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GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd.

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Page 1: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

GPS SPOOFINGLow-cost GPS simulator

HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd.

Page 2: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Who we are? Unicorn Team•  Qihoo360’s UnicornTeam consists of a group of

brilliant security researchers. We focus on the security of anything that uses radio technologies, from small things like RFID, NFC and WSN to big things like GPS, UAV, Smart Cars, Telecom and SATCOM.

•  Our primary mission is to guarantee that Qihoo360 is not vulnerable to any wireless attack. In other words, Qihoo360 protects its users and we protect Qihoo360.

•  During our research, we create and produce various devices and systems, for both attack and defense purposes.

•  We are one of the DEF CON 23 vendors. https://defcon.org/html/defcon-23/dc-23-vendors.html

Page 3: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

YANG Qing•  YANG Qing is the team leader of Unicorn Team.

•  He has rich experiences in wireless and hardware security area, including WiFi penetration testing, cellular network interception, IC card cracking etc. His interests also cover embedded system hacking, firmware reversing, automotive security, and software radio.

•  He is the first one who reported the vulnerabilities of WiFi system and RF IC card system used in Beijing subway.

Page 4: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

HUANG Lin•  One of the early USRP users in China. Got the

first USRP board in 2005 in Orange Labs

•  Authored some tutorials about GNU Radio which were popular in China

•  Made great effort on promoting Cloud-RAN technology in China from 2010 to 2013

•  Join Qihoo 360 as a wireless security researcher in 2014

Page 5: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Beginning of the story …

Page 6: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Civilian-use GPS C/A SignalGPS C/A signal is for civilian usage, and unencrypted. Replay attack is a typical GPS spoofing method.

Record Replay

Page 7: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Firstly try replay attack• Hardware

•  USRP B210 •  Active GPS antenna •  Bias-tee circuit (Mini-Circuit

ZX85-12G-S+) •  LNA (Mini-Circuit ZX60-V82-S+)

Page 8: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Record GPS signal by a USRP B210

Page 9: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Replay the signal by a bladeRF

Page 10: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Success!

Record then replay the GPS signal. You can see the cellphone gets the position and timing information from the replayed GPS signal.

Nexus 5

Page 11: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

If Create any GPS signal rather than Record & Replay…

Page 12: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

This is not a replay• Demo video

Page 13: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Search existing solutions on Internet• Expensive or at least not free

•  NAVSYS ~$5000•  NI LabVIEW ~$6000

Page 14: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Some famous cases of GPS spoofing•  Leading lab: RadioNavigation

Lab from Univ. of Texas at Austin (https://radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/ )

•  Prof. Todd E. Humphrey and his team •  2012 TED talk: how to fool GPS •  2013: spoof an US$80M yacht

at sea •  2014: unmanned aircraft

capture via GPS spoofing

Page 15: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

We are not navigation experts. How can we do GPS spoofing?

Page 16: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

As SDR guys, we have

USRP bladeRF HackRF

Page 17: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

And we found some source codes on Internet

•  This website collects many open source projects about GPS

•  http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/gps-toolbox/index.html

•  This is a very good GPS receiver software based on GNU Radio

•  http://gnss-sdr.org/

• Most of projects are GPS receivers and few are transmitters. This is a transmitter example: https://code.csdn.net/sywcxx/gps-sim-hackrf

•  It’s not finalized !

Page 18: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

DIY a GPS Simulator!

Page 19: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Basic principle of GPS system

Page 20: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

GPS principle

Page 21: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Mathematics time

Page 22: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Key information in Pseudo-range equations

Calculate the delays at receiver WHEN WHERE

Page 23: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Structure of message1 bit (20 ms)

1 word (600 ms)

1 subframe (6 s)

1 page (30 s)

25 pages – the whole message (12.5 min)

x30

x10

x5

x25

Page 24: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Info of WHEN & WHERE

Subframe 1 Subframe 2 Subframe 3 Subframe 4 Subframe 5

Time information

WHENEphemeris

WHERE

Page 25: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Start building the signal

Page 26: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Get Ephemeris data• Method 1

•  Download ephemeris data file from CDDIS website •  ftp://cddis.gsfc.nasa.gov/gnss/data/daily/ •  Here we can only get yesterday’s ephemeris data

• Method 2 •  Use ‘gnss-sdr’ program to receive the real-time GPS signal and get

the fresh ephemeris data •  The ‘GSDR*’ files are the decoded ephemeris data, in standard

RINAX format.

