Decentralization Scenario in the Indian Sub-Continent

(India, Bangladesh And Pakistan)

and Implications for International Development Actors1

1 Author: Nayana RenuKumar, Masters in Public Administration (2014-16) student at the Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, USA

Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1

2. Context of the Study .................................................................................................................... 1

3. Decentralisation in the Indian Sub-Continent: Past and Present ......................................... 3

4. Differing Paces of Decentralization in the Indian Sub-Continent ....................................... 8

5. Implications for International Development Actors ............................................................ 10

6. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 13

List of Figures

Figure 1: Overview of India's decentralization ................................................................................ 4

Figure 2: Overview of Pakistan's decentralization .......................................................................... 5

Figure 3: Overview of Bangladesh's decentralization ..................................................................... 7

List of Tables

Table 1: Overview of economic, social and political indicators of Indian sub-continent ......... 2

Table 2: Summary of comparative analysis of decentralization across India, Bangladesh and Pakistan ......................................................................................................................................... 8

1

1. INTRODUCTION

According to the World Bank, over seventy-five governments have introduced some form of

decentralization since the 1980s (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2005). It has been

argued that decentralization of power and resources to democratically elected local

governments enhances access for citizens, increases accountability of officials and expands

citizen participation in decision-making (Norris, 2008). Recognizing the role of decentralization

to democratize, reduce corruption and enhance the delivery of public services, international

agencies such as the World Bank, OECD and UNDP have extended lending and non-lending

support to its client countries to promote decentralization. During 1990-2006, World Bank

disbursed $31.6 billion (8 percent of total Bank commitment during that period) on

decentralization across 89 client countries (World Bank, 2008).

Today, local tiers of governments handle a substantial share of responsibilities in both

developing and developed countries although there are huge differences in the nature and

extent of decentralization process and outcomes across countries (Schneider, 2003). The

experience of decentralization in South Asia is a case in point. While India, the largest country

in this region has drastically decentralized since 1993, Bangladesh remains one of the most

fiscally centralized countries in the world (World Bank, n.d). Decentralization efforts in Sri

Lanka, Pakistan and Nepal are in different stages of crises given the specter of authoritarian

regimes looming large over their heads amidst post-conflict reconstruction and volatile security

conditions.

In this context, this report reviews the decentralization scenario in the three largest nations of

the Indian sub-continent, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and seeks to identify the key factors

that affect the implementation of democratic decentralization. The report argues that the

current funding programs of the two major international donor agencies, World Bank and

UNDP, fail to fully address these limitations and offers suggestions that the international

donors could adopt to promote democratic decentralization in the Indian sub-continent. The

key suggestions include focus on addressing systemic deficiencies, focusing on democratic

decentralization and pooling of skills and resources of the two agencies.

2. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

The Indian sub-continent consists of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and

Sri Lanka. The following tables gives a snapshot of the economic, social and political set up of

key countries of the region:

2

Table 1: Overview of economic, social and political indicators of Indian sub-continent

Country Type of

Government

Type of

governance

system

Population

(millions)

(WDI 2013)

Density

(WDI

2013)

GDP per

capita

(WDI

2013)

HDI

Ranking

2013 (out

of 187

countries)

Corruption

perception

index 2013

(out of 177

countries)

Freedom

house (2013)

India Federal Parliamentary 1,252.13 421 5238 135 94 Free

Pakistan Federal Parliamentary 182.14 236 4549 146 127 Partly free

Bangladesh Unitary Parliamentary 156.59 1203 2476 142 136 Partly free

Sri Lanka Unitary Presidential 20.48 326 9425 73 91 Partly free

Nepal Unitary Parliamentary 27.79 194 2172 145 116 Partly free

From the above table, it can be observed that the Indian sub-continent is home to close to 22%

of world population and more than its fair share of authoritarianism, corruption, human

development problems, resource constraints and poverty. The scenario is not surprising given

the backdrop of civil wars, military coups and regional conflicts. India is the only country in the

region with an uninterrupted and free democratic set up since the last 57 years of independent

existence.

