immediate and direct effecton the lives and actions of over 800 men.There is no other command appointment, orindeed any other appointment, quite sorewarding.

I was fortunate to have commanded 3RARin the Korean War. This war was unusual inthat it involved almost constant contact,something like World War I as opposed toWorld War II. It is the last time Australiansfought a conventional war as part of a brigade,a division and a corps, with all that thatimplies in terms of large-scale operations, withsupporting arms also on a large scale. At thattime 3RAR was part of 28th CommonwealthBrigade, which in turn was part of 1stCommonwealth Division and the US I Corps. It

was a very fine battalion – a mix ofexperienced “K” Force volunteers, those whovolunteered for a year’s service in Korea, manyof whom had experience in World War II, andenthusiastic young regulars. The young learnedfrom the old hands, who set a fine fightingexample.

There was much movement and fighting inthe first year of the war, including Kapyongand Maryang San, which are pretty wellknown, and then two and a half years of static,trench warfare, not so well known. This littleknown phase of the static war was no picnic –constant shelling, frequent patrol clashes andraids, living in foxholes, and fierce fighting onthe Hook on the very eve of the armistice.

My predecessor, Bruce Ferguson, in TheBattle of Kapyong said: “With no one to turn tofor advice in whatever situation I might findmyself, it was the loneliest command everallotted to any Australian battalioncommander on foreign soil”. He was right, andI found myself in the same situation. It isdangerous to send, as Australia did, a singlecombat unit to a major war without any sort ofnational command back-up, particularly if it isa fast moving and intense war, as in Korea in1950-1951.

A battalion commander has his hands fullcommanding his battalion in action, and haslittle time to devote to national problems inpersonnel and equipment or, even moreimportantly, to ensure that his battalion isbeing sensibly tasked. A more senior man isrequired in country. At Kapyong, for example,only the steadfastness of the battalion got itout of an extremely dangerous situation, whenoverall coordination of the battle was lacking.US tactics are different to ours. Britishcommanders still look on Australians as great“shock troops” and are not averse to usingthem as such.

Very little can match the feeling ofcommanding a good battalion in action. Thismust seem a very strange statement – thatmatters such as death, mutilation, stress, fear,


fatigue, hunger, thirst, grief, the whole gamutof physical and mental hardship – could evenremotely be thought as a wonderful, not to bemissed experience, some sort of game playedfor high stakes. It is as hard to understand, Isuppose, as is, at a much lesser level, say rockclimbing, caving, or diving amongst sharks.But we go to war primarily to defend ourcountry. Once committed, it becomes a case ofkill or be killed, and certain things happenwhich a soldier remembers with pride, either inhis own actions or the performance of others.

Some of us put together a monograph, TheBattle of Maryang San, describing a battalionbattle in the Korean War. It is well known thatAustralian soldiers talk little about theirexperiences and innermost feelings in battle,except amongst themselves when relaxed atreunions and such. On this occasion they wrotefreely. The following give a small indication ofwhat infantry fighting is like, but even morethey bring out the initiative and leadershipshown at the junior levels – the sections andthe platoons:

The fighting (it was a six day battle) was asequence of stories of ordinary soldierspushing on hard, plugging gaps, rescuingtheir mates, ignoring wounds to stay in thefight.We attack the eastern face of the objective –the steepest slope. The enemy reactsviolently with mortar fire – the reservesection is badly hit. I pass Alby Hart,wounded and holding on to a tree forsupport. The CSM, steady, urging us on – amortar round sits me on my backside – Icheck the radio, it has a hole in it but it stillworks. The enemy cracks, he has had morethan enough.I was proud of my Vickers section for whatthey achieved. They never complained, theycarried some enormous loads and did theirbest to assist whoever they supported. Wewere shelled from start to finish and at onestage the Chinese were coming straight atour weapon pits. They were Australians

and they fought and died for what theybelieved was right.As one leader went down another straightaway took his place. Had leadershipfaltered, had there been hesitation at anystage by individuals, then the attacks wouldhave failed.In all that heavy fighting against counter-attacks, the troops remained steady andaggressive. In isolated cases whereindividuals felt they could not sustain theeffort any longer, they were strengthened bythe courage and determination of theirmates. The wounded were an inspiration.We had survived and believed we had givenour best. We were tired but very proud. Oursoldiers were tenacious, they showed greatinitiative and courage, and individualsacted spontaneously for the common goodwhenever a problem arose. For many of uswho were young at the time, we dated ourmaturity from this battle.Most of all I remember the qualities of thesoldiers. Never once did they falter or queryany orders or instructions given them. Theyhad faith in their leaders, their mates andin themselves.I shall never forget the look on the faces ofthe men as they stood over their fallenmates.It is this sort of atmosphere and teamwork

that builds fine battalions. Robert E. Lee, thatgreat Confederate leader who embodied all thesoldierly qualities I am attempting to describe,said, “It is well that war is so terrible – wewould grow too fond of it.”

Brigade Commander

Command of a brigade is also a marvellousjob. I believe it is perhaps one of the easiercommand appointments. By the time he is abrigadier, the commander has usually masteredthe purely military aspects of his profession –if he can command a battalion, for example,then he can command a brigade – but he is notyet heavily involved in the civilian/-


governmental/political arena. From this pointon, however, he becomes increasingly involvedin such issues.

I had two halcyon years as Commander ofthe 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Malaya inthe early 1960s. The brigade’s role was to cleanout the remaining Communist terrorists inMalaya, mostly holed up with the aborigines inthe Betong salient south of the Thai border. Wealso had a SEATO role in Laos, to fly in andhold the airfield at Seno, just across theMekong River from Savannaket in Thailand,against any North Vietnamese or Chineseincursion.

During my first year in command, it was avery large brigade group, about 5000 strongincluding the Ghurkha battalions and theirlarge training depot. The British, New Zealandand Australian battalions were deployed atMalacca, Taiping and Ipoh. In my second yearwe were concentrated at Terandak, and becamea normal type of brigade group of British, NewZealand and Australian troops.

It was a large and interesting area ofcommand, with the battalions sufficientlydeployed not to get in one another’s way,particularly in off duty time. There was anelement of danger to keep soldiers on their toeswhen engaged in jungle operations, withoutthe heavy casualties which often accompanyconventional army clashes. The Emergency,however, was clearly winding down and I wasseeking another form of activity to keep thebrigade busy.

