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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:1 Winter 2005

RAFAEL DE CLERCQ

Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties

In this paper I begin by arguing that aestheticterms cannot be used as metaphors and I end byarguing that the concept of an aesthetic propertyis analyzable in nonaesthetic terms. The begin-ning and the end of the paper are connected by acomplex reasoning that can be summarized asfollows: aesthetic terms cannot be used meta-phorically because their applicability is neverrestricted to a particular category of objects(Section I); if the applicability of aestheticterms is never restricted to a particular categoryof objects then a fortiori it is never restricted toa category of nonvisual objects; if the applica-bility of aesthetic terms is never restricted to acategory of nonvisual objects, then all aestheticterms are applicable to visual objects (Section II);if all aesthetic terms are applicable to visualobjects, then all aesthetic properties can beexemplified by such objects; finally, if all aes-thetic properties can be exemplified by visualobjects, then for the purpose of analyzing theconcept of an aesthetic property it suffices toanalyze the concept of a visual aesthetic prop-erty (Section III).

In arguing for the ultimate conclusion of thepaperthat the concept of an aesthetic propertyis fully analyzable in nonaesthetic termsrefer-ence is made to an earlier paper, The Conceptof an Aesthetic Property, in which the conceptof a visual aesthetic property was analyzed innonaesthetic terms.1 However, understandingthe present paper does not require familiaritywith the previous one. Moreover, until the finalconclusion is reached, nothing hinges onwhether one is prepared to accept the claimsmade in that earlier paper.

It may appear that the visual/nonvisualdistinction plays a central role in my argument.However, as will become clear, an analogousdistinction in terms of a different sense modal-ity (for example, auditory/nonauditory) couldhave served as well and perhaps all reference toparticular sense modalities could have beenavoided, as Section IV suggests. Thus, the presentpaper is only superficially scopocentric.

I

Aesthetic terms have at least one strikingfeature in common and that is their resistance tometaphorical usage. In other words, aestheticterms cannot be turned into metaphors.2 Forinstance, it makes no sense to say that some-thing is beautiful metaphorically speaking.Likewise, it does not make sense to say thatsomething is metaphorically elegant, metaphor-ically harmonious, or metaphorically sublime.

The question is, of course, why this is so. Ata superficial level, the following explanationsuggests itself. Aesthetic terms do not have aparticular area of application associated withthem. There is not a particular kind of objectto which they are to be applied. As a result,it is not possible to commit something like acategory mistake with respect to such terms.By contrast, terms for animal species such aselephant and crocodile can be applied onlywithin the animal kingdom: to apply themoutside this area is to commit a categorymistake (which may of course result in ametaphor). This explanation is supported by the

28 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

fact that aesthetic terms share their resistance tometaphorical transference with other univer-sally applicable terms such as the predicateinteresting and the verb to exist. (Nothingcan be said to exist metaphorically speaking.)

Of course, some aesthetic terms may alreadybe metaphors. The predicate balanced may bea case in point. However, this does not contra-dict the suggested explanation since balancedmay be universally applicable when usedmetaphorically. Moreover, the metaphoricalnature of some aesthetic terms may provide anadditional explanation of their resistance tometaphorical usage. It seems that to apply ametaphor metaphorically just is to apply a meta-phor. At first sight, there seems to be no suchthing as a second-order metaphor.

Note that I am not saying that all metaphorsare category mistakes. In other words, I am notsaying that metaphorical usage always involvessubstituting one domain of application foranother. This would be contradicted by suchmetaphors as the brain is the heart of the ner-vous system. What I am claiming, though, isthat metaphorical usage always requires thepossibility of category mistake. Clearly, thiscondition is satisfied in the case of heart becausewe can say such things as investigators havehit the heart of the criminal organization. How-ever, if what I have said so far is right, then thecondition is not satisfied in the case of aestheticterms such as beautiful and sublime.

One might ask why universal applicabilityorwhat comes to the same thingthe impos-sibility of category mistakes explains resistanceto metaphorical usage. An obvious answer tothat question, it seems to me, is (1) that a termsuniversal applicability deprives it of substantialdescriptive content and (2) that in the absenceof substantial descriptive content, there is noth-ingor at least too littleto serve as the para-phrasable core meaning of a metaphor. (Andmetaphors always have such a core meaning.)3

II

In the previous section I argued that aestheticterms cannot be used metaphorically becausethere is no category of objects to which theirapplication is restricted. Now, if there is nocategory of objects to which their application is

restricted, then a fortiori it is not restricted to acategory of nonvisual objects; therefore, anyaesthetic term is applicable to visual objects, ifapplicable at all.

