david heyd - genethics

8/11/2019 David Heyd - Genethics

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David Heyd

Genethics

Moral Issues in the Creation of People

INTRODUCTION: PLAYING GOD

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them

have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the

cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon

the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he

him male and female created he them. And God !lessed them, and God said

unto them, "e fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and su!due it: and

have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over

every living thing that moveth upon the earth. . . . And God saw every thing that

he had made, and, !ehold, it was very good.

Genesis #:$%&$', ()

Any systematic and well*argued essay should start +in the !eginning,+ especially

if its very su!ect is +!eginnings.+ -he verses uoted a!ove are a !eginning inmore than one sense. -hey !elong to the first chapter of the first !ook of the

"i!le. -hey also descri!e the way humanity started !y a divine act of creation.

/e are not concerned here, however, with either the literary or the theological

significance of these verses. 0ather, # cite them at the outset of this !ook

!ecause they represent one of the earliest attempts in /estern thought to deal

with the pu11ling philosophical pro!lem that will !e the topic of the following

chapters. "ut again, we are less interested in the historical !eginning of that

philosophical pro!lem than in the logically pure form in which it is presented !y

the !i!lical te2t. #t is this conceptual sense of !eginning, that of complete

ideali1ation and total a!straction from any further contingent 3human4

complications, which makes God5s words and works on the si2th day of creation

our starting point.

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6laying on !i!lical connotations, the economist 6artha Dasgupta has coined the

term +genesis pro!lem+ as a name for the ideali1ed conte2t of decision making

regarding population policies. -hus he defines a genesis pro!lem as one that

concerns potential rather than actual human !eings. -he uestion it raises is how

many people should !e created. #n pure form it occurs when no actual people

e2ist 3Dasgupta )7'8, %9 Dasgupta )7'', ))4. -his is e2actly the scene of

Genesis #, where God considers the creation e2 nihilo of the first human !eing 3or

rather the first human couple4.

However, a close reading of the !i!lical te2t will show that God5s genesis pro!lem

is of a wider scope than the demographic sense suggested !y Dasgupta5s

metaphorical use. "efore deciding the num!er of humans to !e created, God has

to choose whether to create them at all. -hen he has to decide what sort of

creatures they are going to !e. ;nly then can the uestion of num!er arise.

-hree uestions are thus involved in the original genesis pro!lem: the e2istence,

the identity, and the num!er of people to !e created. #n the !i!lical te2t they are

all 3at least implicitly4 decided on one and the same ground: the replication and

multiplication of God5s image in the world. -he value of the replication of God5simage is the reason given for


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granted to animals !ut !y a clear>though linguistically minor>change in

wording the !lessing +"e fruitful and multiply+ !ecomes in the case of human

!eings an inunction 3actually the first one4, which in later theological

developments places it very high in the order of religious responsi!ilities and

duties. #t is a uniue commandment, !ecause it is the e2istential !asis for the

very possi!ility of all other commandments. #t is conscious procreation rather

than simple !iological propagation which is the o!ect of the first 3moral4 duty.

-ransforming the instinctual se2ual drive, which in the case of animals can !e

only +a !lessing,+ into a matter of rational will and choice, which in the human

sphere !ecomes a prescription, is that which makes procreation an ethical

su!ect.

So after the creation of Adam and ?ve populating the earth !ecomes the

!usiness of human !eings. God5s pure genesis pro!lem is handed on to humans

who have to solve it in the light of the guiding principle of the replication and

multiplication of God5s image in the world. -here is a long tradition of

interpretations of the idea and nature of God5s image, all concentrating on the

spiritual similarity of human !eings to God as manifested in holiness, rationality

or intellect, consciousness, immortality of the soul, the capacity to choose!etween right and wrong 3ustice4, or in having the divine +!reath+ of spiritual life

3Genesis ##:84. However, the only interpretive clue e2plicitly suggested !y the

original te2t is that human !eings resem!le God in their creative power,

e2pressed primarily !y their procreative capacity to replenish the world and

secondarily !y their power to su!due nature to their own purpose. #n other words,

God replicates himself and his dominion in the created world !y the mediation of

human multiplication and dominion, which itself is the image of God5s creative

power.@) Human !eings take over the sustenance of the divine plan of creation

of the first si2 days, and !y thus doing assume a divine image.

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-his interpretation of the notion of +God5s image+ as referring to the act of

creation of !eings resem!ling the creator is e2plicitly corro!orated !y the later

version in Genesis B: )&(:

-his is the !ook of the generations of Adam. #n the day that God created man, in

the likeness of God made he him.


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-his is why we take the celestial story of creation only as an a!straction of the

very terrestrial dilemmas of the ethics of human procreation. -his theoretical

ideali1ation of the kind of considerations involved in human reproductive choices

is !est captured !y the metaphor of +playing God,+ which is so often used in the

conte2t of human power to decide the very future of humanity. /e are said to

play God whenever we make choices concerning a!ortion, genetic engineering,

the !asic conditions of future life on the planet, interference with evolutionary

processes, or any radical tampering with the allegedly +natural+ development of

human !eings and their environment. 6laying God is almost universally

condemned as an unauthori1ed human intervention in a divine plan or in a

natural process, an arrogant transgression of legitimate !ounds of action in the

world. However, if indeed the capacity to invest the world with value is God5s

image, it elevates human !eings to a uniue 3godly4 status, which is not shared

!y any other creature in the world. -his is playing God in a creative, +human*

specific+ way.

=urthermore, the pure genesis pro!lem raises in a trenchant manner the general

uestion of the nature and source of value: if the world as a whole does not e2ist,

how can its creation !e considered good ;r, alternatively, if no human !eingse2ist 3in the inanimate world created in the first five days4, how can their creation

!e considered of any value God retrospectively udges his creation as +very

good,+ !ut what kind of good is it -here are two possi!le responses to this

uestion. -he first is to take the impersonal wording of the !i!lical verse literally,

that is to say the state of affairs after


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draw!ack of this interpretation is that God is usually not considered as having

interests or pleasures and that these cannot therefore serve as the !asis for the

value of his works. God is self*sufficient in his perfect and infinite e2istence why

should he need 3desire4 his image to !e vicariously augmented !y human

procreation ?ven more difficult is the case of the world !eing created !y a

completely nonpersonal force or process: how can the value of its very e2istence

!e accounted for Fan coming into e2istence have value

#t seems that the impure genesis conte2t, that of human !eings deciding on the

e2istence of future human !eings, is the clue for unraveling the pu11ling issue of

the value of the creation of humanity. =or, as we shall see, in the less pure, more

contingent, conte2ts of human procreation, the actual decision makers are the

reference point for the source of value. #f indeed replication and multiplication are

considered !y human !eings as something good, then these procedures can !e

easily understood as good for them . So the genesis pro!lem that in its pure

godly form might look either logically pu11ling or metaphysically mysterious can

!e more easily dealt with in its impure human form. ustifying the view that value

is always derived from its effects on valuers is easier and more natural in the

human 3anthropocentric4 sphere than in its metaphysical 3theocentric4counterpart. evertheless, the pure divine version of Genesis draws for us the

conceptual contours of our pro!lem.

/ithout then claiming any theological insight or linguistic e2pertise in !i!lical

interpretation, the following reading of the verses from Genesis is suggested as

the framework for the nonreligious argument that will !e developed in the

following chapters: God, the personal creator of the universe, having completed

the creation of the inanimate world, the flora and fauna, considers a further

creation of a uniue creature>one that will resem!le God himself in two

respects: !eing a!le to procreate creatures of the same kind without further

divine help, and conseuently to rule all the rest of the world in the sense of

making it have value. "ut this unorthodo2 interpretation holds that the value of

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the world after the creation of humanity does not arise out of the addition of any

precious and valua!le furniture to it, !ut in the creation of su!ects for whom

things 3which so far have !een valueless4 can !e of any valueI God5s deli!eration

a!out the prospective creation is conducted in the plural form>understood either

as a +pluralis maestatis+ ceremonial formula 3for instance !y Sa5adia Gaon4, or

as referring to a grand consultation of God with the angels 3primarily !y 0ashi,

who regards it as a proof of God5s humility4, or as an indication of the cooperation

of divine and earthly forces in the creation of human !eings 3achmanides4. "ut

whatever the meaning of +us,+ the reasons for creating Adam and ?ve have to do

with God5s wishes, interests, good. God wants his image multiplied and his

dominion e2tended in the world through the mediation of human !eings. -he

success of divine creation is epitomi1ed in the words +!ehold, it was very good,+

that is, success in terms of God5s satisfaction of the way things have turned out

for him . "ut note that the image that God wants to aggrandi1e in the world

according to our reading is the very power of transforming valueless things and

states of affairs into things of value through the creation of the necessary

condition for the e2istence of value, namely valuers.

ow, if indeed the e2istence of valuers 3for whom things might !e good4 is, as weshall claim throughout this !ook, a necessary condition for anything !eing of

value, then it is either God or human !eings 3or !oth4 which are the reference

points for any assignment of value. -he world created stage !y stage is said to

!e good for God 3in his eyes4, !ut, as most interpretations of Genesis point out, it

is created so as to !e good specifically for man . #t must !e +settled+ and tilled !y

human !eings, in order for it to !ecome valua!le. #n that respect human !eings

must perpetuate themselves so as to secure the ongoing value of the created

world. -his is the cosmic design 3which is of value for God4. -his way of reading

the te2t can e2plain the duty we owe to God to !e fertile and increase, as indeed

is the !asic ra!!inic understanding.