I had become absorbed in the nature ofFrench operations in Indo-China. I wanted toknow more about how to organise, equip andtrain a force to conduct this type of warfare.The fact that our SEATO role could involve usin such a war was a big incentive and gave avaluable focus to our training with its manyworthwhile implications. This was in 1960. NoWestern power, including Australia, had giventhis type of warfare much serious thought. InAustralia we were on the Pentropic battalionorganisation – a big unit, lots of road bound

transport and a big logistic tail. In 1964, thenDCGS, I helped persuade the CGS that thePentropic organisation had to go.

During the two years I was commanding28th Brigade, we developed an organisationand tactics suitable for our SEATO role, butnever really to my satisfaction. It was easy toassess the Vietminh tactics and work out whatto avoid, but what to do was harder. Oneimportant tactical requirement was that we hadto have cross-country mobility, to avoid roadsand tracks, because of danger of ambush,which had cost the French dearly. Thisimposed a need for the equipment to do this,and in 1960 it was hard to envisage a scale ofequipment, mostly helicopters and air, thatwould enable us to operate this way.

As an Australian commanding aCommonwealth brigade, and initially beingunder command of GHO in Singapore, I hadmore freedom of action than a brigadecommander as part of a division normallywould. Hence I was not under any tightstrictures as to the type of training the brigadeshould be carrying out, nor were its trainingactivities closely monitored. I pushed thebrigade hard in my two years of command.Just how hard I did not really appreciate until,years later, I read the draft official history ofthe brigade in my time, and saw that, thoughthe British units liked their time in Malaya,they were pleased to get back to the BritishArmy of the Rhine to have a bit of rest!

There was not much else that was new inthe leadership field. My predecessor, laterGeneral Sir John Mogg, set me a goodexample, as indeed had Field Marshal Casselsin earlier years, and that was to be careful tobe even-handed with the units and sub-units,particularly in a multi-national force. In mycase my task was not to be seen to be in anyway partial towards the Australians – in fact,to be harder on them. This approach was prettymuch standard. The New Zealand battalionknew, for example, that when the brigade hada new NZ commander, they were in for a hard


time compared to the Australian and Britishunits.

Leadership at Senior LevelThe qualities of leadership at junior level

carry over into leadership at senior level. Thereis however a change of emphasis in somequalities, and others come into play. Physicalcourage is still a factor, but moral couragecould be a more frequent requirement. I willtalk mainly about higher command in theSouth West Pacific Area (SWPA) in World WarII, as this is best known to most, and Vietnamwas a special sort of war. Although large forceswere engaged in Vietnam operations, theywere dispersed and the demands on seniorcommanders were different to those imposedon say, Wavell in Libya, or Morshead atAlamein.

MacArthur

Our senior land commander during WorldWar II was General Douglas MacArthur, heldby many to be a supreme commander ofexcellence, a master strategist, and for his workin occupied Japan, an outstanding diplomatand statesman. But there were critics ofMacArthur. Even his supporters recognisedthat MacArthur was a thespian – an actor.When Eisenhower was asked if he knewMacArthur he replied, “Yes, I studied dramaunder him for some years in the Philippines.”MacArthur was said not to have a staff but acourt where he was a giant amongst thepygmies. The harshest criticism that I haveread about MacArthur was when it was saidthat he was a false giant among real pygmies.Having said that, one must recognise his greatcharisma and his at times spellbinding oratory.

My personal view is that Australia was insome ways unlucky to have a man likeMacArthur as our principal adviser toGovernment during the island battles from1942 onwards. And it was a pity that ourGovernment, properly concerned butunfamiliar with things military, should havegiven him so much autonomy in matters of

national interest and relied on him so much.Blamey could see, even if Curtin did not, thatMacArthur was clearly less concerned aboutAustralia’s interests than he was aboutAmerica’s and his own. To a point, this isunderstandable.

MacArthur’s ego led to misrepresentationof facts and the seeking of quick victories toenhance his image. He committed the cardinalsin of a senior commander in that he knewnothing of the conditions under which histroops were fighting, for example over theKokoda Track and at Buna, Gona andSanananda. Even worse, he made no attemptto find out – to see for himself. He paralleledthose justly vilified World War I generals whoran the war from the comfort of chateaux safebehind the lines, and committed soldiers tomud, wire and sheets of machine-gun fire.MacArthur’s glory-seeking led to unduepressure on Blamey and others to seek quickvictories in impossible conditions which inturn led to Australian soldiers being unfairlycriticised, which is bad enough, but also tounnecessary casualties, which one can onlycondemn.

In a situation like this senior commanderscan do one of two things. They can makethemselves conversant with the conditions andtasks being set by them or, if they cannot dothat, they must trust their battlefieldcommanders to do their job without undueinterference. MacArthur erred on both counts.He neither made himself aware of theconditions under which his men were fighting,nor did he leave the task to his experiencedand capable forward commanders who did.Many of his orders were rhetorical andunrealistic. He appeared to think that attackscould be made by regiments on a broad front –impossible in that sort of terrain.

It gives me no pleasure to speak ofMacArthur in this fashion. But study ofleadership includes the bad as well as the good.I think it interesting to reflect on the way thecharacter and personality of a senior leader can


shape the nature and conduct of battlesAssume, for example, that Eisenhower, notMacArthur, had come to Australia as C-in-CSWPA. Accept that Eisenhower was not only avery good general, but also a very good man.That he commanded his Allied Headquartersfor “Overlord” efficiently and harmoniously.That he appeared to subscribe to the sentimentthat there is no limit to the amount of goodone can do if one does not care who gets thecredit.

Several things could have happened.Eisenhower would have set up an integratedheadquarters of Americans and Australians.This is what Roosevelt and Marshall wantedbut MacArthur ignored, as was his wont if hedid not agree. There would also have beenAmericans on Blamey’s headquarters – onceagain resisted by MacArthur, but favoured byCurtin and Blamey. There would have been in-creased efficiency and less friction and distrustin the upper echelons of power. Eisenhower,with Blamey, would have made it clear toCurtin and the Government that the C-in-CAMF, Blamey, was not the battlefieldcommander – that Rowell was a goodcommander and had things under control inPNG. Blamey would not have been sent toNew Guinea to take charge of the operationsthere. Rowell would not have been sacked.

There would have been no unfair criticismof the fighting qualities of Australian soldiers.Pressures for hasty victories would not havehappened in the way they did. There wouldhave been fewer casualties. The Australiansfighting in the islands would have had good,well-deserved publicity. MacArthur controlledthe communiqués and, for a long time, therewas no mention of the Australians.Eisenhower, a man generous of spirit, wouldhave acceded to Curtin’s fervent wish for aworthwhile role for the Australians in theadvance by the Americans through thePhilippines. Those great fighting divisions, the6th, 7th and 9th, would have had a role moreappropriate to their skills as opposed to the

“backyard war” roles at Aitape, Wewak andBorneo.