One might object to this reasoning by sayingthat even if the class of aesthetic terms as awhole has no restricted domain of application,there may be subclasses within this class forwhich there exist such domains. (Clearly, if thisobjection is correct, then either aesthetic termscan be used metaphorically or my explanationof why they cannot is mistaken.) In support ofthis objection one might cite the term elegantbecause the applicability of this term is some-times said to be restricted to entities exhibitingline or movement. However, it is not clear to mewhether this is supposed to amount to a genuinerestriction, in the sense of limiting the applica-tion of the term elegant to a certain categoryof objects.4 Line and movement can be found invisual objects, auditory events, and even in non-perceptible entities such as intellectual or emo-tional progressions. Of course, they may not beliterally present in such cases butcruciallythat does not seem to prevent the term elegantfrom being applicable. For instance, a line ofthought (an argumentative line) may beelegant and yet it is never literally a line. Infact, that is probably what makes the termelegance universally applicable: because thereis no clear a priori restriction on themetaphorical applicability of line and move-ment, there is no clear a priori restriction onthe literal applicability of elegant either (forthe literal applicability of elegant seems todepend on the overall applicability of line andmovement).5 In sum, the term elegant isprobably not a counterexample to the claim thataesthetic terms have an unrestricted domain ofapplication.

Similar things cannot be said about (theaesthetic uses of) garish and gaudy. Theseterms are used exclusively to characterizecombinations of colors or textiles, even thoughit is difficult to see how they might apply meta-phorically to other sorts of objects. However,this does not show that the applicability of thecorresponding aesthetic concepts is restricted tothe visual. For our current concept of garishness(that is, the concept associated with our currentuse of the term garish) may be an impure,hybrid concept containing both an aesthetic and

De Clercq Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties 29

a nonaesthetic (for example, purely visual)component. To undermine my proposal onewould have to show that it is the aesthetic com-ponent that is responsible for the restriction ofthe domain. If it is not the aesthetic component,then aesthetic terms with more or less disjointdomains of applicationsay, garish andcacophonouscould express the same aestheticconcept. (Somewhat like boar and man mayboth express the concept of being male.)

But if garish and gaudy do not applyuniversally, then what about my initial claimthat aesthetic terms apply universally? Well,garish and gaudy should be considered assemi-aesthetic terms because they do notmerely express aesthetic concepts. As such theyfall outside the scope of my claim. Nonetheless,my claim would have to be true of a termexpressing the purely aesthetic essence ofgarish and gaudy. Perhaps this essence isexpressed by (a certain use of) harsh andindeed I do not see why this term could not beused without category restrictions.

The foregoing does not imply that theapplication of aesthetic terms is entirely uncon-strainedclearly, aesthetic terms apply to someobjects and not to others. However, what it doesimply is that the application of aesthetic terms isnot restricted to a specific category of objects.In a sense, then, there is no category of aestheticobjects.

At this point it becomes important to saysomething more about the notion of categoryon which I have been relying. The relevantnotion is more or less equivalent to the notionof a kind, and its equivalent at the level ofconcepts or predicates is sometimes called asortal. More specifically, what I have in mindare categories to which entities belong neces-sarily. In other words, if an entity falls underthe corresponding concept, then necessarily so.Thus, the category of beautiful objects is nocategory in the intended sense, in contrast with,say, the category of animals. In any case, someform of essentialism is presupposed throughoutthis paper. Therefore, the additional specifica-tion that categories are based on natural simi-larities is unlikely to add somethingobjectionable. (Thus, the union of the follow-ing two sets is not a category in the intendedsense: the set of all prime numbers and the setof all mammals.)

Now something like the following objectionis likely to be raised. Perhaps artworks have (atleast some of) their aesthetic properties essen-tially. If so, then the set of ugly artworksmight constitute a category in the intendedsense, and surely this category would be onewithin which an aesthetic term such as beautifulcannot even in principle be applied. Thus, thereseems to be an exception to the rule thataesthetic terms are universally applicable.

In response to this objection, the relevantnotion of a category should be characterized ina more precise manner. More specifically, oneshould take into consideration that categoriesstand in hierarchical relations to one anotherand that ugly work of art and beautiful workof art are same-level categories (if they arecategories at all). To follow this suggestion isnot necessarily to make an ad hoc move, sinceno one will regard the attribution of beauty to anugly work of art as a category mistake, that is,as an outright absurdity. In other words, the factthat beautiful cannot apply to ugly works ofart should not be considered as a category-basedlimitation on its applicability.6

One caveat. I do not wish to deny that someentities may be difficult to characterize inaesthetic terms. For instance, directions, inter-vals, subatomic particles, and physical magni-tudes are not the sort of thingsif things theyarewe would be inclined to call sublime orelegant. However, what is striking is that theseentities form a gerrymandered set and that thecomplement of this setthe set of things thatare not directions, magnitudes, and so forthseems equally gerrymandered. In other words,the entities to which aesthetic terms apply donot seem to form a delineated, unified, or self-standing category. Therefore, it does not seempossible to define a category-based limitationon the applicability of aesthetic terms.