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However, if God5s e2istence is denied, human !eings are left as the only

reference point or +source+ of value in the world. -hey themselves !ecome God,

in the sense that they have full sovereignty over the e2istence of value. -he story

of creation !ecomes a metaphor for the human position in pure genesis conte2t

of procreation. Human !eings are forced to play God in a God*less world.

Although they do not share the omnipotence of God, they have +dominion+ over

the world in the radical sense that the very continuation of the e2istence of any

value in and of the world is dependent on their !egetting valuers. #n a God*less

world there is no cosmic plan or transcendental design that makes humans the

sovereign rulers of the earth !ut without their e2istence as su!ects for whom the

earth can !e of value, the earth will remain valueless. -his is the nonstandard

understanding of +dominion,+ and the way human !eings +su!due+ the nonhuman

world.@$

Human !eings, whether they !elieve in God and the story of their creation, or in

!iological evolution and gradual development out of lower forms of life, can play

God e2actly in those two senses: they have control over the e2istence and

num!er of future people, and they are the source of value of the rest of the

natural world. Although the omnipotent creative power of the /ord or fiat is

transformed into a more limited capacity of se2ual procreation, human !eings>with their +divine+ ualities of rationality, consciousness, and free will>can

choose whether and how to continue the original celestial design 3or alternatively,

if they do not !elieve in such a design, how to devise a human design in a world

devoid of any kind of cosmic plan4.

#f God is !elieved to e2ist, then it is this very nature of !eing a!le to choose

which makes human !eings su!ect to the religious inunctions +!e fruitful and

multiply+ and +su!due the earth.+ #t is their responsi!ility to God which guides

!oth family planning and ecological policies. However, if it is assumed that no

God e2ists and no preceding design in the evolution of humanity can !e found,

can there !e any commandment regarding the use of human 3pro4 creative

power -o whom are people answera!le #t is the thesis of this essay that they

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can have no such duty or responsi!ility !eyond that to their own selves. #t is

e2actly in that respect that they +play God+>a solitary and egocentric game. As it

is a!surd to ask to whom God owes the creation of


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us as a sort of Gedankene2periment , a model for what is considered playing

God in the nonplayful sense of the word. #t can !e highly illustrative of the uniue

conceptual difficulties involved in a whole range of issues sometimes referred to

as +futurity pro!lems.+

-ypically the antiuity of the theological inuiry into the pure genesis pro!lem of

creation can !e matched with the novelty of the ethical e2amination of the

parallel impure version of human procreation. -he reason for this is uite simple:

only in the past century or so has humanity made rapid progress towards an

unprecedented degree of control over the reproductive process, there!y making

the compliance with the inunction of propagation a highly complicated and moot

issue. 0eplenishing the earth with people is no longer ust a natural practice over

which individuals and societies have little discretion. #t has !ecome a maor

ethical dilemma due to a whole new repertory of options out of which people can

and have to choose.

=or the first time in human history the future e2istence of humanity as such has

!ecome a matter of choice. A vast nuclear disaster, either as a result of war or as

the outcome of a maor accident in a faulty plant could pose a real menace to thevery e2istence of human life 3or indeed any life4 on the planet. -he continuation

of the species is, therefore, no longer a natural phenomenon threatened only !y

natural catastrophes 3cosmic or evolutionary4, !ut the responsi!ility of the

e2isting generation that has the power literally to destroy itself together with all

prospects of human life.@E ?nvironmentalists regularly warn us also a!out the

more gradual forms of collective suicide, such as the accumulation of

radioactivity, interference with the protective o1one layers of the atmosphere, or

the irreversi!le pollution of vital resources like water and air.

=or those who are less impressed !y the doomsday prophecies of gloomy

ecologists, simpler indications of the newly acuired power +to play God+ can !e

found in recent developments in human control over reproduction, that is to say

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over the num!er 3although secondarily of course also the e2istence4 of future

people. ;n the individual level, modern techniues of contraception have made

the si1e of one5s family a matter of planning, and planning reuires decision

making and choice. -he limited effectiveness of older methods of contraception

3and a!ortion4 made the commandment to propagate difficult to violate. "ut

today, at least in developed countries, the primary decision on the num!er of

future mem!ers in a family lies fully with the parents.

;n the collective level there are also radical changes in the power of societies to

regulate the num!ers of their mem!ers. #n the past, societies could to some

e2tent keep desired demographic !alances under control !y determining the age

of marriage or !y encouraging 3or discouraging4 chastity. However, most

demographic changes and the formation of demographic !alances were in the

past a matter of spontaneous social 3or !iological4 adustment rather than of a

conscious political decision. -oday, demographic trends in any society have

!ecome the responsi!ility of governments, that is, have !ecome the su!ect of a

policy. -o enforce population policies, societies have at their disposal various

means, of varying degrees of compulsion: educational, economic, and legal.


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plants and lower animals to the human sphere, we will !e a!le in the not*too*

distant future to +mold+ children !y 3+positively+4 deciding at least some of their

ualities. "rave ew /orld technology of a similar kind is availa!le in !rain

surgery and radical chemical intervention in the human nervous system. #n all

these cases we suspect that the depth of the intervention merits the title of a

change in identity, thus raising a genesis pro!lem. =urthermore, medical

progress poses a threat over the uality of the gene pool, for e2ample, !y the fact

that more children with genetic defects are +saved+ from natural a!ortion or from

death !efore the age of fertility. "rainwashing and indeed !asic forms of

education and up!ringing will !e discussed in the following chapters under the

category of identity*shaping, although they are !y no means historically new.

;ne should note, however, that a much less dramatic means of determining the

identity of future persons is deciding the timing of their conception. A child

conceived now will have an identity completely different to that of a child

conceived in two months5 time. #n the modern age we are not only in control of

the timing of conception 3as part of family planning4, !ut we are also aware of the

dangers of conceiving a child at a certain time rather than waiting a while so as to

conceive a healthy child 3or for that matter a child with !etter social or economicprospects4 in its stead. "y providing us with the knowledge and a!ility to control

the timing of pregnancies, modern science has endowed our generation with an

unprecedented power of deciding 3at least in a negative way, analogous to

genetic screening and amniocentesis4 the identity of people in a far from trivial

sense.

;n a grander scale, the com!ination of negative and positive genetic

manipulation and other techniues of deep personality change could lead to a

total transformation of the nature of the human species. atural selection would

give way to artificial preselection, making future generations the product of our

creative power, interests, and whims. -his 3so far sci*fi4 scenario would crown us

either as gods or as the masters of !iological evolution 3depending on one5s

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metaphysical !eliefs4. And it will get us very close to a practical, real*life conte2t

of a pure genesis pro!lem 3although never a!solutely pure, since we, the

creators, will always remain actual !eings with particular interests and values4.

Like previous scientific and technoo!ica revoutions that have "odified

our sensi!ilities in the past, twentieth*century developments in reproductive

control profoundly challenge our long*esta!lished modes of thought a!out future

generations: their moral status, their rights, their claims on us. Cntil not long ago

future people were considered as a +given+ natural part of the world in which

people acted and which morally constrained their conduct. ot only were future

people5s e2istence, num!er, and identity mostly !eyond direct human control, !ut

the uality of their future life was also only marginally affected !y the e2isting

generation5s !ehavior. -he modern age has given us the effective tools of long*

term economic and technological investments 3the !enefits of which would !e

reaped only !y our descendants4, the power to manage vital !ut scarce

resources in a way that would make future life on earth possi!le and worthwhile,

the knowledge of the means of leaving posterity with an environment free from

radioactive waste and with sufficient fresh water and clean air. -his puts any

generation under a heavy responsi!ility of a ualitatively new sort: it e2tends thesphere of moral relations into the inter *generational dimension.