All these things could have happened –perhaps not quite as I have said. I have simplysketched in this scenario to illustrate how thepersonality of a senior commander can shapethe way wars are conducted and battle fought.

Australian CommandersThere are a number of good Australian

commanders who are useful role models forstudy. As in history it is more appropriate todiscuss those who are no longer with us. Iwould first make the point that there is aninclination to think that our wars ended in1945. But for the Regular Army they did not.In fact, from 1950 onwards our Army was atwar of some kind for almost 20 years in Korea,Malaya/Borneo and then Vietnam. This periodproduced a number of extremely goodcommanders, and a high standard exists in theArmy today.

Morshead

I have always admired Sir LeslieMorshead’s approach to soldiering. He knewsoldiers, how they thought and felt, and did allin his power to ensure that they were welltrained and equipped, and fighting to a soundplan. He protected his 9th Division from someunsound British tactics and efforts to break itup into small packets for use under Britishcommanders. He was an aggressivecommander who constantly worked to bringthe enemy to battle. He set his men difficulttasks and drove them hard, acceptingcasualties as an inevitable part of war. Histroops admired and respected him. He had acapacity for making points in simple languagesoldiers would heed.

Vasey

George Vasey is a good role model as acommander of Australian troops. He had agreat touch with them. Without losing any oftheir respect, he could put himself at their level,talk to them, and demonstrate that he was


much concerned with their safety and well-being. With all, he was a good tactician and ahard driving commander constantly seeking,like Morshead, to bring the enemy to battle. Acolourful personality, he always wore his redcap when up front, not to grandstand butsimply because he wanted his soldiers to knowhe was there. His language was colourful also– “Bloody George” as he was known. Yet thiswas not one whit offensive, even to thechaplains. It is hard to take exception toanyone who habitually answered the phone bysaying “its bloody old George here.”

All this sounds much like an uninhibitedextrovert, but he was not. He was an intensiveand sensitive man. As commander in Crete, hefaced and handled well a desperate situation.The 7th Division, shocked at the removal ofGeneral Allen during the early phase of theKokoda Track fighting, soon realised they hada good replacement commander in Vasey.He also performed very well inthe difficult situation facing him atBuna/Gona/Sanananda, and again at Nadzaband the Ramu Valley. He had an Australianstyle of heroic leadership which wasoutstandingly successful. His death in a planeaccident in March 1945 caused much sadness.

Blamey

Those Australians who aspire to seniorcommand in future years should focus on Field

Marshal Blamey’s leadership in World War II.Blamey was held to be a controversial soldier,lauded by some, held to be flawed in somequalities by others. The problems he facedcould very well be the ones our future militaryleaders will face. Blamey was involved in theraising, training and operations of a largearmy, some of it prepared to defend Australia,some of it overseas.

He had to work in the shadow anddominance of a brilliant, charismatic butsometimes biased Allied leader, GeneralMacArthur. He had to cope with the ambitionsof some subordinates, a government unversedin things military and the ever-criticalAustralian public. It is this sort of task that willconfront our future military leaders. It is a taskmore complex than that faced by our otherfamous general, Monash, who commanded acorps of five divisions, as part of a group ofAllied armies on a single front. A monumentaltask indeed, and brilliantly executed, butstraightforward in relative terms.

The leadership qualities which Blameydisplayed, or is sometimes accused of failing todisplay, are a good indicator of the attributesrequired of senior military leaders in any futurewar. I will mention some of them, but this isnot an exhaustive list.

General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied land forces in the South West Pacific meets warcorrespondents during a visit to the far north of Australia. AWM Neg 012416


Physical and Mental Robustness

Field Marshal Wavell placed physical andmental robustness as the first of many qualitiesrequired of a general. Certainly the stress ofleadership in war can be very great, and wehave many examples through history ofleaders being worn down to the point of errorin decision making or even collapse. Mostgreat military leaders were either naturallyrugged or developed some approach ortechnique that enabled them to go on longerthan most, or recover more quickly, iftemporarily down. Whatever the approach, it isimportant for a senior commander to get fitand stay fit.

Blamey had great stamina. He was underenormous pressure for almost six years of war,and particularly so during the last year or two.At that stage he was facing a somewhat hostileGovernment under Prime Minister Chifley, wasbeing pushed to one side by MacArthur, andthere were rumblings in the militia formationsabout the value of the island campaigns. Heremained a dominant force, though perhaps hewas, at some 60 years of age, beginning to tire.I believe the consensus was that had the warnot ended in August 1945, he would have soonretired, with Morshead assuming command.

Presence

The quality of presence is loosely defined –not good looks, though appearance plays apart – a combination of manner and manners,an air of authority, of command. Most seniorcommanders in war had it, or developed it.MacArthur had presence – tall, lean,handsome, well turned out, intelligent,articulate, well mannered and so forth. It issaid of another American, General Marshall,that when he entered a room, all went quiet.Field Marshal Slim was always an imposingfigure, a quiet yet forceful man of obviouscharacter, he had the bearing of a leader.General Vasey had great presence and awonderful touch with soldiers. There are, of

course, many other examples, and there arealso exceptions to any general rule.

Short and thickset, Blamey made hispresence felt when you got within range, so tospeak. I had to face him once, when he wasdispleased with me. I haven’t forgotten it, 50years later. Prime Minister Menzies said of him,“None matched him in power of command[presence in this context], a quality hard todefine but impossible to mistake when youmeet it.” He did radiate power, to a degree Ihave seen in few men. One could feel it. Ofcourse, he was the C-in-C, and known to beruthless when it was required, but it was morethan that. In any group of Australian MilitaryForces (AMF) officers, he was unmistakably theleader.

Public Relations

It is a senior commander’s responsibility, apart of his leadership, to ensure that hissoldiers get proper recognition for the job theyare doing, by the use of the media, visits ofdignitaries and so forth. Soldiers doing adangerous job should not be forgotten. Therewas a particularly bad instance of thishappening towards the end of World War II,when MacArthur was controlling the officialcommuniqués. Blamey did not seem to acceptthe importance of public relations, nor did heappear to wish to protect or enhance his ownimage. This was a pity. No one in high officecan ignore public opinion. In Blamey’s case itseemed to me that, on some points of criticism,he had reasonable answers but often did notcare or bother to explain.