The adjective category-based also helpsunderscore the fact we are not interested inde facto (limitations of) applicability. It may bethat some aesthetic terms are as a matter of factapplicable only to a certain category of entities.This would be a factual or contingent limitationon their use, whereas the intended kind oflimitation is principled or necessary. In otherwords, it is a kind of limitation that arises inde-pendently of what sorts of entities are actuallyfound in the world.

30 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

III

In The Concept of an Aesthetic Property, theconcept of a visual aesthetic property was ana-lyzed as follows.

A property P is an aesthetic property of visual objectsif and only if(1) P is, at least in part, a value-property(2) for any visual object O: perceiving that O has P

involves perceiving the shape and color(s) of Obut not vice versa.7

The above analysis is clearly noncircular andwhen applied to examples it appears to deliver theright results: functional properties such as beingeasily visible are classified as nonaesthetic,prototypical aesthetic properties such as beingbeautiful are classified as aesthetic. In furthersupport of the analysis one could cite its explana-tory value: the analysis seems to explain why cer-tain theses have come to be regarded as truisms inaesthetics. For example, the second conditionseems to explain why aestheticians have beeninclined to accept the Acquaintance Principleand the Heresy of Paraphrase.8 In addition, thefirst condition explains why aesthetic propertiesare often considered to be value-grounding.9

Admittedly, the second condition is stillsomewhat crudely formulated. For instance, ablack-and-white photo may conceal the actualcolors of a sculpture and yet need not preventone from seeing that the sculpture has certainaesthetic qualities. Similarly, it is certainlypossible to perceive that an object has certainaesthetic qualities while perceiving it frombehind a colored screen.10 However, I take it thatthe point of the second condition is nonethelessclear: to perceive that a visual object has a cer-tain aesthetic quality one has to perceive at leastsome of its basic visual features.

In any case, suppose that we accept the aboveanalysis along with the following (intuitivelyplausible) thesis.

If all aesthetic terms are applicable to visual objects,then all aesthetic properties can be exemplified bysuch objects.

In the previous sections I provided a priorievidence for the antecedent of this conditional andthus, by transmission of warrant, for its conse-

quent. Put otherwise, this consequent amounts tothe following claim: if P is an aesthetic property,then P is an aesthetic property of visual objects.The reverse claimif P is an aesthetic property ofvisual objects, then P is an aesthetic propertyisof course trivially true. Therefore, the followingequivalence should have been established by now.

For all properties P, P is an aesthetic property if andonly if P is an aesthetic property of visual objects.

Otherwise said, the class of aesthetic propertiesis identical to the class of visual aesthetic prop-erties. If this identity is accepted, then we canturn the analysis outlined in The Concept of anAesthetic Property into a perfectly general ana-lysis of the concept of an aesthetic property. Theanalysis would be:

For all properties P, P is an aesthetic property if andonly if(1) P is, at least in part, a value-property(2) for any visual object O: perceiving that O has P

involves perceiving the shape and color(s) of Obut not vice versa.

This strategydefining the class of aestheticproperties as a whole by reference to whatappears to be one of its subclasseshad alreadybeen briefly considered in the original paper.However, it was not adopted there because thea priori argument was still lacking.11

For those who are not yet convinced by the apriori argument (as outlined in the previoussections), I would like to point out that there isalso significant a posteriori evidence for theclaim that all aesthetic properties are aestheticproperties of visual objects. For all the aestheticproperties that one could plausibly cite as centralor prototypical cases (for example, being beauti-ful, elegant, sublime, harmonious, handsome,graceful) are as a matter of fact aesthetic proper-ties of visual objects. That would be strikingcoincidence unless the above claim expressedsomething like an a priori truth.

IV

The strategy outlined in the previous sectionsmay give the impression that, on my account,vision occupies a privileged position in the

De Clercq Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties 31

sphere of the aesthetic. After all, the class ofaesthetic properties has been defined withexclusive reference to this particular sensemodality. However, the impression is mislead-ing, for a different sense modality could haveserved just as well (after all, there are supposedto be no category restrictions). What is more, itis likely that all reference to particular sensemodalities can be avoided. Consider, forexample, the following generalizing strategy.

