declassified cable: wh-74-0523[3]

8/8/2019 Declassified Cable: wh-74-0523[3]

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tNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATIONPres iden t i a l L ib ra r i es Withdrawal SheetWITHDRAWAL 10 018696

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . Nat iona l secur i ty r e s t r i c t i o nTYPE OF MATERIAL . CableCREATOR'S NAME . .RECEIVER'S NAME ... .. . Scowcrof tKiss ingerTITLE . Nixon and Pak is tan iAziz Ahmed Fore ign Minis te r

CREATION DATE OS/23/1974VOLUME . 2 pagesCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER 10COLLECTION TITLE .BOX NUMBER .FOLDER TITLE .

..

.

031400147Nat iona l Secur i ty Adviser . MemorandaConversat ions4May 23, 1974 - Nixon, Pak is tan i Fore ignMini s t e r Aziz Ahmed

o f

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . .WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . .. 08/20/2004GG

File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library


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Approvea !""or Kelease LUU4r1L/UO: I\lL!""-IVIUv-4-(-"'-O

-T e- p S t G RET - 5 ~ O p v 516 ~ ~ j 2 9 0 8 1440258Z ~ M A V ' 74 Z F F ~ i Z F F ~ 4 ZYHFM THE SITUATION ROOMTO A ~ C O N S U L JERUSALEMTOP SEC RET SENSITIVE VIAl IWH41488- - - - - - - - ~ . TOHAK Z99PLEASE nELIVER TO BREMER/RnDMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

HENRY A ~ K l S S l N G E R BRENT SCDWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT'S 15 ~ I N U T E MEETING WITH AZIZ AHMED LASTEo ABOUT 40 MINUTES. AHMEO POINTED OU T THE THREAT FACING PAKISTAN. HE O ~ S E R V ~ D tHAT I N o I A ~ S D E ~ E ~ S E BUDGET IS AT tHE HIGHEST L ~ V E C S EvER, THAT THE, SOVIET UNION IS SHIPPING ARMS TO INDIA AND N!JW INDiA H ~ S EXPLOOEo'A NUCLEAR DEVICE. ON P A K l S T ~ ~ ' S O T H ~ R 96RDER' THE SOVIET UNION I S ' H E ~ P I N G THE, 4FGHANS TO ARM' A ~ o IS SECRetLY ENCOURAGING B A L U C ~ I S T A N I IRREDENTiSM. PAKISTAN Is THUS ' SURROUN6EO By E N ~ M I E S W ~ O ARE RECEIviNG OUTSIDE ~ I L i T A R Y SUPPORT. ' ,P ~ K I S T A N ON THE OTHER H A ~ D Is STILL VERY WEAK. THE P A K i ~ T A N I S

APPRECIATE OU R ASSISTANCE wItH THEIR TANK MQDERNIZATION BUT THAt DOES NO T ADO TO T H ~ I R MILITARY ARSENAL. THEY N ~ ~ O DEFENSIVE WEAPQNS SAMS A N D A N T I ~ T A N K MISSILES. THEY NEED.HELP'RIGHT ~ W A V AND THE u . s ~ IS THE ONLY O ~ E WHO CAN REALLY PROVIDE'tT: F ~ A N C E WILL SELL ARMS BUT THEIR P ~ I C E S A R E EXORBITANT'BECAUSE THEv KNOW THE PAKISTANIS HAVE NO ~ E A L ALTERNATIVe.

B E S 1 ~ E S ARMS, BHUTTO ASKS ~ O N S I D E R A T I O N OF A GUARANTEE Tn N O N ~ N U C I ~ E A R POWERS BV" NUCLEAR POWERS AGAINSt' NUCLEAR ATTACK: THE PRESIDENT RESPONDEO THAT WE HAve AN ASSESSMENT OF THf

NeW SITUATION NOW UNOERWAV AND WE WOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITU PAKISTAN AS THINGS , D E V E L O P ~ HE. S ~ I D WE WOUeD C O ~ T I N U E TOOQ WHATEVER WE CDULD-- SUCH AS THE ARRANGEMENT WE HAD WORKED OUT ON THE TANKS BUT WE W E R ~ SEVERELY LIMITED IN OU R A ~ J L r T y TO GIVe MILITARY HELP. WE WOULD 00 OUR BEST, ~ O W E V ~ R , EItHER . * * " .' * * ~ H S R COMMENT * * * . * : . *' .,* '*

RECALLEDPAGE 01 D T G : 2 ~ r i 2 0 0 ~ MAY 74***.... -T 0 'S E e R E f- * *5 ~ o p v


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Approvea t"or KeleaSe L:UU4r1 L:/Ut> : I\JLt"-IVIUL.-4-1--'-O' . ; "