Professional Competence

Into this quality we can compress all theleadership qualities. It is comprehensive –rather like the military offence “Conduct to theprejudice”. There is little doubt about Blamey’sprofessional competence. Here is a descriptionof him by one of his admirers, it is an excerptfrom John Hetherington’s book:


A great military brain ... such an intellect isa complex, brilliant force ... it works on avast scale; it has an unerring sense of theright man, an indispensable quality todelegate authority utterly, an infinitecapacity for calm, for making instantaneousdecisions, no sense of regret for mistakesmade, a surgical ruthlessness in dealingwith inefficiency or disobedience orstupidity, recognition of the ultimate goodand an entirely unshakeable, unalterablepurpose of getting there.Whether that is an absolute description of

Blamey is, perhaps, arguable. It is, however, auseful description of some of the rare andbrilliant qualities required of a seniorcommander in time of war.

From what I know of the circumstancesleading to Blamey’s appointment to commandin 1939, he was easily the best soldier offering– selected by Menzies, and backed by mensuch as Street, Casey, Gullet, Brudenell Whiteand Shedden. He was a brilliant man, and hada brilliant record from World War I asMonash’s chief of staff. He was worldly, usedto dealing with the British, and strong enoughto stand up to them. Importantly, heunderstood government and how to work withit.

It is said of Blamey that he was sometimesreckless in his personal behaviour and carelessabout his reputation. One would like all ourleaders to be men of total probity. But historyshows that this is not always the case. Manyoutstanding men had some foibles – Churchillwith his whisky, Menzies with his so-called

intolerance and aloofness, Wellington with his“publish and be damned” approach,Montgomery with his conceit, MacArthur withhis thespian antics, Napoleon with his almosteverything.

But in the final analysis, what is required?The answer is a strong, competent leader.Minor frailties are perhaps not all thatimportant. Lincoln asked the question when itwas said that Ulysses Grant drank too much:“What brand of whisky – I’ll send some to theother generals”. Prime Minister Curtin said“The Government wants a military leader, nota Sunday School teacher.”

Blamey has been dubbed a controversialsoldier. I think this a wrong label. Acontroversial man certainly, but his militarycompetence has never been seriouslychallenged. Blamey raised the AustralianImperial Force, trained it and commanded itand the AMF in various theatres in difficultsituations. He was a brilliant, toughcommander. Not so much at ease as a fieldgeneral, who must be young, fit and able tomove freely about the battlefield, butoutstanding in the complex military politicalsphere of high command. Calwell said of himin this role: “The next man to Blamey is like acurate to a bishop”.

Blamey was unmistakably and indisputablythe AMF’s commander. Every soldier knew it.To do this for almost six long years was amagnificent performance. He was Australia’sgreatest general. He deserved his fieldmarshal’s baton.

General Hassett was Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, from 1975 to 1976 and Chief of the Defence Forces Stafffrom 1976 to 1977. This paper was prepared as part of a presentation which included a question and discussionperiod. The paper is not therefore, in itself, complete nor has it been updated with more recent writings. It remains,however, as suitable background to the points General Hassett wished to make. At the time of the presentation therehad been much talk about the need for higher education of officers and the organisation for command at senior levels.It was thought timely to comment on the most testing areas of leadership at the regimental level – command in battle.

Officer Cadet Craig Johnston receives the "Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey Staff Prize" from Lieutenant General(later General Sir Phillip) P.H. Bennett, AO DSO at the Officer Cadet School Portsea Graduation Parade, June 1982.

Photograph by kind permission of LTCOL C. Johnston

65

On 18 November 1982 I had the honour ofbeing present at the unveiling of two

commemorative plaques in the forecourt areaof the Russell Defence complex in Canberra.They serve to designate that area as the “SirThomas Blamey Square”1, and are intended tohonour the only Australian ever to be awardeda field marshal’s baton, the man we honourhere today.

There are, of course, other places and otherways in which Field Marshal Sir ThomasBlamey’s memory is commemorated – thestatue near the entrance to Government Housein Melbourne is probably the best known.Blamey Crescent and Blamey Place in theCanberra suburb of Campbell are two othersthat readily spring to mind.

But it is another living form ofcommemoration which is of particular interestto me – the system of Blamey Awards that aremade annually to graduates of Army trainingorganisations. They are presented to the topfour graduating cadets from the Royal MilitaryCollege of Australia, Duntroon, and the OfficerCadet School, Portsea, for outstandingperformance, as well as to the two ArmyReserve majors who excel in their courses forpromotion to lieutenant colonel. The BlameyFund specifically devotes its limited resourcesto setting up these awards in the area ofmilitary training because training is an inherentfunction of command. It is also particularlyappropriate that Blamey, the “commander”,should be remembered in this way.

In 1983, the Army, as in Blamey’s time,recognises that its main role in peace is toprepare for the wars we hope will neverhappen. This preparation for war is achievedthrough effective training; because an army

must train to fight and to win. We thereforeowe it to Australia, and particularly to oursoldiers, to provide effective and realistictraining, and to do so within practicaleconomic constraints.

Blamey was no stranger to training. Fromthe time he joined the Army soon afterFederation, until he retired in 1946, the trainingof himself, individuals, units, and even armies,must have shared equal effort for him as infighting campaigns and dealing with all thecomplexities of politics and higher command.As a staff officer in the First AIF, as a militiaofficer and CMF divisional commander in thoseyears of scarcity between the wars, as theVictorian Commissioner of Police, as the GOCFirst Australian Corps of the Second AIF, andthen finally as Commander-in-Chief from 1942,Blamey appreciated the value of realistic,effective training. He also recognised thedifficulties in achieving it.

Blamey was also no stranger to the use oftechnology. His support of advanced militarytechnology of the day in the planning for theBattle of Hamel in July 1918, which involvedthe use of combined arms and aircraft, is nowdescribed in British and Australian militaryhistory as the “first modern battle”. Theresounding success of this battle was largelydue to his grasp of the potential of coordinatedcombat power on the battlefield. He was able topersuade Monash to modify his original plan toincorporate the combined use of infantry,tanks, artillery, air observation and even limitedair raids to achieve all of his objectives asplanned.

Blamey also had a mind open to scientificand technological answers to military problems.His support for the development of the periscope

Blamey and Training for WarBy General Sir Phillip Bennett, AC, KBE, DSO

Address to the United Service Institution of Victoria, Melbourne on 28 July 1983


rifle at Gallipoli; the dropping of supplies toisolated outposts by parachute on the WesternFront; and the measures he took to overcomemalaria, his single greatest problem during theNew Guinea campaign in the Second WorldWar, are all further examples of his vision andlateral thinking. Blamey’s expansive mind wasalso able, in the latter days of the war, tograpple with the training of Australian youth inthe science and technology of the future. Theresult of his interest, along with others, was thesetting up of the Australian National Universityin Canberra in 1946.