#t is, however, our primary conceptual concern to distinguish !etween the first

kind of pro!lems 3genesis pro!lems4 concerning the e2istence num!er and

identity of future people and the second set of issues regarding the way any

generation takes care of the interests and standard of living of future generations

3whose e2istence, num!er, and identity are +given+4. -his distinction has

sometimes !een !lurred !y recent passionate discussions of environmental

ethics, !iomedical issues, and the persistent pleas for ecological responsi!ility.

-he second category of pro!lems is for ideological reasons much more widely

discussed in the philosophical literature of the past decades and illustrates what

was called !y 6eter Singer +the e2panding circle+ of the su!ects of moral

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concern. =ollowing the gradual introduction into the moral domain of women,

people of other races, children, animals, and even plants and inanimate o!ects,

future people have also !ecome candidates for moral consideration.

-he main difference !etween the two kinds of pro!lems is that only the former

3genesis pro!lems4 raise the uniue logical metaphysical and therefore ethical

pu11le of the status of potential !eings, that is to say !eings whose e2istence is

not only remote in time !ut totally dependent on our choice. -here is a clear

3though sometimes unnoticed4 distinction !etween the uestion whether we

should have another child in the family and the uestion whether to move out of

an as!estos !uilt house so that our future children will not !e su!ect to health

ha1ards. o dou!t in the impure conte2t of human genesis pro!lems there is an

intimate and intricate relation !etween the two categories. -hus, unlike God who

created humanity en !loc with the rest of nature and e2 nihilo , we plan our

families and shape our population policies on the !asis of awareness !oth of the

e2istence of future unplanned people and of the limited space and resources that

will !e at their disposal. -his comple2 relationship !etween principles of genesis

and principles of ecology and ust savings will reuire special attention.

So although !oth types of uestions are eually new, owing to their common

!asis in technological !reakthroughs, only the genesis pro!lem is of uniue

philosophical interest. -his can !e illustrated !y the attempt to apply traditional

ethical theories to uestions concerning future generations. #t seems that with

certain adustments one can devise solutions for economic planning,

conservation policies, a!ortion and care of fetuses, or the maintenance of the

historical and artistic heritage in terms of utilitarian, Jantian, or Aristotelian

principles. However, when applied to pure genesis pro!lems these principles

seem to lead to a conceptual dead end or to yield parado2es. Accordingly, we

seem to !e on firm ground in arguing for the prohi!ition of manufacturing goods

now which will prove ha1ardous to the health of !a!ies in ten years5 time. "ut we

lose our moral conviction and philosophical assurance when confronted with a

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+wrongful life+ case in which a child sues his or her parents for having !een !orn.

At least part of this philosophical confusion may !e ascri!ed to the growing

suspicion, associated with ethical individualism, regarding the validity of

impersonal values and eternal moral truths. As we shall see, skeptical trends

regarding historicism and impersonalism in ethics undermine consistent solutions

to genesis pro!lems.

Genesis pro!lems are therefore uniue, not in !eing new, or in reuiring novel

adaptation of ethical principles, !ut in the fact that they resist any kind of ethical

treatment. -hey are novel in the more radical sense of raising the uestion of the

precondition of any meaningful ethical discourse. Here the e2tension of

intragenerational principles of ustice to the intergenerational sphere will not

suffice, since the uestion at hand relates not to the !orderline of the +moral

circle+ and the way to deal with those included in it, !ut to the very creation of its

mem!ers, to the choice of e2panding it. /e are here interested in the uestion of

the limits of ethical theory rather than the limits of moral concern.

-he uestion of future generations is of general theoretical interest, since, as we

shall see, it touches upon the very limits of ethics, the grounds for the attri!utionof value, and the logical conditions of moral relations. 6ure genesis pro!lems, or

their real*life modern impure counterparts, serve as a uniue test case for !oth

our moral intuitions and our e2isting ethical principles. -hey are of special

philosophical interest, for on the one hand they intuitively seem to have a

particular moral significance, yet on the other hand the theoretical e2amination of

their nature raises skeptical reflections a!out their having any ethical meaning.

Human choices in genesis conte2ts will !e shown to lie !eyond the !orders of

ethics in the same way as God5s celestial consultation 3with the angels or with

himself4 regarding the creation of


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Against this !ackground one should hardly wonder why the theological rendering

of the genesis of humanity is difficult to translate into ethical terms, or that the

uestioning of God5s moral motives in this conte2t sounds !i1arre.@% -heoretical

interest in genesis pro!lems has emerged only after !eing forced on us !y the

new dilemmas of demography, genetic manipulation, +wrongful life+ cases, and

self*imposed threats to the very future of the human race. Although moral theory

has always !een interested in the future in the sense of the conseuences of

human !ehavior, it is only since the late )7%s that philosophers have !ecome

directly concerned with genesis pro!lems. #n a pioneering article an arveson

3)7%84 investigated the uniueness of the moral pro!lem of the duty to procreate

in the light of utilitarian theories. -hen came ohn 0awls 3)78)4 in the first

systematic discussion of o!ligations to future generations in terms of a

deontological theory of ustice. And, of course, Derek 6arfit has done more than

any other philosopher in the past two decades toward the clarification of the

special status of genesis pro!lems. #n a series of articles and a whole section of

his !ook 36arfit )7'9, pt. 94 6arfit formulated the agenda for the philosophical

discussion of the topic and offered a series of imaginative and provocative

arguments and e2amples that have served as the focus for the scores of articles

devoted to these pro!lems in recent years.

Do we have an o!ligation to !ring new people into the world Do we have a duty

to have happy children to avoid having misera!le children #s there a right to !e

!orn, or a right not to !e !orn, or a right to !e !orn healthy Fan moral principles

guide us in an artificial genetic molding of humans #s a world with n happy

persons morally !etter than a world with no persons at all than a world with )K$n

eually happy persons than a world with $n persons who are only mildly happy

#s there a value in the e2istence 3and perpetuation4 of the human species as

such, regardless of the uality of life of its mem!ers -hese are some of the

uestions involved in genesis situations, or at least implied 3or presupposed4 !y

them.

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#n the present discussion we are primarily interested in contrasting two !asic

approaches to the analysis and solution of these issues. -he first, tacitly

e2pressed !y the divine conclusion of the act of creation 3+and, !ehold, it was

very good+4, ascri!es value to states of affairs in an impersonal, nonrelative

manner. -he second, implied !y !oth the reasoning !ehind the creation of in 6arfit5s wording 3referring to arveson4

>+person*affecting,+ or +person*regarding.+ -he great maority of moral

philosophers>past and present>hold some form of the former view, in which

genesis pro!lems appear 3# shall argue only at first sight4 to !e less trou!lesome.

"ut those who prefer any version of the latter are confronted with a serious

difficulty in genesis situations: whose good is served !y procreation /hose

rights are involved -he person*affecting approach raises the logical issue of the

attri!ution of rights and interests of potential people. Some philosophers !elieve

that these can have a moral standing, and thus may on some issues agree with

the +impersonal+ approach 3although for different reasons4. ;thers 3though not

many4 claim that only actual persons can !e su!ects for moral consideration and

hence arrive at skeptical conclusions regarding moral theori1ation and guidelines

for genesis pro!lems.

Although this distinction does not refer to a neat Grand Division of positions, !ut

rather to a spectrum of varying degrees of commitment to +impersonalism,+ it can

safely !e said that the tendency of most traditional ethical theory is to the first

approach 3Aristotle, "entham, as typical representatives4. Spino1a and

iet1sche might serve as e2amples for the second approach, insisting on the

analysis of goodness in the human*relative terms of good for . However, it is in

itself a telling fact that such classification of moral theories is a difficult enterprise,

and partly a matter of interpretation. -he reason is that moral philosophers were

hardly confronted !y genesis pro!lems and thus were lacking the ultimate test

case for their analysis.

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-his !ook is an attempt to strengthen the case for the minority approach. "ut

once a human*relative approach to value is adopted, genesis pro!lems raise the

uestion who are the human su!ects relative to whom value predication is made

possi!le


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#t is therefore the purpose of this !ook not to challenge widespread first*order

moral convictions regarding the dilemmas of shaping future people, !ut rather to

use genesis pro!lems as a new, e2ternal, standpoint for the theoretical

e2amination of the nature of value, the logical preconditions of moral relations,

and the limits of ethics.