******* f P SEC REf *******S COpyDIReCTLV OR lNDIRECTLV, TO IMPROVE P A K I S T A N ~ S DEfENSIVE C A P l B I L I T I ~ ~ . THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT WE WOULD USE OUR INFLUENCE,-BOTH -WtTH INOlA AND THE SOVIET UNION, _TO RESTRAIN T ~ E M WITH_RESPECT TO ANY POSSIBLE ADVENTURISM AGAINST PAKISTAN. WE wrULD ALSOA A N A L Y Z ~ CAREFULLY ~ H U T T O ~ S CONCEpT FOR A G U A ~ A N ' E E OF N O N ~ NUC(EAR POWERS.-HE POINTEp OUT THAT THE PRe WAS A GOOD-FRIEND OF PAKISTAN AND THAT WE wOuLD KEEP TOUCH WITH THECHINESE tiN T H I S - I S S U E ~ -

AHMEo R E ~ O R T E D THAT INDIA HAD GONE TO WAR IN THE PAST DURINGTIMES WHEN THE U.S-HAD GOOQ RELATIONS WITH IT AND THE SOVIETV ~ l l n N WAS COMPLETELY U N S C R U P U L O U S ~ THE PAKisTANIS, T H E R E F ~ ~ E , CQUU; NOT DEPEND ON THE RESTR.AINT THE u.s . wOULD-TRY -TO INoIICE-.BHUTTO IS WORRIED ABOUT WHAT -TO TELL HIS PEoPLE AND HIS MILITARYW ~ E N STATES ON B O ~ H SIDES OF _PAKISTAN WERE REARMING AND ONLYPiKlSTA HAD NO ACCESS TO MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE PRESIDENT, _IN c o N C l U S I o N ~ ASSUREO AHMED -THAT THE ~ . ~ : WAS COMMITTED TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND I N T E G ~ I T Y OF PAKISTAN,THAT WE WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS WITH REGARD EITHER TO THE sovieTU N I ~ N OR INDIA, AND THAT Wf-. WOULD 00 EVERYTHING WE CoULD To ASSISTTHEM IN MEETING THEIR NEEDS.

I THINK T ~ E MEETING SERVED THE PURPOSE FrR WH!CH IT WAS i N T E N D E D ~ I-IARM REGAROS.523

RECALLEDpSNio51709 PAGE-Ola 01= 02 DTG:24Q26oz MAV 74-.****** TOP 5 E eRE S COpy


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J\{E:\;10RANDUJ\ITHE WHITE HOUSESEGRE'll/XGDS - 3

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Pres iden t NixonLt . General Brent Scowcroft , Deputy Assis tant to the

Pres iden t for National Securi ty AffairsAziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and

Foreign Affairs, PakistanI

DATE & TIME: Thursday - May 23,10:30 a. m.

1974

PLACE: The Oval OfficeThe White House

. ~ h m e d : It is kind of you to receive me. I bring regards f rom Pr ime Minister'Bhut to. We and the people of Pakis tan are dis tressed about Watergate . I t isvery disturbing to us that i t has been dragged out.

President : Don' t you worry about that; we will take care of that .Ahmed: You know our situation, but le t m e bring you up to date. Our pr isonersa re back and we thought w e could move to normalizat ion with India. Theres t i l l were a couple of problems. India ' s defense budget is the highest ever;the Soviet Union ships a r ms to India; Brezhnev's vis i t has resul ted in morea rm s - - including SAM-6 and 7s. After Swaran Singh's visi t to Moscow,400 officers went to Moscow for t ra ining, and after he want to Afghanistan,300 Afghans went to India.These developments disturb us. They are building their army, but not toattack the PRC.And we have no designs on Afghanistan. I f the Soviets give them a rm s , i thelps them with their i r redentist aims . The Soviet Union t r ies to show theya re not behind the Baluchistan movement.

DEClAHfIiD.EGRET /XGDS - 3 E.O. 1. .,SEC. 1.1NSC 11124198, S.TATEDI!PT. 001.OEUHES J ~ ~ , , ' . 2>/Sf ()'W tJAR/l nATI= '&I!i /01.(I I


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....sgGJ?ETIXGDS - 3 - 2

And while we were wondering why there is this Indian buildup, here comesthe nuclear tes t . We were not surpr ised, but shocked. There is a tendencyto play i t down in SOITle quar te rs , and Mrs . Gandhi says i t 1s"peaceful. 1I vVethink the Soviet Union will enable them to build nuclear weapons. Thisdetonation we think is just a first step in the developITlent of nuclear weaponsand a delivery system.The t iming of the explosion is interesting. The Pr ime Minister was in Pekinga week ago. The PRC said they are ready now to establish relations with allstates in the subcontinent. 'Why this t iming? Is the Soviet Union or Mrs .Gandhi trying to prevent better relations with the PRC?Apart f rom the indirect pressure by the SovIet Union on us - - and on Iranthrough Iraq - - the idea is to get control of the Gulf, so we must be broughtto heel.Iran has ITloved to placate the Soviet Union. The Shah supported the SouthAsian security pact and said he would help implement it . On 14 March theSoviet Union sent this message to Bhutto [He reads from note at Tab A}:

"Pakistan 's membership of CENTO and the act ivizat ion ofi ts participation in the mili tary activit ies of the bloc is , inour opinion" an anachronism and i t can scarcely m eet thein teres ts of the peace-loving countries of this regionin terested in making the process of relaxat ion of tensioni r revers ib le . I I The message a lso refers to Asian Collect iveSecurity in Asia and asks Pakis tan to consider supportingthe idea and making a s ta tement on the question.