The training problems faced by Blamey andhis subordinates in the early stages of WorldWar II have important lessons for us in 1983.This is illustrated by an example from theSecond AIF, in particular the 6th Division.When this formation left Australia for theMiddle East in January 1940, training had notprogressed beyond platoon level. In addition, ofthe initial 20,000 enlistees into the Second AIF,50 per cent had completed little or no fieldtraining, 25 per cent came from the militia, and

most of them at that time would have had onlyan average of 18 days training each year.Arriving in the Middle East in February 1940,the 6th Division finally conducted its firstdivisional exercise in November and then madean impressive debut in action at Bardia inJanuary 1941. Since then, the raising of theRegular Army in 1948 has sensibly avoided thislong training preparation time for any initialAustralian force deployed overseas.

As GOC 1st Australian Corps in the MiddleEast, Blamey’s policy was not to meddle in thetraining being carried out by the formationsunder his command. He regarded training as acommand responsibility, the detailed conductof which should rightly be left to subordinatecommanders. As a contemporary of Blameyonce said, “He believed he was there to giveadvice and to watch an exercise. However, heleft nobody in any doubt of the standard herequired, or of the penalty awaiting anyonewho failed him”.

Let me now dwell for a short time on therelationship between training and technology. I

General Sir Thomas Blamey talking to troops at a Regimental Aid Post on the Masaweng River area,New Guinea, 1944. AWM Neg 016400

BLAMEY AND TRAINING FOR WAR 67

do this by suggesting first some differences andsimilarities between 1983 and the early periodof the Second World War – a period whenAustralian military history is dominated by thefigure of Blamey. These differences andsimilarities assist in understanding why theAustralian Army today must apply technologyto enhance its capabilities and training systems.

Blamey, both a Permanent2 and Militiasoldier, embodied the citizen soldier tradition ofthe Australian Army, a tradition which ismaintained today, with half our manpower inthe form of Reservists. But I can acknowledgeimmediately a major advantage which we nowhave over Blamey’s day. The average annualtraining of a militia soldier on the eve of WorldWar II was 18 days. In 1983, Army Reserviststrained for an average of 38 days, a mostsubstantial and necessary increase.

A further difference between Blamey’sSecond AIF and today’s Army is that, whereasBlamey could call on the services of only 2000permanent soldiers to raise a much largercitizen army, we presently have a RegularArmy of about 32,000. This gives us a coreforce which can not only raise a much largercitizen army, but also provide a sustainable,operational-ready force of about a light brigadeto handle a wide range of low levelcontingencies should that be required.

In comparing our situation now with thatperiod, there are both differences andsimilarities in relation to the uncertainties thatfaced Australia. As in Blamey’s day, we face avariety of threats, some that could arise withlittle or no warning. But today, due to changesin the regional power balance and especially tothe capabilities conferred by technology, thosethreats can materialise far more rapidly. Weneed, therefore, a more capable element of theArmy at a high state of readiness. TheFalklands War, if it did nothing else, also servesto remind us of the need to maintain a highstandard of individual and collective training inour regular component of the Army on whichwe must rely for initial deployments.

Perhaps the most significant difference fromBlamey’s time is the advance in availabletechnology. This has caused the nature ofwarfare to change dramatically and this changeis likely to continue at an even faster rate.Advances in technology have enabled theproduction of weapons and weapon systemswith increasing lethality and effectiveness.While this can arguably reduce the combatmanpower required, it can be used to makeexisting manpower much more effective – aparticularly relevant factor for Australia, givenour relatively small population base and apotentially large operational area to defend intime of threat and to continually monitor andcontrol in peacetime.

The Australian Army therefore needs toremain abreast of technological developments.We should also aim to be regarded by ourneighbours as the regional leader in the use oftechnology. In that way our Army will be seenas an effective and credible deterrent. On thenegative side of this high technology approachis the fact that such equipment and traininggenerally costs more, takes longer to procure,and requires a more sophisticated training andsupport effort.

This leads me to the important relationshipbetween technology and training I spoke aboutearlier. We need a high technology Army butthis is costly to acquire and maintain. We alsorequire high technology training aids andmethods to simulate the operation of expensiveequipments. The Army must react quickly andeffectively to a relatively low level of threat andbe able to expand rapidly to meet higher levelsof threat. To achieve that we must devise waysof effectively and realistically training largenumbers of people in a far more cost-effectiveway in a limited timeframe.

As Blamey realised in his day, training andtechnology in the Army are inextricably linked.Let me now be more specific on how we canuse technology. We can use it in two ways: toteach and test, and to manage our trainingresources better.


Computer-assisted instruction has much tooffer. It allows the brighter soldier to progress ata rapid pace while the soldier having problemscan receive the undivided attention of theinstructor. It also allows more students to betaught more effectively by fewer instructors.We can use war gaming – again not a newconcept. What is new is that those aspects ofwar games once carried out by large staffs ofcontrollers and usually taking a relatively longtime to make the necessary assessments anddecisions, can now be carried out using welldesigned computer based war gaming programsin a fraction of the time.

Today, the rapidly escalating cost oftraining and training resources is a continuingrestraint. This includes the rising cost oftraining support, particularly ammunition,safety and environmental factors, wear and tearon expensive and complex weapon systemsand their associated maintenance costs. In therealm of teaching, technology can simulate theflight of a bullet, missile or shell from a rifle, alauncher or a gun. It can also simulate aircraftor a tank in a tactical situation, and thecomplete range of mechanical or electronicfailures that maintenance staff need tounderstand to keep equipment operational. It isnow obvious that the proper integration ofsimulation into training will lead to the higherskill standards we need to achieve.

In relation to simulation, which again is notnew, we have come a long way from gunnersin Blamey’s time doing gun drill on logs atPuckapunyal in the First World War, fromAustralian infantry in the Second World Warusing wooden representations of weaponspainted in different colours to identify differentweapon types, and from battalions using lightvehicles to simulate helicopters in preparationfor Vietnam. Let me say, though, that there willalways be a place for such innovative ideaswithin the Australian Army due to ever-presentlimits on available resources.