20/85

!y its own necessity, then the genesis pro!lem has no ethical import. "ut if God

is conceived as a free personal force 3as in the udeo*Fhristian tradition4, then

some reference to his +volitions+ must !e part of the account of the world5s

creation. -his has always !een a conceptual pro!lem for theologians trying to

reconcile God5s freedom of choice and omnipotent creative power with his

necessary attri!utes of omniscience, goodness, and universal 3nonpartial4 point

of view. #f indeed humans are created in God5s image, it must !e in the second

sense of the a!ove dilemma, that is, having the power to choose. However,

human !eings are also self*transcending creatures, that is to say they can wish

to !e different from what they actually are. "ut despite this essentially human

drive of self*transcendence, human !eings are always !ound !y their own

nature. Although they may acuire 3in the future4 the a!ility to change their own

human nature, their choice whether to actually e2ercise this a!ility will !e

inevita!ly constrained !y their given human psychological, !iological, and

ideological makeup.

-he important conclusion of our argument will !e that there are no moral

constraints 3over and a!ove the !iological, psychological, and ideological4 in that

constant human attempt at self*transcendence in genesis decisions. #n ourreading +!e fruitful and multiply+ should !e understood as a !lessing rather than

a commandment. #n that respect we occupy a godly position with regard to the

future of humanity, for God is not in any way morally constrained in his creative

act. "ut unlike God, we can never take a completely impersonal view of the

universe and in that sense can only make agent*relative 3human4 decisions. 3And

even God, as we have seen, is inevita!ly !ound !y +theocentric+ motives, like the

spreading of his image, in his act of creation.4 /hen later in the !ook we discuss

education as the most common 3though impure4 e2ample of a genesis pro!lem,

we will see that typically the way we shape the personality of our children is

partly indicative of our a!ility to transcend what we actually are !ut no less

indicative of that part of our identity 3values, traits of character, interests4 from

which we cannot and do not want to escape.

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#f we pursue this line of argument, it seems that the idea of !eing created in

God5s image should !e understood as a logical limitation even on the divine

power of creation e2 nihilo: whatever is created 3either !y God or !y


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Chapter #$ %ron!fu Life: A Pure Genesis Pro&e" 'thics and Genethics

such as aesthetic, gastronomic, or scientific4. Secondly, there are those states

of affairs that could have had a moral value !ut do not !ecause they lie !eyond

human control. -hey are e2cluded from the moral sphere !ecause moral

udgment is concerned only with the possi!le ways in which we can affect the

future state of the world 3and of our own selves4. ?thical theory has always tried

to delineate the !oundary !etween that future which is under human control and

that which is not, !ut the !elief that those future states over which people have

no influence are not su!ect to moral udgment has mostly remained

uncontroversial. "ut then there are those future states that are neither nonmoral

in the sense of the first category 3i.e., they are important and in a seemingly

moral way4, nor !eyond our control as in the second category 3i.e., they are

$$


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!rought a!out !y intentional and deli!erate human action4, !ut nevertheless raise

serious dou!ts as to their moral status. -hese are the su!ect of our

investigation.

-he uniue status of this third category of future states lies in the fact that they

do not refer to the way the future is shaped for actual 3present or future4 human

!eings, !ut rather with the very creation of those !eings. #n grander terms,

whereas ethics is standardly concerned with world*amelioration, the sphere of

action in which we are interested here deals with world*creation. -here are

various ways of representing the distinction, depending on what one sees as

central to the concerns of ethics: making people happy versus making happy

people fighting for a more ust world as opposed to creating a 3new4 ust world

respecting people5s claims as distinguished from creating new claimants

reforming the vicious so as to make them virtuous as against genetically

manipulating the procreation of virtuous people.

o one can deny the theoretical and moral relevance of the distinction

represented !y these pairs. ?ven if the second pro!lem in every pair is moral in

nature, the principles governing its solution cannot !e the same as thosedeployed in the solution of the first. ?ven if our ethics is !ased on the apparently

unifying principles of overall promotion of happiness, ustice, respect for rights,

and virtue, there will still remain an unresolved tension !etween promoting those

values !y furthering them in e2isting people and promoting them !y creating new

people manifesting these respective values. -he distinction !ecomes even more

crucial if we deny the e2istence of such unifying principles and relegate ethics to

the treatment of e2isting people alone.

/e might want to reserve the term ethics for the realm of the first category of

actions and decisions and coin the hy!rid term genethics for the realm of the

second.@) -his terminology will serve us in arguing that, strictly speaking, ethics

is concerned with the rights, welfare, virtue, and value of actual people, whereas

$(


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the creation of people is a su!ect matter that calls for a separate, special

scrutiny. Genethics is on the one hand closely related to ethics, as it deals with

the deli!erate shaping of future states of affairs in a morally significant manner

yet, on the other hand, it cannot !e part of ethics, as it does not share with it the

most !asic presupposition: the e2istence of actual human !eings 3or given moral

su!ects4. ?thics is the theory of moral conduct in the world. Genetics is the

science of creating new !iological worlds. Genethics is the theory of moral

worldmaking. #t is concerned with +ways of worldmaking+ in a sense more literal

than elson Goodman5s.

/hat happens if the presupposition regarding the e2istence of moral su!ects is

dropped /hy does it make the pro!lems of genethics uniue and deserving of

separate investigation -he simple answer is that !oth our everyday moral

intuitions and our traditional ethical principles seem either to lead us into parado2

or to !reak down altogether when applied to genesis pro!lems. ;n the one hand

these pro!lems cannot simply !e swept under the carpet they are highly

important, even critical. ;n the other hand they do not lend themselves to

analysis in terms of e2isting moral and theoretical tools. #n the first part of this

!ook we will e2amine the pu11ling nature of genesis pro!lems, ustifying theneed for a separate treatment. #n the second part we will attempt to provide a

framework for the 3gen4 ethical solution of genesis pro!lems, claiming that

genethics can !e rationali1ed only in terms of ethics. -his will entail a narrowing

down of the relevance of ethics to genesis pro!lems, leaving important aspects

of those +future states+ !eyond the grip of moral discourse. -he last part of the

!ook will consider the far*reaching implications of this skeptical view for the limits

of ethics as a theoretical enterprise, while showing the relatively marginal effect

on our practical moral udgments concerning those dilemmas.

Genesis pro!lems have to do with the !ringing of human !eings into e2istence.

-he uestion of e2istence cannot however !e separated from the uestions of

num!er and identity. #f we are given the power to choose the creation of human

$9


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!eings, we are faced not only with a yes*or*no pro!lem, !ut must also decide

how many of them to create, and also of what kind. Genesis pro!lems were thus

defined in the introduction as those relating to decisions regarding the e2istence,

num!er, and identity of future people. -hese will !e the three dimensions of

genethics, separately discussed !ut intricately interrelated.

Although the thrust of our argument is that the distinction !etween ethics and

genethics is of theoretical and moral su!stance, the two are also interconnected

in complicated and varied ways. all !elong to ethics in the traditional sense 3though not easily applied to

modern dilemmas4. 6opulation policies and genetic engineering, however, clearly

!elong to genethics. et the distinction is hard to maintain in practice, since, for

e2ample, the way we control !irthrates is definitely going to affect the standard of

living of future people, whereas the standard of living of actual people is widely

recogni1ed as a maor factor in determining demographic trends. Again and

again we will see that genethics works only in ideali1ed conditions 3such as thoseof Genesis #4 and that empirical circumstances make it heavily laden with ethical

considerations.

-he -hree Levels of


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a new challenge calling for a complete revision of ethical thinking4. # !elieve that

the cluster of dilemmas confronting modern societies regarding population

policies, family planning, decisions concerning fetal research, the status of fro1en

eggs fertili1ed in vitro , legal claims for wrongful life, donor selection for artificial

insemination, and the regulation of the selection of recipients of these donations

>all call for what might !e ustifia!ly called a revolution in moral thinking.