However, the promise of democracy and peace is brighter than ever with the end of civil wars

in Nepal and Sri Lanka, the first ever-peaceful transition of democracy in Pakistan, the return to

normalcy in Maldives, the transition to guided democracy in Bhutan and the possibility of coup

just eliminated from the fate of Bangladesh. In the last ten years since these changes have

precipitated, the international donor agencies, mainly the World Bank and UNDP have played

important role in attempting to consolidate democracy and by supporting programs to help

strengthen the reach of democracy to the grassroots levels. Huge funds have been disbursed for

various local governance support and sectoral service delivery improvement programs.

However, a decade later, there is very little evidence that these interventions have brought

about democratic decentralization. Corruption, human development and freedom broadly

remain where they have been in most of these nations or have worsened.

Why is the international funding for grassroots democracy failing to create an impact? What

could be done to improve the situation?

These questions are explored by taking the case of decentralization in the three largest nations

of the Indian sub-continent. Together they have more than 90% of the regions population and

its landmass. The study focuses only on these three nations in the hope that the lessons drawn

from this exercise will be useful for other countries in the region too.

3

3. DECENTRALISATION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT: PAST AND

PRESENT

A. INDIA

History: In India, at the time of Constitution formation, the idea of local government was

relegated to Directive Principles of State Policy (Part-IV).

It noted, The State shall take steps to organize village

Panchayats and endow them with such powers and

authority as may be necessary to enable them to function

as units of local self- government. During 1950-75,

several committees were set up to examine the

revitalization of local self-government institutions. The

efforts to amend the Constitution to strengthen local

government institutions succeeded in 1992 with the 73rd

and 74th constitutional amendments. The constitutional

amendments and the accompanying schedules clearly

demarcated functions to be devolved to local

governments by the States. It became mandatory for

States to enact conformity acts.

Present: In India, decentralization has strengthened during 1993-2013. According to the

Devolution Index 2012-13, thirteen States of India has performed above the national average

in decentralization with superior performance in dimensions such as legislative framework,

functions, functionaries, finances, capacity building and accountability. Six more states

performed on the medium level with eleven States performing below the national average. The

general perception has been that while the mandatory provisions of the Constitution regarding elections

and reservations are adhered to in all States, the devolution of powers and resources to Panchayats from the

States has been highly uneven across States (IIPA, 2013). Yet, overall performance is positive.

Regular elections for panchayats have been conducted in all states. All states have constituted

the State Finance Commission. They have also made India the most representative democracy

in the world. By 2006, about 2.9 million representatives were elected to the three levels of

panchayats; about 42.30 percent were women, 13.70 percent belonged to scheduled castes and

14.6 percent were scheduled tribes (Government of India 2006).

73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments

Part IX and IX A added to the Indian Constitution with provisions for Panchayats (rural local bodies) and Municipalities (urban local bodies)

Panchayats and Municipalities to be constituted at every level in each state with direct elections to these bodies

Reservation for scheduled castes and tribes and women

XI and XIIth schedules added to the Constitution listing 29 and 18 functions to be devolved to Panchayats and Municipalities respectively

4

Figure 1: Overview of India's decentralization

B. PAKISTAN

History: In Pakistan, decentralization has a long and chequered history. In 1962, President

Ayub Khan introduced the Basic Democracy concept to promote democracies at the village

level. However, the effort was widely seen as an effort to circumvent the provincial

governments and promote clientelism to legitimize military rule. It has been observed that

local governments (functioning under the military regimes of Ayub and Zia (19581969 and 19771988

respectively), were not empowered and had extremely limited fiscal and administrative mandates (Mohmand

& Cheema, 2007). The subsequent war with India and break away of Bangladesh led to a new

democratically elected government. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto abolished the Basic

Democracy initiative and promulgated two local government ordinances in 1973.

In the 1973 Constitution, Articles 32 and 140-A deals with local government. Article 32

requires the State to encourage local government

institutions composed of elected representatives of the

areas and ensure special representation of weaker sections.

Article 140-A (included in 2002) requires each province to

enact laws to establish a local government system and

devolve responsibility and authority to them (CLGF,

2013)

In 2001, President Parvez Musharaff promulgated the

dramatic and far-reaching Devolution Plan. Through a

central ruling, the 200-year-old colonial system of bureaucratic control over districts by the first two tiers of

INDIA

Devolution Plan by Legal Framework Order, 2002

(expired in 2009)

Balochistan Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (XVIII of 2001)

North-West Frontier Province, Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (XIV of 2001)

Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (XIII of 2001)

Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (XXVII of 2001)

5

government was swiftly replaced by an elected third tier that connected 110 district governments, through 334

tehsil (rural) and 62 town (urban) governments, to 6,125 union governments in the four provinces of Pakistan

(Gellner & Hachhethu, 2008). Local Governments were placed in the sixth schedule of the

constitution through the 17th amendment for a period of six years.