The second way we can use technology intraining is to manage those resources. Because

of our perennial peacetime budgetary problems,we must maximise every dollar we spend ontraining. Many policy-makers outside Defenceare unaware of the size and complexity of theArmy’s training system. In the 1983 trainingyear, Training Command, with approximately3500 regular staff and 3000 Army reservetraining staff in 33 Army schools, units andtraining groups, conducted over one thousandcourses for 28,000 students. These activities donot include a large program of collectivetraining carried out in units and formationswhich often use common training facilities andstaff. The advent of the microprocessor, now inwidespread use in schools, universities,businesses and even in our homes, allows us tocoordinate and control these resources far moreefficiently, often using fewer people.

But what I find most interesting and ofparticular value to the Army, is what could bedescribed as a by-product of the use oftechnology in training, and that is evaluation.The use of technology in training allows us toevaluate two things. Whether we have taughtthe soldier what we set out to do and whetheror not what we wanted him to learn was itselfrelevant to the anticipated operationalenvironment. Let me explain by giving you twoexamples.

The first concerns the use of safe laserbeams to simulate direct fire weapons, forexample, rifles, and automatic weapons.Current collective tactical training can take theform of two-sided dry or blank firing exercises,or simple one-sided exercises occasionallyincorporating live firing. But none of these canusually represent the real combat environmentand the training value of preparing soldiers forwar can be much improved.

A blank round can be used to initiate thelaser systems I describe. Thus reloading, firecontrol and resupply are practised, and theelement of noise remains. On each soldier orvehicle participating are laser sensitive receiversto disable a weapon if the soldier or vehicle ishit or, by emitting a particular sound, tell the

BLAMEY AND TRAINING FOR WAR 69

soldier and umpire that he is under fire and hadbetter do something about it.

There are disadvantages such as the laser’sinability to penetrate foliage and a lack of mineand artillery simulation, but the potential ofsimulation can only be described asrevolutionary. Individuals and commanders cannow experience a higher level of essentialsurvival skills such as fire and movement,terrain appreciation, use of cover andconcealment, control of fire and integration ofweapon systems at levels of skill onlypreviously achieved in combat situations.

More evolutionary than revolutionary is theapplication of technology to war gaming. Thisis the other important value of technology intraining where the aim is to use war gaming tomake training more realistic for the teachingand testing of commanders and their staffswithout the expensive involvement of unitmanpower and equipment.

These two examples illustrate the feedbacktechnology in training can provide. From fieldexercises using simulators and laser devices, wecan not only assess whether the soldiers wetrain are learning and implementing skillscorrectly such as weapon handling and use ofground, but also whether the way we areteaching them is effective. In war games,commanders learn to appreciate thecomplexities of manoeuvring large forces, andtheir staffs become heavily involved, allwithout units and soldiers taking part. Inaddition, in reviewing the results of these wargames, we can assess whether organisations areproperly structured, equipped and manned.Thus, with technology, not only can we train,we can evaluate our effectiveness.

The nature of war has changed dramaticallysince Blamey’s time but there are a number of

aspects of warfare that remain vital. Regardlessof how much technology is absorbed into theArmy and however sophisticated its commandsystems become, as in Blamey’s day, leadership,physical fitness, an ability to endure stress andbasic soldierly skills will never be replaced. Inthe Army we look on technology as a tool foruse by the trainer as part of a mix of techniquesand not as an end in itself. As well, technologyplanned for introduction into the trainingsystem will take some time to occur and therewill never be enough of it. Because of this,commanders must continue to be innovative tomake up for our present lack of technology andto be prepared to use their initiative to get thebest out of technology as it is introduced.

Looking back on what I have said today,my message confirms Blamey’s understandingthat combat power, training and technology areinextricably related. The Australian Army andour defence infrastructure must embracetechnology in training so that our force-in-being can be ready to fight; so that we canselect the best technology to meet our needs;and, finally, so that we train effectively withina realistic training budget.

I firmly believe that Field Marshal SirThomas Blamey would approve of the plans wehave in train today. Your Army is still in goodshape and we are making progress in manyimportant areas.

NOTES1. Renamed and rededicated as “The Field Marshal

Sir Thomas Blamey Square”, on 25 May 2001.2. Before 1946, when an Interim Army was

established, full-time members of the Armywere enlisted in the Permanent Military Forces.The PMF consisted of The Staff Corps, TheAustralian Instructional Corps, Fortress Artillery,Fortress Engineers, Signals, Medical, Veterinary,Service and Ordnance.

When this address was given General Sir Phillip Bennett was Chief of the General Staff with therank of lieutenant general and in this address describes the situation in the Army at that time. Hewas Chief of the Defence Force from 1984 to 1987.

AWM Neg 090036General Sir Thomas Blamey Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces South West Pacific area, accompanied by

Senior Officers on his way to visit forward troops in South Bougainville.

71

Almost 50 years ago, Sir William McKell,then Governor-General, undertook a

journey from Yarralumla to the “Repat”Hospital at Heidelberg. Accompanied by PrimeMinister Robert Menzies, his task was topresent a rare, indeed an unprecedented,honour to an Australian soldier who lay theregravely ill. That soldier was of course SirThomas Blamey, the man whose name andfame and memory we celebrate today – theman who on that day was to receive the scarletand gold baton of a Field Marshal of theBritish Empire.

Only once before had such rank beenbestowed on a Dominion soldier. Never beforeand never since has an Australian been sohonoured. Nor – since the 1995 UK BettsReport recommended that the rank beabolished – is it likely to occur in the future.

Blamey was unable to stand – so weak thathe had been carried from his bed to a chair andso ill that he was unable to speak more than afew words. It is a pity because the speech hehad prepared, and yet was unable to deliver,expressed feelings and emotions that Blamey’srank and responsibilities had kept hidden formany years. Within his address he hadintended to say: “Our nation’s future is,unfortunately, not yet secured and its sonsmust consent to accept whateverresponsibilities fall on them, and draw strengthfor their discharge from the traditions of theirpredecessors”.

I thank you for the invitation to present the1999 Blamey Oration for it gives me theopportunity to speak on these two exactthemes. First, the traditions or, more broadly,

the values of our Anzac legacy and, second,the likelihood of our sons and daughters usingthem, living them, to shape the Australia of thenew millennium.

At the outset, I must say how incrediblyfortunate I believe we are – as a country, as apeople - to have the Anzac tradition on whichto build our identity. From amid all the grief,the loss and the sacrifice our nation gained, inthe words of Charles Bean, “a possessionforever. In the end”, he said, “ANZAC stoodand still stands for reckless valour in a goodcause, for enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity,comradeship and endurance that will neveradmit defeat”. Prime Minister John Howardsaid of these words of Bean that, “I can’t thinkof a more beautifully evocative description ofwhat I always thought the Australian spirit tobe”.