-he parado2ical nature and counterintuitive implications of traditional solutions to

these pro!lems can !e discussed in terms of the three conventionally

distinguished levels of moral discourse: the intuitive 3sometimes referred to as

the +moral+4, the theoretical 3often called the +ethical+4, and the meta*ethical. #n

the rest of this chapter we will deal with the first level, mainly !y discussing a

real*life case that has caused confusion in !oth the legal profession and the

general pu!lic in recent years. Fhapter $ will !e devoted to the e2amination of

the second level 3mainly !y studying some of the maor ethical theories of the

past4. Fhapter ( will discuss the third level, the methodological difficulties

involved in addressing genesis pro!lems, especially the relation !etween theory

and intuition and the demarcation of the limits of ethics. -hus the ground will !e

cleared for an attempted solution to genethical pro!lems 3in part $4.

-he sense of pu11lement raised !y genesis pro!lems on the three levels of moral

discourse is eually sharp in the three dimensions of those pro!lems: e2istence,

num!er, and identity. -ake e2istence first: we are all inclined to !elieve that,

!eyond the de!ate on the morality of a!ortion, there is a difference !etween

killing a fetus and using contraceptive means as respective methods of family

planning. "ut why is it so #s the difference due to a !elief in the distinction

!etween the moral status of actual human !eings and that of merely potential

ones And if so, what is the standing of the latter ;ur intuitions are hardly sharp

on this matter. /e appeal to a more theoretical analysis of the pro!lem !y asking

whether human e2istence is in itself a good thing, or whether it is only the

underlying condition for anything that can !e held as good. #f life 3human

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e2istence4 is good, should we treat all none2istence as !ad And would that

mean considering prenatal none2istence as eually !ad as postmortem

none2istence -hese highly theoretical speculations might lead to a dead end,

implying the meta*ethical conclusion that they lie !eyond the valid o!ects of

ethical thinking and moral udgment.

;r consider num!ers: if we decide on massive assistance programs to starving

people in #ndia, we might save the lives of 2 people however, !y that very

decision we promote the !irthrate in an overpopulated country, directly causing

more starvation in the ne2t generation 3and the potential death of let us say 2 M n

people4. #s this the morally right choice Should we sacrifice the lives of a certain

num!er of actual people in order to save the lives of a greater num!er of

potential people 3cf. Hardin )7')4 ote that the source of our confused

intuitions a!out this case is not the difficulty of solving moral dilemmas involving

the sacrifice of some people for the sake of saving others it is rather connected

with the conceptual pro!lem of the status of potential people: do they have rights

at all Do they have fewer rights than actual people ;r should they !e treated

on a par with e2isting people Again, a typical ascent to a more theoretical level

of analysis is called for. Ctilitarianism, for instance, might guide us to a policy ofsacrifice 3!ased on the ma2imi1ation of goodness in the world4. "ut then we are

!affled !y the uestion whose good is to !e ma2imi1ed: that of all actual moral

su!ects, or that of all possi!le moral su!ects -his immediately leads the

discussion to the logical pro!lem of fi2ing the e2tension of the group of possi!le

moral su!ects, a typical meta*ethical uestion.

=inally, consider the identity of those affected !y our genethical decisions: this is

also a source of confusion on the three respective levels of discourse. #n

premodern moral decision making the identity of the su!ects involved in the

possi!le outcomes of our decisions was usually fi2ed. "asically, comparisons

were made !etween the welfare and rights of one identifia!le person 3or persons4

with those of another eually identifia!le person3s4. "ut now we can decide the

$8


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se2 of a future child, and soon many more of +its+ deep !iological and

psychological traits. #s our future child an a!stract traitless su!ect whose welfare

we must promote !y choosing for +it+ the !est set of traits -he grammatically

neutral language used in the previous sentence attests to the perple2ity involved

in the very formulation of the uestion. =or we are used to making choices for

people only when we know who they are, that is, when they have identity.

#ntuition again might appeal for a more theoretical analysis of the criteria of

personal identity. "ut unlike the issue of a!ortion, much of which can !e decided

after the metaphysical uestion of the !eginning of life is settled, the genesis

pro!lem of what kind of person to create cannot !e similarly resolved. =or

whatever the criteria for personal identity and the !eginning of a person5s life are,

there always will remain the uestion how to decide on the creation of a person

of one kind 3identity4 rather than a person of another kind 3identity4. ?thical

principles do not serve us well in such cases, and the distur!ing meta*ethical

e2planation for this is that they fail not !ecause of any defect in themselves, !ut

rather !ecause of the nature of the cases to which they are !eing applied.

#f this conclusion is indeed true, no revision in ethical principles will suffice to

redirect our moral udgments on those unusual cases. /hat is reuired is aglo!al reconsideration of the limits of ethics in the light of the confusing

implications of traditional ethical principles and a readiness to reeducate our first

order moral intuitions so as to make them as coherent as possi!le.

Suing for "eing "orn


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hard to come !y. "oth legal e2perts and the general pu!lic are !affled !y the

parado2ical nature of these claims.

A few years ago a woman in #srael consulted a doctor a!out the potential danger

of the transmission of a serious genetic disease 3known to e2ist in her family4 to

her future offspring. Her intention was not to conceive if there indeed was such a

danger. -he doctor, allegedly out of negligence, concluded after e2amination that

there was no room for concern. 0elying on the doctor5s opinion, the woman

conceived and gave !irth to a !oy afflicted with the genetic disease, with its

grave physical and psychological implications 3a short life and one of very low

uality4.

-he parents, !oth in their own name and in the name of the child, sued the

doctor for damages. -he district court recogni1ed the parents5 standing !ut not

the child5s. -he doctor appealed to the Supreme Fourt of #srael against the first

decision, and the parents, in the name of their son, against the second. -he

Supreme Fourt unanimously overruled and reected the doctor5s appeal and in a

maority decision accepted the child5s appeal, granted him standing, and returned

the case to the district court to decide the su!stantive case on its merits 3i.e., todetermine the responsi!ility for negligence and the amount of damages to !e

paid if negligence is proved4.@$

Fases of this sort have persistently harassed the udiciary in the Cnited States for

over two decades. Fontrary to the #sraeli Supreme Fourt decision, the attempts

of plaintiffs to recover damages for wrongful life were mostly struck out !y the

courts in various states. However, the reading of those cases testifies to the

serious dilemmas and grave dou!ts with which the courts were faced. ;nly very

few cases were decided unanimously most of them were decided only after

appeal, and the udges5 opinions usually e2press hesitation and a wish to evade

the !asic issue of principle !y either devising a compromise solution or !y

deferring the matter to the legislature.@(

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# am presenting the case of wrongful life as a starring point and as a typical

e2ample of the comple2ity and perple2ity of genesis pro!lems on the intuitive

level 3as well, as we shall later see, on the theoretical one4, for three reasons.

=irst, it is a real*life case, it is morally distur!ing, and it can !y no means !e

dismissed as a philosophical Gedanken e2periment 3we shall have plenty of

those laterI4. Secondly, it is a conceptually pure case in the sense that it typically

involves a decision regarding a human !eing who !y no means and in no sense

yet e2ists, and whose identity is not !iologically or metaphysically given. -hirdly,

it illuminates the negative aspect of genesis pro!lems, as it highlights the alleged

constraints on reproductive !ehavior 3rather than the positive duty to procreate4.

As often in ethics, the analysis of prohi!itions furnishes !etter insights into the

nature of o!ligations.

#f we wish to consider wrongful life cases as pure e2amples of genesis pro!lems,

we should note the difference !etween three similar categories 3often confused in

court discussions4: the neonatal, the prenatal, and the preconceptive.


31/85

cases does the claim refer to negligence that led to the very conception of the

child and eventually to its !irth, like the wrong genetic counseling in the #sraeli

case.@9

#n the prenatal case we have a human fetus, whose actual life is at stake. ;ne

can say that fetuses are full human !eings whose life must not !e taken for any

reason or one can hold that the life of a fetus is not thus protected and can !e

taken for the sake of avoiding the !irth of a misera!le human !eing. "ut even if

we adopt the second approach, the fetus is an identifia!le entity that can !e

characteri1ed as that human entity gradually developing into a full person. -hus,

a child !orn deaf due to the failure of a doctor to warn a ru!ella afflicted pregnant

mother 3as in Gleitman v. Fosgrave 4 can !e seen as making a retroactive claim

for the right to euthanasia. -he history of American udicial reasoning in wrongful

life cases was therefore much influenced !y the 0oe v. /ade a!ortion case,

which allowed a!ortions for reasons referred to in wrongful life cases. ;nce

a!ortions are legal the road is !locked to claims of the sanctity of life of the fetus

and the a!solute prohi!ition on taking it.@E However, in the preconceptive case,

like the #sraeli one, the counterfactual event of the doctor giving the parents the

right medical advice does not refer to any particular individual whose life could !emercifully spared. /e are primarily interested in the wrongful conception of this

sort as a pure illustration of genesis pro!lems that do not depend on the a!ortion

issue and which are particularly difficult !ecause of the identity pro!lem.@%

-hese three categories differ from a fourth one: harm done to individuals whose

coming into e2istence is completely independent of the harm or the wrongful act.