Present: In Pakistan, the momentum given by the 17th amendment gradually subsided with

the expiry of the constitutional protection for local government in 2009. Provinces have been

experimenting with different forms of previous local government ordinances or experimenting

with their own models.

However, Pakistan had another landmark decentralization initiative with the 18th amendment

of the Constitution whereby attempts were made to

strengthen the federal structure by transferring federal-

level resources and responsibilities to provincial

governments. 17 federal ministries targeted for devolution

have been transferred to the provinces. However, the

implementation of what would have been one of the

watershed initiatives in Pakistans history has been stalled

by the lack of capacity and will in the provincial

governments to assume the delegated responsibilities

(Kugelman, 2012). So far only Balochistan has conducted

elections to the local government despite the Supreme

Court judgment mandating all provinces to hold elections

to the local governments (UNDP, 2013).

Figure 2: Overview of Pakistan's decentralization

PAKISTAN

Pakistans 18th amendment

Not only revived but also re-oriented radically the democratic and federalist fundamentals of Pakistan

Three-member committee under the Prime Minister formulated to look at implementation issues

Potential to strengthen democratic devolution at federal, provincial and local levels (UNDP 2013)

6

C. BANGLADESH

History: Till its secession from Pakistan in 1972, Bangladesh followed the Basic

Democracy system. In 1972, immediately following liberation, the Presidential Order No.

7, dissolved all existing local government committees. New Committees were established

only at Union level and District level. The Presidential Order No. 22 of the same year

specified the composition, functions and election procedures of local governments.

The 1973 Constitution has Articles 9, 11 (Principles of State Policy) and 59 (Chapter III:

Local Government) of making provisions for establishing local government as an

inseparable organ of administering state affairs to safeguard democratic values and to

secure economic and social justice. However, the Constitution does not clearly define the

powers and functions of the local government.

The first election for the Union Parishad (lowest tier/village level) was held in December

1973 while elections to the Thana Development Committee (upazila/sub-district) and the

Zila (District) Councils were suspended. The Local Government Ordinance of 1976 by the

Military Government introduced a three-tier system with the Thana level re-established.

The elections to the Union Parishads were held in 1977 while the other levels were under

the control of bureaucracy (Mohabbat Khan, n.d).

In 1982, General Ershad constituted an Administrative Reorganization Committee and

replaced the Thana Development Committee with

Upazila Parishad with wide ranging powers. When

Bangladesh introduced parliamentary democracy in

1991, the inter-mediate level was repealed following

the recommendations of Local Government

Reorganization Commission of 1991 due to the link

between General Ershad and Upazila Parishad

chairmen (Sarker, 2003). The Sheikh Hazina

Government of 1996-2001 set up a Commission to

set up a democratic local government system. It

recommended a four-tiered local government

system starting at district level. The government was

successful in conducting elections to the lowest tier

during this period (Mohabbat Khan, n.d). The

Government has approved direct funding of Union

Bangladeshs legislations on local governance:

Hill District Local Government Parishad Act 1989

Zila Parishad Act 2000

Local Government (Pourashava)

Ordinance 2008

Local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance 2008

Local Government (Upazila Parishad) Ordinance 2008

Local Government (City Corporation) Ordinance 2008

Source: Country profile, CLGF

7

Parishads in 2004, which is a major step to devolve fiscal power to local governments. In

2008, the Sheikh Hazina government passed a series of legislative reforms for

decentralization.

Present: Today there are 4,504 Union Parishads at the lowest-tier of local government in

rural areas and 308 Pourashavas (Municipalities) and 7 City Corporations in urban areas.

All are directly elected, but have limited independent powers or resources to run their

affairs. In addition, there are 484 Upazila Parishads, which have become representative

bodies after the 2008 reforms. (World Bank, 2011).

It can be opined that the Union Parishad is the only local government body that has been

operating for decades with regular elections and has any institutional continuity in the local

government landscape. The failure of development strategies pursued by the State over the

years amidst recurring military coups and weak democratic governments have led to a

international development actors who has placing greater trust on NGOs and the private

sector in the development process (Sarker, 2003).