History could have dealt with us lesskindly. Imagine what might have been if wehad faced the Japanese threat in 1914 ratherthan in 1942. Make no mistake, only rarelydoes history bestow upon a country eventswhich, in one stroke, crystallise its nationalcharacter and provide standards by which itcan measure its future actions. I can think ofonly two other comparable examples – theAmerican War of Independence and the FrenchRevolution.

The United States is still animated by thezeal for democracy, independence and freeenterprise that provoked its secession fromGreat Britain. The War of AmericanIndependence, celebrated on 4 July, galvanisedtheir nation and set a pattern, a standard, forAmerican behaviour and American success

Anzac Values – The Path Travelled and theRoad Ahead

By Major General P.R. Phillips, AO, MC

Address to the Royal United Service Institution of Victoria, 28 October 1999.


evident to this day – “Duty, Honour, Country”says it all for a West Point freshman.

Similarly, France glories still in therevolutionary cry of “Liberte, Fraternite,Egalite”. Now I agree that dealing with Parisiantaxi drivers can somewhat fray the concept offraternity and equality! But, seriously – anyfair assessment of French history since thattime, including her contemporary role inbuilding a united Europe, will determine shehas remained true to those creeds. As Verdunand the ghosts of nearly two millionFrenchmen attest, France was bled white thiscentury in defence of its own freedoms andthose of other nations. It is a spirit thatcontinues to characterise France’s very beingas a nation.

Like these two events, Australia’sinvolvement, its achievement, the values learntin war define each one of us here today andindeed each one of our countrymen. Andstrangely, the life course of one man remainedin step with Australia’s military progress andthe maturing of the Anzac tradition. On theday Thomas Blamey was born, his hometownnewspaper, the Wagga Advertiser carried thestory of “Chinese” Gordon’s expedition to theSudan – a campaign that was to see Australiatake a first step in international conflict. Thegrowing confidence of Australian soldiers inthe Boer War, exemplified by Victoria’s ownColonel Tom Price, was matched in bravado bythe then 15-year old Tom Blamey, whopresented himself at the recruiting depot onlyto be told to go home and grow up!

Then came Gallipoli, both Blamey’s andAustralia’s real baptism of fire. By 1918, hewas a total professional, as was the Army inwhich he served. A new war layered upon hiswell-merited reputation laurels in Greece, inthe Middle East, and then defending Australiaitself in the Pacific. Blamey’s experiences andadult life itself spanned the tumultuous periodin which our country gained its identity. Therewould be few that could argue against thecontribution he made towards that gift.

So what are these values, born or maturedin war, and yet still with us to serve as anational legacy? Sir Charles Court, formerPremier of Western Australia, listed them in arecent speech to the Victorian RSL’s StateConference:Courage in Adversity PatriotismCompassion ReliabilityService FortitudeSelf Reliance Work EthicMateship Self EsteemIntegrity InnovationLoyalty FairnessGenerosity

And the list could go on. Few would arguewith them. They come from the heart, the mindand the spirit, and they owe much to our oldmaiden aunts, “Faith, Hope and Charity”. Theyowe much to the lessons learnt in taming ourgreat harsh land, in the face of great adversity,by a small population. They owe much to bushegalitarianism and to the shared hardship ofthe original “diggers” – the old gold miners.They owe much to our Celtic and convict pastthat brought with it a larrikin streak, anonchalant air and a delight in puncturingpomposity. Sir Charles Court reminded that,“Some of their exploits were not onlypioneering, they were breathtaking in theirfortitude and innovativeness . . . the spirit ofANZAC had been honed in their private lives.It equipped them to perform with greatcourage and valour when confronted with theunknowns of a vicious war – often not wellequipped and often inadequately trained”.

Talking recently to some former nationalservicemen, who had served in Vietnam, I wasintrigued to hear why they held to the viewthat the Australians performed so much betterthan their allies in South Vietnam. Because asthey said, “we just had to live up to the spiritof Anzac” and “we were better disciplined” –interesting comment from a generation thathas largely struck the word “discipline” fromits vocabulary and replaced it with “tolerance”.

ANZAC VALUES – THE PATH TRAVELLED AND THE ROAD AHEAD 73

Former Chief Justice of the High Court, SirGerard Brennan, says in a recent article onAustralian values that egalitarianism bespeakstolerance. I can accept that – tolerance is to beapplauded, even though it may not be one ofthe four great virtues. I cannot accepttolerance, however, when it is manifest as anexcuse for apathy or moral cowardice, nor toput rights ahead of responsibility.

Let me underscore the more importantAnzac values, as I see them. Among these isthe refusal to give in – a determination tosucceed whatever the adversity, however greatthe odds. Our military annals are full ofexamples – from Elands River during theSouth African War to Long Tan and, withoutexception, the household names on whichmuch of the legend is built-Gallipoli itself,Villers-Bretonneux, Kokoda, Tobruk . . .

I remember my delight as a child at thestory of Sir Leslie Morshead, appointed asTobruk’s Fortress Commander by Wavell onBlamey’s recommendation. Prior to the firstonslaught Rommel had ordered leaflets to bedropped on the Australian positions, callingfor their surrender and promising goodtreatment to any digger emerging waving awhite handkerchief. With magnificentunderstatement Morshead’s operational lognoted that “due to the dusty conditions and thegeneral lack of water, apparently no whitehandkerchiefs were available”.

We possess a heritage of courage. Not justbattlefield valour, although 96 Victoria Crossesover 99 years and names like Jacka, Derrickand Newton attest that Australians have beengenerously gifted with physical bravery. Menand women like Simpson, Dunlop andBullwinkel added a new dimension to thatvirtue, rooted in the stoicism of the pioneers.And indeed, decisions of command, like thosemade by Monash and Blamey when the livesof thousands of men were put at stake,demand yet another brand of courage again.

In many ways, courage is a manifestationof selflessness – the great Christian virtue – a

willingness to put oneself at risk for the benefitof others. Courage goes hand in hand withloyalty. And it was loyalty for which Blameyshould be better remembered – though thetestimony of 300,000 lining the route of hisfuneral cortege says it all. As individuals, as anation, the trait of selflessness is a consistentthread throughout this century. It should neverbe forgotten that apart from a few months inearly 1942 when Australia itself seemed inimminent danger, the vast majority of our102,000-war dead was killed defending thefreedoms and homelands of other peoples.

That appalling casualty rate was acceptedby Australian parents, wives and votersbecause they accepted, as our soldiers did, thattyranny and injustice cannot be permitted totriumph – here or half way around the world.It underlines that Australian society was and, Iwould argue, is essentially a decent andhonourable place.