-hus, the courts have no analytical pro!lem in determining damages for victims

of the thalidomide pill or laying responsi!ility on a company manufacturing !a!y

food that may poison a child not yet conceived at the time the food is canned.

-he fact that the individual cannot !e identified at the time the alleged negligent

or wrongful act is taking place does not pose any special conceptual pro!lem, as

long as the coming into !eing of that individual is itself independent of the

()


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wrongful act. -he confusion created !y wrongful life cases arises precisely from

the fact that the wrongful act is the direct cause of the plaintiff5s e2istence.@8

A 0ight ot to !e "orn Bersus a 0ight to !e "orn Healthy

-he pu11ling effect of wrongful life claims arises o!viously from the fact that had

the doctor !een professionally competent and responsi!le, the child would never

have !een !orn at all. -his makes them uniue in tort law, for the only alternative

to the actual state 3handicapped life, or !irth with a serious illness4 is no life at all.

And as it !elongs to the conte2t of tort, it is worth noting that

tort damages serve to compensate a plaintiff for inury caused !y a defendant5s

negligent conduct and are awarded to the e2tent that a plaintiff can !e restored to

the position he would have occupied had the tort not occurred. 3-urpin v. Sortini ,

)$'4

-ort is universally defined as some sort of worsening in the condition of a person

3damages !eing an attempt to compensate for e2actly that difference !etween

the person5s condition !efore the harm was done and that following it4. "ut in our

case, the only condition that can !e the su!ect of such a comparison and a pointof reference for the assessment of appropriate compensation is none2istence.

Does such a comparison make sense #s there any value to none2istence 3even

a negative one4 which could serve as a !asis for the claim that !y !eing !orn one

was suffering a harm 3a worsening of one5s condition4 Surprisingly, the courts,

which have always !een sensitive to this pro!lem of compara!ility, have regularly

!rushed aside the uestion as transcending the sphere of legal discourse.

Discussing it has !een considered as a retreat +into the meditation on the

mysteries of life+ 3Furlender v. "io*Science La!oratories 4, unnecessarily

indulging in an +inscruta!le enigmatic issue+ 3-urpin v. Sortini 4, or entering into

the metaphysical and theological uestions of the meaning of death, the nature

of none2istence, and the mysteries of creation +more properly left to the

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philosophers and theologians+ 3Neitsov v. Jat1 4. #n one of the rare ?nglish

wrongful life cases udge Stephenson says that +man, who knows nothing of

death or nothingness, cannot possi!ly know whether that is so,+ that is, that it

would have !een !etter off for the child not to have !een !orn at all 37)94. And another udge in

the same case speaks a!out +the undiscovered country from whose !ourn no

traveller returns.+ -he general inclination of the courts has !een to avoid these

issues, !ecause they are assumed to pertain to a sphere of knowledge to which

lawyers, udges, and may!e all human !eings 3philosophers e2ceptedI4 have no

access.

/hat is surprising here is not the systematic avoidance of making such

comparisons of defective life with nonlife, !ut rather the reasoning !ehind it.

one2istence is not an unfamiliar or mysterious form of e2istence that we cannot

compare to e2istence !ecause of the lack of epistemic tools. /e do not

understand +the unknown,+ or +the 5essence5 of non*e2istence+ 3Neitsov v. Jat1 4

simply !ecause there is nothing to understand.


34/85

for anyone, would this !oy have !een !etter off Similarly, is !eing !orn an inury

or harm in his case

-he American courts refer more than once to the nonsymmetry !etween the so*

called +wrongful death+ cases 3as old as mid*nineteenth century4 and the new

wrongful life cases. #n more philosophical terms we can say that at least from the

ethical and legal points of view there is a marked difference !etween

preconceptive none2istence and postmortem none2istence. ?ven if Lucretius is

wrong in his attempt to alleviate our fears of death !y saying that when we are

alive death is not with us and when we are dead we are not there to suffer it, a

stoic attitude to the counterfactual possi!ility of not !eing !orn at all is logically

reuired for only death can !e attri!uted as a loss to a person>not the state of

never !eing conceived.@' -he !enefits of suicide or euthanasia are highly

controversial, !ut unlike nonconception they are logically attri!uta!le to a su!ect.

However, an opposite approach to the matter has !een simultaneously

e2pressed !y the courts, usually !y the dissenting minority view. ;ne might say

that !eing !orn with a congenital defect is worse than !eing !orn without it, and

that that difference should serve as the guiding principle in determining theamount of damages owed to the child.@7 #n other words, the uestion should not

!e whether there is a right to !e !orn, !ut whether there is a right to !e !orn in a

healthy condition. #f this latter right is violated, the inured party can claim

compensation for the difference !etween healthy and defective life. -his intuitive

way of viewing the case is !ased on the very appealing idea that there is a

certain minimum or cutoff line that makes life worth living, and that !ringing a

child into the world without guaranteeing this minimum is morally wrong and a

legitimate !asis for compensation.

-hus, we find in the #sraeli case 3Neitsov v. Jat1 4 the typical de!ate !etween

these two conflicting opinions, leading in effect to the mutual invalidation of the

ultimate conclusion 3shared !y !oth 4 to grant the child legal standing. udge

(9


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"arak tries to avoid the a!surdity of comparing life with nonlife and that of

recogni1ing a right not to !e !orn !y treating healthy life as the alternative to the

child5s present situation. "ut to his colleague this does not seem to !e the real

alternative it is only a hypothetical or fictitious one, since this child !y definition

could not have had a healthy life. #f the child wants to sue the doctor for tort he

must present the court with a real alternative in which he would allegedly have

!een !etter off. -his alternative is, as udge "en*6orat claims, none2istence. "ut

in that case, although the real alternative has !een identified, no comparison with

the present situation can !e made !ecause life and nonlife are

incommensura!le, and even if they were commensurate the child could only

prefer his own death 3!y suicide or euthanasia4 to his misera!le life, !ut not +his+

nonconception.

So it seems that the mutual critiues of !oth udges are ustified: no healthy

e2istence of the child can !e envisaged, as his disease is essential to his identity

and no comparison !etween life and nonlife can !e logically ustified, !ecause it

is not clear whether there is anything to compare with e2istence. -herefore, !oth

these lines of argument succeed in undermining their respective alternative view,

thus also undermining the logical !asis for the recognition of a legal standing forthe child. -here is neither a right not to !e !orn nor a +fundamental right . . . to !e

!orn as a whole, functional human !eing+ 3"ecker v. Schwart1 4. 6ut in another

way: !irth in handicap is in wrongful life cases necessary , and hence not a

su!ect for complaint 3the child could not have !een !orn healthy4 !irth as such

is not necessary 3we can imagine the child not !eing !orn at all4 !ut then !eing

!orn is not the su!ect of complaint, only !eing !orn in handicap . Hence, the

distinction !etween the two descriptions of the same event cannot serve as the

!asis for wrongful life suits.

Still, it is hardly surprising that the courts have not !een willing to !e led !y this

purely a!stract reasoning into depriving misera!le children of the right to recover

damages for their handicapped lives !rought a!out !y a negligent party. Despite

(E


36/85

the logical oddity of it, some udges try to attach value to none2istence. #n cases

of particularly severe handicap none2istence can !e said to !e superior to life.

-his argument, which since the complaint of o! sounds intuitively plausi!le,

might rest on a logically sound !asis as long as one is willing to commit oneself

to a certain metaphysic. -he metaphysical assumption relates to the ontological

status of human !eings !efore !irth or conception. #t may !e tempting in genesis

conte2ts to view the prenatal stage as an ante*world , a corridor leading to this

world. "ut once we allow such fantasies to play a role in our reasoning, the

uestion is raised whether there are moral principles governing the passage

!etween this ante*world and the actual world. #n some cases one might think that

it is the duty 3of a doctor or a parent4 !lock this passage, in other cases that it

would !e a duty to grant those waiting in that lim!o*like state the privilege of

entering the world.@)

An e2ample of such an ontology can !e found in the story of Amram,


37/85

-hey clearly viewed parenting a sick child as inferior !oth to parenting a healthy

child and to remaining childless 3or adopting a child4. -hese three conditions can

!e unam!iguously attri!uted to them and compared !y them. -he child, however,

could not point to similar comparisons of welfare, first since his very e2istence as

a comparing su!ect was owed to the alleged harmful act, and secondly the

comparison itself was du!ious. evertheless, we might feel that this logical

distinction !etween the case of the parents and that of the child is morally

irrelevant: the case of the child rests on the !adness of the state of affairs

!rought a!out !y the doctor. ?ven if the child cannot claim that he would have

!een !etter off not !eing !orn, that does not mean that now, having as a matter

of fact !een !orn with a defect 3a state caused !y negligent counseling4, he

deserves no compensation. ?ven if we cannot claim damages for having !een

!orn, we can claim damages for defects with which we were !orn.