Whatever functional space has been left for local government has been taken over by

bureaucracy in the name of development administration. Almost every aspect of local

government operations is controlled by the central government and its field offices either through direct

intervention or a plethora of rules and regulations. The central government has the authority to suspend a

local government unit. All these practices have jeopardized attempts to build an effective and devolved local

government system in Bangladesh (ibid).

Figure 3: Overview of Bangladesh's decentralization

8

4. DIFFERING PACES OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

From the above discussion, it can be seen that the three biggest countries of the Indian sub-continent are at different stages in

the pace of decentralization. The following table summarizes the current challenges in decentralization in the three countries:

Table 2: Summary of comparative analysis of decentralization across India, Bangladesh and Pakistan

Type Feature India Pakistan Bangladesh

Constitutional Strength Achieved a clear transition from local government as a desirable institution (by virtue of inclusion in directive principle of state policy) to an integral democratic institution (by virtue of inclusion as a constitutional provision)

Clear allocation of functions to local governments by schedules XI and XII

Provisions for direct elections and representation of weaker sections and a host of enabling provisions by parts IX and IXA

The success of 18th amendment which transfers substantial powers to provinces and the history of 17th amendment offers hope for inclusion of local government as a Constitutional provision

Local Government an integral part of the Constitution (Articles 59&60)

Broad assignment of functions: Administration, public order, preparation and implementation of development plans

Weaknesses While most political decentralization measures are mandatory, most administrative and decentralization measures are discretionary offering great latitude for States. Responsible for variation among States in decentralization

Failed to achieve the transition from local government as a principle of policy to an integral constitutional provision. With the expiry of Legal Framework Order after six years, the constitutional basis for local government remains only in principles

Powers and functions of local government to be decided by the Parliament

Functions specified in the Constitution are too broad

Limited clarity on elections to these bodies

Legislative Strengths All States have legislated decentralization Acts in conformity with the Constitutional provisions

The devolution of powers under the 18th amendment offers hope that provinces may feel more amenable to devolving powers to local governments as they have limited capacity to handle all responsibilities

A series of ordinances had set the ground for decentralization and representative government in conformity with the constitution

Weaknesses The powers devolved to local governments vary substantially across the Acts of different States. This means that local governments in some States have a more enabling legal environment that

After the expiry of Legal framework Order, there is no clear legal framework governing local government. Each province is adopting their own legal

The parliament has also legislated laws which restrict the powers and functions of local government leaders and give sweeping powers to bureaucrats leading to political-administrative

9

Type Feature India Pakistan Bangladesh

others framework

The 18th amendment makes no mention of local government

conflicts

Implementation Strengths Strong Institutional support including dedicated ministries at national and State level, State Election Commission, State Finance Commission

Strong international development aid support in capacity building, monitoring, performance management

Active participation from citizens

Strong accountability mechanisms including regular elections and rights based legislations

Local government tiers as part of 2001 devolution plan have been retained to certain extent

Institutional set up: Dedicated Local Government Division

Strong support of civil society in implementation efforts

Active bureaucratic support in development activities

Strong international development aid support

Elections to lowest tier held in 2009

Weaknesses Varying performance across States due to weak fiscal and administrative powers in many areas

Danger of elite capture in poor, illiterate, feudal constituencies

Capacity challenges

Due to delay in holding local government election, local governments are still governed by bureaucrats

Dedicated institutional set up at national level has been abolished after 18th amendment and responsibility delegated to provincial level where no clear structure exists today

Limited autonomy in fiscal and administrative spheres

Lack of functional clarity: Mismatch among functions, functionaries and finances

Weak fiscal base: Miniscule share allotted to local

Unpredictable intergovernmental fiscal transfers and low capacity to raise own revenues

Low levels of capacity

Weak systems of accountability

Systemic

Strength

Strong federal system with established and powerful State governments which are today able to view local governments as collaborators and not existential threats

Weaknesses

Countercyclical pattern of local democracy: Tendency to introduce/strengthen local government during military regimes erodes the trust between democratic institutions and local governments in better times. Provincial governments view local governments with collaborators in strengthening and legitimizing non-democratic regimes and would make efforts to emasculate it

Absence of strong federal systems: The lack of strong provincial governments in Pakistan and presence of a unitary, centralized government in Bangladesh means the absence of strong intermediaries between the national and local governments which can effectively guide and monitor the local governments

10

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

International development actors such as World Bank and UNDP have ongoing projects in

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with sizeable fund allocations for decentralization.