Page 27: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Decode the fresh ephemeris data• Software

• Run ‘gnss-sdr’ • Get the GSDR* file

Page 28: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Matlab code of GPS simulator

Page 29: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Example: structure of Subframe 2

Page 30: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Generate navigation message

Page 31: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Bits "Waveform

Page 32: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

GPS principle again

Calculate the transmission time

Page 33: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

How to calculate transmission time

Satellite is moving

Earth is rotating

Calculate the coordinate according to ephemeris data

Calculate the length of signal path

NOT EASY

Page 34: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Matlab code of generating waveform

Page 35: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Firstly offline verify the signal by ‘gnss-sdr’

OK

Page 36: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Secondly verify it by transmitting GPS signal file over air by bladeRF

Page 37: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Soft-receiver ‘gnss-sdr’ demod the signal

OK

Page 38: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Try to spoof cellphone’s GPS …

Failure

Page 39: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Which part is not perfect?

Doppler effect

Page 40: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Another challenge: Doppler effect

Moving towards receiver

Moving far from receiver

Page 41: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

GPS principle again

Delay will be longer and longer, if moving far from receiver

Delay will be shorter and shorter, if moving towards receiver

NOT EASY

Page 42: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Try cellphone again• Nexus 5 GPS chipset

•  Satellites are detected as pre-setting. •  Satellite signal strengths are same as

we defined. •  3D fixed by simulated signal

Bingo!

Page 43: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Bingo! Samsung Note 3

•  Located at Namco Lake in Tibet but the cellphone is actually in Beijing.

Page 44: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Bingo! iPhone 6• Namco Lake in Tibet •  iPhone positioning is much

slower. •  The cellphone clock was also

reset to wrong time if auto-calibration is enabled.

Page 45: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Set any time• You may find the date we set is always Feb. 14 2015. This

is because the ephemeris data file we use is at that day. • Actually not only space but also time, can be spoofed.

Page 46: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

A cellphone in future timeWe set the time as Aug. 6, 2015 (today is Jul. 14) and position as Las Vegas.

Page 47: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Try to spoof cars• Demo video: The car, BYD Qin was located in a lake center.

Page 48: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

DJI drone - forbidden area policy•  To avoid the risk from

drone to people and to critical facilities, drone flying are forbidden in many cities.

•  For example, DJI drone’s engine will keep off when it finds the position is in forbidden area.

A drone that crashed on the grounds of the White House had evaded radar detection.

Page 49: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Try to spoof DJI drone• Demo video Disable forbidden area •  The drone is actually at a forbidden location in Beijing. We

gave it a fake position in Hawaii, then it was unlocked and can fly up.

Page 50: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Try to spoof DJ drone• Demo video: Hijack flying drone • We gave a forbidden position to a flying drone, then it

would automatically land.

Page 51: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Lessons – how to anti-spoof• Application layer

•  Now usually GPS has highest priority. Cellphone is spoofed even if it has cellular network connection.

•  Use multi-mode positioning, GLONASS, Beidou •  Jointly consider cellular network and wifi positioning

• Civil GPS receiver chipset •  Use some algorithms to detect spoofing

• Civil GPS transmitter •  Add digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation

message

Page 52: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

GPS is still a great system •  First global positioning system • Usable for all of the world • Very low cost, small size…

•  It keeps updating so we believe the security issue will be improved in future.

Page 53: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Acknowledgment•  JIA Liwei

•  Graduate student of BUAA majoring radio navigation •  https://code.csdn.net/sywcxx/gps-sim-hackrf

•  JIAO Xianjun •  Senior iOS RFSW engineer at Apple, SDR amateur •  http://sdr-x.github.io/

Page 54: DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research

Thank you!


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