Legal 6olicy and -he Suspension of Logic

Some udges have !een willing to concede that although +a cause of action for

5wrongful life5 could not !e stated+ 3-urpin v. Sortini 4, and that there is +no way of

showing that the 5interests5 of the infant suffered+ 3!eing !orn with Down5s

syndrome as in "ecker v. Schwart1 4, considerations of social policy ustify adecision even if it runs contrary to strict logical reasoning. -he courts often refer

to the need to lay responsi!ility on negligent doctors and to the pro!lem of

guaranteeing sufficient funds for the maintenance of a severely impaired life.@)$

"ut social policy reasoning appears to !e dou!le edged on this matter, as udges

are eually aware of the danger of allowing such claims to stand in court. =or

e2ample, what would !e considered the limits of ustifia!le claims /ould we

allow children to sue their parents for having !een !orn illegitimate 3as in Stills v.

Gratton 4 underweight !ecause of the mother5s smoking while pregnant with a

low #.O. into a polluted world infested with war and insecurity in )79E rather

than in )7EE

(8


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doctors found guilty of creating those !urdens to society. "ut they can hardly

amend tort law so as to accommodate wrongful life cases. #n other words, they

cannot view logical considerations and those of social policy as alternative

grounds for decision, as the former condition the latter. -he willingness to

suspend +considerations of logic+ may remind lawyers of udicial solutions !y way

of legal fiction . et, it is interesting that none of the courts discussed a!ove

directly resorted to this means, perhaps !ecause the healthy e2istence of the

plaintiff was not only an empirical falsity !ut also a logical or metaphysical

impossi!ility, that is, it could not even !e imagined .@)9

6hilosophical Significance of /rongful Life Fases

/e may go a step !eyond the history of actual wrongful life cases and predict

claims for damages that have not yet arisen. So far, children have tried to recover

damages for having !een !orn 3claiming that they would have !een !etter off

a!orted or not conceived4. "ut children might eually try to claim damages for

having !een !orn P rather than , especially as medical technology ena!les

human control of the determination of the new!orns5 identity. #magine a situation

in which the genetic counselor in the #sraeli case with which we !egan suggested

a treatment that would have guaranteed the conception of a healthy child, !utonly !y changing its se2. /ould a child !orn handicapped due to negligence in

this case !e entitled to damages for not !eing !orn healthy though of the other

se2 ;ur intuitions are not clear on these matters that involve identity rather than

e2istence. /e shall however see in part $ why the same o!ections to granting

the child legal standing would apply in this case. Here, on the level of first*order

moral intuition, we can only point out the slippery slope leading from the right to

!e !orn without defect to the general right we all have to !e !orn !etter than we

actually are>!etter in genetic makeup, in citi1enship, in position in time, in racial

or religious identity, even with !etter parentsI

6hilosophers too have grappled with the validity of wrongful life claims.


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harmed, and therefore that they cannot !e compensated for !eing !orn, even

when !orn defective due to negligence. -he unconceived lack identity and the

harm principle cannot !e applied to victimless crimes. However, "ayles attri!utes

the lack of identity of the unconceived to the fact that it is impossi!le to identify

an individual !y way of a definite description 3as suggested !y Hare4, such as

+the person who will !e !orn if these two people start their coitus in precisely five

minutes+ 3"ayles )78%, $774. However, it seems that the pro!lem is even deeper

than that descri!ed !y "ayles: again it is logical rather than epistemological and

has to do with the fact that the identity of an individual in genesis pro!lems is not

only !eyond human knowledge , !ut also a!solutely dependent on human choice

.

"ayles suggests a positive solution to wrongful life cases in terms that lie !eyond

the 3inapplica!le4 harm principle. #t treats classes of people rather than

unidentifia!le individuals. -he law would !e used as an instrument for the

prevention of the !irth of defective children as a group. However, if such a law

cannot !e ustified in terms of the welfare or rights of future individuals, what is its

!asis #s it our rights>as individuals>or is it an impersonal notion of a !etter

world -his underlying philosophical pro!lem does not concern "ayles, !ut it ise2actly the one we have to address in order !etter to articulate and theoretically

support our intuitive positions on genesis pro!lems.

/rongful life cases are particularly illuminating for genethics, !ecause of their

conceptual purity. -hey consist of all the elements of a wrong calling for

compensation: negligence 3an agent responsi!le for a relevant act4, a !ad state

of affairs or event in the world 3a child !orn with a serious defect4, and a causal

link !etween the act and the state of affairs 3causally relating the latter to the

former4. et they seem to escape legal udgment !ecause they do not meet

certain preconditions of e2istence and identity. ;n the one hand, how can we

dou!t the moral wrongness of the act, the moral responsi!ility of the agent, the

ustified complaint of the victim ;n the other hand, how can we !lame anyone

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for having !rought a!out a state of affairs 3vi1., !eing !orn in handicap4 that !y

no means can !e held !ad for the su!ect involved /rongful life acts are at

most victimless crimes. And in that respect, even if we cannot, for logical

reasons, grant legal standing to the child in its claim for compensation, should

not the negligent doctor !e held responsi!le for the wrong and !e lia!le to

3criminal4 punishment 6utting aside the parents5 claim, a wrong was done in the

world even if no individual can !e identified as its victim.

-he courts have !een !affled !y these conflicting moral intuitions, and in their

wavering !etween different and sometimes opposite ways of solving them they

reflect the hesitation we all share in our general moral udgments of similar

genesis pro!lems. -he intricately rounda!out argumentation, the use of

am!iguous language, the persistent attempt to avoid metaphysics together with

an inevita!le involvement in metaphysical 3or even mystical4 rhetoric, the tension

!etween the legal restrictions on ustifia!le claims for tort and the moral

sensitivity to the plight of a defective child, the courageous attempt to suare

logic and social policy>all characteri1e the intellectually insecure response

elicited !y these unprecedented wrongful life claims. -his is precisely what

makes these cases so interesting as primary e2amples for the difficulty we facein general genethical pro!lems.

-here is however one principal limitation on the relevance of wrongful life cases

to our general philosophical discussion of genethics. /e noted earlier that the

comparison !etween life and none2istence is !locked !y two considerations: the

valuelessness of none2istence as such and the unattri!uta!ility of its alleged

value to individual su!ects. -he two considerations are intimately

interconnected: one of the reasons for denying value to the none2istence of

people is the very fact that it cannot !e attached to people. -his indeed will !e

the central thesis of the second part of this !ook. However, it is a su!stantive

ethical claim that is not analytically true, and one should !e cautioned not to

preudge the general genethical issue on the !asis of the intuitive response to

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wrongful life cases. -his however does not mean that wrongful life claims were

not ustifia!ly struck out !y most of the courts, for they are solely concerned with

tort and claims for damages, which are analytically a matter of attri!uta!ility to

individuals. #t remains to !e seen whether the incongruity of these attempted

claims can !e traced also in the wider impersonal realm of genesis pro!lems.@)E

-he point of this chapter was to emphasi1e the novelty of genesis pro!lems and

how this novelty undermines the attempt to get our intuitions on the matter clear.