So then the Soviet Union is getting more and more specific about the AsianSecurity System. We have no desire to be drawn in .So here we are . Two things worry us. 'W e are stil l weak. The provision oftanks is helpful and we are grateful we won1t have to pay. But that doesn' t addto our arsenal . We need defensive weapons - - SAMs and anti-tank missi les .I t is only for defense against India - - amI Afghanistan, which might not standaside in another war.The Pr ime Minister would l ike some help soon. And could the nuclear powersgive a guarantee to the non-nuclear powers against nuclear at tack? You gaveone guarantee to India when China at tacked. We think i t would be helpful, notjust for us but also for many others i f more countr ies get nuclear weapons.A system which would rule out blackmail ,would reduce the incentive to getnuclear weapons. I t is an im.rnediate problem for us, but a genera l one for all .

8CQilT!XGDS - 3


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-elk""P ~ ' P - f X G D S - 3 - 3

We are worried. We a re holding out, t rying to work for peace. You havebeen very kind and gracious.President : But not able to do very much. We must begin with an assessment - you should make one also - - on the implications of the Indian nuclear weapons.We will keep you informed on our analysis .I f i t is , as you describe, a Soviet attempt to encircle Pakistan and a move to another partit ion - - as a par t of a move to the Indian Ocean - - we must assess that also. Another point is what the U. S. can do. You know what rest r ic t ions have been put on us . We have done what we could on tanks and will continue. We will see on defensive capabil i t ies what we can do directly or indirectly. We will do what we can with India. We are start ing a dialogue with them. Now,India in the past has not been easi ly dissuaded. But I think you know i t isbet ter for the U. S. to have some influence w ith India ra ther than leave i t tothe Soviet Union. The independence of Pakistan is a principle to which wea re committed. We will use our influence to help you defend that independence,both by getting you the means and helping with other countries.The Afghanistan thing is worr isome. An i r responsible Afghanistan could bethe las t cannon on the deck. You couldn' t fight on two fronts. Of course, ourposition on the Asian Security system is the same as yours .I would summar ize thus: we will help as we can with military equipment,but we can' t promise. Secondly, we will use our influence with India and theSoviet Union to restrain them. Third, your concept of a guarantee for thenon-nuclear countries is one we must assess . We must hold this close - - whoknows who could be next?The Pr ime Minister is very sophisticated, both about his neighbors and aboutwhat we could do to affect the act ions of those neighbors. We will make c l e ~ r with the Soviet Union our determination about Pakistan. India needs ou r helpand we will use our influence to focus India 's energies internally and notexternally. .I t seems to me that the non-nuclear countries need some sor t of guarantee. , We m ay not be able to put i t in a t reaty. Ahmed: But the nuclear countries must know i t .

9iiRE"P'tXGDS - 3


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.. - :S:E'ZilET - XGDS - 3 - 4

President: The PRC is your friend. They don't want an expanded India.We will keep in close touch with the Chinese on this. The PRC already hassome nuclear capability. Your best hopes are the PRC and the United States hot in collusion but cooperating together , and by the U.S. playing a strongdiplomatic role with the Soviet Union and India.How we implement this we must work out . Trust what I told you at the t imeof the previous war . We did it with little support. But our actions then - and now - - reflected our policy.We are doing an assessment on these developments; you do l ikewise, and wewill keep in close touch on what steps to take - - publicly and privately - - toensure Pakistan 's survival .I am under no i l lusions about the Soviet Union - or India. N or aboutAfghanistan, since they may be a Soviet puppet. But keep close l ines tothe PRe . They can ' t help much now.Ahm.ed: Thank you, M r. President. Let me make just one or two briefcom.m.ents. You should have influence with India, and with the Soviet Union.But India has gone to war when you had good relations with them. And theSoviet Union is unscrupulous. I don't know if they would stop in a crunch.

And what do we tel l our people? Not to worry? And for our armed forces:Everyone on both sides of us is rearming; only we can' t get a rms . We t ryto get something from France but i t 's only on tough financial t e rms . Wea re getting a few things, but the price has gone up 100% during our negotiations.Since we have no alternative, we have to pay the price. Our position is .......".........President: I hate to have such a ser ious problem raised without being ableto reassure you. I am seriously concerned, and we will take up at the highestlevel what we can do. We understand your assessment and we see what yourneighbors a re doing. I have no answers now, but we will try to developanswers at the highest level to the new s i ~ u a t i o n . We don't want to promisewhat we can't deliver. Maybe your guarantee idea has meri t . I promisewe will look into itoAluned: Thahk you, M r. President .

888RE1!F !XGDS - 3


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March 74; Message

"Pakistan 's membership of CENTO andthe act ivizat ion of i t s part icipat ion in themili tary ac t iv i t i e s of the bloc is> in our opinion,an anachronism and it can scarcely meet the in teres tsof the peace-loving countries of th is regionin teres ted in making the process of relaxation oftension i rreversible" . The message also refersto Asian Collect ive Security in Asia and asksPakistan to consider supporting the idea andmaking a statement on the question.


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declassified cable: wh-74-0523[3]

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