World Bank has supported the Local

Governance Support project (I&II) of

Bangladesh with a ten-year commitment of

$1193 million. The direct support to Indias

third tier by World Bank approximates to

around $1358 million (World Bank, 2005-

2014). Pakistan is currently implementing the

Strengthening Participatory Federalism

and Decentralization Project in partnership

with UNDP at a project cost of $15 million

(UNDP, 2013). World Bank has projects

worth more than $1000 millions in sector service delivery programs in Pakistans

provinces.

However, a detailed analysis of the funding components brings in the following insights:

World Bank

Uniform design for different contexts: World Banks local governance support

project in Bangladesh has adopted a project design and implementation strategy very

similar to that of its local government projects in India regardless of the stark

differences in decentralization challenges faced by the two countries. In both

Bangladesh and India, World Bank projects focus on the lowest tiers of the

Government. Whereas this approach may be suitable in case of India, which has

mostly addressed the systemic, constitutional and legislative challenges and is working

on implementation challenges, this approach appears unsuitable for Bangladesh that

face huge systemic deficiencies and policy level limitations.

Narrow focus on fiscal transfers and assumption of Governments

responsibilities: The diagram below shows that 92 percent of project funding has

gone into fiscal transfers to the lowest level of the government, the Union Parishad

with the World Bank performing the role that the Government of Bangladesh should

ideally perform. This would mean that the national governments and local

governments would have limited ownership for the funds so transferred as also weak

Figure 4: International development aid for strengthening local government (direct funding)

11

institutional mechanisms or resources to sustain the transfers upon the completion of

the project by World Bank.

UNDP

Limited resources: An analysis of UNDPs project documents on Strengthening

Participatory Federalism and Decentralization Project in Pakistan indicate that

UNDP has a better understanding and insight into the ground realities and challenges

faced by Pakistan in strengthening decentralization and federalism. While its focus is

on enabling the government to implement the 18th amendment and strengthen the

Provinces, it has very strategically weaved in strong commitments for decentralization

to lower levels as part of the funding program. UNDP has outlined realistic and

meaningful project goals in terms of addressing systemic and legislative challenges

involved in decentralization. However, the extremely limited funding support offered

by UNDP in this program may not help build enough political and administrative will

for bringing about the policy shifts it envisages.

Recommendations

There is a need for international development agencies to understand that decentralization

need not be seen as a universally benign value by countries that has suffered under it, such as

Pakistan and Bangladesh. As Hart (1972: 607) for instance, observed: commitment to

democracy must precede the commitment to decentralization, if the latter is to be

instrumental in promoting the former (Andrews & de Vries, 2007). To promote

Source: Author (drawn upon LGS II project documents)

Figure 5: Components of Local Governance support Program II: World Bank Bangladesh

12

decentralization without that prior commitment can lead to unforeseen and sometimes

antidemocratic results.

Most efforts of World Bank, UNDP and all related funding agencies has been to work at the

lowest levels of government and focus on improvement of service delivery and performance

management without really focusing on the core issues of federalism and democracy and

how it affects the implementation of federalism in both these countries. While it is useful to

export best practices from India where grassroots level approaches worked, this happened

where the state governments owing to the federal structure were strong enough to support

the decentralization process.

There is a need for strong political commitment for democracy before decentralization can

be thought of in earnest. Such political commitment should first reflect in constitutional

amendments that clearly specify areas allocated to the local government institutions and

clearly demarcate powers between the provincial and local governments.

Towards this, there is great potential for better impact if World Bank and UNDP can work

together in creating more joint initiatives as in case of joint UNDP-World Bank Project on

country-led Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) or on State-building in Fragile and

Post-conflict situations. Great joint gains for the countries and international donors can

come from pooling funds and specific skills and knowledge to build more effective

democratic decentralization initiatives in the Indian sub-continent.