;ur confusion is due to our wavering !etween a sense of high moral importance

on the one hand and of a shaky logical foundation on the other. -he case of

wrongful life is a maor real*life illustration of the uniueness of these pro!lems,

as is well captured !y udge Stephenson5s words:

Here the court is considering not +an ancient law+ !ut a novel cause of action, for

or against which there is no authority in any reported case in the courts of the

Cnited Jingdom or the Fommonwealth. . . . #t is tempting to say that the

uestion . . . is so important that it should !e argued out at a trial and on appeal

up to the House of Lords. "ut it may !ecome ust as plain and o!vious that the

novel cause of action is unargua!le or unsustaina!le . . . 3


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enhance overall happiness in the world are only two e2amples of the pitfalls

awaiting those who ignore the distinction !etween ethics and genethics. #n part $

we undertook the more positive task of supporting the argument !y suggesting

the generocentric framework for the solution of genesis uestions. -his

framework, even if proven theoretically cogent, was however shown to run the

risk of yielding some pu11ling, even em!arrassing, results. =or e2ample, it

cannot in principle rule out the willful conception of a defective child, or an

irresponsi!ly e2panding population policy leading to an +overcrowded,+ N*like

world nor can it prohi!it the engineering of +happy pigs+ as su!stitutes for human

!eings, or indeed the total e2tinction of the human race !y a voluntary act of

collective suicide.

#n the first section of chapter ( we suggested that a possi!le resolution of these

conflicts of intuitions regarding +futurity pro!lems+ could !e found either in a

revision of ethical theory which would make it applica!le to these pro!lems, or in

the redefinition of the !orderlines of

********************************************************************************

)79

ethics in a way that would leave these pro!lems outside the moral sphere

altogether. #n slightly different terms, the issue was, in what way is genethics part

of ethics and in what way does it lie !eyond it. -he generocentric approach

outlined in part $ showed precisely how decisions regarding the e2istence,

num!er, and identity of future people should either !e accounted for in moral

terms 3the interests, welfare, and rights of actual people4 or !e considered as

having no moral dimension 3potential people as well as +impersonal values+

having no moral status4. #n other words, to the e2tent that genesis choices affect

actual !eings, they should !e udged !y conventional moral principles !ut

inasmuch as they have no such effect, they should !e recogni1ed as lying

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!eyond the grip of moral udgment. -hus the meaningfulness and coherence of

the morality of procreation is saved !y limiting the scope of ethical theory.

#n this final part of the !ook we are concerned with two senses in which

genethics points at the limits of ethics. ;n the one hand there are deep empirical

conditions that serve as a natural constraining !ackground for any ethical theory.

-hey are +deep+ in the sense that we can hardly conceive of a world in which

they do not o!tain, and trying to apply moral concepts in such a world would

amount to a deviation from the common sense of these concepts in a way no

less radical than ascri!ing rights to rivers or duties to animals. ;n the other hand,

genethics is a uniue domain through which the limits of ethics can !e e2amined

from a metaphysical perspective for genethics deals with the very creation of the

conditions of ethics, namely human !eings. -he motives for such a creation are,

in this metaphysical sense, not merely empirical 3!iological or psychological4, !ut

also +proective+ in nature, e2pressing the uniuely human attempt at self*

transcendence, at esta!lishing the meaning of life in terms of the creation of

further life. -he present chapter discusses the empirical considerations that make

generocentrism look less threatening. -he ne2t chapter undertakes the

metaphysical investigation into the ultimate nature of genethics and themethodological implications regarding the limits of ethics. -he spirit of the

discussion of genesis issues in part $ was that of ethical skepticism. However,

this skepticism will !e shown in part ( to !e only of partial force: first !ecause

empirical considerations will show that most of our cherished intuitions can !e

+saved,+ and secondly !ecause this skepticism is well contained !y !eing

relegated e2clusively to the genethical realm 3with no implications for other

+standard+ ethical issues relating to actual human !eings4.

As we have noted in chapter (, the principled discussion of genethical issues

cannot !e dismissed as !eing +remote from reality+ or overly a!stract, since in its

very nature it consists of choices regarding the possi!le molding of radically

novel states of affairs. #n that respect, intuitions are less of a help in genesis

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pro!lems than in standard ethical issues. However, the ultimate choice !etween

a person*affecting view 3implying generocentrism4 and impersonalism 3granting

moral standing also to potential !eings4 depends partly on the overall intuitive

appeal of the respective views in their accounting for hard cases. #n that sense

6arfit is ustified in confronting the two competing views with their respective

repugnant conclusions 3such as the N*world for the impersonalist and the

deli!erate conception of a defective child for the person*affecting view4.

evertheless, although we insist on the generocentric theory as the only

consistent solution to the wide variety of genesis pro!lems, even if at times it

conflicts with our immediate moral responses, it is important to note that deep

empirical facts can remove the sting of repugnance from many of the

hypothetical counterintuitive conclusions of generocentrism. -hese facts cannot

indeed serve as an independent philosophical corro!oration of generocentrism,

!ut they may help in defusing the force of some of its unwelcome implications.

0ecall that the most direct insight into the uniue nature of genesis pro!lems was

gained through the ideali1ation of genesis choices in pure conte2ts, that is, where

the decision regarding the creation of human !eings, their num!er, and identity is

taken in a world in which there are no actual !eings. "ut the purity of the conte2tof choice should not !e taken as implying its ar!itrariness. /hen God creates


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#n impure conte2ts, however, there are many more constraints on genesis

choices. -he very e2istence of actual people other than the chooser introduces

two kinds of constraints: moral and empirical. #n the last section of chapter E we

e2amined the ethical comple2ity of distri!utive and coordinative considerations in

population policies. Here we are concerned with the empirical way in which the

fact that other people e2ist 3or will e2ist4 affects the formation of our genethical

preferences. ?thical considerations make it unust to e2isting people to add a

new person to an overcrowded community. ?mpirical considerations make it less

desira!le for the prospective parent to !ring a child into such a populous

environment.

?mpirical constraints in impure genesis conte2ts may !e either human or

environmental . -he human conditions in which reproductive choices are made

are either !iological or psychological 3see ne2t section4. -he environmental

conditions relate to the way in which the e2istence and welfare of human !eings

is dependent on environmental factors over which we do not have control 3see

last section of this chapter4. -his distinction is significant in a person*affecting

theory, for it will !e argued that the manipulation of those very empiricalconditions is morally constrained only in the case of the human conditions. -hat

is to say, we are morally restrained in manipulating the !iological and

psychological desires of actual adults in having children so as to achieve a

certain genethical outcome !ut we are morally free to change the natural

environmental conditions so as to free genesis choices from their restriction.

?mpirical conditions can limit procreative choices either !y affecting our power to

achieve desired genesis goals or !y influencing the will to achieve those goals.


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empirically unconstrained in the relevant manner. -hus, on the hori1ontal level, a

completely solitary creator 3God, a demiurgus, a 0o!inson Frusoe having the

tools for producing a clone of himself4 is e2empt from having to take into account

the rights and interests of his contemporaries this does not necessarily mean

that he can ignore the rights and interests of future generations 3since they might

!e +actual+4. ;n the vertical a2is, however, imagine again human !eings with all

their present traits, with ust one difference: immediately after procreating they

die. Generations succeed each other with no overlap>!oth in the individual and

the collective spheres. #n these circumstances it seems that the life of future

people would count less this again does not mean that the interests and rights of

the chooser5s contemporaries do not make a moral difference 3e.g., if such

!eelike procreation has a social cost4. /e may say that the Godlike and the

!eelike a!stractions serve to purify the genesis situation from those empirical

facts that o!fuscate analytical argument. "ut as we shall see in the following

sections, they can also !e used as reference points in relation to which the

deviation of real*life genesis circumstances accounts for many of our deeply held

intuitive !eliefs regarding procreation, demographic policies, and the identity

formation of human !eings.

Generational ;verlap and the Desire to have Fhildren

-he most general empirical constraint on genethical choices in impure conte2ts is

the e2istence of other actual !eings. -he o!vious and trivial nature of this

statement attests to the universality of the impact this fact has on the way we

deal with genesis issues. #f we stick to the person*affecting view of value, the

coming to life of humans can have value only if there is an actual !eing 3creator4

!ehind it for whom it is of value. -hus, the creation of humanity could !e given

a2iological meaning if God saw it as +very good,+ !ut it is value*neutral if human

!eings were as a matter of fact created !y a nonvolitional process like evolution,

or if they ust popped out into the world somehow. "ut, of course, the less

controversial fact is that in impure conte2ts of human procreation there are actual

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!eings 3other than an alleged creator4 whose interests and rights must !e taken

into account.

=irst, on the intragenerational level, it is a !iological fact that human procreation

takes two individuals. Fonseuently, procreative and educational decisions

usually involve more than one parent. Secondly, it is a social fact of human

e2istence that people live in societies or communities and that their very capacity

to !eget and raise children reuires the support of a social 3and economic4

system. ?ven if the motive to have children is !asically !iological in nature, their

num!er and more so their identity are decided in the

david heyd - genethics

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