1. A property P is an aesthetic property if and only if itis an aesthetic property of perceptual objects.

2. A property P is an aesthetic property of perceptualobjects if and only ifa. P is, at least in part, a value-propertyb. for any perceptual object O: perceiving that O

has P involves perceiving the basic perceptualfeatures of O but not vice versa.

Compared with the previous one, this strategyhas two clear advantages. First, this strategy ismore elegant (!) because it does not give theappearance of privileging a particular sensemodality (for example, vision). Second, it ismore likely to be adopted because the extraassumption it needs (to support the first part) isweaker than the one needed for the first strategy.(Recall that the first strategy required that allaesthetic terms be applicable to visual objects,whereas this strategy only requires that all aes-thetic terms be applicable to perceptual objects.)

However, apart from possible worries aboutthe somewhat obscure notion of a basic percep-tual featureHow is this notion to be definedfor all actual and possible sense modalities?thealternative strategy may not offer all the argumen-tative benefits it promises. After all, to support theextra assumption (all aesthetic terms are applic-able to perceptual objects) one would probablyneed to appeal to the same argument as the oneoutlined in this paper. Thus, it seems that theweakness of the assumption cannot be cashedin at an argumentative level (which is normallypart of what makes weak assumptions attractive).

V

In this paper I argued as follows: aesthetic termscannot be applied metaphorically because theyare universally applicable; if aesthetic terms are

universally applicable, then (roughly speaking)there is no aesthetic property that only certainobjects can have; if (again, roughly speaking)there is no aesthetic property that only certainobjects can have, then there is no aestheticproperty that only nonvisual objects can have;finally, if there is no aesthetic property that onlynonvisual objects can have, then all aestheticproperties are (also) aesthetic properties of vis-ual objects.

This conclusion matters because it allows oneto demarcate the class of aesthetic properties asa whole by means of an analysis, given in adifferent paper, for visual aesthetic property(or perceptual aesthetic property if one prefersthe alternative strategy).12

RAFAEL DE CLERCQInstitute of PhilosophyUniversity of LeuvenB-3000 Leuven Belgium

INTERNET: rafael.declercq@hiw.kuleuven.ac.be

1. Rafael De Clercq, The Concept of an AestheticProperty, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60(2002): 167176.

2. In searching for counterexamples the reader should becareful to distinguish metaphoric from idiomatic and evenironic uses of terms (to name just two rivaling categories). Formore on the idiomatic/metaphoric distinction, see, forexample, Richard Moran, Metaphor in A Companion to thePhilosophy of Language, ed. Bob Hale and Crispin Wright(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 249250. For more on theironic/metaphoric distinction, see, for example, Ted Cohen,Metaphor in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. JerroldLevinson (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 369370.

3. For a convincing defense of this view, see JerroldLevinson, Whos Afraid of a Paraphrase? Theoria 67(2001): 723.

4. The notion of a category will be further elucidated indue course.

5. By speaking of the literal applicability of the termelegant I do not mean to suggest that the term is alsometaphorically applicable.

6. It may have occurred to the reader that I have concen-trated on categories of objects. However, the argumentcould also be stated in terms of events, states of affairs,ways, configurations, and so forth. It will always turn outthat the applicability of aesthetic terms is never restricted toa category of nonvisual entities.

7. De Clercq, The Concept of an Aesthetic Property,p. 170.

8. See The Concept of an Aesthetic Property, pp. 172173.Note that the acceptability of the analysis is independent ofthe truth of these alleged truisms. The analysis merely

32 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

explains why they have come to be regarded as truisms. Forrecent doubts concerning the Acquaintance Principle, seeMalcolm Budd, The Acquaintance Principle, The BritishJournal of Aesthetics 43 (2003): 386392, and PaisleyLivingston, On an Apparent Truism in Aesthetics, TheBritish Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2003): 260278.

9. See the references to Monroe Beardsley and AlanGoldman in note 28 of The Concept of an AestheticProperty, p. 176. In addition, see note 1 of JerroldLevinson, Aesthetic Supervenience in Jerrold Levinson,Music, Art, and Metaphysics (Cornell University Press,1990), pp. 134135.

10. Compare note 7, De Clercq, The Concept of anAesthetic Property, p. 175.

11. Compare Another way to generalize the accountwould be to claim that all aesthetic properties are also aes-thetic properties of visual objects, so that, when one hasdefined the latter, one has also defined the former. I do notsee, however, how this claim could be argued for on an apriori basis (De Clercq, The Concept of an AestheticProperty, p. 173).

12. Thanks to Malcolm Budd, Leon Horsten, JerroldLevinson, Hans Maes, and the editor of this journal forhelpful comments and/or discussion.