***

13

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Http://Databank.Worldbank.Org/Data/Views/Variableselection/Selectvariables.As

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1. Introduction2. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY3. DECENTRALISATION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT: PAST AND PRESENT4. Differing paces of Decentralization in the Indian Sub-Continent5. ImPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL development actors6. Bibliography1. Ahmad, J., Devarajan , S., Khemani, S., & Shah, S. (2005). Decentralization And Service Delivery. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3603, World Bank.2. Ahmad, M. S., & Talib, N. B. (2013). Local Government Systems And Decentralization: Evidence From Pakistans Devolution Plan. Contemporary Economics , 7 (1), Pp. 33-44.3. Andrews , C. W., & De Vries, M. S. (2007). High Expectations, Varying Outcomes: Decentralization And Participation In Brazil, Japan, Russia And Sweden. International Review Of Administrative Sciences .4. Cheema, A., & Khan, A. Q. (2014, August). Breaking The Countercyclical Pattern Of Local Democracy In Pakistan.5. CLGF (2013). The Local Government System In Pakistan. Commonwealth Local Government Handbook 2013/14 .6. Crook, R., & Manor, J. (2000). Democratic Decentralization. Oed Working Paper Series, World Bank, Washington D.C.7. Freedom House. (2013). Freedom In The World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs In The Balance.8. Fritzen, S., & Ramesh, M. (2009). Transforming Asian Governance: Rethinking Assumptions, Challenging Practice. Routledge.9. Gellner, D., & Hachhethu, K. (2008). Local Democracy In South Asia: Microprocesses Of Democratization In Nepal And Its Neighbours . Sage.10. Iipa. (2013). Strengthening Of Panchayats In India: Comparing Devolution Across State: Emprirical Assessment 2012-13s. Indian Institution Of Public Administration (Iipa). Ministry Of Panchayato Raj, Government Of India.11. Kugelman, M. (2012). Decentralisation In Pakistan: The Lost Opportunity Of The 18th Amendment. Noref Expert Analysis, Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre.12. Mohabbat Khan, D. (N.D). Functioning Of Local Government (Union Parishad): Legal And Practical Constraints. Democracy Watch.13. Mohmand, S. K., & Cheema, A. (2007, January). Accountability Failures And The Decentralisation Of Service Delivery In Pakistan. Ids Bulletin , 38 (1).14. Norris, P. (2008). Driving Democracy - Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.15. Olum , Y. (N.D.). Decentralisation In Developing Countries: Preconditions For Successful Implementation.16. Overview Of Rural Decentralisation In India . (2004). Workshop On Decentralizing Civil Servants. 1. World Bank.17. Pilpat, S. (2014, May 22). Asia Pacific Director At Transparency International (Ti). 'Fighting Corruption In South Asia: Building Accountability'. Ndtv.18. Sarker, A. E. (2003). The Illusion Of Decentralization: Evidence From Bangladesh. The International Journal Of Public Sector Management , 16 (7), 523-548.19. Schneider, A. (2003). Measurement, Decentralization: Conceptualization And Measurement. Studies In Comparative International Development , 38 (3), 32-56.20. Transparency International. (2013). Corruption Perception Index 2013. Retrieved November 28, 2014, From Transparency International: Http://Www.Transparency.Org/Cpi2013/Results21. UNDP. (2013). Human Development Report: Rise Of The South: Human Progress In A Diverse World. United Nations Development Programme.22. UNDP. (2013). Strengthening Participatory Federalism And Decentralization Project. Annual Progress Report, United Nations Development Programme Pakistan.23. World Bank. (N.D). Basic Facts About Local Government System In Bangladesh.24. World Bank. (N.D). Decentralization In Bangladesh. Retrieved November 30, 2014, From Decentralization In South Asia: Http://Web.Worldbank.Org/Archive/Website01061/Web/0__Co-25.Htm25. World Bank. (2008). Decentralization In Client Countries An Evaluation Of World Bank Support, 19902007. World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group.26. World Bank. (2005-2014). Project & Operations. Retrieved December 1, 2014, From The World Bank: Http://Www.Worldbank.Org/Projects/Search?Lang=En&Searchterm=Local27. World Bank. (2011). Project Apparaisal Document For Second Local Governance Support Project. World Bank, Sustainable Development Unit. World Bank.28. World Bank. (2014). World Data Bank - World Development Indicators. Retrieved November 28, 2014, From World Bank: Http://Databank.Worldbank.Org/Data/Views/Variableselection/Selectvariables.Aspx?Source=World-Development-Indicators