In Australia everyone is basically “given ago”. We quietly but firmly demand personalliberties and even now, as in the response toevents in East Timor or far off Turkey, we riseto the occasion in time of crisis or need. Iunderstand that, statistically, ordinaryAustralians give more to deserving charitiesthan anywhere else in the world and ourcitizens volunteer in their tens of thousands foractivities like beach patrolling, bush firefighting and emergency relief.

Whatever the adversity, in war or peace,humour seems to find its place. Again I wouldrate it as a core value of the Anzac tradition –a way to lighten the situation, mask fear orpain or, as commonly, just for the sake of it. Irecall an anecdote recounted by one of mypredecessors as National President of the RSL,Sir William Keys. Bill took part in the viciousfighting on Tarakan before being wounded andfinding himself in hospital during a visit by the“Old Man” – Blamey himself. Next to Bill lay ayoung Australian, badly wounded by a burstof machine-gun fire. His treatment requiredblood, saline and pharmaceutical drips going


into his body with other tubing coming out todrain his wounds. Sir William recalls that thedigger, upon being approached by theCommander in Chief of his country’s militaryforces, announced loudly, “I’m the TarakanTelephone Exchange – what number wouldyou like, Sir?” General Blamey strode on!

This larrikinism is a hallmark of the Anzaclegend, expressing the individualism for whichour soldiers, sailors and airmen have becomefamous. It is our “point of difference” andmany claim that it has contributed to oursuccess on the battlefield. Great commandersunderstood it – indeed cultivated it. Learningfrom their outstanding success at Hamel,Monash and his then 34-year-old chief of staff,Brigadier General Blamey, ensured that in-depth explanations to ordinary soldiers aboutobjectives and proposed tactics were part of thepreparation for all major operations. InMonash’s own words, “each man understoodhis part and understood also that the partwhich others had to play depended upon theproper performance of his own”.

Blamey also understood that Australiansoldiers valued independence too highly tosubmit to mindless discipline. During the nextwar, he was to spend much time in the MiddleEast defending his command from officialcomplaints by British officers who were lessthan enthusiastic about Australian discipline.In this he sometimes had allies – when theEnglish General “Jumbo” Wilson confronted avisiting Robert Menzies soon after the captureof Benghazi, Menzies retorted simply, “Iunderstand that the Italians found them verytroublesome”. This spirit of independence isimportant if patriotism is to survive in the faceof globalisation, if national pride is to bemaintained in a society not given to greatpassion.

Maybe innovation and ingenuity comefrom the refusal to accept convention.Certainly, new tactics pioneered by Monashand Blamey in 1918 that melded infantry,armour, artillery and aircraft into a single

strike force changed modern tactics forever.The resourcefulness of Australian prisoners ofwar comes to mind – it set them above manyof their fellow prisoners. The ordinary digger’scapacity to scrounge bits and pieces, creatingingenious inventions is also well recorded.Blamey had a personal hand in one of themore notable ideas during the Gallipolicampaign. Visiting the trenches with CharlesBean, Australia’s official war correspondent,Major Blamey came across two men of the 2ndBattalion, in Bean’s words. “messing aboutwith some bits of wood stuck on the end of arifle”. Asked what it was, they explained it wasa primitive periscope allowing the rifle to beaimed without exposing the firer to danger.

Bean was unimpressed at the time butBlamey arranged for its inventor, LanceCorporal Beech, to be seconded to hisheadquarters to progress the idea. Within a fewdays, the pattern was perfected and periscoperifles began to be used throughout theAustralian trenches. Blamey was always a manwho could see opportunity and in his owngruff way, always respected the ordinarysoldier’s commonsense approach to life andwar

So there we have it – with some anecdotesI have tried to illustrate what I view as theessence of the Anzac spirit – courage,determination, self belief, humour in adversity,ingenuity, a respect for results not rank, and allglued together by the bond of mateship. Thespirit of Anzac is not a spirit of war; it is thetrue spirit of Australia. And I have no doubtthat our success at the highest levels of worldsport and in other fields of endeavour owesmuch to this spirit.

It was a powerful mix and there remainsonly the question of whether it retains itspotency. Will our sons, in Blamey’s words,“draw strength from the traditions of theirpredecessors?” My answer to you is yes,completely. I do not believe for a moment thatthe essence of our national character haschanged at all. The times certainly, standards,

ANZAC VALUES – THE PATH TRAVELLED AND THE ROAD AHEAD 75

fashions, the calls placed on the young, theworld itself – these are profoundly changed,but not us as a people. When the need arises,the Australian people, the Australian spiritrallies.

The Anzac values I have listed are asrelevant today as they were then and asrelevant in peace as in war. Sir Gerard Brennansays that “national values define the identity ofthe people … they are a charter of the society’sfuture”. Ingenuity, determination, courage andconfidence are virtues that ensure success inwhatever field of endeavour they are found –business, sport, on the land, in education.

One caution, however, I must offer. Wecannot take the preservation of the Anzacspirit for granted. It needs to be nurtured in theproper development of our youngsters and inthe professionalism of our Defence Force. Ourheroes, our leaders, our role models, our greatsports men and women must be and be seen tobe people of values. And if national values areto be of worth, they must be shared. My greatpersonal concern with our nation is that thepost-war era has seen the abandonment of

much of the great tradition of shared Christianvalues – absolute values – that underpinnedgood government.

As our late Governor-General, Sir PaulHasluck, said in his memoirs, “many in oursociety do not hold to even the possibility ofabsolute rights and wrongs. Increasingly”, hesaid, “people judge what is right by what islegal and what is wrong by what is illegal”. Inthese circumstances, our governments have agrave responsibility to maintain traditionalmoral standards in legislation. And we, all ofus, have a part to play.

Despite my caution, I am so captured bythe young people that I see in this country,that I am sure they will innately draw from theAnzac heritage to build their future. I have nodoubt that it would be the wish of FieldMarshal Sir Thomas Blamey that they do so. Ileave you with the last line of the speech henever gave, which read: “I can no longer leadthem, but I commend those familiar armywords, in which was so often combined all thatwas best of exhortation and encouragement –‘Carry on’.”

Major General Phillips is the National President, Returned & Services League of Australia. He retired as AssistantChief of the General Staff-Personnel in 1991.

Painting by Jeff Isaacs.Periscope Rifle.

The Field Marshal’s Baton presented to General Sir Thomas A. Blamey, GBE KCB CMG DSO ED.AWM Neg 100141

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